* feat(coordinator): phase 7 — governance + skill metadata + cross-cutting invariants
Combines three stacked sub-PRs into a single coordinator phase-7
shipment against the phase-7 plan doc. The sub-PR structure (0 / A /
B) preserved on individual branches for reviewer drill-down; this
branch is the one reviewers should merge.
## Sub-PR 0 — service-auth boundary invariants
Shared helpers and contracts that lock the console ↔ node service-auth
boundary so later authz surfaces use them by construction.
- ``_effective_user_filter(request)`` in both ``turnstone.console.server``
and ``turnstone.server`` with a shared ``DENY_EMPTY_SUB`` sentinel
on ``turnstone.core.auth``. Three-way return — admin/service
bypass, scoped caller uid, or fail-closed sentinel on blank sub.
Four callsite migrations (``_coordinator_rows``,
``coordinator_children``, ``coordinator_metrics``,
``cluster_ws_live_bulk``).
- ``StorageBackend`` class docstring codifies the tenancy contract
(every list/count/aggregate method must accept ``user_id: str |
None = None`` and push ``WHERE user_id = :user_id`` into SQL) and
the ``_mapping`` row-access contract. New
``turnstone.testing.row_contract`` ships ``assert_row_like()``.
- ``_verify_collector_service_scope`` probes an upstream node at boot
with ``expected_node_id=_scope-probe_``; a 409 proves the scope
gate was passed, a 403/401 sets ``collector_scope_error`` and
causes ``cluster_snapshot`` / ``cluster_events_sse`` to return 503
with a remediation hint. Probe URL allowlist rejects non-http(s)
schemes and 169.254.0.0/16 hosts.
- 4xx log-level floor on ``_NodeDashboardCache.get``,
``_fetch_live_block``, and ``_proxy_sse`` — dotted-hierarchy
prefixes with bounded body previews. ``_bounded_body_preview`` and
``_bounded_stream_preview`` strip control chars.
## Sub-PR A — coordinator governance core
Mid-session governance surface for coordinator workstreams.
- **Trusted-session mode.** New ``coordinator.trust.send``
permission (migration 042). ``ChatSession.set_trust_send`` /
``revoke_tools`` methods with a ``_governance_lock``. ``POST
/v1/api/coordinator/{ws_id}/trust {send: bool}`` double-gated on
``admin.coordinator`` AND ``coordinator.trust.send`` with
``allow_service_bypass=False`` so service tokens can't escalate.
``_prepare_send_to_workstream`` auto-approves sends whose target is
in the coordinator's own subtree; foreign ws_ids still require
approval. ``_is_own_subtree`` checks both ``parent_ws_id`` AND
``user_id`` to defend against cross-tenant row corruption.
- **Audit-layer credential redaction.** ``record_audit`` walks
``detail`` (dicts, lists, tuples, sets, frozensets; keys too)
and routes every string through ``redact_credentials`` + a C0
control-char scrub. New kw-only ``raw_detail=True`` opt-out.
``_has_any_string`` fast-path. Audit action registry extended
with the four new governance sub-prefixes.
- **Mid-session revocation + cascading stop.** ``POST
/v1/api/coordinator/{ws_id}/restrict {revoke: [...]}`` caps 256
entries / 128 chars; ``_prepare_tool`` short-circuits with a
tool-error. ``POST /v1/api/coordinator/{ws_id}/stop_cascade``
cancels the coord's in-flight generation then dispatches
``cancel_workstream`` for every direct child in parallel via
``asyncio.gather`` bounded by ``Semaphore(16)``. Per-child
outcomes split into ``cancelled`` / ``failed`` / ``skipped``
(404 = already-gone rather than dispatch-broken). Both endpoints
apply ``allow_service_bypass=False`` on the admin gate.
- **Shared plumbing.** ``_resolve_coord_session`` helper collapses
the handler prelude three endpoints shared. ``_emit_coord_audit``
wraps ``record_audit`` in a dedicated ``ThreadPoolExecutor``
(``app.state.audit_executor``) so audit bursts don't starve cancel
dispatches. ``_require_json_object`` guards body parsing so non-
object JSON returns 400 instead of 500.
## Sub-PR B — skill metadata governance
- **Description validator (migration 043).** ``prompt_templates``
rows now require a non-empty ``description``. Existing empty rows
get backfilled with a ``"Skill: <name>"`` placeholder on upgrade.
The installer (``admin_skill_discover``) and MCP prompt sync both
synthesise a placeholder when the upstream description is blank
so non-admin write paths satisfy the invariant.
- **Skill kind classifier (migration 044).** New
``prompt_templates.kind`` column (``interactive`` / ``coordinator``
/ ``any``; defaults to ``any``). New
``turnstone.core.skill_kind.SkillKind`` StrEnum is the single
source of truth; Pydantic schemas type ``kind`` as ``SkillKind``
(OpenAPI advertises the enum) and the handler validator catches
the ValueError. ``list_skills_filtered`` gains a
``kinds: list[str] | None = None`` SQL filter.
``CoordinatorClient.list_skills`` defaults to
``kinds=["coordinator", "any"]`` so interactive-only skills are
hidden from the orchestrator.
- **``scan_status`` → ``risk_level`` rename (migration 045).**
Lossless column rename to align with ``IntentVerdict.risk_level``
terminology. Swept storage (both backends + schema + protocol),
handlers, API schemas, tool JSON, generated OpenAPI specs,
TypeScript SDK types, frontend (``governance.js``), tests, and
English prose in ``docs/judge.md`` + ``docs/tools.md``. The
user-facing on-load warning now reads ``has risk level:
{risk_tier}``. Tool JSON's ``risk_level`` enum corrected to the
scanner's actual taxonomy (``safe / low / medium / high /
critical``; was the never-shipped ``clean / flagged / unscanned /
pending``). Historical migration 021 left untouched.
## Migrations
042 (``coordinator.trust.send`` perm — PR A)
043 (description backfill — PR B)
044 (``kind`` column add — PR B)
045 (``scan_status`` → ``risk_level`` rename — PR B)
All four use position-anchored permission strings / host-side
parse-filter-rejoin on downgrade where SQL ``REPLACE`` could
corrupt prefix-overlapping values.
## Verification
- ``ruff check turnstone tests`` clean.
- ``mypy turnstone`` clean on 165 source files.
- ``pytest -m "not live"``: 4431 passed (+85 over the phase-6
baseline). Includes +32 tests in ``tests/test_service_auth_boundary.py``
and +38 in ``tests/test_coordinator_governance.py``; shared fixtures
extracted to ``tests/_coord_test_helpers.py``.
- Generated OpenAPI JSON (``sdk/typescript/openapi-{console,server}.json``)
regenerated via ``sdk/typescript/scripts/generate-types.py``; zero
``scan_status`` occurrences remaining outside the historical
migration 021 and the rename migration 045.
## Security reviews
Both reviews flagged by the phase-7 plan (items 1 + 5, plus 0a's
refuse-to-serve gate) ran through the multi-stage ``/review``
pipeline twice per sub-PR; all confirmed findings landed in-branch.
* fixup(phase-7): CI lint + PR #383 review fixups
Addresses the lint CI failure (ruff format) plus 12 findings from the
two automated PR reviewers.
Copilot:
- ``_sqlite.list_installed_skill_urls`` / ``_postgresql.list_installed_skill_urls``
used positional row indexing (``r[0]``/``r[1]``/``r[2]``) while this
same PR's ``StorageBackend`` class docstring forbids it. Switched
both to ``r._mapping["..."]`` access.
- ``list_skills.json`` previously advertised ``risk_level=""`` as a
filter for unscanned skills, but the implementation treats empty
strings as "no filter". Clarified the tool description to say
omit the filter entirely to include unscanned rows, and added an
explicit ``enum`` on the parameter restricting it to the scanner
tiers. ``_prepare_list_skills`` keeps the ``strip() or None``
normalisation — unscanned filtering now has an unambiguous contract.
- ``test_storage_skills_filtered.test_risk_level_filter`` used the
legacy ``clean`` / ``flagged`` values from the pre-rename column.
Rewritten with the scanner's actual taxonomy (``safe`` / ``high``).
github-code-quality (CodeQL):
- ``test_deny_sentinel_is_singleton`` previously asserted
``cs.DENY_EMPTY_SUB is cs.DENY_EMPTY_SUB`` — an identical-expression
comparison. Rewritten as two separate ``from ... import ... as`` aliases
(``FIRST_READ`` / ``SECOND_READ``) so the identity check is between
distinct bindings.
- ``test_restrict_empty_revoke_is_noop_but_audits`` unpacked ``state``
without using it. Renamed to ``_state``.
- Mixed import styles in ``test_service_auth_boundary.py`` — the
file previously used both ``import turnstone.console.server as cs``
and ``from turnstone.console.server import ...`` for the same
module (same story for ``turnstone.core.auth`` and
``turnstone.server``). Consolidated to the ``from X import Y`` style
used elsewhere in the file; the ``_fetch_live_block`` test now
patches via pytest's ``monkeypatch`` fixture instead of a manual
rebind through a module alias.
CI:
- ``ruff format`` reformatted one line in
``tests/test_coordinator_endpoints.py``.
Verification: ruff check + mypy clean (166 files); 4459 non-live
pytest pass.
* fix(tests): swap asyncio marker for anyio in service-auth boundary tests
PR #383 CI caught that the 13 ``@pytest.mark.asyncio`` decorators I
added in ``test_service_auth_boundary.py`` are an off-convention
choice — the rest of the repo uses ``@pytest.mark.anyio`` (148 sites
vs my 13). The CI environment pulls in ``anyio`` but not
``pytest-asyncio``, so every async test in this one file was failing
with "async def functions are not natively supported". It passed
locally by accident — my dev venv happens to have pytest-asyncio
installed ambiently.
Swapped all 13 marker sites to ``@pytest.mark.anyio``. No functional
change; the tests run under the same default asyncio backend anyio
provides.
Verification: ruff + mypy clean (166 files); 4459 non-live pytest
pass.
Turnstone
Multi-node AI orchestration platform. Deploy tool-using AI agents across a cluster of servers with direct HTTP routing, interactive interfaces, and enterprise governance.
Named after the Ruddy Turnstone (Arenaria interpres) — a shorebird that flips stones to discover what's hiding underneath.
Release Tracks
| Track | Install | Docker | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable | pip install turnstone |
ghcr.io/turnstonelabs/turnstone:stable |
Production-grade. Bugfixes only. |
| Experimental | pip install turnstone --pre |
ghcr.io/turnstonelabs/turnstone:experimental |
New features. May have rough edges. |
See docs/releasing.md for the full release process.
What it does
Turnstone gives LLMs tools — shell, files, search, web, planning — and orchestrates multi-turn conversations where the model investigates, acts, and reports.
- Interactive sessions — terminal CLI or browser UI with parallel workstreams
- Cluster dashboard — real-time view of all nodes and workstreams with console routing proxy
- Intent validation — LLM judge evaluates every tool call with risk assessments and evidence
- Governance — RBAC, OIDC SSO, tool policies, skills, usage tracking, audit logs
- Multi-provider — OpenAI-compatible APIs (vLLM, llama.cpp, NIM), Anthropic Messages API, and Google Gemini
- MCP support — external tool servers with native deferred loading (Anthropic/OpenAI) or BM25 fallback
Quickstart
pip install turnstone
# Terminal REPL
turnstone --base-url http://localhost:8000/v1
# Browser UI
turnstone-server --port 8080 --base-url http://localhost:8000/v1
# Cluster dashboard
pip install turnstone[console]
turnstone-console --port 8090
For PostgreSQL (recommended for production):
pip install turnstone[postgres]
export TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND=postgresql
export TURNSTONE_DB_URL="postgresql+psycopg://user:pass@localhost:5432/turnstone"
turnstone-server --port 8080 --base-url http://localhost:8000/v1
Docker
cp .env.example .env # edit LLM_BASE_URL, OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.
docker compose --profile production up
See QUICKSTART.md for the bootstrap wizard and docs/docker.md for Docker configuration and profiles.
Programmatic (SDK)
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneServer
with TurnstoneServer("http://localhost:8080", token="tok_xxx") as client:
ws = client.create_workstream(name="demo")
result = client.send_and_wait("Analyze the error logs", ws.ws_id, auto_approve=True)
print(result.content)
Tools
Built-in tools for shell, files, search, web, memory, notifications, and autonomous sub-agents — plus external tools via MCP with native deferred loading. See docs/tools.md for the full reference and docs/mcp-registry.md for MCP configuration.
Architecture
Single-node: Client → Server (direct HTTP + SSE). No external dependencies beyond the database.
Multi-node: Client → Console (hash ring routing proxy) → Server nodes. The console maintains a 65536-entry bucket cache for O(1) workstream routing. A rebalancer daemon redistributes buckets when nodes join or leave.
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
turnstone |
Terminal CLI (REPL) |
turnstone-server |
Web UI + REST API + SSE events |
turnstone-console |
Cluster dashboard + routing proxy + admin panel |
turnstone-channel |
Channel gateway (Discord and Slack adapters) |
turnstone-admin |
User/token management CLI |
turnstone-eval |
Eval harness for prompt/tool optimization |
turnstone-bootstrap |
LLM-guided setup wizard |
Diagrams
UML diagrams in docs/diagrams/:
| Diagram | Description |
|---|---|
| System Context | Components and external dependencies |
| Package Structure | Python modules and dependency graph |
| Core Engine | SessionUI, ChatSession, LLMProvider |
| Conversation Turn | Message lifecycle through the engine |
| Tool Pipeline | Prepare / approve / execute |
| Workstream States | State machine transitions |
| Console Data Flow | Dashboard data collection |
| Deployment | Docker Compose topology |
| Auth | JWT, scopes, login flows |
| Channels | Discord / Slack adapters + routing |
| Judge | Intent validation pipeline |
| OIDC | SSO authorization code flow |
Documentation
| Topic | Link |
|---|---|
| Configuration reference | docs/settings.md |
| API reference | docs/api-reference.md |
| Docker deployment | docs/docker.md |
| Intent validation (judge) | docs/judge.md |
| Governance & RBAC | docs/governance.md |
| OIDC SSO | docs/oidc.md |
| TLS / mTLS | docs/tls.md |
| Channel integrations | docs/channels.md |
| Console dashboard | docs/console.md |
| Eval harness | docs/eval.md |
| Tools reference | docs/tools.md |
| MCP integration | docs/mcp-registry.md |
Requirements
- Python 3.11+
- An OpenAI-compatible API endpoint, Anthropic API key, or Google Gemini API key
- Optional: PostgreSQL (
pip install turnstone[postgres]), Anthropic (pip install turnstone[anthropic]) - Git LFS for cloning (diagram PNGs)
License
Business Source License 1.1 — free for all use except hosting as a managed service. Converts to Apache 2.0 on 2030-03-01.
