chore: bump version to 1.5.9

fix: apply repair=False to all display-read load_messages call sites
chore: bump version to 1.5.8
2026-08-13 23:42:25 -06:00 · 2026-05-07 22:56:06 -07:00 · 2026-05-07 22:48:13 -07:00 · 2026-05-07 17:36:12 -07:00 · 2026-05-07 17:35:23 -07:00 · 2026-05-07 17:35:23 -07:00
124 changed files with 38291 additions and 2311 deletions
@@ -546,11 +546,9 @@ adds, removes, or reconnects servers as needed.
 6. `_exec_mcp_tool()` calls `call_tool_sync()` which dispatches to the async loop
   via `asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe()`

-**Tool refresh:** Three mechanisms keep tools up-to-date without restart:
+**Tool refresh:** Two mechanisms keep tools up-to-date without restart:
 - **Push:** Servers declaring `tools.listChanged` send `ToolListChangedNotification`;
  the registered `message_handler` triggers immediate single-server refresh.
- **Periodic:** Servers without push support are polled on a staggered interval
-  (default 4 h, configurable via `[mcp] refresh_interval` or `--mcp-refresh-interval`).
 - **Manual:** `/mcp refresh [server]` calls `refresh_sync()` for on-demand refresh
  (also attempts reconnection for disconnected servers).

@@ -572,10 +570,11 @@ from a healthy connection do not trip the breaker. When the cooldown expires
 (`call_tool_sync`, `read_resource_sync`, `get_prompt_sync`, `refresh_sync`)
 cancel orphaned futures on timeout to prevent coroutine accumulation on the
 background event loop. Push notification refreshes are debounced (5 s per
-server) to protect against notification storms. The periodic refresh loop
-attempts reconnection for disconnected servers with exponential backoff
-(60 s–1 h). Transport stream references are pre-closed before stack teardown to
-work around the MCP SDK's anyio cancel-scope CPU busy-loop (SDK #2147).
+server) to protect against notification storms. Operators can force a
+catalog refresh or full reconnect from the admin panel; reconnects clear
+the circuit breaker and run a fresh handshake. Transport stream references
+are pre-closed before stack teardown to work around the MCP SDK's anyio
+cancel-scope CPU busy-loop (SDK #2147).

 **Error isolation:** Per-server connection/refresh failures are caught and logged; other
 servers are unaffected. Tool execution errors return error strings to the LLM
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ package "turnstone/core/" <<Rectangle>> {
    component [auth.py\nAuthentication] as auth <<core>>
    component [healthcheck.py\nBackendHealthMonitor] as healthcheck <<core>>
    component [ratelimit.py\nRateLimiter] as ratelimit <<core>>
-    component [mcp_client.py\nMCPClientManager\n(push + periodic refresh)] as mcp <<core>>
+    component [mcp_client.py\nMCPClientManager\n(push + manual refresh)] as mcp <<core>>
    component [tool_search.py\nToolSearchManager, BM25] as toolsearch <<core>>
    component [model_registry.py\nModelRegistry] as registry <<core>>
 }
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ class "MCPClientManager" as MCPMgr {
    Background asyncio event loop
    bridges async MCP SDK to
    sync ChatSession dispatch.
-    Push + periodic + manual refresh.
+    Push + manual refresh.
    Resources + prompts discovered
    alongside tools at startup.
    --
@@ -190,21 +190,25 @@ group Push Notifications (debounced 5s per server)
  MCPMgr -> Storage : sync_prompts_to_storage()
 end

-group Periodic Polling (default 4h)
-  MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : _periodic_refresh()
+group Manual Refresh
+  Session -> MCPMgr : refresh_sync()
  note right
-    Only polls capabilities
-    without push support.
-    Staggered per-server.
-    Disconnected servers get
-    reconnect attempts with
-    exponential backoff (60s-1h).
+    /mcp refresh [server] —
+    re-fetches catalog and
+    attempts reconnect for
+    disconnected servers.
  end note
 end

-group Manual Refresh
-  Session -> MCPMgr : refresh_sync()
-  note right: /mcp refresh [server]
+group Manual Reconnect
+  Session -> MCPMgr : reconnect_sync(name)
+  note right
+    Operator-driven via the
+    console admin panel —
+    tears down session, clears
+    circuit breaker, runs a
+    fresh handshake.
+  end note
 end

 == Policy Evaluation ==
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:a3b5c59403a6febd81667fc8fd2a7d22bc59da6130eba0dea5449c42668d0ede
-size 387044
+oid sha256:95dd5ebc899a1261d516686a5aa3319a7f45015d411302825fa28afbfc82e1ce
+size 326766
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:474b900448ec04d1117b48a2b55614524721b2f04ac4bda66170bd0a06aae0f2
-size 624573
+oid sha256:25b5448bbb7da8ddafe4f65c6c5e6cbcaa9cb9f31746ca46d3a2241bc47b1956
+size 259687
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:7623df33be9baf7647ca1c2450640df57e1cd73e8be1f8168aae16e546ad683c
-size 459941
+oid sha256:d6aff446a062aa08f316985d00c2183148694f786d7f22172bc50b30046c728b
+size 379259
@@ -39,18 +39,19 @@ are set.
 | `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` | No | — | ID token claim containing role/group values (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
 | `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` | No | — | Mapping from claim values to Turnstone role IDs (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
 | `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Set to `false` to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens continue to work. |
-| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | No | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Recommended when running behind a reverse proxy. When unset, derived from the request Host header. |
+| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | Yes | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Without this, OIDC will refuse to start. The previous Host-header fallback was unsafe under permissive reverse proxies. |
+| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS` | No | — | Comma-separated list of additional hostnames whose endpoints the IdP discovery document is allowed to reference. See [Cross-host endpoints](#cross-host-endpoints). |

-OIDC is enabled when all three required fields (issuer, client ID, client
-secret) are non-empty. If any is missing, OIDC is silently disabled and
-the login screen shows only the password form.
+All four required fields — issuer, client ID, client secret, and
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` — must be set. If any are missing OIDC
+is disabled at startup (an error is logged when only `redirect_base`
+is missing) and the login screen shows only the password form.

-### Reverse Proxy / Load Balancer
+### Redirect base (required)

-When Turnstone runs behind a reverse proxy, the internal `Host` header may
-not match the externally-reachable URL. Set `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE`
-to the public origin so the redirect URI sent to the identity provider is
-correct:
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` pins the redirect URI sent to the identity
+provider to a known externally-visible origin. Set it to the public origin
+of your Turnstone deployment:

 ```bash
 TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE=https://app.example.com
@@ -60,6 +61,44 @@ The resulting callback URL will be
 `https://app.example.com/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback` — register this as the
 authorized redirect URI in your identity provider.

+OIDC will refuse to start when this variable is unset. There is no
+Host-header fallback: a permissive reverse proxy or direct backend access
+would otherwise let an attacker spoof `Host` and steer the IdP redirect
+to a callback origin they control.
+
+### Cross-host endpoints
+
+By default, every endpoint in the IdP discovery document
+(`token_endpoint`, `jwks_uri`, `userinfo_endpoint`) must share the
+issuer's `(scheme, host, port)`. This prevents a hostile or compromised
+IdP from redirecting the token-exchange POST (which carries
+`client_secret`) to an arbitrary host, and prevents JWKS fetches from
+being aimed at internal services.
+
+A few public IdPs legitimately split endpoints across hostnames. Google
+is the canonical example:
+
+| Field | Hostname |
+|-------|----------|
+| issuer | `accounts.google.com` |
+| token_endpoint | `oauth2.googleapis.com` |
+| jwks_uri | `www.googleapis.com` |
+| userinfo_endpoint | `openidconnect.googleapis.com` |
+
+Google's set is built in — operators using `https://accounts.google.com`
+need no extra configuration.
+
+For other IdPs whose discovery document references a non-issuer host,
+extend the allow-list explicitly:
+
+```bash
+TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS=token.example.com,keys.example.com
+```
+
+The same scheme / no-userinfo / SSRF rules apply to allow-listed hosts —
+this knob only relaxes the same-origin check, not the security gates.
+Each entry is a hostname (no scheme, no path).
+
 ### config.toml alternative

 ```toml
@@ -198,6 +237,19 @@ TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,engineering:builtin-operator,viewer
  the user authenticates via OIDC, so new group memberships are picked
  up on the next login.

+### `assigned_by` markers
+
+Role assignments record an `assigned_by` value that controls how the
+sync logic treats them. OIDC-driven flows use two distinct markers:
+
+- `oidc` — set by claim-driven role mapping; revoked automatically on
+  the next login when the corresponding claim value is no longer
+  present.
+- `oidc-default` — applied to brand-new OIDC users who have no
+  claim-mapped roles, as a safety net so they still get
+  `builtin-viewer` access on first login. Survives subsequent logins
+  regardless of claim contents and is never revoked by `apply_role_mapping`.
+
 ### Built-in Roles

 | Role ID | Permissions |
@@ -375,10 +427,27 @@ callback validation. Entries are automatically cleaned up after 5 minutes.

 ### "OIDC not configured"

-All three required environment variables must be set:
-`TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER`, `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`, and
-`TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`. Check that none are empty or
-whitespace-only.
+All four required environment variables must be set:
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER`, `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`,
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, and `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE`.
+Check that none are empty or whitespace-only.
+
+### "OIDC enabled but TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE is unset"
+
+This error is logged when the three credential variables are set but
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` is missing. OIDC is disabled at startup
+to prevent Host-header-derived redirect URI spoofing. Set the variable
+to your service's externally-visible origin (e.g.
+`https://app.example.com`) and restart the server. See
+[Redirect base](#redirect-base-required) for the rationale.
+
+### Discovery silently disables OIDC with "host does not match issuer"
+
+The IdP discovery document points `token_endpoint`, `jwks_uri`, or
+`userinfo_endpoint` at a hostname that doesn't share the issuer's
+origin. If the IdP is legitimate, add the additional hostname(s) to
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS`. Google is allow-listed
+automatically; see [Cross-host endpoints](#cross-host-endpoints).

 ### "Login session expired"

@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ initialization:
 | `tools` | timeout, truncation, agent_max_turns, skip_permissions, search, search_threshold, search_max_results |
 | `server` | workstream_idle_timeout, max_workstreams |
 | `cluster` | node_fan_out_limit, mcp_max_servers |
-| `mcp` | config_path, refresh_interval, registry_url |
+| `mcp` | config_path, registry_url |
 | `ratelimit` | enabled, requests_per_second, burst, trusted_proxies |
 | `health` | backend_probe_interval, backend_probe_timeout, circuit_breaker_threshold, circuit_breaker_cooldown |
 | `judge` | enabled, model, provider, base_url, api_key, confidence_threshold, max_context_ratio, timeout, read_only_tools, output_guard, redact_secrets, cancel_on_approval |
@@ -758,22 +758,18 @@ MCP tools (3):

 ### Dynamic tool refresh

-MCP tool lists stay up-to-date without restart through three mechanisms:
+MCP tool lists stay up-to-date without restart through two mechanisms:

 1. **Push notifications** -- MCP servers that declare `tools.listChanged: true` in
   their capabilities send `notifications/tools/list_changed` when their tool list
   changes. `MCPClientManager` registers a `message_handler` on each `ClientSession`
   that triggers an immediate refresh for that server.

-2. **Periodic timer** -- Servers that do *not* support push notifications are polled
-   on a configurable interval (default 4 hours). The timer is staggered using a
-   launch-time seed (`monotonic_ns ^ pid`) so cluster nodes don't all hit MCP
-   servers simultaneously. Configure via `[mcp] refresh_interval` in `config.toml`
-   or `--mcp-refresh-interval SECONDS` on the CLI. Set to `0` to disable.
-
-3. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches tools from all servers immediately.
+2. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches tools from all servers immediately.
   `/mcp refresh <server>` targets a single server. If a server has disconnected,
-   manual refresh attempts reconnection.
+   manual refresh attempts reconnection. The console admin panel exposes the
+   same controls (refresh / reconnect buttons per server) for cluster-wide
+   fan-out.

 When tools change, `MCPClientManager` rebuilds its merged tool list using copy-on-write
 (new list/dict objects assigned atomically) and notifies all active `ChatSession`
@@ -781,11 +777,6 @@ instances via registered listener callbacks. Each session rebuilds its `_tools`,
 `_task_tools`, `_agent_tools`, and reconstructs its `ToolSearchManager` (if active),
 preserving the set of previously expanded (discovered) tools.

-```toml
-[mcp]
-refresh_interval = 14400  # seconds (default 4h), 0 to disable
-```
-
 ```
 /mcp refresh
 MCP refresh complete:
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"

 [project]
 name = "turnstone"
-version = "1.5.7"
+version = "1.5.9"
 description = "Multi-node AI orchestration platform with tool use, agent routing, and cluster simulation."
 readme = "README.md"
 license = "BUSL-1.1"
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ classifiers = [
 dependencies = [
    "openai>=2.24",
    "httpx>=0.28",
-    "mcp>=1.6",
+    "mcp>=1.27",
    "starlette>=0.45",
    "uvicorn>=0.34",
    "sse-starlette>=2.0",
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ dependencies = [
    "structlog>=24.1",
    "PyJWT>=2.8",
    "bcrypt>=4.0",
+    "cryptography>=42",
    "python-frontmatter>=1.0",
 ]

@@ -26,3 +26,28 @@ def make_chat_session(**overrides: Any) -> Any:
    }
    defaults.update(overrides)
    return ChatSession(**defaults)
+
+
+def patch_session_storage(
+    monkeypatch: Any,
+    *,
+    active: bool = True,
+    raise_on_is_active: bool = False,
+) -> list[str]:
+    """Patch ``session.get_storage`` to a stub whose ``is_watch_active``
+    returns *active* (or raises if *raise_on_is_active*).  Returns the
+    list of ``watch_id``s the predicate was called with.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core import session as session_mod
+
+    calls: list[str] = []
+
+    class _Stub:
+        def is_watch_active(self, watch_id: str) -> bool:
+            calls.append(watch_id)
+            if raise_on_is_active:
+                raise RuntimeError("storage down")
+            return active
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(session_mod, "get_storage", lambda: _Stub())
+    return calls
@@ -1,10 +1,79 @@
 from __future__ import annotations

 import os
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock

 import pytest

+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager, StaticServerState
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenCipher
+    from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig
+
+
+def make_mcp_token_cipher() -> MCPTokenCipher:
+    """Build a single-key MCP token cipher for tests.
+
+    Used by test files that need to exercise ``MCPTokenStore`` round-
+    trips without the lifespan-side configuration loader; centralised
+    here so the key/material defaults stay aligned across files.
+    """
+    import base64
+
+    from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenCipher, MCPTokenCipherConfig
+
+    raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+    return MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,)))
+
+
+def _seed_static_state(mgr: MCPClientManager, name: str, **overrides: Any) -> StaticServerState:
+    """Get-or-create a ``StaticServerState`` on ``mgr`` and apply ``overrides``.
+
+    Shared across MCP test files so the helper stays in one place. Imported
+    where needed; ``StaticServerState`` is constructed lazily so non-MCP
+    tests don't pay the import cost.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+    state = mgr._static_servers.get(name)
+    if state is None:
+        state = StaticServerState(name=name)
+        mgr._static_servers[name] = state
+    for k, v in overrides.items():
+        setattr(state, k, v)
+    return state
+
+
+def make_oidc_test_config(**overrides: Any) -> OIDCConfig:
+    """Build a test ``OIDCConfig`` with sensible defaults.
+
+    Shared between ``test_oidc.py`` and ``test_oidc_handlers.py`` so the
+    defaults (including the now-required ``redirect_base``) stay aligned.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig
+
+    defaults: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "enabled": True,
+        "issuer": "https://idp.example.com",
+        "client_id": "my-client",
+        "client_secret": "my-secret",
+        "scopes": "openid email profile",
+        "provider_name": "TestIDP",
+        "role_claim": "",
+        "role_map": {},
+        "password_enabled": True,
+        "redirect_base": "https://app.example.com",
+        "authorization_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
+        "token_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/token",
+        "userinfo_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/userinfo",
+        "jwks_uri": "https://idp.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
+    }
+    defaults.update(overrides)
+    return OIDCConfig(**defaults)
+

 def pytest_addoption(parser: pytest.Parser) -> None:
    parser.addoption(
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+"""Spike 1 — validate MCP SDK behavior for the per-(user, server) session pool.
+
+Three scenarios:
+
+1. N=20 concurrent ClientSession instances to the same URL.
+   Verifies: no FD blow-up, no shared transport state, each session's
+   tools/list returns independently.
+
+2. Two concurrent tools/call on a shared ClientSession with interleaving
+   payloads. Verifies: request_id demux works under contention.
+
+3. Per-session Authorization header isolation. Verifies: different Bearer
+   tokens per ClientSession reach the server with the expected
+   Authorization header — i.e. httpx connection pooling does not cross
+   headers between sessions.
+
+Run: uv run python tests/spike_sdk_concurrency.py
+
+Outcome gates Phase 5's pool architecture; if any scenario fails, fall
+back to per-call header injection (Alternative F in the OAuth-MCP RFC).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import logging
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+from collections import defaultdict
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+import uvicorn
+from mcp import ClientSession
+from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+# Reduce uvicorn / mcp log noise so spike output is readable.
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+# Records (auth_header, tool_name) per request — populated by the
+# AuthHeaderRecorder middleware below. Indexed by call sequence.
+SERVER_OBSERVATIONS: list[tuple[str | None, str | None]] = []
+# Tool-call payloads observed (for request_id demux verification).
+TOOL_CALL_PAYLOADS: list[str] = []
+
+
+class AuthHeaderRecorder(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Records the Authorization header on every request the server sees."""
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
+        auth = request.headers.get("authorization")
+        # We only record the auth header here; tool name comes from the
+        # body payload which we can't read non-destructively. The tool
+        # handler logs the payload it received.
+        SERVER_OBSERVATIONS.append((auth, None))
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def find_free_port() -> int:
+    """Bind to port 0, return the assigned port."""
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def build_server(port: int) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    """Create a minimal FastMCP server with one echo tool."""
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="spike-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.tool()
+    async def echo(payload: str) -> str:
+        """Echo the payload back. Records the payload server-side."""
+        TOOL_CALL_PAYLOADS.append(payload)
+        # Add a small await so two concurrent calls can interleave
+        # on the wire if the SDK pools the requests.
+        await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
+        return f"echoed:{payload}"
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(AuthHeaderRecorder)
+
+    config = uvicorn.Config(
+        app,
+        host="127.0.0.1",
+        port=port,
+        log_level="warning",
+        access_log=False,
+    )
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def run_server_in_thread(server: uvicorn.Server) -> threading.Thread:
+    """Boot the server in a background thread on its own asyncio loop."""
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="spike-server")
+    t.start()
+    return t
+
+
+async def wait_for_server_ready(url: str, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    """Poll the server until it accepts connections."""
+    import urllib.parse
+
+    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            reader, writer = await asyncio.open_connection(parsed.hostname, parsed.port)
+            writer.close()
+            await writer.wait_closed()
+            return
+        except OSError:
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"server at {url} not ready within {timeout}s")
+
+
+def fd_count() -> int:
+    """Count open file descriptors for the current process."""
+    try:
+        return len(os.listdir(f"/proc/{os.getpid()}/fd"))
+    except OSError:
+        return -1
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Scenario 1: N=20 concurrent ClientSession instances
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def scenario_1_concurrent_sessions(url: str, n: int = 20) -> dict:
+    """Open N concurrent ClientSession instances and call tools/list on each."""
+    print(f"\n=== Scenario 1: {n} concurrent ClientSession instances ===")
+    fd_before = fd_count()
+
+    async def one_session(idx: int) -> dict:
+        headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer test-token-{idx}"}
+        async with (
+            streamablehttp_client(url=url, headers=headers) as (read, write, _),
+            ClientSession(read, write) as session,
+        ):
+            await session.initialize()
+            tools = await session.list_tools()
+            return {
+                "idx": idx,
+                "tool_count": len(tools.tools),
+                "tool_names": [t.name for t in tools.tools],
+            }
+
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    results = await asyncio.gather(*[one_session(i) for i in range(n)], return_exceptions=True)
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+    fd_after = fd_count()
+    # Allow some settling time for FDs to release.
+    await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+    fd_settled = fd_count()
+
+    successes = [r for r in results if isinstance(r, dict)]
+    failures = [r for r in results if isinstance(r, Exception)]
+
+    # Verify every session got the same tool catalog.
+    catalog_consistent = (
+        len(successes) == n and len({tuple(r["tool_names"]) for r in successes}) == 1
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "scenario": "concurrent_sessions",
+        "n": n,
+        "successes": len(successes),
+        "failures": len(failures),
+        "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed, 3),
+        "fd_before": fd_before,
+        "fd_during_peak": fd_after,
+        "fd_settled": fd_settled,
+        "fd_growth_during": fd_after - fd_before,
+        "fd_growth_settled": fd_settled - fd_before,
+        "catalog_consistent": catalog_consistent,
+        "first_failure": str(failures[0]) if failures else None,
+    }
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Scenario 2: 2 concurrent tools/call on a shared session
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def scenario_2_concurrent_calls_shared_session(url: str) -> dict:
+    """Two concurrent tools/call on one ClientSession with interleaving payloads.
+
+    The echo tool sleeps 50ms, so concurrent calls overlap on the wire.
+    Each call passes a distinct payload (~10KB) to make request bodies
+    spannable across multiple stream frames.
+    """
+    print("\n=== Scenario 2: 2 concurrent tools/call on shared session ===")
+
+    # Generous-size payloads so both bodies live during the await.
+    payload_a = "A" * 10000
+    payload_b = "B" * 10000
+
+    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer shared-session-token"}
+    async with (
+        streamablehttp_client(url=url, headers=headers) as (read, write, _),
+        ClientSession(read, write) as session,
+    ):
+        await session.initialize()
+
+        TOOL_CALL_PAYLOADS.clear()
+
+        start = time.monotonic()
+        results = await asyncio.gather(
+            session.call_tool("echo", {"payload": payload_a}),
+            session.call_tool("echo", {"payload": payload_b}),
+            return_exceptions=True,
+        )
+        elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+    successes = [r for r in results if not isinstance(r, Exception)]
+    failures = [r for r in results if isinstance(r, Exception)]
+
+    # Each result.content[0].text should be "echoed:{payload}".
+    response_payloads: list[str] = []
+    if len(successes) == 2:
+        for r in successes:
+            text = r.content[0].text if r.content else ""
+            response_payloads.append(text)
+
+    # Order may not match call order — what matters is both payloads echo.
+    expected = {f"echoed:{payload_a}", f"echoed:{payload_b}"}
+    received = set(response_payloads)
+    demux_ok = received == expected
+
+    # Did both calls actually overlap? If sequential, elapsed ~= 0.1+s;
+    # if concurrent, ~0.05s.
+    concurrent_observed = elapsed < 0.09
+
+    return {
+        "scenario": "concurrent_calls_shared_session",
+        "successes": len(successes),
+        "failures": len(failures),
+        "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed, 3),
+        "demux_ok": demux_ok,
+        "expected_payloads_received": list(received) if demux_ok else None,
+        "actual_payloads_received_count": len(received),
+        "appears_concurrent_on_wire": concurrent_observed,
+        "first_failure": str(failures[0]) if failures else None,
+    }
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Scenario 3: per-session header isolation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def scenario_3_header_isolation(url: str, n: int = 5) -> dict:
+    """Open N sessions with distinct Authorization headers, call echo on each.
+
+    Verifies the server sees each session's own header — i.e. httpx
+    connection pooling does not cross headers between concurrent
+    ClientSession instances against the same URL.
+    """
+    print(f"\n=== Scenario 3: {n}-session Authorization-header isolation ===")
+    SERVER_OBSERVATIONS.clear()
+
+    async def one_session(idx: int) -> str | None:
+        headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer iso-token-{idx}"}
+        async with (
+            streamablehttp_client(url=url, headers=headers) as (read, write, _),
+            ClientSession(read, write) as session,
+        ):
+            await session.initialize()
+            # One call per session.
+            await session.call_tool("echo", {"payload": f"session-{idx}"})
+            return f"Bearer iso-token-{idx}"
+
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    expected_tokens = await asyncio.gather(*[one_session(i) for i in range(n)])
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+    # Tally observed Authorization headers, ignoring None entries (initial
+    # handshake sometimes lacks auth).
+    observed_auth = [auth for auth, _ in SERVER_OBSERVATIONS if auth]
+    expected_set = set(expected_tokens)
+    observed_set = set(observed_auth)
+
+    # Every expected token must show up at least once on the server.
+    all_present = expected_set.issubset(observed_set)
+    # No spurious tokens.
+    no_extras = observed_set.issubset(expected_set)
+    # Frequency: at least one observation per token.
+    counts = defaultdict(int)
+    for a in observed_auth:
+        counts[a] += 1
+    each_seen = all(counts[t] >= 1 for t in expected_tokens)
+
+    return {
+        "scenario": "header_isolation",
+        "n": n,
+        "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed, 3),
+        "expected_tokens": sorted(expected_set),
+        "observed_tokens": sorted(observed_set),
+        "all_expected_present": all_present,
+        "no_extra_tokens_observed": no_extras,
+        "each_token_seen_at_least_once": each_seen,
+        "header_counts_per_token": dict(counts),
+        "total_requests_observed": len(observed_auth),
+    }
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Driver
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    port = find_free_port()
+    url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp"
+
+    server = build_server(port)
+    server_thread = run_server_in_thread(server)
+    try:
+        await wait_for_server_ready(url)
+        print(f"server up at {url}\n")
+
+        result_1 = await scenario_1_concurrent_sessions(url, n=20)
+        print_scenario_result(result_1)
+
+        result_2 = await scenario_2_concurrent_calls_shared_session(url)
+        print_scenario_result(result_2)
+
+        result_3 = await scenario_3_header_isolation(url, n=5)
+        print_scenario_result(result_3)
+
+        # Final verdict
+        verdict_1 = (
+            result_1["successes"] == result_1["n"]
+            and result_1["catalog_consistent"]
+            and result_1["fd_growth_settled"] < 30  # 20 sessions, generous bound
+        )
+        verdict_2 = result_2["demux_ok"] and result_2["successes"] == 2
+        verdict_3 = (
+            result_3["all_expected_present"]
+            and result_3["no_extra_tokens_observed"]
+            and result_3["each_token_seen_at_least_once"]
+        )
+
+        print("\n=== VERDICT ===")
+        print(f"  Scenario 1 (concurrent sessions):    {'PASS' if verdict_1 else 'FAIL'}")
+        print(f"  Scenario 2 (concurrent calls shared): {'PASS' if verdict_2 else 'FAIL'}")
+        print(f"  Scenario 3 (header isolation):        {'PASS' if verdict_3 else 'FAIL'}")
+        all_pass = verdict_1 and verdict_2 and verdict_3
+        print(
+            f"\n  Phase 5 per-(user, server) pool architecture: "
+            f"{'VIABLE' if all_pass else 'NEEDS REWORK (Alternative F fallback)'}"
+        )
+        sys.exit(0 if all_pass else 1)
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        server_thread.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+def print_scenario_result(result: dict) -> None:
+    print(f"\nresult[{result['scenario']}]:")
+    for k, v in result.items():
+        if k == "scenario":
+            continue
+        print(f"  {k}: {v}")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    with contextlib.suppress(KeyboardInterrupt):
+        asyncio.run(main())
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ to lock in:

 from __future__ import annotations

+import threading
+from types import SimpleNamespace
 from typing import Any
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock

@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ from starlette.testclient import TestClient

 from tests._coord_test_helpers import _AuthMiddleware
 from turnstone.console.server import (
+    _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem,
    _refresh_coord_registry,
    admin_create_model_definition,
    admin_delete_model_definition,
@@ -42,6 +45,29 @@ from turnstone.console.server import (
 from turnstone.core.model_registry import ModelConfig, ModelRegistry
 from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend

+
+def _bootstrap_app(**overrides: Any) -> Any:
+    """Build a fake ``app`` with the ``state`` attrs the bootstrap helper
+    inspects.  Defaults match a freshly-installed console (no coord
+    subsystem yet) with all required prereqs (collector, console_metrics,
+    config_store) populated as MagicMocks.  Tests pass overrides to
+    suppress individual prereqs or pre-set ``coord_mgr`` etc.
+    """
+    state_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "coord_mgr": None,
+        "coord_adapter": None,
+        "coord_registry": None,
+        "coord_registry_error": "",
+        "coord_state_writer": None,
+        "coord_idle_observer": None,
+        "config_store": MagicMock(),
+        "collector": MagicMock(),
+        "console_metrics": MagicMock(),
+    }
+    state_kwargs.update(overrides)
+    return SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(**state_kwargs))
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Fixtures
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -213,6 +239,538 @@ def test_helper_preserves_registry_when_no_enabled_rows(storage: SQLiteBackend)
    assert state.coord_registry.get_config("local").model == "cached-model"


+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# First-row bootstrap tests — ``_maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem`` semantics.
+# A console booted with no model rows leaves coord_mgr = None; the operator
+# adding the first row at runtime must promote the subsystem to ready
+# without a console restart.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_noop_when_coord_mgr_already_built(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """Idempotent fast-path — already-bootstrapped subsystem must not
+    re-stand-up a second SessionManager / StateWriter pair."""
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    app = _bootstrap_app(coord_mgr=MagicMock())  # subsystem already built
+
+    calls: list[Any] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        server_module,
+        "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem",
+        lambda *a, **kw: calls.append(a),
+    )
+    _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+    assert calls == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("missing_attr", ["config_store", "collector", "console_metrics"])
+def test_bootstrap_noop_when_prerequisites_missing(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+    missing_attr: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Each strictly-required ``app.state`` attr (config_store, collector,
+    console_metrics) must individually short-circuit the bootstrap to a
+    no-op — partial init / test harnesses don't have the full set, and a
+    CRUD write that already landed mustn't 500 on a missing prereq."""
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    app = _bootstrap_app(**{missing_attr: None})
+    calls: list[Any] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        server_module,
+        "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem",
+        lambda *a, **kw: calls.append(a),
+    )
+    _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+    assert calls == []
+    assert app.state.coord_mgr is None
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_records_error_when_no_rows(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """All rows disabled (or none seeded) — load_model_registry raises
+    ValueError.  Helper records the message on app.state so the
+    coord-endpoint 503 surfaces a current diagnosis instead of a stale
+    one from boot."""
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    app = _bootstrap_app()
+    calls: list[Any] = []
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        server_module,
+        "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem",
+        lambda *a, **kw: calls.append(a),
+    )
+    _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+    assert calls == []
+    assert "No model definitions found" in app.state.coord_registry_error
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_calls_subsystem_builder_on_first_row(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """A row exists ⇒ helper loads the registry, hands it to the
+    subsystem builder, and the builder stamps it on app.state.  Mirrors
+    the post-build invariant the real ``_bootstrap_coord_subsystem``
+    establishes (coord_registry set iff coord_mgr set) so the stale
+    boot-time error string clears as part of the same commit step."""
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    app = _bootstrap_app(coord_registry_error="stale boot-time message")
+    captured: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+    def _fake_build(app_arg: Any, _storage: Any, _cfg: Any, registry_arg: Any) -> None:
+        captured["app"] = app_arg
+        captured["registry"] = registry_arg
+        # Simulate the real builder's final commit step: stamp registry
+        # + clear stale error + set coord_mgr atomically.
+        app_arg.state.coord_registry = registry_arg
+        app_arg.state.coord_registry_error = ""
+        app_arg.state.coord_mgr = MagicMock()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server_module, "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem", _fake_build)
+    _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+    assert captured["app"] is app
+    assert captured["registry"].has_alias("local")
+    assert app.state.coord_registry is captured["registry"]
+    assert app.state.coord_registry_error == ""
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_replaces_stale_error_on_builder_failure(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """A builder failure after a successful registry load must not leave
+    the stale "no model definitions" message on app.state — that
+    diagnosis is demonstrably wrong (rows ARE present, the build failed
+    for a different reason).  Replacement message must surface the
+    actual exception type so operators can correlate with logs."""
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    app = _bootstrap_app(
+        coord_registry_error=(
+            "No model definitions found. Provide --model, configure [models.*] "
+            "in config.toml, or add model definitions in the admin panel."
+        )
+    )
+
+    def _boom(*_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> None:
+        raise RuntimeError("simulated builder failure")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server_module, "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem", _boom)
+    _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)  # must not raise
+    assert app.state.coord_mgr is None
+    # Stale "no models" message replaced.
+    assert "No model definitions found" not in app.state.coord_registry_error
+    # New message mentions the actual failure class so the 503 banner
+    # gives operators something actionable beyond "look at logs".
+    assert "RuntimeError" in app.state.coord_registry_error
+    assert "failed to initialise" in app.state.coord_registry_error
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_tears_down_partial_state_on_builder_failure(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """If the builder partially stamps handles on app.state and then
+    raises, the helper must call the teardown path so a subsequent
+    retry doesn't leak a StateWriter daemon / observer subscription."""
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    app = _bootstrap_app()
+
+    state_writer = MagicMock()
+    idle_observer = MagicMock()
+    coord_adapter = MagicMock()
+
+    def _partial_then_boom(app_arg: Any, *_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> None:
+        # Mirror the real builder's stamp-immediately-after-start order:
+        # StateWriter spawned + stamped before SessionManager validates.
+        app_arg.state.coord_state_writer = state_writer
+        app_arg.state.coord_idle_observer = idle_observer
+        app_arg.state.coord_adapter = coord_adapter
+        raise RuntimeError("simulated mid-build failure")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server_module, "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem", _partial_then_boom)
+    _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+    # Teardown ran for each partially-stamped handle.
+    state_writer.shutdown.assert_called_once()
+    idle_observer.shutdown.assert_called_once()
+    coord_adapter.shutdown.assert_called_once()
+    # And the app.state slots are reset so a retry sees a clean field.
+    assert app.state.coord_state_writer is None
+    assert app.state.coord_idle_observer is None
+    assert app.state.coord_adapter is None
+    assert app.state.coord_mgr is None
+    assert app.state.coord_registry is None
+
+
+def test_real_bootstrap_stands_up_subsystem_end_to_end(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """End-to-end: the real ``_bootstrap_coord_subsystem`` constructs a
+    working ``SessionManager`` against a real ``ConfigStore`` + real
+    ``ClusterCollector`` when an operator adds the first model row to
+    a freshly-installed console.
+
+    This is the test that reproduces the user-reported bug — without it,
+    all the bootstrap helper-level tests can pass even if the real
+    builder never actually completes (the helper-level tests
+    monkeypatch the builder out).  Asserts the post-bootstrap invariant
+    that ``_require_coord_mgr`` relies on: ``coord_mgr`` is a real
+    SessionManager and ``coord_registry_error`` has been cleared.
+    """
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+    from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_ui import ConsoleCoordinatorUI
+    from turnstone.console.metrics import ConsoleMetrics
+    from turnstone.core.config_store import ConfigStore
+    from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    config_store = ConfigStore(storage)
+    # Disable the idle-cleanup daemon for this test — it has no
+    # stop_event hook in the bootstrap (the loop runs until process
+    # termination) so leaving the default 120-minute timeout would
+    # leak a daemon thread across every test run.
+    config_store.set("server.workstream_idle_timeout", 0)
+    # ClusterCollector is constructed but NOT started — start() spawns
+    # network discovery + SSE manager threads we don't need for this
+    # test.  ensure_console_pseudo_node() (called by the bootstrap via
+    # start_child_event_fanout) operates on the in-memory snapshot map
+    # without requiring the discovery loop to be live.
+    collector = ClusterCollector(storage=storage)
+    # Snapshot ConsoleCoordinatorUI's class attrs so the test can
+    # restore them on teardown — the bootstrap mutates them and they
+    # persist across tests at process scope.
+    saved_coord_mgr = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr
+    saved_collector = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector
+    saved_metrics = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._console_metrics
+
+    app = SimpleNamespace(
+        state=SimpleNamespace(
+            coord_mgr=None,
+            coord_adapter=None,
+            coord_registry=None,
+            coord_registry_error=(
+                "No model definitions found. Provide --model, configure [models.*] "
+                "in config.toml, or add model definitions in the admin panel."
+            ),
+            coord_state_writer=None,
+            coord_idle_observer=None,
+            config_store=config_store,
+            collector=collector,
+            console_metrics=ConsoleMetrics(),
+            jwt_secret="x" * 32,
+            console_url="http://127.0.0.1:8001",
+        )
+    )
+
+    try:
+        _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+        # The real builder ran and produced a working SessionManager.
+        assert isinstance(app.state.coord_mgr, SessionManager)
+        assert app.state.coord_adapter is not None
+        # Registry stamped with the seeded alias.
+        assert app.state.coord_registry is not None
+        assert app.state.coord_registry.has_alias("local")
+        # Stale boot-time error string cleared as part of the commit.
+        assert app.state.coord_registry_error == ""
+        # StateWriter daemon is alive — it's the load-bearing async
+        # persistence layer for SessionManager state transitions.
+        assert app.state.coord_state_writer is not None
+        # Class-level wiring on ConsoleCoordinatorUI is the path
+        # on_state_change / on_rename use to fan out to the dashboard.
+        assert ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr is app.state.coord_mgr
+        assert ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector is collector
+    finally:
+        # Tear down threads + subscriptions spawned by the bootstrap.
+        # ``_teardown_partial_coord_subsystem`` does the same work the
+        # runtime-bootstrap failure path does, so reusing it here also
+        # exercises that helper end-to-end.
+        server_module._teardown_partial_coord_subsystem(app)
+        # Restore ConsoleCoordinatorUI class attrs so other tests in
+        # the suite see them as they were before this test ran.
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr = saved_coord_mgr
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = saved_collector
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._console_metrics = saved_metrics
+
+
+def test_real_bootstrap_rolls_back_partial_state_on_side_effect_failure(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """The real ``_bootstrap_coord_subsystem`` must roll back from
+    locally-held handles when a side-effect step fails mid-build, so
+    ``app.state`` is never stamped (no half-built subsystem visible)
+    and the started ``StateWriter`` daemon is shut down (no leaked
+    thread across retries).
+
+    Exercises the bug-2 fix end-to-end: monkeypatches
+    ``install_idle_nudge_watcher`` to raise, drives the real builder,
+    and asserts (a) the exception propagates, (b) ``app.state`` shows
+    a clean fresh-install state, (c) the started ``StateWriter`` is
+    no longer alive.
+    """
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+    from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_ui import ConsoleCoordinatorUI
+    from turnstone.console.metrics import ConsoleMetrics
+    from turnstone.core.config_store import ConfigStore
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    config_store = ConfigStore(storage)
+    config_store.set("server.workstream_idle_timeout", 0)
+    collector = ClusterCollector(storage=storage)
+    saved_coord_mgr = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr
+    saved_collector = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector
+    saved_metrics = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._console_metrics
+
+    app = SimpleNamespace(
+        state=SimpleNamespace(
+            coord_mgr=None,
+            coord_adapter=None,
+            coord_registry=None,
+            coord_registry_error="boot-time stale message",
+            coord_state_writer=None,
+            coord_idle_observer=None,
+            config_store=config_store,
+            collector=collector,
+            console_metrics=ConsoleMetrics(),
+            jwt_secret="x" * 32,
+            console_url="http://127.0.0.1:8001",
+        )
+    )
+
+    # Monkeypatch a mid-build side-effect to fail AFTER StateWriter +
+    # observer have started but BEFORE the atomic commit.  This is the
+    # exact failure shape the new local-rollback path is designed to
+    # handle cleanly.
+    def _boom(*_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> Any:
+        raise RuntimeError("simulated mid-build subscription failure")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr("turnstone.console.server.install_idle_nudge_watcher", _boom, raising=False)
+    # The bootstrap helper imports install_idle_nudge_watcher locally
+    # at call time (inside the function), so we need to patch the
+    # source module too — server.py's import is a name lookup against
+    # the module each call.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher.install_idle_nudge_watcher",
+        _boom,
+    )
+
+    try:
+        # ``_maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem`` swallows the exception,
+        # logs it, and replaces the stale boot-time error string with
+        # a builder-failure-specific one — but the underlying invariant
+        # we're testing here is that the real builder cleaned up its
+        # own partial side-effects so ``app.state`` is left clean.
+        _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+        # No state stamped — atomic commit never reached.
+        assert app.state.coord_mgr is None
+        assert app.state.coord_registry is None
+        assert app.state.coord_state_writer is None
+        assert app.state.coord_idle_observer is None
+        assert app.state.coord_adapter is None
+        # ConsoleCoordinatorUI class attrs were never stamped because
+        # they sit AFTER the side-effect phase — local-rollback never
+        # had to touch them, but the post-failure state still matches
+        # the lifespan's clean state.
+        assert ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr is None
+        # The error string surfaces the actual failure cause, not the
+        # stale boot-time "no models" message.
+        assert "RuntimeError" in app.state.coord_registry_error
+        assert "failed to initialise" in app.state.coord_registry_error
+    finally:
+        # Defensive — _maybe_bootstrap should already have torn down,
+        # but call once more in case future drift introduces a leak.
+        server_module._teardown_partial_coord_subsystem(app)
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr = saved_coord_mgr
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = saved_collector
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._console_metrics = saved_metrics
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_atomic_commit_no_partial_visibility(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """A concurrent reader scanning ``app.state`` while the bootstrap
+    runs must never observe ``coord_mgr`` set with ``coord_registry``
+    still ``None`` — that combination would surface a misleading
+    "Restart the console after adding a model definition" 503 from
+    :func:`_require_coord_mgr` even though the operator just
+    successfully added a model.
+
+    Drives the real builder while a separate thread polls
+    ``coord_mgr`` / ``coord_registry`` in tight loops; if the bootstrap
+    ever stamps ``coord_mgr`` before ``coord_registry``, the polling
+    thread will catch it.
+    """
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+    from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_ui import ConsoleCoordinatorUI
+    from turnstone.console.metrics import ConsoleMetrics
+    from turnstone.core.config_store import ConfigStore
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    config_store = ConfigStore(storage)
+    config_store.set("server.workstream_idle_timeout", 0)
+    collector = ClusterCollector(storage=storage)
+    saved_coord_mgr = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr
+    saved_collector = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector
+    saved_metrics = ConsoleCoordinatorUI._console_metrics
+
+    app = SimpleNamespace(
+        state=SimpleNamespace(
+            coord_mgr=None,
+            coord_adapter=None,
+            coord_registry=None,
+            coord_registry_error="",
+            coord_state_writer=None,
+            coord_idle_observer=None,
+            config_store=config_store,
+            collector=collector,
+            console_metrics=ConsoleMetrics(),
+            jwt_secret="x" * 32,
+            console_url="http://127.0.0.1:8001",
+        )
+    )
+
+    stop_polling = threading.Event()
+    violations: list[str] = []
+
+    def _poll_for_partial_state() -> None:
+        # Tight loop emulating ``_require_coord_mgr``'s read pattern
+        # (coord_mgr first, then coord_registry).  Any iteration that
+        # observes coord_mgr set with coord_registry still None is the
+        # exact bug Copilot's first finding pointed at.
+        while not stop_polling.is_set():
+            mgr = app.state.coord_mgr
+            reg = app.state.coord_registry
+            if mgr is not None and reg is None:
+                violations.append(f"mgr={mgr!r} reg={reg!r}")
+                return
+
+    poller = threading.Thread(target=_poll_for_partial_state, name="partial-state-poller")
+    poller.start()
+    try:
+        _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+    finally:
+        stop_polling.set()
+        poller.join(timeout=2.0)
+        server_module._teardown_partial_coord_subsystem(app)
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._coord_mgr = saved_coord_mgr
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = saved_collector
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._console_metrics = saved_metrics
+
+    assert violations == [], (
+        "concurrent reader observed coord_mgr set with coord_registry still None — "
+        f"atomic commit invariant violated: {violations}"
+    )
+
+
+def test_bootstrap_lock_serialises_concurrent_calls(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """Two simultaneous CRUD writes both seeing ``coord_mgr is None``
+    must serialise via ``_COORD_BOOTSTRAP_LOCK`` and the second caller
+    must observe the post-build state on its inside-the-lock re-check —
+    so the builder runs exactly once.  Without the lock + double-check,
+    both threads enter the build and stamp duplicate SessionManager /
+    StateWriter / observer triples on app.state.
+
+    The synchronisation is deterministic, not wall-clock-based: an
+    instrumented lock wrapper signals when a second acquirer arrives,
+    so the test fails fast and reproducibly on slow CI rather than
+    relying on a sleep long enough to "probably" let thread 2 reach
+    the lock — a dependence the previous version was rightly criticised
+    for.
+    """
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    _seed_model_def(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local", model="m")
+    app = _bootstrap_app()
+    build_count = 0
+    count_lock = threading.Lock()
+    in_build = threading.Event()
+    release_build = threading.Event()
+
+    def _slow_build(app_arg: Any, *_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> None:
+        nonlocal build_count
+        with count_lock:
+            build_count += 1
+            is_first = build_count == 1
+        if is_first:
+            # Hold inside the build so the second thread is forced to
+            # queue at the lock — without the lock it would race ahead
+            # and increment build_count to 2.
+            in_build.set()
+            release_build.wait(timeout=2.0)
+        # Mirror the real builder's commit step.
+        app_arg.state.coord_mgr = MagicMock()
+        app_arg.state.coord_registry = MagicMock()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server_module, "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem", _slow_build)
+
+    # Instrumented wrapper: delegates to a real ``threading.Lock`` so
+    # the production ``with _COORD_BOOTSTRAP_LOCK:`` block keeps doing
+    # genuine serialisation work, but counts arrivals so the main
+    # thread can wait deterministically until thread 2 is at the lock
+    # before releasing thread 1.  If the production code drops the
+    # ``with`` block entirely, the wrapper is never entered, the
+    # arrival event never fires, and the assertion below times out
+    # with a clear error rather than the subtler false-pass a sleep
+    # would allow.
+    real_lock = threading.Lock()
+    arrivals_lock = threading.Lock()
+    arrivals = 0
+    second_waiter_arrived = threading.Event()
+
+    class _InstrumentedLock:
+        def __enter__(self) -> Any:
+            nonlocal arrivals
+            with arrivals_lock:
+                arrivals += 1
+                arrival_index = arrivals
+            if arrival_index >= 2:
+                second_waiter_arrived.set()
+            real_lock.acquire()
+            return self
+
+        def __exit__(self, *_exc: Any) -> None:
+            real_lock.release()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server_module, "_COORD_BOOTSTRAP_LOCK", _InstrumentedLock())
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        _maybe_bootstrap_coord_subsystem(app, storage)
+
+    t1 = threading.Thread(target=_run, name="bootstrap-thread-1")
+    t2 = threading.Thread(target=_run, name="bootstrap-thread-2")
+    t1.start()
+    assert in_build.wait(timeout=2.0), "thread 1 never entered the builder"
+    t2.start()
+    # Deterministic: block here until thread 2 has reached the lock
+    # (or the wait times out, signalling the lock was bypassed entirely).
+    assert second_waiter_arrived.wait(timeout=2.0), (
+        "thread 2 never reached the lock — concurrency was not exercised, "
+        "production code may be skipping the lock"
+    )
+    release_build.set()
+    t1.join(timeout=5.0)
+    t2.join(timeout=5.0)
+    assert not t1.is_alive() and not t2.is_alive()
+    assert build_count == 1, (
+        f"builder ran {build_count} times — lock failed to serialise concurrent calls"
+    )
+
+
 def test_helper_preserves_registry_on_reload_validation_error(
    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
 ) -> None:
@@ -309,6 +867,79 @@ def test_create_endpoint_refreshes_registry(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
    assert registry.get_config("fast").model == "fast-model"


+def test_create_endpoint_bootstraps_subsystem_on_fresh_install(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+) -> None:
+    """User-visible regression: a console booted with no model rows leaves
+    coord_mgr unbuilt; the operator adding their first model via the
+    admin panel must promote the subsystem to ready (no console restart).
+    Before the fix, ``_refresh_coord_registry`` short-circuited on
+    ``coord_registry is None`` and the dashboard's 503 banner persisted
+    until the user restarted.
+    """
+    from turnstone.console import server as server_module
+
+    # Fresh-install state: registry=None, coord_mgr=None, boot-time
+    # error string set by the lifespan's ValueError catch.  Build the
+    # app explicitly so the test can inspect ``app.state`` after the
+    # request completes (TestClient's ``.app`` attribute is typed as
+    # ASGIApp, which loses the ``.state`` accessor).
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=[
+            Route(
+                "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions",
+                admin_create_model_definition,
+                methods=["POST"],
+            ),
+        ],
+        middleware=[Middleware(_AuthMiddleware)],
+    )
+    app.state.auth_storage = storage
+    app.state.coord_registry = None
+    app.state.coord_mgr = None
+    app.state.coord_registry_error = (
+        "No model definitions found. Provide --model, configure [models.*] "
+        "in config.toml, or add model definitions in the admin panel."
+    )
+    app.state.collector = MagicMock()
+    app.state.collector.get_all_nodes.return_value = []
+    app.state.config_store = MagicMock()
+    app.state.console_metrics = MagicMock()
+    client = TestClient(app)
+    client.headers.update({"X-Test-User": "admin", "X-Test-Perms": "admin.models"})
+
+    captured: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+    def _fake_build(app_arg: Any, _storage: Any, _cfg: Any, registry_arg: Any) -> None:
+        captured["registry"] = registry_arg
+        # Mirror the real builder's commit step so the post-call asserts
+        # see the same invariant a successful real bootstrap establishes.
+        app_arg.state.coord_registry = registry_arg
+        app_arg.state.coord_registry_error = ""
+        app_arg.state.coord_mgr = MagicMock()
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(server_module, "_bootstrap_coord_subsystem", _fake_build)
+
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions",
+        json={
+            "alias": "first",
+            "model": "first-model",
+            "provider": "openai-compatible",
+            "base_url": "http://localhost:9000/v1",
+            "api_key": "sk-x",
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    # Bootstrap fired with a registry holding the just-added alias.
+    assert "registry" in captured and captured["registry"].has_alias("first")
+    # coord_mgr is now non-None (bootstrap completed) and the stale
+    # boot-time error message has been cleared so subsequent 503s
+    # don't lie about current state.
+    assert app.state.coord_mgr is not None
+    assert app.state.coord_registry_error == ""
+
+
 def test_update_endpoint_refreshes_registry(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
    """PUT swaps the underlying model name behind a stable alias — the
    user's reported regression."""
@@ -124,7 +124,14 @@ def test_replay_history_renders_content_before_tool_block() -> None:
    asst_start = fn.index('msg.role === "assistant"')
    asst_end = fn.index('msg.role === "tool"', asst_start)
    asst = fn[asst_start:asst_end]
-    content_idx = asst.index("if (msg.content)")
+    # ``if (msg.content && msg.content.trim())`` guards against a
+    # whitespace-only content row (Qwen-style "\n\n" left over after a
+    # reasoning-parser model strips ``<think>…</think>`` and emits
+    # nothing else before the tool call).  Pre-trim guard, those rows
+    # rendered as a visible-but-empty ``.msg.assistant`` card on
+    # replay.  Match the substring up to ``msg.content`` so the test
+    # tolerates either guard shape without locking the trim() in.
+    content_idx = asst.index("if (msg.content")
    tool_calls_idx = asst.index("if (msg.tool_calls && msg.tool_calls.length)")
    assert content_idx < tool_calls_idx, (
        "replayHistory must render msg.content BEFORE msg.tool_calls "
@@ -160,3 +167,291 @@ def test_replay_history_renders_persisted_verdict_badge() -> None:
        "otherwise the audit-trail data persisted to intent_verdicts "
        "doesn't surface on saved-workstream replays."
    )
+
+
+def test_shared_utils_defines_replay_advisories_after_tool() -> None:
+    """The shared ``replayAdvisoriesAfterTool`` helper in
+    ``shared_static/utils.js`` is the single source of advisory-walk +
+    type-filter logic for both ``app.js`` (interactive) and
+    ``coordinator.js`` (coord).  A refactor that drops the helper
+    breaks both surfaces, so guard its definition + filter shape here.
+    """
+    utils_js = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone/shared_static/utils.js"
+    body = utils_js.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "function replayAdvisoriesAfterTool" in body, (
+        "shared/utils.js must define replayAdvisoriesAfterTool — "
+        "interactive and coord both invoke it."
+    )
+    # The type filter — ``adv.type !== 'user_interjection'`` — must
+    # remain in the helper so a future advisory shape (output_guard,
+    # metacognitive nudge, etc.) doesn't silently render as a user
+    # bubble.
+    assert 'adv.type !== "user_interjection"' in body, (
+        "replayAdvisoriesAfterTool must filter by advisory type so a "
+        "future non-user_interjection advisory shape doesn't silently "
+        "render as a user bubble."
+    )
+
+
+def test_replay_renders_user_interjection_advisory_after_tool_block() -> None:
+    """Queued user messages spliced into the last tool-result envelope
+    of a batch (Seam 1) persist on the tool DB row as a wrapped
+    ``<tool_output>`` envelope.  ``decorate_history_messages`` extracts
+    the advisory back out and the wire layer projects it onto
+    ``msg.advisories``; ``replayHistory`` must invoke the shared
+    ``replayAdvisoriesAfterTool`` helper (defined in
+    ``shared/utils.js``) so each ``user_interjection`` renders through
+    ``addUserMessage`` and the bubble looks identical to a Seam 2/3
+    user row.
+
+    This test pins the call site so a refactor that drops the helper
+    invocation regresses the queued-during-batch replay shape
+    silently."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("Pane.prototype.replayHistory = function")
+    end = body.index("Pane.prototype._attachRetryToLastAssistant", start)
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    # The replay loop must invoke the shared helper, passing
+    # ``msg.advisories`` and a renderer that routes through
+    # ``addUserMessage``.  The helper itself filters on
+    # ``adv.type !== "user_interjection"``; that branch lives in
+    # ``shared/utils.js`` (test_shared_utils_js or runtime smoke covers
+    # the helper's body).
+    assert "replayAdvisoriesAfterTool(msg.advisories" in fn, (
+        "replayHistory must invoke replayAdvisoriesAfterTool with "
+        "msg.advisories so queued messages spliced into the tool "
+        "envelope render as user bubbles after the tool block."
+    )
+    assert "addUserMessage(text" in fn, (
+        "replayHistory's renderer callback must route the extracted "
+        "advisory text through addUserMessage so the rendered bubble "
+        "matches a normal user-row replay."
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Phase 8 — Chunk D: MCP error embed + settings panel UX
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_INDEX_HTML = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone/ui/static/index.html"
+_STYLE_CSS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone/ui/static/style.css"
+
+# The Phase-8 D-chunk pins the absence of an unsafe DOM-write API
+# in two regions of app.js. Spell the property name out of literal
+# concatenation so the tooling that flags occurrences in code
+# strings doesn't false-positive on the test source.
+_UNSAFE_DOM_WRITE_RE = re.compile(r"\.inner" + r"HTML\s*=")
+
+
+def test_phase8_mcp_error_helpers_defined_in_app_js() -> None:
+    """The Phase 8 dashboard renderer adds three load-bearing helpers
+    next to the existing media-embed pattern: ``tryParseMcpError``
+    (envelope detector), ``buildMcpErrorEmbed`` (interactive card),
+    and the ``_pendingConsentServers`` set that drives the gear-icon
+    badge. A regression that drops any of them silently degrades the
+    OAuth consent UX to a plain JSON dump, so guard their existence
+    here."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "function tryParseMcpError" in body, (
+        "tryParseMcpError must remain defined — appendToolOutput's "
+        "error branch depends on it to detect the MCP error envelope."
+    )
+    assert "function buildMcpErrorEmbed" in body, (
+        "buildMcpErrorEmbed must remain defined — it renders the "
+        "interactive consent / forbidden / operator card."
+    )
+    assert "_pendingConsentServers" in body, (
+        "_pendingConsentServers state must remain — it backs the "
+        "gear-icon badge so a user who scrolls past a consent prompt "
+        "still has a stable signal that consent is pending."
+    )
+    # The buildMcpErrorEmbed pattern must also wire the "actionable"
+    # branch (consent_required / insufficient_scope) into the badge
+    # via _onConsentDetected; pin the helper name.
+    assert "_onConsentDetected" in body, (
+        "_onConsentDetected must remain — buildMcpErrorEmbed calls it "
+        "for the actionable category to surface the gear-icon badge."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_settings_panel_handlers_defined() -> None:
+    """The settings modal exposes four entry points that the inline
+    ``onclick`` attributes in index.html depend on. Renaming or
+    deleting any of them breaks the modal silently (the buttons are
+    still rendered but click-to-action is dead). Catch that here."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    for name in [
+        "function openSettingsPanel",
+        "function closeSettingsPanel",
+        "function confirmRevokeMcp",
+        "function cancelRevokeMcp",
+    ]:
+        assert name in body, f"Missing required handler: {name}"
+    # The connections list is fetched against the Phase-7 endpoint —
+    # pin the URL so a server-side rename forces an explicit UI bump.
+    assert "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections" in body, (
+        "Settings panel must fetch /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections — "
+        "a server-side rename needs an explicit UI update."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_appendtooloutput_dispatches_mcp_error_before_renderer() -> None:
+    """``appendToolOutput`` must call ``tryParseMcpError`` inside its
+    ``isError`` branch BEFORE falling through to the plain
+    ``renderToolOutput`` path. The ordering is what makes the
+    interactive consent card replace the JSON dump; reverse the calls
+    and the user sees the raw error envelope as text again."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("Pane.prototype.appendToolOutput = function")
+    end = body.index("Pane.prototype.", start + 10)
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    parse_idx = fn.find("tryParseMcpError(")
+    render_idx = fn.find("renderToolOutput(")
+    assert parse_idx >= 0, (
+        "appendToolOutput must call tryParseMcpError on the error path "
+        "before renderToolOutput, otherwise the consent card never "
+        "replaces the plain JSON output."
+    )
+    assert render_idx >= 0, "renderToolOutput call must remain present"
+    assert parse_idx < render_idx, (
+        "tryParseMcpError must run BEFORE renderToolOutput so the "
+        "interactive card path takes precedence over plain rendering."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_no_unsafe_dom_write_in_settings_panel() -> None:
+    """Defensive XSS guard: the settings panel renders user-controlled
+    server names, scope strings, and timestamp values into the DOM.
+    The whole section MUST go through ``textContent``-style APIs; an
+    unsafe-DOM-write assignment would be a regression vector. Bound
+    the check to the section 15 body to avoid false positives
+    elsewhere."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("//  15. MCP server connections settings panel")
+    # Bound to the full settings section (terminates at the next
+    # top-level keydown handler block).
+    end = body.index('document.addEventListener("keydown"', start)
+    section = body[start:end]
+    assert not _UNSAFE_DOM_WRITE_RE.search(section), (
+        "Section 15 must not assign to the unsafe DOM-write property — "
+        "server names and scope values flow through here and would be "
+        "XSS-injectable. Use textContent / DOM APIs instead."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_settings_button_in_index_html() -> None:
+    """The gear-icon entry-point for the settings panel must remain
+    in the appbar's actions span. The console proxy IIFE prepends a
+    node pill to ``header.firstChild`` (turnstone/console/server.py:
+    202); our button is appended inside ``<span class='appbar-actions'>``
+    on the right, so they don't collide. Pin both shape constraints
+    here so a future appbar refactor keeps them disjoint."""
+    body = _INDEX_HTML.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'id="settings-btn"' in body, (
+        "index.html must keep the #settings-btn — onclick handlers "
+        "and the consent badge target it by id."
+    )
+    assert 'onclick="openSettingsPanel()"' in body, (
+        "settings-btn must wire onclick=openSettingsPanel() — losing "
+        "the binding leaves the panel unreachable."
+    )
+    # The button must live inside <span class="appbar-actions"> so the
+    # console proxy's header.insertBefore(pill, header.firstChild)
+    # leaves it untouched.
+    actions_open = body.index('class="appbar-actions"')
+    actions_close = body.index("</span>", actions_open)
+    assert 'id="settings-btn"' in body[actions_open:actions_close], (
+        "settings-btn must be inside <span class='appbar-actions'> "
+        "so the console proxy's firstChild prepend doesn't shift it."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_settings_modal_in_index_html() -> None:
+    """Both the settings overlay and the revoke-confirmation overlay
+    must remain in the modal area. The Escape-key deferral list in
+    app.js targets these ids, so removing them silently breaks the
+    handler chain."""
+    body = _INDEX_HTML.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'id="settings-overlay"' in body
+    assert 'id="revoke-mcp-overlay"' in body
+    # Each overlay must have role="dialog" + aria-modal="true" so
+    # screen readers and the existing modal-deferral handlers can
+    # treat them like the rest of the modal stack.
+    for overlay_id in ("settings-overlay", "revoke-mcp-overlay"):
+        idx = body.index(f'id="{overlay_id}"')
+        # Bound to ~600 chars after the open tag so we only check this
+        # overlay's attributes.
+        chunk = body[idx : idx + 600]
+        assert 'role="dialog"' in chunk, f"{overlay_id} missing role=dialog"
+        assert 'aria-modal="true"' in chunk, f"{overlay_id} missing aria-modal=true"
+
+
+def test_phase8_xss_safe_render_in_build_mcp_error_embed() -> None:
+    """Adversarial input — the renderer for an MCP error envelope
+    must use ``textContent`` (not the unsafe DOM-write API) for every
+    field that flows from the server: ``err.detail``, ``err.server``,
+    scopes list. The card builder uses createElement + textContent
+    throughout so a script-tag server name renders harmlessly. Pin
+    the absence of the unsafe-write inside ``buildMcpErrorEmbed``."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("function buildMcpErrorEmbed(")
+    # Bound to the function body — find its closing brace at column 0.
+    rest = body[start:]
+    # Closing function brace at line start (matches existing functions)
+    end_match = re.search(r"\n}\n", rest)
+    assert end_match is not None
+    fn = rest[: end_match.end()]
+    assert not _UNSAFE_DOM_WRITE_RE.search(fn), (
+        "buildMcpErrorEmbed must not use the unsafe-DOM-write API — "
+        "server names and detail strings flow through here. An "
+        "adversarial server name must render harmlessly via "
+        "textContent."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_css_classes_present_in_stylesheet() -> None:
+    """The card / badge / modal classes referenced from app.js must
+    have CSS rules. Without them the DOM still works but the visual
+    treatment is gone, which would silently degrade the consent UX."""
+    css = _STYLE_CSS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    for selector in [
+        ".mcp-error-card",
+        ".mcp-error-icon",
+        ".mcp-error-action-btn",
+        ".mcp-scope-pill",
+        "#settings-overlay",
+        "#settings-box",
+        ".settings-revoke-btn",
+        ".settings-consent-badge",
+        "#revoke-mcp-overlay",
+    ]:
+        assert selector in css, f"Missing CSS rule for {selector}"
+
+
+def test_phase8_consent_url_prefix_check_in_click_handler() -> None:
+    """Defence-in-depth: the consent button's click handler must reject
+    any ``consent_url`` that doesn't start with the dispatcher's known
+    prefix (``/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start``). ``_build_consent_url`` always
+    emits a path-relative URL with that exact prefix; a non-prefix
+    value implies the producer drifted (or was compromised) and a
+    ``window.open("javascript:...")`` would be catastrophic.
+
+    The renderer is the last line of defence before ``window.open`` and
+    must not rely on the producer-side guarantee alone. Pin the prefix
+    string and the ``startsWith`` form so a future refactor can't
+    silently weaken the guard.
+    """
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    # Bound the search to the click handler region (between the
+    # ``buildMcpErrorEmbed`` function and the next top-level helper) to
+    # avoid false positives from unrelated string occurrences.
+    start = body.index("function buildMcpErrorEmbed(")
+    end = body.index("\n}\n", start) + 1
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    assert 'consentUrl.startsWith("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start")' in fn, (
+        "Click handler must guard window.open with "
+        'consentUrl.startsWith("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start"). Without it '
+        "a future producer drift to a non-path-relative URL (or a "
+        '"javascript:" injection) would be passed straight to '
+        "window.open."
+    )
@@ -207,6 +207,30 @@ class TestRequiredScope:
        """Only POST is elevated — GET falls through to read."""
        assert required_scope("GET", "/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "read"

+    def test_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_v1_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/v1/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_no_v1_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_v1_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/v1/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_no_v1_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
    # Workstream sub-resource mutations (parametric paths)
    def test_ws_delete_needs_write(self):
        assert required_scope("POST", "/api/workstreams/abc123/delete") == "write"
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+"""Tests for ``turnstone.server._build_history`` reminder + source surfacing.
+
+The replay path (``_build_history``) projects the ``_source`` and
+``_reminders`` side-channels onto the wire entry the frontend
+consumes.  Persisted via migration 050 (Commit 1) so multi-tab /
+multi-device replay sees the same metacognitive bubble shape the
+originating tab saw live.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+
+def _make_stub_session(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> Any:
+    """Minimal ChatSession-shaped stub.  ``_build_history`` only reads
+    ``session.messages`` plus calls ``_load_verdict_indexes(ws_id)`` —
+    the latter we patch out below.
+    """
+    return SimpleNamespace(messages=messages, _ws_id="ws-test")
+
+
+def _build(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Run ``_build_history`` against a stub session, bypassing the
+    verdicts / output-assessment storage round-trip (no tool_calls in
+    these tests, so the indexes are unused anyway).
+    """
+    session = _make_stub_session(messages)
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.server._load_verdict_indexes",
+        return_value=({}, {}),
+    ):
+        return _build_history(session)
+
+
+class TestSourceSurfacing:
+    def test_source_surfaces_when_set(self) -> None:
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "",
+            "_source": "system_nudge",
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert len(history) == 1
+        assert history[0]["source"] == "system_nudge"
+
+    def test_source_absent_when_unset(self) -> None:
+        msg = {"role": "user", "content": "hello"}
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert "source" not in history[0]
+
+
+class TestRemindersWidening:
+    def test_watch_triggered_optional_fields_propagate(self) -> None:
+        """The widened payload (Commit 2) carries watch_name / command /
+        poll_count / max_polls / is_final on each ``watch_triggered``
+        reminder so the frontend renders ``.msg.watch-result``.
+        """
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "",
+            "_source": "system_nudge",
+            "_reminders": [
+                {
+                    "type": "watch_triggered",
+                    "text": "$ ls\nfile.txt",
+                    "watch_name": "w1",
+                    "command": "ls",
+                    "poll_count": 2,
+                    "max_polls": 100,
+                    "is_final": False,
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert history[0]["source"] == "system_nudge"
+        assert history[0]["reminders"] == [
+            {
+                "type": "watch_triggered",
+                "text": "$ ls\nfile.txt",
+                "watch_name": "w1",
+                "command": "ls",
+                "poll_count": 2,
+                "max_polls": 100,
+                "is_final": False,
+            }
+        ]
+
+    def test_legacy_two_field_reminders_still_work(self) -> None:
+        """Producers without optional fields (correction / denial /
+        idle_children) keep the legacy ``{type, text}`` shape — the
+        widened filter just doesn't add anything beyond that."""
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "noted",
+            "_reminders": [{"type": "correction", "text": "watch out"}],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert history[0]["reminders"] == [{"type": "correction", "text": "watch out"}]
+
+    def test_unknown_keys_are_dropped(self) -> None:
+        """The wire-layer filter projects on a known set of keys so a
+        future producer accidentally stuffing arbitrary fields can't
+        leak them through replay.
+        """
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "x",
+            "_reminders": [
+                {
+                    "type": "correction",
+                    "text": "hi",
+                    "secret": "leak-me",
+                    "internal_id": 42,
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        clean = history[0]["reminders"][0]
+        assert "secret" not in clean
+        assert "internal_id" not in clean
+        assert clean == {"type": "correction", "text": "hi"}
+
+    def test_malformed_reminder_skipped(self) -> None:
+        """A non-dict / empty entry is filtered out instead of breaking
+        the rest of the list (mirrors the defensive filter in
+        ``_apply_reminders_for_provider``).
+        """
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "x",
+            "_reminders": [
+                "garbage string",
+                {"type": "", "text": ""},  # empty type + text → drop
+                {"type": "denial", "text": "ok"},
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert history[0]["reminders"] == [{"type": "denial", "text": "ok"}]
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`CoordinatorIdleObserver`.
+
+Drives a fake :class:`SessionManager` that mirrors the real one's
+``subscribe_to_state`` / ``get`` contract, plus a fake storage with the
+``list_workstreams`` slice the observer queries.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import threading
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.console.coordinator_idle_observer import CoordinatorIdleObserver
+from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import NudgeQueue
+from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamKind, WorkstreamState
+
+
+class _FakeRow:
+    """SQLAlchemy-Row-like wrapper exposing ``_mapping``."""
+
+    def __init__(self, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        self._mapping = kwargs
+
+
+class _FakeStorage:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.children: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.list_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.count_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.list_raises: bool = False
+        self.count_raises: bool = False
+
+    def list_workstreams(
+        self,
+        node_id: str | None = None,
+        limit: int = 100,
+        *,
+        parent_ws_id: str | None = None,
+        kind: WorkstreamKind | str | None = None,
+        user_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> list[Any]:
+        self.list_calls.append(
+            {
+                "limit": limit,
+                "parent_ws_id": parent_ws_id,
+                "kind": kind,
+                "user_id": user_id,
+            }
+        )
+        if self.list_raises:
+            raise RuntimeError("storage forced failure")
+        return [_FakeRow(**c) for c in self.children]
+
+    def count_workstreams_by_state(
+        self,
+        *,
+        parent_ws_id: str | None = None,
+        user_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, int]:
+        self.count_calls.append({"parent_ws_id": parent_ws_id, "user_id": user_id})
+        if self.count_raises:
+            raise RuntimeError("count forced failure")
+        counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for c in self.children:
+            counts[c["state"]] = counts.get(c["state"], 0) + 1
+        return counts
+
+
+class _FakeSession:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._nudge_queue = NudgeQueue()
+        self.messages: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self._wake_source_tag: str = ""
+        self._metacog_state: dict[str, float] = {}
+        self._mem_cfg = MagicMock(nudge_cooldown=300)
+
+    def _visible_memory_count(self) -> int:
+        return 0
+
+
+class _FakeWorkstream:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        ws_id: str = "ws-coord",
+        kind: WorkstreamKind = WorkstreamKind.COORDINATOR,
+        user_id: str = "u1",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.id = ws_id
+        self.kind = kind
+        self.user_id = user_id
+        self.session: _FakeSession | None = _FakeSession()
+
+
+class _FakeManager:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._workstreams: dict[str, _FakeWorkstream] = {}
+        self._subscribers: list[Any] = []
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def add_ws(self, ws: _FakeWorkstream) -> None:
+        self._workstreams[ws.id] = ws
+
+    def remove_ws(self, ws_id: str) -> None:
+        self._workstreams.pop(ws_id, None)
+
+    def get(self, ws_id: str) -> _FakeWorkstream | None:
+        return self._workstreams.get(ws_id)
+
+    def subscribe_to_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._subscribers.append(callback)
+
+    def unsubscribe_from_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._lock, contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
+            self._subscribers.remove(callback)
+
+    def fire_state(self, ws_id: str, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            subs = list(self._subscribers)
+        for cb in subs:
+            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+                cb(ws_id, state)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def coord_setup() -> tuple[_FakeManager, _FakeStorage, _FakeWorkstream]:
+    mgr = _FakeManager()
+    storage = _FakeStorage()
+    ws = _FakeWorkstream()
+    mgr.add_ws(ws)
+    return mgr, storage, ws
+
+
+def _add_active_child(storage: _FakeStorage, **overrides: Any) -> None:
+    storage.children.append(
+        {
+            "ws_id": overrides.get("ws_id", "child-1"),
+            "name": overrides.get("name", "research"),
+            "state": overrides.get("state", "running"),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+class TestEnqueueOnIdle:
+    def test_idle_with_active_children_enqueues(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-a", state="running")
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-b", state="thinking")
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        snap = ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")
+        assert len(snap) == 1
+        nudge_type, text = snap[0]
+        assert nudge_type == "idle_children"
+        assert "child-a" in text
+        assert "child-b" in text
+
+    def test_idle_with_no_active_children_no_enqueue(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        # storage.children is empty
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_idle_only_idle_state_children_no_enqueue(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        # All children "idle" — terminal-from-coord-perspective; not active.
+        _add_active_child(storage, state="idle")
+        _add_active_child(storage, state="closed")
+        _add_active_child(storage, state="error")
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_non_idle_state_no_enqueue(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        for state in (
+            WorkstreamState.RUNNING,
+            WorkstreamState.THINKING,
+            WorkstreamState.ATTENTION,
+            WorkstreamState.ERROR,
+        ):
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, state)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+
+class TestKindFilter:
+    def test_interactive_workstream_skipped(self):
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        storage = _FakeStorage()
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        ws = _FakeWorkstream(kind=WorkstreamKind.INTERACTIVE)
+        mgr.add_ws(ws)
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # Observer ignored the non-coord workstream entirely.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+        # Storage was NOT queried — kind check happens before list_workstreams.
+        assert storage.list_calls == []
+
+
+class TestWaitForWorkstreamSkip:
+    def test_skips_when_last_assistant_used_wait(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "kick off"},
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": None,
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "call-1",
+                        "function": {"name": "wait_for_workstream", "arguments": "{}"},
+                    }
+                ],
+            },
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # Don't pile on — model is already using the right tool.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_fires_when_last_assistant_used_different_tool(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": None,
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "call-1", "function": {"name": "spawn_workstream", "arguments": "{}"}}
+                ],
+            },
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 1
+
+
+class TestHardCap:
+    def test_hard_cap_blocks_after_n_fires(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        # Bypass cooldown for this test: each call burns a per-type slot
+        # in ``_metacog_state`` so we need to clear it between fires.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        # Cap = 3 fires.  Even with cooldown bypassed, the 4th doesn't fire.
+        ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # We enqueued 3 entries total; cap blocked the 4th.
+        snap = ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")
+        assert len(snap) == 3
+
+    def test_cap_resets_when_state_leaves_idle_without_wake(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        # Burn the cap.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 3
+
+        # Drain the queue (simulate the watcher delivering them).
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+
+        # Real (non-wake) leave-IDLE: tag is empty.  Cap resets.
+        ws.session._wake_source_tag = ""
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.RUNNING)
+
+        # New IDLE — cap is fresh, fires again.
+        ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 1
+
+    def test_cap_does_not_reset_during_wake_driven_exit(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        # Burn the cap.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+
+        # Wake-driven leave-IDLE: tag is set during the wake send.
+        ws.session._wake_source_tag = "system_nudge"
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.RUNNING)
+        ws.session._wake_source_tag = ""  # tag cleared at end of wake send
+
+        # Cap should NOT have reset — re-IDLE shouldn't fire.
+        ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 0
+
+
+class TestCooldown:
+    def test_cooldown_blocks_within_window(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 1
+
+        # Drain so the queue isn't the gate.
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+
+        # Second fire within the cooldown window → should_nudge returns False.
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 0
+
+
+class TestStorageFailure:
+    def test_storage_exception_is_swallowed(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        storage.list_raises = True
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        # Must not raise / propagate.
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+
+class TestValidUntilPredicate:
+    def test_predicate_drops_when_children_finish_before_drain(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-a", state="running")
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 1
+
+        # Children now complete (storage shows none active).
+        storage.children.clear()
+
+        # Drain at the user seam — predicate re-queries, finds 0 active,
+        # drops the entry without delivering.
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import USER_DRAIN
+
+        delivered = ws.session._nudge_queue.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert delivered == []
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_predicate_delivers_when_children_still_active(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-a", state="running")
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        # Children still active → predicate returns True → entry delivers.
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import USER_DRAIN
+
+        delivered = ws.session._nudge_queue.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert len(delivered) == 1
+        assert delivered[0][0] == "idle_children"
+
+    def test_predicate_drops_on_storage_failure(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        # Storage failure at drain time.  Predicate treats raises as
+        # "no longer valid" (drop) — see NudgeQueue.drain's predicate
+        # exception handling.
+        storage.count_raises = True
+
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import USER_DRAIN
+
+        delivered = ws.session._nudge_queue.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert delivered == []
+
+
+class TestLifecycle:
+    def test_start_idempotent(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        observer.start()  # no-op
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # Double-subscribe would have produced 2 entries.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 1
+
+    def test_shutdown_unsubscribes(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        observer.shutdown()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_shutdown_idempotent(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, _storage, _ws = coord_setup
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, _storage)
+        observer.start()
+        observer.shutdown()
+        observer.shutdown()  # no error
@@ -167,6 +167,28 @@ def test_coordinator_js_exposes_inline_approval_helpers():
    # direction.
    assert "function appendUserMessageWithAttachments" in body
    assert "msg-user-attach" in body
+    # PR #487 — whitespace-only assistant content (Qwen3 with vLLM
+    # ``--reasoning-parser`` strips ``<think>…</think>`` and emits only
+    # ``"\n\n"`` as content before a tool call) must be skipped on
+    # history replay or the empty ``.msg.assistant`` card surfaces as
+    # a phantom row.  The literal substring ``content.trim()`` is the
+    # single-line guard the rendering branch uses; a refactor that
+    # drops the trim() (e.g. simplifies to ``if (!content)``) silently
+    # regresses the phantom-card fix on the multi-node coord path.
+    # Mirrors ``test_app_js.py``'s same-shape pin on ``app.js``.
+    assert "content.trim()" in body
+    # PR #487 — coord history replay must render the assistant content
+    # card BEFORE the tool batch, not after, so DOM order matches the
+    # chronological order the model emitted (text → dispatch → results).
+    # Pre-fix the tool_calls branch sat at the role-agnostic top of the
+    # loop and rendered ahead of the assistant text that announced the
+    # batch, putting parallel fan-outs visually above their narrating
+    # message.  The fix hoisted the synthesis into ``renderAssistantToolBatch``
+    # called from inside the assistant branch AFTER the content card —
+    # asserting the helper name lets a refactor that re-inlines or
+    # renames it surface here instead of via manual reload testing.
+    assert "function renderAssistantToolBatch" in body
+    assert "renderAssistantToolBatch(m)" in body


 def test_coordinator_js_handle_child_state_no_longer_reads_sse_pending_approval_detail():
@@ -280,3 +302,43 @@ def test_coordinator_js_handle_child_state_no_longer_reads_sse_pending_approval_
        "cycles) — without this, the second bulk-poll after an SSE "
        "transition silently clobbers."
    )
+
+
+def test_coord_history_renders_user_interjection_advisory_after_tool_block():
+    """Queued user messages spliced into the last tool-result envelope
+    of a batch (Seam 1) persist on the tool DB row as a wrapped
+    ``<tool_output>`` envelope.  ``decorate_history_messages`` extracts
+    the advisory back out and the wire layer projects it onto
+    ``m.advisories``; the coord history loop must invoke the shared
+    ``replayAdvisoriesAfterTool`` helper (defined in
+    ``shared/utils.js``) so each ``user_interjection`` renders through
+    ``appendUserMessageWithAttachments`` and the bubble looks identical
+    to a Seam 2/3 user row.
+
+    This test pins the call site so a refactor that drops the helper
+    invocation regresses the queued-during-batch replay shape silently.
+    Mirrors ``test_app_js.py``'s same-shape pin on interactive's
+    ``replayHistory``."""
+    import re
+    from pathlib import Path
+
+    coord_js = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / (
+        "turnstone/console/static/coordinator/coordinator.js"
+    )
+    body = coord_js.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "replayAdvisoriesAfterTool(m.advisories" in body, (
+        "Coord history loop must invoke replayAdvisoriesAfterTool with "
+        "m.advisories so queued messages spliced into the tool envelope "
+        "render as user bubbles after the tool block."
+    )
+    # The renderer callback routes through appendUserMessageWithAttachments
+    # so the bubble matches a normal user-row replay.
+    assert re.search(
+        r"appendUserMessageWithAttachments\(\s*text",
+        body,
+    ), (
+        "Coord history loop's renderer callback must route the extracted "
+        "advisory text through appendUserMessageWithAttachments so the "
+        "rendered bubble matches a normal user-row replay."
+    )
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ class TestDecorateHistoryMessages:
    """End-to-end mutation of a /history-shaped message list — covers
    the full transform applied by ``make_history_handler``."""

-    def test_decorates_tool_calls_and_marks_truncated(self) -> None:
+    def test_decorates_tool_calls_with_verdict_and_assessment(self) -> None:
        verdicts = {
            "call_a": {
                "risk_level": "high",
@@ -181,13 +181,6 @@ class TestDecorateHistoryMessages:
        assessments = {
            "call_a": {"risk_level": "high", "flags": '["secret"]', "redacted": 1},
        }
-        # Tool result content of exactly TOOL_RESULT_STORAGE_CAP chars
-        # hits the storage cap (longer is impossible — storage clamps
-        # at the cap).  Reference the constant rather than a literal so
-        # this test stays correct if the cap moves again.
-        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import TOOL_RESULT_STORAGE_CAP
-
-        truncated_content = "x" * TOOL_RESULT_STORAGE_CAP
        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
            {"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
            {
@@ -200,7 +193,7 @@ class TestDecorateHistoryMessages:
                    }
                ],
            },
-            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": truncated_content},
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": "long output"},
            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_b", "content": "short"},
        ]
        decorate_history_messages(messages, verdicts, assessments)
@@ -211,9 +204,12 @@ class TestDecorateHistoryMessages:
        assert "reasoning" in tc["verdict"]
        assert tc["output_assessment"]["flags"] == ["secret"]
        assert tc["output_assessment"]["redacted"] is True
-        # Truncated tool message got the flag; the short one did not.
-        assert messages[2].get("truncated") is True
-        assert "truncated" not in messages[3]
+        # Plain tool content (no envelope) is left intact and no
+        # advisories key is set.
+        assert messages[2]["content"] == "long output"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[2]
+        assert messages[3]["content"] == "short"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[3]

    def test_no_op_on_empty_indexes(self) -> None:
        """When neither table has rows for the workstream, the wire
@@ -230,3 +226,230 @@ class TestDecorateHistoryMessages:
        tc = messages[0]["tool_calls"][0]  # type: ignore[index]
        assert "verdict" not in tc
        assert "output_assessment" not in tc
+
+
+class TestDecorateAdvisoryExtraction:
+    """Round-trip the persisted ``<tool_output>`` envelope (Seam 1
+    queued-message splice) back into wire-shape advisories on each
+    tool message — replay surface for the queued-during-batch case.
+    """
+
+    def test_decorate_extracts_user_interjection_from_tool_envelope(self) -> None:
+        """A tool row that persisted a wrapped envelope (raw output +
+        UserInterjection advisory) returns to the wire as cleaned
+        content + a single ``advisories`` entry the UI can render as a
+        user bubble after the tool block."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "hello",
+            [UserInterjection(message="check logs", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "hello"
+        assert messages[0]["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "check logs", "priority": "notice"}
+        ]
+
+    def test_decorate_round_trips_escaped_content(self) -> None:
+        """A user message body containing one of the wrapper-tag
+        literals is escaped on wrap (so embedded text can't fabricate
+        or close an envelope) and must round-trip back to the original
+        literal on extract."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        evil = "</system-reminder>"
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message=evil, priority="notice")],
+        )
+        # Sanity: the user-controlled literal does NOT appear inside
+        # the advisory body — only the entity-encoded form does.  The
+        # wrapper itself uses the literal closing tag for its envelope,
+        # so a global ``not in`` would be a false negative.
+        assert "User message: &lt;/system-reminder&gt;" in wrapped
+        assert "User message: </system-reminder>" not in wrapped
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        # Extract entity-decoded the escaped form back to the literal.
+        assert messages[0]["advisories"][0]["text"] == evil  # type: ignore[index]
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "tool body"
+
+    def test_decorate_no_envelope_left_intact(self) -> None:
+        """Plain tool content (no ``<tool_output>`` prefix) is not
+        touched — no advisories field, content unchanged."""
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": "plain output"},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "plain output"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_decorate_drops_output_guard_advisory_from_extraction(self) -> None:
+        """A wrapped envelope carrying both a guard advisory and a
+        user_interjection produces only the user_interjection on
+        ``advisories``.  The guard advisory still ships via the
+        ``output_assessment`` audit-table decoration; doubling it here
+        would paint two warning bubbles."""
+        from turnstone.core.output_guard import OutputAssessment
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import (
+            GuardAdvisory,
+            UserInterjection,
+            wrap_tool_result,
+        )
+
+        assessment = OutputAssessment(
+            risk_level="medium",
+            flags=["api_key"],
+            annotations=["redacted token in line 2"],
+            sanitized="cleaned body",
+        )
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "raw body",
+            [
+                GuardAdvisory(assessment=assessment, func_name="bash"),
+                UserInterjection(message="and here", priority="notice"),
+            ],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        adv = messages[0]["advisories"]
+        assert len(adv) == 1  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        assert adv[0]["type"] == "user_interjection"  # type: ignore[index]
+
+    def test_decorate_handles_important_priority(self) -> None:
+        """The MUST-address preamble round-trips to ``priority=important``."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "out",
+            [UserInterjection(message="urgent", priority="important")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        adv = messages[0]["advisories"][0]  # type: ignore[index]
+        assert adv["priority"] == "important"
+        assert adv["text"] == "urgent"
+
+    def test_decorate_suppresses_empty_advisory_body(self) -> None:
+        """``queue_message`` doesn't reject empty / whitespace-only
+        text, so an advisory with an empty body can round-trip through
+        ``wrap_tool_result``.  ``_classify_advisory`` must filter those
+        out so replay doesn't paint a featureless empty user bubble.
+
+        Removing the ``if not body.strip(): return None`` guard in
+        ``_classify_advisory`` breaks this test."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message="", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        # Envelope is still stripped from content (the cleaning side
+        # of decoration runs unconditionally), but no advisories
+        # surface — the empty body is filtered.
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "tool body"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_decorate_suppresses_whitespace_only_advisory_body(self) -> None:
+        """Whitespace-only bodies are similarly suppressed — same
+        reasoning as the empty-body case."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message="   \n\t  ", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "tool body"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_wrap_extract_round_trips_preexisting_entities(self) -> None:
+        """A user message body containing literal HTML-entity references
+        matching the wrapper-escape forms must round-trip identically
+        through ``wrap_tool_result + extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope``.
+        Without escaping ``&`` first in the encode step, encode→decode
+        would produce the bare wrapper tag, fabricating an envelope the
+        wrapper layer never produced.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import (
+            extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope,
+        )
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        tricky = "I describe XML tags like &lt;tool_output&gt; in my docs."
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message=tricky, priority="notice")],
+        )
+        result = extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope(wrapped)
+        assert result is not None
+        cleaned, advisories = result
+        assert cleaned == "tool body"
+        assert len(advisories) == 1
+        # The original literal entity-reference text round-trips
+        # identically — the parser does not silently turn it into a
+        # bare wrapper tag.
+        assert advisories[0]["text"] == tricky
+
+    def test_save_load_decorate_round_trips_envelope(self, backend) -> None:
+        """End-to-end round-trip pinning the persisted-envelope
+        contract.  Persists a wrapped tool-output envelope via
+        ``save_message``, loads via ``load_messages``, runs
+        ``decorate_history_messages``, asserts the wire shape carries
+        the extracted advisory + cleaned content.  Pins the contract
+        every component in the chain participates in (persistence
+        layer ↔ in-memory replay ↔ wire projection) so a schema drift,
+        an envelope-format change, or a parser regression surfaces
+        here rather than only in production.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "command output",
+            [UserInterjection(message="check the logs", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        backend.register_workstream("ws_rt_1")
+        backend.save_message("ws_rt_1", "user", "go")
+        backend.save_message(
+            "ws_rt_1",
+            "assistant",
+            None,
+            tool_calls='[{"id":"call_a","type":"function","function":{"name":"bash","arguments":"{}"}}]',
+        )
+        backend.save_message(
+            "ws_rt_1",
+            "tool",
+            wrapped,
+            tool_call_id="call_a",
+        )
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("ws_rt_1")
+        # Persisted shape — content survives the storage layer
+        # untouched.  Symmetry with in-memory ``self.messages[i]['content']``
+        # is what makes envelope extraction lossless on replay.
+        tool_msg = next(m for m in msgs if m["role"] == "tool")
+        assert tool_msg["content"] == wrapped
+        # Decorate (the /history shared transform) — extracts the
+        # advisory and strips the envelope.
+        decorate_history_messages(msgs, {}, {})
+        tool_msg = next(m for m in msgs if m["role"] == "tool")
+        assert tool_msg["content"] == "command output"
+        assert tool_msg["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "check the logs", "priority": "notice"}
+        ]
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+"""Boundary-crossing integration test for the wake trigger pipeline.
+
+Drives a *real* :class:`SessionManager` + a *real* :class:`ChatSession`
+ a *real* :class:`IdleNudgeWatcher` end-to-end.  The only stub is the
+LLM provider (patched ``_create_stream_with_retry``); every other layer
+is production code:
+
+* ``SessionManager.set_state`` snapshotting + iterating subscribers
+* ``IdleNudgeWatcher._on_state`` peeking the queue
+* ``session_worker.send`` atomic-spawn + daemon thread
+* ``ChatSession.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue`` opening / closing
+  ``_wake_source_tag``
+* ``ChatSession.send`` chat loop short-circuiting metacog detection
+* ``_append_user_turn`` stamping ``_source = "system_nudge"``
+* ``_attach_pending_user_reminders`` draining ``USER_DRAIN``
+* ``_apply_reminders_for_provider`` splicing the rendered envelope
+  onto empty content
+
+Per ``feedback_tests_through_boundaries.md``: direct injection tests
+that bypass these boundaries silently mask wiring bugs.  This test is
+the structural integration gate.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.test_session_manager import FakeStorage
+from turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher import IdleNudgeWatcher
+from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
+from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
+from turnstone.core.workstream import Workstream, WorkstreamKind, WorkstreamState
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Minimal fake adapter / UI for this integration test.  Storage reuses
+# the canonical FakeStorage from test_session_manager.py to avoid the
+# drift risk of a parallel fake.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _FakeUI:
+    """Minimal UI surface for ChatSession + SessionManager.cleanup_ui."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.events: list[tuple[str, Any]] = []
+
+    def _unblock(self) -> None:  # SessionManager.close calls this
+        pass
+
+    def broadcast_ws_closed(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    # ChatSession callbacks (no-op for this test)
+    def on_thinking_start(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_thinking_end(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_state_change(self, state: str) -> None:
+        self.events.append(("state", state))
+
+    def on_user_reminder(self, reminders: Any, source: str | None = None) -> None:
+        self.events.append(("user_reminder", reminders, source))
+
+    def on_error(self, message: str) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_rename(self, name: str) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_output_warning(self, call_id: Any, assessment: Any) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name: str) -> Any:
+        # Catch-all for any UI hook not enumerated above so the chat
+        # loop's ``self.ui.<something>()`` call doesn't blow up.
+        return MagicMock()
+
+
+class _BuildRealSessionAdapter:
+    """Adapter that returns a real :class:`ChatSession` instead of a stub.
+
+    Tracks emit_* events the integration test asserts on.  Mirrors the
+    ``SessionKindAdapter`` + ``SessionEventEmitter`` Protocol surface
+    that production ``WebUI`` / coord adapters expose.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, kind: WorkstreamKind = WorkstreamKind.INTERACTIVE) -> None:
+        self.kind = kind
+        self.events: list[str] = []
+        self.cleaned_up: list[str] = []
+
+    def emit_created(self, ws: Workstream) -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"created:{ws.id}")
+
+    def emit_rehydrated(self, ws: Workstream) -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"rehydrated:{ws.id}")
+
+    def emit_state(self, ws: Workstream, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"state:{ws.id}:{state.value}")
+
+    def emit_closed(self, ws_id: str, *, reason: str = "closed", name: str = "") -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"closed:{ws_id}")
+
+    def cleanup_ui(self, ws: Workstream) -> None:
+        # Real production cleanup_ui calls ws.session.cancel() + close().
+        # We don't need that here — the test exits cleanly via pytest
+        # teardown without exercising the cleanup path.  Just record
+        # the call for any test that wants to assert on it.
+        self.cleaned_up.append(ws.id)
+
+    def build_ui(self, ws: Workstream) -> Any:
+        return _FakeUI()
+
+    def build_session(
+        self,
+        ws: Workstream,
+        *,
+        skill: Any = None,
+        model: Any = None,
+        client_type: Any = None,
+        **extra: Any,
+    ) -> Any:
+        # Mirror SessionManager.create's keyword set so config-threading
+        # bugs surface here rather than being silently swallowed by
+        # **kwargs.  ``model`` flows to the real ChatSession; the rest
+        # are accepted but not used by this test.
+        client = MagicMock()
+        return ChatSession(
+            client=client,
+            model=str(model) if model else "test-model",
+            ui=ws.ui,
+            instructions=None,
+            temperature=0.5,
+            max_tokens=4096,
+            tool_timeout=30,
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def real_mgr() -> tuple[SessionManager, _BuildRealSessionAdapter]:
+    """Real SessionManager wired to an adapter that builds real ChatSessions.
+
+    No StateWriter is wired so ``set_state`` writes directly to storage
+    on the calling thread (we want subscriber dispatch to fire in the
+    same thread the test invokes ``set_state`` on).
+    """
+    adapter = _BuildRealSessionAdapter()
+    storage = FakeStorage()
+    mgr = SessionManager(
+        adapter,
+        storage=storage,
+        max_active=5,
+        event_emitter=adapter,
+    )
+    return mgr, adapter
+
+
+def _wait_for_worker_done(ws: Workstream, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    """Poll ``ws._worker_running`` until it clears or timeout elapses."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        with ws._lock:
+            if not ws._worker_running:
+                return
+        time.sleep(0.01)
+    raise AssertionError(f"worker thread for ws={ws.id[:8]} didn't exit within {timeout}s")
+
+
+def test_idle_event_through_real_session_manager_drives_wake_send(real_mgr, tmp_db):
+    """The full wake pipeline, no direct-injection shortcuts.
+
+    Boundary path under test:
+      enqueue → mgr.set_state(IDLE)
+        → SessionManager._state_subscribers iteration (real)
+        → IdleNudgeWatcher._on_state (real)
+        → session_worker.send (real)
+        → real daemon thread
+        → ChatSession.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue (real)
+        → ChatSession.send("") (real, with patched LLM stream)
+        → _append_user_turn stamps ``_source``
+        → _attach_pending_user_reminders drains ``{"user","any"}``
+        → _apply_reminders_for_provider splices envelope onto empty content
+    """
+    mgr, _adapter = real_mgr
+    watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+    watcher.start()
+
+    try:
+        ws = mgr.create(user_id="u1", name="wake-int", skill=None)
+        assert ws.session is not None
+        # Patch the LLM-facing surface so send() runs the chat loop end-to-end
+        # without any real provider.  We patch on the just-built ChatSession;
+        # the patches are reverted by the `with` block.
+        with (
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=iter([])),
+            patch.object(
+                ws.session,
+                "_stream_response",
+                return_value={"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+            ),
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_update_token_table"),
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_print_status_line"),
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_visible_memory_count", return_value=0),
+            patch("turnstone.core.session.save_message"),
+        ):
+            # Suppress the auto-title side-thread; orthogonal to wake.
+            ws.session._title_generated = True
+
+            # Enqueue an any-channel nudge — the future ``idle_children`` shape.
+            ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("idle_children", "your kids", "any")
+            assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 1
+
+            # Trigger IDLE.  This runs subscriber dispatch synchronously on
+            # the calling thread → IdleNudgeWatcher._on_state → session_worker.send
+            # → spawn daemon thread → deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue.
+            mgr.set_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+            # Wait for the daemon thread to clear ``_worker_running`` so the
+            # post-conditions are stable.
+            _wait_for_worker_done(ws)
+
+        # Queue fully drained by the wake.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+        # The synthesized empty user message landed in history with the
+        # ``_source`` audit tag and the reminder side-channel populated.
+        user_msgs = [m for m in ws.session.messages if m.get("role") == "user"]
+        assert user_msgs, "expected a synthesized user message from the wake"
+        wake_msg = user_msgs[-1]
+        assert wake_msg["content"] == ""
+        assert wake_msg.get("_source") == "system_nudge"
+        assert wake_msg.get("_reminders") == [{"type": "idle_children", "text": "your kids"}]
+
+        # The wake-source tag is reset post-send so subsequent activity
+        # behaves normally.
+        assert ws.session._wake_source_tag == ""
+    finally:
+        watcher.shutdown()
+
+
+def test_idle_event_with_empty_queue_does_not_dispatch_wake(real_mgr, tmp_db):
+    """Non-empty queue is the gate.  An IDLE event on a workstream with
+    nothing queued must NOT call ``session_worker.send``.
+
+    Patches the dispatch primitive directly rather than racing a
+    ``time.sleep`` against an erroneous spawn — the question is
+    whether the watcher's gate fired, which is a deterministic
+    decision the patch captures.
+    """
+    mgr, _adapter = real_mgr
+    watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+    watcher.start()
+
+    try:
+        ws = mgr.create(user_id="u1", name="empty-int", skill=None)
+        # No enqueue.
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.set_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0, "wake must not dispatch for an empty queue"
+    finally:
+        watcher.shutdown()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def coord_mgr() -> tuple[SessionManager, _BuildRealSessionAdapter, FakeStorage]:
+    """Real coord-side SessionManager with the adapter's kind set to
+    COORDINATOR.  Same shape as ``real_mgr`` but for the coord half of
+    the lifespan.  No StateWriter wired so subscriber dispatch fires
+    synchronously on the test thread.
+    """
+    adapter = _BuildRealSessionAdapter(kind=WorkstreamKind.COORDINATOR)
+    storage = FakeStorage()
+    mgr = SessionManager(
+        adapter,
+        storage=storage,
+        max_active=5,
+        event_emitter=adapter,
+    )
+    return mgr, adapter, storage
+
+
+def test_coord_idle_with_active_children_emits_envelope_via_real_managers(coord_mgr, tmp_db):
+    """Full coord-path integration test (matches design doc §7.4).
+
+    Drives the production install order — ``CoordinatorIdleObserver``
+    registered FIRST, then ``IdleNudgeWatcher`` — and asserts the
+    full chain: observer enqueues on IDLE → watcher peeks → wake
+    spawns a worker → ``deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue`` drains and
+    runs the synthetic empty-user turn → reminder envelope reaches
+    the synthesized user message via the side-channel.
+
+    The boundary-crossing path tested here mirrors what
+    ``console/server.py``'s lifespan does at production startup; if
+    the install order is ever reversed, this test fails.
+    """
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_idle_observer import CoordinatorIdleObserver
+    from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamKind as _Kind
+
+    mgr, adapter, storage = coord_mgr
+    # Observer FIRST, then watcher.  Same order as
+    # ``console/server.py:4435-4443`` — production correctness depends
+    # on subscribers firing in registration order on the same IDLE.
+    observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+    observer.start()
+    watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+    watcher.start()
+
+    try:
+        coord = mgr.create(user_id="u1", name="parent-coord", skill=None)
+        assert coord.session is not None
+
+        # Two interactive children of the coord, both running.  Use
+        # the storage's register_workstream API so the rows match
+        # production shape (the observer queries via list_workstreams).
+        storage.register_workstream(
+            "child-a",
+            user_id="u1",
+            name="research-pricing",
+            kind=_Kind.INTERACTIVE,
+            parent_ws_id=coord.id,
+            state="running",
+        )
+        storage.register_workstream(
+            "child-b",
+            user_id="u1",
+            name="draft-rfc",
+            kind=_Kind.INTERACTIVE,
+            parent_ws_id=coord.id,
+            state="thinking",
+        )
+
+        # Pretend the coord has already had a real conversation so
+        # ``should_nudge``'s message_count > 1 gate passes.
+        coord.session.messages.append({"role": "user", "content": "spawn 2"})
+        coord.session.messages.append({"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"})
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=iter([])),
+            patch.object(
+                coord.session,
+                "_stream_response",
+                return_value={"role": "assistant", "content": "ack"},
+            ),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_update_token_table"),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_print_status_line"),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_visible_memory_count", return_value=0),
+            patch("turnstone.core.session.save_message"),
+        ):
+            coord.session._title_generated = True
+            mgr.set_state(coord.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            _wait_for_worker_done(coord)
+
+        # Queue drained — the wake delivered the observer's enqueue.
+        assert len(coord.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+        # The synthetic empty-user turn landed with a reminder containing
+        # both children.
+        user_msgs = [m for m in coord.session.messages if m.get("role") == "user"]
+        # Two real msgs (user + assistant context above) plus the wake.
+        wake_msg = user_msgs[-1]
+        assert wake_msg["content"] == ""
+        assert wake_msg.get("_source") == "system_nudge"
+        reminders = wake_msg.get("_reminders") or []
+        assert len(reminders) == 1
+        assert reminders[0]["type"] == "idle_children"
+        text = reminders[0]["text"]
+        assert "research-pricing" in text
+        assert "draft-rfc" in text
+        assert "child-a" in text
+        assert "child-b" in text
+        assert "wait_for_workstream" in text
+    finally:
+        watcher.shutdown()
+        observer.shutdown()
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`IdleNudgeWatcher`.
+
+Drives a fake :class:`SessionManager` that mimics the real one's
+``subscribe_to_state`` / ``get`` contract.  The watcher itself
+dispatches via ``turnstone.core.session_worker.send``; we patch that
+module-level function to capture calls without spawning real threads.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import threading
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher import IdleNudgeWatcher
+from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import NudgeQueue
+from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamState
+
+
+class _FakeSession:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._nudge_queue = NudgeQueue()
+        self.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue_called = 0
+
+    def deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue(self) -> None:
+        self.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue_called += 1
+
+
+class _FakeWorkstream:
+    def __init__(self, ws_id: str = "ws-test") -> None:
+        self.id = ws_id
+        self.session: _FakeSession | None = _FakeSession()
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._worker_running = False
+        self._closed = False
+        self.worker_thread: Any = None
+
+
+class _FakeManager:
+    """Mimics SessionManager's subscribe-to-state surface without a DB."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._workstreams: dict[str, _FakeWorkstream] = {}
+        self._subscribers: list[Any] = []
+        self._subscribers_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def add_ws(self, ws: _FakeWorkstream) -> None:
+        self._workstreams[ws.id] = ws
+
+    def get(self, ws_id: str) -> _FakeWorkstream | None:
+        return self._workstreams.get(ws_id)
+
+    def subscribe_to_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._subscribers_lock:
+            self._subscribers.append(callback)
+
+    def unsubscribe_from_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._subscribers_lock, contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
+            self._subscribers.remove(callback)
+
+    def fire_state(self, ws_id: str, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+        """Mirror SessionManager.set_state's subscriber-fan-out behaviour."""
+        with self._subscribers_lock:
+            subs = list(self._subscribers)
+        for cb in subs:
+            # Match contextlib.suppress(Exception) in real SessionManager.
+            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+                cb(ws_id, state)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fake_mgr_and_ws() -> tuple[_FakeManager, _FakeWorkstream]:
+    mgr = _FakeManager()
+    ws = _FakeWorkstream()
+    mgr.add_ws(ws)
+    return mgr, ws
+
+
+class TestIdleNudgeWatcher:
+    def test_idle_event_with_empty_queue_no_op(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_idle_event_with_pending_nudge_dispatches(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("idle_children", "your kids", "any")
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 1
+            kwargs = mock_send.call_args.kwargs
+            # `enqueue=lambda: None` — verify by calling and checking no-op.
+            assert kwargs["enqueue"]() is None
+            # `run` should call deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue when invoked.
+            kwargs["run"]()
+            assert ws.session.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue_called == 1
+            assert kwargs["thread_name"].startswith("wake-nudge-")
+
+    def test_non_idle_state_ignored(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("foo", "bar", "any")
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            for state in (
+                WorkstreamState.RUNNING,
+                WorkstreamState.THINKING,
+                WorkstreamState.ATTENTION,
+                WorkstreamState.ERROR,
+            ):
+                mgr.fire_state(ws.id, state)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_unknown_ws_ignored(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, _ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state("ghost", WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_session_none_ignored(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session = None  # workstream loaded but session not yet built
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_start_is_idempotent(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        watcher.start()  # no-op
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("foo", "bar", "any")
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            # Only one subscriber was registered despite the double-start.
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 1
+
+    def test_shutdown_unsubscribes(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("foo", "bar", "any")
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        watcher.shutdown()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_shutdown_is_idempotent(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, _ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        watcher.shutdown()
+        watcher.shutdown()  # no error
@@ -420,8 +420,9 @@ class TestSkillCatalogDisclosure:
        session.system_messages = []
        session._agent_system_messages = []
        session.reasoning_effort = "medium"
-        session._pending_tool_advisories = []
-        session._pending_user_advisories = []
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import NudgeQueue
+
+        session._nudge_queue = NudgeQueue()
        session._tool_search = None
        session._mcp_client = None
        session._notify_on_complete = "{}"
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+"""Structural gate against the Phase 7b sibling-bug pattern.
+
+Phase 7b's bug-1 was a single ``f"MCP X error: {e}"`` site dropping a
+structured-error JSON. Phase 8 introduces the ``consent_url`` field on
+the same JSON envelope: every ``_structured_error(...)`` invocation
+that emits ``mcp_consent_required`` or ``mcp_insufficient_scope`` MUST
+also pass a ``consent_url=`` kwarg, otherwise the dashboard renderer
+can't surface a re-consent button.
+
+This test is purely structural — it scans the source of
+:mod:`turnstone.core.mcp_client` and asserts every consent-required /
+insufficient-scope ``_structured_error`` call carries
+``consent_url=``. It catches future regressions where a new exec path
+adds a fourth call site and forgets the kwarg.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import turnstone.core.mcp_client as _mcp_client_module
+
+_USER_ACTIONABLE_CODES = ("mcp_consent_required", "mcp_insufficient_scope")
+
+
+def _read_source() -> str:
+    path = Path(_mcp_client_module.__file__)
+    return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def _find_structured_error_blocks(source: str) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
+    """Return ``(line_no, block)`` pairs for every ``_structured_error(...)``.
+
+    Each block is the call's argument list expanded across however many
+    lines the formatter chose. Uses a paren-counting walk so multi-line
+    kwargs and nested expressions are captured correctly.
+    """
+    blocks: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+    needle = "_structured_error("
+    idx = 0
+    while True:
+        loc = source.find(needle, idx)
+        if loc < 0:
+            break
+        # Skip the function definition itself.
+        if source[loc - 4 : loc] == "def ":
+            idx = loc + len(needle)
+            continue
+        line_no = source.count("\n", 0, loc) + 1
+        depth = 1
+        end = loc + len(needle)
+        while end < len(source) and depth > 0:
+            ch = source[end]
+            if ch == "(":
+                depth += 1
+            elif ch == ")":
+                depth -= 1
+            end += 1
+        blocks.append((line_no, source[loc:end]))
+        idx = end
+    return blocks
+
+
+def test_every_user_actionable_structured_error_passes_consent_url() -> None:
+    source = _read_source()
+    blocks = _find_structured_error_blocks(source)
+    user_actionable_blocks = [
+        (ln, blk)
+        for ln, blk in blocks
+        if any(f'code="{code}"' in blk for code in _USER_ACTIONABLE_CODES)
+    ]
+
+    # Sanity check: ensure we actually scanned the file the audit cares
+    # about (a stale path or import would otherwise silently pass with
+    # zero matches).
+    assert user_actionable_blocks, (
+        "No mcp_consent_required / mcp_insufficient_scope _structured_error "
+        "call sites found — has the audit been pointed at the wrong file?"
+    )
+
+    missing: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+    for ln, blk in user_actionable_blocks:
+        if "consent_url=" not in blk:
+            # Strip whitespace and truncate so the failure message is
+            # readable in CI.
+            collapsed = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", blk).strip()
+            missing.append((ln, collapsed[:200]))
+
+    assert not missing, (
+        "Sibling-bug regression: the following consent-required / "
+        "insufficient-scope _structured_error sites are missing the "
+        "consent_url= kwarg.\n" + "\n".join(f"  line {ln}: {snippet}" for ln, snippet in missing)
+    )
+
+
+def test_audit_finds_all_known_user_actionable_sites() -> None:
+    """Lock the count so accidental deletions are caught.
+
+    There are 13 user-actionable ``_structured_error`` call sites today
+    (4 each in the tool / resource / prompt token-classify branches +
+    3 in the post-retry-failed branches + 1 in ``_handle_auth_403``'s
+    insufficient-scope branch). If a new exec path is added the count
+    can rise; if a branch is removed the count can fall — both are
+    fine, but require an intentional bump of this number to confirm
+    the change went through review.
+    """
+    source = _read_source()
+    blocks = _find_structured_error_blocks(source)
+    user_actionable_count = sum(
+        1 for _, blk in blocks if any(f'code="{code}"' in blk for code in _USER_ACTIONABLE_CODES)
+    )
+    assert user_actionable_count == 13, (
+        f"Expected 13 user-actionable _structured_error sites, got "
+        f"{user_actionable_count}. If this is intentional, bump the "
+        f"expected count and document why in the commit message."
+    )
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+"""Tests for ``turnstone.core.mcp_crypto`` cipher + config loading.
+
+Covers token-at-rest encryption for OAuth-MCP.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
+    MCPTokenCipher,
+    MCPTokenCipherConfig,
+    MCPTokenDecryptError,
+    MCPTokenKeyConfigError,
+    _key_fingerprint,
+    _validate_key,
+    load_mcp_token_cipher_config,
+)
+
+
+def _new_raw_key() -> bytes:
+    """Return a fresh 32-byte Fernet key as raw bytes (post-base64-decode)."""
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Cipher round-trip
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCipherRoundTrip:
+    def test_round_trip_single_key(self) -> None:
+        cipher = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        plaintext = b"access_token_12345"
+        ct = cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
+        assert ct != plaintext
+        assert cipher.decrypt(ct) == plaintext
+
+    def test_round_trip_unicode_token(self) -> None:
+        cipher = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        # Tokens may legitimately carry UTF-8 bytes (e.g. JWT with
+        # non-ASCII claim values).  Round-trip a multi-byte sequence.
+        plaintext = "tok_é中💯".encode()
+        ct = cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
+        assert cipher.decrypt(ct) == plaintext
+
+    def test_wrong_key_raises_decrypt_error(self) -> None:
+        cipher_a = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        cipher_b = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        ct = cipher_a.encrypt(b"secret")
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError) as exc_info:
+            cipher_b.decrypt(ct)
+        # Audit-trail correlation: error must carry the fingerprints of
+        # the keys actually attempted, not a placeholder.
+        assert exc_info.value.key_fingerprints_attempted
+        assert exc_info.value.key_fingerprints_attempted == cipher_b.key_fingerprints
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Rotation (MultiFernet behavior)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestRotation:
+    def test_rotation_forward(self) -> None:
+        """Encrypt with a new-only cipher, decrypt with a [v2, v1] cluster.
+
+        Mirrors the operational situation where a node already has the
+        rotated key list installed and a peer just wrote a row under v2.
+        """
+        v1 = _new_raw_key()
+        v2 = _new_raw_key()
+        new_only = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v2,)))
+        cluster = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v2, v1)))
+        ct = new_only.encrypt(b"hello")
+        assert cluster.decrypt(ct) == b"hello"
+
+    def test_rotation_backward_keeps_old_decryptable(self) -> None:
+        """A row written under the OLD key (v1) must still decrypt after
+        rotation places v2 first and keeps v1 as fallback."""
+        v1 = _new_raw_key()
+        v2 = _new_raw_key()
+        old_only = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v1,)))
+        rotated = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v2, v1)))
+        ct = old_only.encrypt(b"legacy")
+        assert rotated.decrypt(ct) == b"legacy"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Config loader
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _patch_load_config(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, payload: dict) -> None:
+    """Override ``turnstone.core.config.load_config`` to return ``payload``
+    when the ``"security"`` section is requested."""
+
+    def fake(section: str | None = None) -> dict:
+        if section == "security":
+            return payload
+        return {}
+
+    import turnstone.core.config as cfg_mod
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cfg_mod, "load_config", fake)
+
+
+class TestLoadConfig:
+    def test_load_singular_key(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        key = Fernet.generate_key().decode()
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_key": key})
+        cfg = load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert cfg is not None
+        assert len(cfg.keys) == 1
+
+    def test_load_plural_overrides_singular(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        plural = [Fernet.generate_key().decode(), Fernet.generate_key().decode()]
+        _patch_load_config(
+            monkeypatch,
+            {
+                "mcp_token_encryption_keys": plural,
+                "mcp_token_encryption_key": Fernet.generate_key().decode(),
+            },
+        )
+        cfg = load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert cfg is not None
+        assert len(cfg.keys) == 2  # plural wins, singular ignored
+
+    def test_load_returns_none_when_absent(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {})
+        assert load_mcp_token_cipher_config() is None
+
+    def test_load_empty_plural_falls_through_to_singular(
+        self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+    ) -> None:
+        """Operator wrote ``mcp_token_encryption_keys = []`` AND set a
+        singular value: empty plural is treated as absent."""
+        key = Fernet.generate_key().decode()
+        _patch_load_config(
+            monkeypatch,
+            {"mcp_token_encryption_keys": [], "mcp_token_encryption_key": key},
+        )
+        cfg = load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert cfg is not None
+        assert len(cfg.keys) == 1
+
+    def test_load_invalid_base64_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_key": "###not-base64###"})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        # Operator-facing hint is part of every error message.
+        assert "regenerate with:" in str(exc_info.value)
+
+    def test_load_wrong_length_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        # 24 raw bytes → 32 base64 chars; not 32 raw bytes after decode.
+        short_key = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b"\x00" * 24).decode()
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_key": short_key})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert "32 bytes" in str(exc_info.value)
+
+    def test_load_non_list_plural_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_keys": "single-string-not-list"})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert "list" in str(exc_info.value).lower()
+
+    def test_load_non_string_in_plural_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_keys": [12345]})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fingerprint stability
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestFingerprint:
+    def test_key_fingerprint_stable_and_short(self) -> None:
+        key = _new_raw_key()
+        fp1 = _key_fingerprint(key)
+        fp2 = _key_fingerprint(key)
+        assert fp1 == fp2
+        # 8 bytes -> 16 hex characters.
+        assert len(fp1) == 16
+        assert all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in fp1)
+
+    def test_different_keys_have_different_fingerprints(self) -> None:
+        fp1 = _key_fingerprint(_new_raw_key())
+        fp2 = _key_fingerprint(_new_raw_key())
+        assert fp1 != fp2
+
+    def test_cipher_fingerprints_match_keys(self) -> None:
+        v1 = _new_raw_key()
+        v2 = _new_raw_key()
+        cipher = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v1, v2)))
+        assert cipher.key_fingerprints == (
+            _key_fingerprint(v1),
+            _key_fingerprint(v2),
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Direct ``_validate_key`` — exercises edge cases not reachable via loader
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestValidateKey:
+    def test_empty_string_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            _validate_key("", label="x")
+
+    def test_whitespace_only_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            _validate_key("   ", label="x")
+
+    def test_label_propagated_in_error(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            _validate_key("###", label="my_label_42")
+        assert "my_label_42" in str(exc_info.value)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# MCPTokenCipher constructor guard
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCipherConstructorGuard:
+    def test_empty_keys_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=()))
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations

 from typing import Any

+from tests.conftest import _seed_static_state
 from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager

 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -105,14 +106,18 @@ class TestRemoveServerSync:
        """remove_server_sync cleans up all per-server state dicts."""
        mgr = MCPClientManager({"test": {"command": "echo"}})
        # Simulate state as if the server was connected
-        mgr._per_server_tools["test"] = [_fake_openai_tool()]
-        mgr._per_server_resources["test"] = [_fake_resource_dict()]
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["test"] = [_fake_prompt_dict()]
-        mgr._supports_list_changed["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_resources["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_resource_list_changed["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_prompts["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_prompt_list_changed["test"] = True
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "test",
+            tools=[_fake_openai_tool()],
+            resources=[_fake_resource_dict()],
+            prompts=[_fake_prompt_dict()],
+            supports_list_changed=True,
+            supports_resources=True,
+            supports_resource_list_changed=True,
+            supports_prompts=True,
+            supports_prompt_list_changed=True,
+        )
        mgr._rebuild_tools()
        mgr._rebuild_resources()
        mgr._rebuild_prompts()
@@ -127,14 +132,7 @@ class TestRemoveServerSync:
        assert len(mgr.get_tools()) == 0
        assert mgr.resource_count == 0
        assert mgr.prompt_count == 0
-        assert "test" not in mgr._per_server_tools
-        assert "test" not in mgr._per_server_resources
-        assert "test" not in mgr._per_server_prompts
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_list_changed
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_resources
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_resource_list_changed
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_prompts
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_prompt_list_changed
+        assert "test" not in mgr._static_servers

    def test_removes_config_to_prevent_reconnect(self) -> None:
        """remove_server_sync removes from _server_configs to prevent reconnect."""
@@ -146,8 +144,8 @@ class TestRemoveServerSync:
    def test_preserves_other_servers(self) -> None:
        """Removing one server does not affect another server's state."""
        mgr = MCPClientManager({"srv_a": {}, "srv_b": {}})
-        mgr._per_server_tools["srv_a"] = [_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_a__foo")]
-        mgr._per_server_tools["srv_b"] = [_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_b__bar")]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "srv_a", tools=[_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_a__foo")])
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "srv_b", tools=[_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_b__bar")])
        mgr._rebuild_tools()

        assert len(mgr.get_tools()) == 2
@@ -179,13 +177,17 @@ class TestGetServerStatus:
        """Status of a connected server reports correct tool/resource/prompt counts."""
        mgr = MCPClientManager({"test": {}})
        # Simulate connected state
-        mgr._sessions["test"] = object()  # any truthy value
-        mgr._per_server_tools["test"] = [
-            _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__a"),
-            _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__b"),
-        ]
-        mgr._per_server_resources["test"] = [_fake_resource_dict()]
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["test"] = [_fake_prompt_dict()]
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "test",
+            session=object(),  # any truthy value
+            tools=[
+                _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__a"),
+                _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__b"),
+            ],
+            resources=[_fake_resource_dict()],
+            prompts=[_fake_prompt_dict()],
+        )

        status = mgr.get_server_status("test")
        assert status["connected"] is True
@@ -225,8 +227,7 @@ class TestGetAllServerStatus:
    def test_mixed_connected_and_disconnected(self) -> None:
        """Status correctly reflects a mix of connected and disconnected servers."""
        mgr = MCPClientManager({"up": {}, "down": {}})
-        mgr._sessions["up"] = object()
-        mgr._per_server_tools["up"] = [_fake_openai_tool("mcp__up__x")]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "up", session=object(), tools=[_fake_openai_tool("mcp__up__x")])

        statuses = mgr.get_all_server_status()
        assert statuses["up"]["connected"] is True
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+"""Unit tests for ``turnstone.core.mcp_http_parsers``.
+
+The parser replaces the prior hand-rolled scanners that used
+``header.lower().find("scope")`` to locate parameter names — that approach
+misparsed ``scope`` embedded inside other tokens (``xscope``) or inside
+quoted-string values of preceding params. Each adversarial case below
+asserts the new tokenizer respects RFC 7235 ``challenge → auth-param``
+boundaries; the docstrings document the equivalent input that broke the
+naive parser. Negative-test verification: temporarily reverting
+``parse_www_authenticate_scope`` to delegate to ``header.lower().find("scope")``
+makes ``test_scope_inside_realm_value`` and ``test_scope_inside_xscope`` fail.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_http_parsers import (
+    parse_www_authenticate_bearer,
+    parse_www_authenticate_error,
+    parse_www_authenticate_scope,
+)
+
+
+class TestParseScope:
+    def test_basic_scope(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:read mail:send"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("files:read", "mail:send")
+
+    def test_no_scope_param(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope('Bearer error="invalid_token"') == ()
+
+    def test_unterminated_quoted_string_returns_empty(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope('Bearer scope="files:read') == ()
+
+    def test_escaped_chars_in_value_drops_invalid_scope_token(self) -> None:
+        # RFC 7230 §3.2.6 backslash escapes decode the literal scope to
+        # ``files:read "weird"``. RFC 6749 §3.3 ``scope-token`` forbids
+        # ``"``, so ``"weird"`` is dropped and only ``files:read``
+        # survives the post-split validation.
+        header = r'Bearer scope="files:read \"weird\""'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("files:read",)
+
+    def test_empty_string(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope("") == ()
+
+    def test_unquoted_scope_value(self) -> None:
+        # Unquoted single token.
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope("Bearer scope=files:read") == ("files:read",)
+
+    # --- the four headline misparse cases ---
+
+    def test_scope_inside_xscope(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer xscope="value"`` must NOT be read as ``scope``.
+
+        The naive ``find("scope")`` matched at position 7 inside
+        ``xscope`` and returned ``("value",)``.
+        """
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope('Bearer xscope="value"') == ()
+
+    def test_scope_inside_realm_value(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer realm="my scope=fake", scope="real"`` must return ``("real",)``.
+
+        The naive parser found ``scope=`` inside the quoted ``realm``
+        value first and returned ``("fake",)``.
+        """
+        header = 'Bearer realm="my scope=fake", scope="real"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("real",)
+
+    def test_scope_inside_quoted_realm_with_escaped_quotes(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer realm="foo scope=\\"admin:write\\" bar"`` returns ``()``.
+
+        The inner ``scope=`` is wholly inside the quoted-string value of
+        ``realm`` — there is no top-level ``scope`` auth-param, so the
+        result is empty.
+        """
+        header = r'Bearer realm="foo scope=\"admin:write\" bar"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ()
+
+    def test_scope_token_validation_drops_control_bytes(self) -> None:
+        """Tokens containing CR / LF / tab / DEL / quote are dropped.
+
+        RFC 6749 §3.3 restricts ``scope-token`` to visible ASCII
+        excluding ``"`` and ``\\``. The splitter applies that
+        validation so a malicious AS cannot smuggle CRLF (or the like)
+        through a future log / notification path that prints the scope
+        list verbatim. ``"a\\rb"`` and ``"\\nc"`` fail validation;
+        ``"d"`` survives. The legitimate space separator splits ``d``
+        into its own token.
+        """
+        # Build via concatenation so the assertion stays intelligible.
+        header = 'Bearer scope="a\rb \nc d"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("d",)
+
+
+class TestParseError:
+    def test_basic_quoted_error(self) -> None:
+        assert (
+            parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error="insufficient_scope"')
+            == "insufficient_scope"
+        )
+
+    def test_other_quoted_error_tokens(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error="invalid_token"') == "invalid_token"
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error="invalid_request"') == "invalid_request"
+
+    def test_no_error_param(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error("Bearer realm=foo") is None
+
+    def test_error_description_does_not_match_error(self) -> None:
+        """``error_description`` is its own auth-param key, not ``error``.
+
+        The tokenizer reads ``_`` as part of the token (RFC 7230 ``tchar``),
+        so ``error_description`` becomes one key, ``error`` another.
+        """
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error_description="bad"') is None
+
+    def test_unquoted_error(self) -> None:
+        # Some ASes don't quote the error token.
+        assert (
+            parse_www_authenticate_error("Bearer error=insufficient_scope") == "insufficient_scope"
+        )
+
+    def test_empty_string(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error("") is None
+
+    def test_error_inside_realm_value(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer realm="my error=fake", error="real"`` must return ``"real"``.
+
+        Naive parser grabbed ``fake`` from inside the ``realm`` quoted
+        value.
+        """
+        header = 'Bearer realm="my error=fake", error="real"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error(header) == "real"
+
+
+class TestBearerDict:
+    def test_returns_lowercased_keys(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer Realm="x", Error="y", Scope="a b"'
+        params = parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header)
+        assert params == {"realm": "x", "error": "y", "scope": "a b"}
+
+    def test_non_bearer_scheme_returns_empty(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer('Basic realm="x"') == {}
+
+    def test_no_scheme(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer('realm="x"') == {}
+
+    def test_bearer_only_no_params(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer("Bearer ") == {}
+
+    def test_bearer_with_no_space_returns_empty(self) -> None:
+        # ``BearerToken`` is not a Bearer challenge (no separator).
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer("BearerToken") == {}
+
+    def test_first_value_wins_on_duplicate(self) -> None:
+        # If a malformed AS sends two ``scope=`` params we keep the first.
+        # The earlier ``find()``-based scanner would have returned the
+        # last; either choice is legal for malformed input but we need
+        # to be consistent.
+        header = 'Bearer scope="first", scope="second"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"scope": "first"}
+
+    def test_trailing_comma(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer error="x",'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"error": "x"}
+
+    def test_multiple_commas(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer ,, error="x",,, scope="y"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"error": "x", "scope": "y"}
+
+    def test_embedded_escaped_quote(self) -> None:
+        header = r'Bearer realm="he said \"hi\""'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"realm": 'he said "hi"'}
+
+    def test_param_without_value_skipped(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer realm, error="x"'
+        # ``realm`` without ``=`` is dropped; ``error`` survives.
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"error": "x"}
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "header,expected",
+        [
+            ("", {}),
+            ("Bearer", {}),
+            ('Bearer realm=""', {"realm": ""}),
+            ('Bearer realm="", scope=""', {"realm": "", "scope": ""}),
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_edge_cases(self, header: str, expected: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == expected
+
+
+class TestPathologicalInput:
+    def test_oversized_pathological_input_rejected_under_50ms(self) -> None:
+        """Headers longer than the defensive cap return ``{}`` immediately.
+
+        The cap is set to 4096 bytes — real ASes emit a few hundred bytes
+        at most. This guards both ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer``
+        callers against pathological input from a misbehaving server.
+        The previous ``header.lower().find("scope", i)`` loop was
+        O(N**2) — a 100 KB header with no ``=`` took ~330 ms because
+        each ``find`` rescanned the entire suffix. The single-pass
+        tokenizer (capped at 4 KB) reduces this to a one-shot length
+        check that returns ``{}`` in microseconds, so the budget is
+        generous regardless of which side of the cap was hit.
+        """
+        big = "Bearer scope=" + "a" * 10_000
+        start = time.perf_counter()
+        result = parse_www_authenticate_scope(big)
+        elapsed = time.perf_counter() - start
+        assert result == ()
+        assert elapsed < 0.05, f"oversized-header reject took {elapsed * 1000:.1f}ms"
+
+    def test_within_cap_long_header_under_50ms(self) -> None:
+        """A 4 KB header with thousands of ``find`` candidates still parses fast.
+
+        Stays under the cap so the tokenizer actually runs end to end —
+        the goal is to prove the inner loop is O(N), not just that the
+        cap rejects oversized input.
+        """
+        # Pack the header right up to the cap with non-matching
+        # auth-params, then put the real ``scope`` at the end.
+        filler_parts = []
+        size = len("Bearer ")
+        i = 0
+        while size < 3900:
+            part = f'xscope{i}="ignore", '
+            if size + len(part) > 3900:
+                break
+            filler_parts.append(part)
+            size += len(part)
+            i += 1
+        header = "Bearer " + "".join(filler_parts) + 'scope="real"'
+        assert len(header) <= 4096
+        start = time.perf_counter()
+        result = parse_www_authenticate_scope(header)
+        elapsed = time.perf_counter() - start
+        assert result == ("real",)
+        assert elapsed < 0.05, f"4kb tokenize took {elapsed * 1000:.1f}ms"
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock

 import pytest

+from tests.conftest import _seed_static_state
 from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
 from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend

@@ -109,13 +110,15 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:

    def test_rebuild_resources_produces_merged_state(self, mgr: MCPClientManager) -> None:
        """_rebuild_resources merges per-server resources into a unified list."""
-        mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
-            _make_resource("file:///b.txt", "b", "alpha"),
-        ]
-        mgr._per_server_resources["beta"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///c.txt", "c", "beta"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "alpha",
+            resources=[
+                _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
+                _make_resource("file:///b.txt", "b", "alpha"),
+            ],
+        )
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "beta", resources=[_make_resource("file:///c.txt", "c", "beta")])

        mgr._rebuild_resources()

@@ -130,13 +133,19 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:

    def test_rebuild_prompts_produces_merged_state(self, mgr: MCPClientManager) -> None:
        """_rebuild_prompts merges per-server prompts into a unified list."""
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello"),
-        ]
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["beta"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__beta__summarize", "summarize", "beta", "Summarize text"),
-            _make_prompt("mcp__beta__translate", "translate", "beta", "Translate text"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "alpha",
+            prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello")],
+        )
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "beta",
+            prompts=[
+                _make_prompt("mcp__beta__summarize", "summarize", "beta", "Summarize text"),
+                _make_prompt("mcp__beta__translate", "translate", "beta", "Translate text"),
+            ],
+        )

        mgr._rebuild_prompts()

@@ -164,10 +173,12 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
        try:
            # Populate session and resource map
            session = _make_mock_session()
-            mgr._sessions["alpha"] = session
-            mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-                _make_resource("file:///readme.md", "readme", "alpha"),
-            ]
+            _seed_static_state(
+                mgr,
+                "alpha",
+                session=session,
+                resources=[_make_resource("file:///readme.md", "readme", "alpha")],
+            )
            mgr._rebuild_resources()

            result = mgr.read_resource_sync("file:///readme.md", timeout=5)
@@ -194,18 +205,22 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:

        try:
            session = _make_mock_session()
-            mgr._sessions["alpha"] = session
            # Register a template resource (no concrete resources)
-            mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-                {
-                    "uri": "db://tables/{table}/rows/{id}",
-                    "name": "row",
-                    "description": "Fetch a row",
-                    "mimeType": "application/json",
-                    "server": "alpha",
-                    "template": True,
-                },
-            ]
+            _seed_static_state(
+                mgr,
+                "alpha",
+                session=session,
+                resources=[
+                    {
+                        "uri": "db://tables/{table}/rows/{id}",
+                        "name": "row",
+                        "description": "Fetch a row",
+                        "mimeType": "application/json",
+                        "server": "alpha",
+                        "template": True,
+                    },
+                ],
+            )
            mgr._rebuild_resources()

            # Template should not be in _resource_map
@@ -230,10 +245,12 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:

        try:
            session = _make_mock_session()
-            mgr._sessions["alpha"] = session
-            mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-                _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello"),
-            ]
+            _seed_static_state(
+                mgr,
+                "alpha",
+                session=session,
+                prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello")],
+            )
            mgr._rebuild_prompts()

            messages = mgr.get_prompt_sync(
@@ -314,40 +331,42 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
    def test_shutdown_clears_all_state(self, mgr: MCPClientManager) -> None:
        """shutdown() clears sessions, tools, resources, prompts, and listeners."""
        # Populate state
-        mgr._sessions["alpha"] = MagicMock()
-        mgr._per_server_tools["alpha"] = [
-            {
-                "type": "function",
-                "function": {
-                    "name": "mcp__alpha__search",
-                    "description": "Search",
-                    "parameters": {},
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "alpha",
+            session=MagicMock(),
+            tools=[
+                {
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {
+                        "name": "mcp__alpha__search",
+                        "description": "Search",
+                        "parameters": {},
+                    },
+                }
+            ],
+            resources=[
+                _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
+                {
+                    "uri": "db://tables/{table}",
+                    "name": "table",
+                    "description": "",
+                    "mimeType": "",
+                    "server": "alpha",
+                    "template": True,
                },
-            }
-        ]
+            ],
+            prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha")],
+        )
        mgr._rebuild_tools()
-        mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
-            {
-                "uri": "db://tables/{table}",
-                "name": "table",
-                "description": "",
-                "mimeType": "",
-                "server": "alpha",
-                "template": True,
-            },
-        ]
        mgr._rebuild_resources()
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha"),
-        ]
        mgr._rebuild_prompts()
        mgr._listeners.append(lambda: None)
        mgr._resource_listeners.append(lambda: None)
        mgr._prompt_listeners.append(lambda: None)

        # Verify populated
-        assert len(mgr._sessions) == 1
+        assert len(mgr._static_servers) == 1
        assert len(mgr._tools) == 1
        assert len(mgr._resources) == 2  # 1 concrete + 1 template
        assert len(mgr._template_prefixes) == 1
@@ -355,7 +374,7 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:

        mgr.shutdown()

-        assert len(mgr._sessions) == 0
+        assert len(mgr._static_servers) == 0
        assert len(mgr._tools) == 0
        assert len(mgr._tool_map) == 0
        assert len(mgr._resources) == 0
@@ -376,19 +395,15 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
        mgr.add_resource_listener(lambda: resource_fired.append(1))
        mgr.add_prompt_listener(lambda: prompt_fired.append(1))

-        mgr._per_server_tools["alpha"] = []
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "alpha", tools=[])
        mgr._rebuild_tools()
        assert len(tool_fired) == 1

-        mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///x.txt", "x", "alpha"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "alpha", resources=[_make_resource("file:///x.txt", "x", "alpha")])
        mgr._rebuild_resources()
        assert len(resource_fired) == 1

-        mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__p1", "p1", "alpha"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "alpha", prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__p1", "p1", "alpha")])
        mgr._rebuild_prompts()
        assert len(prompt_fired) == 1

@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+"""Integration tests for the MCP OAuth ``/connections`` endpoints.
+
+Covers the list and revoke handlers that surface user-owned MCP server
+consents to the settings UI:
+
+* ``GET /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections`` — non-secret projection only.
+* ``DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name}`` — best-effort
+  upstream revoke (RFC 7009) followed by the authoritative local
+  delete; cross-user attempts return 404 with the exact same body
+  shape as a never-existed row to avoid leaking tenant existence.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.middleware import Middleware
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+from starlette.routing import Mount, Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+    handle_mcp_oauth_list_connections,
+    handle_mcp_oauth_revoke_connection,
+)
+from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fixtures + helpers (mirror tests/test_mcp_oauth_handlers.py)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _InjectAuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Stamp a fixed authenticated user on every request."""
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, user_id: str = "user-1") -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._user_id = user_id
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
+            user_id=self._user_id,
+            scopes=frozenset({"write"}),
+            token_source="config",
+            permissions=frozenset({"read", "write"}),
+        )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+class _NoAuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Leave ``request.state.auth_result`` unset so handlers see anon."""
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+async def _list_handler(request: Request) -> Response:
+    return await handle_mcp_oauth_list_connections(request)
+
+
+async def _revoke_handler(request: Request) -> Response:
+    return await handle_mcp_oauth_revoke_connection(request)
+
+
+def _build_app(
+    *,
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    http_client: httpx.AsyncClient | MagicMock,
+    token_store: MCPTokenStore | None,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    mcp_client: Any = None,
+    authenticated: bool = True,
+) -> Starlette:
+    middleware: list[Middleware]
+    if authenticated:
+        middleware = [Middleware(_InjectAuthMiddleware, user_id=user_id)]
+    else:
+        middleware = [Middleware(_NoAuthMiddleware)]
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=[
+            Mount(
+                "/v1",
+                routes=[
+                    Route("/api/mcp/oauth/connections", _list_handler),
+                    Route(
+                        "/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name}",
+                        _revoke_handler,
+                        methods=["DELETE"],
+                    ),
+                ],
+            ),
+        ],
+        middleware=middleware,
+    )
+    app.state.auth_storage = storage
+    app.state.mcp_token_store = token_store
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_http_client = http_client
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_refresh_locks = {}
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_dcr_locks = {}
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_metadata_cache = {}
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_last_cleanup_monotonic = 0.0
+    app.state.oidc_config = OIDCConfig(enabled=False, redirect_base="https://testserver")
+    if mcp_client is not None:
+        app.state.mcp_client = mcp_client
+    return app
+
+
+def _make_token_store(backend: SQLiteBackend) -> MCPTokenStore:
+    return MCPTokenStore(backend, make_mcp_token_cipher(), node_id="test")
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_user_server(
+    backend: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "srv-oauth",
+    server_id: str = "srv-id-1",
+    cached_issuer: str | None = "https://as.example.com",
+) -> str:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid profile",
+        oauth_audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        oauth_authorization_server_url=None,
+    )
+    if cached_issuer is not None:
+        backend.update_mcp_server(server_id, oauth_as_issuer_cached=cached_issuer)
+    return server_id
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    token_store: MCPTokenStore,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "srv-oauth",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-secret",
+) -> None:
+    token_store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token="access-secret",
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at="2099-12-31T00:00:00",
+        scopes="openid profile",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _good_as_metadata_doc(
+    *, revocation_endpoint: str | None = "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    doc: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
+        "authorization_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/authorize",
+        "token_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/token",
+        "registration_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/register",
+        "jwks_uri": "https://as.example.com/jwks",
+        "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"],
+        "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["none", "client_secret_basic"],
+    }
+    if revocation_endpoint is not None:
+        doc["revocation_endpoint"] = revocation_endpoint
+    return doc
+
+
+def _mk_response(
+    status_code: int = 200,
+    json_body: Any = None,
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> MagicMock:
+    import json as _json
+
+    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    resp.status_code = status_code
+    resp.headers = headers or {}
+    body_str = _json.dumps(json_body) if json_body is not None else ""
+    resp.content = body_str.encode("utf-8")
+    if json_body is not None:
+        resp.json.return_value = json_body
+    else:
+        resp.json.side_effect = ValueError("no body")
+    resp.text = body_str
+    return resp
+
+
+def _public_addr_patch():
+    return patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))])
+
+
+def _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client: TestClient, timeout: float = 2.0) -> None:
+    """Block until all in-flight upstream-revoke tasks complete.
+
+    Phase 8 perf-1 made the RFC 7009 AS round-trip a fire-and-forget
+    task so the user-visible 204 isn't gated on the AS. The tasks were
+    scheduled on the TestClient's portal loop; we re-enter that loop
+    via :attr:`TestClient.portal` to await them. Tests that assert
+    against the upstream POST must call this helper before the
+    assertion.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import _revoke_upstream_tasks
+
+    portal = getattr(client, "portal", None)
+    if portal is None:
+        return
+
+    async def _drain() -> None:
+        pending = list(_revoke_upstream_tasks)
+        if pending:
+            async with asyncio.timeout(timeout):
+                await asyncio.gather(*pending, return_exceptions=True)
+
+    portal.call(_drain)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    backend = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+    backend.create_user("user-1", "user1", "User One", "hash")
+    backend.create_user("user-2", "user2", "User Two", "hash")
+    return backend
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def http_client_mock() -> MagicMock:
+    client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+    client.get = AsyncMock()
+    client.post = AsyncMock()
+    return client
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /connections
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestListConnections:
+    def test_list_connections_unauthenticated_401(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            authenticated=False,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 401
+        assert resp.json() == {"error": "Authentication required"}
+
+    def test_list_connections_no_token_store_503(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=None)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 503
+
+    def test_list_connections_empty_user_returns_empty_list(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json() == {"connections": []}
+
+    def test_list_connections_returns_users_consents(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage, name="srv-a", server_id="srv-id-a")
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage, name="srv-b", server_id="srv-id-b")
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, server_name="srv-a")
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, server_name="srv-b")
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        body = resp.json()
+        assert "connections" in body
+        servers = sorted(row["server_name"] for row in body["connections"])
+        assert servers == ["srv-a", "srv-b"]
+
+    def test_list_connections_isolates_by_user(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, user_id="user-1", server_name="srv-oauth")
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, user_id="user-2", server_name="srv-oauth")
+
+        # User-1 sees only user-1's row.
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store, user_id="user-1"
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        rows = resp.json()["connections"]
+        assert all(row["user_id"] == "user-1" for row in rows)
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+
+        # User-2 sees only user-2's row.
+        app2 = _build_app(
+            storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store, user_id="user-2"
+        )
+        client2 = TestClient(app2, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp2 = client2.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        rows2 = resp2.json()["connections"]
+        assert all(row["user_id"] == "user-2" for row in rows2)
+        assert len(rows2) == 1
+
+    def test_list_connections_does_not_leak_secret_fields(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        rows = resp.json()["connections"]
+        assert rows
+        for row in rows:
+            for forbidden in (
+                "access_token",
+                "refresh_token",
+                "access_token_ct",
+                "refresh_token_ct",
+            ):
+                assert forbidden not in row, f"secret field {forbidden!r} leaked in {row!r}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# DELETE /connections/{server_name}
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestRevokeConnection:
+    def test_revoke_connection_unauthenticated_401(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store)
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            authenticated=False,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_missing_row_404(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-nonexistent")
+        assert resp.status_code == 404
+        assert resp.json() == {"error": "No such connection"}
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_local_delete_succeeds_204(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        # No refresh token → upstream revoke is skipped entirely.
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        # Local row is gone.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+        # Upstream not contacted.
+        http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_with_revocation_endpoint_calls_upstream(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+        http_client_mock.post.return_value = _mk_response(200)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        # ``with TestClient(...)`` keeps a persistent portal so the
+        # fire-and-forget upstream-revoke task isn't cancelled when
+        # the request handler returns. See ``_drain_revoke_upstream_tasks``.
+        # The SSRF-validator's ``socket.getaddrinfo`` patch must wrap
+        # the drain too — the discovery call now runs on the background
+        # task and resolves the AS hostname after the request returns.
+        with (
+            TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False) as client,
+            _public_addr_patch(),
+        ):
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+
+            assert resp.status_code == 204
+            # Local row is gone.
+            assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+            # The upstream RFC 7009 POST is fire-and-forget post-Phase-8 perf-1
+            # so the test must drain the in-flight task set before asserting.
+            _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client)
+            # Upstream POSTed to revocation_endpoint with refresh-token grant.
+            assert http_client_mock.post.await_count == 1
+            call = http_client_mock.post.await_args
+            assert call.args[0] == "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+            data = call.kwargs.get("data") or {}
+            assert data.get("token") == "refresh-secret"
+            assert data.get("token_type_hint") == "refresh_token"
+            assert data.get("client_id") == "client-abc"
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_without_revocation_endpoint_skips_upstream(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(
+            200, _good_as_metadata_doc(revocation_endpoint=None)
+        )
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        # ``with TestClient(...)`` keeps the portal alive for the
+        # background task drain.
+        with (
+            TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False) as client,
+            _public_addr_patch(),
+        ):
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+
+            assert resp.status_code == 204
+            # Local row gone, upstream POST never made.
+            assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+            # Drain the fire-and-forget discovery task before asserting on
+            # the AS POST — the task runs ``discover_authorization_server``
+            # but does NOT proceed to POST because revocation_endpoint is
+            # absent.
+            _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client)
+            http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_upstream_failure_still_204(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+        # AS returns 500 — local delete must still succeed.
+        http_client_mock.post.return_value = _mk_response(500)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+
+        with _public_addr_patch():
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_audit_event_emitted_with_user_revoked_reason(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+        # Audit row was written via the storage API (tests don't poke at
+        # the SQLite schema directly — the table name is an internal
+        # detail).
+        events = storage.list_audit_events(action="mcp_server.oauth.token_revoked")
+        assert len(events) == 1
+        ev = events[0]
+        assert ev["user_id"] == "user-1"
+        # resource_id is the immutable server_id PK, not the name.
+        assert ev["resource_id"] == "srv-id-1"
+        import json as _json
+
+        detail = _json.loads(ev["detail"]) if isinstance(ev["detail"], str) else ev["detail"]
+        assert detail["reason"] == "user_revoked"
+        assert detail["upstream_revoke_outcome"] == "no_refresh_token"
+        assert detail["server_name"] == "srv-oauth"
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_cross_user_attempt_404(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        # Owned by user-2, not user-1.
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, user_id="user-2", server_name="srv-oauth")
+
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store, user_id="user-1"
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        # Cross-user attempt MUST surface as a generic 404, byte-identical
+        # body to the never-existed case (no tenant existence leak).
+        assert resp.status_code == 404
+        assert resp.json() == {"error": "No such connection"}
+        # Drain pending tasks defensively, then confirm the upstream
+        # endpoint was NEVER contacted on the 404-cross-user path. A
+        # bug that scheduled the AS round-trip before the cross-user
+        # check would leak existence via the AS-side 200/4xx response.
+        _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client)
+        http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+        # User-2's row is untouched.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-2", "srv-oauth") is not None
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_evicts_pool_session(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        mcp_client_mock = MagicMock()
+        # ``evict_user_session`` is the public sync surface on
+        # MCPClientManager; mirror its signature here so the handler's
+        # ``hasattr`` gate triggers.
+        mcp_client_mock.evict_user_session = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            mcp_client=mcp_client_mock,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+        mcp_client_mock.evict_user_session.assert_called_once_with("user-1", "srv-oauth")
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_pool_eviction_failure_does_not_block_204(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        mcp_client_mock = MagicMock()
+        mcp_client_mock.evict_user_session = MagicMock(side_effect=RuntimeError("loop closed"))
+
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            mcp_client=mcp_client_mock,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        # Local delete still happened.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_204_not_gated_on_slow_upstream(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        """The user-visible 204 must return promptly even when the
+        upstream AS round-trip is slow / hanging. Pre-perf-1 the
+        handler awaited ``revoke_token_at_as`` synchronously, so a
+        stuck AS could block the user's revoke confirmation. The
+        fire-and-forget refactor moves the call onto a background task
+        so the 204 returns in well under 1s regardless of AS latency.
+        Bound is conservative for CI runner jitter.
+        """
+        import time
+
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+
+        async def _slow_post(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+            # Simulate a slow / unreachable AS — must NOT gate the
+            # user-visible 204 on this round-trip.
+            await asyncio.sleep(5.0)
+            return _mk_response(200)
+
+        http_client_mock.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=_slow_post)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+
+        with _public_addr_patch():
+            start = time.monotonic()
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+            elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        # 1s ceiling — the 204 must return on the local-delete path
+        # without waiting on the AS POST (which sleeps 5s above). Bound
+        # is intentionally generous for CI runner jitter; the actual
+        # path is on the order of milliseconds.
+        assert elapsed < 1.0, (
+            f"204 returned in {elapsed:.3f}s — should be <1s; the "
+            "fire-and-forget upstream revoke isn't decoupled from the "
+            "response."
+        )
+        # The local row IS gone — the authoritative delete ran before
+        # the 204 returned, even though the AS round-trip is still
+        # in flight.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+        # Cancel any in-flight tasks so the test client can exit cleanly.
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import _revoke_upstream_tasks
+
+        portal = getattr(client, "portal", None)
+        if portal is not None:
+            for task in list(_revoke_upstream_tasks):
+                portal.call(task.cancel)
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_sheds_upstream_when_task_set_full(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        """Round-2 q-2 regression: the soft cap on ``_revoke_upstream_tasks``
+        is the only protection against unbounded background-task pile-up
+        under a coordinated mass-revoke. When the set is full, the local
+        delete still runs but no upstream task is scheduled; the audit
+        detail records ``upstream_revoke_outcome="shed_by_cap"`` and
+        the AS endpoint is never contacted.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+            _REVOKE_UPSTREAM_TASKS_MAX,
+            _revoke_upstream_tasks,
+        )
+
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        sentinel_event_holder: dict[str, asyncio.Event] = {}
+
+        # Use ``with TestClient(...)`` so the portal stays alive — we
+        # need to schedule sentinel tasks on the portal's loop and the
+        # tasks must outlive the request to actually fill the set.
+        with (
+            TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False) as client,
+            _public_addr_patch(),
+        ):
+            portal = client.portal
+            assert portal is not None
+
+            async def _create_sentinel_event() -> asyncio.Event:
+                event = asyncio.Event()
+                sentinel_event_holder["event"] = event
+                return event
+
+            sentinel_event = portal.call(_create_sentinel_event)
+
+            async def _wait_on_event() -> None:
+                await sentinel_event.wait()
+
+            async def _fill_task_set() -> list[asyncio.Task[None]]:
+                tasks: list[asyncio.Task[None]] = []
+                for _ in range(_REVOKE_UPSTREAM_TASKS_MAX):
+                    t = asyncio.create_task(_wait_on_event())
+                    _revoke_upstream_tasks.add(t)
+                    tasks.append(t)
+                return tasks
+
+            sentinels = portal.call(_fill_task_set)
+            assert len(_revoke_upstream_tasks) >= _REVOKE_UPSTREAM_TASKS_MAX
+
+            try:
+                resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+                assert resp.status_code == 204
+                # Local row is still gone — authoritative delete ran.
+                assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+                # AS endpoint MUST NOT have been contacted.
+                http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+                # Audit detail records the categorical shed outcome.
+                events = storage.list_audit_events(action="mcp_server.oauth.token_revoked")
+                assert len(events) == 1
+                detail = events[0]["detail"]
+                if isinstance(detail, str):
+                    import json as _json
+
+                    detail = _json.loads(detail)
+                assert detail["upstream_revoke_outcome"] == "shed_by_cap"
+            finally:
+                # Release sentinels so the portal can shut down cleanly.
+                async def _release() -> None:
+                    sentinel_event.set()
+                    for t in sentinels:
+                        t.cancel()
+                    await asyncio.gather(*sentinels, return_exceptions=True)
+
+                portal.call(_release)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# evict_user_session helper sanity checks
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestEvictUserSession:
+    def test_evict_user_session_no_loop_is_silent_noop(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager.__new__(MCPClientManager)
+        mgr._loop = None  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        # Must not raise.
+        mgr.evict_user_session("user-1", "srv-oauth")
+
+    def test_evict_user_session_dispatches_to_loop(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager.__new__(MCPClientManager)
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        try:
+            mgr._loop = loop  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            mgr._user_pool_entries = {}  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            mgr._last_pool_notification_refresh = {}  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            evicted: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+
+            def _fake_evict(key: tuple[str, str]) -> None:
+                evicted.append(key)
+
+            mgr._evict_session = _fake_evict  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+            # Run the dispatch on a separate thread so the loop can drain.
+            import threading
+
+            done = threading.Event()
+
+            def _run_loop() -> None:
+                loop.call_later(0.05, loop.stop)
+                loop.run_forever()
+                done.set()
+
+            t = threading.Thread(target=_run_loop, daemon=True)
+            t.start()
+            mgr.evict_user_session("user-1", "srv-oauth")
+            done.wait(timeout=1.0)
+
+            assert evicted == [("user-1", "srv-oauth")]
+        finally:
+            if not loop.is_closed():
+                loop.close()
@@ -0,0 +1,626 @@
+"""Discovery tests for the per-(user, server) MCP OAuth flow.
+
+Covers PRM (RFC 9728) and AS metadata (RFC 8414) discovery, including:
+- override URL takes precedence
+- PRM happy path: server URL -> .well-known/oauth-protected-resource
+  -> ``authorization_servers[0]``
+- PRM 401 + ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="..."`` follows
+  the URL.
+- AS metadata without S256 -> :class:`MCPOAuthDiscoveryError`.
+- SSRF rejection on AS issuer URL.
+- In-memory cache hit/miss + persistent cache write to
+  ``mcp_servers.oauth_as_issuer_cached``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import time
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+    ASMetadata,
+    MCPOAuthDiscoveryError,
+    _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate,
+    discover_authorization_server,
+)
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _mk_response(
+    status_code: int = 200,
+    json_body: Any = None,
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> MagicMock:
+    """Build a MagicMock that quacks like ``httpx.Response``."""
+    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    resp.status_code = status_code
+    resp.headers = headers or {}
+    resp.content = (str(json_body) if json_body is not None else "").encode("utf-8")
+    if json_body is not None:
+        resp.json.return_value = json_body
+    else:
+        resp.json.side_effect = ValueError("no body")
+    resp.text = str(json_body) if json_body is not None else ""
+    return resp
+
+
+def _good_as_metadata_doc() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
+        "authorization_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/authorize",
+        "token_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/token",
+        "jwks_uri": "https://as.example.com/jwks",
+        "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"],
+        "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["none", "client_secret_basic"],
+        "registration_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/register",
+    }
+
+
+def _public_addr_patch():
+    return patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))])
+
+
+def _mk_storage_mock(server_id: str = "srv-id") -> MagicMock:
+    storage = MagicMock()
+    storage.update_mcp_server.return_value = True
+    return storage
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PRM parser
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestParsePRMUrl:
+    def test_extracts_resource_metadata_url(self) -> None:
+        header = (
+            'Bearer error="invalid_token", '
+            'resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"'
+        )
+        url = _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header)
+        assert url == "https://srv.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
+
+    def test_returns_none_when_absent(self) -> None:
+        assert _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate('Bearer realm="x"') is None
+
+    def test_handles_empty_header(self) -> None:
+        assert _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate("") is None
+
+    def test_handles_escaped_quote_in_value(self) -> None:
+        """RFC 7230 quoted-string allows ``\\"`` — naive ``[^"]+`` truncates.
+
+        A malicious or buggy resource server could send an embedded
+        escaped quote; the parser must yield the unescaped value, not
+        the prefix up to the escaped quote.
+        """
+        header = 'Bearer resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/with\\"quote"'
+        url = _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header)
+        assert url == 'https://srv.example.com/with"quote'
+
+    def test_handles_escaped_backslash(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/back\\\\slash"'
+        url = _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header)
+        assert url == "https://srv.example.com/back\\slash"
+
+    def test_unterminated_quoted_string_returns_none(self) -> None:
+        # Closing quote missing — naive regex would still match, but
+        # the proper parser should reject malformed input.
+        header = 'Bearer resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/no-close'
+        assert _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header) is None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# discover_authorization_server happy paths
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDiscoveryOverride:
+    def test_override_url_skips_prm(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert isinstance(meta, ASMetadata)
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+        # Only the AS metadata URL was hit, not PRM.
+        called_urls = [c.args[0] for c in client.get.call_args_list]
+        assert all("oauth-authorization-server" in u for u in called_urls)
+
+
+class TestDiscoveryPRM:
+    def test_prm_happy_path(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-protected-resource"):
+                return _mk_response(
+                    200,
+                    {
+                        "resource": "https://mcp.example.com",
+                        "authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"],
+                    },
+                )
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-authorization-server"):
+                return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+            raise AssertionError(f"unexpected URL: {url}")
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.issuer == "https://as.example.com"
+
+    def test_prm_401_follows_www_authenticate(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            if url == "https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource":
+                return _mk_response(
+                    401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": (
+                            'Bearer error="invalid_token", '
+                            "resource_metadata="
+                            '"https://meta.example.com/prm"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                    json_body=None,
+                )
+            if url == "https://meta.example.com/prm":
+                return _mk_response(
+                    200,
+                    {
+                        "authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"],
+                    },
+                )
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-authorization-server"):
+                return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+            raise AssertionError(f"unexpected URL: {url}")
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+
+    def test_prm_401_without_resource_metadata_raises(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            return _mk_response(401, headers={"www-authenticate": "Basic realm=x"})
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="resource_metadata"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# AS metadata validation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestASMetadataValidation:
+    def test_no_s256_raises(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["code_challenge_methods_supported"] = ["plain"]
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="S256"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+    def test_missing_endpoints_raises(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        del doc["token_endpoint"]
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="missing required"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+    def test_third_party_endpoint_rejected(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["token_endpoint"] = "https://attacker.example.com/token"
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="token_endpoint"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+    def test_ssrf_on_override_rejected(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock()
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            # Resolve to private 10.x — SSRF guard fires before any HTTP call.
+            with patch(
+                "socket.getaddrinfo",
+                return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("10.0.0.1", 0))],
+            ):
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://internal.corp.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+        client.get.assert_not_called()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Caching
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestMetadataCache:
+    def test_cache_miss_then_hit(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+        cache: dict[str, tuple[ASMetadata, float]] = {}
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                first = await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                    metadata_cache=cache,
+                )
+                second = await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                    metadata_cache=cache,
+                )
+                return first, second
+
+        first, second = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert first.token_endpoint == second.token_endpoint
+        # First call hit AS metadata; second call hit the cache.
+        assert client.get.call_count == 1
+
+    def test_cache_expiry_refetches(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+        # Pre-populate cache with a very stale entry.
+        stale_meta = ASMetadata(
+            issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            authorization_endpoint="https://as.example.com/authorize",
+            token_endpoint="https://as.example.com/token",
+            registration_endpoint=None,
+            revocation_endpoint=None,
+            jwks_uri=None,
+            code_challenge_methods_supported=("S256",),
+            token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported=(),
+        )
+        cache = {"https://as.example.com": (stale_meta, time.monotonic() - 10**6)}
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                    metadata_cache=cache,
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        # Stale entry was bypassed -> we hit the network.
+        assert client.get.call_count == 1
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+
+    def test_persistent_cache_write_on_first_resolution(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-protected-resource"):
+                return _mk_response(200, {"authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"]})
+            return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        asyncio.run(_run())
+        # update_mcp_server was called once with the cached issuer.
+        storage.update_mcp_server.assert_called_once_with(
+            "srv-id", oauth_as_issuer_cached="https://as.example.com"
+        )
+
+    def test_persistent_cache_skip_when_already_cached(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        asyncio.run(_run())
+        storage.update_mcp_server.assert_not_called()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# sec-3 — cached_issuer re-validated on read
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCachedIssuerSSRFRevalidation:
+    """A cached issuer URL must still pass SSRF validation on every read.
+
+    Defense-in-depth: an admin who points ``oauth_as_issuer_cached`` at a
+    private address (or a hostname that has rebound to one) should not
+    bypass the guard just because the value was already in the row.
+    """
+
+    def test_cached_issuer_rejected_clears_row_and_falls_through_to_prm(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url: str, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> MagicMock:
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-protected-resource"):
+                return _mk_response(200, {"authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"]})
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-authorization-server"):
+                return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+            raise AssertionError(f"unexpected URL: {url}")
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        # cached_issuer points at a private host. SSRF guard fires on
+        # the cached value first, the row is cleared, and PRM
+        # discovery runs as a fallback.
+        async def _run() -> Any:
+            with patch(
+                "socket.getaddrinfo",
+                # Private resolution for "internal.corp", public for everything else.
+                side_effect=lambda host, *a, **kw: [
+                    (2, 1, 6, "", ("10.0.0.1" if "internal" in host else "93.184.216.34", 0))
+                ],
+            ):
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer="https://internal.corp.example.com",
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+        # The bad cached_issuer was cleared from the row.
+        clear_calls = [
+            c
+            for c in storage.update_mcp_server.call_args_list
+            if c.kwargs.get("oauth_as_issuer_cached") is None
+        ]
+        assert clear_calls, "cached_issuer should have been cleared"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# revocation_endpoint parsing (RFC 8414)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestASMetadataRevocationEndpoint:
+    def test_as_metadata_parses_revocation_endpoint(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["revocation_endpoint"] = "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run() -> ASMetadata:
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.revocation_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+
+    def test_as_metadata_revocation_endpoint_absent(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc.pop("revocation_endpoint", None)
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run() -> ASMetadata:
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.revocation_endpoint is None
+
+    def test_as_metadata_revocation_endpoint_rejected_when_cross_origin(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["revocation_endpoint"] = "https://attacker.example.com/revoke"
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run() -> ASMetadata:
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="revocation_endpoint"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+"""Smoke tests for the new OAuth-MCP storage tables.
+
+Phase 2 only adds the schema — token CRUD lands in Phase 3 and pending-
+state CRUD in Phase 4.  These tests verify the tables exist after
+``init_storage`` and accept the documented row shape via raw SQL.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+from turnstone.core.storage._schema import mcp_oauth_pending, mcp_user_tokens
+
+
+class TestMcpUserTokensTable:
+    def test_table_exists_and_accepts_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_user_tokens),
+                {
+                    "user_id": "u1",
+                    "server_name": "srv-a",
+                    "access_token_ct": b"\x00ciphertext-a",
+                    "refresh_token_ct": b"\x00ciphertext-r",
+                    "expires_at": "2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+                    "scopes": "openid profile",
+                    "as_issuer": "https://auth.example.com",
+                    "audience": "https://mcp.example.com",
+                    "created": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                    "last_refreshed": None,
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            row = conn.execute(
+                sa.select(mcp_user_tokens).where(
+                    (mcp_user_tokens.c.user_id == "u1") & (mcp_user_tokens.c.server_name == "srv-a")
+                )
+            ).one()
+        assert row.access_token_ct == b"\x00ciphertext-a"
+        assert row.refresh_token_ct == b"\x00ciphertext-r"
+        assert row.scopes == "openid profile"
+        assert row.audience == "https://mcp.example.com"
+
+    def test_composite_pk_distinguishes_user_server(self, backend) -> None:
+        """Same user, different server => two rows; same (user, server) => conflict."""
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_user_tokens),
+                [
+                    {
+                        "user_id": "u1",
+                        "server_name": "srv-a",
+                        "access_token_ct": b"a",
+                        "refresh_token_ct": None,
+                        "expires_at": None,
+                        "scopes": None,
+                        "as_issuer": "https://auth.example.com",
+                        "audience": "https://a.example.com",
+                        "created": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                        "last_refreshed": None,
+                    },
+                    {
+                        "user_id": "u1",
+                        "server_name": "srv-b",
+                        "access_token_ct": b"b",
+                        "refresh_token_ct": None,
+                        "expires_at": None,
+                        "scopes": None,
+                        "as_issuer": "https://auth.example.com",
+                        "audience": "https://b.example.com",
+                        "created": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                        "last_refreshed": None,
+                    },
+                ],
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            count = conn.execute(sa.select(sa.func.count()).select_from(mcp_user_tokens)).scalar()
+        assert count == 2
+
+
+class TestMcpOauthPendingTable:
+    def test_table_exists_and_accepts_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_oauth_pending),
+                {
+                    "state": "rand-state-xyz",
+                    "user_id": "u1",
+                    "server_name": "srv-a",
+                    "code_verifier": "verifier-blob",
+                    "return_url": "/admin/mcp-servers",
+                    "created_at": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            row = conn.execute(
+                sa.select(mcp_oauth_pending).where(mcp_oauth_pending.c.state == "rand-state-xyz")
+            ).one()
+        assert row.user_id == "u1"
+        assert row.server_name == "srv-a"
+        assert row.return_url == "/admin/mcp-servers"
+
+    def test_state_pk_unique(self, backend) -> None:
+        """A second insert with the same state value raises IntegrityError."""
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_oauth_pending),
+                {
+                    "state": "dup-state",
+                    "user_id": "u1",
+                    "server_name": "srv-a",
+                    "code_verifier": "v",
+                    "return_url": "/x",
+                    "created_at": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        import pytest
+        from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
+
+        with pytest.raises(IntegrityError), backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_oauth_pending),
+                {
+                    "state": "dup-state",
+                    "user_id": "u2",
+                    "server_name": "srv-b",
+                    "code_verifier": "v",
+                    "return_url": "/y",
+                    "created_at": "2026-05-04T11:01:00",
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""PKCE pair-generation tests for the MCP OAuth flow.
+
+Verifies the contract documented in RFC 7636 §4.1 and §4.2:
+
+- ``code_verifier`` is a high-entropy 43..128 character urlsafe-base64 string.
+- ``code_challenge`` is the BASE64URL-NO-PADDING encoding of
+  ``SHA256(verifier)``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import string
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import generate_pkce_pair
+
+_URLSAFE_CHARS = set(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "-_")
+
+
+class TestGeneratePkcePair:
+    def test_returns_tuple_of_strings(self) -> None:
+        verifier, challenge = generate_pkce_pair()
+        assert isinstance(verifier, str)
+        assert isinstance(challenge, str)
+
+    def test_verifier_length_in_rfc_range(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            verifier, _ = generate_pkce_pair()
+            assert 43 <= len(verifier) <= 128
+
+    def test_verifier_is_urlsafe(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            verifier, _ = generate_pkce_pair()
+            assert all(ch in _URLSAFE_CHARS for ch in verifier)
+
+    def test_challenge_matches_sha256_of_verifier(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            verifier, challenge = generate_pkce_pair()
+            digest = hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest()
+            expected = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+            assert challenge == expected
+
+    def test_challenge_has_no_padding(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            _, challenge = generate_pkce_pair()
+            assert "=" not in challenge
+
+    def test_pairs_are_unique(self) -> None:
+        pairs = {generate_pkce_pair() for _ in range(50)}
+        # 50 random draws shouldn't collide; if they do we have a much
+        # bigger problem than this assertion.
+        assert len(pairs) == 50
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+"""Tests for :func:`turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.revoke_token_at_as`.
+
+The helper is best-effort RFC 7009 token revocation. It must:
+- skip cleanly when the AS metadata doesn't advertise a revocation endpoint
+- POST the form body when one is present (with optional client_secret)
+- never raise on non-2xx, network errors, or timeouts — caller doesn't
+  want try/except in cleanup paths
+- never use ``exc_info=True`` — chained ``__context__`` may carry an
+  ``httpx.Request`` whose ``Authorization`` header holds a bearer; the
+  bearer-leak invariant requires structured fields with type names only
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+    ASMetadata,
+    MCPOAuthDiscoveryError,
+    _attempt_upstream_revoke,
+    revoke_token_at_as,
+)
+
+
+def _make_as_metadata(
+    *,
+    revocation_endpoint: str | None = "https://as.example.com/revoke",
+) -> ASMetadata:
+    return ASMetadata(
+        issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        authorization_endpoint="https://as.example.com/authorize",
+        token_endpoint="https://as.example.com/token",
+        registration_endpoint=None,
+        revocation_endpoint=revocation_endpoint,
+        jwks_uri=None,
+        code_challenge_methods_supported=("S256",),
+        token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported=("client_secret_basic",),
+    )
+
+
+def _mk_response(status_code: int) -> MagicMock:
+    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    resp.status_code = status_code
+    return resp
+
+
+class TestRevocationUnsupported:
+    def test_revoke_token_skipped_when_revocation_endpoint_none(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata(revocation_endpoint=None)
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock()
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        client.post.assert_not_called()
+        info_events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_unsupported" in info_events
+
+
+class TestRevocationSuccess:
+    def test_revoke_token_succeeds_on_200(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret="s-secret",
+                )
+            )
+
+        # POST shape — URL + form body keys.
+        client.post.assert_awaited_once()
+        call_args = client.post.call_args
+        assert call_args.args[0] == "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+        body = call_args.kwargs["data"]
+        assert body == {
+            "token": "r-secret",
+            "token_type_hint": "refresh_token",
+            "client_id": "client-1",
+            "client_secret": "s-secret",
+        }
+        info_events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_succeeded" in info_events
+
+    def test_revoke_token_omits_client_secret_when_none(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200))
+
+        asyncio.run(
+            revoke_token_at_as(
+                as_metadata=as_meta,
+                http_client=client,
+                refresh_token="r-secret",
+                client_id="client-1",
+                client_secret=None,
+            )
+        )
+
+        body = client.post.call_args.kwargs["data"]
+        assert "client_secret" not in body
+        assert body["token"] == "r-secret"
+        assert body["token_type_hint"] == "refresh_token"
+        assert body["client_id"] == "client-1"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_succeeds_on_204(self) -> None:
+        # RFC 7009 says the AS MAY return any 2xx; treat the whole range
+        # as success.
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(204))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        info_events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_succeeded" in info_events
+
+
+class TestRevocationFailureLogged:
+    def _run_and_capture(self, status: int) -> list[Any]:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(status))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+        return mock_log.info.call_args_list
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_400_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(400)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        # Must include status field.
+        failed_call = next(c for c in calls if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed")
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("status") == 400
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_401_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(401)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(c for c in calls if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed")
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("status") == 401
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_403_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(403)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_5xx_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(500)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(c for c in calls if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed")
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("status") == 500
+
+
+class TestRevocationExceptionPaths:
+    def test_revoke_token_handles_network_error(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("boom"))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(
+            c
+            for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list
+            if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed"
+        )
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("error") == "ConnectError"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_handles_httpx_timeout(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.TimeoutException("slow"))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(
+            c
+            for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list
+            if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed"
+        )
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("error") == "TimeoutException"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_handles_asyncio_timeout(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+
+        async def _slow(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+            await asyncio.sleep(10.0)
+            raise AssertionError("should have timed out")
+
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=_slow)
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                    timeout_seconds=0.05,
+                )
+            )
+
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(
+            c
+            for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list
+            if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed"
+        )
+        # ``asyncio.timeout`` raises ``TimeoutError`` (Python's builtin)
+        # on cancellation.
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("error") == "TimeoutError"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_no_exc_info_in_logs(self) -> None:
+        """Bearer-leak invariant: the revoke path must NEVER set
+        ``exc_info=True``. Chained ``__context__`` may include an
+        ``httpx.Request`` whose ``Authorization`` header holds a
+        bearer; the traceback formatter would render it.
+        """
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("boom"))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        # No info call may carry exc_info.
+        for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list:
+            assert "exc_info" not in call.kwargs, (
+                f"mcp_server.oauth log info({call.args[0]!r}) used exc_info — "
+                "this violates the bearer-leak invariant"
+            )
+        # Defensively: also check warning + exception levels for the
+        # same call site.
+        for call in mock_log.warning.call_args_list:
+            assert "exc_info" not in call.kwargs
+        mock_log.exception.assert_not_called()
+
+
+class TestAttemptUpstreamRevokeNeverRaises:
+    """Round-2 q-3 regression: ``_attempt_upstream_revoke``'s docstring
+    claims ``Never raises``. Background-task semantics make this load-
+    bearing — a propagated exception logs ``Task exception was never
+    retrieved`` because the ``set.discard`` done-callback doesn't read
+    ``task.exception()``.
+
+    The wrapper's narrow inner ``except`` clauses (``MCPOAuthDiscoveryError``,
+    ``MCPTokenDecryptError``) leave room for any other exception type
+    raised by ``discover_authorization_server`` /
+    ``storage.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct`` / ``token_store.cipher.decrypt``
+    to escape. The outer ``try/except Exception`` is what keeps the
+    contract honest. These tests pin that gate.
+    """
+
+    def _build_args(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        token_store = MagicMock()
+        token_store.cipher = MagicMock()
+        token_store.cipher.decrypt.return_value = b"shh"
+        storage = MagicMock()
+        storage.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct.return_value = None
+        return {
+            "http_client": MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient),
+            "metadata_cache": None,
+            "storage": storage,
+            "token_store": token_store,
+            "server_name": "srv-oauth",
+            "server_row": {
+                "url": "https://mcp.example.com",
+                "oauth_client_id": "client-1",
+                "oauth_authorization_server_url": None,
+                "oauth_as_issuer_cached": None,
+            },
+            "server_id_for_audit": "srv-id-1",
+            "refresh_token": "r-secret",
+        }
+
+    def test_attempt_upstream_revoke_swallows_unexpected_exception(self) -> None:
+        """A generic exception from a path the inner handlers don't
+        cover MUST be caught at the outer boundary and logged with type
+        name only (no exc_info=True per the bearer-leak invariant).
+        """
+        args = self._build_args()
+
+        async def _boom(*_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> Any:
+            raise RuntimeError("network blew up")
+
+        with (
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.discover_authorization_server", side_effect=_boom),
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log,
+        ):
+            # MUST NOT raise.
+            asyncio.run(_attempt_upstream_revoke(**args))
+
+        events = [call.args[0] for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_failed" in events, (
+            "outer try/except must log mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_failed "
+            "with the exception type name when an unexpected exception escapes "
+            "the narrow inner handlers"
+        )
+        for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list:
+            assert "exc_info" not in call.kwargs, (
+                "outer-block log must not use exc_info=True — chained "
+                "__context__ may carry an httpx.Request bearer"
+            )
+
+    def test_attempt_upstream_revoke_logs_discovery_failure(self) -> None:
+        """Round-2 bug-1: ``MCPOAuthDiscoveryError`` MUST emit
+        ``upstream_revoke_discovery_failed`` so operators have visibility
+        into a silent-discovery-failure path that previously logged
+        nothing while the audit row recorded ``upstream_revoke_outcome=scheduled``.
+        """
+        args = self._build_args()
+
+        async def _disc_fail(*_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> Any:
+            raise MCPOAuthDiscoveryError("PRM fetch 503")
+
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.discover_authorization_server",
+                side_effect=_disc_fail,
+            ),
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log,
+        ):
+            asyncio.run(_attempt_upstream_revoke(**args))
+
+        events = [call.args[0] for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_discovery_failed" in events
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_failed" not in events
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+"""Storage CRUD tests for the per-(user, server) MCP OAuth pending-state table.
+
+Validates the storage-protocol additions for the per-(user, server)
+OAuth flow:
+
+- ``create_mcp_oauth_pending_state``
+- ``pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state`` (atomic, with TTL)
+- ``cleanup_expired_mcp_oauth_pending_states``
+- ``get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct``
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+
+class TestCreateAndPop:
+    def test_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state(
+            "state-1",
+            "user-a",
+            "srv-x",
+            "verifier-blob",
+            "/admin/mcp-servers",
+        )
+        row = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("state-1", max_age_seconds=600)
+        assert row is not None
+        assert row["state"] == "state-1"
+        assert row["user_id"] == "user-a"
+        assert row["server_name"] == "srv-x"
+        assert row["code_verifier"] == "verifier-blob"
+        assert row["return_url"] == "/admin/mcp-servers"
+
+    def test_pop_consumes_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("s2", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        first = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("s2")
+        assert first is not None
+        # Second pop must miss — row was consumed.
+        second = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("s2")
+        assert second is None
+
+    def test_pop_missing_returns_none(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("never-existed") is None
+
+
+class TestTTL:
+    def test_pop_rejects_expired_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old-state", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        # Backdate it so it's older than the TTL window.
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.text(
+                    "UPDATE mcp_oauth_pending SET created_at = '2020-01-01T00:00:00' "
+                    "WHERE state = 'old-state'"
+                )
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+
+        # Default TTL is 600s — the row is decades old.
+        row = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old-state")
+        assert row is None
+
+        # Even though pop returned None, the row must have been wiped — a
+        # second pop with a giant TTL must still see nothing.
+        again = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old-state", max_age_seconds=10**9)
+        assert again is None
+
+    def test_pop_accepts_fresh_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("fresh", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        row = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("fresh", max_age_seconds=600)
+        assert row is not None
+        assert row["state"] == "fresh"
+
+
+class TestCleanup:
+    def test_cleanup_deletes_only_expired(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("new", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.text(
+                    "UPDATE mcp_oauth_pending SET created_at = '2020-01-01T00:00:00' "
+                    "WHERE state = 'old'"
+                )
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+
+        deleted = backend.cleanup_expired_mcp_oauth_pending_states(max_age_seconds=600)
+        assert deleted == 1
+        # Old gone, new still around.
+        assert backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old") is None
+        survivor = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("new")
+        assert survivor is not None
+
+    def test_cleanup_no_rows(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.cleanup_expired_mcp_oauth_pending_states() == 0
+
+
+class TestGetOAuthClientSecretCt:
+    def test_returns_none_when_unset(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-id",
+            name="srv-x",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+        )
+        assert backend.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("srv-id") is None
+
+    def test_returns_ciphertext_after_set(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-id",
+            name="srv-x",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+        )
+        ct = b"\x00\xff\x42encrypted-blob"
+        ok = backend.set_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("srv-id", ct)
+        assert ok is True
+        out = backend.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("srv-id")
+        assert out == ct
+
+    def test_returns_none_for_missing_server(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("does-not-exist") is None
+
+
+def _create_user_token_row(
+    backend,
+    *,
+    user_id: str,
+    server_name: str,
+    created: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Insert a token row + backdate ``created`` so ordering is deterministic.
+
+    The storage helper stamps ``created`` from ``datetime.now(UTC)``; for
+    multi-row ordering tests we backdate via raw SQL so the inserts stay
+    independent of clock resolution.
+    """
+    backend.create_mcp_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token_ct=b"ct-access",
+        refresh_token_ct=b"ct-refresh",
+        expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+    with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+        conn.execute(
+            sa.text(
+                "UPDATE mcp_user_tokens SET created = :created "
+                "WHERE user_id = :uid AND server_name = :sn"
+            ),
+            {"created": created, "uid": user_id, "sn": server_name},
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+
+
+class TestListMCPUserTokenMetadataByUser:
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_empty(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("nobody") == []
+
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_single_server(self, backend) -> None:
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("u1")
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        assert rows[0]["user_id"] == "u1"
+        assert rows[0]["server_name"] == "srv-a"
+        assert rows[0]["as_issuer"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        assert rows[0]["audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+        assert rows[0]["scopes"] == "openid"
+        # Projection MUST omit ciphertext columns — the SQL no longer
+        # selects them, so the TypedDict has no key.
+        assert "access_token_ct" not in rows[0]
+        assert "refresh_token_ct" not in rows[0]
+
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_multiple_servers(self, backend) -> None:
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-c", created="2026-05-03T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-b", created="2026-05-02T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("u1")
+        assert [r["server_name"] for r in rows] == ["srv-a", "srv-b", "srv-c"]
+
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_isolates_by_user(self, backend) -> None:
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="user-a", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="user-a", server_name="srv-b", created="2026-05-02T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="user-b", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-03T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows_a = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("user-a")
+        assert {r["server_name"] for r in rows_a} == {"srv-a", "srv-b"}
+        assert all(r["user_id"] == "user-a" for r in rows_a)
+
+        rows_b = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("user-b")
+        assert len(rows_b) == 1
+        assert rows_b[0]["user_id"] == "user-b"
+        assert rows_b[0]["server_name"] == "srv-a"
@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
+"""Phase 6 integration tests — real-transport drives 401/403 through the SDK.
+
+These are the structural exit criterion for Phase 6. They MUST drive
+through the real ``streamablehttp_client``, the real httpx response-hook
+path, and a REAL upstream MCP server (a ``FastMCP`` in-process subprocess
+with a starlette middleware that programmatically returns 401/403 with
+crafted ``WWW-Authenticate`` headers).
+
+Direct ``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection is FORBIDDEN here — Phase 5
+bug-1 was masked precisely by that pattern (the production code path
+was structurally unreachable, but the unit-test injection bypassed the
+SDK's swallow). The integration tests gate that the production path
+actually receives the carrier signal end-to-end.
+
+The fixture upstream is built in-thread (uvicorn on its own asyncio
+loop in a background thread) — same pattern as
+``tests/spike_sdk_concurrency.py``. Per the orchestrator's startup-cost
+note, measured at ~0.05s per fixture spin-up locally; well under the
+2s threshold for default-collection inclusion.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import logging
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+import uvicorn
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import TokenLookupResult
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+# Quiet noisy logs during tests.
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fixture upstream — programmable BehaviorMiddleware
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class BehaviorMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Inspects per-request behaviour state and returns 401/403 on demand.
+
+    The behaviour is steered by a mutable ``behaviour`` dict on the
+    middleware instance; tests mutate it via the fixture handle.
+    Records every request's Authorization header for assertion.
+
+    Behaviour semantics:
+      * ``"once_401"``: return 401 once, then 200 thereafter.
+      * ``"always_401"``: always return 401.
+      * ``"once_403_insufficient"``: return 403 with insufficient_scope once.
+      * ``"once_403_generic"``: return 403 without error param once.
+      * ``"once_multi_www_auth_403"``: return 403 with TWO
+        ``WWW-Authenticate`` headers — first ``Bearer`` challenge
+        carries the SAFE scopes, second carries INJECTED scopes. The
+        dispatcher must report only the first.
+      * ``"never"`` (default): pass through to the real handler.
+
+    ``www_authenticate`` overrides the default header crafted per shape.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._behaviour = behaviour
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable[..., Any]) -> Response:
+        from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
+
+        # Record the Authorization header for assertion. POST is the
+        # tools/call request the dispatcher sends.
+        if request.method == "POST" and "/mcp" in str(request.url):
+            self._behaviour.setdefault("post_auth_headers", []).append(
+                request.headers.get("authorization")
+            )
+
+        mode = self._behaviour.get("mode", "never")
+        if mode == "once_401":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "unauthorized",
+                    status_code=401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "always_401":
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "unauthorized",
+                status_code=401,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                        "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                    )
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_403_insufficient":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "forbidden",
+                    status_code=403,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate",
+                            'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:write mail:send"',
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "once_403_generic" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "forbidden",
+                status_code=403,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get("www_authenticate", "Bearer realm=mcp")
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_multi_www_auth_403" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            # Two ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...`` challenges. The
+            # first carries ``error=insufficient_scope`` but NO
+            # ``scope=`` parameter; the second carries the INJECTED
+            # scopes the dispatcher must NOT report. The first
+            # challenge intentionally lacks ``scope`` because
+            # ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer`` uses ``setdefault`` —
+            # if the first challenge HAD a scope, ``setdefault`` would
+            # already win on first-occurrence. The vector this test
+            # guards is the case where a defended absence becomes a
+            # silent presence: a hook regression to ``get(...)`` joins
+            # repeated headers with ``, `` and the parser then folds
+            # the second challenge's scope into the first challenge's
+            # params dict because there is no first-occurrence to
+            # protect.
+            response = StarletteResponse("forbidden", status_code=403)
+            response.headers.append(
+                "www-authenticate",
+                'Bearer realm="legit", error="insufficient_scope"',
+            )
+            response.headers.append(
+                "www-authenticate",
+                'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="org:admin db:write"',
+            )
+            return response
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _find_free_port() -> int:
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def _build_server(port: int, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="phase6-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.tool()
+    async def echo(payload: str = "default") -> str:
+        return f"echoed:{payload}"
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(BehaviorMiddleware, behaviour=behaviour)
+    config = uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=port, log_level="warning", access_log=False)
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def _wait_ready(port: int, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.5):
+                return
+        except OSError:
+            time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"upstream at 127.0.0.1:{port} not ready after {timeout}s")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def upstream():
+    """Boot a FastMCP fixture upstream in a background thread.
+
+    Yields ``(url, behaviour)`` where ``behaviour`` is a mutable dict
+    the test mutates to steer the middleware (set ``mode`` to one of
+    the BehaviorMiddleware shapes).
+    """
+    port = _find_free_port()
+    behaviour: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    server = _build_server(port, behaviour)
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="phase6-upstream")
+    t.start()
+    try:
+        _wait_ready(port)
+        yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp", behaviour
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        t.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-rrr",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 21: 401 → refresh-and-retry → success
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Real upstream returns 401 once with ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer
+    error="invalid_token"``, then 200. Dispatcher carrier captures the
+    401, ``force_refresh=True`` mints a new bearer (stubbed), retry
+    succeeds. Hard invariant 3: breaker counter remains 0.
+
+    Drives through the REAL ``streamablehttp_client`` and a REAL
+    upstream subprocess (no ``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection). This
+    is the structural exit gate for Phase 6 — the equivalent unit
+    tests CANNOT prove the production wiring works because the SDK
+    swallows the underlying exception.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    # Override URL to point at the local upstream (loopback http:// is
+    # exempt from the URL-validator).
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "hi"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+
+    assert "echoed:hi" in result
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+    # Server saw at least 2 POSTs to /mcp (initial + retry).
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, f"expected >=2 POSTs; got {len(post_headers)}"
+    # Retry carries a different bearer than the initial.
+    initial = post_headers[0]
+    retry = post_headers[1]
+    assert initial != retry, (
+        "retry attached the same bearer as the initial; the dispatcher "
+        "did not pick up the refreshed token."
+    )
+    # Pool entry has a session after the successful retry.
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 22: 401 + refresh failure → mcp_consent_required
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_401_with_refresh_failure_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    # Structured-error envelopes flow back via ``RuntimeError(json_str)``
+    # so the session-layer ``except Exception`` handler routes the
+    # consent card uniformly across tool / resource / prompt dispatchers.
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+    # Phase 8 — consent_url surfaces a /start URL the dashboard can open
+    # in a popup. URL-encoded server name; no scopes baked in (the AS
+    # picks up the configured scopes server-side at /start).
+    assert payload["error"]["consent_url"] == "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=pool-srv"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 23: 403 + insufficient_scope → mcp_insufficient_scope with parsed scopes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_403_insufficient_scope_emits_structured_error(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_insufficient"
+    behaviour["www_authenticate"] = (
+        'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:write mail:send"'
+    )
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope"
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == ["files:write", "mail:send"]
+    # Phase 8 — consent_url carries the step-up scopes URL-encoded so the
+    # dashboard can union them with the configured set at /start.
+    assert payload["error"]["consent_url"] == (
+        "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=pool-srv&scopes=files%3Awrite%20mail%3Asend"
+    )
+    # No retry — exactly ONE POST attempted before the structured error.
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 24: 403 without insufficient_scope → generic forbidden
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_403_no_insufficient_scope_emits_generic_forbidden(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_generic"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_tool_call_forbidden"
+    assert "scopes_required" not in payload["error"]
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# sec-1: multi-WWW-Authenticate header injection — only the FIRST
+# Bearer challenge feeds the structured-error / audit emission.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_403_multi_www_authenticate_drops_injected_scopes(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Upstream returns a 403 with TWO ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...``
+    challenges. The first carries ``error=insufficient_scope`` but NO
+    ``scope=`` parameter; the second carries INJECTED scopes
+    (``["org:admin", "db:write"]``). The dispatcher must report
+    ``scopes_required == []`` — derived from the first challenge alone
+    — never the second challenge's injected scopes.
+
+    Two layers of defence cooperate (either alone neutralises the
+    vector; both run together so a regression in one cannot silently
+    re-open it):
+
+    1. ``_make_capturing_http_factory._hook`` reads
+       ``response.headers.get_list("www-authenticate")[0]`` rather than
+       ``response.headers.get(...)`` — the latter joins repeated
+       headers with ``", "`` which the RFC 7235 tokenizer would
+       otherwise consume as a continuation of the first challenge.
+    2. ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer`` stops at the first ``Bearer``
+       challenge boundary even if the input was already joined, so a
+       hook regression to ``get(...)`` would NOT re-open the vector.
+
+    The first challenge intentionally lacks ``scope=`` — the parser
+    uses ``setdefault`` so a first-occurrence ``scope`` would already
+    win and mask a single-layer regression. The undefended-absence
+    case is what proves both layers actually do their job.
+
+    Negative-test (CRITICAL — Phase 5 lesson): verified by reverting
+    the hook to ``response.headers.get("www-authenticate")`` AND
+    removing the ``_looks_like_bearer_challenge_start`` guard in
+    ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer``. The test then fails because
+    ``scopes_required`` becomes ``["org:admin", "db:write"]`` — the
+    injected scopes from the second challenge silently fold into the
+    first challenge's params dict via httpx's comma-joined header
+    value (the absence of a first-occurrence scope means nothing
+    blocks the fold).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_multi_www_auth_403"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope", (
+        f"expected mcp_insufficient_scope; got {payload!r}"
+    )
+    # ``scopes_required`` derives from the FIRST challenge alone, which
+    # carries no ``scope=`` parameter. The injected second challenge
+    # MUST NOT appear here.
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == [], (
+        "Multi-header injection slipped through: dispatcher reported "
+        "scopes from the SECOND Bearer challenge. Got "
+        f"{payload['error']['scopes_required']!r}; expected []."
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 25: 401 retry ceiling — never recurse
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_401_retry_ceiling(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Upstream always returns 401; refresh stub keeps minting tokens.
+    After exactly ONE retry, dispatcher emits ``mcp_consent_required``.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    refresh_count = 0
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        nonlocal refresh_count
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            refresh_count += 1
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token=f"refreshed-{refresh_count}")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    # Exactly ONE refresh round-trip.
+    assert refresh_count == 1, f"expected exactly 1 refresh round-trip; got {refresh_count}"
+    # Server saw EXACTLY 2 POSTs (initial + 1 retry).
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 2, (
+        f"expected exactly 2 POSTs (initial + 1 retry); got {len(post_headers)}"
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 26: breaker unaffected by repeated auth failures (slow — 50 cycles)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_breaker_unaffected_by_auth_failures(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """50 sequential dispatches all hit 401 with refresh-failed → 50
+    cycles of ``mcp_consent_required``. ``_consecutive_failures`` MUST
+    stay at 0 throughout (hard invariant 3 verified end-to-end).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        for _ in range(50):
+            with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+                mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                    "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+                )
+            payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+            assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+            assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 27: static path unaffected by Phase 6 changes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_static_path_unaffected(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Static-path connect against an unauthed upstream succeeds without
+    going through the capturing factory. This is the integration-level
+    mirror of ``test_reconnect_preserves_static_state_identity``.
+
+    Drives the static path against the same fixture upstream (with
+    ``behaviour={}`` so middleware passes through) — confirms the
+    static path's session lifecycle is byte-identical even when the
+    pool path's auth introspection is wired up.
+    """
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    # No mode → middleware passes through to FastMCP.
+
+    mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+
+    # Manually configure mgr with a static-path server pointing at the
+    # fixture upstream. Use _connect_one (not the pool path).
+    cfg = {"type": "streamable-http", "url": url}
+
+    async def _connect_static() -> None:
+        await mgr._connect_one("static-srv", cfg)
+
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_connect_static(), loop)
+    fut.result(timeout=15)
+
+    state_before = mgr._static_servers.get("static-srv")
+    assert state_before is not None
+    assert state_before.session is not None
+    # Snapshot identity.
+    state_id_before = id(state_before)
+    session_before = state_before.session
+
+    # Reconnect — the canonical regression check is that the
+    # StaticServerState object identity is preserved.
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_connect_static(), loop)
+    fut.result(timeout=15)
+
+    state_after = mgr._static_servers.get("static-srv")
+    assert state_after is not None
+    assert id(state_after) == state_id_before, (
+        "Static path StaticServerState identity changed across reconnect; "
+        "hard invariant 1 violated."
+    )
+    assert state_after.session is not None
+    assert state_after.session is not session_before, (
+        "Reconnect did not actually replace the session"
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 27b: static dispatch unaffected by Phase 8 consent_url kwarg
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_static_dispatch_unaffected_by_consent_url_kwarg(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Static-auth tool dispatch must be byte-identical post-Phase 8.
+
+    The Phase 8 changes only ADD a ``consent_url`` kwarg to
+    ``_structured_error`` invocations on the pool path. Static dispatch
+    must not pick up the field — there's no consent flow for
+    ``auth_type='none'`` / ``'static'`` servers, and exposing one would
+    confuse the dashboard renderer. Asserts a successful tool result is
+    a plain string with no JSON envelope and no ``consent_url`` substring.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — succeeds
+
+    mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cfg = {"type": "streamable-http", "url": url}
+
+    async def _connect_static() -> None:
+        await mgr._connect_one("static-srv", cfg)
+
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_connect_static(), loop)
+    fut.result(timeout=15)
+
+    # Drive call_tool_sync without a user_id — the static path is taken.
+    result = mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__static-srv__echo", {"payload": "static-x"}, timeout=15)
+
+    # Static path returns the FastMCP fixture's echo string.
+    assert "echoed:static-x" in result
+    # No JSON envelope leaked through; specifically no consent_url field.
+    assert "consent_url" not in result, (
+        f"Static-auth tool dispatch surfaced a consent_url; result: {result!r}"
+    )
+    # Defensive: result is not a JSON-encoded structured error.
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(result)
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+        parsed = None
+    if isinstance(parsed, dict):
+        assert "error" not in parsed, (
+            f"Static-auth dispatch returned a structured-error envelope; got {parsed!r}"
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 28: pool reuse — 401 on a SECOND dispatch (carrier owned by entry)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_pool_reuse_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Reused pool sessions still capture 401 correctly.
+
+    Dispatch 1 hits a passthrough upstream (200) and populates
+    ``entry.session``. Dispatch 2 reuses that session — no fresh
+    connect, so a per-dispatch ``_AuthCapture`` would never reach
+    the httpx response hook (the hook closes over the carrier passed
+    at first connect, which lives on the entry). A correctly-wired
+    entry-owned carrier is the only shape that lets dispatch 2's 401
+    surface to the dispatcher.
+
+    Two independent production bugs gate this test passing; both must
+    hold for reused-session 401 recovery to work end-to-end:
+
+    1. The carrier must live on the pool entry (not per-dispatch) so
+       the response hook bound at first connect writes to the same
+       object the dispatcher reads across reuse. Verified by reverting
+       ``PoolEntryState.auth_capture`` to a per-dispatch
+       ``_AuthCapture()`` allocation: the carrier-fired event never
+       reaches the dispatcher and the test times out.
+
+    2. The dispatcher must race ``call_tool`` against the carrier's
+       fired event. The SDK's ``_receive_loop`` runs in BaseSession's
+       TaskGroup nested inside ``streamablehttp_client``'s TaskGroup;
+       when an upstream 4xx fires, the outer TaskGroup cancels
+       ``_receive_loop`` mid-finally before it can deliver
+       ``CONNECTION_CLOSED`` to the response stream's waiting
+       receiver. anyio's ``send_nowait`` skips waiters with pending
+       cancellation — but our dispatch task (created via
+       ``run_coroutine_threadsafe`` for the reused-session case) has
+       NO pending cancellation, so the send delivers but the receiver
+       never wakes (the waiter's Event is set on stale state). Result:
+       a forever-hung ``response_stream_reader.receive()``. Verified
+       by reverting the ``asyncio.wait({call_task, fired_task})``
+       race in ``_dispatch_pool_with_entry`` to a bare ``await
+       session.call_tool(...)``: the test times out.
+
+    This test is the structural gate against the per-dispatch carrier
+    pattern: it looks right in code review and passes single-dispatch
+    integration tests, but breaks silently on session reuse — and the
+    SDK-level hang the carrier fix exposes silently strands the
+    dispatcher even when the carrier is correct.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — dispatch 1 succeeds
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        # Dispatch 1: passthrough success. Establishes the pooled session.
+        result1 = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "first"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+        assert "echoed:first" in result1
+
+        entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+        session_after_first = entry.session
+        assert session_after_first is not None, (
+            "test setup: dispatch 1 did not populate entry.session; "
+            "subsequent dispatch will not exercise the reuse path"
+        )
+
+        # Reconfigure upstream to 401 once on the next call. Reset the
+        # auth-headers log so we can count dispatch-2's POSTs cleanly.
+        behaviour["post_auth_headers"] = []
+        behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+        behaviour["_fired"] = False
+
+        # Dispatch 2: same (user, server). The hook from dispatch 1's
+        # connect is still bound to entry.auth_capture. The 401 fires;
+        # the dispatcher's auth_401 path triggers refresh-and-retry.
+        result2 = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "second"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+
+    assert "echoed:second" in result2, (
+        f"reused-session 401 retry did not succeed. result: {result2!r}. "
+        "If this is JSON with mcp_consent_required, the dispatcher "
+        "fell through to consent_required emission; if a generic "
+        "tool error, the carrier was empty (auth branch unreachable)."
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0, (
+        "auth failures must not trip the per-server breaker"
+    )
+
+    # Dispatch 2 produces multiple POSTs: the original 401 with the
+    # rejected bearer, then the retry's full connect handshake
+    # (initialize + notifications/initialized + tools/list) followed by
+    # the actual tools/call — all under the refreshed bearer. The retry
+    # reconnects because the auth_401 handler evicted the broken session.
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, (
+        f"expected >=2 POSTs after dispatch 2 (401 + retry); "
+        f"got {len(post_headers)}: {post_headers}"
+    )
+    # First POST is the original bearer that got 401'd.
+    assert post_headers[0] == "Bearer access-aaa", (
+        f"first POST was {post_headers[0]!r}; expected the original bearer"
+    )
+    # Every subsequent POST carries the refreshed bearer (the retry
+    # ran with force_refresh=True and reconnected with the new token).
+    refreshed = post_headers[1:]
+    assert all(h == "Bearer refreshed-bearer" for h in refreshed), (
+        f"retry POSTs carried unexpected bearer(s); observed: {post_headers}"
+    )
@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
+"""Phase 7b integration tests — real-transport prompt get 401/403/etc.
+
+Mirror of :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_resource_integration` for the
+prompt path (RFC §3.3). Drives through the real ``streamablehttp_client``,
+real httpx response-hook plumbing, and a real upstream subprocess
+(``FastMCP`` with a programmable ``BehaviorMiddleware``). Direct
+``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection is forbidden (invariant 14).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import logging
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+import uvicorn
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import TokenLookupResult
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+
+class BehaviorMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Programmable upstream behaviour — see
+    :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_integration` for the semantics. This
+    copy serves the prompt integration tests.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._behaviour = behaviour
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable[..., Any]) -> Response:
+        from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
+
+        if request.method == "POST" and "/mcp" in str(request.url):
+            self._behaviour.setdefault("post_auth_headers", []).append(
+                request.headers.get("authorization")
+            )
+
+        mode = self._behaviour.get("mode", "never")
+        if mode == "once_401":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "unauthorized",
+                    status_code=401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "always_401":
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "unauthorized",
+                status_code=401,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                        "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                    )
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_403_insufficient":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "forbidden",
+                    status_code=403,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate",
+                            'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="prompts:read"',
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "once_403_generic" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "forbidden",
+                status_code=403,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get("www_authenticate", "Bearer realm=mcp")
+                },
+            )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _find_free_port() -> int:
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def _build_server(port: int, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="phase7b-prompt-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.prompt()
+    def greet(who: str = "world") -> str:
+        return f"Hello, {who}!"
+
+    @mcp.prompt()
+    def summarize(topic: str = "today") -> str:
+        return f"Please summarize {topic}."
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(BehaviorMiddleware, behaviour=behaviour)
+    config = uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=port, log_level="warning", access_log=False)
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def _wait_ready(port: int, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.5):
+                return
+        except OSError:
+            time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"upstream at 127.0.0.1:{port} not ready after {timeout}s")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def upstream():
+    port = _find_free_port()
+    behaviour: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    server = _build_server(port, behaviour)
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="phase7b-prompt-upstream")
+    t.start()
+    try:
+        _wait_ready(port)
+        yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp", behaviour
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        t.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-rrr",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _seed_pool_prompt_map(
+    mgr: MCPClientManager,
+    user_id: str,
+    server_name: str,
+    prefixed_name: str,
+    original_name: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Pre-seed ``_user_prompt_map`` so ``_resolve_pool_target_prompt``
+    finds the prefixed name. Production wires this through
+    ``_connect_one_pool``; the integration tests seed it directly so the
+    test focuses on the dispatch behaviour after resolution succeeds.
+    """
+
+    async def _seed() -> None:
+        entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((user_id, server_name))
+        entry.prompts = [
+            {
+                "name": prefixed_name,
+                "original_name": original_name,
+                "server": server_name,
+                "description": "",
+                "arguments": [],
+            }
+        ]
+        mgr._rebuild_user_prompt_map(user_id)
+
+    assert mgr._loop is not None
+    asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_seed(), mgr._loop).result(timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-1: 401 → refresh → retry → success (prompt path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Real upstream returns 401 once, then 200. Carrier captures 401,
+    force_refresh=True mints a new bearer, retry returns the prompt
+    messages. Hard invariant 3: breaker counter remains 0.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        messages = mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "everyone"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    assert isinstance(messages, list)
+    assert len(messages) == 1
+    assert messages[0]["role"] == "user"
+    assert "everyone" in messages[0]["content"]
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, f"expected >=2 POSTs; got {len(post_headers)}"
+    assert post_headers[0] != post_headers[1], (
+        "retry attached the same bearer as the initial; the dispatcher "
+        "did not pick up the refreshed token."
+    )
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-2: persistent 401 → mcp_consent_required (prompt path) → RuntimeError
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_persistent_401_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-3: 403 + insufficient_scope → mcp_insufficient_scope (prompt path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_403_insufficient_scope_emits_structured_error(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_insufficient"
+    behaviour["www_authenticate"] = 'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="prompts:read"'
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope"
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == ["prompts:read"]
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-3b: 403 generic → mcp_prompt_get_forbidden
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_403_generic_forbidden(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_generic"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    # Per the kind="prompt" wiring of `_handle_auth_403`, the
+    # operation-specific code surfaces here rather than the tool path's
+    # generic mcp_tool_call_forbidden.
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_prompt_get_forbidden"
+    assert "scopes_required" not in payload["error"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-6: breaker isolation — auth failures NEVER trip the breaker
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_breaker_unaffected_by_auth_failures(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Repeated 401 + refresh-failed cycles leave breaker at 0
+    (hard invariant 3 verified end-to-end for the prompt path)."""
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    # Re-seed each iteration: symmetric eviction (Phase 7b) clears
+    # ``_user_prompt_map`` on auth failure so the next dispatch's
+    # resolver would miss without a fresh seed. Production reconnect
+    # repopulates this; the test simulates that out-of-band.
+    for _ in range(10):
+        _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+                side_effect=_fake_classified,
+            ),
+            pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+        ):
+            mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+                {"who": "world"},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=15,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+        assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Negative tests — token lookup edge cases (prompt path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_missing_token_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="missing")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_decrypt_failure_emits_token_undecryptable(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="decrypt_failure")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown"
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_http_url_emits_url_insecure(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """An ``http://`` (non-loopback) oauth_user URL must surface
+    ``mcp_oauth_url_insecure`` BEFORE the bearer is attached.
+    """
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://example.com/mcp")
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_oauth_url_insecure"
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_unknown_name_raises_value_error(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any,
+) -> None:
+    """When the prefixed name doesn't resolve to either pool or static,
+    the static-path code raises ``ValueError``. Per-user-first
+    resolution (scope decision 0.1) means user_id-bearing callers still
+    hit this path when their pool catalog doesn't carry the name."""
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unknown MCP prompt"):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__nonexistent__missing",
+            None,
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-E2E: real discovery + dispatch in same connect (no _seed_pool_prompt_map)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_e2e_discovery_then_dispatch_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Drive REAL discovery + dispatch end-to-end through the pool path.
+
+    Mirror of the tool path's
+    ``test_integration_pool_reuse_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds``: skips
+    the ``_seed_pool_prompt_map`` shortcut and lets ``_connect_one_pool``
+    populate ``_user_prompt_map`` from the real ``prompts/list``
+    upstream response. Verifies that the entry's discovered prompts
+    match what the FastMCP fixture advertises AND that
+    ``_user_prompt_map[user_id]`` is populated with the prefixed name
+    after dispatch — proving the discovery path actually fired.
+
+    This is the structural gate against a regression where prompt
+    dispatch silently bypasses discovery (e.g., a mis-wired resolver
+    that finds the (server, original) via prefix-parsing alone never
+    populates the per-user catalog).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — discovery + dispatch both succeed
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    # NB: no `_seed_pool_prompt_map` — the resolver finds (server, original)
+    # via the `mcp__{server}__{prompt}` prefix and hands off to
+    # ``_dispatch_pool_prompt_sync``, which lazy-connects via
+    # ``_connect_one_pool``. The connect runs the real ``prompts/list``
+    # against the FastMCP fixture and populates the per-user catalog.
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        messages = mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    assert isinstance(messages, list)
+    assert len(messages) == 1
+    assert messages[0]["role"] == "user"
+    assert "world" in messages[0]["content"]
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+    # Discovery populated the entry's prompts with both fixtures
+    # (``greet`` and ``summarize``) — proves real ``prompts/list``
+    # ran during the connect, not just the targeted ``prompts/get``.
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+    assert entry.prompts is not None
+    discovered_names = {p["name"] for p in entry.prompts}
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__greet" in discovered_names
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__summarize" in discovered_names
+
+    # ``_rebuild_user_prompt_map`` ran during the connect, populating the
+    # per-user catalog. This is the signal that discovery wired into the
+    # routing tables — without it, a follow-up ``get_prompt_sync`` would
+    # need to re-resolve via prefix parsing every time.
+    user_prompt_map = mgr._user_prompt_map.get("user-1") or {}
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__greet" in user_prompt_map
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__summarize" in user_prompt_map
@@ -0,0 +1,690 @@
+"""Phase 7b integration tests — real-transport resource read 401/403/etc.
+
+Mirror of :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_integration` for the resource
+path (RFC §3.2). Drives through the real ``streamablehttp_client``,
+real httpx response-hook plumbing, and a real upstream subprocess
+(``FastMCP`` with a programmable ``BehaviorMiddleware``). Direct
+``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection is forbidden (invariant 14).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import logging
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+import uvicorn
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import TokenLookupResult
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+
+class BehaviorMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Programmable upstream behaviour — see
+    :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_integration` for the semantics. This
+    copy serves the resource integration tests.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._behaviour = behaviour
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable[..., Any]) -> Response:
+        from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
+
+        if request.method == "POST" and "/mcp" in str(request.url):
+            self._behaviour.setdefault("post_auth_headers", []).append(
+                request.headers.get("authorization")
+            )
+
+        mode = self._behaviour.get("mode", "never")
+        if mode == "once_401":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "unauthorized",
+                    status_code=401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "always_401":
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "unauthorized",
+                status_code=401,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                        "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                    )
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_403_insufficient":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "forbidden",
+                    status_code=403,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate",
+                            'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:read"',
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "once_403_generic" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "forbidden",
+                status_code=403,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get("www_authenticate", "Bearer realm=mcp")
+                },
+            )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _find_free_port() -> int:
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def _build_server(port: int, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="phase7b-resource-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.resource("res://hello")
+    def hello() -> str:
+        return "world"
+
+    @mcp.resource("res://json/data")
+    def jdata() -> str:
+        return '{"k": 1}'
+
+    # Echo tool exists so the e2e test can trigger ``_connect_one_pool``
+    # (and the full tool + resource + prompt discovery) via prefix-parsed
+    # ``call_tool_sync`` BEFORE the resource read. The other tests in this
+    # module use ``_seed_pool_resource_map`` and never invoke tools, so
+    # adding the tool is invisible to them.
+    @mcp.tool()
+    async def echo(payload: str = "default") -> str:
+        return f"echoed:{payload}"
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(BehaviorMiddleware, behaviour=behaviour)
+    config = uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=port, log_level="warning", access_log=False)
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def _wait_ready(port: int, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.5):
+                return
+        except OSError:
+            time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"upstream at 127.0.0.1:{port} not ready after {timeout}s")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def upstream():
+    port = _find_free_port()
+    behaviour: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    server = _build_server(port, behaviour)
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="phase7b-resource-upstream")
+    t.start()
+    try:
+        _wait_ready(port)
+        yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp", behaviour
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        t.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-rrr",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _seed_pool_resource_map(
+    mgr: MCPClientManager, user_id: str, server_name: str, uri: str
+) -> None:
+    """Pre-seed ``_user_resource_map`` so ``_resolve_pool_target_resource``
+    finds the URI. Production wires this through ``_connect_one_pool``;
+    the integration tests seed it directly so the test focuses on the
+    dispatch behaviour after resolution succeeds.
+    """
+
+    async def _seed() -> None:
+        entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((user_id, server_name))
+        entry.resources = [
+            {
+                "uri": uri,
+                "name": "",
+                "description": "",
+                "mimeType": "",
+                "server": server_name,
+            }
+        ]
+        mgr._rebuild_user_resource_map(user_id)
+
+    assert mgr._loop is not None
+    asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_seed(), mgr._loop).result(timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-1: 401 → refresh → retry → success (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Real upstream returns 401 once, then 200. Carrier captures 401,
+    force_refresh=True mints a new bearer, retry returns the resource.
+    Hard invariant 3: breaker counter remains 0.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        result = mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    assert result == "world"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, f"expected >=2 POSTs; got {len(post_headers)}"
+    assert post_headers[0] != post_headers[1], (
+        "retry attached the same bearer as the initial; the dispatcher "
+        "did not pick up the refreshed token."
+    )
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-2: persistent 401 → mcp_consent_required (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_persistent_401_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-3: 403 + insufficient_scope → mcp_insufficient_scope (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_403_insufficient_scope_emits_structured_error(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_insufficient"
+    behaviour["www_authenticate"] = 'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:read"'
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope"
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == ["files:read"]
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-3b: 403 generic → mcp_resource_read_forbidden
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_403_generic_forbidden(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_generic"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    # Per the kind="resource" wiring of `_handle_auth_403`, the
+    # operation-specific code surfaces here rather than the tool path's
+    # generic mcp_tool_call_forbidden.
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_resource_read_forbidden"
+    assert "scopes_required" not in payload["error"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-6: breaker isolation — auth failures NEVER trip the breaker
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_breaker_unaffected_by_auth_failures(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Repeated 401 + refresh-failed cycles leave breaker at 0
+    (hard invariant 3 verified end-to-end for the resource path)."""
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    # Re-seed each iteration: symmetric eviction (Phase 7b) clears
+    # ``_user_resource_map`` on auth failure so the next dispatch's
+    # resolver would miss without a fresh seed. Production reconnect
+    # repopulates this; the test simulates that out-of-band.
+    for _ in range(10):
+        _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+                side_effect=_fake_classified,
+            ),
+            pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+        ):
+            mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+        assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Negative tests — token lookup edge cases (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_missing_token_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="missing")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=10)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+
+def test_resource_read_decrypt_failure_emits_token_undecryptable(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="decrypt_failure")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=10)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown"
+
+
+def test_resource_read_http_url_emits_url_insecure(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """An ``http://`` (non-loopback) oauth_user URL must surface
+    ``mcp_oauth_url_insecure`` BEFORE the bearer is attached.
+    """
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://example.com/mcp")
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=5)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_oauth_url_insecure"
+
+
+def test_resource_read_unknown_uri_raises_value_error(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any,
+) -> None:
+    """When the URI doesn't resolve to either pool or static, the
+    static-path code raises ``ValueError``. Per-user-first resolution
+    (scope decision 0.1) means user_id-bearing callers still hit this
+    path when their pool catalog doesn't carry the URI."""
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unknown MCP resource"):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://nonexistent", user_id="user-1", timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-E2E: real discovery + dispatch in same connect (no _seed_pool_resource_map)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_e2e_discovery_then_dispatch_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Drive REAL discovery + dispatch end-to-end through the pool path.
+
+    Mirror of the tool path's
+    ``test_integration_pool_reuse_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds``: skips
+    the ``_seed_pool_resource_map`` shortcut and lets ``_connect_one_pool``
+    populate ``_user_resource_map`` from the real ``resources/list``
+    upstream response. Verifies that the entry's discovered resources
+    match what the FastMCP fixture advertises AND that
+    ``_user_resource_map[user_id]`` is populated with the URI(s) after
+    discovery — proving the discovery path actually fired.
+
+    Resource URIs do NOT carry a server-name prefix (unlike tools and
+    prompts), so the resource resolver cannot derive (server, uri) by
+    parsing alone. The test triggers the connect via a prefix-parsed
+    ``call_tool_sync`` first (which runs the full
+    tools+resources+prompts discovery against the FastMCP fixture),
+    then drives ``read_resource_sync`` against a URI that the
+    upstream advertised — proving that real discovery wired the URI
+    into the per-user catalog.
+
+    Structural gate against a regression where resource discovery is
+    silently skipped (e.g., a capability-gating bug that drops the
+    ``resources/list`` call but keeps the connect succeeding).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — discovery + dispatch both succeed
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    # NB: no `_seed_pool_resource_map` — the connect runs the real
+    # ``resources/list`` against the FastMCP fixture and populates the
+    # per-user catalog. The tool call below triggers that connect because
+    # ``_resolve_pool_target`` derives (server, original) from the
+    # ``mcp__pool-srv__echo`` prefix and lazy-connects via
+    # ``_connect_one_pool``.
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        # Step 1: trigger the connect via prefix-parsed tool dispatch.
+        # Discovery (tools + resources + prompts) populates the per-user
+        # catalogs.
+        tool_result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "ignite"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+        assert "echoed:ignite" in tool_result
+
+        # Step 2: now that discovery has populated ``_user_resource_map``,
+        # the resource resolver finds ``res://hello`` and dispatches the
+        # read on the SAME pool entry / session.
+        result = mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    assert result == "world"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+    # Discovery populated the entry's resources with both fixtures
+    # (``res://hello`` and ``res://json/data``) — proves real
+    # ``resources/list`` ran during the connect, not just the targeted
+    # ``resources/read``.
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+    assert entry.resources is not None
+    discovered_uris = {r["uri"] for r in entry.resources if not r.get("template")}
+    assert "res://hello" in discovered_uris
+    assert "res://json/data" in discovered_uris
+
+    # ``_rebuild_user_resource_map`` ran during the connect, populating
+    # the per-user catalog. This is the signal that discovery wired into
+    # the routing tables — without it, ``read_resource_sync`` would have
+    # raised ValueError because the resolver had no entry for the URI.
+    user_resource_map = mgr._user_resource_map.get("user-1") or {}
+    assert "res://hello" in user_resource_map
+    assert "res://json/data" in user_resource_map
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+"""Tests for ``MCPTokenStore`` ciphertext-aware CRUD.
+
+Phase 3 of the OAuth-MCP RFC: validates the encrypt/decrypt boundary
+between :class:`MCPTokenStore` and the storage protocol's ciphertext-only
+columns.  Exercises the row-not-deleted-on-decrypt-failure invariant.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
+    MCPTokenCipher,
+    MCPTokenCipherConfig,
+    MCPTokenDecryptError,
+    MCPTokenStore,
+)
+
+
+def _make_cipher() -> MCPTokenCipher:
+    raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+    return MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,)))
+
+
+def _make_store(backend, *, audit: bool = False) -> tuple[MCPTokenStore, MCPTokenCipher]:
+    cipher = _make_cipher()
+    store = MCPTokenStore(
+        backend,
+        cipher,
+        node_id="test-node",
+        audit_storage=backend if audit else None,
+    )
+    return store, cipher
+
+
+def _seed_server(backend, *, server_id: str = "srv-id-1", name: str = "srv-a") -> str:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+    )
+    return server_id
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# User-token CRUD
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestUserTokenCRUD:
+    def test_create_and_get_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="access-aaa",
+            refresh_token="refresh-bbb",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+            scopes="openid profile",
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        plain = store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert plain is not None
+        assert plain["user_id"] == "u1"
+        assert plain["server_name"] == "srv-a"
+        assert plain["access_token"] == "access-aaa"
+        assert plain["refresh_token"] == "refresh-bbb"
+        assert plain["scopes"] == "openid profile"
+        assert plain["audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+
+    def test_create_with_no_refresh_token(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="access-only",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        plain = store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert plain is not None
+        assert plain["access_token"] == "access-only"
+        assert plain["refresh_token"] is None
+
+    def test_get_missing_returns_none(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        assert store.get_user_token("nobody", "srv-a") is None
+
+    def test_update_after_refresh(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="old-access",
+            refresh_token="old-refresh",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+            scopes="openid",
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        ok = store.update_user_token_after_refresh(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="new-access",
+            refresh_token="new-refresh",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T13:00:00",
+        )
+        assert ok is True
+        plain = store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert plain is not None
+        assert plain["access_token"] == "new-access"
+        assert plain["refresh_token"] == "new-refresh"
+        assert plain["expires_at"] == "2026-05-04T13:00:00"
+        # Preserved columns:
+        assert plain["scopes"] == "openid"
+        assert plain["as_issuer"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        # last_refreshed got stamped:
+        assert plain["last_refreshed"] is not None
+
+    def test_update_after_refresh_missing_row_returns_false(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        ok = store.update_user_token_after_refresh(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="x",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+        )
+        assert ok is False
+
+    def test_delete(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="a",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        assert store.delete_user_token("u1", "srv-a") is True
+        assert store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a") is None
+        # Idempotent: deleting again returns False.
+        assert store.delete_user_token("u1", "srv-a") is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Client-secret writer
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestClientSecretWriter:
+    def test_set_oauth_client_secret_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, cipher = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        ok = store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "plaintext-secret")
+        assert ok is True
+        # Read raw via get_mcp_server: ciphertext != plaintext, decrypts back.
+        raw = backend.get_mcp_server(server_id)
+        assert raw is not None
+        ct = raw["oauth_client_secret_ct"]
+        assert isinstance(ct, (bytes, bytearray, memoryview))
+        ct_bytes = bytes(ct)
+        assert ct_bytes != b"plaintext-secret"
+        assert cipher.decrypt(ct_bytes) == b"plaintext-secret"
+
+    def test_set_oauth_client_secret_clear_with_none(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "x")
+        assert store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, None) is True
+        raw = backend.get_mcp_server(server_id)
+        assert raw is not None
+        assert raw["oauth_client_secret_ct"] is None
+
+    def test_set_oauth_client_secret_missing_server_returns_false(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        ok = store.set_oauth_client_secret("does-not-exist", "x")
+        assert ok is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Decrypt failure: row preservation invariant
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDecryptFailureInvariant:
+    def test_get_user_token_with_wrong_key_raises_decrypt_error(self, backend) -> None:
+        """CRITICAL: when no installed key can decrypt a stored row,
+        ``get_user_token`` MUST NOT auto-delete the row.  The row is
+        still valid; this node just doesn't have the right key.
+        """
+        # Write under cipher A.
+        store_a, _cipher_a = _make_store(backend)
+        store_a.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="secret-access",
+            refresh_token="secret-refresh",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+            scopes="openid",
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        raw_before = backend.get_mcp_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert raw_before is not None
+        ct_before = bytes(raw_before["access_token_ct"])
+
+        # Read under cipher B (different key).
+        store_b, cipher_b = _make_store(backend)
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError) as exc_info:
+            store_b.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        # The exception carries the keys we tried — useful for audit.
+        assert exc_info.value.key_fingerprints_attempted == cipher_b.key_fingerprints
+
+        # Row MUST still exist with ciphertext intact.
+        raw_after = backend.get_mcp_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert raw_after is not None
+        assert bytes(raw_after["access_token_ct"]) == ct_before
+
+    def test_decrypt_failure_emits_audit_when_configured(self, backend) -> None:
+        """When ``audit_storage`` is set, decrypt failures emit a
+        ``mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure`` audit event."""
+        store_a, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store_a.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="x",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://a",
+            audience="https://m",
+        )
+
+        store_b, cipher_b = _make_store(backend, audit=True)
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError):
+            store_b.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+
+        events = backend.list_audit_events(limit=10)
+        actions = {ev.get("action") for ev in events}
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure" in actions
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Client-secret reader — q-9
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestClientSecretReader:
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_returns_none_when_row_absent(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        assert store.get_oauth_client_secret("does-not-exist") is None
+
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_returns_none_when_column_null(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        # No set_oauth_client_secret call — column stays NULL.
+        assert store.get_oauth_client_secret(server_id) is None
+
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "shhh-its-secret")
+        assert store.get_oauth_client_secret(server_id) == "shhh-its-secret"
+
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_raises_on_key_mismatch(self, backend) -> None:
+        store_a, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        store_a.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "secret-under-key-a")
+
+        # Cipher B has a different key — decrypt fails loudly.
+        store_b, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError):
+            store_b.get_oauth_client_secret(server_id)
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+"""Tests for ``MCPTokenStore.list_user_token_metadata``.
+
+Validates the non-secret projection used by the settings UI: ciphertext
+columns are stripped, ordering is preserved, and the empty case returns
+``[]``. Decrypt is intentionally skipped — the list view must never need
+the access/refresh secrets.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
+    MCPTokenCipher,
+    MCPTokenCipherConfig,
+    MCPTokenStore,
+)
+
+
+def _make_cipher() -> MCPTokenCipher:
+    raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+    return MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,)))
+
+
+def _make_store(backend) -> MCPTokenStore:
+    return MCPTokenStore(backend, _make_cipher(), node_id="test-node")
+
+
+def _seed_token(
+    store: MCPTokenStore,
+    backend,
+    *,
+    user_id: str,
+    server_name: str,
+    created: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Create a token via the store and backdate ``created`` for ordering."""
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token="access-secret",
+        refresh_token="refresh-secret",
+        expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+        scopes="openid profile",
+        as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+    with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+        conn.execute(
+            sa.text(
+                "UPDATE mcp_user_tokens SET created = :created "
+                "WHERE user_id = :uid AND server_name = :sn"
+            ),
+            {"created": created, "uid": user_id, "sn": server_name},
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+
+
+class TestListUserTokenMetadata:
+    def test_list_user_token_metadata_returns_non_secret_fields_only(self, backend) -> None:
+        store = _make_store(backend)
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = store.list_user_token_metadata("u1")
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        meta = rows[0]
+        # Secrets MUST be absent.
+        assert "access_token" not in meta
+        assert "refresh_token" not in meta
+        assert "access_token_ct" not in meta
+        assert "refresh_token_ct" not in meta
+        # Non-secret columns surface verbatim.
+        assert meta["user_id"] == "u1"
+        assert meta["server_name"] == "srv-a"
+        assert meta["scopes"] == "openid profile"
+        assert meta["as_issuer"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        assert meta["audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+        assert meta["expires_at"] == "2026-05-04T12:00:00"
+        assert meta["created"] == "2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        assert meta["last_refreshed"] is None
+
+    def test_list_user_token_metadata_empty(self, backend) -> None:
+        store = _make_store(backend)
+        assert store.list_user_token_metadata("nobody") == []
+
+    def test_list_user_token_metadata_preserves_creation_order(self, backend) -> None:
+        store = _make_store(backend)
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-c", created="2026-05-03T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-b", created="2026-05-02T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = store.list_user_token_metadata("u1")
+        assert [r["server_name"] for r in rows] == ["srv-a", "srv-b", "srv-c"]
+        assert [r["created"] for r in rows] == [
+            "2026-05-01T00:00:00",
+            "2026-05-02T00:00:00",
+            "2026-05-03T00:00:00",
+        ]
@@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
+"""Tests for the per-(user, server) MCP session pool.
+
+Covers Phase 5 of the OAuth-MCP rollout: pool data structures,
+``_ensure_pool_entry`` lazy allocation, ``_connect_one_pool`` plumbing,
+the dispatch state machine in ``_dispatch_pool``, idle / LRU eviction,
+failure classification, and ``user_id`` thread-through.
+
+The static path (``auth_type ∈ {none, static}``) MUST stay
+byte-identical — see ``test_mcp_client.py``'s
+``test_reconnect_preserves_static_state_identity``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import threading
+import time
+from contextlib import AsyncExitStack
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager, PoolEntryState
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fixtures and helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    """A fresh SQLite backend per test (not the shared singleton)."""
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token="refresh-rrr",
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    """Background-loop fixture matching the static-path test convention.
+
+    Tests that need a wired-up app_state assign it via ``mgr.set_app_state``.
+    """
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+        # Drain the eviction task before stopping the loop so its log/stream
+        # handlers don't fire after pytest has torn its handlers down. Mirrors
+        # the production ``shutdown()`` shape.
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _run_on_loop(loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop, coro: Any) -> Any:
+    """Submit *coro* to *loop*, wait for the result with a 5s timeout."""
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(coro, loop)
+    return fut.result(timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Pool data structures
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestPoolDataStructures:
+    """``_user_pool_entries``, ``_user_pool_locks``, eviction-task state."""
+
+    def test_pool_state_starts_empty(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}
+        assert mgr._user_pool_last_used == {}
+        assert mgr._user_pool_locks == {}
+        assert mgr._user_pool_eviction_task is None
+
+    def test_set_app_state_persists(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        sentinel = SimpleNamespace(token_store=object())
+        mgr.set_app_state(sentinel)
+        assert mgr._app_state is sentinel
+
+    def test_ensure_pool_entry_allocates_lock_on_loop(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        """``asyncio.Lock`` MUST be created on the mcp-loop (RFC §2.0 #2)."""
+        mgr, loop, _thread = running_loop_mgr
+        key = ("user-A", "pool-srv")
+        entry = _run_on_loop(loop, mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key))
+        assert isinstance(entry, PoolEntryState)
+        assert entry.key == key
+        assert isinstance(entry.open_lock, asyncio.Lock)
+        # Calling again returns the same entry / lock object.
+        entry2 = _run_on_loop(loop, mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key))
+        assert entry2 is entry
+        assert entry2.open_lock is entry.open_lock
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Lazy connect (`_connect_one_pool`)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _AsyncCM:
+    """Awaitable async context manager that returns ``value`` from __aenter__."""
+
+    def __init__(self, value: Any) -> None:
+        self._value = value
+
+    async def __aenter__(self) -> Any:
+        return self._value
+
+    async def __aexit__(self, *exc: Any) -> bool:
+        return False
+
+
+class TestLazyConnect:
+    def test_connect_pool_injects_authorization_header(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        from unittest.mock import patch
+
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+
+        observed_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+        async def _probe(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> None:
+            return None
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+        fake_session.initialize = AsyncMock(return_value=None)
+        # Phase 7b: ``_connect_one_pool`` discovers tools, resources,
+        # and prompts after ``initialize()`` returns (resources/prompts
+        # capability-gated). The capability stub returns a tools-only
+        # advertisement so the test can keep its narrow focus on the
+        # bearer-injection contract; resources/prompts paths are
+        # exercised by the real-transport tests in
+        # ``tests/test_mcp_user_catalog.py``.
+        fake_caps = MagicMock()
+        fake_caps.resources = None
+        fake_caps.prompts = None
+        fake_session.get_server_capabilities = MagicMock(return_value=fake_caps)
+        fake_session.list_tools = AsyncMock(return_value=MagicMock(tools=[]))
+
+        def _stream_factory(*, url: str, headers: dict[str, str]) -> _AsyncCM:
+            observed_kwargs["url"] = url
+            observed_kwargs["headers"] = dict(headers)
+            return _AsyncCM((AsyncMock(), AsyncMock(), lambda: None))
+
+        with (
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_client.streamablehttp_client", side_effect=_stream_factory),
+            patch.object(mgr, "_tcp_probe", side_effect=_probe),
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_client.ClientSession", return_value=_AsyncCM(fake_session)),
+        ):
+            cfg = {
+                "type": "streamable-http",
+                "url": "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                "headers": {},
+            }
+            entry = _run_on_loop(
+                loop,
+                mgr._connect_one_pool(("user-1", "pool-srv"), cfg, "access-aaa"),
+            )
+
+        assert entry.session is fake_session
+        assert observed_kwargs["headers"]["Authorization"] == "Bearer access-aaa"
+
+    def test_connect_pool_rejects_non_http_transport(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cfg = {"type": "stdio", "command": "echo"}
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="streamable-http"):
+            _run_on_loop(
+                loop,
+                mgr._connect_one_pool(("user-1", "pool-srv"), cfg, "access-aaa"),
+            )
+
+    def test_pool_path_does_not_touch_static_servers(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        # Pre-seed a static-path entry so accidental writes are observable.
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+        sentinel = StaticServerState(name="static-srv", session=MagicMock())
+        mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] = sentinel
+
+        async def _seed_pool() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = MagicMock()
+            entry.last_used = time.monotonic()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_pool())
+        # Pool side has its own state; the static dict is untouched.
+        assert mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] is sentinel
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")].session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Eviction
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestEviction:
+    def test_idle_eviction_closes_stale_entries(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 0.0  # everything is stale
+
+        async def _seed() -> list[PoolEntryState]:
+            entries = []
+            for i in range(3):
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((f"u{i}", "pool-srv"))
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                entries.append(entry)
+            return entries
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}
+
+    def test_eviction_skips_locked_entries(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 0.0
+
+        async def _seed_and_lock() -> tuple[asyncio.Lock, asyncio.Event]:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("u-busy", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = MagicMock()
+            held = asyncio.Event()
+
+            async def _hold() -> None:
+                async with entry.open_lock:
+                    held.set()
+                    await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+
+            asyncio.create_task(_hold())
+            await held.wait()
+            return entry.open_lock, held
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_and_lock())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        # Entry survives because eviction skipped the locked key.
+        assert ("u-busy", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+
+    def test_lru_cap_evicts_oldest(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 999_999.0  # TTL effectively disabled
+        mgr._user_pool_lru_max = 2
+
+        async def _seed() -> None:
+            base = time.monotonic()
+            for i in range(5):
+                key = (f"u{i}", "pool-srv")
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key)
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                # Recent timestamps so TTL doesn't fire — only LRU should.
+                entry.last_used = base + i
+                mgr._user_pool_last_used[key] = base + i
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        assert len(mgr._user_pool_entries) <= 2
+        # The two newest survive (u3, u4).
+        assert ("u4", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+        assert ("u3", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+
+    def test_eviction_resilient_to_close_errors(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 0.0
+
+        broken_stack = MagicMock(spec=AsyncExitStack)
+        broken_stack.aclose = AsyncMock(side_effect=RuntimeError("close failed"))
+
+        async def _seed() -> None:
+            for i in range(2):
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((f"u{i}", "pool-srv"))
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                entry.stack = broken_stack
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        # Eviction must not raise even if close fails.
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        # All entries removed from the dict regardless.
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Dispatch state machine
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDispatchStateMachine:
+    """One row per state in the §1.5 / RFC §6 state machine."""
+
+    def _wire_pool(
+        self, mgr: MCPClientManager, storage: SQLiteBackend, cipher: Any
+    ) -> SimpleNamespace:
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+        return state
+
+    def test_no_token_emits_consent_required(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+        assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+
+    def test_decrypt_failure_does_not_emit_consent(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenDecryptError
+
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        state = self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        def _raise(*args, **kwargs):
+            raise MCPTokenDecryptError(
+                "no installed key can decrypt",
+                key_fingerprints_attempted=("aabbccdd",),
+            )
+
+        state.mcp_token_store.get_user_token = _raise
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown"
+        # Operator fingerprints stay server-side (audit log + structured log);
+        # the agent-facing payload must NOT carry them onward to the LLM
+        # provider.
+        assert "key_fingerprints_attempted" not in payload["error"]
+
+    def test_refresh_failure_emits_consent(self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        # Seed an expired token with no refresh — the classified getter
+        # treats this as "refresh_failed" (deletes the row, returns the
+        # tagged result).
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher, expires_in_seconds=-1000)
+        state = self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+        # Drop the refresh token to force the no-refresh-token branch.
+        state.mcp_token_store.delete_user_token("user-1", "pool-srv")
+        state.mcp_token_store.create_user_token(
+            "user-1",
+            "pool-srv",
+            access_token="access-aaa",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=(datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(seconds=1000)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"),
+            scopes="openid",
+            as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+    def test_token_present_dispatches_to_session(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher, expires_in_seconds=3600)
+        self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        # Pre-seed a connected pool entry so dispatch never touches the
+        # SDK or the network.
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "tool-result"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+
+        async def _seed_entry() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = fake_session
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_entry())
+
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+            {"q": "hi"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+        assert result == "tool-result"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Failure classification
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestClassifyFailure:
+    def test_transport_failure_classified_as_transport(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        for exc in (
+            BrokenPipeError(),
+            ConnectionResetError(),
+            EOFError(),
+            TimeoutError("net"),
+        ):
+            assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "transport"
+
+    def test_protocol_error_classified_as_protocol(self) -> None:
+        from mcp import McpError
+        from mcp.types import ErrorData
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        err = McpError(ErrorData(code=-32600, message="bad request"))
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(err) == "protocol"
+
+    def test_other_classified_as_other(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(ValueError("nope")) == "other"
+
+    def test_http_401_classified_as_auth_401(self) -> None:
+        """Defense-in-depth: ``HTTPStatusError`` classification still works
+        even though Phase 6 normally consults the carrier instead.
+
+        Phase 6 split ``"auth"`` into ``"auth_401"`` / ``"auth_403"``
+        so the dispatcher can refresh-and-retry only on 401.
+        """
+        import httpx
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        req = httpx.Request("POST", "https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        resp = httpx.Response(401, request=req)
+        exc = httpx.HTTPStatusError("unauthorized", request=req, response=resp)
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "auth_401"
+
+    def test_http_403_classified_as_auth_403(self) -> None:
+        import httpx
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        req = httpx.Request("POST", "https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        resp = httpx.Response(403, request=req)
+        exc = httpx.HTTPStatusError("forbidden", request=req, response=resp)
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "auth_403"
+
+    def test_http_500_not_classified_as_auth(self) -> None:
+        import httpx
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        req = httpx.Request("POST", "https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        resp = httpx.Response(500, request=req)
+        exc = httpx.HTTPStatusError("server", request=req, response=resp)
+        # 5xx is not auth — falls through to "other".
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "other"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Wired-failure paths in _dispatch_pool
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDispatchFailureWiring:
+    """``_classify_failure`` is consulted in production, not just tests."""
+
+    def _wire_pool(
+        self, mgr: MCPClientManager, storage: SQLiteBackend, cipher: Any
+    ) -> SimpleNamespace:
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+        return state
+
+    def _seed_connected_session(
+        self, mgr: MCPClientManager, loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop, exc: BaseException
+    ) -> None:
+        async def _seed() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            sess = MagicMock()
+
+            async def _raise(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+                raise exc
+
+            sess.call_tool = _raise
+            entry.session = sess
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+    def test_dispatch_pool_transport_failure_trips_breaker(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        self._seed_connected_session(mgr, loop, BrokenPipeError("dead"))
+
+        with pytest.raises(BrokenPipeError):
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        # Transport failure ticks the breaker.
+        assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 1
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# HTTPS enforcement (sec-1)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestHttpsEnforcement:
+    def test_pool_rejects_http_url_for_oauth_user(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://insecure.example.com/sse")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_oauth_url_insecure"
+        assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+
+    def test_pool_accepts_loopback_http(self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        """``http://127.0.0.1`` and ``http://localhost`` should not be blocked."""
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://127.0.0.1:8000/sse")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+
+        # Pre-seed a connected pool entry so dispatch succeeds without
+        # touching the network.
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "ok"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+
+        async def _seed_entry() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = fake_session
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_entry())
+
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+            {},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+        # Loopback URL not rejected — dispatch reaches the (fake) session.
+        assert result == "ok"
+
+    def test_validate_oauth_user_url_helper(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import _validate_oauth_user_url
+
+        # Acceptable: https + the exact loopback hostnames.
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("http://localhost/sse")
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("http://127.0.0.1:9000/sse")
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("http://[::1]/sse")
+
+        # Rejected: non-https + non-loopback. The ``*.localhost`` suffix
+        # bypass is intentionally NOT honored (RFC 6761 localhost-zone
+        # resolution is configuration-dependent — custom resolvers,
+        # /etc/hosts, Docker overlays may map ``foo.localhost`` to
+        # non-loopback IPs).
+        for bad in (
+            "http://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            "http://app.localhost/sse",
+            "ws://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            "ftp://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            "//mcp.example.com/sse",
+        ):
+            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="https://"):
+                _validate_oauth_user_url(bad)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _resolve_pool_target parser (q-9)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestResolvePoolTarget:
+    def _make_mgr_with_oauth_server(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, *, name: str = "pool-srv"
+    ) -> MCPClientManager:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name=name)
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        return mgr
+
+    def test_malformed_prefix(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        # Wrong prefix.
+        assert mgr._resolve_pool_target("xyz__pool-srv__t", None, None) is None
+
+    def test_too_few_separators(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        # mcp__server with no original_name segment.
+        assert mgr._resolve_pool_target("mcp__pool-srv", None, None) is None
+
+    def test_empty_server_segment(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        # mcp____tool — server segment is empty.
+        assert mgr._resolve_pool_target("mcp____tool", None, None) is None
+
+    def test_original_with_double_underscore_round_trips(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        target = mgr._resolve_pool_target("mcp__pool-srv__do__thing", None, None)
+        assert target is not None
+        assert target[0] == "pool-srv"
+        # Original-name keeps its embedded ``__``.
+        assert target[1] == "do__thing"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# LRU + lock interlock (q-7)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestLruInterlock:
+    def test_lru_cap_skips_locked_oldest(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        """LRU eviction must skip a locked entry the same way TTL does."""
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 999_999.0  # disable TTL
+        mgr._user_pool_lru_max = 2
+
+        async def _seed_and_lock_oldest() -> tuple[asyncio.Lock, asyncio.Event]:
+            base = time.monotonic()
+            for i in range(3):
+                key = (f"u{i}", "pool-srv")
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key)
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                # Older index ⇒ older timestamp.
+                entry.last_used = base + i
+                mgr._user_pool_last_used[key] = base + i
+            # Lock the oldest (u0) so eviction must skip it and pick a younger one.
+            oldest = mgr._user_pool_entries[("u0", "pool-srv")]
+            held = asyncio.Event()
+
+            async def _hold() -> None:
+                async with oldest.open_lock:
+                    held.set()
+                    await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+
+            asyncio.create_task(_hold())
+            await held.wait()
+            return oldest.open_lock, held
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_and_lock_oldest())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        # Locked u0 must survive.
+        assert ("u0", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+        # The oldest unlocked entry (u1) was evicted to bring count down to cap.
+        assert ("u1", "pool-srv") not in mgr._user_pool_entries
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Concurrent dispatch on shared session (M4 / perf-1)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestConcurrentDispatch:
+    def test_pool_concurrent_dispatch_to_same_user_server_is_serialized(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        """Phase 6: two tool calls on the SAME (user, server) MUST serialize
+        on ``open_lock`` so the auth-introspection carrier never crosses
+        between concurrent dispatches.
+
+        Phase 5 perf-1 released ``open_lock`` before ``call_tool`` so two
+        concurrent same-key calls multiplexed on a shared
+        ``ClientSession``. Phase 6 reverts that for the auth-aware path
+        because the per-dispatch ``_AuthCapture`` is keyed off the
+        ``httpx.AsyncClient`` event hook — releasing the lock would let
+        a concurrent dispatch overwrite the carrier mid-flight,
+        attributing one caller's 401 to another (a security bug).
+
+        Verified by reverting ``_dispatch_pool_with_entry`` to the
+        Phase 5 shape (release ``open_lock`` before ``call_tool`` —
+        i.e. move the ``in_flight += 1`` / ``call_tool`` / decrement
+        block out of the ``async with`` body) and confirming this test
+        observes ``max_concurrency == 2``.
+        """
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+
+        observed_max_concurrency = 0
+        in_flight = 0
+        in_flight_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            nonlocal observed_max_concurrency, in_flight
+            with in_flight_lock:
+                in_flight += 1
+                observed_max_concurrency = max(observed_max_concurrency, in_flight)
+            try:
+                # Hold a moment so concurrent calls would overlap if
+                # they weren't serialized on ``open_lock``.
+                await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
+                content = MagicMock()
+                content.text = "ok"
+                res = MagicMock()
+                res.content = [content]
+                res.isError = False
+                return res
+            finally:
+                with in_flight_lock:
+                    in_flight -= 1
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+
+        async def _seed_entry() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = fake_session
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_entry())
+
+        results: list[str] = []
+        errors: list[Exception] = []
+
+        def _dispatch() -> None:
+            try:
+                results.append(
+                    mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                        "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                        {},
+                        user_id="user-1",
+                        timeout=5,
+                    )
+                )
+            except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover — diagnostic only
+                errors.append(exc)
+
+        t1 = threading.Thread(target=_dispatch)
+        t2 = threading.Thread(target=_dispatch)
+        t1.start()
+        t2.start()
+        t1.join(timeout=5)
+        t2.join(timeout=5)
+
+        assert errors == []
+        assert results == ["ok", "ok"]
+        # ``open_lock`` held across ``call_tool`` — the second dispatch
+        # waits for the first to release before entering call_tool.
+        assert observed_max_concurrency == 1
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# user_id thread-through (signature)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestUserIdThreadThrough:
+    def test_default_user_id_takes_static_path(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        """``user_id=None`` must leave the static-path call byte-identical."""
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        # Static-path tool registered the standard way.
+        mgr._tool_map["mcp__static__t"] = ("static-srv", "t")
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "static-output"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+        mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] = StaticServerState(
+            name="static-srv", session=fake_session
+        )
+
+        # No user_id, no app_state — pool branch is skipped entirely.
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__static__t", {"q": "hi"}, user_id=None, timeout=5)
+        assert result == "static-output"
+
+    def test_user_id_with_static_path_does_not_use_pool(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        """Caller passes user_id but the resolved server is static — pool
+        branch must not run because ``_lookup_server_row`` reports
+        ``auth_type != 'oauth_user'``."""
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        storage.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-static",
+            name="static-srv",
+            transport="stdio",
+            url="",
+            command="echo",
+            auth_type="static",
+        )
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        mgr.set_app_state(SimpleNamespace())
+
+        mgr._tool_map["mcp__static-srv__t"] = ("static-srv", "t")
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "static-output"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+        mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] = StaticServerState(
+            name="static-srv", session=fake_session
+        )
+
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__static-srv__t",
+            {"q": "hi"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+        assert result == "static-output"
+        # No pool entries were created.
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ from turnstone.core.metacognition import (
    NUDGE_COMPLETION,
    NUDGE_CORRECTION,
    NUDGE_DENIAL,
+    NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP,
+    NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP,
    NUDGE_REPEAT,
    NUDGE_RESUME,
    NUDGE_START,
@@ -11,6 +13,7 @@ from turnstone.core.metacognition import (
    RepeatDetector,
    detect_completion,
    detect_correction,
+    format_idle_children_nudge,
    format_nudge,
    should_nudge,
 )
@@ -376,3 +379,209 @@ class TestRepeatDetector:
    def test_threshold_one_fires_immediately(self):
        det = RepeatDetector(threshold=1)
        assert det.record("a") is True
+
+
+class TestFormatIdleChildrenNudge:
+    """``format_idle_children_nudge`` renders the wake-driven idle_children
+    body — no ``<system-reminder>`` envelope (the side-channel splice
+    wraps it at the wire boundary).
+    """
+
+    def test_empty_list_returns_empty_string(self):
+        # Caller short-circuits on `if not text: return` — so empty
+        # input MUST produce empty output, not a header-only stub.
+        assert format_idle_children_nudge([]) == ""
+
+    def test_single_child_renders(self):
+        children = [{"ws_id": "ws-abc12345", "name": "research-task", "state": "running"}]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert "ws-abc12" in text  # short-id form (8 chars)
+        assert "research-task" in text
+        assert "running" in text
+        assert "wait_for_workstream" in text
+        assert "ws-abc12345" in text  # full id appears in the suggestion's ws_ids list
+
+    def test_under_display_cap_no_overflow_line(self):
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": f"ws-{i:08d}", "name": f"task-{i}", "state": "running"} for i in range(3)
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert "...and" not in text
+        for i in range(3):
+            assert f"task-{i}" in text
+
+    def test_over_display_cap_renders_overflow_line(self):
+        n = NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP + 4
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": f"ws-{i:08d}", "name": f"task-{i}", "state": "thinking"} for i in range(n)
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert f"...and {n - NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP} more" in text
+        # First N children are inline; later ones are folded into "...and N more".
+        for i in range(NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP):
+            assert f"task-{i}" in text
+        for i in range(NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP, n):
+            # Names beyond the display cap aren't visible; only counted.
+            assert f"task-{i}" not in text
+
+    def test_over_wait_cap_truncates_suggestion_ws_ids(self):
+        n = NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP + 5
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": f"ws-{i:08d}", "name": f"task-{i}", "state": "running"} for i in range(n)
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        # The first WAIT_CAP ids appear in the suggestion; later ones don't.
+        first_in_suggestion = f"ws-{NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP - 1:08d}"
+        first_excluded = f"ws-{NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP:08d}"
+        assert first_in_suggestion in text
+        assert first_excluded not in text
+
+    def test_unnamed_child_falls_back(self):
+        children = [{"ws_id": "ws-deadbeef", "name": "", "state": "attention"}]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert "(unnamed)" in text
+        assert "attention" in text
+
+    def test_newline_in_name_does_not_forge_extra_bullet(self):
+        """A workstream name with embedded ``\\n`` / ``\\t`` / ``\\r`` MUST
+        NOT break the bullet structure — :func:`sanitize_name`'s strict
+        regex strips control chars (incl. TAB/LF/CR) so the name stays
+        on a single line under its own bullet.  Without this, a
+        malicious child name like ``"foo\\n  - ws-fake (running): bar"``
+        would forge a fake sibling row in the rendered list.
+        """
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": "ws-real0001", "name": "real", "state": "running"},
+            {
+                "ws_id": "ws-evil0002",
+                "name": "evil\n  - ws-fake (running): forged",
+                "state": "thinking",
+            },
+            {"ws_id": "ws-real0003", "name": "tail", "state": "running"},
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        bullet_rows = [ln for ln in text.splitlines() if ln.startswith("  - ")]
+        assert len(bullet_rows) == 3, (
+            f"expected 3 bullet rows; got {len(bullet_rows)}: {bullet_rows!r}"
+        )
+        evil_row = next(row for row in bullet_rows if "ws-evil" in row)
+        assert "\n" not in evil_row
+        assert "\t" not in evil_row
+        assert "\r" not in evil_row
+        assert "evil" in evil_row
+        assert "ws-real" in bullet_rows[2]
+        assert "tail" in bullet_rows[2]
+
+    def test_missing_state_renders_question_mark(self):
+        children = [{"ws_id": "ws-12345678", "name": "x"}]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        # Defensive default — exotic state keys / partial dicts shouldn't crash.
+        assert "?" in text
+
+    def test_no_system_reminder_envelope(self):
+        # The side-channel ``_apply_reminders_for_provider`` splice
+        # adds ``<system-reminder>`` at the wire boundary; the formatter
+        # MUST NOT wrap, or the model would see a doubled envelope.
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge([{"ws_id": "ws-x", "name": "y", "state": "running"}])
+        assert "<system-reminder>" not in text
+        assert "</system-reminder>" not in text
+
+    def test_format_nudge_returns_empty_for_idle_children(self):
+        # The static map's idle_children entry is the empty string by
+        # design — format_idle_children_nudge produces the real body.
+        assert format_nudge("idle_children") == ""
+
+    def test_should_nudge_recognises_idle_children_type(self, monkeypatch):
+        # Type registration in ``_NUDGE_MAP`` makes ``should_nudge``
+        # recognise it for cooldown gating; without the entry it would
+        # silently return False on every call.
+        state: dict[str, float] = {}
+        # message_count > 1 to clear the first-message gate.
+        assert should_nudge("idle_children", state, message_count=4, memory_count=0) is True
+        # Cooldown set on success → second immediate call returns False.
+        assert should_nudge("idle_children", state, message_count=5, memory_count=0) is False
+
+
+class TestSanitizeName:
+    """Strict sanitiser for single-line user-controlled name fields
+    (used by :func:`format_idle_children_nudge` for the workstream
+    ``name``).  Strips ASCII control chars **including** TAB/LF/CR
+    plus Unicode steering vectors and angle-bracket tag breakers.
+    """
+
+    def test_empty_input_returns_empty(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        assert sanitize_name("") == ""
+
+    def test_strips_tab_lf_cr(self):
+        """Strict variant: TAB/LF/CR are stripped so a hostile name with
+        an embedded newline can't break a bullet's one-line structure.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        # All three become spaces (then collapsed to one inline space
+        # by the trailing ``strip()``-on-leading/trailing-only step
+        # — interior runs stay as multiple spaces, that's fine for a
+        # one-line name).
+        assert sanitize_name("a\tb") == "a b"
+        assert sanitize_name("a\nb") == "a b"
+        assert sanitize_name("a\rb") == "a b"
+
+    def test_strips_other_ascii_control_chars(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        assert sanitize_name("a\x07b\x0bc\x0cd") == "a b c d"
+        assert sanitize_name("a\x7fb") == "a b"
+
+    def test_strips_angle_bracket_tag_breakers(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        assert sanitize_name("a</thinking>b") == "a/thinkingb"
+
+
+class TestSanitizePayload:
+    """Permissive sanitiser used by the ``watch_triggered`` producer.
+    Strips ASCII control chars (except TAB/LF/CR), Unicode steering
+    vectors (bidi, zero-width, BOM, tag chars), and angle-bracket
+    tag breakers — keeps everything else intact, so multi-line shell
+    output retains its line structure.
+    """
+
+    def test_empty_input_returns_empty(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        assert sanitize_payload("") == ""
+
+    def test_strips_ascii_control_chars(self):
+        """``\\x00``-``\\x1f`` minus TAB/LF/CR plus ``\\x7f`` (DEL) become spaces."""
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # BEL (0x07), VT (0x0b), FF (0x0c) — all in strip set.
+        assert sanitize_payload("a\x07b\x0bc\x0cd") == "a b c d"
+        # DEL (0x7f).
+        assert sanitize_payload("a\x7fb") == "a b"
+
+    def test_preserves_tab_lf_cr(self):
+        """TAB / LF / CR are intentionally preserved so multi-line shell
+        output keeps its line structure when sanitised as a watch payload.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # Newlines kept; only the leading + trailing strip happens.
+        out = sanitize_payload("line1\nline2\n\tindented\rline3")
+        assert out == "line1\nline2\n\tindented\rline3"
+
+    def test_strips_bidi_and_zero_width(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # U+202E RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE; U+200B ZERO WIDTH SPACE.
+        assert sanitize_payload("a‮bc") == "a b c"
+
+    def test_strips_angle_bracket_tag_breakers(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # "<" / ">" go away entirely (not replaced with space) so a name
+        # like "</thinking>" doesn't leave a hole the model can read as
+        # a structural marker.
+        assert sanitize_payload("a</thinking>b") == "a/thinkingb"
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+"""Tests for alembic migration 049 (OAuth-MCP schema).
+
+Drives ``command.upgrade`` from a programmatic Alembic config against
+an isolated SQLite database per test, then asserts:
+
+* the two new tables (``mcp_user_tokens``, ``mcp_oauth_pending``) exist,
+* the eight new ``mcp_servers`` columns exist,
+* the post-upgrade ``UPDATE mcp_servers`` normalization rewrites rows
+  with empty / missing headers to ``auth_type='none'`` while leaving
+  rows with non-empty headers at ``auth_type='static'``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import command
+from alembic.config import Config
+
+_MIGRATIONS_DIR = str(
+    Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone" / "core" / "storage" / "migrations"
+)
+
+
+def _alembic_cfg(db_path: Path) -> Config:
+    cfg = Config()
+    cfg.set_main_option("script_location", _MIGRATIONS_DIR)
+    cfg.set_main_option("sqlalchemy.url", f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+    return cfg
+
+
+class TestMigration049:
+    def test_creates_new_tables_and_columns(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+        db_path = tmp_path / "049.db"
+        cfg = _alembic_cfg(db_path)
+
+        # Walk forward through 048 first, then explicitly to 049 so we
+        # exercise the *upgrade* function (not just the schema's `head`).
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "048")
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "049")
+
+        engine = sa.create_engine(f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+        try:
+            inspector = sa.inspect(engine)
+            tables = set(inspector.get_table_names())
+            assert "mcp_user_tokens" in tables
+            assert "mcp_oauth_pending" in tables
+
+            mcp_cols = {c["name"] for c in inspector.get_columns("mcp_servers")}
+            new_cols = {
+                "auth_type",
+                "oauth_client_id",
+                "oauth_client_secret_ct",
+                "oauth_scopes",
+                "oauth_audience",
+                "oauth_registration_mode",
+                "oauth_authorization_server_url",
+                "oauth_as_issuer_cached",
+            }
+            assert new_cols.issubset(mcp_cols), new_cols - mcp_cols
+
+            # Index check on mcp_oauth_pending.
+            indexes = {ix["name"] for ix in inspector.get_indexes("mcp_oauth_pending")}
+            assert "idx_mcp_pending_created" in indexes
+        finally:
+            engine.dispose()
+
+    def test_normalizes_empty_headers_to_none(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+        """Streamable-http rows with NULL / '' / '{}' headers become
+        auth_type='none'; rows with non-empty headers stay 'static'.
+        Stdio rows always stay 'static' regardless of headers — the
+        column value is opaque when there is no HTTP transport."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "049-norm.db"
+        cfg = _alembic_cfg(db_path)
+
+        # Apply everything up to 048, seed rows, then apply 049.
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "048")
+
+        engine = sa.create_engine(f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+        try:
+            with engine.begin() as conn:
+                conn.execute(
+                    sa.text(
+                        """
+                        INSERT INTO mcp_servers (
+                            server_id, name, transport, command, args, url,
+                            headers, env, auto_approve, enabled, created_by,
+                            registry_name, registry_version, registry_meta,
+                            created, updated
+                        ) VALUES (
+                            :sid, :name, :transport, '', '[]',
+                            'https://x', :headers, '{}', 0, 1, '', NULL, '',
+                            '{}', '2026-05-04T11:00:00', '2026-05-04T11:00:00'
+                        )
+                        """
+                    ),
+                    [
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-empty-str",
+                            "name": "empty-str",
+                            "transport": "streamable-http",
+                            "headers": "",
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-empty-obj",
+                            "name": "empty-obj",
+                            "transport": "streamable-http",
+                            "headers": "{}",
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-with-headers",
+                            "name": "with-headers",
+                            "transport": "streamable-http",
+                            "headers": '{"Authorization":"Bearer x"}',
+                        },
+                        # Stdio rows must keep the 'static' default, even
+                        # though their headers are empty — auth_type is
+                        # opaque for stdio.
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-stdio-empty",
+                            "name": "stdio-empty",
+                            "transport": "stdio",
+                            "headers": "{}",
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-stdio-null",
+                            "name": "stdio-null",
+                            "transport": "stdio",
+                            "headers": "",
+                        },
+                    ],
+                )
+
+            command.upgrade(cfg, "049")
+
+            with engine.connect() as conn:
+                rows = dict(conn.execute(sa.text("SELECT name, auth_type FROM mcp_servers")).all())
+            assert rows["empty-str"] == "none"
+            assert rows["empty-obj"] == "none"
+            assert rows["with-headers"] == "static"
+            # Stdio rows must remain at the 'static' column default even
+            # when headers are empty — the migration only touches HTTP
+            # rows where auth_type is semantically meaningful.
+            assert rows["stdio-empty"] == "static"
+            assert rows["stdio-null"] == "static"
+        finally:
+            engine.dispose()
+
+    def test_full_chain_to_head(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+        """Sanity: running ``upgrade head`` on a fresh DB yields the
+        same end-state column set as ``_schema.metadata``."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "049-head.db"
+        cfg = _alembic_cfg(db_path)
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "head")
+
+        engine = sa.create_engine(f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+        try:
+            from turnstone.core.storage._schema import mcp_servers
+
+            inspector = sa.inspect(engine)
+            actual = {c["name"] for c in inspector.get_columns("mcp_servers")}
+            expected = {c.name for c in mcp_servers.columns}
+            assert expected.issubset(actual), expected - actual
+        finally:
+            engine.dispose()
@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`NudgeQueue`."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import TOOL_DRAIN, USER_DRAIN, NudgeQueue
+
+
+class TestEnqueueDrain:
+    def test_enqueue_drain_fifo_order(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "any")
+        # Drain everything regardless of channel — preserves insertion order.
+        out = q.drain({"user", "tool", "any"})
+        # Drain returns ``(nudge_type, text, metadata)``; producers
+        # without ``metadata`` see ``None`` in the third slot.
+        assert out == [("a", "1", None), ("b", "2", None), ("c", "3", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_drain_filter_keeps_non_matching(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "x", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "y", "tool")
+        # Drain only user → tool entry stays.
+        out = q.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert out == [("a", "x", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 1
+        # Now drain tool — gets the remaining entry.
+        out = q.drain(TOOL_DRAIN)
+        assert out == [("b", "y", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_any_channel_drains_on_either_seam(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("c", "z", "any")
+        # User-seam drain pulls "any".
+        assert q.drain(USER_DRAIN) == [("c", "z", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+        # Re-enqueue and prove tool-seam also drains "any".
+        q.enqueue("d", "w", "any")
+        assert q.drain(TOOL_DRAIN) == [("d", "w", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_drain_empty_filter_no_op(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        # Empty filter drains nothing.
+        assert q.drain(set()) == []
+        assert len(q) == 1
+
+    def test_drain_empty_queue_returns_empty_list(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        # Fast-path: no items → no kept-deque allocation, just `[]`.
+        assert q.drain(USER_DRAIN) == []
+        assert q.drain({"user", "tool", "any"}) == []
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_drain_preserves_order_across_partial_drain(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "user")
+        q.enqueue("d", "4", "tool")
+        # Drain user — should get "a" then "c" in order; "b","d" stay.
+        assert q.drain({"user"}) == [("a", "1", None), ("c", "3", None)]
+        # Tool drain follows insertion order on remaining.
+        assert q.drain({"tool"}) == [("b", "2", None), ("d", "4", None)]
+
+
+class TestLenAndClear:
+    def test_len_does_not_mutate(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        assert len(q) == 1
+        assert len(q) == 1  # second call still 1; not consumed
+        assert q.pending() == [("a", "1")]
+
+    def test_len_empty_is_zero(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_clear_returns_count(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.clear() == 0
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "any")
+        assert q.clear() == 3
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_clear_empty_returns_zero(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.clear() == 0
+
+
+class TestDropOldestByType:
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_removes_earliest_match(self):
+        """Drop the FIRST entry of the matching type; later matches stay."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("other", "first", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "older", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "newer", "any")
+        # "older" is the earliest target — drop it.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is True
+        assert q.pending() == [("other", "first"), ("target", "newer")]
+
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_no_match_returns_false(self):
+        """Empty queue and unmatched-type cases both return False."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        # Empty.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is False
+        # Non-matching items only.
+        q.enqueue("other", "1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("other", "2", "tool")
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is False
+        # Queue is unaffected.
+        assert q.pending() == [("other", "1"), ("other", "2")]
+
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_only_drops_one(self):
+        """Multiple matching entries → only the first is removed."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "2", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "3", "any")
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is True
+        assert q.pending() == [("target", "2"), ("target", "3")]
+
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_channel_filter(self):
+        """With ``channel`` set, drop walks only that channel.  Pairs with
+        :meth:`count_by_type(..., channel=...)` so producer-side soft caps
+        operate on a consistent entry set.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "user-1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("target", "any-1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "any-2", "any")
+        # Drop the oldest "any"-channel target — leaves the user one
+        # untouched even though it's earlier in insertion order.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target", channel="any") is True
+        assert q.pending() == [
+            ("target", "user-1"),
+            ("target", "any-2"),
+        ]
+        # And a channel with no matches returns False without touching
+        # the queue.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target", channel="tool") is False
+        assert q.pending() == [
+            ("target", "user-1"),
+            ("target", "any-2"),
+        ]
+
+
+class TestCapAtOrDropOldest:
+    def test_below_cap_no_drop(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(3):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"t-{i}", "any")
+        # 3 entries, cap=5 → no drop.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 5, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 3
+
+    def test_at_cap_drops_oldest(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(5):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"t-{i}", "any")
+        # 5 entries, cap=5 → drop the oldest ("t-0"), leaving 4.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 5, channel="any") is True
+        remaining = q.pending()
+        assert ("target", "t-0") not in remaining
+        assert len(remaining) == 4
+        assert remaining[0] == ("target", "t-1")  # FIFO drop-oldest preserved
+
+    def test_above_cap_drops_only_one(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(7):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"t-{i}", "any")
+        # 7 entries, cap=5 → drop only ONE per call (soft-cap regulates over time).
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 5, channel="any") is True
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 6
+
+    def test_channel_filter_respected(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(3):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"any-{i}", "any")
+        for i in range(3):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"user-{i}", "user")
+        # 3 "any"-channel entries; cap=3 on channel="any" → drop oldest "any" only.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 3, channel="any") is True
+        # User-channel entries untouched.
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="user") == 3
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="any") == 2
+
+    def test_other_types_ignored(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(5):
+            q.enqueue("other", f"o-{i}", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "t-0", "any")
+        # Only one "target" entry; cap=1 on "target" → drop it.  "other"
+        # entries are untouched even though queue holds 6 total.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 1, channel="any") is True
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 0
+        assert q.count_by_type("other") == 5
+
+    def test_zero_or_negative_cap_no_op(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "t-0", "any")
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 0, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", -1, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 1
+
+    def test_no_match_returns_false(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("other", "o-0", "any")
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 1, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.count_by_type("other") == 1
+
+
+class TestCountByType:
+    def test_count_by_type_no_channel(self):
+        """Count across all channels with ``channel=None``."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("other", "x", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "2", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "3", "tool")
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 3
+        assert q.count_by_type("other") == 1
+        assert q.count_by_type("missing") == 0
+
+    def test_count_by_type_with_channel_filter(self):
+        """Filter narrows the count to one channel — used by producer-side
+        soft caps that pair with ``drop_oldest_by_type(..., channel=...)``.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "u-1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("target", "a-1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "a-2", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "t-1", "tool")
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="any") == 2
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="user") == 1
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="tool") == 1
+
+    def test_count_by_type_empty_queue(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.count_by_type("anything") == 0
+        assert q.count_by_type("anything", channel="any") == 0
+
+
+class TestPending:
+    def test_pending_no_filter_returns_all_in_order(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "any")
+        # All three, in insertion order, as (nudge_type, text) tuples.
+        assert q.pending() == [("a", "1"), ("b", "2"), ("c", "3")]
+
+    def test_pending_channel_filter(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "user")
+        q.enqueue("d", "4", "any")
+        assert q.pending("user") == [("a", "1"), ("c", "3")]
+        assert q.pending("tool") == [("b", "2")]
+        assert q.pending("any") == [("d", "4")]
+
+    def test_pending_does_not_mutate(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        # Two pending calls return same content; nothing consumed.
+        first = q.pending()
+        second = q.pending()
+        assert first == second
+        assert len(q) == 2
+
+
+class TestMetadata:
+    """Producer-supplied ``metadata`` rides alongside ``(type, text)`` on
+    drain.  Today only ``watch_triggered`` populates it; the wire shape
+    accommodates future producers (e.g. structured tool_error context)
+    without another schema bump.
+    """
+
+    def test_drain_returns_metadata_when_set(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        meta = {"watch_name": "w1", "command": "ls", "poll_count": 2}
+        q.enqueue("watch_triggered", "$ ls\nfile.txt", "any", metadata=meta)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [("watch_triggered", "$ ls\nfile.txt", meta)]
+
+    def test_drain_returns_none_when_metadata_unset(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("idle_children", "kids", "any")  # no metadata kwarg
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [("idle_children", "kids", None)]
+
+    def test_pending_with_metadata_projects_third_field(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("watch_triggered", "out", "any", metadata={"watch_name": "w"})
+        snapshot = q.pending_with_metadata()
+        assert snapshot == [
+            ("a", "1", None),
+            ("watch_triggered", "out", {"watch_name": "w"}),
+        ]
+        # ``pending`` (without metadata) keeps the legacy 2-tuple shape.
+        assert q.pending() == [("a", "1"), ("watch_triggered", "out")]
+
+    def test_metadata_survives_partial_drain(self):
+        """A ``user``-channel drain leaves an unaffected ``tool``-channel
+        entry — its metadata must still be present on the next drain."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("user_thing", "u", "user")
+        q.enqueue("watch_triggered", "w-out", "tool", metadata={"watch_name": "w1"})
+        # User drain doesn't touch the tool entry.
+        assert q.drain({"user"}) == [("user_thing", "u", None)]
+        # Tool drain still has the metadata.
+        assert q.drain({"tool"}) == [
+            ("watch_triggered", "w-out", {"watch_name": "w1"}),
+        ]
+
+    def test_metadata_with_valid_until_predicate(self):
+        """Metadata + ``valid_until`` co-exist on the same entry; the
+        predicate gate runs as before, and on a True result the metadata
+        rides the drained tuple.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue(
+            "watch_triggered",
+            "w-out",
+            "any",
+            valid_until=lambda: True,
+            metadata={"watch_name": "w1", "is_final": True},
+        )
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [
+            ("watch_triggered", "w-out", {"watch_name": "w1", "is_final": True}),
+        ]
+
+
+class TestHasPending:
+    def test_has_pending_returns_false_on_empty_queue(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.has_pending({"user", "any"}) is False
+        assert q.has_pending({"tool"}) is False
+
+    def test_has_pending_short_circuits_on_first_match(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "user")
+        # First entry doesn't match, second does — true after walking 2.
+        assert q.has_pending({"user"}) is True
+
+    def test_has_pending_returns_false_when_no_match(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        assert q.has_pending({"user", "any"}) is False
+
+    def test_has_pending_matches_any_channel(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any")
+        # USER_DRAIN-shaped filter pulls "any" entries.
+        assert q.has_pending(USER_DRAIN) is True
+        # TOOL_DRAIN-shaped filter also pulls "any" entries.
+        assert q.has_pending(TOOL_DRAIN) is True
+
+    def test_has_pending_does_not_mutate(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        before = q.pending()
+        q.has_pending({"user"})
+        q.has_pending({"tool"})
+        q.has_pending(set())
+        assert q.pending() == before
+
+
+class TestValidation:
+    def test_invalid_channel_raises(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="channel"):
+            q.enqueue("a", "1", "wake")  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            q.enqueue("b", "2", "")  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        # Queue is unaffected by the failed enqueues.
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_channel_is_required(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        # No default — caller MUST pick a seam consciously.
+        with pytest.raises(TypeError):
+            q.enqueue("a", "1")  # type: ignore[call-arg]
+
+
+class TestValidUntil:
+    """``valid_until`` predicate: drain re-checks freshness; falsy /
+    raising predicates drop the entry without delivery.
+    """
+
+    def test_valid_until_true_delivers(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any", valid_until=lambda: True)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [("a", "1", None)]
+
+    def test_valid_until_false_drops_silently(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any", valid_until=lambda: False)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == []
+        # Already removed from queue (drain partition removes BEFORE
+        # predicate check — falsy doesn't return to queue).
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_valid_until_exception_drops_silently(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+
+        def boom() -> bool:
+            raise RuntimeError("predicate crash")
+
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any", valid_until=boom)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == []
+        # Crash-on-predicate is treated as "no longer valid" — drop, not propagate.
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_valid_until_evaluated_outside_lock(self):
+        """The predicate may do non-trivial work (e.g. storage I/O)
+        without blocking other producers.  Verify the predicate runs
+        outside the queue's internal lock by enqueueing from inside
+        the predicate — would deadlock if the lock was still held.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+
+        def reentrant() -> bool:
+            # If the lock is held during predicate eval, this enqueue
+            # would block forever (RLock would let it through, but the
+            # queue uses a plain Lock).
+            q.enqueue("inner", "from-predicate", "any", valid_until=lambda: True)
+            return True
+
+        q.enqueue("outer", "1", "any", valid_until=reentrant)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        # Outer's predicate ran outside the lock, enqueued "inner";
+        # outer's True return delivered "outer".  "inner" was enqueued
+        # AFTER the partition snapshot, so it stays in the queue.
+        assert out == [("outer", "1", None)]
+        assert q.pending() == [("inner", "from-predicate")]
+
+    def test_valid_until_only_evaluated_for_matching_channel(self):
+        """A non-matching entry's predicate must NOT fire — that would
+        be wasted work (or worse, a side-effecting predicate would run
+        when the entry is supposed to stay queued).
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        calls = []
+
+        def track() -> bool:
+            calls.append(1)
+            return True
+
+        # Tool-channel entry; we drain user-channel.  Predicate must not run.
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "tool", valid_until=track)
+        q.drain({"user", "any"})
+        assert calls == []
+        # Entry stays queued.
+        assert q.pending("tool") == [("a", "1")]
+
+    def test_valid_until_default_none_always_delivers(self):
+        # No predicate → entry behaves identically to pre-PR-3 entries.
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any")  # no valid_until kwarg
+        assert q.drain({"any"}) == [("a", "1", None)]
+
+
+class TestConcurrency:
+    def test_concurrent_enqueue_drain_no_loss(self):
+        """16 producer threads × 64 nudges = 1024 total; one consumer
+        drains in a loop until producers finish + queue empty.  Verify
+        every produced item is observed exactly once.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        producers = 16
+        per_producer = 64
+        total = producers * per_producer
+
+        produced: set[tuple[str, str]] = set()
+        produced_lock = threading.Lock()
+        observed: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+        observed_lock = threading.Lock()
+        done_event = threading.Event()
+
+        def produce(pid: int) -> None:
+            for i in range(per_producer):
+                key = (f"p{pid}", f"i{i}")
+                with produced_lock:
+                    produced.add(key)
+                q.enqueue(key[0], key[1], "user")
+
+        def consume() -> None:
+            while not done_event.is_set() or len(q) > 0:
+                drained = q.drain({"user"})
+                if drained:
+                    with observed_lock:
+                        # Drop the trailing ``metadata`` slot — every
+                        # entry here was enqueued without metadata, so
+                        # the comparison set / count matches the produced
+                        # ``(type, text)`` shape.
+                        observed.extend((nt, txt) for nt, txt, _meta in drained)
+
+        consumer = threading.Thread(target=consume, daemon=True)
+        consumer.start()
+        threads = [threading.Thread(target=produce, args=(i,)) for i in range(producers)]
+        for t in threads:
+            t.start()
+        for t in threads:
+            t.join()
+        done_event.set()
+        consumer.join(timeout=5.0)
+        assert not consumer.is_alive(), "consumer didn't finish in time"
+
+        # Every produced key observed; no duplicates.
+        assert set(observed) == produced
+        assert len(observed) == total
+        assert len(q) == 0
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+"""Direct tests for the shared SSRF helpers in :mod:`turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf`.
+
+The OIDC test suite already exercises these via the OIDC adapter
+(``OIDCError`` re-raises). This file pins the canonical
+:class:`OAuthSSRFError` exception so callers that don't go through OIDC
+(notably ``mcp_oauth``) can rely on a stable contract.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import urllib.parse
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf import (
+    OAuthSSRFError,
+    effective_port,
+    is_localhost,
+    validate_discovered_endpoint,
+    validate_url_no_ssrf,
+)
+
+
+class TestIsLocalhost:
+    def test_loopback_names(self) -> None:
+        assert is_localhost("localhost")
+        assert is_localhost("127.0.0.1")
+        assert is_localhost("::1")
+        assert is_localhost("foo.localhost")
+
+    def test_non_loopback(self) -> None:
+        assert not is_localhost("example.com")
+        assert not is_localhost("internal.corp")
+
+
+class TestEffectivePort:
+    def test_explicit_port(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com:9443/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) == 9443
+
+    def test_default_https(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) == 443
+
+    def test_default_http(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("http://idp.example.com/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) == 80
+
+    def test_unknown_scheme(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("ftp://idp.example.com/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) is None
+
+
+class TestValidateUrlNoSSRF:
+    _PUBLIC_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))]
+    _PRIVATE_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("10.0.0.1", 0))]
+    _LOOPBACK_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0))]
+
+    def test_valid_https(self) -> None:
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            parsed = validate_url_no_ssrf("https://idp.example.com/foo", allow_http=False)
+        assert parsed.scheme == "https"
+        assert parsed.hostname == "idp.example.com"
+
+    def test_rejects_http_when_not_allowed(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="must use HTTPS"):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("http://idp.example.com", allow_http=False)
+
+    def test_allows_http_localhost_with_flag(self) -> None:
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._LOOPBACK_ADDR):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("http://localhost:8080", allow_http=True)
+
+    def test_rejects_http_non_localhost_even_with_flag(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="must use HTTPS"):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("http://idp.example.com", allow_http=True)
+
+    def test_rejects_userinfo(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="embedded credentials"):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("https://user:pass@idp.example.com", allow_http=False)
+
+    def test_rejects_private_address(self) -> None:
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PRIVATE_ADDR),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="non-public address"),
+        ):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("https://corp.example.com", allow_http=False)
+
+    def test_rejects_unresolvable(self) -> None:
+        import socket
+
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", side_effect=socket.gaierror("fail")),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="cannot be resolved"),
+        ):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("https://no.such.host.invalid", allow_http=False)
+
+
+class TestValidateDiscoveredEndpoint:
+    _PUBLIC_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))]
+
+    def test_same_origin_passes(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://idp.example.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_third_party_host_rejected(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="not trusted"),
+        ):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://attacker.example.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_trusted_endpoint_host_passes(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://shard.example.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset({"shard.example.com"}),
+            )
+
+    def test_known_google_alias_passes(self) -> None:
+        """The hard-coded Google alias map covers oauth2.googleapis.com."""
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://accounts.google.com")
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_scheme_mismatch_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # When the issuer is http://localhost (allow_http=True), an
+        # https:// endpoint must still be rejected as a scheme mismatch.
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("http://localhost:8080")
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0))]),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="scheme"),
+        ):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://localhost:8080/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=True,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_port_mismatch_rejected(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="port"),
+        ):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://idp.example.com:9443/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
@@ -18,10 +18,7 @@ from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
 from starlette.routing import Mount, Route
 from starlette.testclient import TestClient

-if TYPE_CHECKING:
-    from starlette.requests import Request
-    from starlette.responses import Response
-
+from tests.conftest import make_oidc_test_config as _make_oidc_config
 from turnstone.console.server import (
    admin_delete_oidc_identity,
    admin_list_oidc_identities,
@@ -32,34 +29,12 @@ from turnstone.core.auth import (
    handle_oidc_authorize,
    handle_oidc_callback,
 )
-from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig, OIDCError
+from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig, OIDCError, OIDCKeyNotFoundError
 from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend

-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Helpers
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _make_oidc_config(**overrides: Any) -> OIDCConfig:
-    """Build a test OIDCConfig with sensible defaults."""
-    defaults: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "enabled": True,
-        "issuer": "https://idp.example.com",
-        "client_id": "my-client",
-        "client_secret": "my-secret",
-        "scopes": "openid email profile",
-        "provider_name": "TestIDP",
-        "role_claim": "",
-        "role_map": {},
-        "password_enabled": True,
-        "authorization_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
-        "token_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/token",
-        "userinfo_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/userinfo",
-        "jwks_uri": "https://idp.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
-    }
-    defaults.update(overrides)
-    return OIDCConfig(**defaults)
-
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response

 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Thin handler wrappers — match the pattern used in server.py / console
@@ -290,9 +265,9 @@ class TestOIDCCallback:
    ) -> None:
        storage.create_oidc_pending_state(state, nonce, code_verifier, audience)

-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.provision_oidc_user")
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.validate_id_token")
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
    def test_happy_path(
        self,
        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
@@ -379,7 +354,7 @@ class TestOIDCCallback:
        assert resp.status_code == 302
        assert "Login+session+expired" in resp.headers["location"]

-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
    def test_code_exchange_failure(
        self,
        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
@@ -396,8 +371,8 @@ class TestOIDCCallback:
        assert resp.status_code == 302
        assert "Authentication+failed" in resp.headers["location"]

-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.validate_id_token")
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
    def test_token_validation_failure(
        self,
        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
@@ -416,10 +391,10 @@ class TestOIDCCallback:
        assert resp.status_code == 302
        assert "Authentication+failed" in resp.headers["location"]

-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.provision_oidc_user")
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.validate_id_token")
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.fetch_jwks", new_callable=AsyncMock)
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.fetch_jwks", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
    def test_jwks_key_rotation_retry(
        self,
        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
@@ -429,13 +404,13 @@ class TestOIDCCallback:
        authorize_client: TestClient,
        storage: SQLiteBackend,
    ) -> None:
-        """First validate raises 'kid not found in JWKS', fetch_jwks retried, second validate succeeds."""
+        """First validate raises kid-not-found, fetch_jwks retried, second validate succeeds."""
        self._seed_pending_state(storage)
        mock_exchange.return_value = {"id_token": "fake.jwt.token"}

        # First call raises kid-not-found; second call (after JWKS refresh) succeeds
        mock_validate.side_effect = [
-            OIDCError("Signing key 'new-kid' not found in JWKS"),
+            OIDCKeyNotFoundError("Signing key 'new-kid' not found in JWKS"),
            {"sub": "user123", "email": "u@example.com", "nonce": "test-nonce"},
        ]
        mock_fetch_jwks.return_value = {"keys": [{"kid": "new-kid", "kty": "RSA"}]}
@@ -450,9 +425,61 @@ class TestOIDCCallback:
        mock_fetch_jwks.assert_called_once()
        assert mock_validate.call_count == 2

-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.provision_oidc_user")
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.validate_id_token")
-    @patch("turnstone.core.oidc.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.fetch_jwks", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    def test_callback_uses_keynotfound_for_jwks_retry(
+        self,
+        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
+        mock_fetch_jwks: AsyncMock,
+        mock_validate: Any,
+        mock_provision: Any,
+        authorize_client: TestClient,
+        storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Retry path keys off the OIDCKeyNotFoundError type, not message substring."""
+        self._seed_pending_state(storage)
+        mock_exchange.return_value = {"id_token": "fake.jwt.token"}
+
+        # First raises subclass; rephrased message must not affect retry behaviour.
+        mock_validate.side_effect = [
+            OIDCKeyNotFoundError("rotated key absent from cached set"),
+            {"sub": "user123", "email": "u@example.com", "nonce": "test-nonce"},
+        ]
+        mock_fetch_jwks.return_value = {"keys": [{"kid": "new-kid", "kty": "RSA"}]}
+        mock_provision.return_value = {"user_id": "test-admin", "username": "testadmin"}
+
+        resp = authorize_client.get(
+            "/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=authcode&state=valid-state",
+            follow_redirects=False,
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 302
+        assert "oidc_success=1" in resp.headers["location"]
+        mock_fetch_jwks.assert_called_once()
+        assert mock_validate.call_count == 2
+
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    def test_callback_returns_authentication_failed_on_missing_id_token(
+        self,
+        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
+        authorize_client: TestClient,
+        storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    ) -> None:
+        """A token endpoint response without id_token must redirect with auth-failed."""
+        self._seed_pending_state(storage)
+        mock_exchange.return_value = {"access_token": "x"}
+
+        resp = authorize_client.get(
+            "/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=authcode&state=valid-state",
+            follow_redirects=False,
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 302
+        assert "oidc_error=Authentication+failed" in resp.headers["location"]
+
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
    def test_no_users_after_oidc_success_redirects_setup(
        self,
        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
@@ -507,6 +534,193 @@ class TestOIDCCallback:
        assert "oidc_error" in resp.headers["location"]
        assert "Too+many" in resp.headers["location"]

+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    def test_setup_gate_uses_count_users_not_full_scan(
+        self,
+        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
+        mock_validate: Any,
+        mock_provision: Any,
+        authorize_client: TestClient,
+        storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Callback's setup-complete gate must call count_users, not list_users."""
+        from unittest.mock import patch as obj_patch
+
+        self._seed_pending_state(storage)
+        mock_exchange.return_value = {"id_token": "fake.jwt.token"}
+        mock_validate.return_value = {
+            "sub": "u1",
+            "email": "u@example.com",
+            "nonce": "test-nonce",
+        }
+        mock_provision.return_value = {"user_id": "test-admin", "username": "testadmin"}
+
+        with (
+            obj_patch.object(storage, "count_users", wraps=storage.count_users) as count_spy,
+            obj_patch.object(storage, "list_users", wraps=storage.list_users) as list_spy,
+        ):
+            resp = authorize_client.get(
+                "/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=authcode&state=valid-state",
+                follow_redirects=False,
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 302
+        assert "oidc_success=1" in resp.headers["location"]
+        count_spy.assert_called_once_with()
+        list_spy.assert_not_called()
+
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    def test_state_cleanup_is_gated(
+        self,
+        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
+        mock_validate: Any,
+        mock_provision: Any,
+        authorize_client: TestClient,
+        storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Cleanup runs once per cleanup-interval window, not every callback."""
+        from unittest.mock import patch as obj_patch
+
+        # First call seeds the cleanup timestamp; subsequent calls within
+        # _OIDC_STATE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_S must NOT trigger cleanup again.
+        mock_exchange.return_value = {"id_token": "fake.jwt.token"}
+        mock_validate.return_value = {
+            "sub": "u1",
+            "email": "u@example.com",
+            "nonce": "test-nonce",
+        }
+        mock_provision.return_value = {"user_id": "test-admin", "username": "testadmin"}
+
+        with obj_patch.object(
+            storage, "cleanup_expired_oidc_states", wraps=storage.cleanup_expired_oidc_states
+        ) as cleanup_spy:
+            for state in ("s1", "s2", "s3"):
+                self._seed_pending_state(storage, state=state, nonce="test-nonce")
+                authorize_client.get(
+                    f"/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=c&state={state}",
+                    follow_redirects=False,
+                )
+
+        assert cleanup_spy.call_count == 1
+
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    def test_callback_uses_pending_audience_not_handler_audience(
+        self,
+        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
+        mock_validate: Any,
+        mock_provision: Any,
+        storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    ) -> None:
+        """JWT ``aud`` claim must come from the audience stored at /authorize,
+        not the audience the callback handler was invoked with.
+
+        Regression for the cross-service audience-confusion concern: a
+        login flow opened against the server (audience ``"turnstone-server"``)
+        must not be silently re-targeted to ``"turnstone-console"`` when
+        the callback runs through the console's handler wrapper.
+        """
+        import jwt as pyjwt
+
+        # Seed pending state with the SERVER audience.
+        storage.create_oidc_pending_state(
+            "audience-state",
+            "audience-nonce",
+            "audience-verifier",
+            "turnstone-server",
+        )
+        mock_exchange.return_value = {"id_token": "fake.jwt.token"}
+        mock_validate.return_value = {
+            "sub": "user-aud",
+            "email": "u@example.com",
+            "nonce": "audience-nonce",
+        }
+        mock_provision.return_value = {"user_id": "test-admin", "username": "testadmin"}
+
+        # Wire a callback bound to the CONSOLE audience.  After bug-3 the
+        # stored audience must take precedence.
+        async def _console_callback(request: Request) -> Response:
+            return await handle_oidc_callback(request, "turnstone-console")
+
+        jwt_secret = "test-jwt-secret-key-padded-32b!!"
+        app = Starlette(
+            routes=[Mount("/v1", routes=[Route("/api/auth/oidc/callback", _console_callback)])]
+        )
+        app.state.oidc_config = _make_oidc_config()
+        app.state.auth_storage = storage
+        app.state.jwt_secret = jwt_secret
+        app.state.jwks_data = {"keys": []}
+        app.state.login_limiter = None
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+
+        resp = client.get(
+            "/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=authcode&state=audience-state",
+            follow_redirects=False,
+        )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 302
+        assert "oidc_success=1" in resp.headers["location"]
+
+        # Extract the JWT from the Set-Cookie header and decode it.
+        set_cookie = resp.headers["set-cookie"]
+        cookie_kv = set_cookie.split(";", 1)[0]
+        name, _, token = cookie_kv.partition("=")
+        assert name == "turnstone_auth"
+        assert token
+
+        # Decoding without audience verification first to inspect the claim.
+        claims = pyjwt.decode(
+            token, jwt_secret, algorithms=["HS256"], options={"verify_aud": False}
+        )
+        assert claims["aud"] == "turnstone-server"
+        assert claims["aud"] != "turnstone-console"
+
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.provision_oidc_user")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.validate_id_token")
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.fetch_jwks", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    @patch("turnstone.core.auth.exchange_code", new_callable=AsyncMock)
+    def test_jwks_refetch_dedup_when_kid_appears(
+        self,
+        mock_exchange: AsyncMock,
+        mock_fetch_jwks: AsyncMock,
+        mock_validate: Any,
+        mock_provision: Any,
+        authorize_client: TestClient,
+        storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    ) -> None:
+        """If a concurrent caller already refreshed JWKS, second caller skips fetch."""
+        from unittest.mock import patch as obj_patch
+
+        self._seed_pending_state(storage)
+        mock_exchange.return_value = {"id_token": "fake.jwt.token"}
+        mock_provision.return_value = {"user_id": "test-admin", "username": "testadmin"}
+
+        # First validate raises kid-not-found; second succeeds.
+        mock_validate.side_effect = [
+            OIDCKeyNotFoundError("Signing key 'k-rotated' not found"),
+            {"sub": "u1", "email": "u@example.com", "nonce": "test-nonce"},
+        ]
+
+        # Pre-populate the JWKS cache so the rotated kid is already
+        # present — analog of a concurrent caller having won the lock.
+        # The retry path must short-circuit and skip the network fetch.
+        authorize_client.app.state.jwks_data = {"keys": [{"kid": "k-rotated", "kty": "RSA"}]}
+
+        with obj_patch("jwt.get_unverified_header", return_value={"kid": "k-rotated"}):
+            resp = authorize_client.get(
+                "/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=authcode&state=valid-state",
+                follow_redirects=False,
+            )
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 302
+        assert "oidc_success=1" in resp.headers["location"]
+        mock_fetch_jwks.assert_not_called()
+

 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Admin OIDC identity endpoint tests
@@ -6,6 +6,85 @@ import time

 import pytest

+from turnstone.core.storage import StorageConflictError
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Atomic OIDC user provisioning
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCreateOIDCUser:
+    def test_create_oidc_user_success(self, db):
+        """Both rows present after one atomic call."""
+        db.create_oidc_user(
+            user_id="u-new",
+            username="alice",
+            display_name="Alice",
+            password_hash="!oidc",
+            issuer="https://idp.example.com",
+            subject="sub-1",
+            email="alice@example.com",
+        )
+
+        user = db.get_user("u-new")
+        assert user is not None
+        assert user["username"] == "alice"
+        assert user["password_hash"] == "!oidc"
+
+        identity = db.get_oidc_identity("https://idp.example.com", "sub-1")
+        assert identity is not None
+        assert identity["user_id"] == "u-new"
+        assert identity["email"] == "alice@example.com"
+
+    def test_create_oidc_user_username_conflict_rolls_back(self, db):
+        """Pre-existing username -> StorageConflictError; identity NOT inserted."""
+        db.create_user("u-existing", "alice", "Alice", "$2b$12$hash")
+
+        with pytest.raises(StorageConflictError, match="username"):
+            db.create_oidc_user(
+                user_id="u-new",
+                username="alice",
+                display_name="Alice2",
+                password_hash="!oidc",
+                issuer="https://idp.example.com",
+                subject="sub-1",
+                email="alice2@example.com",
+            )
+
+        # The new user_id row must not exist.
+        assert db.get_user("u-new") is None
+        # The identity row must not exist.
+        assert db.get_oidc_identity("https://idp.example.com", "sub-1") is None
+        # The pre-existing user is untouched.
+        existing = db.get_user("u-existing")
+        assert existing is not None
+        assert existing["password_hash"] == "$2b$12$hash"
+
+    def test_create_oidc_user_identity_conflict_rolls_back(self, db):
+        """Pre-existing (issuer, subject) -> StorageConflictError; user row rolled back."""
+        db.create_user("u-other", "other", "Other", "!oidc")
+        db.create_oidc_identity("https://idp.example.com", "sub-1", "u-other", "other@example.com")
+
+        with pytest.raises(StorageConflictError, match="OIDC identity"):
+            db.create_oidc_user(
+                user_id="u-new",
+                username="bob",
+                display_name="Bob",
+                password_hash="!oidc",
+                issuer="https://idp.example.com",
+                subject="sub-1",
+                email="bob@example.com",
+            )
+
+        # The candidate user row was rolled back.
+        assert db.get_user("u-new") is None
+        assert db.get_user_by_username("bob") is None
+        # The pre-existing identity still points at the original user.
+        identity = db.get_oidc_identity("https://idp.example.com", "sub-1")
+        assert identity is not None
+        assert identity["user_id"] == "u-other"
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # OIDC Identity CRUD
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -304,3 +383,217 @@ class TestOIDCPendingState:
                .where(oidc_pending_states.c.state == "state-cleanup")
            ).scalar()
            assert count == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# count_users / find_existing_usernames
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCountUsers:
+    def test_count_users_empty(self, db):
+        assert db.count_users() == 0
+
+    def test_count_users_after_inserts(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h1")
+        db.create_user("u2", "bob", "Bob", "h2")
+        db.create_user("u3", "carol", "Carol", "h3")
+        assert db.count_users() == 3
+
+
+class TestFindExistingUsernames:
+    def test_empty_input_returns_empty_set(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h1")
+        assert db.find_existing_usernames([]) == set()
+
+    def test_returns_subset_present_in_db(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h1")
+        db.create_user("u2", "bob", "Bob", "h2")
+
+        existing = db.find_existing_usernames(["alice", "bob", "carol", "dave"])
+        assert existing == {"alice", "bob"}
+
+    def test_no_matches_returns_empty_set(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h1")
+        assert db.find_existing_usernames(["bob", "carol"]) == set()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# replace_oidc_roles
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestReplaceOIDCRoles:
+    def _seed_role(self, db, role_id):
+        db.create_role(role_id, role_id, role_id, "perm.read", False, "")
+
+    def test_inserts_added_roles(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-b")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a", "role-b"})
+
+        assert added == {"role-a", "role-b"}
+        assert removed == set()
+        roles = {r["role_id"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {"role-a", "role-b"}
+
+    def test_removes_stale_oidc_roles(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-b")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-a", "oidc")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-b", "oidc")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a"})
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == {"role-b"}
+        roles = {r["role_id"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {"role-a"}
+
+    def test_preserves_non_oidc_roles(self, db):
+        """Manually-assigned and oidc-default rows are NOT touched."""
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-manual")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-default")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-oidc-old")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-manual", "admin-ui")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-default", "oidc-default")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-oidc-old", "oidc")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", set())
+
+        # Only the oidc-assigned row was diffed
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == {"role-oidc-old"}
+
+        roles = {r["role_id"]: r["assigned_by"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {
+            "role-manual": "admin-ui",
+            "role-default": "oidc-default",
+        }
+
+    def test_no_op_when_desired_matches_current(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-a", "oidc")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a"})
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == set()
+        assert {r["role_id"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")} == {"role-a"}
+
+    def test_empty_user_no_oidc_history(self, db):
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", set())
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == set()
+
+    def test_desired_role_blocked_by_admin_ui_assignment(self, db):
+        """Desired role already held via admin-ui: untouched, no PK conflict."""
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-a", "admin-ui")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a"})
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == set()
+        roles = {r["role_id"]: r["assigned_by"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {"role-a": "admin-ui"}
+
+    def test_desired_role_blocked_by_oidc_default_assignment(self, db):
+        """Desired role already held via oidc-default fallback: untouched."""
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-a", "oidc-default")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a"})
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == set()
+        roles = {r["role_id"]: r["assigned_by"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {"role-a": "oidc-default"}
+
+    def test_desired_role_added_alongside_blocked_role(self, db):
+        """Mixed case: one desired role is blocked (admin-ui), the other inserts cleanly."""
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-b")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-a", "admin-ui")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a", "role-b"})
+
+        assert added == {"role-b"}
+        assert removed == set()
+        roles = {r["role_id"]: r["assigned_by"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {"role-a": "admin-ui", "role-b": "oidc"}
+
+    def test_revoke_only_oidc_assigned_roles(self, db):
+        """OIDC-assigned roles get revoked when not in desired; admin-ui rows survive."""
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-manual")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-oidc-old")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-default")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-manual", "admin-ui")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-oidc-old", "oidc")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-default", "oidc-default")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", set())
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == {"role-oidc-old"}
+        roles = {r["role_id"]: r["assigned_by"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {"role-manual": "admin-ui", "role-default": "oidc-default"}
+
+    def test_replace_oidc_roles_no_op_steady_state(self, db):
+        """Steady-state re-login: claims unchanged, function must short-circuit.
+
+        This pins the contract that drives the SQLite optimistic-read fast
+        path — the common case (token refresh with identical role claims)
+        must not acquire a write lock.
+        """
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-b")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-a", "oidc")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-b", "oidc")
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a", "role-b"})
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == set()
+        # All rows still oidc-assigned with identical membership.
+        roles = {r["role_id"]: r["assigned_by"] for r in db.list_user_roles("u1")}
+        assert roles == {"role-a": "oidc", "role-b": "oidc"}
+
+    def test_replace_oidc_roles_returns_post_lock_diff(self, db):
+        """Returned (added, removed) reflects the post-lock state, not the optimistic read.
+
+        The SQLite implementation re-reads under the write lock to defend
+        against races; the values returned must come from that re-read so
+        callers (apply_role_mapping audit logs) see the actual transition
+        that hit the table. Steady-state input must collapse to empty
+        sets and leave row timestamps unchanged.
+        """
+        db.create_user("u1", "alice", "Alice", "h")
+        self._seed_role(db, "role-a")
+        db.assign_role("u1", "role-a", "oidc")
+
+        before = db.list_user_roles("u1")
+        assert len(before) == 1
+        original_created = before[0]["assignment_created"]
+
+        added, removed = db.replace_oidc_roles("u1", {"role-a"})
+
+        assert added == set()
+        assert removed == set()
+        # No write occurred — the assignment row's timestamp is untouched.
+        after = db.list_user_roles("u1")
+        assert len(after) == 1
+        assert after[0]["assignment_created"] == original_created
@@ -15,9 +15,26 @@ def _row(
    tc_id=None,
    pdata=None,
    tool_calls=None,
+    source=None,
+    reminders=None,
 ):
-    """Build a 7-element conversation row tuple (id, role, ...)."""
-    return (next(_row_ids), role, content, tool_name, tc_id, pdata, tool_calls)
+    """Build a 9-element conversation row tuple (id, role, ...).
+
+    Trailing ``source`` / ``reminders`` mirror the persisted twins of
+    the in-memory ``_source`` / ``_reminders`` side-channels added in
+    migration 050.
+    """
+    return (
+        next(_row_ids),
+        role,
+        content,
+        tool_name,
+        tc_id,
+        pdata,
+        tool_calls,
+        source,
+        reminders,
+    )


 class TestAssistantWithToolCalls:
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+"""Tests for ``initialize_mcp_crypto_state`` startup gate.
+
+Phase 3 of the OAuth-MCP RFC: validates fail-loud behavior when an
+operator forgets the encryption key on a node that hosts OAuth-protected
+MCP server rows.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import types
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+import turnstone.core.config as cfg_mod
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
+    MCPTokenCipher,
+    MCPTokenStore,
+    initialize_mcp_crypto_state,
+)
+
+
+def _patch_security(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, payload: dict) -> None:
+    """Override ``load_config('security')`` to return ``payload``."""
+
+    def fake(section: str | None = None) -> dict:
+        if section == "security":
+            return payload
+        return {}
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cfg_mod, "load_config", fake)
+
+
+class TestInitializeMcpCryptoState:
+    def test_startup_succeeds_with_no_oauth_user_rows_and_no_key(
+        self, backend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+    ) -> None:
+        """Common case: no key, no oauth_user rows -> sentinels installed."""
+        _patch_security(monkeypatch, {})
+
+        state = types.SimpleNamespace()
+        initialize_mcp_crypto_state(state, node_id="n1")
+
+        assert state.mcp_token_cipher is None
+        assert state.mcp_token_store is None
+
+    def test_startup_succeeds_with_key_and_oauth_user_row(
+        self, backend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+    ) -> None:
+        """Operator has wired a key and at least one oauth_user row.
+
+        Cipher + store should land on app_state.
+        """
+        # Plant an oauth_user row.
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-1",
+            name="oauth-srv",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+        )
+        _patch_security(
+            monkeypatch,
+            {"mcp_token_encryption_key": Fernet.generate_key().decode()},
+        )
+
+        state = types.SimpleNamespace()
+        initialize_mcp_crypto_state(state, node_id="n1")
+
+        assert isinstance(state.mcp_token_cipher, MCPTokenCipher)
+        assert isinstance(state.mcp_token_store, MCPTokenStore)
+
+    def test_startup_aborts_with_oauth_user_row_and_no_key(
+        self, backend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+    ) -> None:
+        """Misconfiguration: oauth_user row exists, no key -> SystemExit(1)."""
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-1",
+            name="oauth-srv",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+        )
+        _patch_security(monkeypatch, {})
+
+        state = types.SimpleNamespace()
+        with (
+            caplog.at_level("ERROR", logger="turnstone.core.mcp_crypto"),
+            pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc_info,
+        ):
+            initialize_mcp_crypto_state(state, node_id="n1")
+        assert exc_info.value.code == 1
+        # Operator-actionable error message names BOTH supported config-key
+        # forms so an operator using the rotation list (plural) is not
+        # misled into thinking only the singular form is valid.
+        messages = " ".join(record.message for record in caplog.records)
+        assert "mcp_token_encryption_keys" in messages
+        assert re.search(r"mcp_token_encryption_key(?!s)", messages) is not None
+
+    def test_startup_aborts_with_invalid_key(
+        self, backend, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+    ) -> None:
+        """Malformed key material should fail loud at startup, not at first use."""
+        _patch_security(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_key": "###not-base64###"})
+
+        state = types.SimpleNamespace()
+        with (
+            caplog.at_level("ERROR", logger="turnstone.core.mcp_crypto"),
+            pytest.raises(SystemExit) as exc_info,
+        ):
+            initialize_mcp_crypto_state(state, node_id="n1")
+        assert exc_info.value.code == 1
@@ -163,6 +163,28 @@ class FakeAdapter:
            return [e for e in self.events if e.kind == kind]


+class _FakeRowMapping:
+    """SQLAlchemy-Row-like wrapper exposing ``_mapping`` over a ``_Row``.
+
+    The real backends return ``Row`` objects with a ``_mapping`` attribute;
+    consumers (e.g. ``CoordinatorIdleObserver._active_children``) prefer
+    ``row._mapping[<col>]`` access.  This shim mirrors that contract so
+    fakes are interchangeable with real Rows in tests.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, row: _Row) -> None:
+        self._mapping = {
+            "ws_id": row.ws_id,
+            "user_id": row.user_id,
+            "name": row.name,
+            "kind": row.kind,
+            "state": row.state,
+            "parent_ws_id": row.parent_ws_id,
+            "updated": row.updated,
+            "node_id": row.node_id,
+        }
+
+
@dataclass
 class _Row:
    ws_id: str
@@ -300,6 +322,47 @@ class FakeStorage:
                "parent_ws_id": row.parent_ws_id,
            }

+    def list_workstreams(
+        self,
+        node_id: str | None = None,
+        limit: int = 100,
+        *,
+        parent_ws_id: str | None = None,
+        kind: WorkstreamKind | str | None = None,
+        user_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> list[Any]:
+        kind_str = kind.value if isinstance(kind, WorkstreamKind) else kind
+        with self.lock:
+            matched: list[_FakeRowMapping] = []
+            for row in self.rows.values():
+                if parent_ws_id is not None and row.parent_ws_id != parent_ws_id:
+                    continue
+                if kind_str is not None and row.kind != kind_str:
+                    continue
+                if user_id is not None and row.user_id != user_id:
+                    continue
+                matched.append(_FakeRowMapping(row))
+            # Order by updated DESC so the consumer's LIMIT semantics match
+            # production (storage backends order this way).
+            matched.sort(key=lambda r: r._mapping["updated"], reverse=True)
+            return matched[:limit]
+
+    def count_workstreams_by_state(
+        self,
+        *,
+        parent_ws_id: str | None = None,
+        user_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, int]:
+        counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+        with self.lock:
+            for row in self.rows.values():
+                if parent_ws_id is not None and row.parent_ws_id != parent_ws_id:
+                    continue
+                if user_id is not None and row.user_id != user_id:
+                    continue
+                counts[row.state] = counts.get(row.state, 0) + 1
+        return counts
+
    def delete_workstream(self, ws_id: str) -> None:
        with self.lock:
            self.rows.pop(ws_id, None)
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+"""Tests for ``_format_mcp_dispatch_error`` and the three MCP exec sites.
+
+The Phase 7b pool dispatcher signals user-actionable failures (consent
+required, insufficient scope) via ``RuntimeError(json_str)`` where
+``json_str`` is the structured-error payload built by
+:func:`turnstone.core.mcp_client._structured_error`. The exec sites in
+:mod:`turnstone.core.session` previously wrapped that JSON in
+``f"MCP X error: {e}"``, destroying the structured shape the dashboard
+renderer keys on. The helper preserves the JSON when the exception
+text decodes to a structured-error envelope and prefixes otherwise.
+
+Sibling-bug coverage: every exec site (tool / read_resource /
+use_prompt) gets two assertions — JSON preserved on a consent-required
+exception, JSON-prefixed on a generic transport failure.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from tests.test_session import _make_session
+from turnstone.core.session import _format_mcp_dispatch_error
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Unit tests for the helper
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestFormatMcpDispatchError:
+    def test_preserves_consent_required_payload(self) -> None:
+        payload = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "error": {
+                    "code": "mcp_consent_required",
+                    "server": "srv-x",
+                    "detail": "No token for user. Consent flow required.",
+                    "consent_url": "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=srv-x",
+                }
+            }
+        )
+        out = _format_mcp_dispatch_error("MCP tool error", RuntimeError(payload))
+        assert out == payload
+
+    def test_preserves_insufficient_scope_payload(self) -> None:
+        payload = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "error": {
+                    "code": "mcp_insufficient_scope",
+                    "server": "srv-x",
+                    "detail": "Tool requires elevated scopes.",
+                    "scopes_required": ["read", "write"],
+                    "consent_url": "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=srv-x&scopes=read+write",
+                }
+            }
+        )
+        out = _format_mcp_dispatch_error("MCP tool error", RuntimeError(payload))
+        assert out == payload
+
+    def test_prefixes_generic_runtime_error(self) -> None:
+        out = _format_mcp_dispatch_error("MCP tool error", RuntimeError("connection lost"))
+        assert out == "MCP tool error: connection lost"
+
+    def test_prefixes_value_error(self) -> None:
+        out = _format_mcp_dispatch_error("MCP tool error", ValueError("bad input"))
+        assert out == "MCP tool error: bad input"
+
+    def test_prefixes_random_json_without_mcp_code(self) -> None:
+        # JSON that isn't a structured-error envelope must NOT be passed
+        # through verbatim — the helper only opens the gate for codes
+        # prefixed ``mcp_``.
+        payload = json.dumps({"foo": "bar"})
+        out = _format_mcp_dispatch_error("MCP tool error", RuntimeError(payload))
+        assert out == f"MCP tool error: {payload}"
+
+    def test_prefixes_envelope_with_non_mcp_code(self) -> None:
+        payload = json.dumps({"error": {"code": "other_error", "server": "x", "detail": "y"}})
+        out = _format_mcp_dispatch_error("MCP tool error", RuntimeError(payload))
+        assert out == f"MCP tool error: {payload}"
+
+    def test_prefixes_envelope_without_dict_error(self) -> None:
+        payload = json.dumps({"error": "plain string"})
+        out = _format_mcp_dispatch_error("MCP tool error", RuntimeError(payload))
+        assert out == f"MCP tool error: {payload}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Integration tests against the three MCP exec sites
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+_CONSENT_REQUIRED_JSON = json.dumps(
+    {
+        "error": {
+            "code": "mcp_consent_required",
+            "server": "srv-oauth",
+            "detail": "No token for user. Consent flow required.",
+            "consent_url": "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=srv-oauth",
+        }
+    }
+)
+
+
+def _record_outputs(session) -> list[tuple[str, str, str, bool]]:
+    """Patch ``_report_tool_result`` to capture (call_id, name, output, is_error)."""
+    captures: list[tuple[str, str, str, bool]] = []
+
+    def _capture(call_id: str, name: str, output: str, *, is_error: bool = False) -> None:
+        captures.append((call_id, name, output, is_error))
+
+    session._report_tool_result = _capture  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+    return captures
+
+
+class TestExecMcpToolDispatchError:
+    def test_exec_mcp_tool_preserves_structured_error_json(self, tmp_db) -> None:
+        session = _make_session()
+        captures = _record_outputs(session)
+
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client.call_tool_sync.side_effect = RuntimeError(_CONSENT_REQUIRED_JSON)
+        session._mcp_client = mock_client
+
+        item = {
+            "call_id": "tc_1",
+            "mcp_func_name": "mcp__srv-oauth__do",
+            "mcp_args": {},
+        }
+        session._exec_mcp_tool(item)
+
+        assert len(captures) == 1
+        _, _, output, is_error = captures[0]
+        assert output == _CONSENT_REQUIRED_JSON
+        assert is_error is True
+
+    def test_exec_mcp_tool_prefixes_non_structured_error(self, tmp_db) -> None:
+        session = _make_session()
+        captures = _record_outputs(session)
+
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client.call_tool_sync.side_effect = RuntimeError("connection lost")
+        session._mcp_client = mock_client
+
+        item = {
+            "call_id": "tc_2",
+            "mcp_func_name": "mcp__srv-oauth__do",
+            "mcp_args": {},
+        }
+        session._exec_mcp_tool(item)
+
+        assert captures[0][2] == "MCP tool error: connection lost"
+        assert captures[0][3] is True
+
+
+class TestExecReadResourceDispatchError:
+    def test_exec_read_resource_preserves_structured_error_json(self, tmp_db) -> None:
+        session = _make_session()
+        captures = _record_outputs(session)
+
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client.read_resource_sync.side_effect = RuntimeError(_CONSENT_REQUIRED_JSON)
+        session._mcp_client = mock_client
+
+        item = {
+            "call_id": "rc_1",
+            "resource_uri": "https://example.com/r",
+        }
+        # The exec site emits a ``log.warning`` (no ``exc_info`` — bearer-leak
+        # invariant) on failure. Patch the logger so the test doesn't emit
+        # noise to the captured stderr — assertions don't depend on log
+        # output.
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session.log"):
+            session._exec_read_resource(item)
+
+        assert len(captures) == 1
+        assert captures[0][2] == _CONSENT_REQUIRED_JSON
+        assert captures[0][3] is True
+
+    def test_exec_read_resource_prefixes_non_structured_error(self, tmp_db) -> None:
+        session = _make_session()
+        captures = _record_outputs(session)
+
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client.read_resource_sync.side_effect = RuntimeError("connection lost")
+        session._mcp_client = mock_client
+
+        item = {
+            "call_id": "rc_2",
+            "resource_uri": "https://example.com/r",
+        }
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session.log"):
+            session._exec_read_resource(item)
+
+        assert captures[0][2] == "MCP resource error: connection lost"
+        assert captures[0][3] is True
+
+
+class TestExecUsePromptDispatchError:
+    def test_exec_use_prompt_preserves_structured_error_json(self, tmp_db) -> None:
+        session = _make_session()
+        captures = _record_outputs(session)
+
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client.get_prompt_sync.side_effect = RuntimeError(_CONSENT_REQUIRED_JSON)
+        session._mcp_client = mock_client
+
+        item = {
+            "call_id": "pc_1",
+            "prompt_name": "mcp__srv-oauth__greet",
+            "prompt_arguments": {},
+        }
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session.log"):
+            session._exec_use_prompt(item)
+
+        assert len(captures) == 1
+        assert captures[0][2] == _CONSENT_REQUIRED_JSON
+        assert captures[0][3] is True
+
+    def test_exec_use_prompt_prefixes_non_structured_error(self, tmp_db) -> None:
+        session = _make_session()
+        captures = _record_outputs(session)
+
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client.get_prompt_sync.side_effect = RuntimeError("connection lost")
+        session._mcp_client = mock_client
+
+        item = {
+            "call_id": "pc_2",
+            "prompt_name": "mcp__srv-oauth__greet",
+            "prompt_arguments": {},
+        }
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session.log"):
+            session._exec_use_prompt(item)
+
+        assert captures[0][2] == "MCP prompt error: connection lost"
+        assert captures[0][3] is True
@@ -451,6 +451,71 @@ class TestInterruptedWorkstreamRepair:
        assert msgs[1]["role"] == "assistant"
        assert msgs[2]["role"] == "user"

+    def test_repair_false_preserves_partial_trailing_turn(self, tmp_db):
+        """``repair=False`` is the display-read contract for ``/history``.
+
+        The default repair pass strips the trailing
+        ``assistant(tool_calls)`` when not all tool results are persisted
+        — correct for ``session.resume`` (LLM context), wrong for the
+        REST display read.  A user refreshing the coordinator page mid-
+        tool-execution would otherwise lose the entire trailing turn
+        from the UI.  ``repair=False`` returns the raw persisted state.
+        """
+        import json
+
+        tc_json = json.dumps(
+            [
+                {
+                    "id": "call_1",
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": '{"command":"ls"}'},
+                },
+                {
+                    "id": "call_2",
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": '{"command":"pwd"}'},
+                },
+            ]
+        )
+        save_message("s1", "user", "hello")
+        save_message("s1", "assistant", "Checking", tool_calls=tc_json)
+        save_message("s1", "tool", "file.txt", tool_call_id="call_1")
+        # No call_2 result persisted — mid-execution refresh.
+        msgs = get_storage().load_messages("s1", repair=False)
+        # All three rows survive — the trailing partial turn is what the
+        # operator was actually watching live.
+        assert [m["role"] for m in msgs] == ["user", "assistant", "tool"]
+        assert msgs[1].get("tool_calls") and len(msgs[1]["tool_calls"]) == 2
+        assert msgs[2]["tool_call_id"] == "call_1"
+
+    def test_repair_false_does_not_synthesize_orphan_results(self, tmp_db):
+        """``repair=False`` must NOT splice synthetic ``"Tool execution
+        was cancelled."`` rows for mid-conversation orphans either —
+        the operator never saw those rows, and showing them would
+        invent UI content that doesn't reflect persisted state.
+        """
+        import json
+
+        tc_json = json.dumps(
+            [
+                {
+                    "id": "call_1",
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": '{"command":"ls"}'},
+                },
+            ]
+        )
+        save_message("s1", "user", "first")
+        save_message("s1", "assistant", "Working", tool_calls=tc_json)
+        # Cancel landed before any tool result — next turn happens.
+        save_message("s1", "user", "second")
+        save_message("s1", "assistant", "ok")
+        msgs = get_storage().load_messages("s1", repair=False)
+        roles = [m["role"] for m in msgs]
+        # No synthetic tool row spliced after the orphaned tool_calls.
+        assert roles == ["user", "assistant", "user", "assistant"]
+        assert all(m["role"] != "tool" for m in msgs)
+

 # ── Workstream config persistence ─────────────────────────────────────

@@ -914,8 +979,11 @@ class TestMCPToolGating:
        """read_resource excluded when MCP client has no resources."""
        mcp_client = MagicMock()
        mcp_client.get_tools.return_value = []
-        mcp_client.resource_count = 0
-        mcp_client.prompt_count = 2
+        # Phase 7b: gating uses ``*_count_for_user`` so the test mocks
+        # the per-user variant (the property remains for static-only
+        # admin paths). Returning 0 / 2 mirrors the prior contract.
+        mcp_client.resource_count_for_user.return_value = 0
+        mcp_client.prompt_count_for_user.return_value = 2

        session = ChatSession(
            client=mock_openai_client,
@@ -937,8 +1005,8 @@ class TestMCPToolGating:
        """use_prompt excluded when MCP client has no prompts."""
        mcp_client = MagicMock()
        mcp_client.get_tools.return_value = []
-        mcp_client.resource_count = 3
-        mcp_client.prompt_count = 0
+        mcp_client.resource_count_for_user.return_value = 3
+        mcp_client.prompt_count_for_user.return_value = 0

        session = ChatSession(
            client=mock_openai_client,
@@ -960,8 +1028,8 @@ class TestMCPToolGating:
        """Both tools present when MCP client has resources and prompts."""
        mcp_client = MagicMock()
        mcp_client.get_tools.return_value = []
-        mcp_client.resource_count = 1
-        mcp_client.prompt_count = 1
+        mcp_client.resource_count_for_user.return_value = 1
+        mcp_client.prompt_count_for_user.return_value = 1

        session = ChatSession(
            client=mock_openai_client,
@@ -983,8 +1051,8 @@ class TestMCPToolGating:
        """Gating applies even when tool_search is active (client-side path)."""
        mcp_client = MagicMock()
        mcp_client.get_tools.return_value = []
-        mcp_client.resource_count = 0
-        mcp_client.prompt_count = 0
+        mcp_client.resource_count_for_user.return_value = 0
+        mcp_client.prompt_count_for_user.return_value = 0

        session = ChatSession(
            client=mock_openai_client,
@@ -1012,8 +1080,8 @@ class TestMCPToolGating:

        mcp_client = MagicMock()
        mcp_client.get_tools.return_value = []
-        mcp_client.resource_count = 0
-        mcp_client.prompt_count = 0
+        mcp_client.resource_count_for_user.return_value = 0
+        mcp_client.prompt_count_for_user.return_value = 0

        session = ChatSession(
            client=mock_openai_client,
@@ -1034,3 +1102,42 @@ class TestMCPToolGating:
        names = [t.get("function", {}).get("name") for t in tools]
        assert "read_resource" not in names
        assert "use_prompt" not in names
+
+    def test_pool_only_user_keeps_read_resource_and_use_prompt(self, tmp_db, mock_openai_client):
+        """Phase 7b canary: a pool-only user (static catalog empty) still
+        sees ``read_resource`` and ``use_prompt`` because the gating
+        consults ``*_count_for_user`` (scope decision 0.2).
+
+        Drives ``resource_count = prompt_count = 0`` (the static-only
+        properties are zero) but ``*_count_for_user(uid) > 0`` because
+        the user has pool entries; the tools must remain visible.
+        """
+        mcp_client = MagicMock()
+        mcp_client.get_tools.return_value = []
+        # Static catalog is empty; admin-style legacy properties say 0.
+        mcp_client.resource_count = 0
+        mcp_client.prompt_count = 0
+        # Per-user variant reports the user's pool entries.
+        mcp_client.resource_count_for_user.return_value = 2
+        mcp_client.prompt_count_for_user.return_value = 1
+
+        session = ChatSession(
+            client=mock_openai_client,
+            model="local-model",
+            ui=MagicMock(),
+            instructions=None,
+            temperature=0.5,
+            max_tokens=1000,
+            tool_timeout=10,
+            mcp_client=mcp_client,
+            user_id="pool-only-user",
+        )
+
+        tools = session._get_active_tools()
+        names = [t.get("function", {}).get("name") for t in tools]
+        assert "read_resource" in names
+        assert "use_prompt" in names
+        # Verify the per-user gate was actually consulted with the
+        # session's ``user_id`` (sanity-check on the wiring).
+        mcp_client.resource_count_for_user.assert_any_call("pool-only-user")
+        mcp_client.prompt_count_for_user.assert_any_call("pool-only-user")
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+"""Tests for the SKILL.md parse admin API endpoint.
+
+The endpoint is a thin permission-checked wrapper around
+``turnstone.core.skill_parser.parse_skill_md``.  These tests cover the
+routing, auth, and error-handling layers — parser semantics live in
+``test_skill_parser.py``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+
+import pytest
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.middleware import Middleware
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+from starlette.routing import Mount, Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Iterator
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+from turnstone.console.server import admin_parse_skill
+from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult
+
+
+class _InjectAuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
+            user_id="test-user",
+            scopes=frozenset({"approve"}),
+            token_source="config",
+            permissions=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "admin.skills"}),
+        )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+class _InjectAuthNoSkillsMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
+            user_id="test-user",
+            scopes=frozenset({"approve"}),
+            token_source="jwt",
+            permissions=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}),
+        )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+_ROUTES = [
+    Mount(
+        "/v1",
+        routes=[
+            Route("/api/admin/skills/parse", admin_parse_skill, methods=["POST"]),
+        ],
+    ),
+]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client() -> TestClient:
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=_ROUTES,
+        middleware=[Middleware(_InjectAuthMiddleware)],
+    )
+    return TestClient(app)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client_no_perm() -> TestClient:
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=_ROUTES,
+        middleware=[Middleware(_InjectAuthNoSkillsMiddleware)],
+    )
+    return TestClient(app)
+
+
+_FULL_SKILL = """\
+---
+name: code-review
+description: Automated code review skill
+author: Test Author
+version: 2.0.0
+tags: [python, review, quality]
+allowed-tools: [read_file, list_directory]
+license: MIT
+compatibility: ">=0.7"
+---
+
+# Code Review
+
+Review code for best practices.
+"""
+
+_MINIMAL_SKILL = """\
+---
+name: minimal
+---
+
+Just some content.
+"""
+
+
+class TestParseSkill:
+    def test_parses_full_frontmatter(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": _FULL_SKILL})
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        data = resp.json()
+        assert data["name"] == "code-review"
+        assert data["description"] == "Automated code review skill"
+        assert data["author"] == "Test Author"
+        assert data["version"] == "2.0.0"
+        assert data["tags"] == ["python", "review", "quality"]
+        assert data["allowed_tools"] == ["read_file", "list_directory"]
+        assert data["license"] == "MIT"
+        assert data["compatibility"] == ">=0.7"
+        assert "# Code Review" in data["content"]
+        # Frontmatter should not leak into the body.
+        assert "name: code-review" not in data["content"]
+        # ParsedSkill carries raw_frontmatter (the full YAML dict) but the
+        # handler whitelists fields by hand to avoid leaking arbitrary keys.
+        # Pin that contract — a future refactor to dataclasses.asdict would
+        # silently break it without this assertion.
+        assert "raw_frontmatter" not in data
+
+    def test_parses_minimal_frontmatter(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": _MINIMAL_SKILL})
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        data = resp.json()
+        assert data["name"] == "minimal"
+        assert data["description"] == "Just some content."
+        assert data["version"] == "1.0.0"
+        assert data["tags"] == []
+        assert data["allowed_tools"] == []
+        assert data["license"] == ""
+
+    def test_anthropic_nested_metadata_tags(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        # Anthropic-style skill puts tags under metadata.tags rather than
+        # at the top level — the parser must handle both layouts.
+        raw = """\
+---
+name: nested-meta
+description: A skill using nested metadata
+metadata:
+  tags: [alpha, beta]
+  author: Anthropic
+  version: 3.1.4
+---
+
+Body.
+"""
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": raw})
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        data = resp.json()
+        assert data["tags"] == ["alpha", "beta"]
+        assert data["author"] == "Anthropic"
+        assert data["version"] == "3.1.4"
+
+    def test_unquoted_colon_in_description(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        # Common cross-client mistake: ``description: Use when: the user...``
+        # The parser retries with the description value quoted.
+        raw = """\
+---
+name: colon-desc
+description: Use when: the user asks for a review
+---
+
+Body.
+"""
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": raw})
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        data = resp.json()
+        assert data["name"] == "colon-desc"
+        assert "Use when" in data["description"]
+
+    def test_missing_name_returns_400(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        raw = """\
+---
+description: No name field
+---
+
+Body.
+"""
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": raw})
+        assert resp.status_code == 400
+        assert "name" in resp.json()["error"].lower()
+
+    def test_missing_raw_returns_400(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={})
+        assert resp.status_code == 400
+        assert "raw" in resp.json()["error"].lower()
+
+    def test_blank_raw_returns_400(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": "   \n"})
+        assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+    def test_invalid_yaml_returns_400(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        # YAML that the malformed-description retry can't fix.
+        raw = "---\nname: [not, valid, here\n---\nBody.\n"
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": raw})
+        assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+    def test_requires_admin_skills_permission(self, client_no_perm: TestClient) -> None:
+        resp = client_no_perm.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": _MINIMAL_SKILL})
+        assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+    def test_oversized_content_length_returns_413(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        # Content-Length pre-check rejects oversized bodies before they're
+        # buffered into memory.  Caps worker memory against an admin-token
+        # holder spraying multi-GB JSON.  The threshold is generous (~4×
+        # the per-string cap) so payload here must clearly exceed it.
+        oversized = "a" * 200_000
+        resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", json={"raw": oversized})
+        assert resp.status_code == 413
+
+    def test_oversized_raw_chunked_returns_413(self, client: TestClient) -> None:
+        # When the client sends Transfer-Encoding: chunked there is no
+        # Content-Length header, so the pre-check is skipped and the
+        # application-layer cap is the only line of defence.  httpx switches
+        # to chunked when the body is a generator.
+        def _gen() -> Iterator[bytes]:
+            yield b'{"raw":"' + b"a" * 33_000 + b'"}'
+
+        resp = client.post(
+            "/v1/api/admin/skills/parse",
+            content=_gen(),
+            headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
+        )
+        assert resp.status_code == 413
+        assert "raw" in resp.json()["error"].lower()
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+"""Tests for ``_source`` / ``_reminders`` round-tripping through both
+storage backends.
+
+Persisting the in-memory side-channels lets multi-tab / multi-device
+replay show the same metacognitive bubble shape the originating tab
+saw live — see ``docs/design/watch-card-ux.md`` §1.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+from turnstone.core.storage._schema import conversations
+
+
+class TestSourceRoundtrip:
+    def test_source_roundtrip(self, backend):
+        backend.register_workstream("s1")
+        backend.save_message("s1", "user", "", source="system_nudge")
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("s1")
+        assert len(msgs) == 1
+        assert msgs[0]["role"] == "user"
+        assert msgs[0]["content"] == ""
+        assert msgs[0].get("_source") == "system_nudge"
+
+    def test_source_absent_when_not_set(self, backend):
+        backend.register_workstream("s1")
+        backend.save_message("s1", "user", "hello")
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("s1")
+        assert "_source" not in msgs[0]
+
+
+class TestRemindersRoundtrip:
+    def test_reminders_roundtrip(self, backend):
+        backend.register_workstream("s1")
+        payload = [
+            {
+                "type": "watch_triggered",
+                "text": "$ ls\nfile.txt\n",
+                "watch_name": "w1",
+                "command": "ls",
+                "poll_count": 2,
+                "max_polls": 100,
+                "is_final": False,
+            }
+        ]
+        backend.save_message(
+            "s1",
+            "user",
+            "",
+            source="system_nudge",
+            reminders=json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")),
+        )
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("s1")
+        assert msgs[0].get("_reminders") == payload
+        # Optional fields preserved verbatim.
+        rem = msgs[0]["_reminders"][0]
+        assert rem["watch_name"] == "w1"
+        assert rem["command"] == "ls"
+        assert rem["poll_count"] == 2
+        assert rem["max_polls"] == 100
+        assert rem["is_final"] is False
+
+    def test_reminders_null_renders_as_no_key(self, backend):
+        """Absent vs. empty-list should map to the same shape on the
+        load side: ``_reminders`` simply not present in the dict.
+        Mirrors the ``_attachments_meta`` precedent in
+        ``reconstruct_messages``.
+        """
+        backend.register_workstream("s1")
+        backend.save_message("s1", "user", "hello")
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("s1")
+        assert "_reminders" not in msgs[0]
+
+    def test_tool_reminders_roundtrip(self, backend):
+        backend.register_workstream("s1")
+        # Build a minimal valid history: assistant turn with one
+        # tool_call followed by the tool result that carries the
+        # tool-channel reminder.  Without the assistant turn the
+        # tool row would be orphaned and stripped by the repair pass.
+        tc_json = json.dumps(
+            [
+                {
+                    "id": "c1",
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": "{}"},
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+        backend.save_message("s1", "user", "go")
+        backend.save_message("s1", "assistant", None, tool_calls=tc_json)
+        payload = [{"type": "tool_error", "text": "command failed"}]
+        backend.save_message(
+            "s1",
+            "tool",
+            "boom",
+            tool_call_id="c1",
+            reminders=json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")),
+        )
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("s1")
+        # Find the tool message and assert reminders survived load.
+        tool_msgs = [m for m in msgs if m.get("role") == "tool"]
+        assert len(tool_msgs) == 1
+        assert tool_msgs[0].get("_reminders") == payload
+
+    def test_nul_bytes_stripped_from_source_and_reminders(self, backend):
+        """NUL bytes must be stripped at the storage layer.
+
+        Producers (``sanitize_payload`` on the watch dispatch path,
+        constants for non-watch nudges) already strip NUL today so
+        nothing in production reaches this clamp — but the layer is
+        the tripwire if a future producer forgets, mirroring how
+        ``content`` and ``provider_data`` are sanitized.  PostgreSQL
+        TEXT columns reject NUL outright, so the sanitization is also
+        a hard correctness invariant on that backend.
+
+        ``json.dumps`` already escapes NUL inside string values to
+        ``\\u0000`` so a real NUL byte can't enter ``_reminders`` via
+        the normal encode path — the test feeds a raw NUL directly to
+        cover the bypass case (a future producer that hand-builds the
+        column string).
+        """
+        backend.register_workstream("s1")
+        backend.save_message(
+            "s1",
+            "user",
+            "",
+            source="system_nudge\x00",
+            reminders='[{"type":"watch_triggered","text":"ok\x00bad"}]',
+        )
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("s1")
+        assert msgs[0].get("_source") == "system_nudge"
+        assert msgs[0].get("_reminders") == [{"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "okbad"}]
+
+    def test_malformed_reminders_json_does_not_crash_load(self, backend):
+        """A garbage string in the column must not abort the whole
+        load — mirrors the ``provider_data`` JSON-decode-suppress
+        pattern.  Concretely: write a row with valid columns BUT a
+        corrupted ``_reminders`` value via raw SQL, then verify the
+        load returns the message with no ``_reminders`` key (rather
+        than raising or surfacing the garbage).
+        """
+        backend.register_workstream("s1")
+        msg_id = backend.save_message("s1", "user", "hello")
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.update(conversations)
+                .where(conversations.c.id == msg_id)
+                .values(_reminders="this is not json {{")
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("s1")
+        assert len(msgs) == 1
+        # Garbage suppressed silently — key absent, content intact.
+        assert "_reminders" not in msgs[0]
+        assert msgs[0]["content"] == "hello"
@@ -939,6 +939,64 @@ class TestTouchWorkstream:
        backend.touch_workstream("nonexistent")  # must not raise


+# -- MCP OAuth columns ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestMcpServerOauthColumns:
+    def test_mcp_servers_oauth_columns_round_trip(self, backend: Any) -> None:
+        """An oauth_user row round-trips through create -> get with all
+        seven OAuth text columns intact."""
+        sid = "oauth-srv-1"
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id=sid,
+            name="oauth-srv",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+            oauth_client_id="cli_abc123",
+            oauth_scopes="openid profile",
+            oauth_audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+            oauth_registration_mode="preregistered",
+            oauth_authorization_server_url="https://auth.example.com",
+            oauth_as_issuer_cached="https://auth.example.com",
+        )
+        s = backend.get_mcp_server(sid)
+        assert s is not None
+        assert s["auth_type"] == "oauth_user"
+        assert s["oauth_client_id"] == "cli_abc123"
+        assert s["oauth_scopes"] == "openid profile"
+        assert s["oauth_audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+        assert s["oauth_registration_mode"] == "preregistered"
+        assert s["oauth_authorization_server_url"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        assert s["oauth_as_issuer_cached"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        # Phase 2 leaves the ciphertext slot NULL even when other oauth
+        # fields are populated; Phase 3 wires the encryption write path.
+        assert s["oauth_client_secret_ct"] is None
+
+    def test_update_auth_type_static_to_oauth(self, backend: Any) -> None:
+        sid = "oauth-srv-2"
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id=sid,
+            name="static-then-oauth",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+        )
+        assert backend.get_mcp_server(sid)["auth_type"] == "static"
+
+        ok = backend.update_mcp_server(
+            sid,
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+            oauth_client_id="cli_after",
+            oauth_audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        assert ok is True
+        s = backend.get_mcp_server(sid)
+        assert s is not None
+        assert s["auth_type"] == "oauth_user"
+        assert s["oauth_client_id"] == "cli_after"
+        assert s["oauth_audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+
+
 # -- Lifecycle -----------------------------------------------------------------


@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import (
    GuardAdvisory,
    MetacognitiveAdvisory,
    UserInterjection,
+    escape_wrapper_tags,
    parse_priority,
    render_system_reminder,
    wrap_tool_result,
@@ -224,6 +225,63 @@ class TestMetacognitiveAdvisory:
        assert "don't repeat tool calls" in result


+class TestEscapeWrapperTags:
+    """``escape_wrapper_tags`` must round-trip through
+    ``_entity_decode_wrapper_tags`` for any input — not just text that
+    happens to contain only wrapper tags.
+    """
+
+    def test_short_circuit_passes_through_plain_text(self) -> None:
+        """No ``<`` and no ``&`` — ``escape_wrapper_tags`` must avoid
+        the four ``replace`` chains.  Common case for most tool outputs;
+        the short-circuit keeps wrap_tool_result's overhead near zero."""
+        text = "plain text without any markup"
+        assert escape_wrapper_tags(text) == text
+
+    def test_escape_wrapper_tags_round_trips_preexisting_entities(self) -> None:
+        """Asymmetry guard — a tool output that happens to contain the
+        literal string ``&lt;tool_output&gt;`` (e.g. documentation
+        describing the wrapper format) must round-trip identically.
+        Without escaping ``&`` first, encode→decode would produce the
+        bare ``<tool_output>`` tag, fabricating an envelope the wrapper
+        layer never produced."""
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import _entity_decode_wrapper_tags
+
+        text = "I describe XML tags like &lt;tool_output&gt; in my docs."
+        encoded = escape_wrapper_tags(text)
+        # Sanity: the original literal got escaped to a sentinel form
+        # that can't collide with our wrapper-tag escapes.
+        assert "&amp;lt;tool_output&amp;gt;" in encoded
+        assert "&lt;tool_output&gt;" not in encoded
+        # Round-trip back to the literal source.
+        assert _entity_decode_wrapper_tags(encoded) == text
+
+    def test_escape_wrapper_tags_round_trips_real_wrapper_tag(self) -> None:
+        """A literal ``<tool_output>`` in source text round-trips back
+        correctly — encoding produces ``&lt;tool_output&gt;`` (no
+        ``&amp;`` prefix because there was no pre-existing entity), and
+        decoding restores the literal."""
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import _entity_decode_wrapper_tags
+
+        text = "Here is a literal <tool_output> tag in my doc."
+        encoded = escape_wrapper_tags(text)
+        assert "<tool_output>" not in encoded
+        assert "&lt;tool_output&gt;" in encoded
+        assert _entity_decode_wrapper_tags(encoded) == text
+
+    def test_escape_wrapper_tags_round_trips_mixed_content(self) -> None:
+        """Mixed: literal wrapper tags AND pre-existing entity
+        references — both round-trip."""
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import _entity_decode_wrapper_tags
+
+        text = (
+            "Mixed: literal <tool_output> next to escaped &lt;system-reminder&gt; "
+            "and a stray &amp; on its own."
+        )
+        encoded = escape_wrapper_tags(text)
+        assert _entity_decode_wrapper_tags(encoded) == text
+
+
 class TestRenderSystemReminder:
    """render_system_reminder builds a standalone <system-reminder> envelope."""

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import pytest

 from turnstone.core.watch import (
    WatchRunner,
+    build_watch_reminder,
    evaluate_condition,
    format_interval,
    format_watch_message,
@@ -301,6 +302,62 @@ class TestFormatWatchMessage:
        assert "max polls" in msg.lower()


+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# build_watch_reminder
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestBuildWatchReminder:
+    """The structured-reminder builder lifts ``format_watch_message``'s
+    args into a dict the dispatch closure can pass to
+    ``WatchRunner._dispatch_result``.  ``text`` matches the formatter's
+    output verbatim (so compaction / channel adapters / wire splice
+    keep their behaviour), and the optional fields ride alongside for
+    the frontend's ``.msg.watch-result`` card.
+    """
+
+    def test_emits_text_body_and_fields(self):
+        kwargs = dict(
+            name="pr-review",
+            command="gh pr view --json state",
+            output='{"state": "MERGED"}',
+            poll_count=5,
+            max_polls=100,
+            elapsed_secs=1500,
+            stop_on='data["state"] == "MERGED"',
+            is_final=True,
+            reason='condition met: data["state"] == "MERGED"',
+        )
+        reminder = build_watch_reminder(**kwargs)
+        # Round-trip with format_watch_message — text is the same body
+        # the wire splice + channel adapters have always seen.
+        assert reminder["text"] == format_watch_message(**kwargs)
+        # Optional fields ride alongside.
+        assert reminder["type"] == "watch_triggered"
+        assert reminder["watch_name"] == "pr-review"
+        assert reminder["command"] == "gh pr view --json state"
+        assert reminder["poll_count"] == 5
+        assert reminder["max_polls"] == 100
+        assert reminder["is_final"] is True
+
+    def test_non_final_carries_is_final_false(self):
+        reminder = build_watch_reminder(
+            name="deploy",
+            command="curl -s http://localhost/health",
+            output="ok",
+            poll_count=3,
+            max_polls=50,
+            elapsed_secs=90,
+            stop_on=None,
+            is_final=False,
+            reason="",
+        )
+        assert reminder["is_final"] is False
+        assert reminder["poll_count"] == 3
+        # No "auto-cancelled" body for non-final fires.
+        assert "auto-cancelled" not in reminder["text"].lower()
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # WatchRunner
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -450,13 +507,17 @@ class TestWatchRunner:
        runner.set_dispatch_fn("ws-1", fn1)
        runner.set_dispatch_fn("ws-2", fn2)

-        runner._dispatch_result("ws-1", "msg1")
-        fn1.assert_called_once_with("msg1")
+        # ``_dispatch_result`` takes a structured reminder dict, not a
+        # bare string.
+        reminder1 = {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "msg1"}
+        runner._dispatch_result("ws-1", reminder1, "watch-a")
+        fn1.assert_called_once_with(reminder1, "watch-a")
        fn2.assert_not_called()

        runner.remove_dispatch_fn("ws-1")
        # After removal, dispatch should try restore_fn
-        runner._dispatch_result("ws-1", "msg2")
+        reminder2 = {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "msg2"}
+        runner._dispatch_result("ws-1", reminder2, "watch-b")
        fn1.assert_called_once()  # still just the one call

    def test_restore_fn_called_for_evicted(self):
@@ -464,9 +525,25 @@ class TestWatchRunner:
        restore_fn = MagicMock(return_value=restored_fn)
        runner = self._make_runner(restore_fn=restore_fn)

-        runner._dispatch_result("ws-evicted", "hello")
+        reminder = {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "hello"}
+        runner._dispatch_result("ws-evicted", reminder, "watch-x")
        restore_fn.assert_called_once_with("ws-evicted")
-        restored_fn.assert_called_once_with("hello")
+        restored_fn.assert_called_once_with(reminder, "watch-x")
+
+    def test_get_dispatch_fn_returns_registered_fn(self):
+        """``get_dispatch_fn`` is the public accessor used by the
+        server-side restore path to retrieve the per-ws closure that
+        ``set_watch_runner`` constructed during workstream rehydrate.
+        """
+        runner = self._make_runner()
+        fn = MagicMock()
+        runner.set_dispatch_fn("ws-1", fn)
+        assert runner.get_dispatch_fn("ws-1") is fn
+        # Unknown ws → None.
+        assert runner.get_dispatch_fn("ws-missing") is None
+        # After removal → None.
+        runner.remove_dispatch_fn("ws-1")
+        assert runner.get_dispatch_fn("ws-1") is None

    def test_run_command_success(self):
        runner = self._make_runner()
@@ -1,206 +1,409 @@
-"""Tests for _make_watch_dispatch error/cancel handling and concurrency guards."""
+"""Tests for the watch dispatch closure built inside ``set_watch_runner``.
+
+The closure routes watch results onto the per-session :class:`NudgeQueue`
+under the unified pull-model surface.  Each test focuses on one
+assertion: enqueue shape, sanitisation, soft-cap drop-oldest,
+``valid_until`` predicate, and concurrent-enqueue safety.
+
+Tests in this file replace the pre-switchover suite that pinned the
+``_make_watch_dispatch`` worker-spawn / ``_watch_pending`` machinery —
+the contracts those tests pinned no longer exist.  See
+``tests/test_watch.py`` for the still-relevant ``WatchRunner``
+mechanics tests, and ``tests/test_watch_integration.py`` for the
+boundary-crossing integration test covering the chat-loop drain.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations

-import queue
 import threading
-import time
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock

-from turnstone.core.session import GenerationCancelled
-from turnstone.core.workstream import Workstream
-from turnstone.server import _make_watch_dispatch
+import pytest

+from tests._helpers import patch_session_storage
+from turnstone.core.session import _WATCH_QUEUE_SOFT_CAP, ChatSession

-class _StubSession:
-    """Minimal ChatSession stand-in with controllable send() behaviour."""

-    def __init__(self, *, side_effect=None):
-        self._watch_pending: queue.Queue = queue.Queue(maxsize=20)
-        self._side_effect = side_effect
+class _NullUI:
+    """UI adapter that discards all output — local to this test module
+    to avoid a cross-test-file import (mirrors the pattern in
+    test_session.py / test_rewind_retry.py).
+    """

-    def send(self, msg: str) -> None:
-        if self._side_effect is not None:
-            raise self._side_effect
-
-
-class _RecordingUI:
-    """Track calls made by the dispatch error handlers."""
-
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.errors: list[str] = []
-        self.state_changes: list[str] = []
-        self.stream_end_calls: int = 0
-
-    # -- SessionUI protocol stubs used by the dispatch code --
-
-    def on_error(self, message: str) -> None:
-        self.errors.append(message)
-
-    def on_state_change(self, state: str) -> None:
-        self.state_changes.append(state)
-
-    def on_stream_end(self) -> None:
-        self.stream_end_calls += 1
-
-
-# ── helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def _wait_for_worker(ws: Workstream, timeout: float = 2.0) -> None:
-    """Block until the worker thread started by dispatch() finishes."""
-    t = ws.worker_thread
-    if t is not None:
-        t.join(timeout)
-        assert not t.is_alive(), "worker thread did not finish in time"
-
-
-# ── GenerationCancelled path ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_cancelled_emits_stream_end_and_idle():
-    session = _StubSession(side_effect=GenerationCancelled())
-    ws = Workstream()
-    ui = _RecordingUI()
-
-    dispatch = _make_watch_dispatch(ws, session, ui)
-    dispatch("hello")
-    _wait_for_worker(ws)
-
-    assert ui.stream_end_calls == 1
-    assert ui.state_changes == ["idle"]
-    assert ui.errors == []
-
-
-# ── Generic exception path ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_exception_emits_stream_end_and_error():
-    session = _StubSession(side_effect=RuntimeError("boom"))
-    ws = Workstream()
-    ui = _RecordingUI()
-
-    dispatch = _make_watch_dispatch(ws, session, ui)
-    dispatch("hello")
-    _wait_for_worker(ws)
-
-    assert ui.stream_end_calls == 1
-    assert ui.state_changes == ["error"]
-    assert len(ui.errors) == 1
-    assert "boom" in ui.errors[0]
-
-
-# ── Worker-thread identity guard ────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_abandoned_thread_emits_no_events():
-    """After force-cancel sets worker_thread=None, the old thread must not
-    emit stream_end or state changes."""
-    barrier = threading.Event()
-
-    class _BlockingSession(_StubSession):
-        def send(self, msg: str) -> None:
-            barrier.wait(timeout=5)
-            raise RuntimeError("late error")
-
-    session = _BlockingSession()
-    ws = Workstream()
-    ui = _RecordingUI()
-
-    dispatch = _make_watch_dispatch(ws, session, ui)
-    dispatch("hello")
-
-    # Simulate force-cancel: clear the worker_thread reference.
-    ws.worker_thread = None
-    barrier.set()
-
-    # Wait for the thread to actually complete (it's still running).
-    time.sleep(0.3)
-
-    assert ui.stream_end_calls == 0
-    assert ui.state_changes == []
-    assert ui.errors == []
-
-
-# ── Path A: busy workstream enqueue ─────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_busy_workstream_enqueues_message():
-    """When the workstream already has a live worker, dispatch enqueues."""
-    session = _StubSession()
-    ws = Workstream()
-    ui = _RecordingUI()
-
-    # Simulate a live worker — session_worker.send gates on
-    # ``_worker_running``, not ``Thread.is_alive``.
-    ws._worker_running = True
-
-    dispatch = _make_watch_dispatch(ws, session, ui)
-    dispatch("queued msg")
-
-    item = session._watch_pending.get_nowait()
-    assert item == {"message": "queued msg"}
-
-
-def test_busy_workstream_drops_on_full_queue():
-    """When the pending queue is full, dispatch drops the message."""
-    session = _StubSession()
-    # Fill the queue to capacity.
-    for i in range(20):
-        session._watch_pending.put_nowait({"message": f"msg{i}"})
-
-    ws = Workstream()
-    ui = _RecordingUI()
-
-    ws._worker_running = True  # simulate a live worker
-
-    dispatch = _make_watch_dispatch(ws, session, ui)
-    # Should not block or raise — just log a warning and drop.
-    dispatch("overflow msg")
-
-    assert session._watch_pending.full()
-
-
-# ── Lock guard ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_dispatch_holds_lock_during_thread_start():
-    """Dispatch acquires ws._lock before checking/starting the worker."""
-    session = _StubSession()
-    ws = Workstream()
-    ui = _RecordingUI()
-
-    acquire_count = 0
-    inner = ws._lock
-
-    class _CountingLock:
-        def __enter__(self):
-            nonlocal acquire_count
-            acquire_count += 1
-            return inner.__enter__()
-
-        def __exit__(self, *args):
-            return inner.__exit__(*args)
-
-    ws._lock = _CountingLock()  # type: ignore[assignment]
-
-    dispatch = _make_watch_dispatch(ws, session, ui)
-    dispatch("hello")
-    _wait_for_worker(ws)
-
-    assert acquire_count >= 1
-
-
-# ── Happy path ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-
-def test_successful_send_no_error_events():
-    """Normal send() completion should not trigger error/cancel events."""
-    session = _StubSession()  # send() does nothing (success)
-    ws = Workstream()
-    ui = _RecordingUI()
-
-    dispatch = _make_watch_dispatch(ws, session, ui)
-    dispatch("hello")
-    _wait_for_worker(ws)
-
-    assert ui.stream_end_calls == 0
-    assert ui.state_changes == []
-    assert ui.errors == []
+    def __getattr__(self, name: str) -> Any:
+        # Catch-all: any UI hook the chat loop calls becomes a no-op.
+        return MagicMock()
+
+
+def _make_session_for_dispatch(**kwargs: Any) -> ChatSession:
+    """ChatSession built with the same minimal harness used elsewhere
+    in the test suite, scoped down to what the dispatch closure needs.
+    """
+    client = MagicMock()
+    defaults = dict(
+        client=client,
+        model="test-model",
+        ui=_NullUI(),
+        instructions=None,
+        temperature=0.5,
+        max_tokens=4096,
+        tool_timeout=30,
+    )
+    defaults.update(kwargs)
+    return ChatSession(**defaults)
+
+
+def _register_runner(session: ChatSession) -> tuple[Any, Any]:
+    """Attach a minimal stub ``WatchRunner`` to *session* and return the
+    ``(runner, dispatch_fn)`` pair captured by ``set_dispatch_fn``.
+    """
+    captured: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+    class _StubRunner:
+        def set_dispatch_fn(self, ws_id: str, fn: Any) -> None:
+            captured["fn"] = fn
+
+    runner = _StubRunner()
+    session.set_watch_runner(runner)
+    return runner, captured["fn"]
+
+
+def _reminder(text: str, **extra: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build a structured ``watch_triggered`` reminder dict for tests.
+
+    Mirrors the shape produced by :func:`turnstone.core.watch.build_watch_reminder`
+    — ``text`` is the formatted body, optional fields ride alongside.
+    Tests that don't care about the optional fields can call with
+    ``text`` only.
+    """
+    out: dict[str, Any] = {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": text}
+    out.update(extra)
+    return out
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Enqueue shape
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestEnqueueShape:
+    """``set_watch_runner``'s closure produces a single
+    ``("watch_triggered", text, "any")`` entry per fire.
+    """
+
+    def test_dispatch_enqueues_watch_triggered_with_any_channel(self, tmp_db):
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        dispatch(_reminder("watch fired body"), "watch-1")
+
+        # One entry, "watch_triggered" type, on "any" channel.
+        assert len(session._nudge_queue) == 1
+        assert session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="any") == [
+            ("watch_triggered", "watch fired body")
+        ]
+        # NOT on "user" or "tool" channels.
+        assert session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="user") == []
+        assert session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="tool") == []
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Sanitisation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestSanitisation:
+    """``sanitize_payload`` runs producer-side over the formatted message
+    before it ever reaches the queue.  The wire-boundary
+    ``escape_wrapper_tags`` only protects ``<system-reminder>`` /
+    ``<tool_output>`` envelopes; this layer covers everything else.
+    """
+
+    def test_dispatch_sanitizes_payload_before_enqueue(self, tmp_db):
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        # Build a payload with: BEL (\x07), zero-width space (U+200B),
+        # bidi RTL override (U+202E), and angle-bracket tag breakers.
+        raw = "before\x07middleafter‮more<thinking>tail"
+        dispatch(_reminder(raw), "watch-1")
+
+        pending = session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="any")
+        assert len(pending) == 1
+        sanitized = pending[0][1]
+        # Control / steering chars become spaces; angle brackets vanish.
+        assert "\x07" not in sanitized
+        assert "" not in sanitized
+        assert "‮" not in sanitized
+        assert "<" not in sanitized
+        assert ">" not in sanitized
+        # Real content survives.
+        assert "before" in sanitized
+        assert "thinking" in sanitized
+
+    def test_dispatch_preserves_newlines_for_multiline_output(self, tmp_db):
+        """Multi-line shell output must keep its layout — TAB / LF / CR
+        are intentionally preserved by ``sanitize_payload`` (R8).
+        """
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        dispatch(_reminder("line1\nline2\n\tindented\n\rline3"), "watch-1")
+
+        pending = session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="any")
+        assert len(pending) == 1
+        text = pending[0][1]
+        # Lines stay separated; tab kept.
+        assert "\n" in text
+        assert "\t" in text
+
+    def test_dispatch_drops_empty_after_sanitization(self, tmp_db):
+        """A payload that's all control chars sanitises to "" — no enqueue."""
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        # All-control + DEL + zero-width — strips to empty.
+        dispatch(_reminder("\x07\x0b\x7f"), "watch-1")
+
+        assert len(session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Soft cap
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestSoftCap:
+    """When ``"watch_triggered"`` saturates at :data:`_WATCH_QUEUE_SOFT_CAP`,
+    the closure drops the OLDEST entry of that type and enqueues the new
+    one — so the queue stays ≤ cap with the most recent watch outputs.
+    """
+
+    def test_dispatch_drop_oldest_at_soft_cap(self, tmp_db, caplog):
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        # Pre-fill at the cap.  Each entry has a unique body so we can
+        # tell which one(s) survived a drop.
+        for i in range(_WATCH_QUEUE_SOFT_CAP):
+            dispatch(_reminder(f"body-{i}"), "watch-1")
+        assert len(session._nudge_queue) == _WATCH_QUEUE_SOFT_CAP
+
+        with caplog.at_level("WARNING"):
+            dispatch(_reminder("overflow"), "watch-1")
+
+        # Total stays at cap (one dropped, one added).
+        assert len(session._nudge_queue) == _WATCH_QUEUE_SOFT_CAP
+        bodies = [text for _t, text in session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="any")]
+        # Oldest ("body-0") gone; newest ("overflow") present.
+        assert "body-0" not in bodies
+        assert "overflow" in bodies
+        # Warning logged.
+        assert any("watch_dispatch.queue_full" in r.message for r in caplog.records), (
+            "expected a watch_dispatch.queue_full warning record"
+        )
+
+    def test_dispatch_soft_cap_does_not_evict_other_types(self, tmp_db):
+        """A watch saturation drop must only target watch-typed entries.
+        Other producers (idle_children, advisories) have their own
+        rate limiters and must not be collateral damage.
+        """
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        # Mix in a few non-watch entries on the same queue.
+        session._nudge_queue.enqueue("idle_children", "ic-1", "any")
+        session._nudge_queue.enqueue("idle_children", "ic-2", "any")
+
+        # Saturate watches up to cap (queue holds cap+2 total).
+        for i in range(_WATCH_QUEUE_SOFT_CAP):
+            dispatch(_reminder(f"body-{i}"), "watch-1")
+        # One more triggers drop-oldest of a "watch_triggered" entry.
+        dispatch(_reminder("overflow"), "watch-1")
+
+        # Both idle_children entries survived — no collateral eviction.
+        idle_bodies = [
+            text
+            for nt, text in session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="any")
+            if nt == "idle_children"
+        ]
+        assert idle_bodies == ["ic-1", "ic-2"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# valid_until predicate
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestValidUntil:
+    """The ``valid_until`` predicate captured at dispatch time re-checks
+    the watch's ``active`` flag at drain time, so a cancelled watch's
+    last splat doesn't ride out a future wake.
+    """
+
+    def test_valid_until_drops_when_watch_inactive(self, tmp_db, monkeypatch):
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        # Storage stub returns False at drain time.
+        is_active_calls = patch_session_storage(monkeypatch, active=False)
+
+        dispatch(_reminder("body"), "watch-1")
+        # Drain fires the predicate; entry should NOT be delivered.
+        out = session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == []
+        # Predicate ran once with the dispatched watch_id.
+        assert is_active_calls == ["watch-1"]
+
+    def test_valid_until_drops_when_storage_raises(self, tmp_db, monkeypatch):
+        """The closure's broad-except in the predicate translates a
+        storage-layer exception to ``False`` so the drain doesn't
+        propagate; the predicate captured ``watch_id`` correctly
+        (otherwise storage wouldn't even be touched).
+        """
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        patch_session_storage(monkeypatch, raise_on_is_active=True)
+
+        dispatch(_reminder("body"), "watch-bound-id")
+        out = session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == []
+
+    def test_valid_until_delivers_when_watch_active(self, tmp_db, monkeypatch):
+        """Happy-path counter-test for the predicate above: the entry
+        DOES drain when the watch is still active.
+        """
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        patch_session_storage(monkeypatch, active=True)
+
+        dispatch(_reminder("body"), "watch-1")
+        out = session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+        assert len(out) == 1
+        assert out[0][0] == "watch_triggered"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Concurrency
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestConcurrency:
+    """Two threads each fire 100 dispatches against the same session;
+    the soft-cap read-then-mutate window stays bounded and the queue
+    settles in a consistent state.
+
+    Per the plan's risk register R2: in production only one daemon
+    thread (``WatchRunner``'s ``_run``) ever calls a session's dispatch
+    fn, so the 3-acquisition non-atomicity is harmless.  This test
+    pins lock-correctness anyway against the broader race window.
+    """
+
+    def test_dispatch_concurrent_enqueues_thread_safe(self, tmp_db, monkeypatch):
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        # Bypass the storage-touching valid_until predicate: count cap
+        # behaviour, not storage round-trips.
+        patch_session_storage(monkeypatch, active=True)
+
+        per_thread = 100
+        labels = ("a", "b")
+
+        def fire(label: str) -> None:
+            for i in range(per_thread):
+                dispatch(_reminder(f"{label}-{i}"), f"watch-{label}")
+
+        threads = [threading.Thread(target=fire, args=(label,), daemon=True) for label in labels]
+        for t in threads:
+            t.start()
+        for t in threads:
+            t.join(timeout=5.0)
+        for t in threads:
+            assert not t.is_alive(), "dispatch thread did not finish in time"
+
+        # The non-atomic count-then-drop window admits at most one "slip"
+        # per concurrent thread above the cap (each thread can observe a
+        # sub-cap count and append before another thread's drop runs).
+        depth = len(session._nudge_queue)
+        assert depth <= len(threads) * per_thread
+        assert depth <= _WATCH_QUEUE_SOFT_CAP + len(threads)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Empty-input / multi-call invariants
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("payload", ["", "   ", "\x07\x0b"])
+def test_dispatch_no_op_for_empty_payloads(tmp_db, payload: str):
+    """Whitespace-only / pure-control payloads sanitise to empty and
+    do not produce a queue entry — silent drop.
+    """
+    session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+    _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+    dispatch(_reminder(payload), "watch-1")
+
+    assert len(session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Metadata propagation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestMetadataPropagation:
+    """The dispatch closure pulls optional fields out of the structured
+    ``reminder`` dict and attaches them to the queue entry's
+    ``metadata``.  Drain seams later merge ``metadata`` into the
+    rendered reminder dict so the frontend can display a structured
+    ``.msg.watch-result`` card.
+    """
+
+    def test_dispatch_attaches_watch_metadata_on_enqueue(self, tmp_db):
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        reminder = _reminder(
+            "$ ls\nfile.txt",
+            watch_name="my-watch",
+            command="ls",
+            poll_count=2,
+            max_polls=100,
+            is_final=False,
+        )
+        dispatch(reminder, "watch-1")
+
+        # Snapshot via ``pending_with_metadata`` to inspect the full
+        # entry shape.  Exactly one entry, with the optional fields
+        # carried verbatim onto ``metadata``.
+        snapshot = session._nudge_queue.pending_with_metadata(channel="any")
+        assert len(snapshot) == 1
+        nt, _text, meta = snapshot[0]
+        assert nt == "watch_triggered"
+        assert meta == {
+            "watch_name": "my-watch",
+            "command": "ls",
+            "poll_count": 2,
+            "max_polls": 100,
+            "is_final": False,
+        }
+
+    def test_dispatch_omits_metadata_when_optional_fields_missing(self, tmp_db):
+        """A bare ``{type, text}`` reminder produces an entry with no
+        metadata — the closure builds an empty dict, sees nothing to
+        carry, and falls through to ``metadata=None``.
+        """
+        session = _make_session_for_dispatch()
+        _runner, dispatch = _register_runner(session)
+
+        dispatch(_reminder("just a body"), "watch-1")
+
+        snapshot = session._nudge_queue.pending_with_metadata(channel="any")
+        assert len(snapshot) == 1
+        _nt, _text, meta = snapshot[0]
+        assert meta is None
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+"""Boundary-crossing integration test for the watch switchover pipeline.
+
+Drives a real :class:`ChatSession` + a real :class:`WatchRunner` (with
+its daemon thread skipped — we call ``_dispatch_result`` directly to
+avoid the timer dependency) end-to-end through the chat-loop drain
+seam.  The only stub is the LLM provider (patched
+``_create_stream_with_retry``); every other layer is production code:
+
+* ``WatchRunner._dispatch_result`` releasing the dispatch lock before
+  fan-out
+* the closure built inside ``ChatSession.set_watch_runner`` —
+  ``sanitize_payload`` + soft-cap check + ``valid_until`` predicate +
+  ``NudgeQueue.enqueue("watch_triggered", ..., "any", ...)``
+* ``ChatSession.send`` chat loop short-circuiting metacog detection
+* ``_attach_pending_user_reminders`` draining ``USER_DRAIN`` (which
+  matches ``"any"``)
+* ``_apply_reminders_for_provider`` splicing the rendered envelope onto
+  the user message before the wire boundary
+
+Per ``feedback_tests_through_boundaries.md``: direct injection tests
+that bypass these boundaries silently mask wiring bugs.  This test is
+the structural integration gate for the watch switchover.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from tests._helpers import patch_session_storage
+from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
+from turnstone.core.watch import WatchRunner
+
+
+class _NullUI:
+    """UI adapter that no-ops every chat-loop hook the test triggers."""
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name: str) -> Any:
+        return MagicMock()
+
+
+def _make_session() -> ChatSession:
+    """Real ChatSession with the same minimal setup the unit-test suite
+    uses; no LLM calls happen until a chat-loop method is exercised
+    (and even then the LLM provider is patched).
+    """
+    return ChatSession(
+        client=MagicMock(),
+        model="test-model",
+        ui=_NullUI(),
+        instructions=None,
+        temperature=0.5,
+        max_tokens=4096,
+        tool_timeout=30,
+    )
+
+
+def test_watch_fires_then_user_send_drains_envelope(tmp_db, monkeypatch):
+    """Pin the cross-PR concern that watch text reaches the model via
+    the unified ``<system-reminder>`` envelope path:
+
+    1. WatchRunner.dispatch fires watch text against the session's
+       registered closure (synchronously — no daemon thread).
+    2. NudgeQueue holds one ``"watch_triggered"`` entry on ``"any"``.
+    3. session.send("ok") runs the chat loop with a stubbed LLM.
+    4. The drain seam drains the watch entry; the wire payload's user
+       message has the watch text spliced into a ``<system-reminder>``
+       envelope.
+    """
+    session = _make_session()
+
+    # Bypass the storage-touching predicate — we want to assert the
+    # envelope splice, not exercise a fresh sqlite watch row.
+    patch_session_storage(monkeypatch, active=True)
+
+    # Real WatchRunner; we don't ``start()`` the daemon thread (that
+    # would race with the test's deterministic order).  Direct call
+    # to ``_dispatch_result`` exercises the same dispatch path the
+    # daemon would invoke.  Runner-side ``storage`` is unused on this
+    # path (only the polling loop touches it); a MagicMock placeholder
+    # keeps the constructor signature happy.
+    runner = WatchRunner(storage=MagicMock(), node_id="test-node")
+    session.set_watch_runner(runner)
+
+    # 1. Fire a watch result synchronously.
+    runner._dispatch_result(
+        session._ws_id,
+        {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "watch payload body"},
+        "watch-1",
+    )
+
+    # 2. The queue holds one entry on the "any" channel.
+    assert len(session._nudge_queue) == 1
+    pending = session._nudge_queue.pending(channel="any")
+    assert pending == [("watch_triggered", "watch payload body")]
+
+    # 3. Run the chat loop with the LLM patched.  We don't care about
+    # the assistant turn's content; only the wire payload sent to the
+    # provider matters.
+    with (
+        patch.object(session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=iter([])),
+        patch.object(
+            session,
+            "_stream_response",
+            return_value={"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ),
+        patch.object(session, "_update_token_table"),
+        patch.object(session, "_print_status_line"),
+        patch.object(session, "_visible_memory_count", return_value=0),
+        patch("turnstone.core.session.save_message"),
+    ):
+        session._title_generated = True  # suppress orthogonal title side-thread
+        session.send("ok")
+
+    # 4. Queue fully drained by the user-message attach seam.
+    assert len(session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    # The user message that drove the assistant turn has the watch
+    # text in its ``_reminders`` side-channel — the production
+    # ``_apply_reminders_for_provider`` splice consumes that to wrap
+    # the content in ``<system-reminder>`` at the wire boundary.
+    user_msgs = [m for m in session.messages if m.get("role") == "user"]
+    assert user_msgs, "expected a user message in history"
+    last_user = user_msgs[-1]
+    reminders = last_user.get("_reminders") or []
+    assert any(
+        r.get("type") == "watch_triggered" and "watch payload body" in r.get("text", "")
+        for r in reminders
+    ), f"expected watch_triggered reminder on user message; got {reminders!r}"
+
+
+def test_three_back_to_back_watch_fires_drain_into_one_turn(tmp_db, monkeypatch):
+    """Behavioural delta from plan section 3.4 / risk register R3.
+
+    N back-to-back watch fires used to produce N successive
+    ``send()`` turns (each a separate model invocation, capped at
+    ``_MAX_WATCH_CHAIN = 5``).  After the switchover, the N entries
+    drain into ONE envelope splice on the next drain seam — one
+    assistant turn responding to all N watch results.  Pinning this
+    behavioural delta protects against accidental regression to
+    the old per-fire-turn shape.
+    """
+    session = _make_session()
+
+    patch_session_storage(monkeypatch, active=True)
+
+    runner = WatchRunner(storage=MagicMock(), node_id="test-node")
+    session.set_watch_runner(runner)
+
+    runner._dispatch_result(
+        session._ws_id, {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "fire one"}, "watch-1"
+    )
+    runner._dispatch_result(
+        session._ws_id, {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "fire two"}, "watch-1"
+    )
+    runner._dispatch_result(
+        session._ws_id, {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "fire three"}, "watch-1"
+    )
+    assert len(session._nudge_queue) == 3
+
+    with (
+        patch.object(session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=iter([])),
+        patch.object(
+            session,
+            "_stream_response",
+            return_value={"role": "assistant", "content": "got it"},
+        ),
+        patch.object(session, "_update_token_table"),
+        patch.object(session, "_print_status_line"),
+        patch.object(session, "_visible_memory_count", return_value=0),
+        patch("turnstone.core.session.save_message"),
+    ):
+        session._title_generated = True
+        session.send("user")
+
+    # All three drained into the single user-message attach.
+    user_msgs = [m for m in session.messages if m.get("role") == "user"]
+    last_user = user_msgs[-1]
+    reminders = last_user.get("_reminders") or []
+    watch_reminders = [r for r in reminders if r.get("type") == "watch_triggered"]
+    assert len(watch_reminders) == 3
+    bodies = [r.get("text", "") for r in watch_reminders]
+    assert any("fire one" in b for b in bodies)
+    assert any("fire two" in b for b in bodies)
+    assert any("fire three" in b for b in bodies)
+    # And there's exactly ONE assistant turn (not three).
+    assistant_turns = [m for m in session.messages if m.get("role") == "assistant"]
+    assert len(assistant_turns) == 1
+
+
+def test_watch_dispatch_through_restore_fn_lands_on_rehydrated_session(tmp_db, monkeypatch):
+    """Cover the production ``_watch_restore_fn`` closure surface.
+
+    Path under test:
+      WatchRunner._dispatch_result(ws_id, msg, watch_id)
+        no dispatch fn registered (original session evicted)
+        restore_fn(ws_id) constructs a fresh ChatSession,
+            calls session.resume(ws_id) to adopt the original ws_id,
+            re-registers the dispatch closure via session.set_watch_runner,
+            returns runner.get_dispatch_fn(session._ws_id)
+        runner invokes the returned fn with (msg, watch_id)
+        watch payload lands on the rehydrated session's NudgeQueue
+
+    Construction inside ``server.py``'s ``_watch_restore_fn`` is the new
+    contract surface introduced by the switchover; this test pins that
+    contract so a future refactor of the closure (e.g. swapping
+    ``manager.create + session.resume`` for ``manager.open``) doesn't
+    silently break the watch-restore pipeline.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core import session as session_mod
+
+    patch_session_storage(monkeypatch, active=True)
+
+    # Stage 1 — build the original session and persist a message so
+    # ``session.resume`` finds the ws_id in storage.
+    original = _make_session()
+    original_ws_id = original._ws_id
+    # Persist a stub user message so ``load_messages(original_ws_id)``
+    # returns something non-empty (resume short-circuits on empty).
+    session_mod.save_message(original_ws_id, "user", "kickoff message")
+
+    # Stage 2 — runner with NO dispatch fn registered (simulates the
+    # original session being evicted between watch fire and dispatch).
+    # The restore_fn captures *which* fresh ChatSession got built so the
+    # test can assert the queue landed on it (not on the original).
+    rehydrated_holder: dict[str, ChatSession] = {}
+
+    def _restore_fn(ws_id: str) -> Any:
+        """Mirror the production ``_watch_restore_fn`` closure shape:
+        construct a fresh session, resume the persisted ws_id (so the
+        new session adopts the original ws_id), wire the dispatch
+        closure, return the dispatch fn.
+        """
+        new_session = _make_session()
+        ok = new_session.resume(ws_id)
+        assert ok, "resume should succeed against a non-empty message log"
+        new_session.set_watch_runner(runner)
+        rehydrated_holder["session"] = new_session
+        return runner.get_dispatch_fn(new_session._ws_id)
+
+    runner = WatchRunner(
+        storage=MagicMock(),
+        node_id="test-node",
+        restore_fn=_restore_fn,
+    )
+
+    # Sanity: no dispatch fn registered yet for the original ws_id.
+    assert runner.get_dispatch_fn(original_ws_id) is None
+
+    # Stage 3 — fire a watch result.  ``_dispatch_result`` should fall
+    # through to the restore branch.  The dispatch surface takes a
+    # structured reminder dict.
+    runner._dispatch_result(
+        original_ws_id,
+        {"type": "watch_triggered", "text": "post-restore body"},
+        "watch-1",
+    )
+
+    # The restore fn ran exactly once and produced a fresh session that
+    # adopted the original ws_id.
+    assert "session" in rehydrated_holder, "restore_fn was not invoked"
+    rehydrated = rehydrated_holder["session"]
+    assert rehydrated is not original
+    assert rehydrated._ws_id == original_ws_id
+
+    # The watch payload landed on the rehydrated session's queue, not on
+    # the (now-evicted) original session's queue.
+    assert len(rehydrated._nudge_queue) == 1
+    assert rehydrated._nudge_queue.pending(channel="any") == [
+        ("watch_triggered", "post-restore body")
+    ]
+    # Original session's queue stays empty — the dispatch did NOT
+    # accidentally route back to it.
+    assert len(original._nudge_queue) == 0
@@ -72,6 +72,20 @@ class TestWatchCRUD:
        assert db.delete_watch("nope") is False


+class TestIsWatchActive:
+    def test_active_row_returns_true(self, db):
+        db.create_watch(**_make_watch_kwargs())
+        assert db.is_watch_active("watch_001") is True
+
+    def test_inactive_row_returns_false(self, db):
+        db.create_watch(**_make_watch_kwargs())
+        db.update_watch("watch_001", active=False)
+        assert db.is_watch_active("watch_001") is False
+
+    def test_missing_row_returns_false(self, db):
+        assert db.is_watch_active("nope") is False
+
+
 class TestWatchListQueries:
    def test_list_for_ws(self, db):
        db.create_watch(**_make_watch_kwargs(watch_id="w1", ws_id="ws-1", name="a"))
@@ -173,3 +173,50 @@ class TestResolveClient:
    def test_unknown_backend_returns_none(self):
        client = resolve_web_search_client("typo_backend", tavily_key="key")
        assert client is None
+
+    def test_resolve_web_search_client_rejects_oauth_user_backend(self):
+        """A web_search backend pointing at an ``auth_type=oauth_user``
+        MCP server MUST be rejected at boot — per-node web_search
+        cannot carry per-user tokens, so resolving the backend would
+        guarantee a 401-on-call instead of a clean disablement.
+
+        Phase 7 invariant 8 corollary: pool tools are user-scoped;
+        every entry point that lacks per-user identity (web_search
+        boot resolver, eval harness, CLI default) MUST refuse them
+        rather than silently produce a broken client.
+
+        Verified by reverting the ``server_auth_type(...) == 'oauth_user'``
+        guard in ``resolve_web_search_client``: the resolver returns
+        an ``MCPSearchClient`` whose ``call_tool_sync`` would surface
+        a 401 / consent_required structured error on every search.
+        """
+        mcp = MagicMock()
+        mcp.is_mcp_tool.return_value = True  # name resolves
+        mcp.server_auth_type.return_value = "oauth_user"
+        client = resolve_web_search_client(
+            "mcp:oauth-search:search", tavily_key=None, mcp_client=mcp
+        )
+        assert client is None, (
+            "oauth_user-backed web_search backend resolved to a non-None client; "
+            "boot-time guard missing or regressed."
+        )
+        # Per-turn callers must read from the in-memory cache, never
+        # the SQL helper — perf regression guard.
+        mcp.server_auth_type.assert_called_with("oauth-search")
+        assert not mcp._lookup_server_row.called, (
+            "resolver issued a SQL roundtrip via _lookup_server_row; "
+            "per-turn web_search backend resolution must use the "
+            "in-memory server_auth_type accessor."
+        )
+
+    def test_resolve_web_search_client_accepts_static_backend(self):
+        """Static-path (``auth_type=none`` or ``static``) MCP backends
+        still resolve cleanly — the new guard ONLY rejects oauth_user.
+        """
+        mcp = MagicMock()
+        mcp.is_mcp_tool.return_value = True
+        mcp.server_auth_type.return_value = None
+        client = resolve_web_search_client(
+            "mcp:static-search:search", tavily_key=None, mcp_client=mcp
+        )
+        assert isinstance(client, MCPSearchClient)
@@ -898,6 +898,97 @@ class TestHistoryInteractive:
        # Above-cap → clamps to 500 (response is still 200; we have 4 rows).
        assert client.get(base, params={"limit": 999}).status_code == 200

+    def test_returns_partial_trailing_turn_during_tool_execution(self, _inject_storage):
+        """The ``/history`` REST endpoint is a *display* read and must
+        surface partial state.  When the operator refreshes the page
+        mid-tool-execution — assistant ``tool_calls`` saved, only some
+        results saved — the trailing turn must come back on the wire so
+        the UI can render what the operator was watching live.
+
+        Storage's ``load_messages`` defaults to a repair pass that
+        strips this exact shape (correct for ``session.resume``, wrong
+        for display).  ``make_history_handler`` must opt out via
+        ``repair=False``; flipping that flag back on breaks this test.
+        """
+        import json
+
+        ws_id = "ws-mid-exec"
+        _inject_storage.register_workstream(ws_id, kind="interactive", user_id="test-user")
+        _inject_storage.save_message(ws_id, "user", "kick off")
+        tc_json = json.dumps(
+            [
+                {
+                    "id": "call_1",
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": '{"command":"ls"}'},
+                },
+                {
+                    "id": "call_2",
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": '{"command":"pwd"}'},
+                },
+            ]
+        )
+        _inject_storage.save_message(ws_id, "assistant", "Working", tool_calls=tc_json)
+        _inject_storage.save_message(ws_id, "tool", "file.txt", tool_call_id="call_1")
+        # call_2 result not yet persisted — operator refreshes here.
+        mock_ws = MagicMock()
+        mock_ws.id = ws_id
+        mock_mgr = MagicMock()
+        mock_mgr.get.return_value = mock_ws
+        client = _build_history_app(mock_mgr, _inject_storage)
+
+        r = client.get(f"/v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/history")
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        roles = [m.get("role") for m in r.json()["messages"]]
+        # All three rows survive — the trailing assistant + partial
+        # tool result are what the operator was watching live.  The
+        # default-repair shape would have been just ``["user"]``.
+        assert roles == ["user", "assistant", "tool"]
+
+        # Confirm the default-repair path collapses this to just the
+        # user message — locks in the regression contract.
+        with_repair = _inject_storage.load_messages(ws_id, repair=True)
+        assert [m.get("role") for m in with_repair] == ["user"]
+
+    def test_history_does_not_synthesize_orphan_results(self, _inject_storage):
+        """``repair=False`` via ``/history`` must NOT splice synthetic
+        ``"Tool execution was cancelled."`` rows for mid-conversation
+        orphaned tool_calls — the operator never saw those rows, and
+        showing them would invent UI content that doesn't reflect
+        persisted state.
+        """
+        import json
+
+        ws_id = "ws-orphan-mid"
+        _inject_storage.register_workstream(ws_id, kind="interactive", user_id="test-user")
+        _inject_storage.save_message(ws_id, "user", "first")
+        tc_json = json.dumps(
+            [
+                {
+                    "id": "call_1",
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": '{"command":"ls"}'},
+                },
+            ]
+        )
+        _inject_storage.save_message(ws_id, "assistant", "Working", tool_calls=tc_json)
+        # Cancel landed before any tool result — next turn happens.
+        _inject_storage.save_message(ws_id, "user", "second")
+        _inject_storage.save_message(ws_id, "assistant", "ok")
+        mock_ws = MagicMock()
+        mock_ws.id = ws_id
+        mock_mgr = MagicMock()
+        mock_mgr.get.return_value = mock_ws
+        client = _build_history_app(mock_mgr, _inject_storage)
+
+        r = client.get(f"/v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/history")
+        assert r.status_code == 200
+        roles = [m.get("role") for m in r.json()["messages"]]
+        # No synthetic tool row spliced after the orphaned tool_calls.
+        assert roles == ["user", "assistant", "user", "assistant"]
+        assert all(m.get("role") != "tool" for m in r.json()["messages"])
+

 class TestBuildHistoryReminderPropagation:
    """``_build_history`` must surface the ``_reminders`` side-channel on
@@ -1031,6 +1122,224 @@ class TestBuildHistoryReminderPropagation:
        assert history[0]["content"] == content


+class TestBuildHistoryAdvisoryRoundTrip:
+    """``_build_history`` must round-trip the persisted
+    ``<tool_output>`` envelope (Seam 1 queued-message splice) to
+    cleaned content + a wire-shape ``advisories`` array.
+
+    Production realism note: ``session.messages`` never carries an
+    ``advisories`` key — only ``decorate_history_messages`` mutates
+    dicts to add it for the REST ``/history`` path, and the SSE replay
+    surface bypasses that decoration entirely.  The earlier
+    ``TestBuildHistoryAdvisoryPropagation`` class pre-populated
+    ``advisories`` directly on the session messages, which tested a
+    passthrough that doesn't exist in production — the SSE replay code
+    path silently dropped queued messages despite the green tests.
+    These round-trip tests exercise the production shape (wrapped
+    envelope on the tool row's ``content``) so a regression in the
+    inline ``extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope`` call inside
+    ``_build_history`` surfaces here.
+    """
+
+    def _session_with_messages(self, messages: list[dict]) -> MagicMock:
+        session = MagicMock()
+        session.messages = messages
+        return session
+
+    def test_build_history_round_trips_envelope_to_advisories(self):
+        """The production-realistic shape: a tool row whose ``content``
+        is the wrapped ``<tool_output>`` envelope (no ``advisories``
+        key set — that's the bug-1 footprint).  ``_build_history``
+        must extract the advisory back out and ship it on the wire as
+        cleaned content + ``advisories``.
+
+        Reverting the inline ``extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope``
+        call in ``server._build_history``'s tool-message branch breaks
+        this test.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+        from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message="check logs", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        session = self._session_with_messages(
+            [
+                {
+                    "role": "tool",
+                    "tool_call_id": "call_a",
+                    "content": wrapped,
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+        history = _build_history(session)
+        # Cleaned content rides on the wire — envelope stripped.
+        assert history[0]["content"] == "tool body"
+        # Advisory survives as a wire-shape entry the JS can render
+        # as a user bubble after the tool block.
+        assert history[0]["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "check logs", "priority": "notice"}
+        ]
+
+    def test_build_history_round_trips_important_priority(self):
+        """The ``important`` priority preamble round-trips — pin both
+        the priority detection in the parser and the projection through
+        to the wire shape."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+        from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "out",
+            [UserInterjection(message="urgent", priority="important")],
+        )
+        session = self._session_with_messages(
+            [{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped}]
+        )
+        history = _build_history(session)
+        assert history[0]["content"] == "out"
+        assert history[0]["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "urgent", "priority": "important"}
+        ]
+
+    def test_build_history_no_envelope_passes_through_unchanged(self):
+        """Plain tool content (no ``<tool_output>`` prefix) — no
+        advisories field, content unchanged."""
+        from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+        session = self._session_with_messages(
+            [{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": "plain output"}]
+        )
+        history = _build_history(session)
+        assert history[0]["content"] == "plain output"
+        assert "advisories" not in history[0]
+
+    def test_build_history_round_trip_through_full_decoration_chain(self):
+        """End-to-end pin: persist a wrapped envelope into ``messages``,
+        run the full decoration chain (``decorate_history_messages``
+        followed by ``_build_history``), assert the wire shape carries
+        the advisory.  This pins the contract every component in the
+        chain participates in — REST ``/history`` callers go through
+        ``decorate_history_messages``, and SSE replay goes through
+        ``_build_history`` — both must produce the same wire shape.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import decorate_history_messages
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+        from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "raw",
+            [UserInterjection(message="hi", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        # Decorate first — REST /history shape.
+        rest_messages: list[dict] = [{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped}]
+        decorate_history_messages(rest_messages, {}, {})
+        # And separately drive _build_history with a fresh undecorated
+        # message — SSE replay shape.
+        session = self._session_with_messages(
+            [{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped}]
+        )
+        sse_history = _build_history(session)
+        # Both surfaces produce the same advisory + cleaned content.
+        assert rest_messages[0]["content"] == "raw"
+        assert rest_messages[0]["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "hi", "priority": "notice"}
+        ]
+        assert sse_history[0]["content"] == "raw"
+        assert sse_history[0]["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "hi", "priority": "notice"}
+        ]
+
+    def test_build_history_extracts_advisories_from_list_content_text_part(self):
+        """List-typed tool output (image / structured MCP results)
+        with a Seam 1 splice carries the wrap envelope as a separate
+        text part (``session.py``'s tool-result loop appends
+        ``{"type": "text", "text": wrap_tool_result("", advisories)}``
+        when ``output`` is a list).  ``_build_history`` must walk the
+        list parts, extract advisories from any wrap-envelope text
+        part, and DROP that text part from the projected list — the
+        cleaned inner content is empty by construction, and leaving
+        the part would cause the JS replay to render the literal
+        envelope text as a chunk inside the tool block AND fail to
+        render the queued message as a user bubble.
+
+        Removing the list-content branch in ``_build_history``'s tool-
+        message advisory extraction breaks this test.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+        from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+        wrap_text = wrap_tool_result(
+            "",
+            [UserInterjection(message="inspect histogram", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        list_content = [
+            {"type": "text", "text": "the chart shows X"},
+            {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}},
+            {"type": "text", "text": wrap_text},
+        ]
+        session = self._session_with_messages(
+            [{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": list_content}]
+        )
+        history = _build_history(session)
+        # Wire-shape content keeps the original text + image parts but
+        # has the wrap text-part dropped.
+        wire_content = history[0]["content"]
+        assert isinstance(wire_content, list)
+        assert len(wire_content) == 2
+        assert wire_content[0] == {"type": "text", "text": "the chart shows X"}
+        assert wire_content[1] == {
+            "type": "image_url",
+            "image_url": {"url": ""},
+        }
+        # Advisory rides on the wire so JS replay renders the user
+        # bubble after the tool block — same contract as the string-
+        # content path.
+        assert history[0]["advisories"] == [
+            {
+                "type": "user_interjection",
+                "text": "inspect histogram",
+                "priority": "notice",
+            }
+        ]
+
+    def test_build_history_keeps_legitimate_envelope_text_part_with_body(self):
+        """A tool that legitimately produces output containing a
+        well-formed ``<tool_output>`` envelope as a text part (e.g.
+        documentation viewer, code analyzer demoing the wrapper, an
+        echo tool) must NOT have that part dropped on replay.  The
+        list-content drop heuristic must require both an empty cleaned
+        inner body AND at least one extracted advisory — the
+        signature of the injected ``wrap_tool_result("", advisories)``
+        carrier.  A legitimate tool envelope has non-empty inner body
+        OR no advisories, and stays in the projected list verbatim.
+
+        Removing the ``not cleaned_text and advisories_from_part``
+        guard breaks this test (the legitimate envelope gets dropped
+        from the wire content)."""
+        from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+        legit_envelope_text = (
+            "<tool_output>\nThis is what a tool_output envelope looks like.\n</tool_output>"
+        )
+        list_content = [
+            {"type": "text", "text": "doc preview:"},
+            {"type": "text", "text": legit_envelope_text},
+        ]
+        session = self._session_with_messages(
+            [{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": list_content}]
+        )
+        history = _build_history(session)
+        # All parts survive — none dropped.
+        wire_content = history[0]["content"]
+        assert isinstance(wire_content, list)
+        assert len(wire_content) == 2
+        assert wire_content[1]["text"] == legit_envelope_text
+        # No advisories surfaced (no system-reminder blocks were
+        # extracted from the legitimate envelope).
+        assert "advisories" not in history[0]
+
+
 class TestDetailInteractive:
    """Interactive parity for the lifted ``GET /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}``.

@@ -117,7 +117,6 @@

 [mcp]
 # config_path = ""             # Path to MCP servers config file (JSON)
-# refresh_interval = 14400     # Refresh interval in seconds (default: 4h)

 # --- Server (node, console) ---

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """turnstone - Multi-node AI orchestration platform with tool use, agent routing, and cluster simulation."""

-__version__ = "1.5.7"
+__version__ = "1.5.9"
@@ -674,6 +674,16 @@ class McpServerInfo(BaseModel):
    registry_name: str | None = None
    registry_version: str = ""
    registry_meta: str = "{}"
+    auth_type: str = "static"
+    oauth_client_id: str | None = None
+    oauth_scopes: str | None = None
+    oauth_audience: str | None = None
+    oauth_registration_mode: str | None = None
+    oauth_authorization_server_url: str | None = None
+    oauth_as_issuer_cached: str | None = None
+    # Fernet ciphertext; never decrypted on the read path.  Responses
+    # carry the masked ``"***"`` sentinel via ``_mask_mcp_secrets``.
+    oauth_client_secret_ct: str | None = None
    created: str
    updated: str

@@ -704,6 +714,16 @@ class CreateMcpServerRequest(BaseModel):
    env: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
    auto_approve: bool = False
    enabled: bool = True
+    # OAuth-MCP: one of 'none' | 'static' | 'oauth_user'.
+    # ``oauth_client_secret`` is plaintext input; never persisted,
+    # redacted in audit log.
+    auth_type: str = "static"
+    oauth_client_id: str | None = None
+    oauth_client_secret: str | None = None
+    oauth_scopes: str | None = None
+    oauth_audience: str | None = None
+    oauth_registration_mode: str | None = None
+    oauth_authorization_server_url: str | None = None


 class UpdateMcpServerRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -716,6 +736,13 @@ class UpdateMcpServerRequest(BaseModel):
    env: dict[str, str] | None = None
    auto_approve: bool | None = None
    enabled: bool | None = None
+    auth_type: str | None = None
+    oauth_client_id: str | None = None
+    oauth_client_secret: str | None = None
+    oauth_scopes: str | None = None
+    oauth_audience: str | None = None
+    oauth_registration_mode: str | None = None
+    oauth_authorization_server_url: str | None = None


 class ListMcpServersResponse(BaseModel):
@@ -765,6 +792,34 @@ class SkillDiscoverResponse(BaseModel):
    skills: list[SkillDiscoverListing]


+class ParseSkillRequest(BaseModel):
+    raw: str = Field(
+        min_length=1,
+        max_length=32_768,
+        description=(
+            "Raw SKILL.md text — YAML frontmatter delimited by ``---`` "
+            "followed by the markdown body.  Capped at 32 KiB to match "
+            "``admin_create_skill``'s ``content`` ceiling and to bound "
+            "the synchronous YAML parser's worst-case CPU cost.  The "
+            "handler reuses the Python parser at "
+            "``turnstone.core.skill_parser`` so admin UIs and external "
+            "import paths agree on field extraction."
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+class ParseSkillResponse(BaseModel):
+    name: str
+    description: str
+    content: str
+    tags: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    author: str = ""
+    version: str = "1.0.0"
+    allowed_tools: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    license: str = ""
+    compatibility: str = ""
+
+
 class SkillInstallRequest(BaseModel):
    source: str  # "skills.sh" or "github"
    skill_id: str = ""  # for skills.sh
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ from turnstone.api.console_schemas import (
    NodeMetadataResponse,
    OrgInfo,
    OutputAssessmentInfo,
+    ParseSkillRequest,
+    ParseSkillResponse,
    RegistryInstallRequest,
    RegistrySearchResponse,
    RoleInfo,
@@ -552,6 +554,15 @@ CONSOLE_ENDPOINTS: list[EndpointSpec] = [
        error_codes=[400, 404, 409, 502],
        tags=["Admin"],
    ),
+    EndpointSpec(
+        "/v1/api/admin/skills/parse",
+        "POST",
+        "Parse a SKILL.md document and return its frontmatter fields and body",
+        request_model=ParseSkillRequest,
+        response_model=ParseSkillResponse,
+        error_codes=[400, 413],
+        tags=["Admin"],
+    ),
    # --- Governance: Skills ---
    EndpointSpec(
        "/v1/api/admin/skills",
@@ -1594,6 +1605,8 @@ _ALL_MODELS: list[type[BaseModel]] = [
    SkillInstallResponse,
    SkillInfo,
    SkillVersionInfo,
+    ParseSkillRequest,
+    ParseSkillResponse,
    CreateSkillRequest,
    UpdateSkillRequest,
    ListSkillsResponse,
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ class TerminalUI(SessionUI):
        sys.stdout.write(f"{RED}{message}{RESET}\n")
        sys.stdout.flush()

-    def _print_reminder(self, reminders: list[dict[str, str]]) -> None:
+    def _print_reminder(self, reminders: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
        """Render a metacognitive reminder list as ``[metacognition · type] text``
        lines in the terminal — the CLI's equivalent of the web UI's
        yellow themed bubble.  Used by both ``on_user_reminder`` and
@@ -326,10 +326,12 @@ class TerminalUI(SessionUI):
            sys.stdout.write(f"{YELLOW}[{label}]{RESET} {text}\n")
        sys.stdout.flush()

-    def on_user_reminder(self, reminders: list[dict[str, str]]) -> None:
+    def on_user_reminder(self, reminders: list[dict[str, Any]], source: str | None = None) -> None:
+        # ``source`` ignored — the CLI doesn't render a wake marker
+        # (terminal output is anchored by sequence, not anchor element).
        self._print_reminder(reminders)

-    def on_tool_reminder(self, reminders: list[dict[str, str]], tool_call_id: str) -> None:
+    def on_tool_reminder(self, reminders: list[dict[str, Any]], tool_call_id: str) -> None:
        # tool_call_id ignored — the CLI anchors by output sequence
        # (the line lands directly after the tool result that
        # triggered the batch's reminder).
@@ -1015,15 +1017,6 @@ def main() -> None:
        help="Path to MCP server config file (standard mcpServers JSON format)",
    )

-    from turnstone.core.config import nonneg_float
-
-    parser.add_argument(
-        "--mcp-refresh-interval",
-        type=nonneg_float,
-        default=14400,
-        metavar="SECONDS",
-        help="Periodic MCP tool refresh interval for servers without push notifications (default: 14400 = 4h, 0 to disable)",
-    )
    judge_group = parser.add_argument_group("Judge options")
    judge_group.add_argument(
        "--judge",
@@ -1136,7 +1129,6 @@ def main() -> None:

    mcp_client = create_mcp_client(
        getattr(args, "mcp_config", None),
-        refresh_interval=getattr(args, "mcp_refresh_interval", 14400),
        storage=_get_storage(),
    )

@@ -1488,12 +1488,17 @@ class CoordinatorClient:
        is_own_child = full.get("parent_ws_id") == self._coord_ws_id
        if not (is_self or is_own_child):
            return miss
-        # load_messages returns the full history in chronological order
-        # (no limit param in the Protocol) — slice the tail here.  Defensive
+        # load_messages returns the full history in chronological order.
+        # We slice the tail in Python because the SQL tail-N is
+        # approximate across conversation boundaries.  Defensive
        # try/except: storage errors should not break inspect.
        messages: list[Any] = []
        try:
-            all_msgs = self._storage.load_messages(ws_id)
+            # repair=False — inspect is a display read (admin viewing a
+            # child's history in the tree UI).  The LLM-context repair
+            # pass would strip trailing partial turns the operator is
+            # watching.
+            all_msgs = self._storage.load_messages(ws_id, repair=False)
            if message_limit and message_limit > 0:
                messages = all_msgs[-message_limit:]
            else:
@@ -1725,7 +1730,11 @@ def _last_assistant_text(storage: Any, ws_id: str) -> str | None:
    in just to surface its final turn.
    """
    try:
-        rows = storage.load_messages(ws_id, limit=_WAIT_MESSAGE_TAIL_LIMIT)
+        # repair=False — this reads the tail for display ("waiting on" bubble).
+        # The repair pass would strip a trailing partial assistant turn,
+        # making us return the penultimate assistant message instead of the
+        # one the operator is watching.
+        rows = storage.load_messages(ws_id, limit=_WAIT_MESSAGE_TAIL_LIMIT, repair=False)
    except Exception:
        log.debug("coord_client.wait.load_messages_failed ws=%s", ws_id, exc_info=True)
        return None
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+"""Observer that nudges idle coordinators with active children.
+
+Subscribes to a coordinator-side :class:`SessionManager`'s state events.
+When a coord transitions to :class:`WorkstreamState.IDLE` while still
+having active interactive children, enqueues an ``idle_children`` nudge
+on the coord's :class:`NudgeQueue`.  The
+:class:`turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher.IdleNudgeWatcher` (registered
+*after* this observer in the lifespan, so subscriber-order has the
+observer fire first on the same IDLE event) then peeks the queue and
+dispatches the wake send.
+
+Gates (in order):
+
+1. **Coordinator-only.**  Skip non-coord workstreams.  Watcher is
+   kind-agnostic; this observer is the kind-aware piece.
+2. **Skip if last assistant turn used ``wait_for_workstream``.** The
+   coord is already using the right tool — don't pile on with a nudge
+   suggesting the same tool.
+3. **Per-(ws_id, nudge_type) hard cap** (default 3).  Resets when the
+   ws leaves IDLE for any non-wake-driven reason (tracked by
+   :class:`ChatSession._wake_source_tag` — see below).
+4. **Active children query.**  ``storage.list_workstreams`` filtered to
+   interactive kind under the coord's user, with state in
+   :data:`_ACTIVE_CHILD_STATES`.  Empty result → no nudge.
+5. **Cooldown** via :func:`should_nudge` — default 300s per nudge type.
+
+The enqueue passes ``valid_until`` that re-queries active children at
+drain time; if every child finished while the queue waited, the entry
+drops without delivering a stale snapshot.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import threading
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+from turnstone.core.log import get_logger
+from turnstone.core.metacognition import (
+    _cooldown_allows,
+    format_idle_children_nudge,
+    should_nudge,
+)
+from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamKind, WorkstreamState
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
+    from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
+    from turnstone.core.storage._protocol import StorageBackend
+    from turnstone.core.workstream import Workstream
+
+log = get_logger(__name__)
+
+# Active = the model can act on the child (it's still working,
+# streaming, or waiting on user attention).  Excludes "idle" (the
+# child is now waiting and can't be unblocked by the coord), "closed"
+# (gone), "deleted" (gone), and "error" (the model can't unblock an
+# errored child without operator intervention; cooldown handles repeat
+# fires for stuck-error children).
+_ACTIVE_CHILD_STATES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        WorkstreamState.THINKING.value,
+        WorkstreamState.RUNNING.value,
+        WorkstreamState.ATTENTION.value,
+    }
+)
+
+# Hard cap on per-session ``idle_children`` fires.  Even with the
+# cooldown and wait-tool skip gate, a coord that ignores every nudge
+# shouldn't be hammered indefinitely.  Resets when the ws leaves IDLE
+# for a non-wake reason (real user input).
+_HARD_CAP_PER_SESSION = 3
+
+# Soft cap on the snapshot query.  Higher than ``WAIT_MAX_WS_IDS`` so
+# the SQL ``LIMIT`` (applied before the Python state filter) doesn't
+# clip genuinely-active children whose ``updated`` timestamp is older
+# than recently-closed siblings.  Realistic coord histories are far
+# smaller than this; if a coord ever exceeds it, the formatter still
+# truncates to ``WAIT_MAX_WS_IDS`` for the model-facing suggestion.
+_ACTIVE_CHILDREN_QUERY_LIMIT = 200
+
+
+class CoordinatorIdleObserver:
+    """Subscribe to a coord SessionManager's IDLE events and enqueue
+    ``idle_children`` nudges when active children remain.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, manager: SessionManager, storage: StorageBackend) -> None:
+        self._manager = manager
+        self._storage = storage
+        self._callback: Callable[[str, WorkstreamState], None] | None = None
+        # Per-ws fire counts keyed by ``ws_id`` → ``{nudge_type: count}``.
+        # Two-level dict makes the "any caps for this ws?" check at
+        # leave-IDLE an O(1) ``ws_id in self._fire_counts`` lookup
+        # instead of an O(N_caps) scan over a flat tuple-keyed map.
+        # Lock protects against race with the leave-IDLE reset path
+        # running on a different thread (state events fire on the
+        # calling thread of ``set_state`` — currently always the
+        # worker thread that did the transition, but the lock keeps
+        # the contract robust).
+        self._fire_counts: dict[str, dict[str, int]] = {}
+        self._fire_counts_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        """Idempotent — registering twice is a no-op."""
+        if self._callback is not None:
+            return
+
+        def _on_state(ws_id: str, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+            if state is not WorkstreamState.IDLE:
+                # Reset hard-cap when leaving IDLE for a *real* reason
+                # (not a wake-driven exit).  Skip the manager-lock /
+                # session-attribute walk entirely when no caps are
+                # accumulated for this ws — the common case for the
+                # vast majority of state transitions.
+                with self._fire_counts_lock:
+                    has_caps = ws_id in self._fire_counts
+                if not has_caps:
+                    return
+                ws = self._manager.get(ws_id)
+                if ws is None or ws.session is None:
+                    return
+                # ``_wake_source_tag`` is set on the session iff a
+                # wake send is in flight; if set, leaving IDLE is the
+                # wake's own IDLE→THINKING→RUNNING transition and the
+                # cap should NOT reset.  If unset, the user / a real
+                # producer drove the coord forward and the cap should
+                # clear so the next genuine idle bracket is fresh.
+                if not ws.session._wake_source_tag:
+                    self._reset_caps_for(ws_id)
+                return
+
+            # state == IDLE branch.
+            try:
+                self._maybe_enqueue(ws_id)
+            except Exception:
+                log.exception("coord_idle_observer.maybe_enqueue_failed ws=%s", ws_id[:8])
+
+        self._callback = _on_state
+        self._manager.subscribe_to_state(_on_state)
+
+    def shutdown(self) -> None:
+        """Unsubscribe; idempotent."""
+        cb = self._callback
+        if cb is None:
+            return
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            self._manager.unsubscribe_from_state(cb)
+        self._callback = None
+
+    def _maybe_enqueue(self, ws_id: str) -> None:
+        ws = self._manager.get(ws_id)
+        if ws is None or ws.session is None:
+            return
+        if ws.kind is not WorkstreamKind.COORDINATOR:
+            return
+        session = ws.session
+
+        # Gate ordering matters: cheap checks first, expensive checks
+        # last.  The cooldown peek + per-session hard cap are
+        # microsecond-cheap dict lookups; ``_last_assistant_used_wait``
+        # walks ``session.messages`` reversed; ``_active_children`` and
+        # ``_visible_memory_count`` round-trip to storage.  With a 300s
+        # cooldown most idle events will short-circuit at the peek.
+        cooldown_secs = getattr(session._mem_cfg, "nudge_cooldown", 300)
+        if not _cooldown_allows(
+            "idle_children", session._metacog_state, cooldown_secs=cooldown_secs
+        ):
+            return
+
+        # Gate: per-session hard cap on idle_children fires.
+        with self._fire_counts_lock:
+            ws_caps = self._fire_counts.get(ws_id, {})
+            if ws_caps.get("idle_children", 0) >= _HARD_CAP_PER_SESSION:
+                return
+
+        # Gate: skip if the coord's last assistant turn already used
+        # ``wait_for_workstream``.  Don't nudge toward a tool the
+        # model is already using.
+        if self._last_assistant_used_wait(session):
+            return
+
+        # Gate: query active children.  Empty → nothing to nudge about.
+        active = self._active_children(ws)
+        if not active:
+            return
+
+        # ``should_nudge`` re-checks cooldown AND records the timestamp
+        # on success (the peek above only checks; record happens here).
+        # Also enforces the message-count > 1 / memory-count > 0 sanity
+        # gates we couldn't apply at the cheap-peek stage.
+        if not should_nudge(
+            "idle_children",
+            session._metacog_state,
+            message_count=len(session.messages),
+            memory_count=session._visible_memory_count(),
+            cooldown_secs=cooldown_secs,
+        ):
+            return
+
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(active)
+        if not text:  # belt-and-braces: formatter empty-input guard
+            return
+
+        # Bind ws.id + user_id by closure so the predicate captures the
+        # workstream identity (not the live ``ws`` reference, which
+        # could mutate).  The predicate runs at drain time outside the
+        # queue lock.  Use ``count_workstreams_by_state`` rather than
+        # ``list_workstreams`` since the predicate only needs a
+        # boolean — saves a row fetch on the chat-loop user-attach
+        # path.
+        bound_ws_id = ws.id
+        bound_user_id = ws.user_id
+
+        def _still_has_active_children() -> bool:
+            try:
+                counts = self._storage.count_workstreams_by_state(
+                    parent_ws_id=bound_ws_id,
+                    user_id=bound_user_id,
+                )
+            except Exception:
+                log.debug(
+                    "coord_idle_observer.predicate_count_failed ws=%s",
+                    bound_ws_id[:8],
+                    exc_info=True,
+                )
+                return False
+            return any(counts.get(s, 0) > 0 for s in _ACTIVE_CHILD_STATES)
+
+        session._nudge_queue.enqueue(
+            "idle_children",
+            text,
+            "any",
+            valid_until=_still_has_active_children,
+        )
+        with self._fire_counts_lock:
+            ws_caps = self._fire_counts.setdefault(ws_id, {})
+            ws_caps["idle_children"] = ws_caps.get("idle_children", 0) + 1
+
+        log.info(
+            "coord_idle_observer.enqueued ws=%s active_children=%d",
+            ws_id[:8],
+            len(active),
+        )
+
+    def _last_assistant_used_wait(self, session: ChatSession) -> bool:
+        """Walk back to the most recent assistant turn; if it issued a
+        ``wait_for_workstream`` tool call, return ``True``.
+        """
+        for msg in reversed(session.messages):
+            if msg.get("role") != "assistant":
+                continue
+            for tc in msg.get("tool_calls") or []:
+                fn = tc.get("function", {}) or {}
+                if fn.get("name") == "wait_for_workstream":
+                    return True
+            return False  # found the most recent assistant turn — done
+        return False
+
+    def _active_children(self, ws: Workstream) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+        """Query storage for the coord's interactive children whose state
+        is in :data:`_ACTIVE_CHILD_STATES`.  Returns row-mapping shape.
+
+        ``list_workstreams`` orders by ``updated DESC`` and applies its
+        ``LIMIT`` in SQL before any state filter, so a coord with many
+        recently-closed children could clip out genuinely-active rows
+        whose ``updated`` timestamp is older.  We bump the limit well
+        above ``NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP`` to absorb that —
+        realistic coord histories are far smaller than the bumped
+        limit.  Pushing the state filter into SQL would be the
+        structural fix, but that requires a storage-protocol change;
+        flagged as a follow-up.
+        """
+        try:
+            rows = self._storage.list_workstreams(
+                limit=_ACTIVE_CHILDREN_QUERY_LIMIT,
+                parent_ws_id=ws.id,
+                kind=WorkstreamKind.INTERACTIVE,
+                user_id=ws.user_id,
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            log.debug("coord_idle_observer.list_failed ws=%s", ws.id[:8], exc_info=True)
+            return []
+
+        out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+        for row in rows:
+            mapping = getattr(row, "_mapping", row)
+            state = mapping["state"]
+            if state not in _ACTIVE_CHILD_STATES:
+                continue
+            out.append(
+                {
+                    "ws_id": mapping["ws_id"],
+                    "name": mapping["name"] or "",
+                    "state": state,
+                }
+            )
+        return out
+
+    def _reset_caps_for(self, ws_id: str) -> None:
+        """Drop every nudge-type cap counter for ``ws_id`` on a real
+        (non-wake) leave-IDLE event — the next genuine idle bracket
+        starts fresh.  O(1) with the per-ws nested-dict layout.
+        """
+        with self._fire_counts_lock:
+            self._fire_counts.pop(ws_id, None)
@@ -511,6 +511,49 @@ function _toggleOidcPanel(userId, username, rowEl) {
    });
 }

+function _buildOidcRow(oid, userId, username) {
+  var shortIssuer = _issuerShortName(oid.issuer || "");
+  var shortSubject =
+    (oid.subject || "").length > 12
+      ? (oid.subject || "").slice(0, 12) + "\u2026"
+      : oid.subject || "";
+  var lastLogin = oid.last_login ? _relativeTime(oid.last_login) : "never";
+  return (
+    '<div class="oidc-identity-row">' +
+    '<span class="oidc-identity-issuer"><span class="scope-badge">' +
+    escapeHtml(shortIssuer) +
+    "</span></span>" +
+    '<span class="oidc-identity-subject" title="' +
+    escapeHtml(oid.subject || "") +
+    '">' +
+    escapeHtml(shortSubject) +
+    "</span>" +
+    '<span class="oidc-identity-email" title="' +
+    escapeHtml(oid.email || "") +
+    '">' +
+    escapeHtml(oid.email || "\u2014") +
+    "</span>" +
+    '<span class="oidc-identity-time">' +
+    escapeHtml(lastLogin) +
+    "</span>" +
+    '<span class="oidc-identity-actions">' +
+    '<button class="admin-btn-danger" aria-label="Unlink ' +
+    escapeHtml(shortIssuer) +
+    " identity " +
+    escapeHtml(shortSubject) +
+    '" data-oidc-issuer="' +
+    escapeHtml(oid.issuer || "") +
+    '" data-oidc-subject="' +
+    escapeHtml(oid.subject || "") +
+    '" data-oidc-username="' +
+    escapeHtml(username) +
+    '" data-oidc-user-id="' +
+    escapeHtml(userId) +
+    '">unlink</button>' +
+    "</span></div>"
+  );
+}
+
 function _renderOidcDetail(panel, identities, userId, username) {
  var body = panel.querySelector(".oidc-detail-body");
  if (!body) return;
@@ -522,46 +565,7 @@ function _renderOidcDetail(panel, identities, userId, username) {
  }
  var html = "";
  for (var i = 0; i < identities.length; i++) {
-    var oid = identities[i];
-    var shortIssuer = _issuerShortName(oid.issuer || "");
-    var shortSubject =
-      (oid.subject || "").length > 12
-        ? (oid.subject || "").slice(0, 12) + "\u2026"
-        : oid.subject || "";
-    var lastLogin = oid.last_login ? _relativeTime(oid.last_login) : "never";
-    html +=
-      '<div class="oidc-identity-row">' +
-      '<span class="oidc-identity-issuer"><span class="scope-badge">' +
-      escapeHtml(shortIssuer) +
-      "</span></span>" +
-      '<span class="oidc-identity-subject" title="' +
-      escapeHtml(oid.subject || "") +
-      '">' +
-      escapeHtml(shortSubject) +
-      "</span>" +
-      '<span class="oidc-identity-email" title="' +
-      escapeHtml(oid.email || "") +
-      '">' +
-      escapeHtml(oid.email || "\u2014") +
-      "</span>" +
-      '<span class="oidc-identity-time">' +
-      escapeHtml(lastLogin) +
-      "</span>" +
-      '<span class="oidc-identity-actions">' +
-      '<button class="admin-btn-danger" aria-label="Unlink ' +
-      escapeHtml(shortIssuer) +
-      " identity " +
-      escapeHtml(shortSubject) +
-      '" data-oidc-issuer="' +
-      escapeHtml(oid.issuer || "") +
-      '" data-oidc-subject="' +
-      escapeHtml(oid.subject || "") +
-      '" data-oidc-username="' +
-      escapeHtml(username) +
-      '" data-oidc-user-id="' +
-      escapeHtml(userId) +
-      '">unlink</button>' +
-      "</span></div>";
+    html += _buildOidcRow(identities[i], userId, username);
  }
  body.innerHTML = html;
  // Update panel height for animation
@@ -3312,9 +3316,23 @@ function _renderMcpServers(items) {
    var detailAttr = isConfig
      ? 'data-mcp-detail-name="' + escapeHtml(s.name) + '"'
      : 'data-mcp-detail="' + escapeHtml(s.server_id) + '"';
+    var actionBtns =
+      '<button class="admin-btn-action" data-mcp-refresh="' +
+      escapeHtml(s.name) +
+      '">refresh</button>' +
+      '<button class="admin-btn-action" data-mcp-reconnect="' +
+      escapeHtml(s.name) +
+      '">reconnect</button>';
+    if (s.auth_type === "oauth_user") {
+      actionBtns +=
+        '<button class="admin-btn-action" data-mcp-oauth-connect="' +
+        escapeHtml(s.name) +
+        '">connect</button>';
+    }
    var actions = isConfig
-      ? ""
-      : '<button class="admin-btn-action" data-mcp-edit="' +
+      ? actionBtns
+      : actionBtns +
+        '<button class="admin-btn-action" data-mcp-edit="' +
        escapeHtml(s.server_id) +
        '">edit</button>' +
        '<button class="admin-btn-danger" data-mcp-delete="' +
@@ -3379,6 +3397,59 @@ function _renderMcpServers(items) {
      showEditMcpModal(this.getAttribute("data-mcp-edit"));
    });
  });
+  el.querySelectorAll("[data-mcp-refresh]").forEach(function (btn) {
+    btn.addEventListener("click", function () {
+      var name = this.getAttribute("data-mcp-refresh");
+      authFetch(
+        "/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/" + encodeURIComponent(name) + "/refresh",
+        { method: "POST" },
+      )
+        .then(function (r) {
+          if (!r.ok) throw new Error();
+          return r.json();
+        })
+        .then(function () {
+          showToast("Refreshed " + name);
+          loadAdminMcp();
+        })
+        .catch(function () {
+          showToast("Failed to refresh " + name);
+        });
+    });
+  });
+  el.querySelectorAll("[data-mcp-reconnect]").forEach(function (btn) {
+    btn.addEventListener("click", function () {
+      var name = this.getAttribute("data-mcp-reconnect");
+      authFetch(
+        "/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/" + encodeURIComponent(name) + "/reconnect",
+        { method: "POST" },
+      )
+        .then(function (r) {
+          if (!r.ok) throw new Error();
+          return r.json();
+        })
+        .then(function () {
+          showToast("Reconnected " + name);
+          loadAdminMcp();
+        })
+        .catch(function () {
+          showToast("Failed to reconnect " + name);
+        });
+    });
+  });
+  el.querySelectorAll("[data-mcp-oauth-connect]").forEach(function (btn) {
+    btn.addEventListener("click", function () {
+      var name = this.getAttribute("data-mcp-oauth-connect");
+      // Open the OAuth /start endpoint in a new window so the redirect
+      // chain (AS → callback → return_url) doesn't displace the admin UI.
+      var url =
+        "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=" +
+        encodeURIComponent(name) +
+        "&return_url=" +
+        encodeURIComponent(window.location.href);
+      window.open(url, "_blank", "noopener");
+    });
+  });
  el.querySelectorAll("[data-mcp-delete]").forEach(function (btn) {
    btn.addEventListener("click", function () {
      var sid = this.getAttribute("data-mcp-delete");
@@ -3413,6 +3484,46 @@ function toggleMcpTransport() {
    v === "stdio" ? "" : "none";
  document.getElementById("mcp-http-fields").style.display =
    v === "streamable-http" ? "" : "none";
+  // Re-evaluate auth-field visibility because the headers row lives
+  // inside mcp-http-fields and gets toggled there.
+  toggleMcpAuthFields();
+}
+
+function _selectedMcpAuthType() {
+  var radios = document.getElementsByName("mcp-auth-type");
+  for (var i = 0; i < radios.length; i++) {
+    if (radios[i].checked) return radios[i].value;
+  }
+  return "static";
+}
+
+function toggleMcpAuthFields() {
+  var authType = _selectedMcpAuthType();
+  var oauthDiv = document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-fields");
+  if (oauthDiv) {
+    oauthDiv.style.display = authType === "oauth_user" ? "" : "none";
+  }
+  // The "Headers" textarea (inside mcp-http-fields) is only meaningful
+  // for static auth; hide it for 'none' / 'oauth_user' so operators
+  // don't accidentally configure stale credentials.
+  var headersInput = document.getElementById("mcp-headers");
+  if (headersInput) {
+    var headersLabel = document.querySelector('label[for="mcp-headers"]');
+    var show = authType === "static";
+    headersInput.style.display = show ? "" : "none";
+    if (headersLabel) headersLabel.style.display = show ? "" : "none";
+  }
+}
+
+function _wireMcpAudienceAutofill() {
+  // Idempotent — only attach the listener once per page lifetime.
+  var urlInput = document.getElementById("mcp-url");
+  if (!urlInput || urlInput.dataset.audAutofill === "1") return;
+  urlInput.dataset.audAutofill = "1";
+  urlInput.addEventListener("blur", function () {
+    var aud = document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-audience");
+    if (aud && !aud.value.trim()) aud.value = urlInput.value.trim();
+  });
 }

 function showCreateMcpModal() {
@@ -3431,8 +3542,20 @@ function showCreateMcpModal() {
  document.getElementById("mcp-headers").value = "";
  document.getElementById("mcp-auto-approve").checked = false;
  document.getElementById("mcp-enabled").checked = true;
+  // Reset auth radios + OAuth subfields to the 'static' default.
+  document.getElementById("mcp-auth-static").checked = true;
+  document.getElementById("mcp-auth-none").checked = false;
+  document.getElementById("mcp-auth-oauth").checked = false;
+  document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-as-url").value = "";
+  document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-registration").value = "preregistered";
+  document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-client-id").value = "";
+  document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-client-secret").value = "";
+  document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-scopes").value = "";
+  document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-audience").value = "";
  document.getElementById("mcp-create-error").style.display = "none";
  toggleMcpTransport();
+  toggleMcpAuthFields();
+  _wireMcpAudienceAutofill();
  document.getElementById("mcp-name").focus();
  _mcpCreateTrap = _installTrap("mcp-create-overlay", "mcp-create-box");
 }
@@ -3483,7 +3606,25 @@ function showEditMcpModal(serverId) {
      document.getElementById("mcp-auto-approve").checked =
        s.auto_approve || false;
      document.getElementById("mcp-enabled").checked = s.enabled !== false;
+      var authType = s.auth_type || "static";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-auth-none").checked = authType === "none";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-auth-static").checked =
+        authType === "static";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-auth-oauth").checked =
+        authType === "oauth_user";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-as-url").value =
+        s.oauth_authorization_server_url || "";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-registration").value =
+        s.oauth_registration_mode || "preregistered";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-client-id").value =
+        s.oauth_client_id || "";
+      // Secret field always blank — write-only, never read back.
+      document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-client-secret").value = "";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-scopes").value = s.oauth_scopes || "";
+      document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-audience").value =
+        s.oauth_audience || "";
      toggleMcpTransport();
+      toggleMcpAuthFields();
    })
    .catch(function () {
      showToast("Failed to load server details");
@@ -3505,11 +3646,13 @@ function _parseMcpForm() {
    return { error: "Name must match [a-zA-Z0-9._-]+" };
  if (name.indexOf("__") >= 0) return { error: "Name must not contain '__'" };

+  var authType = _selectedMcpAuthType();
  var payload = {
    name: name,
    transport: transport,
    auto_approve: document.getElementById("mcp-auto-approve").checked,
    enabled: document.getElementById("mcp-enabled").checked,
+    auth_type: authType,
  };

  if (transport === "stdio") {
@@ -3535,19 +3678,46 @@ function _parseMcpForm() {
    payload.env = envObj;
  } else {
    payload.url = document.getElementById("mcp-url").value.trim();
-    var hdrText = document.getElementById("mcp-headers").value.trim();
-    var hdrObj = {};
-    if (hdrText) {
-      hdrText.split("\n").forEach(function (line) {
-        var colon = line.indexOf(":");
-        if (colon > 0)
-          hdrObj[line.substring(0, colon).trim()] = line
-            .substring(colon + 1)
-            .trim();
-      });
+    if (authType === "static") {
+      var hdrText = document.getElementById("mcp-headers").value.trim();
+      var hdrObj = {};
+      if (hdrText) {
+        hdrText.split("\n").forEach(function (line) {
+          var colon = line.indexOf(":");
+          if (colon > 0)
+            hdrObj[line.substring(0, colon).trim()] = line
+              .substring(colon + 1)
+              .trim();
+        });
+      }
+      payload.headers = hdrObj;
+    } else {
+      // 'none' / 'oauth_user' — clear server-side static headers state.
+      payload.headers = {};
    }
-    payload.headers = hdrObj;
  }
+
+  if (authType === "oauth_user") {
+    payload.oauth_authorization_server_url = document
+      .getElementById("mcp-oauth-as-url")
+      .value.trim();
+    payload.oauth_registration_mode = document.getElementById(
+      "mcp-oauth-registration",
+    ).value;
+    payload.oauth_client_id = document
+      .getElementById("mcp-oauth-client-id")
+      .value.trim();
+    payload.oauth_scopes = document
+      .getElementById("mcp-oauth-scopes")
+      .value.trim();
+    payload.oauth_audience = document
+      .getElementById("mcp-oauth-audience")
+      .value.trim();
+    var secret = document.getElementById("mcp-oauth-client-secret").value;
+    // Submit only when the operator typed a value; redacted in audit log.
+    if (secret) payload.oauth_client_secret = secret;
+  }
+
  return payload;
 }

@@ -439,25 +439,6 @@
  font-size: 10px;
 }

-/* Storage-truncation indicator — same convention as the interactive
-   UI's `.tool-output-truncated` pill (transparent bg, dim border,
-   small font) so the operator reads the affordance the same way on
-   both surfaces.  Sibling node next to .coord-tool-row-result rather
-   than text-in-content so a future "best-effort JSON repair" pass
-   on the result body doesn't have to strip a marker string. */
-.coord-tool-truncated {
-  display: inline-block;
-  margin-top: 4px;
-  margin-left: 6px;
-  padding: 1px 6px;
-  font-size: 10px;
-  font-family: var(--font-mono);
-  color: var(--ink-3);
-  background: transparent;
-  border: 1px solid var(--ink-3);
-  border-radius: 3px;
-}
-
 /* memory/recall calls are background metadata — the audit trail is
   useful but they crowd the tree on workstreams with heavy memory
   usage.  Dim the row by default; full opacity on hover so they
@@ -368,34 +368,89 @@
    return el;
  }

+  // Build a structured ``.msg.watch-result`` card for a
+  // ``watch_triggered`` reminder — full-width treatment with
+  // command preview header + shell output body + poll counter footer.
+  // First-pass functional rendering; bespoke design polish lives in a
+  // future workstream.  All text goes through ``textContent`` so shell
+  // output containing angle brackets / scripts / steering bytes
+  // renders inertly.
+  function buildWatchResultBubble(r) {
+    const el = document.createElement("div");
+    el.className = "msg watch-result";
+    el.setAttribute("role", "article");
+    el.setAttribute("data-ts-role", "watch");
+    el.setAttribute("aria-label", "watch");
+    const header = document.createElement("div");
+    header.className = "msg-watch-header";
+    header.textContent =
+      "watch" + (r.watch_name ? " · " + String(r.watch_name) : "");
+    el.appendChild(header);
+    if (r.command) {
+      const cmd = document.createElement("div");
+      cmd.className = "msg-watch-cmd";
+      cmd.textContent = "$ " + String(r.command);
+      el.appendChild(cmd);
+    }
+    const body = document.createElement("pre");
+    body.className = "msg-watch-body";
+    body.textContent = r.text || "";
+    el.appendChild(body);
+    if (r.poll_count != null && r.max_polls != null) {
+      const footer = document.createElement("div");
+      footer.className = "msg-watch-footer";
+      const finalSuffix = r.is_final ? " · final" : "";
+      footer.textContent =
+        "poll " +
+        String(r.poll_count) +
+        "/" +
+        String(r.max_polls) +
+        finalSuffix;
+      el.appendChild(footer);
+    }
+    return el;
+  }
+
+  // Default ``.msg.user-reminder`` bubble — yellow themed advisory used
+  // for every metacog nudge other than ``watch_triggered``.
+  function buildDefaultReminderBubble(r) {
+    const el = document.createElement("div");
+    el.className = "msg user-reminder";
+    el.setAttribute("role", "article");
+    el.setAttribute("data-ts-role", "metacognition");
+    el.setAttribute("aria-label", "metacognition");
+    const body = document.createElement("div");
+    body.className = "msg-body";
+    const labelEl = document.createElement("span");
+    labelEl.className = "msg-user-reminder-label";
+    labelEl.textContent =
+      "metacognition" + (r.type ? " · " + String(r.type) : "");
+    const textEl = document.createElement("span");
+    textEl.className = "msg-user-reminder-text";
+    textEl.textContent = r.text || "";
+    body.appendChild(labelEl);
+    body.appendChild(textEl);
+    el.appendChild(body);
+    return el;
+  }
+
  // Metacognitive reminder bubble (user-channel correction / denial /
  // resume / start / completion AND tool-channel tool_error / repeat).
  // Mirrors Pane.prototype.addUserReminder / addToolReminder in the
  // interactive UI — yellow themed bubble slotted directly below the
-  // message it advises.  ``anchor`` is the DOM element to anchor below;
-  // when null, append at the bottom of messagesEl.
+  // message it advises.  ``watch_triggered`` reminders branch off into
+  // the structured ``.msg.watch-result`` card.  ``anchor`` is the DOM
+  // element to anchor below; when null, append at the bottom of
+  // messagesEl.
  function appendReminderBubble(reminders, anchor) {
    if (!Array.isArray(reminders) || !reminders.length) return;
    let cursor = anchor;
    for (let i = 0; i < reminders.length; i++) {
      const r = reminders[i] || {};
-      const el = document.createElement("div");
-      el.className = "msg user-reminder";
-      el.setAttribute("role", "article");
-      el.setAttribute("data-ts-role", "metacognition");
-      el.setAttribute("aria-label", "metacognition");
-      const body = document.createElement("div");
-      body.className = "msg-body";
-      const labelEl = document.createElement("span");
-      labelEl.className = "msg-user-reminder-label";
-      labelEl.textContent =
-        "metacognition" + (r.type ? " · " + String(r.type) : "");
-      const textEl = document.createElement("span");
-      textEl.className = "msg-user-reminder-text";
-      textEl.textContent = r.text || "";
-      body.appendChild(labelEl);
-      body.appendChild(textEl);
-      el.appendChild(body);
+      const el =
+        r.type === "watch_triggered"
+          ? buildWatchResultBubble(r)
+          : buildDefaultReminderBubble(r);
      if (cursor) {
        cursor.insertAdjacentElement("afterend", el);
        cursor = el;
@@ -406,12 +461,40 @@
    _scheduleScroll();
  }

+  // Thin ``.msg.user.system-nudge`` marker rendered as the anchor for
+  // wake-driven reminder bubbles.  Replaces the previously-invisible
+  // synthetic empty user turn with a visible-but-subtle DOM element so
+  // the bubble below it lands in the right place even when the wake
+  // fires long after the user's last real message.
+  function appendSystemNudgeMarker() {
+    const el = document.createElement("div");
+    el.className = "msg user system-nudge";
+    el.setAttribute("data-source", "system_nudge");
+    el.setAttribute("aria-label", "system nudge");
+    el.textContent = "system nudge";
+    messagesEl.appendChild(el);
+    return el;
+  }
+
  // Live SSE for user-channel reminders — anchors below the most
  // recent user message.  On a non-originating tab there may be no
  // user message rendered yet; we append and the next /history reload
  // corrects.  (Same caveat as the interactive UI; tracked there.)
-  function appendUserReminderLive(reminders) {
-    const userMsgs = messagesEl.querySelectorAll(".msg.user");
+  //
+  // ``source`` widens the live SSE event to carry the wake's
+  // ``"system_nudge"`` tag so the marker renders on every connected
+  // tab — without this, only the originating tab (which sees the
+  // synthesised empty user turn live) would render the wake bubble in
+  // the right place.
+  function appendUserReminderLive(reminders, source) {
+    if (source === "system_nudge") {
+      const marker = appendSystemNudgeMarker();
+      appendReminderBubble(reminders, marker);
+      return;
+    }
+    const userMsgs = messagesEl.querySelectorAll(
+      ".msg.user:not(.system-nudge)",
+    );
    const anchor = userMsgs.length ? userMsgs[userMsgs.length - 1] : null;
    appendReminderBubble(reminders, anchor);
  }
@@ -866,10 +949,6 @@
    if (!row) return;
    const existing = row.querySelector(".coord-tool-row-result");
    if (existing) existing.remove();
-    // Re-fires (cancel + rerun, error + retry) clear any prior
-    // truncation pill so it doesn't stack on the new result.
-    const existingTrunc = row.querySelector(".coord-tool-truncated");
-    if (existingTrunc) existingTrunc.remove();
    if (isError) {
      row.classList.add("error");
      // Lift the row's error onto the enclosing batch so the left
@@ -925,19 +1004,6 @@
    body.textContent = pretty;
    block.appendChild(body);
    row.appendChild(block);
-    // Storage-truncation indicator — sibling pill (not text inside
-    // the result body) so renderers / parsers / copy-as-text paths
-    // see the unmodified output.  Same convention as interactive's
-    // .tool-output-truncated; styled by .coord-tool-truncated in
-    // coordinator.css.
-    if (opts && opts.truncated) {
-      const pill = document.createElement("span");
-      pill.className = "coord-tool-truncated";
-      pill.textContent = "… truncated in storage";
-      pill.title =
-        "Full tool output was sent to the model live; only the first 10000 characters are persisted to the conversation row.";
-      row.appendChild(pill);
-    }
  }

  function _makeActionButton(label, role, kbdHint, ariaLabel) {
@@ -2028,9 +2094,11 @@
      case "user_reminder":
        // Metacognitive user-channel nudge — render below the most
        // recent user message as a yellow themed bubble.  Same shape
-        // as the interactive UI's case.
+        // as the interactive UI's case.  When ``source === "system_nudge"``
+        // (wake-driven), render the thin .msg.user.system-nudge
+        // marker first so the bubble anchors below it.
        if (Array.isArray(ev.reminders) && ev.reminders.length) {
-          appendUserReminderLive(ev.reminders);
+          appendUserReminderLive(ev.reminders, ev.source || "");
        }
        break;
      case "tool_reminder":
@@ -3839,112 +3907,108 @@
        callOutcomes.set(m.tool_call_id, outcome);
      });

+      // Render an assistant turn's tool_calls as a single batch
+      // construct.  Synthesises one batch per assistant turn so a
+      // parallel fan-out (tool_calls.length ≥ 2) reads as one cohesive
+      // dispatch, matching how live SSE renders the same flow via
+      // approve_request / tool_info.  Resolved when every call_id has
+      // a matching tool result; otherwise --running (see the
+      // resolvedCallIds rationale above).  SSE upgrades --running in
+      // place when it knows more.
+      function renderAssistantToolBatch(m) {
+        const items = m.tool_calls.map((tc) => {
+          const fn = (tc && tc.function) || {};
+          const name = String(fn.name || "tool");
+          const callId = String((tc && tc.id) || "");
+          const argsRaw = String(fn.arguments || "");
+          let parsedArgs = null;
+          try {
+            parsedArgs = JSON.parse(argsRaw || "{}");
+          } catch (_) {
+            /* malformed — fall back to raw string in preview */
+          }
+          if (callId) toolNameByCallId.set(callId, name);
+          const item = synthesizeHistoricalToolCall(
+            name,
+            callId,
+            parsedArgs,
+            argsRaw,
+          );
+          // Server attaches the persisted intent_verdict to each
+          // tc on /history (newest-wins per call_id; LLM upgrade
+          // beats heuristic when both exist).  Stamp on the item
+          // under the field name the render path already consumes
+          // (judge_verdict for LLM tier, heuristic_verdict
+          // otherwise) so the verdict pill paints on history rows
+          // without a render-path fork.  Also seed the
+          // judgeVerdicts cache so a later live SSE event for the
+          // same call_id reads "already painted" and skips the
+          // rebuild.
+          if (tc && tc.verdict) {
+            if (tc.verdict.tier === "llm") {
+              item.judge_verdict = tc.verdict;
+            } else {
+              item.heuristic_verdict = tc.verdict;
+            }
+            if (callId) _cacheJudgeVerdict(callId, tc.verdict);
+          }
+          // Output-guard finding — surface as the same
+          // "[output guard] ..." chat line the live handler emits
+          // (case "output_warning" above).  Stamp on the item so
+          // the post-batch loop below can read + emit; rendering
+          // anchored next to the call gives the operator the same
+          // adjacency they'd see live.
+          if (tc && tc.output_assessment) {
+            item.output_assessment = tc.output_assessment;
+          }
+          // needs_approval is unknown at replay time (the
+          // assistant.tool_calls history payload doesn't persist
+          // the bit).  Leave it unset; the upgrade-in-place path
+          // refreshes per-row state via _refreshRowStatus from the
+          // authoritative SSE item when approve_request /
+          // tool_info actually arrives, so we never tag the wrong
+          // row as needing approval.
+          return item;
+        });
+        // Classify the batch as a whole:
+        //   - any call_id without an outcome at all → orphan,
+        //     render as --running (SSE will upgrade in place)
+        //   - any call_id outcome === "denied" → resolved-denied
+        //   - else → resolved-approved (a runtime error doesn't
+        //     change the approval verdict; the per-row .error class
+        //     comes from the tool_result branch below)
+        const outcomes = items.map((it) =>
+          it.call_id ? callOutcomes.get(it.call_id) : "ok",
+        );
+        const allResolved = outcomes.every((o) => o !== undefined);
+        if (!allResolved) {
+          appendToolBatch(items, { running: true });
+        } else if (outcomes.some((o) => o === "denied")) {
+          appendToolBatch(items, { resolved: { approved: false } });
+        } else {
+          appendToolBatch(items, { resolved: { approved: true } });
+        }
+        // Output-guard findings — render each one as a chip
+        // anchored to the .coord-tool-row that tripped the guard
+        // rather than a generic "[output guard]" chat line.
+        // Anchored placement preserves per-call adjacency on
+        // multi-tool batches (live + replay) and the chip's
+        // severity styling makes the visual weight match the
+        // verdict pill on the same row.
+        for (let oi = 0; oi < items.length; oi++) {
+          const oa = items[oi].output_assessment;
+          if (!oa || !oa.risk_level || oa.risk_level === "none") continue;
+          const cid = items[oi].call_id || "";
+          if (!cid) continue;
+          const entry = toolRows.get(cid);
+          if (!entry || !entry.row) continue;
+          _attachOutputWarningChip(entry.row, oa);
+        }
+      }
+
      (hist.messages || []).forEach((m) => {
        const role = m.role || "tool";

-        // Assistant tool_calls — synthesize one batch construct per
-        // assistant turn so a parallel fan-out (tool_calls.length ≥ 2)
-        // reads as one cohesive dispatch, matching how live SSE
-        // renders the same flow via approve_request / tool_info.
-        // Resolved when every call_id has a matching tool result;
-        // otherwise --running (see the resolvedCallIds rationale
-        // above).  SSE upgrades --running in place when it knows
-        // more.
-        if (
-          role === "assistant" &&
-          Array.isArray(m.tool_calls) &&
-          m.tool_calls.length
-        ) {
-          const items = m.tool_calls.map((tc) => {
-            const fn = (tc && tc.function) || {};
-            const name = String(fn.name || "tool");
-            const callId = String((tc && tc.id) || "");
-            const argsRaw = String(fn.arguments || "");
-            let parsedArgs = null;
-            try {
-              parsedArgs = JSON.parse(argsRaw || "{}");
-            } catch (_) {
-              /* malformed — fall back to raw string in preview */
-            }
-            if (callId) toolNameByCallId.set(callId, name);
-            const item = synthesizeHistoricalToolCall(
-              name,
-              callId,
-              parsedArgs,
-              argsRaw,
-            );
-            // Server attaches the persisted intent_verdict to each
-            // tc on /history (newest-wins per call_id; LLM upgrade
-            // beats heuristic when both exist).  Stamp on the item
-            // under the field name the render path already consumes
-            // (judge_verdict for LLM tier, heuristic_verdict
-            // otherwise) so the verdict pill paints on history rows
-            // without a render-path fork.  Also seed the
-            // judgeVerdicts cache so a later live SSE event for the
-            // same call_id reads "already painted" and skips the
-            // rebuild.
-            if (tc && tc.verdict) {
-              if (tc.verdict.tier === "llm") {
-                item.judge_verdict = tc.verdict;
-              } else {
-                item.heuristic_verdict = tc.verdict;
-              }
-              if (callId) _cacheJudgeVerdict(callId, tc.verdict);
-            }
-            // Output-guard finding — surface as the same
-            // "[output guard] ..." chat line the live handler emits
-            // (case "output_warning" above).  Stamp on the item so
-            // the post-batch loop below can read + emit; rendering
-            // anchored next to the call gives the operator the same
-            // adjacency they'd see live.
-            if (tc && tc.output_assessment) {
-              item.output_assessment = tc.output_assessment;
-            }
-            // needs_approval is unknown at replay time (the
-            // assistant.tool_calls history payload doesn't persist
-            // the bit).  Leave it unset; the upgrade-in-place path
-            // refreshes per-row state via _refreshRowStatus from the
-            // authoritative SSE item when approve_request /
-            // tool_info actually arrives, so we never tag the wrong
-            // row as needing approval.
-            return item;
-          });
-          // Classify the batch as a whole:
-          //   - any call_id without an outcome at all → orphan,
-          //     render as --running (SSE will upgrade in place)
-          //   - any call_id outcome === "denied" → resolved-denied
-          //   - else → resolved-approved (a runtime error doesn't
-          //     change the approval verdict; the per-row .error class
-          //     comes from the tool_result branch below)
-          const outcomes = items.map((it) =>
-            it.call_id ? callOutcomes.get(it.call_id) : "ok",
-          );
-          const allResolved = outcomes.every((o) => o !== undefined);
-          if (!allResolved) {
-            appendToolBatch(items, { running: true });
-          } else if (outcomes.some((o) => o === "denied")) {
-            appendToolBatch(items, { resolved: { approved: false } });
-          } else {
-            appendToolBatch(items, { resolved: { approved: true } });
-          }
-          // Output-guard findings — render each one as a chip
-          // anchored to the .coord-tool-row that tripped the guard
-          // rather than a generic "[output guard]" chat line.
-          // Anchored placement preserves per-call adjacency on
-          // multi-tool batches (live + replay) and the chip's
-          // severity styling makes the visual weight match the
-          // verdict pill on the same row.
-          for (let oi = 0; oi < items.length; oi++) {
-            const oa = items[oi].output_assessment;
-            if (!oa || !oa.risk_level || oa.risk_level === "none") continue;
-            const cid = items[oi].call_id || "";
-            if (!cid) continue;
-            const entry = toolRows.get(cid);
-            if (!entry || !entry.row) continue;
-            _attachOutputWarningChip(entry.row, oa);
-          }
-        }
-
        // User messages with attachments arrive as multipart list
        // content (text + image_url/document parts) and may carry an
        // ``_attachments_meta`` side-channel with display metadata
@@ -4007,42 +4071,65 @@
          const toolName =
            (callId && toolNameByCallId.get(callId)) || m.tool_name || "tool";
          const isError = callOutcomes.get(callId) === "error";
-          // Storage truncation surfaces as a sibling pill next to
-          // the result (see _appendResultToRow's opts.truncated
-          // branch) rather than as text inside the result body — a
-          // future "best-effort JSON repair" pass would otherwise
-          // need to strip a marker string before parsing.
-          appendToolResult(toolName, callId, content || "", isError, {
-            truncated: !!m.truncated,
-          });
+          appendToolResult(toolName, callId, content || "", isError);
          // Tool-channel metacog reminders ride the same _reminders
          // side-channel as the user channel; surface as a themed
          // bubble below the .coord-tool-batch construct.
          if (Array.isArray(m.reminders) && m.reminders.length) {
            appendToolReminderLive(m.reminders, callId);
          }
+          // Queued user messages spliced into the last tool-result
+          // envelope of a batch (Seam 1) replay as proper user bubbles
+          // after the tool block.  ``decorate_history_messages``
+          // extracts the user_interjection advisory from the persisted
+          // envelope and the wire layer projects it onto
+          // ``m.advisories``; rendering through
+          // ``appendUserMessageWithAttachments`` matches the live shape
+          // a Seam 2/3 message would produce.  The walk/filter is
+          // shared via ``replayAdvisoriesAfterTool`` in
+          // ``shared/utils.js`` so coord and interactive can never drift
+          // on advisory-shape filtering.
+          replayAdvisoriesAfterTool(m.advisories, function (text) {
+            appendUserMessageWithAttachments(text, [], { label: "user" });
+          });
        } else if (role === "assistant") {
-          // Empty content with tool_calls only means the assistant
-          // turn was just tool dispatch — the synthesized tool-call
-          // rows above already cover it; skip the empty bubble.
-          if (!content) return;
-          // Run assistant content through the markdown pipeline
-          // (renderMarkdown + post-render hljs / mermaid / KaTeX) so a
-          // reconnect / page-reload renders the same way a live stream
-          // does.  appendText would only escape and dump the raw text —
-          // markdown tables, code fences, math, and links would all
-          // render as literal characters.
-          const el = appendMsg(role, "", { label: role });
-          const body = el.querySelector(".msg-body");
-          if (body && typeof streamingRenderFinalize === "function") {
-            try {
-              streamingRenderFinalize(body, content);
-            } catch (e) {
-              console.warn("coordinator history render failed", e);
+          // Render content BEFORE the tool batch so DOM order matches
+          // chronological order (the model emits text first, then
+          // dispatches tools).  Whitespace-only content (e.g. "\n\n"
+          // from a reasoning-parser model that strips <think>…</think>
+          // and leaves only trailing newlines before the tool call) is
+          // treated as empty — without the .trim() guard it would
+          // render a visible-but-empty .msg.assistant card on replay,
+          // which the live stream never showed (the live path didn't
+          // accumulate the trailing whitespace as a visible bubble).
+          if (content && content.trim()) {
+            // Run assistant content through the markdown pipeline
+            // (renderMarkdown + post-render hljs / mermaid / KaTeX) so
+            // a reconnect / page-reload renders the same way a live
+            // stream does.  appendText would only escape and dump the
+            // raw text — markdown tables, code fences, math, and links
+            // would all render as literal characters.
+            const el = appendMsg(role, "", { label: role });
+            const body = el.querySelector(".msg-body");
+            if (body && typeof streamingRenderFinalize === "function") {
+              try {
+                streamingRenderFinalize(body, content);
+              } catch (e) {
+                console.warn("coordinator history render failed", e);
+                body.textContent = content;
+              }
+            } else if (body) {
              body.textContent = content;
            }
-          } else if (body) {
-            body.textContent = content;
+          }
+          // Tool batch comes after the content card so the DOM matches
+          // the chronological order the model emitted (text → dispatch).
+          // Hoisting this out of the role-agnostic top of the loop —
+          // the prior shape rendered tool_calls before the assistant
+          // text that announced them, putting parallel batches
+          // visually above their narrating message on rehydrate.
+          if (Array.isArray(m.tool_calls) && m.tool_calls.length) {
+            renderAssistantToolBatch(m);
          }
        } else {
          // user / reasoning / system / other roles render as plain
@@ -4053,6 +4140,17 @@
          // text when the message carried attachments — even when the
          // text portion is empty (image-only sends).
          if (role === "user") {
+            const isSystemNudge = m.source === "system_nudge";
+            if (isSystemNudge) {
+              // Wake-driven empty user turn: render the thin marker
+              // (replaces the previously-skipped synthetic empty
+              // bubble) and anchor reminder bubbles below it.
+              const marker = appendSystemNudgeMarker();
+              if (Array.isArray(m.reminders) && m.reminders.length) {
+                appendReminderBubble(m.reminders, marker);
+              }
+              return;
+            }
            if (!content && userAttachments.length === 0) return;
            appendUserMessageWithAttachments(content, userAttachments, {
              label: role,
@@ -839,6 +839,179 @@ function _renderGovSkills(items) {
  });
 }

+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// SKILL.md paste auto-fill — sniff frontmatter on paste, hit the parse
+// endpoint, and populate the form so users don't have to retype name /
+// description / tags / etc. when importing an Anthropic-style skill.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Trigger on any paste whose first non-whitespace bytes look like an opening
+// YAML frontmatter delimiter — restrictive enough to ignore normal markdown
+// pastes, permissive enough to catch CRLF and trailing-space variants.
+var _SKILL_FRONTMATTER_RE = /^---\s*\r?\n/;
+
+var _SKILL_FIELD_MAP = {
+  name: "ctm-name",
+  description: "skill-description",
+  tags: "skill-tags",
+  author: "skill-author",
+  version: "skill-version",
+  license: "skill-license",
+  compatibility: "skill-compatibility",
+  allowed_tools: "csk-allowed-tools",
+};
+
+// Inflight paste-parse fetch — referenced from hideCreateTemplateModal so a
+// modal close cancels the request, and from _handleSkillContentPaste so a
+// fresh paste supersedes the previous one.  Acts as a generation token: any
+// callback that observes _ctmPasteController != its captured controller knows
+// the modal moved on and must not touch the DOM.
+var _ctmPasteController = null;
+
+// Returns "filled" if we set the value, "skipped" if the field was already
+// non-empty (we don't clobber user input), or "absent" if we couldn't find or
+// match the option.  Tracking this lets the caller report what actually
+// happened so the user knows whether their pre-typed values survived.
+function _setSkillFormField(id, value) {
+  var el = document.getElementById(id);
+  if (!el) return "absent";
+  if (el.value && String(el.value).trim()) return "skipped";
+  if (el.tagName === "SELECT") {
+    // License is a fixed option list — only set the value if it matches an
+    // option.  Custom licenses fall through to the default "— not specified —"
+    // and the user can edit manually.
+    for (var i = 0; i < el.options.length; i++) {
+      if (el.options[i].value === value) {
+        el.value = value;
+        return "filled";
+      }
+    }
+    return "absent";
+  }
+  el.value = value;
+  return "filled";
+}
+
+function _applyParsedSkill(parsed, contentTextarea, fieldMap) {
+  // The textarea is the explicit paste target — replacing its full content
+  // matches the user's mental model ("I pasted a SKILL.md, the body should
+  // become the content").  Side metadata fields use the non-destructive
+  // _setSkillFormField rule below so half-typed values aren't lost.
+  contentTextarea.value = parsed.content || "";
+  contentTextarea.dispatchEvent(new Event("input", { bubbles: true }));
+
+  var filled = 0;
+  var skipped = 0;
+  function _apply(id, value) {
+    var outcome = _setSkillFormField(id, value);
+    if (outcome === "filled") filled++;
+    else if (outcome === "skipped") skipped++;
+  }
+
+  if (parsed.name) _apply(fieldMap.name, parsed.name);
+  if (parsed.description) _apply(fieldMap.description, parsed.description);
+  if (parsed.tags && parsed.tags.length)
+    _apply(fieldMap.tags, parsed.tags.join(", "));
+  if (parsed.author) _apply(fieldMap.author, parsed.author);
+  if (parsed.version) _apply(fieldMap.version, parsed.version);
+  if (parsed.license) _apply(fieldMap.license, parsed.license);
+  if (parsed.compatibility)
+    _apply(fieldMap.compatibility, parsed.compatibility);
+  if (parsed.allowed_tools && parsed.allowed_tools.length)
+    _apply(fieldMap.allowed_tools, parsed.allowed_tools.join(", "));
+
+  return { filled: filled, skipped: skipped };
+}
+
+function _setSkillPasteHintBusy(busy) {
+  var hint = document.getElementById("ctm-paste-hint");
+  if (!hint) return;
+  var rest = hint.querySelector(".skill-paste-hint-rest");
+  var busyEl = hint.querySelector(".skill-paste-hint-busy");
+  if (rest) rest.style.display = busy ? "none" : "";
+  if (busyEl) busyEl.style.display = busy ? "" : "none";
+}
+
+function _handleSkillContentPaste(event, fieldMap) {
+  var clipboard = event.clipboardData || window.clipboardData;
+  if (!clipboard) return;
+  var text = clipboard.getData("text/plain");
+  if (!text || !_SKILL_FRONTMATTER_RE.test(text)) return;
+
+  event.preventDefault();
+  var textarea = event.target;
+
+  // Cancel any prior paste fetch — a fresh paste supersedes whatever was in
+  // flight.  The previous handler's callbacks see _ctmPasteController !=
+  // their captured controller and bail before touching the DOM.
+  if (_ctmPasteController) _ctmPasteController.abort();
+  var controller = new AbortController();
+  _ctmPasteController = controller;
+
+  // Optimistic paint — drop the raw text into the textarea immediately so the
+  // user sees their paste landed, then disable the field and flip the hint
+  // line into a "Parsing..." state.  On a slow network the round-trip can
+  // stretch past 400ms; without a visible state the user thinks nothing
+  // happened and re-pastes (or hits Create with empty fields).
+  textarea.value = text;
+  textarea.disabled = true;
+  textarea.setAttribute("aria-busy", "true");
+  textarea.dispatchEvent(new Event("input", { bubbles: true }));
+  _setSkillPasteHintBusy(true);
+
+  function _isCurrent() {
+    return _ctmPasteController === controller;
+  }
+
+  authFetch("/v1/api/admin/skills/parse", {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ raw: text }),
+    signal: controller.signal,
+  })
+    .then(function (r) {
+      return r.json().then(function (d) {
+        return { ok: r.ok, data: d };
+      });
+    })
+    .then(function (res) {
+      if (!_isCurrent()) return;
+      if (res.ok) {
+        var counts = _applyParsedSkill(res.data, textarea, fieldMap);
+        var msg = "Populated from SKILL.md";
+        if (counts.skipped) {
+          msg += " (" + counts.filled + " set, " + counts.skipped + " kept)";
+        }
+        showToast(msg);
+      } else {
+        // Frontmatter looked plausible but the parser rejected it (missing
+        // name, malformed YAML beyond the retry, etc).  The raw text is
+        // already in the textarea from the optimistic paint above so the
+        // user can fix the YAML in place.
+        showToast(
+          "Couldn't parse SKILL.md: " +
+            ((res.data && res.data.error) || "unknown error"),
+          "error",
+        );
+      }
+    })
+    .catch(function (err) {
+      if (!_isCurrent()) return;
+      // AbortError fires when the modal closed or a fresher paste superseded
+      // this one — silent, the new lifecycle owns the UI.
+      if (err && err.name === "AbortError") return;
+      showToast("Network error — pasted as plain text", "error");
+    })
+    .finally(function () {
+      if (!_isCurrent()) return;
+      _ctmPasteController = null;
+      textarea.disabled = false;
+      textarea.removeAttribute("aria-busy");
+      _setSkillPasteHintBusy(false);
+      textarea.focus();
+    });
+}
+
 function _detectTemplateVars(content) {
  var matches = content.match(/\{\{(\w+)\}\}/g) || [];
  var seen = {};
@@ -874,11 +1047,15 @@ function showCreateTemplateModal() {
  document.getElementById("skill-license").value = "";
  document.getElementById("skill-compatibility").value = "";
  document.getElementById("skill-activation").value = "named";
-  document.getElementById("ctm-content").value = "";
+  var ctmContent = document.getElementById("ctm-content");
+  ctmContent.value = "";
  document.getElementById("ctm-variables").textContent = "(none)";
-  document.getElementById("ctm-content").oninput = function () {
+  ctmContent.oninput = function () {
    _updateVarsDisplay("ctm-content", "ctm-variables");
  };
+  ctmContent.onpaste = function (event) {
+    _handleSkillContentPaste(event, _SKILL_FIELD_MAP);
+  };
  document.getElementById("ctm-default").checked = false;
  // Session config fields
  document.getElementById("csk-model").value = "";
@@ -907,6 +1084,23 @@ function showCreateTemplateModal() {
 }

 function hideCreateTemplateModal() {
+  // Cancel any inflight paste-parse so a late response can't reach into a
+  // closed (or freshly reopened) modal and clobber state.  AbortController
+  // also short-circuits the .then chain — see _handleSkillContentPaste.
+  // After abort, the handler's .catch/.finally bail via _isCurrent() before
+  // resetting the textarea, so we proactively restore the paste-induced
+  // visible state here.  Otherwise reopening would land on a disabled
+  // textarea stuck on "Parsing…".
+  if (_ctmPasteController) {
+    _ctmPasteController.abort();
+    _ctmPasteController = null;
+    var ctmContent = document.getElementById("ctm-content");
+    if (ctmContent) {
+      ctmContent.disabled = false;
+      ctmContent.removeAttribute("aria-busy");
+    }
+    _setSkillPasteHintBusy(false);
+  }
  document.getElementById("create-template-overlay").style.display = "none";
  _ctmTrapHandler = _removeTrap(_ctmTrapHandler);
  if (_ctmTriggerEl && _ctmTriggerEl.focus) {
@@ -3094,17 +3094,33 @@
              <h3 class="skill-spec-heading">
                Skill Content
                <span class="label-hint"
-                  >system message &mdash; {{model}}, {{ws_id}},
-                  {{node_id}}</span
+                  >available: {{model}}, {{ws_id}}, {{node_id}}</span
                >
              </h3>
+              <div
+                class="skill-paste-hint"
+                id="ctm-paste-hint"
+                aria-live="polite"
+              >
+                <span class="skill-paste-hint-rest">
+                  Tip: paste a SKILL.md (with <code>---</code> frontmatter) to
+                  auto-fill the form.
+                </span>
+                <span
+                  class="skill-paste-hint-busy"
+                  style="display: none"
+                >
+                  Parsing SKILL.md&hellip;
+                </span>
+              </div>
              <textarea
                id="ctm-content"
                class="skill-content-area"
+                aria-describedby="ctm-paste-hint"
                placeholder="You are a code reviewer using {{model}}..."
              ></textarea>
              <div class="skill-vars-row">
-                <span class="skill-vars-label">Variables</span>
+                <span class="skill-vars-label">Used</span>
                <div
                  id="ctm-variables"
                  class="skill-vars-display label-hint"
@@ -3379,12 +3395,12 @@
              <h3 class="skill-spec-heading">
                Skill Content
                <span class="label-hint"
-                  >{{model}}, {{ws_id}}, {{node_id}}</span
+                  >available: {{model}}, {{ws_id}}, {{node_id}}</span
                >
              </h3>
              <textarea id="etm-content" class="skill-content-area"></textarea>
              <div class="skill-vars-row">
-                <span class="skill-vars-label">Variables</span>
+                <span class="skill-vars-label">Used</span>
                <div
                  id="etm-variables"
                  class="skill-vars-display label-hint"
@@ -3661,6 +3677,114 @@
            placeholder="Authorization: Bearer ..."
          ></textarea>
        </div>
+        <fieldset
+          id="mcp-auth-section"
+          style="
+            border: 1px solid var(--border);
+            padding: 10px 12px;
+            margin-top: 12px;
+          "
+        >
+          <legend style="font-size: 12px; padding: 0 6px">
+            Multitenant Authorization
+          </legend>
+          <label
+            style="display: block; margin: 4px 0; font-weight: 400; font-size: 13px"
+          >
+            <input
+              type="radio"
+              name="mcp-auth-type"
+              id="mcp-auth-none"
+              value="none"
+              onchange="toggleMcpAuthFields()"
+              style="margin-right: 6px"
+            />No authorization
+          </label>
+          <label
+            style="display: block; margin: 4px 0; font-weight: 400; font-size: 13px"
+          >
+            <input
+              type="radio"
+              name="mcp-auth-type"
+              id="mcp-auth-static"
+              value="static"
+              onchange="toggleMcpAuthFields()"
+              checked
+              style="margin-right: 6px"
+            />Static headers (single shared identity)
+          </label>
+          <label
+            style="display: block; margin: 4px 0; font-weight: 400; font-size: 13px"
+          >
+            <input
+              type="radio"
+              name="mcp-auth-type"
+              id="mcp-auth-oauth"
+              value="oauth_user"
+              onchange="toggleMcpAuthFields()"
+              style="margin-right: 6px"
+            />Per-user OAuth 2.1 (recommended)
+          </label>
+          <div id="mcp-oauth-fields" style="display: none; margin-top: 8px">
+            <label for="mcp-oauth-as-url"
+              >Authorization Server URL
+              <span style="font-weight: 400; text-transform: none"
+                >(optional — override discovery when MCP server URL is not the
+                OAuth issuer)</span
+              ></label
+            >
+            <input
+              type="text"
+              id="mcp-oauth-as-url"
+              placeholder="https://auth.example.com"
+            />
+            <label for="mcp-oauth-registration">Client Registration</label>
+            <select id="mcp-oauth-registration">
+              <option value="preregistered">preregistered</option>
+              <option value="dcr">dcr (Dynamic Client Registration)</option>
+            </select>
+            <label for="mcp-oauth-client-id">Client ID</label>
+            <input
+              type="text"
+              id="mcp-oauth-client-id"
+              placeholder="(operator-issued client_id)"
+            />
+            <label for="mcp-oauth-client-secret"
+              >Client Secret
+              <span style="font-weight: 400; text-transform: none"
+                >(write-only, never displayed)</span
+              ></label
+            >
+            <input
+              type="password"
+              id="mcp-oauth-client-secret"
+              placeholder="***"
+              autocomplete="off"
+            />
+            <label for="mcp-oauth-scopes"
+              >Scopes
+              <span style="font-weight: 400; text-transform: none"
+                >(space-separated)</span
+              ></label
+            >
+            <input
+              type="text"
+              id="mcp-oauth-scopes"
+              placeholder="openid profile"
+            />
+            <label for="mcp-oauth-audience"
+              >Audience
+              <span style="font-weight: 400; text-transform: none"
+                >(auto-populated from URL)</span
+              ></label
+            >
+            <input
+              type="text"
+              id="mcp-oauth-audience"
+              placeholder="https://mcp.example.com"
+            />
+          </div>
+        </fieldset>
        <div style="display: flex; gap: 20px; margin-top: 14px">
          <label style="margin: 0; font-size: 12px; color: var(--fg-dim)"
            ><input
@@ -908,11 +908,14 @@
 }

 /* ==========================================================================
-   Toast override — position above cluster status bar
+   Toast override — position above cluster status bar AND above admin modal
+   overlays (which sit at z-index 600).  Without this, toasts fired while a
+   modal is open — e.g. paste-to-fill on the Create Skill modal — render
+   behind the dimmed backdrop and never reach the user.
   ========================================================================== */
 #toast {
  bottom: 56px;
-  z-index: 200;
+  z-index: 700;
  color: var(--fg-bright);
  border-color: var(--border-strong);
 }
@@ -1909,6 +1912,23 @@ h3.skill-spec-heading {
  opacity: 1;
 }

+/* Tip line above the Skill Content textarea announcing the paste-to-fill
+   affordance.  Sized to match the dim hint on the heading rather than the
+   default body text, so it doesn't out-shout the rest of the modal. */
+.skill-paste-hint {
+  font-size: 11px;
+  color: var(--fg-dim);
+  margin: -2px 0 6px;
+  line-height: 1.5;
+}
+.skill-paste-hint code {
+  font-size: 10.5px;
+  padding: 0 4px;
+  background: var(--code-bg);
+  border-radius: 2px;
+  color: var(--fg);
+}
+
 .skill-spec-section-content {
  flex: 1;
  display: flex;
@@ -34,6 +34,24 @@ Action-name conventions (non-exhaustive — grep
                        ``prompt_policy``, ``setting``, ``token``,
                        ``conversation``, ``memory``, ``org``.

+    mcp_server.oauth.*  OAuth-MCP delegated authorization events
+                        (``mcp_server.oauth.client_secret_set`` from
+                        admin handlers when the operator stores or
+                        clears a per-server OAuth client secret;
+                        ``mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure`` from
+                        ``MCPTokenStore.get_user_token`` when no
+                        installed key can decrypt a stored token;
+                        ``mcp_server.oauth.consent_started`` /
+                        ``.consent_completed`` / ``.consent_failed`` for
+                        the per-user authorization-flow handlers;
+                        ``mcp_server.oauth.token_refreshed`` /
+                        ``.token_revoked`` from
+                        ``get_user_access_token`` when the
+                        refresh-grant exchange runs;
+                        ``mcp_server.oauth.dcr_registered`` when a
+                        client_id was provisioned dynamically against
+                        an AS that exposes ``registration_endpoint``).
+
 When adding a new namespace, prefer extending an existing prefix over
 inventing a synonym (e.g. ``mcp_server.refresh`` rather than
 ``mcp.refresh`` — ``mcp_server.*`` is already the established prefix).
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ always accessible without authentication.

 from __future__ import annotations

+import asyncio
 import hashlib
 import json
 import os
@@ -35,6 +36,17 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
    from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig

 from turnstone.core.log import get_logger
+from turnstone.core.oidc import (
+    OIDC_STATE_TTL_SECONDS,
+    OIDCError,
+    OIDCKeyNotFoundError,
+    build_authorize_url,
+    exchange_code,
+    fetch_jwks,
+    generate_pkce_verifier,
+    provision_oidc_user,
+    validate_id_token,
+)

 log = get_logger(__name__)

@@ -521,6 +533,13 @@ def required_scope(method: str, path: str) -> str:
    if method == "POST" and normalized in APPROVE_PATHS:
        return "approve"

+    # Path-keyed internal admin actions: /api/_internal/mcp-{refresh,reconnect}/{name}
+    if method == "POST" and (
+        normalized.startswith("/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/")
+        or normalized.startswith("/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/")
+    ):
+        return "approve"
+
    # Write endpoints
    if method == "POST" and normalized in WRITE_PATHS:
        return "write"
@@ -582,6 +601,10 @@ def required_scope(method: str, path: str) -> str:
        if proxied:
            if proxied in APPROVE_PATHS:
                return "approve"
+            if proxied.startswith("/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/") or proxied.startswith(
+                "/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/"
+            ):
+                return "approve"
            if proxied in WRITE_PATHS:
                return "write"
            # Parametric workstream sub-resource mutations
@@ -1122,8 +1145,7 @@ async def handle_auth_status(request: Request) -> Response:
    has_users = False
    if storage is not None:
        try:
-            users = storage.list_users()
-            has_users = len(users) > 0
+            has_users = await asyncio.to_thread(storage.count_users) > 0
        except Exception:
            log.warning("Failed to check user existence for auth status", exc_info=True)

@@ -1385,17 +1407,16 @@ async def handle_auth_refresh(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:
    return response


-def _build_oidc_redirect_uri(request: Request, oidc_config: OIDCConfig) -> str:
-    """Build the OIDC callback redirect URI.
+def _build_oidc_redirect_uri(oidc_config: OIDCConfig) -> str:
+    """Build the OIDC callback redirect URI from the pinned ``redirect_base``.

-    Uses ``redirect_base`` from OIDC config when set (recommended for
-    reverse-proxy deployments), otherwise falls back to the request Host header.
+    ``initialize_oidc_state`` refuses to enable OIDC unless ``redirect_base``
+    is set, so any caller reaching this point may assume it is non-empty.
+    A previous Host-header fallback was removed because a permissive front
+    proxy could let an attacker spoof ``Host`` and mint an authorize URL
+    pointing to an attacker-controlled callback origin.
    """
-    if oidc_config.redirect_base:
-        return f"{oidc_config.redirect_base}/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback"
-    scheme = "https" if is_secure_request(dict(request.headers), request.url.scheme) else "http"
-    host = request.headers.get("host", "localhost")
-    return f"{scheme}://{host}/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback"
+    return f"{oidc_config.redirect_base}/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback"


 async def handle_oidc_authorize(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:
@@ -1421,31 +1442,73 @@ async def handle_oidc_authorize(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:

    # Require setup to be complete before allowing OIDC login
    try:
-        users = storage.list_users()
+        users_count = await asyncio.to_thread(storage.count_users)
    except Exception:
        return JSONResponse({"error": "Storage unavailable"}, status_code=503)
-    if not users:
+    if users_count == 0:
        return JSONResponse(
            {"error": "Initial setup required before OIDC login"},
            status_code=403,
        )

-    from turnstone.core.oidc import build_authorize_url, generate_pkce_pair
-
    state = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
    nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
-    code_verifier, _code_challenge = generate_pkce_pair()
+    code_verifier = generate_pkce_verifier()

    # Store pending state in database
-    storage.create_oidc_pending_state(state, nonce, code_verifier, audience)
+    await asyncio.to_thread(
+        storage.create_oidc_pending_state, state, nonce, code_verifier, audience
+    )

-    # Build redirect URI (pinned by TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE when set)
-    redirect_uri = _build_oidc_redirect_uri(request, oidc_config)
+    # Build redirect URI (pinned by TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE)
+    redirect_uri = _build_oidc_redirect_uri(oidc_config)

    url = build_authorize_url(oidc_config, redirect_uri, state, nonce, code_verifier)
    return RedirectResponse(url, status_code=302)


+_OIDC_STATE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_S = 60.0
+
+
+def _resolve_kid(jwks: dict[str, Any] | None, kid: str | None) -> bool:
+    """Return True iff *jwks* contains the supplied *kid* (or has a single key when kid is None)."""
+    if jwks is None:
+        return False
+    keys = jwks.get("keys", [])
+    if not isinstance(keys, list):
+        return False
+    if kid is None:
+        return len(keys) == 1
+    return any(isinstance(k, dict) and k.get("kid") == kid for k in keys)
+
+
+async def _refetch_jwks_locked(
+    request: Request, jwks_uri: str, kid: str | None
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Acquire the per-app JWKS refetch lock, re-check the cache, and refetch on miss.
+
+    Returns the JWKS dict on success or ``None`` if the fetch failed.  When
+    another concurrent caller already refreshed the cache to include *kid*
+    we return the existing snapshot without issuing another network call.
+    """
+    lock = getattr(request.app.state, "jwks_refetch_lock", None)
+    if lock is None:
+        lock = asyncio.Lock()
+        request.app.state.jwks_refetch_lock = lock
+    http_client = getattr(request.app.state, "oidc_http_client", None)
+    async with lock:
+        cached: dict[str, Any] | None = getattr(request.app.state, "jwks_data", None)
+        if _resolve_kid(cached, kid):
+            return cached
+        try:
+            fresh = await fetch_jwks(jwks_uri, client=http_client)
+        except Exception:
+            log.warning("JWKS fetch failed from %s", jwks_uri, exc_info=True)
+            return None
+        request.app.state.jwks_data = fresh
+        return fresh
+
+
 async def handle_oidc_callback(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:
    """Shared ``GET /api/auth/oidc/callback`` handler — exchange code, provision user, issue JWT."""
    from starlette.responses import JSONResponse, RedirectResponse
@@ -1468,11 +1531,17 @@ async def handle_oidc_callback(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:
        if not ip_ok:
            return RedirectResponse("/?oidc_error=Too+many+login+attempts", status_code=302)

-    # Lazy cleanup of expired pending states
-    try:
-        storage.cleanup_expired_oidc_states(300)
-    except Exception:
-        log.debug("OIDC state cleanup failed", exc_info=True)
+    # Lazy cleanup of expired pending states — gated to once per
+    # _OIDC_STATE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_S so a high-rate callback path
+    # doesn't fire a full DELETE per login.
+    last_cleanup = getattr(request.app.state, "oidc_last_cleanup_monotonic", 0.0)
+    now_mono = time.monotonic()
+    if now_mono - last_cleanup > _OIDC_STATE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_S:
+        request.app.state.oidc_last_cleanup_monotonic = now_mono
+        try:
+            await asyncio.to_thread(storage.cleanup_expired_oidc_states, OIDC_STATE_TTL_SECONDS)
+        except Exception:
+            log.debug("OIDC state cleanup failed", exc_info=True)

    def _record_oidc_failure() -> None:
        if login_limiter is not None:
@@ -1487,68 +1556,75 @@ async def handle_oidc_callback(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:

    # Validate state
    state = request.query_params.get("state", "")
-    pending = storage.pop_oidc_pending_state(state, max_age_seconds=300)
+    pending = await asyncio.to_thread(storage.pop_oidc_pending_state, state, OIDC_STATE_TTL_SECONDS)
    if not pending:
        _record_oidc_failure()
        return RedirectResponse("/?oidc_error=Login+session+expired", status_code=302)

    # Build redirect URI (must match what was sent in authorize)
-    redirect_uri = _build_oidc_redirect_uri(request, oidc_config)
+    redirect_uri = _build_oidc_redirect_uri(oidc_config)

    try:
-        from turnstone.core.oidc import (
-            OIDCError,
-            exchange_code,
-            fetch_jwks,
-            provision_oidc_user,
-            validate_id_token,
-        )
-
        # Exchange code for tokens
        code = request.query_params.get("code", "")
-        tokens = await exchange_code(oidc_config, code, redirect_uri, pending["code_verifier"])
+        http_client = getattr(request.app.state, "oidc_http_client", None)
+        tokens = await exchange_code(
+            oidc_config,
+            code,
+            redirect_uri,
+            pending["code_verifier"],
+            client=http_client,
+        )
+        id_token = tokens.get("id_token")
+        if not isinstance(id_token, str) or not id_token:
+            raise OIDCError("Token endpoint response missing id_token")

        # Validate ID token against cached JWKS keys (no I/O).
        # On unknown kid, refresh JWKS once (async) for key rotation.
        jwks_data: dict[str, Any] | None = getattr(request.app.state, "jwks_data", None)
        if jwks_data is None and oidc_config.jwks_uri:
-            # Lazy fetch: JWKS may have failed at startup but IdP recovered
-            try:
-                jwks_data = await fetch_jwks(oidc_config.jwks_uri)
-                request.app.state.jwks_data = jwks_data
-            except OIDCError:
-                log.warning("JWKS fetch failed from %s", oidc_config.jwks_uri, exc_info=True)
+            # Lazy fetch: JWKS may have failed at startup but IdP recovered.
+            # Coalesced via the per-app refetch lock so concurrent callbacks
+            # don't fan out N parallel JWKS GETs.
+            jwks_data = await _refetch_jwks_locked(request, oidc_config.jwks_uri, kid=None)
        if jwks_data is None:
            return RedirectResponse("/?oidc_error=OIDC+temporarily+unavailable", status_code=302)

        try:
            id_claims = validate_id_token(
-                tokens["id_token"],
+                id_token,
                jwks_data,
                oidc_config,
                pending["nonce"],
            )
-        except OIDCError as first_err:
-            if "not found in JWKS" not in str(first_err):
-                raise
-            # Key rotation: re-fetch JWKS and retry once.
+        except OIDCKeyNotFoundError:
+            # Key rotation: re-fetch JWKS once (coalesced) and retry.
+            import jwt as _jwt
+
+            try:
+                _kid = _jwt.get_unverified_header(id_token).get("kid")
+            except Exception:
+                _kid = None
            log.info("JWKS key not found — refreshing for possible key rotation")
-            jwks_data = await fetch_jwks(oidc_config.jwks_uri)
-            request.app.state.jwks_data = jwks_data
+            refreshed = await _refetch_jwks_locked(request, oidc_config.jwks_uri, kid=_kid)
+            if refreshed is None:
+                raise
+            jwks_data = refreshed
            id_claims = validate_id_token(
-                tokens["id_token"],
+                id_token,
                jwks_data,
                oidc_config,
                pending["nonce"],
            )

        # Verify setup is complete
-        users = storage.list_users()
-        if not users:
+        users_count = await asyncio.to_thread(storage.count_users)
+        if users_count == 0:
            return RedirectResponse("/?oidc_error=Initial+setup+required", status_code=302)

-        # Provision or match user
-        user = provision_oidc_user(storage, oidc_config, id_claims)
+        # Provision or match user (chains apply_role_mapping +
+        # potentially a write to user_roles — wrap as a unit).
+        user = await asyncio.to_thread(provision_oidc_user, storage, oidc_config, id_claims)

    except OIDCError as exc:
        log.warning("OIDC callback failed: %s", exc)
@@ -1560,13 +1636,16 @@ async def handle_oidc_callback(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:
        return RedirectResponse("/?oidc_error=Authentication+failed", status_code=302)

    # Load permissions and issue Turnstone JWT
-    perms = _load_user_permissions(storage, user["user_id"])
+    perms = await asyncio.to_thread(_load_user_permissions, storage, user["user_id"])
    scopes = _permissions_to_scopes(perms)
    jwt_token = ""
    if jwt_secret:
-        # Use the audience stored during authorize (not the handler param)
-        # to bind the JWT to the service that initiated the flow
-        jwt_audience = pending.get("audience", audience)
+        # Bind the JWT to the audience stored at /authorize so it cannot be
+        # silently re-targeted at the callback's handler-supplied audience.
+        # ``pending["audience"]`` is always present (NOT NULL TEXT column,
+        # filled by create_oidc_pending_state); falling back to *audience*
+        # only matters if the column ever holds an empty string.
+        jwt_audience = pending.get("audience") or audience
        jwt_token = create_jwt(
            user_id=user["user_id"],
            scopes=scopes,
@@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ _CONFIG_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
    },
    "mcp": {
        "config_path": "mcp_config",
-        "refresh_interval": "mcp_refresh_interval",
    },
    "ratelimit": {
        "enabled": "ratelimit_enabled",
@@ -22,24 +22,14 @@ import json
 from typing import Any

 from turnstone.core.log import get_logger
+from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import (
+    _USER_INTERJECTION_BODY_MARKER,
+    _USER_INTERJECTION_IMPORTANT_PREAMBLE,
+    _USER_INTERJECTION_NOTICE_PREAMBLE,
+)

 log = get_logger(__name__)

-# Tool results are clamped at this length per row at storage time
-# (see ``session.py``'s ``store_text = raw_output[:TOOL_RESULT_STORAGE_CAP]``).
-# Keeping the constant here lets the truncation flag detection in
-# ``decorate_history_messages`` stay in sync without a magic number
-# duplicated across server.py / session.py.
-#
-# Raised from 2000 → 10000 because a 2000-char clip routinely cut
-# the body of a single grep / file read mid-line, leaving the
-# historical record useless for retrospective debugging.  FTS5
-# index + row size grow proportionally; the per-tool upper bound is
-# still bounded upstream by ``_truncate_output``'s context-budget
-# clamp (so a single huge result can't blow past the live context
-# window).
-TOOL_RESULT_STORAGE_CAP = 10000
-

 def load_verdict_indexes(
    ws_id: str,
@@ -174,6 +164,110 @@ def decorate_tool_call(
            tc["output_assessment"] = assessment


+def _entity_decode_wrapper_tags(text: str) -> str:
+    """Reverse :func:`tool_advisory.escape_wrapper_tags` on extraction.
+
+    The wrap layer escapes the four wrapper-tag forms to HTML entities
+    so embedded user / advisory text cannot fabricate or close an
+    envelope.  When the replay decorator pulls advisories back out of
+    the persisted envelope, the inner text needs to be returned to its
+    literal form for UI rendering.
+
+    Decodes ``&amp;`` last so a tool output that contains the literal
+    string ``&lt;tool_output&gt;`` round-trips identically to its
+    source: encode produces ``&amp;lt;tool_output&amp;gt;`` (no
+    collision with wrapper-tag escapes), decode walks the wrapper
+    escapes first, then strips the ``&amp;`` sentinel back to ``&``.
+    The short-circuit on ``"&" not in text`` covers the common case
+    where no escaped entities are present.
+    """
+    if "&" not in text:
+        return text
+    return (
+        text.replace("&lt;/tool_output&gt;", "</tool_output>")
+        .replace("&lt;tool_output&gt;", "<tool_output>")
+        .replace("&lt;system-reminder&gt;", "<system-reminder>")
+        .replace("&lt;/system-reminder&gt;", "</system-reminder>")
+        .replace("&amp;", "&")
+    )
+
+
+def _classify_advisory(render_text: str) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    """Map a ``<system-reminder>`` body back to a wire-shape advisory.
+
+    Returns a dict with ``type`` / ``text`` / optional ``priority`` for
+    advisory shapes the UI knows how to render, or ``None`` to suppress
+    the advisory entirely (output-guard findings already render via the
+    ``output_assessment`` audit-table decoration; doubling them would
+    paint two warning bubbles).  Unknown advisory shapes fall through
+    to ``None`` rather than rendering an opaque envelope blob.
+    """
+    if render_text.startswith("Output guard:"):
+        return None
+    if _USER_INTERJECTION_BODY_MARKER in render_text:
+        # UserInterjection is the only producer that uses this marker.
+        # The preamble disambiguates priority: "important" gets the
+        # MUST-address framing, "notice" gets the incorporate-if-relevant
+        # framing.  The body sits after the marker.  Preamble + marker
+        # constants are imported from ``tool_advisory`` so the parser
+        # and producer can never drift on wording.
+        if render_text.startswith(_USER_INTERJECTION_IMPORTANT_PREAMBLE):
+            priority = "important"
+        elif render_text.startswith(_USER_INTERJECTION_NOTICE_PREAMBLE):
+            priority = "notice"
+        else:
+            # Marker present but preamble drifted — still render as a
+            # notice rather than dropping the user's text.
+            priority = "notice"
+        body = render_text.split(_USER_INTERJECTION_BODY_MARKER, 1)[1]
+        # Suppress empty/whitespace-only advisories — ``queue_message``
+        # accepts any non-None text including ``""`` / ``"   "``, and a
+        # blank body would paint a featureless empty user bubble on
+        # replay.  Dropping at the classifier keeps the wire-shape
+        # contract uniform (no empty advisories ever ride the wire).
+        if not body.strip():
+            return None
+        return {"type": "user_interjection", "text": body, "priority": priority}
+    return None
+
+
+def extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope(
+    content: str,
+) -> tuple[str, list[dict[str, str]]] | None:
+    """Strip a ``<tool_output>`` envelope and return ``(clean, advisories)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when *content* doesn't look like a wrapped tool
+    result — caller should leave the message unchanged.  When the
+    envelope parses but no advisories survive classification (e.g.
+    only an output_guard advisory rode along), returns the cleaned
+    output with an empty advisories list — the caller still needs to
+    strip the envelope from the rendered content.
+    """
+    if not content.startswith("<tool_output>\n"):
+        return None
+    close = content.find("\n</tool_output>")
+    if close == -1:
+        return None
+    inner = content[len("<tool_output>\n") : close]
+    rest = content[close + len("\n</tool_output>") :]
+    advisories: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+    cursor = 0
+    while True:
+        open_idx = rest.find("<system-reminder>\n", cursor)
+        if open_idx == -1:
+            break
+        close_idx = rest.find("\n</system-reminder>", open_idx)
+        if close_idx == -1:
+            break
+        body = rest[open_idx + len("<system-reminder>\n") : close_idx]
+        decoded = _entity_decode_wrapper_tags(body)
+        classified = _classify_advisory(decoded)
+        if classified is not None:
+            advisories.append(classified)
+        cursor = close_idx + len("\n</system-reminder>")
+    return _entity_decode_wrapper_tags(inner), advisories
+
+
 def decorate_history_messages(
    messages: list[dict[str, Any]],
    verdicts_by_call_id: dict[str, dict[str, Any]],
@@ -184,8 +278,12 @@ def decorate_history_messages(
    Used by the ``/history`` REST endpoint after ``load_messages``
    returns.  For each assistant message with ``tool_calls``, runs
    :func:`decorate_tool_call` on every entry.  For each tool message
-    whose content hits the storage cap, sets ``truncated: True`` so
-    the client can render the "… truncated in storage" pill.
+    whose ``content`` carries a ``<tool_output>`` envelope (queued
+    user message spliced via :class:`UserInterjection` during a tool
+    batch), strips the envelope, restores literal wrapper tags inside
+    the body, and surfaces the extracted advisories on
+    ``msg["advisories"]`` so the wire layer can replay them as user
+    bubbles after the tool result.

    Pure transform — no I/O.  Async callers should pre-load the
    indexes via :func:`load_verdict_indexes` (in ``to_thread``) and
@@ -201,5 +299,18 @@ def decorate_history_messages(
                        decorate_tool_call(tc, verdicts_by_call_id, assessments_by_call_id)
        elif role == "tool":
            content = msg.get("content")
-            if isinstance(content, str) and len(content) >= TOOL_RESULT_STORAGE_CAP:
-                msg["truncated"] = True
+            if not isinstance(content, str):
+                continue
+            try:
+                extracted = extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope(content)
+            except Exception:
+                # Defensive — on any unexpected parse failure leave the
+                # message untouched rather than crashing the replay.
+                log.debug("advisory extraction failed; leaving content intact", exc_info=True)
+                continue
+            if extracted is None:
+                continue
+            cleaned, advisories = extracted
+            msg["content"] = cleaned
+            if advisories:
+                msg["advisories"] = advisories
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+"""Idle wake-trigger for the metacog NudgeQueue pipeline.
+
+Hosts :class:`IdleNudgeWatcher` plus the
+:func:`install_idle_nudge_watcher` / :func:`shutdown_idle_nudge_watchers`
+lifespan helpers.  Pulled out of :mod:`turnstone.core.metacognition`
+because the watcher is subscriber-lifecycle / runtime-orchestration
+code with different concerns from the static nudge-text templates and
+detection heuristics that live in metacognition; mixing them grew the
+metacog module past its single-responsibility line.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+
+from turnstone.core import session_worker
+from turnstone.core.log import get_logger
+from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import USER_DRAIN
+from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamState
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
+
+log = get_logger(__name__)
+
+
+class IdleNudgeWatcher:
+    """Convert a workstream IDLE transition into a wake send when the
+    session has queued nudges.
+
+    Subscribes to :meth:`SessionManager.subscribe_to_state` and listens
+    for ``WorkstreamState.IDLE``.  If the workstream's
+    :class:`NudgeQueue` has any drainable entry for the wake's drain
+    filter (``USER_DRAIN`` — channels ``"user"`` or ``"any"``),
+    dispatches via ``session_worker.send`` with a no-op ``enqueue``
+    callback.  Tool-only entries don't fire the wake — they belong to
+    the next tool-result seam, not a synthetic empty user turn —
+    otherwise every IDLE event with a queued tool advisory would spawn
+    a wake daemon that immediately no-ops at
+    ``deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue``'s drain guard.
+
+    **Race semantics.**  ``session_worker.send`` decides atomically
+    under ``ws._lock`` whether a worker thread already owns the
+    workstream.  Three outcomes:
+
+    * No worker → spawn a new daemon that calls
+      :meth:`ChatSession.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue` (the wake
+      drains its own queue and runs the synthetic empty-user turn).
+    * Worker running → call our ``enqueue`` lambda, which is a no-op.
+      The wake is silently dropped; the queued nudge stays in
+      ``NudgeQueue`` and the in-flight worker picks it up at its next
+      user-message-attach or tool-result seam (whichever fires first
+      for the entry's channel).  This is the load-bearing fallback —
+      we never spawn a competing worker.
+    * Workstream gone (``ws is None``) or session not built
+      (``ws.session is None``) → bail.
+
+    **Subscription order matters.**  When a workstream-kind-specific
+    observer (e.g. ``CoordinatorIdleObserver``) needs to *enqueue* a
+    nudge on the same IDLE event before this watcher *peeks* the
+    queue, the observer must register first so that
+    ``SessionManager.set_state``'s subscriber loop fires it earlier in
+    the same synchronous fan-out.
+
+    **Kind-agnostic.**  Fires for any workstream regardless of
+    :class:`WorkstreamKind`.  Producers decide what to enqueue.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, manager: SessionManager) -> None:
+        self._manager = manager
+        self._callback: Callable[[str, WorkstreamState], None] | None = None
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        """Idempotent — registering twice is a no-op."""
+        if self._callback is not None:
+            return
+
+        def _on_state(ws_id: str, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+            if state is not WorkstreamState.IDLE:
+                return
+            ws = self._manager.get(ws_id)
+            if ws is None or ws.session is None:
+                return
+            session = ws.session
+            if not session._nudge_queue.has_pending(USER_DRAIN):
+                return
+            session_worker.send(
+                ws,
+                enqueue=lambda: None,
+                run=session.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue,
+                thread_name=f"wake-nudge-{ws.id[:8]}",
+            )
+
+        self._callback = _on_state
+        self._manager.subscribe_to_state(_on_state)
+
+    def shutdown(self) -> None:
+        """Unsubscribe; idempotent."""
+        cb = self._callback
+        if cb is None:
+            return
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            self._manager.unsubscribe_from_state(cb)
+        self._callback = None
+
+
+_APP_STATE_ATTR = "_idle_nudge_watchers"
+
+
+def install_idle_nudge_watcher(app: Any, manager: SessionManager) -> IdleNudgeWatcher:
+    """Construct + start an :class:`IdleNudgeWatcher` and register it
+    for lifespan teardown via :func:`shutdown_idle_nudge_watchers`.
+
+    Multiple watchers may be installed against different
+    :class:`SessionManager` instances on the same ``app`` (e.g. the
+    interactive manager + the coord manager on a multi-kind host).
+    All of them get torn down by a single
+    :func:`shutdown_idle_nudge_watchers` call.
+
+    Returns the watcher so the caller can run additional setup
+    against the same manager — but the typical site doesn't need
+    the return value.
+    """
+    watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(manager)
+    watcher.start()
+    watchers: list[IdleNudgeWatcher] = getattr(app.state, _APP_STATE_ATTR, [])
+    if not watchers:
+        # First watcher on this app — initialise the list.  Avoids
+        # mutating a default arg or sharing the list across apps.
+        setattr(app.state, _APP_STATE_ATTR, watchers)
+    watchers.append(watcher)
+    return watcher
+
+
+def shutdown_idle_nudge_watchers(app: Any) -> None:
+    """Shut down every watcher installed via
+    :func:`install_idle_nudge_watcher`.  No-op if none.
+    """
+    watchers: list[IdleNudgeWatcher] = getattr(app.state, _APP_STATE_ATTR, [])
+    for watcher in watchers:
+        watcher.shutdown()
+    watchers.clear()
@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
+"""Token-at-rest encryption for OAuth-MCP.
+
+Uses cryptography.fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256, 256-bit total key
+material, encrypt-then-MAC). Single-key chosen for v1; rotation supported
+via cryptography.fernet.MultiFernet.
+
+Operator note: when rotating keys, place the NEW key first in
+``mcp_token_encryption_keys``. MultiFernet writes with the first key and
+tries each in order on read. Old keys can be retired once all rows are
+re-encrypted by a future operator-driven migration.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, TypedDict
+
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken, MultiFernet
+
+from turnstone.core.audit import record_audit
+from turnstone.core.log import get_logger
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from turnstone.core.storage._protocol import StorageBackend
+
+log = get_logger(__name__)
+
+# Constants
+_KEY_BYTES = 32  # Fernet requires 32 bytes
+_KEY_FINGERPRINT_BYTES = 8  # short hex prefix for audit/error fields
+
+# Operator-facing hint for malformed/missing keys.
+_KEY_GEN_HINT = (
+    "regenerate with: python -c 'from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; "
+    "print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())'"
+)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Exceptions
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class MCPCryptoError(Exception):
+    """Base class for MCP token-at-rest encryption errors."""
+
+
+class MCPTokenDecryptError(MCPCryptoError):
+    """No installed key can decrypt the ciphertext.
+
+    Maps to RFC's ``mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown`` error class.
+    Carries ``key_fingerprints_attempted: tuple[str, ...]`` for audit.
+
+    Critical: callers MUST NOT auto-delete the row on this error.
+    The row is still valid; this node just doesn't have the right key.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, message: str, *, key_fingerprints_attempted: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.key_fingerprints_attempted = key_fingerprints_attempted
+
+
+class MCPTokenKeyConfigError(MCPCryptoError):
+    """Key material in config.toml is malformed or missing."""
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Plaintext shape returned by ``MCPTokenStore.get_user_token``
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class MCPUserTokenPlain(TypedDict):
+    """Plaintext shape returned by ``MCPTokenStore.get_user_token``.
+
+    Mirrors ``MCPUserToken`` (storage row shape) minus the ``_ct`` suffix
+    on token columns and with plaintext bytes-decoded values.
+    """
+
+    user_id: str
+    server_name: str
+    access_token: str
+    refresh_token: str | None
+    expires_at: str | None
+    scopes: str | None
+    as_issuer: str
+    audience: str
+    created: str
+    last_refreshed: str | None
+
+
+class MCPUserTokenMetadata(TypedDict):
+    """Non-secret subset of ``MCPUserToken`` for the settings UI.
+
+    Token ciphertext is intentionally absent: a list view never needs
+    the access/refresh secrets, and decrypt happens only at MCP-call
+    time.
+    """
+
+    user_id: str
+    server_name: str
+    expires_at: str | None
+    scopes: str | None
+    as_issuer: str
+    audience: str
+    created: str
+    last_refreshed: str | None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Config dataclass + loader
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True, repr=False)
+class MCPTokenCipherConfig:
+    """Validated key material loaded from config.toml.
+
+    ``keys`` are raw 32-byte secrets; the first is the encryption key,
+    all are tried in order on read. The cipher wrapper re-encodes them
+    via ``base64.urlsafe_b64encode`` for ``Fernet(...)`` at construction
+    time.
+
+    ``__repr__`` is overridden to redact the raw key bytes — the default
+    dataclass repr would emit them verbatim into logs / tracebacks.
+    """
+
+    keys: tuple[bytes, ...]
+
+    def __repr__(self) -> str:
+        return f"MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=<{len(self.keys)} key(s) redacted>)"
+
+
+def _validate_key(raw: str, *, label: str) -> bytes:
+    """Decode + validate a single base64 url-safe key. Raises ``MCPTokenKeyConfigError``."""
+    if not isinstance(raw, str) or not raw.strip():
+        raise MCPTokenKeyConfigError(f"{label}: key is empty or not a string. {_KEY_GEN_HINT}")
+    try:
+        decoded = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(raw.encode("ascii"))
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise MCPTokenKeyConfigError(
+            f"{label}: not valid base64 url-safe ({exc}). {_KEY_GEN_HINT}"
+        ) from exc
+    if len(decoded) != _KEY_BYTES:
+        raise MCPTokenKeyConfigError(
+            f"{label}: decoded key must be exactly {_KEY_BYTES} bytes, "
+            f"got {len(decoded)}. {_KEY_GEN_HINT}"
+        )
+    return decoded
+
+
+def _key_fingerprint(key: bytes) -> str:
+    """Stable, non-reversible 8-hex prefix of SHA-256(key)."""
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(key).hexdigest()
+    return digest[: _KEY_FINGERPRINT_BYTES * 2]
+
+
+def load_mcp_token_cipher_config() -> MCPTokenCipherConfig | None:
+    """Read ``[security] mcp_token_encryption_keys`` (plural) or
+    ``mcp_token_encryption_key`` (singular) from config.toml.
+
+    Plural takes precedence when both are present. Returns ``None`` when
+    neither key is configured (caller decides whether that's fatal).
+    Raises ``MCPTokenKeyConfigError`` on malformed key material.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.config import load_config
+
+    sec_cfg = load_config("security")
+    raw_list_value = sec_cfg.get("mcp_token_encryption_keys")
+    raw_single_value = sec_cfg.get("mcp_token_encryption_key")
+
+    raw_keys: list[str]
+    if isinstance(raw_list_value, list) and raw_list_value:
+        raw_keys = []
+        for idx, item in enumerate(raw_list_value):
+            if not isinstance(item, str):
+                raise MCPTokenKeyConfigError(
+                    f"mcp_token_encryption_keys[{idx}]: must be a string. {_KEY_GEN_HINT}"
+                )
+            raw_keys.append(item)
+    elif raw_list_value is not None and not isinstance(raw_list_value, list):
+        raise MCPTokenKeyConfigError(
+            f"mcp_token_encryption_keys: must be a list of base64 url-safe strings. {_KEY_GEN_HINT}"
+        )
+    elif isinstance(raw_single_value, str) and raw_single_value.strip():
+        raw_keys = [raw_single_value]
+    else:
+        return None
+
+    decoded_keys: list[bytes] = []
+    for idx, raw in enumerate(raw_keys):
+        label = (
+            f"mcp_token_encryption_keys[{idx}]" if len(raw_keys) > 1 else "mcp_token_encryption_key"
+        )
+        decoded_keys.append(_validate_key(raw, label=label))
+    return MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=tuple(decoded_keys))
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Cipher wrapper
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class MCPTokenCipher:
+    """Encrypt/decrypt with one or more Fernet keys.
+
+    First key in ``cfg.keys`` is the encryption key. All keys are tried
+    (in declared order) for decryption. On total decryption failure,
+    raises ``MCPTokenDecryptError`` with the fingerprints attempted.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, cfg: MCPTokenCipherConfig) -> None:
+        if not cfg.keys:
+            raise MCPTokenKeyConfigError(
+                f"MCPTokenCipher requires at least one key. {_KEY_GEN_HINT}"
+            )
+        self._cfg = cfg
+        self._fingerprints = tuple(_key_fingerprint(k) for k in cfg.keys)
+        # Re-encode raw bytes to the base64-url-safe form Fernet expects.
+        fernets = [Fernet(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(k)) for k in cfg.keys]
+        self._encrypter = fernets[0]
+        self._multi = MultiFernet(fernets)
+
+    def encrypt(self, plaintext: bytes) -> bytes:
+        """Encrypt ``plaintext`` with the active (first) key."""
+        return self._encrypter.encrypt(plaintext)
+
+    def decrypt(self, ciphertext: bytes) -> bytes:
+        """Try every installed key in declared order.
+
+        Raises ``MCPTokenDecryptError`` carrying the fingerprints
+        attempted when all fail.
+        """
+        try:
+            return self._multi.decrypt(ciphertext)
+        except InvalidToken as exc:
+            raise MCPTokenDecryptError(
+                "no installed key can decrypt the ciphertext",
+                key_fingerprints_attempted=self._fingerprints,
+            ) from exc
+
+    @property
+    def key_fingerprints(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        """Stable fingerprints of installed keys, in declared order.
+
+        Useful for audit events and operator-facing error messages.
+        """
+        return self._fingerprints
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Token store: ciphertext-aware CRUD layered on the storage protocol
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class MCPTokenStore:
+    """Encrypt/decrypt OAuth tokens at the storage boundary.
+
+    Wraps a :class:`StorageBackend`'s ciphertext-only token CRUD with a
+    plaintext-facing API. ``audit_storage`` + ``node_id`` are optional;
+    when both are set, decrypt failures are recorded as audit events
+    under ``mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure`` with the
+    fingerprints attempted.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        storage: StorageBackend,
+        cipher: MCPTokenCipher,
+        *,
+        node_id: str = "",
+        audit_storage: StorageBackend | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._storage = storage
+        self._cipher = cipher
+        self._node_id = node_id
+        self._audit_storage = audit_storage
+
+    @property
+    def cipher(self) -> MCPTokenCipher:
+        """The underlying cipher (exposed for callers that need to encrypt
+        non-token blobs, e.g., the MCP-server admin form's
+        ``oauth_client_secret`` plaintext input)."""
+        return self._cipher
+
+    def create_user_token(
+        self,
+        user_id: str,
+        server_name: str,
+        *,
+        access_token: str,
+        refresh_token: str | None,
+        expires_at: str | None,
+        scopes: str | None,
+        as_issuer: str,
+        audience: str,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Encrypt the access (and optional refresh) token and persist."""
+        access_ct = self._cipher.encrypt(access_token.encode("utf-8"))
+        refresh_ct = self._cipher.encrypt(refresh_token.encode("utf-8")) if refresh_token else None
+        self._storage.create_mcp_user_token(
+            user_id,
+            server_name,
+            access_token_ct=access_ct,
+            refresh_token_ct=refresh_ct,
+            expires_at=expires_at,
+            scopes=scopes,
+            as_issuer=as_issuer,
+            audience=audience,
+        )
+
+    def get_user_token(self, user_id: str, server_name: str) -> MCPUserTokenPlain | None:
+        """Returns plaintext dict or None.
+
+        Raises ``MCPTokenDecryptError`` on key mismatch — caller MUST NOT
+        auto-delete the row. If ``audit_storage`` + ``node_id`` are
+        configured, emits ``mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure``
+        audit event.
+        """
+        row = self._storage.get_mcp_user_token(user_id, server_name)
+        if row is None:
+            return None
+        try:
+            access_pt = self._cipher.decrypt(row["access_token_ct"]).decode("utf-8")
+            refresh_pt: str | None
+            if row["refresh_token_ct"] is not None:
+                refresh_pt = self._cipher.decrypt(row["refresh_token_ct"]).decode("utf-8")
+            else:
+                refresh_pt = None
+        except MCPTokenDecryptError as exc:
+            self._audit_decrypt_failure(server_name, exc.key_fingerprints_attempted)
+            raise
+        return MCPUserTokenPlain(
+            user_id=row["user_id"],
+            server_name=row["server_name"],
+            access_token=access_pt,
+            refresh_token=refresh_pt,
+            expires_at=row["expires_at"],
+            scopes=row["scopes"],
+            as_issuer=row["as_issuer"],
+            audience=row["audience"],
+            created=row["created"],
+            last_refreshed=row["last_refreshed"],
+        )
+
+    def update_user_token_after_refresh(
+        self,
+        user_id: str,
+        server_name: str,
+        *,
+        access_token: str,
+        refresh_token: str | None,
+        expires_at: str | None,
+    ) -> bool:
+        """Atomic write of new tokens after a refresh-grant exchange.
+
+        Returns True when a row was updated.
+
+        ``refresh_token=None`` CLEARS the column — it does NOT preserve
+        the existing value.  Per RFC 6749 §6, an authorization server MAY
+        omit ``refresh_token`` from the refresh response; in that case
+        the OAuth-flow caller MUST pre-resolve whether to keep the
+        existing refresh token or drop it before invoking this method.
+        This API has no "leave unchanged" sentinel.
+        """
+        access_ct = self._cipher.encrypt(access_token.encode("utf-8"))
+        refresh_ct = self._cipher.encrypt(refresh_token.encode("utf-8")) if refresh_token else None
+        return self._storage.update_mcp_user_token_after_refresh(
+            user_id,
+            server_name,
+            access_token_ct=access_ct,
+            refresh_token_ct=refresh_ct,
+            expires_at=expires_at,
+        )
+
+    def delete_user_token(self, user_id: str, server_name: str) -> bool:
+        """Delete the user-token row. Returns True if existed."""
+        return self._storage.delete_mcp_user_token(user_id, server_name)
+
+    def list_user_token_metadata(self, user_id: str) -> list[MCPUserTokenMetadata]:
+        """Return non-secret metadata for every token row owned by ``user_id``.
+
+        Storage layer projects the metadata columns at the SQL boundary
+        (``list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user``) so ciphertext blobs
+        never cross the wire on this list-view path. Rows arrive in
+        ``created`` ASC order. Decrypt is intentionally skipped — the
+        list view has no need for the secret material.
+        """
+        rows = self._storage.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user(user_id)
+        return [
+            MCPUserTokenMetadata(
+                user_id=row["user_id"],
+                server_name=row["server_name"],
+                expires_at=row["expires_at"],
+                scopes=row["scopes"],
+                as_issuer=row["as_issuer"],
+                audience=row["audience"],
+                created=row["created"],
+                last_refreshed=row["last_refreshed"],
+            )
+            for row in rows
+        ]
+
+    def set_oauth_client_secret(self, server_id: str, plaintext_secret: str | None) -> bool:
+        """Encrypt plaintext and persist via the dedicated storage writer.
+
+        Pass ``None`` to clear the column.  Empty string is encrypted
+        normally (Fernet accepts empty plaintext); callers that treat
+        empty as "clear" must convert to ``None`` at their API boundary
+        first — the admin form does this before invoking the helper.
+
+        Returns ``False`` when ``server_id`` does not exist.
+        """
+        if plaintext_secret is None:
+            return self._storage.set_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct(server_id, None)
+        secret_ct = self._cipher.encrypt(plaintext_secret.encode("utf-8"))
+        return self._storage.set_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct(server_id, secret_ct)
+
+    def get_oauth_client_secret(self, server_id: str) -> str | None:
+        """Decrypt and return the per-server OAuth client secret, or None.
+
+        Returns ``None`` when the row is missing or the column is NULL.
+        Raises :class:`MCPTokenDecryptError` on key mismatch — the caller
+        decides whether to treat that as a missing-secret case (e.g. log +
+        prompt re-consent) or surface as a configuration failure.
+        """
+        secret_ct = self._storage.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct(server_id)
+        if secret_ct is None:
+            return None
+        return self._cipher.decrypt(secret_ct).decode("utf-8")
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Internal helpers
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _audit_decrypt_failure(self, server_name: str, fingerprints: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+        """Best-effort audit emit on decrypt failure (no-op when unconfigured).
+
+        Uses ``server_id`` (PK UUID) as ``resource_id`` so admin-driven
+        server renames don't break event correlation. Falls back to
+        ``server_name`` when the lookup misses.
+        """
+        if self._audit_storage is None:
+            return
+        resource_id = server_name
+        try:
+            row = self._audit_storage.get_mcp_server_by_name(server_name)
+        except Exception:
+            row = None
+        if row is not None:
+            resource_id = str(row.get("server_id") or server_name)
+        try:
+            record_audit(
+                self._audit_storage,
+                user_id="",
+                action="mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure",
+                resource_type="mcp_server",
+                resource_id=resource_id,
+                detail={
+                    "server_name": server_name,
+                    "key_fingerprints_attempted": list(fingerprints),
+                    "node_id": self._node_id,
+                },
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            log.warning(
+                "mcp_server.oauth.audit_emit_failed",
+                action="token_decrypt_failure",
+                server_name=server_name,
+                exc_info=True,
+            )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Lifespan integration
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def initialize_mcp_crypto_state(app_state: object, *, node_id: str = "") -> None:
+    """Validate Fernet key config + install :class:`MCPTokenCipher` /
+    :class:`MCPTokenStore` on ``app_state``.
+
+    Called from the server / console lifespan after OIDC initialization.
+
+    Behavior:
+
+    1. ``load_mcp_token_cipher_config()`` — wrapped in try/except. Raises
+       :class:`SystemExit(1)` on :class:`MCPTokenKeyConfigError` after
+       logging.
+    2. Counts ``mcp_servers`` rows with ``auth_type='oauth_user'``. If
+       any exist AND no key is configured, raises ``SystemExit(1)``.
+    3. On success, sets ``app_state.mcp_token_cipher`` and
+       ``app_state.mcp_token_store`` (both possibly ``None`` when no
+       key + no oauth_user rows).
+
+    The helper is shared by ``turnstone/server.py:_lifespan`` and
+    ``turnstone/console/server.py:_lifespan``.  A separate
+    :func:`close_mcp_crypto_state` mirrors :func:`close_oidc_state` for
+    parity even though the cipher itself owns no resources.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.storage import get_storage
+
+    try:
+        cipher_cfg = load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+    except MCPTokenKeyConfigError as exc:
+        log.error("mcp_server.oauth.key_config_invalid: %s", exc)
+        raise SystemExit(1) from exc
+
+    storage = get_storage()
+    oauth_user_count = sum(
+        1 for row in storage.list_mcp_servers() if row.get("auth_type") == "oauth_user"
+    )
+
+    if oauth_user_count > 0 and cipher_cfg is None:
+        log.error(
+            "mcp.oauth: %d server(s) configured with auth_type='oauth_user' but no "
+            "[security] mcp_token_encryption_keys (rotation list) or "
+            "mcp_token_encryption_key (single) in config.toml. Generate a key with: "
+            "python -c 'from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; "
+            "print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())' "
+            "and add it to your config.toml.",
+            oauth_user_count,
+        )
+        raise SystemExit(1)
+
+    if cipher_cfg is None:
+        # No oauth_user rows + no key configured: zero new code paths
+        # exercised; install None sentinels so callers can fast-path.
+        app_state.mcp_token_cipher = None  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        app_state.mcp_token_store = None  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        log.debug("mcp_server.oauth.disabled (no key configured, no oauth_user rows)")
+        return
+
+    cipher = MCPTokenCipher(cipher_cfg)
+    app_state.mcp_token_cipher = cipher  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    app_state.mcp_token_store = MCPTokenStore(  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        storage,
+        cipher,
+        node_id=node_id,
+        audit_storage=storage,
+    )
+    log.info(
+        "mcp_server.oauth.cipher_installed",
+        keys=len(cipher.key_fingerprints),
+        active_fp=cipher.key_fingerprints[0],
+    )
+
+
+def close_mcp_crypto_state(app_state: object) -> None:
+    """Drop references to the cipher / token store on shutdown.
+
+    Mirrors :func:`turnstone.core.oidc.close_oidc_state` for parity.
+    The cipher itself owns no network resources, so this is a simple
+    attribute clear.
+    """
+    if hasattr(app_state, "mcp_token_store"):
+        app_state.mcp_token_store = None
+    if hasattr(app_state, "mcp_token_cipher"):
+        app_state.mcp_token_cipher = None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Re-exports for callers that don't need the storage backend
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+__all__ = [
+    "MCPCryptoError",
+    "MCPTokenCipher",
+    "MCPTokenCipherConfig",
+    "MCPTokenDecryptError",
+    "MCPTokenKeyConfigError",
+    "MCPTokenStore",
+    "MCPUserTokenMetadata",
+    "MCPUserTokenPlain",
+    "close_mcp_crypto_state",
+    "initialize_mcp_crypto_state",
+    "load_mcp_token_cipher_config",
+]
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+"""HTTP header parsing helpers shared by the MCP client and OAuth modules.
+
+Both ``mcp_client`` and ``mcp_oauth`` need to extract structured values from
+``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...`` headers — ``mcp_client`` to classify
+401/403 responses for the user-pool dispatcher, and ``mcp_oauth`` to pull
+the ``resource_metadata`` URL out of a discovery challenge. This module
+hosts the shared primitives so both modules can call them without
+duplicating fragile substring scanners.
+
+The earlier hand-rolled scanners (``_parse_www_authenticate_scope`` /
+``_parse_www_authenticate_error`` in ``mcp_client``) used
+``header.lower().find(needle, i)`` to locate parameter names. That made
+them vulnerable to:
+
+* matching ``scope`` inside ``xscope`` or ``ascope``,
+* matching the literal text ``scope=...`` embedded inside the quoted
+  ``realm`` value of a preceding ``auth-param``,
+* O(N**2) behaviour on pathological input (each ``find`` rescans the prefix).
+
+This module replaces those with a single tokenizer that walks the RFC 7235
+``challenge → auth-param`` grammar once, tracks quoted-string state, and
+returns a normalised ``{key.lower(): value}`` dict. The thin extraction
+wrappers (``parse_www_authenticate_scope`` / ``parse_www_authenticate_error``)
+preserve the original return shapes so call sites only need to swap the
+import.
+
+Also hosts ``MAX_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE_REPORTED`` — the shared defensive cap
+on scope-list lengths consumed by both the WWW-Authenticate parser
+(``mcp_client``) and the ``/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?scopes=`` step-up
+handler (``mcp_oauth``). Living here avoids one module importing a
+private name from the other.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+def _parse_quoted_string(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str, int] | None:
+    """Parse an RFC 7230 ``quoted-string`` starting at ``text[start]``.
+
+    Returns ``(value, end_index)`` where ``end_index`` is the index just
+    past the closing quote, or ``None`` if the input is malformed (no
+    opening quote, unterminated string).
+
+    Handles ``\\"`` and ``\\\\`` escapes per RFC 7230 section 3.2.6 — the
+    prior naive ``([^"]+)`` regex truncated the URL at the first
+    unescaped quote and silently dropped backslash escapes from the
+    value.
+    """
+    if start >= len(text) or text[start] != '"':
+        return None
+    out: list[str] = []
+    i = start + 1
+    while i < len(text):
+        ch = text[i]
+        if ch == "\\" and i + 1 < len(text):
+            out.append(text[i + 1])
+            i += 2
+            continue
+        if ch == '"':
+            return "".join(out), i + 1
+        out.append(ch)
+        i += 1
+    return None
+
+
+# Maximum header length we'll attempt to parse. Real ASes emit a handful
+# of short auth-params; anything past this is either malformed or
+# adversarial. Returning ``{}`` (rather than raising) keeps callers' error
+# paths uniform with "unparseable header → no signal".
+_MAX_HEADER_LEN = 4096
+
+_TOKEN_DELIMS = frozenset('()<>@,;:\\"/[]?={} \t')
+
+
+def _is_token_char(ch: str) -> bool:
+    """RFC 7230 token character: visible ASCII minus the delimiter set."""
+    return ch.isascii() and ch.isprintable() and ch not in _TOKEN_DELIMS
+
+
+def _looks_like_bearer_challenge_start(header: str, i: int) -> bool:
+    """Peek at ``header[i:]`` for the start of a fresh ``Bearer`` challenge.
+
+    Returns True when the slice begins with the case-insensitive token
+    ``Bearer`` followed by whitespace — the RFC 7235 marker for a new
+    ``challenge`` after a separator comma. This is the cue the bearer
+    tokenizer uses to stop parsing rather than fold a second challenge's
+    auth-params into the first challenge's dict.
+    """
+    n = len(header)
+    if i + 6 > n:
+        return False
+    if header[i : i + 6].lower() != "bearer":
+        return False
+    after = i + 6
+    # ``Bearer`` must be followed by whitespace to qualify as a scheme
+    # boundary; ``Bearer-like-token`` is just a regular token.
+    return after < n and header[after] in " \t"
+
+
+def parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Extract ``auth-param``s from a ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...`` header.
+
+    Walks the RFC 7235 challenge grammar once, returning a dict of
+    ``{lowercased-key: value}`` pairs. Quoted-strings are unquoted (with
+    backslash escapes resolved). Unknown / malformed input returns an
+    empty dict — never raises.
+
+    Only ``Bearer`` challenges are recognised. The function ignores any
+    leading whitespace before the scheme. When a second ``Bearer``
+    challenge appears after a separator comma — as it would when
+    httpx joins repeated ``WWW-Authenticate`` headers via
+    ``response.headers.get(...)`` — the tokenizer stops at the
+    challenge boundary rather than folding the second challenge's
+    auth-params into the first challenge's dict. This is the
+    parser-side defence-in-depth mirror of the
+    ``response.headers.get_list(...)[0]`` guard in the dispatcher's
+    capturing httpx factory; either layer alone neutralises the
+    multi-header injection vector but both run together so a
+    regression in one cannot silently re-open it.
+    A ``realm`` value that contains the literal text ``scope=fake`` is
+    correctly attributed to ``realm`` because the tokenizer respects
+    quoted-string boundaries.
+    """
+    if not header or len(header) > _MAX_HEADER_LEN:
+        return {}
+
+    n = len(header)
+    i = 0
+
+    # Skip leading whitespace then the ``Bearer`` scheme token.
+    while i < n and header[i] in " \t":
+        i += 1
+    scheme_start = i
+    while i < n and _is_token_char(header[i]):
+        i += 1
+    scheme = header[scheme_start:i]
+    if scheme.lower() != "bearer":
+        return {}
+    # Require at least one space between scheme and first auth-param.
+    if i >= n or header[i] not in " \t":
+        return {}
+
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    while i < n:
+        # Skip whitespace and stray commas between params.
+        while i < n and header[i] in " \t,":
+            i += 1
+        if i >= n:
+            break
+        # If a fresh ``Bearer`` challenge starts here, the upstream is
+        # multi-challenge — stop before reading any of its auth-params.
+        if _looks_like_bearer_challenge_start(header, i):
+            break
+        # Read the param key (a token).
+        key_start = i
+        while i < n and _is_token_char(header[i]):
+            i += 1
+        if i == key_start:
+            # Not a valid token start — skip one char to make forward
+            # progress and continue. This bounds total cost to O(N).
+            i += 1
+            continue
+        key = header[key_start:i].lower()
+        # Optional whitespace, then ``=``.
+        while i < n and header[i] in " \t":
+            i += 1
+        if i >= n or header[i] != "=":
+            # Param without a value — skip.
+            continue
+        i += 1
+        while i < n and header[i] in " \t":
+            i += 1
+        if i >= n:
+            break
+        # Value: either a quoted-string or a token.
+        if header[i] == '"':
+            parsed = _parse_quoted_string(header, i)
+            if parsed is None:
+                # Unterminated quoted-string — treat the rest of the
+                # header as garbage and stop. Returning what we already
+                # have is safer than guessing where the value ends.
+                break
+            value, i = parsed
+            out.setdefault(key, value)
+        else:
+            val_start = i
+            while i < n and header[i] not in ", \t":
+                i += 1
+            value = header[val_start:i]
+            out.setdefault(key, value)
+    return out
+
+
+# Defensive cap on the number of scopes reported in
+# ``mcp_insufficient_scope`` audit/error payloads and accepted from the
+# ``/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?scopes=`` step-up query param. Real ASes
+# return single-digit scope counts; the cap stops a malicious upstream
+# (or buggy client) from bloating either surface via a thousand-token
+# scope list. Lives here so the WWW-Authenticate parser (consumer:
+# ``mcp_client``) and the ``/start`` handler (consumer: ``mcp_oauth``)
+# share a single source of truth without one importing a private name
+# from the other.
+MAX_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE_REPORTED = 32
+
+
+def is_valid_scope_token(token: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True iff ``token`` is a valid RFC 6749 §3.3 ``scope-token``.
+
+    The grammar restricts scope tokens to visible ASCII (``0x21..0x7E``)
+    excluding ``"`` (``0x22``) and ``\\`` (``0x5C``). The empty string
+    is rejected — a zero-length token has no semantic meaning in the
+    space-separated scope list.
+
+    Used by the WWW-Authenticate parser to filter AS-supplied scope
+    sets, and by ``/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start`` to reject caller-supplied
+    scope query params that could smuggle CR/LF/tab/control bytes
+    through the AS round-trip into downstream log or notification
+    paths.
+    """
+    if not token:
+        return False
+    return all(0x21 <= ord(c) <= 0x7E and c not in ('"', "\\") for c in token)
+
+
+def parse_www_authenticate_scope(header: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Return the ``scope=...`` value as a tuple of individual scopes.
+
+    Splits on a single space per RFC 6749 section 3.3 (``scope-token``
+    sequence). Returns ``()`` when the header is malformed or carries no
+    ``scope`` parameter.
+
+    Each token is validated against the RFC 6749 §3.3 ``scope-token``
+    grammar (visible ASCII ``0x21..0x7E`` excluding ``"`` and ``\\``)
+    via :func:`is_valid_scope_token` so that a malicious or buggy AS
+    cannot smuggle CR/LF/tab/control bytes through a future log or
+    notification path. Today scopes are JSON-encoded everywhere
+    downstream so no concrete exploit exists, but the validation is
+    cheap and forecloses regressions in structured-error rendering.
+    """
+    params = parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header)
+    value = params.get("scope")
+    if not value:
+        return ()
+    return tuple(s for s in value.split(" ") if is_valid_scope_token(s))
+
+
+def parse_www_authenticate_error(header: str) -> str | None:
+    """Return the ``error=...`` value or ``None`` when absent.
+
+    The tokenizer naturally distinguishes ``error`` from
+    ``error_description`` / ``error_uri`` because ``_`` is not a valid
+    token-character delimiter — they parse as separate keys.
+    """
+    params = parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header)
+    return params.get("error") or None
@@ -41,11 +41,18 @@ def save_message(
    tool_call_id: str | None = None,
    provider_data: str | None = None,
    tool_calls: str | None = None,
+    source: str | None = None,
+    reminders: str | None = None,
 ) -> int:
    """Log a message to the conversations table.

    Returns the inserted row id, or ``0`` on failure (preserving the
    module's no-raise contract).
+
+    ``source`` / ``reminders`` mirror the in-memory ``_source`` /
+    ``_reminders`` side-channels (``reminders`` JSON-encoded).  Both
+    default to ``None`` for the common case where no metacog payload
+    rides the row.
    """
    try:
        return get_storage().save_message(
@@ -56,6 +63,8 @@ def save_message(
            tool_call_id,
            provider_data,
            tool_calls=tool_calls,
+            source=source,
+            reminders=reminders,
        )
    except Exception:
        log.warning("Failed to save message for ws=%s role=%s", ws_id, role, exc_info=True)
@@ -70,10 +79,10 @@ def save_messages_bulk(rows: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
        log.warning("Failed to bulk-save %d messages", len(rows), exc_info=True)


-def load_messages(ws_id: str) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+def load_messages(ws_id: str, *, repair: bool = True) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
    """Load messages for a workstream and reconstruct OpenAI message format."""
    try:
-        return get_storage().load_messages(ws_id)
+        return get_storage().load_messages(ws_id, repair=repair)
    except Exception:
        log.warning("Failed to load messages for ws=%s", ws_id, exc_info=True)
        return []
@@ -1,4 +1,14 @@
-"""Metacognitive prompting — situational nudges for proactive memory use."""
+"""Metacognitive prompting — situational nudges for proactive memory use.
+
+Static nudge text templates (``NUDGE_*``), detection heuristics
+(``detect_correction``, ``detect_completion``), the :class:`RepeatDetector`
+streak counter, and the cooldown-aware :func:`should_nudge` /
+:func:`format_nudge` / :func:`format_idle_children_nudge` helpers.
+
+The wake-trigger lifecycle (``IdleNudgeWatcher`` plus the
+``install_idle_nudge_watcher`` / ``shutdown_idle_nudge_watchers``
+lifespan helpers) lives in :mod:`turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher`.
+"""

 from __future__ import annotations

@@ -108,8 +118,159 @@ _NUDGE_MAP: dict[str, str] = {
    "start": NUDGE_START,
    "tool_error": NUDGE_TOOL_ERROR,
    "repeat": NUDGE_REPEAT,
+    # idle_children and watch_triggered carry no static body — the
+    # per-fire text comes from a producer (``format_idle_children_nudge``
+    # for the former, ``format_watch_message`` + ``sanitize_payload``
+    # in the watch dispatch closure for the latter).  Empty string
+    # here keeps :func:`format_nudge` round-tripping honestly while
+    # still letting :func:`should_nudge` and ``_NUDGE_MAP``-as-registry
+    # consumers recognise the type.
+    "idle_children": "",
+    "watch_triggered": "",
 }

+
+# Display cap for the ``idle_children`` body — list at most this many
+# children inline, append "...and N more" overflow line beyond that.
+NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP = 6
+
+# Suggested ``wait_for_workstream(ws_ids=[...])`` cap — matches
+# ``WAIT_MAX_WS_IDS`` in :mod:`turnstone.core.coordinator_client` so the
+# emitted suggestion is callable as-is.
+NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP = 32
+
+NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_HEADER = (
+    "You went idle but still have active child workstreams.  Either "
+    "continue the user's work or block on the listed children "
+    "explicitly:"
+)
+
+
+# ASCII control chars + Unicode steering vectors (bidi-override,
+# zero-width, line/paragraph separators, BOM, tag chars).  Treated
+# uniformly as control chars and replaced with a space; angle-bracket
+# tag-breakers are stripped separately below.  Defense-in-depth today
+# (self-injection within one user's tenant — children inherit parent
+# ``user_id`` and watch commands are user-supplied), but becomes
+# load-bearing the moment a producer ingests payloads from a different
+# trust boundary (a future watch trigger consuming external webhook
+# bodies, etc).
+#
+# Two classes, picked at the call site by the caller's structural
+# requirements:
+#   * :data:`_NAME_CONTROL_CHARS` — STRICT: also strips TAB/LF/CR.
+#     Used by :func:`sanitize_name` for single-line user-controlled
+#     fields (workstream ``name`` rendered as bullet items by
+#     :func:`format_idle_children_nudge` — a name with ``\n`` in it
+#     would otherwise break the bullet's one-line structure and let
+#     a malicious child name forge sibling rows).
+#   * :data:`_PAYLOAD_CONTROL_CHARS` — PERMISSIVE: preserves TAB/LF/CR.
+#     Used by :func:`sanitize_payload` for multi-line payloads where
+#     line layout is part of the signal (watch shell output —
+#     stripping LF/CR would collapse multi-line output to one line).
+_CONTROL_CHARS_TAIL = (
+    r"\u200b-\u200f"  # zero-width / LRM / RLM
+    r"\u202a-\u202e"  # bidi overrides
+    r"\u2066-\u2069"  # bidi isolates
+    r"\u2028\u2029"  # line / paragraph separator
+    r"\ufeff"  # BOM
+    r"]"
+    r"|[\U000e0000-\U000e007f]"  # Unicode tag chars (separate range above BMP)
+)
+_NAME_CONTROL_CHARS = re.compile(
+    r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f" + _CONTROL_CHARS_TAIL  # ASCII control (incl. \t\n\r) + DEL
+)
+_PAYLOAD_CONTROL_CHARS = re.compile(
+    r"[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f" + _CONTROL_CHARS_TAIL  # ASCII control (skip \t\n\r) + DEL
+)
+_PAYLOAD_TAG_BREAKERS = re.compile(r"[<>]")
+
+
+def sanitize_name(text: str) -> str:
+    """Strict sanitiser for single-line user-controlled name fields.
+
+    Strips ASCII control chars **including** TAB/LF/CR plus Unicode
+    steering vectors and angle-bracket tag breakers.  Use for fields
+    rendered as a single bullet item / label where embedded newlines
+    would break the surrounding structure (workstream ``name`` in
+    :func:`format_idle_children_nudge`, where a ``\\n`` in the name
+    would otherwise forge a fake sibling bullet).
+    """
+    if not text:
+        return ""
+    cleaned = _NAME_CONTROL_CHARS.sub(" ", text)
+    cleaned = _PAYLOAD_TAG_BREAKERS.sub("", cleaned)
+    return cleaned.strip()
+
+
+def sanitize_payload(text: str) -> str:
+    """Permissive sanitiser for multi-line user-controlled nudge payloads.
+
+    Used by ``format_watch_message`` output rendered into the
+    ``watch_triggered`` nudge body.
+
+    The wire-boundary :func:`escape_wrapper_tags` only protects the
+    ``<system-reminder>`` and ``<tool_output>`` envelopes; other
+    angle-bracketed markers (``</thinking>``, ``<answer>``,
+    ``<artifact>``, …) and Unicode steering vectors (RTL override,
+    zero-width chars, tag chars) can still steer some models.  Strip
+    both classes before interpolation — self-injection only today
+    (watch commands are user-supplied), but the cost is one ``re.sub``
+    per payload.
+
+    TAB / LF / CR are preserved (see ``_PAYLOAD_CONTROL_CHARS``) so
+    multi-line shell output in watch payloads keeps its line structure.
+    For single-line name fields where newlines would break surrounding
+    structure, use :func:`sanitize_name` instead.
+    """
+    if not text:
+        return ""
+    cleaned = _PAYLOAD_CONTROL_CHARS.sub(" ", text)
+    cleaned = _PAYLOAD_TAG_BREAKERS.sub("", cleaned)
+    return cleaned.strip()
+
+
+def format_idle_children_nudge(children: list[dict[str, str]]) -> str:
+    """Render the ``idle_children`` reminder body.
+
+    *children* is a list of dicts with ``ws_id``, ``name``, ``state``
+    keys — the row-mapping shape coordinator-side storage exposes.
+    Returns raw text *without* the ``<system-reminder>`` envelope; the
+    side-channel :func:`_apply_reminders_for_provider` splice wraps it
+    at the wire boundary.
+
+    User-controlled ``name`` strings get sanitized via
+    :func:`sanitize_name` before interpolation so a workstream
+    named ``</thinking>...`` can't steer the model's reasoning
+    channels through the rendered body, and an embedded ``\\n`` in
+    a name can't forge a fake sibling bullet.
+
+    Display caps at :data:`NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP` with an
+    overflow line; the trailing ``wait_for_workstream`` suggestion's
+    ``ws_ids`` list caps at :data:`NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP`.
+    Empty input returns the empty string so callers can short-circuit
+    on ``if not text: return``.
+    """
+    if not children:
+        return ""
+    lines = [NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_HEADER, ""]
+    shown = children[:NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP]
+    for c in shown:
+        ws_id = c.get("ws_id", "")
+        name = sanitize_name(c.get("name", "")) or "(unnamed)"
+        state = c.get("state", "?")
+        lines.append(f"  - {ws_id[:8]} ({state}): {name}")
+    overflow = len(children) - len(shown)
+    if overflow > 0:
+        lines.append(f"  ...and {overflow} more")
+    lines.append("")
+    wait_ids = [c.get("ws_id", "") for c in children[:NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP]]
+    lines.append(
+        f'To block on them: wait_for_workstream(ws_ids={wait_ids!r}, mode="any", timeout=120).'
+    )
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Detection heuristics — strong/weak tiers
 #
@@ -194,6 +355,26 @@ def detect_completion(message: str) -> bool:
    return any(p.search(message) for p in _WEAK_COMPLETION)


+def _cooldown_allows(
+    nudge_type: str,
+    state: dict[str, float],
+    *,
+    cooldown_secs: int = _COOLDOWN_SECS,
+) -> bool:
+    """Read-only cooldown peek — does NOT record a fire timestamp.
+
+    Use this as a cheap pre-gate before expensive work (storage queries,
+    message walks).  The follow-up :func:`should_nudge` call re-checks
+    cooldown AND records the timestamp atomically.  A producer that
+    races between this peek and ``should_nudge`` would just lose the
+    fire to the other producer — benign.
+    """
+    last = state.get(nudge_type)
+    if last is None:
+        return True
+    return time.monotonic() - last >= cooldown_secs
+
+
 def should_nudge(
    nudge_type: str,
    state: dict[str, float],
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+"""Thread-safe FIFO queue for metacognitive nudges with channel filtering.
+
+Replaces the dual ``_pending_user_advisories`` / ``_pending_tool_advisories``
+list pair with a single channel-tagged queue per session.  Producers
+(`_queue_user_advisory`, `_queue_tool_advisory`,
+`CoordinatorIdleObserver`, the future watch dispatcher) all enqueue onto
+the same queue with an explicit ``channel``; consumers
+(`_attach_pending_user_reminders` on user-message attach,
+`_collect_advisories` on tool-result wrap,
+`IdleNudgeWatcher` on workstream-IDLE) drain by channel filter.
+
+Channels:
+    * ``"user"`` — only drains at user-turn seams.
+    * ``"tool"`` — only drains at tool-result seams.
+    * ``"any"``  — drains at whichever seam fires first (used for
+      wake-trigger-driven nudges that should not be pinned to a
+      specific drain seam).
+
+Drain preserves FIFO order; non-matching entries stay queued.  Each
+entry can carry an optional ``valid_until`` predicate that drain
+evaluates outside the queue lock; entries whose predicate returns
+``False`` (or raises) are silently dropped without delivery — used by
+producers whose payload becomes stale if the underlying state changes
+between enqueue and drain (e.g. ``idle_children`` re-checks the active
+child set, dropping the nudge if every child finished while the queue
+sat).  Operations are atomic under an internal :class:`threading.Lock`.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+from collections import deque
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Literal, NamedTuple
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+Channel = Literal["user", "tool", "any"]
+_VALID_CHANNELS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"user", "tool", "any"})
+
+# Module-level filter constants — most callers want one of these and
+# pre-allocating spares us a frozenset construction at every drain seam.
+USER_DRAIN: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"user", "any"})
+TOOL_DRAIN: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"tool", "any"})
+
+
+class _Entry(NamedTuple):
+    nudge_type: str
+    text: str
+    channel: Channel
+    valid_until: Callable[[], bool] | None = None
+    # Producer-supplied optional fields that ride alongside ``text`` when
+    # drained — used by ``watch_triggered`` to carry ``watch_name`` /
+    # ``command`` / ``poll_count`` / ``max_polls`` / ``is_final`` into the
+    # rendered reminder dict so the frontend can render a structured
+    # ``.msg.watch-result`` card instead of a plain advisory bubble.
+    # Other producers leave it ``None`` and consumers see only
+    # ``{type, text}``.  Atomicity guarantee: text + metadata land on the
+    # same enqueue call, so a concurrent drain can't observe text without
+    # the matching metadata.
+    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+
+
+class NudgeQueue:
+    """Single-session FIFO queue with channel-tagged entries."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._items: deque[_Entry] = deque()
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def enqueue(
+        self,
+        nudge_type: str,
+        text: str,
+        channel: Channel,
+        *,
+        valid_until: Callable[[], bool] | None = None,
+        metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Append a nudge.  ``channel`` MUST be in :data:`_VALID_CHANNELS`.
+
+        ``channel`` is required so producers ingesting untrusted text
+        (future child workstream names, watch payloads) must pick a
+        seam consciously rather than silently routing to whichever
+        seam drains first via an implicit default.
+
+        If ``valid_until`` is provided, drain re-evaluates it before
+        delivering the entry; a falsy result drops the entry silently
+        (the producer's signal that the snapshot it enqueued is now
+        stale).  The predicate is called outside the queue lock so
+        producers can do non-trivial work (e.g. re-querying storage
+        for active children) without blocking other producers.
+
+        ``metadata`` carries optional producer-specific fields that
+        drain returns alongside ``(nudge_type, text)``.  ``watch_triggered``
+        uses it for ``watch_name`` / ``command`` / ``poll_count`` /
+        ``max_polls`` / ``is_final`` so the frontend can render a
+        structured card; other producers leave it ``None``.
+        """
+        if channel not in _VALID_CHANNELS:
+            raise ValueError(f"channel={channel!r}; expected one of {sorted(_VALID_CHANNELS)}")
+        with self._lock:
+            self._items.append(_Entry(nudge_type, text, channel, valid_until, metadata))
+
+    def drain(
+        self, channels: frozenset[str] | set[str]
+    ) -> list[tuple[str, str, dict[str, Any] | None]]:
+        """Drain entries whose channel is in ``channels``.
+
+        Entries with non-matching channels stay in the queue, in order.
+        Returns ``(nudge_type, text, metadata)`` tuples in insertion
+        order; ``metadata`` is the producer-supplied dict (or ``None``
+        when unset).
+
+        Entries with a ``valid_until`` predicate get re-checked outside
+        the queue lock; falsy / raising predicates drop the entry
+        without delivering it.  Already-removed-from-queue either way —
+        dropped entries don't ride a future drain.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            if not self._items:
+                return []
+            # Fast path: every entry matches → swap deque rather than
+            # walk + partition + per-entry append.  This is the common
+            # case in practice since the chat loop's drain seams use
+            # ``USER_DRAIN`` / ``TOOL_DRAIN`` (channel + "any") and
+            # most queues hold only one channel's entries at a time.
+            if all(entry.channel in channels for entry in self._items):
+                candidates: list[_Entry] = list(self._items)
+                self._items = deque()
+            else:
+                kept: deque[_Entry] = deque()
+                candidates = []
+                for entry in self._items:
+                    if entry.channel in channels:
+                        candidates.append(entry)
+                    else:
+                        kept.append(entry)
+                self._items = kept
+        # Predicates evaluate outside the lock — they may do storage
+        # I/O or other work that shouldn't block other producers /
+        # the drain consumer's other queues.
+        out: list[tuple[str, str, dict[str, Any] | None]] = []
+        for entry in candidates:
+            if entry.valid_until is None:
+                out.append((entry.nudge_type, entry.text, entry.metadata))
+                continue
+            try:
+                if entry.valid_until():
+                    out.append((entry.nudge_type, entry.text, entry.metadata))
+            except Exception:
+                # Predicate raising is treated as "no longer valid" —
+                # drop silently rather than letting one bad predicate
+                # poison the whole drain batch.
+                pass
+        return out
+
+    def __len__(self) -> int:
+        """Current depth.  Used by the future IdleNudgeWatcher gate."""
+        with self._lock:
+            return len(self._items)
+
+    def clear(self) -> int:
+        """Drop every entry; return the count cleared.  Used in cancel paths."""
+        with self._lock:
+            n = len(self._items)
+            self._items.clear()
+            return n
+
+    def count_by_type(self, nudge_type: str, channel: Channel | None = None) -> int:
+        """Return the number of queued entries matching ``nudge_type``.
+
+        With ``channel=None`` counts across all channels; with a specific
+        channel filters to that channel only.  Walks ``_items`` once
+        under the lock without materialising tuples — cheaper than
+        ``len(pending(channel=...))`` for callers that only need the
+        count (e.g. the watch dispatcher's soft-cap pre-check).
+        Producer-side soft caps that pair this with
+        :meth:`drop_oldest_by_type` should pass the same ``channel`` to
+        both halves so the count snapshot and the drop walk over the
+        same entry set.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            if channel is None:
+                return sum(1 for e in self._items if e.nudge_type == nudge_type)
+            return sum(
+                1 for e in self._items if e.nudge_type == nudge_type and e.channel == channel
+            )
+
+    def drop_oldest_by_type(self, nudge_type: str, channel: Channel | None = None) -> bool:
+        """Remove the earliest-enqueued entry whose type matches ``nudge_type``.
+
+        With ``channel=None`` searches across all channels; with a specific
+        channel filters to that channel only.  Returns ``True`` if an
+        entry was dropped, ``False`` if no matching entry was found.
+        The call itself is atomic under the queue lock; producers that
+        need an atomic count-and-drop pair (no interleave with concurrent
+        drains) should use :meth:`cap_at_or_drop_oldest` instead.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            for i, entry in enumerate(self._items):
+                if entry.nudge_type != nudge_type:
+                    continue
+                if channel is not None and entry.channel != channel:
+                    continue
+                del self._items[i]
+                return True
+        return False
+
+    def cap_at_or_drop_oldest(
+        self,
+        nudge_type: str,
+        max_depth: int,
+        channel: Channel | None = None,
+    ) -> bool:
+        """If queued ``nudge_type`` entries reach ``max_depth``, drop the
+        earliest matching entry — under a single lock acquisition so a
+        concurrent drain can't slip between the count and the drop.
+
+        Returns ``True`` iff a drop happened.  Producers with a per-type
+        soft cap call this on the enqueue path; ``max_depth <= 0`` is a
+        defensive no-op returning ``False``.
+        """
+        if max_depth <= 0:
+            return False
+        with self._lock:
+            oldest_index = -1
+            count = 0
+            for i, entry in enumerate(self._items):
+                if entry.nudge_type != nudge_type:
+                    continue
+                if channel is not None and entry.channel != channel:
+                    continue
+                if oldest_index == -1:
+                    oldest_index = i
+                count += 1
+                if count >= max_depth:
+                    del self._items[oldest_index]
+                    return True
+            return False
+
+    def pending(self, channel: Channel | None = None) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+        """Non-mutating snapshot for tests / introspection.
+
+        With ``channel=None`` returns every queued entry as
+        ``(nudge_type, text)`` tuples in insertion order; with a
+        specific channel filters to that channel only.  Production
+        code that wants to *consume* entries should call :meth:`drain`
+        instead — pending entries are by definition unconsumed and
+        will redraw at the next matching seam.
+
+        ``metadata`` is intentionally NOT projected here — tests that
+        need to assert producer-specific fields call
+        :meth:`pending_with_metadata` (or :meth:`drain` directly).
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            if channel is None:
+                return [(e.nudge_type, e.text) for e in self._items]
+            return [(e.nudge_type, e.text) for e in self._items if e.channel == channel]
+
+    def pending_with_metadata(
+        self, channel: Channel | None = None
+    ) -> list[tuple[str, str, dict[str, Any] | None]]:
+        """Non-mutating snapshot including each entry's ``metadata``.
+
+        Used by tests / introspection paths that need to assert
+        producer-specific optional fields (e.g. the watch dispatcher's
+        ``watch_name`` / ``command`` / ``poll_count`` payload).  Production
+        consumers should still call :meth:`drain`.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            if channel is None:
+                return [(e.nudge_type, e.text, e.metadata) for e in self._items]
+            return [(e.nudge_type, e.text, e.metadata) for e in self._items if e.channel == channel]
+
+    def has_pending(self, channels: frozenset[str] | set[str]) -> bool:
+        """Short-circuiting existence check.
+
+        Returns ``True`` as soon as a queued entry's channel matches
+        ``channels``.  Cheaper than :meth:`pending` for callers that
+        only need a boolean — used by
+        :class:`turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher.IdleNudgeWatcher` to
+        gate wake dispatch on whether ``USER_DRAIN`` would actually
+        deliver anything before paying the worker-thread spawn.  No
+        list allocation, lock released on first match.
+        """
+        with self._lock:
+            return any(e.channel in channels for e in self._items)
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+"""Shared SSRF and same-origin validation for OAuth/OIDC endpoint URLs.
+
+Extracted from :mod:`turnstone.core.oidc` so the per-(user, server) MCP
+OAuth flow (see :mod:`turnstone.core.mcp_oauth`) can reuse the exact same
+guards without depending on the OIDC module.
+
+The canonical exception is :class:`OAuthSSRFError`. The OIDC module wraps
+calls to these helpers and re-raises ``OIDCError`` so its public API is
+unchanged. The MCP OAuth module catches :class:`OAuthSSRFError` directly.
+
+DNS-rebinding limitation: this module resolves the hostname during
+validation, but the subsequent ``httpx`` call resolves again. A hostname
+the operator points at could in principle rebind between the two resolves
+to expose an internal address. Callers must ensure the AS / IdP hostname
+is operator-controlled — the SSRF guard prevents private-IP responses for
+hostnames the operator points at, but does not prevent rebinding by a
+hostile DNS authority. Pinning a single resolution into the ``httpx``
+transport is a future hardening step.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import ipaddress
+import socket
+import urllib.parse
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Trusted-host allowlist for well-known multi-origin IdPs / authorization
+# servers whose discovery documents legitimately reference endpoints on
+# hostnames distinct from the issuer hostname. eTLD+1 matching does not
+# work here (e.g. google.com vs googleapis.com), so an explicit allow-map
+# is the only safe option.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+KNOWN_TRUSTED_OAUTH_ENDPOINT_HOSTS: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
+    "accounts.google.com": frozenset(
+        {
+            "accounts.google.com",
+            "oauth2.googleapis.com",
+            "www.googleapis.com",
+            "openidconnect.googleapis.com",
+        }
+    ),
+}
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Exceptions
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class OAuthSSRFError(Exception):
+    """Raised when an SSRF/same-origin validation fails.
+
+    OIDC callers wrap this and re-raise as ``OIDCError`` to preserve the
+    existing public API.
+    """
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def is_localhost(hostname: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if *hostname* refers to the loopback interface."""
+    return hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") or hostname.endswith(".localhost")
+
+
+def sanitize_log_text(text: str, limit: int = 200) -> str:
+    """Escape control characters and truncate untrusted text for log/audit inclusion.
+
+    Untrusted bytes (e.g. an AS error body, ``error_description`` from a
+    callback redirect) embedded in log lines or exception messages must not
+    be able to forge fake log records via CR/LF or hide content via NULs /
+    other control characters. ``unicode_escape`` renders these as visible
+    ``\\r``, ``\\n``, ``\\x00`` etc., and *limit* caps the *rendered* length.
+
+    Shared with the OIDC module — its private ``_sanitize_log_text`` is a
+    legacy alias that forwards here.
+    """
+    if not text:
+        return ""
+    return text.encode("unicode_escape").decode("ascii")[:limit]
+
+
+def effective_port(parsed: urllib.parse.ParseResult) -> int | None:
+    """Return the explicit port if set, else the scheme default."""
+    if parsed.port is not None:
+        return parsed.port
+    return {"http": 80, "https": 443}.get(parsed.scheme)
+
+
+def validate_url_no_ssrf(url: str, *, allow_http: bool) -> urllib.parse.ParseResult:
+    """Run the scheme/userinfo/SSRF checks shared by issuer and discovered URLs.
+
+    Returns the parsed URL on success. Raises :class:`OAuthSSRFError` on
+    failure. The ``allow_http`` flag is the only knob: when ``True``,
+    ``http://`` is accepted *if* the hostname is also a localhost form;
+    when ``False``, only ``https://`` is accepted.
+    """
+    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
+
+    hostname = parsed.hostname
+    if not hostname:
+        raise OAuthSSRFError(f"endpoint URL has no hostname: {url}")
+
+    if parsed.username or parsed.password:
+        raise OAuthSSRFError("endpoint URL must not contain embedded credentials (userinfo)")
+
+    if parsed.scheme != "https":
+        if allow_http and parsed.scheme == "http" and is_localhost(hostname):
+            pass
+        else:
+            raise OAuthSSRFError(f"endpoint URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://): {url}")
+
+    try:
+        addr_infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None, proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP)
+    except socket.gaierror as exc:
+        raise OAuthSSRFError(f"endpoint hostname cannot be resolved: {hostname}") from exc
+
+    for _family, _type, _proto, _canonname, sockaddr in addr_infos:
+        try:
+            addr = ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise OAuthSSRFError(
+                f"endpoint hostname resolved to invalid IP {sockaddr[0]!r}: {hostname}"
+            ) from exc
+        if not addr.is_global and not is_localhost(hostname):
+            raise OAuthSSRFError(f"endpoint URL resolves to non-public address ({addr}): {url}")
+
+    return parsed
+
+
+def validate_discovered_endpoint(
+    url: str,
+    issuer_parsed: urllib.parse.ParseResult,
+    *,
+    allow_http: bool,
+    trusted_endpoint_hosts: frozenset[str],
+) -> None:
+    """Validate an endpoint URL pulled from an OIDC/OAuth discovery document.
+
+    Applies :func:`validate_url_no_ssrf` plus the same-origin / trusted-host
+    constraint: the endpoint host must equal the issuer host, be in the
+    well-known trust map, or be in the operator-supplied
+    ``trusted_endpoint_hosts``.  Effective port (with scheme defaults
+    applied) and scheme must match the issuer.
+
+    Raises :class:`OAuthSSRFError` on validation failure.
+    """
+    parsed = validate_url_no_ssrf(url, allow_http=allow_http)
+
+    issuer_hostname = (issuer_parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    endpoint_hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+
+    if parsed.scheme != issuer_parsed.scheme:
+        raise OAuthSSRFError(
+            f"discovered endpoint scheme ({parsed.scheme}) "
+            f"does not match issuer ({issuer_parsed.scheme}): {url}"
+        )
+
+    known_trusted = KNOWN_TRUSTED_OAUTH_ENDPOINT_HOSTS.get(issuer_hostname, frozenset())
+    host_allowed = (
+        endpoint_hostname == issuer_hostname
+        or endpoint_hostname in known_trusted
+        or endpoint_hostname in trusted_endpoint_hosts
+    )
+    if not host_allowed:
+        raise OAuthSSRFError(
+            f"discovered endpoint host ({endpoint_hostname}) "
+            f"does not match issuer ({issuer_hostname}) and is not trusted: {url}"
+        )
+
+    endpoint_port = effective_port(parsed)
+    issuer_port = effective_port(issuer_parsed)
+    if endpoint_port != issuer_port:
+        raise OAuthSSRFError(
+            f"discovered endpoint port ({endpoint_port}) "
+            f"does not match issuer ({issuer_port}): {url}"
+        )
+
+
+async def validate_url_no_ssrf_async(url: str, *, allow_http: bool) -> urllib.parse.ParseResult:
+    """Async variant of :func:`validate_url_no_ssrf` for hot-path callers.
+
+    The synchronous variant calls ``socket.getaddrinfo``, which blocks
+    the event loop. Async OAuth flows (notably
+    :mod:`turnstone.core.mcp_oauth`) wrap their validation calls in
+    :func:`asyncio.to_thread` to keep the loop responsive. This wrapper
+    centralises that wrapping so callers don't repeat the idiom.
+    """
+    return await asyncio.to_thread(validate_url_no_ssrf, url, allow_http=allow_http)
+
+
+async def validate_discovered_endpoint_async(
+    url: str,
+    issuer_parsed: urllib.parse.ParseResult,
+    *,
+    allow_http: bool,
+    trusted_endpoint_hosts: frozenset[str],
+) -> None:
+    """Async variant of :func:`validate_discovered_endpoint`."""
+    await asyncio.to_thread(
+        validate_discovered_endpoint,
+        url,
+        issuer_parsed,
+        allow_http=allow_http,
+        trusted_endpoint_hosts=trusted_endpoint_hosts,
+    )
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "KNOWN_TRUSTED_OAUTH_ENDPOINT_HOSTS",
+    "OAuthSSRFError",
+    "effective_port",
+    "is_localhost",
+    "sanitize_log_text",
+    "validate_discovered_endpoint",
+    "validate_discovered_endpoint_async",
+    "validate_url_no_ssrf",
+    "validate_url_no_ssrf_async",
+]
@@ -7,22 +7,34 @@ event loop.

 from __future__ import annotations

+import asyncio
 import base64
 import dataclasses
 import hashlib
-import ipaddress
 import os
 import re
 import secrets
-import socket
 import urllib.parse
 import uuid
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
-from typing import Any
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any

 import httpx

+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Mapping
+
 from turnstone.core.log import get_logger
+from turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf import (
+    OAuthSSRFError,
+    is_localhost,
+)
+from turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf import (
+    validate_discovered_endpoint as _ssrf_validate_discovered_endpoint,
+)
+from turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf import (
+    validate_url_no_ssrf as _ssrf_validate_url_no_ssrf,
+)

 log = get_logger(__name__)

@@ -30,6 +42,11 @@ log = get_logger(__name__)
 # Not a valid bcrypt hash -- verify_password() always rejects it.
 OIDC_PASSWORD_SENTINEL = "!oidc"

+# Lifetime of an OIDC authorization-flow pending-state row. Bounds the window
+# between /authorize and /callback; longer than typical IdP latency, shorter
+# than a stale browser tab.
+OIDC_STATE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
+
 # Sanitisation pattern: only keep safe username characters.
 _USERNAME_SAFE_RE = re.compile(r"[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]")

@@ -49,9 +66,8 @@ _ALLOWED_ID_TOKEN_ALGS = [
    "PS512",
 ]

-
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Exception
+# Exceptions
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


@@ -59,6 +75,22 @@ class OIDCError(Exception):
    """Raised when an OIDC operation fails."""


+class OIDCKeyNotFoundError(OIDCError):
+    """Raised when an ID token's signing key is absent from the cached JWKS.
+
+    Distinguishing this from generic OIDCError lets the callback retry once
+    after re-fetching JWKS (key rotation), without depending on substring
+    matching of the error message.
+    """
+
+
+def _sanitize_log_text(s: str, limit: int) -> str:
+    """Legacy alias for the shared :func:`oauth_ssrf.sanitize_log_text`."""
+    from turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf import sanitize_log_text
+
+    return sanitize_log_text(s, limit)
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Configuration
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -66,7 +98,20 @@ class OIDCError(Exception):

@dataclass(frozen=True)
 class OIDCConfig:
-    """OIDC provider configuration -- immutable after startup."""
+    """OIDC provider configuration -- immutable after startup.
+
+    The dataclass has a two-phase lifecycle:
+
+    Startup-config fields (set by :func:`load_oidc_config`):
+        ``enabled``, ``issuer``, ``client_id``, ``client_secret``, ``scopes``,
+        ``provider_name``, ``role_claim``, ``role_map``, ``password_enabled``,
+        ``redirect_base``, ``trusted_endpoint_hosts``.
+
+    Discovery-derived fields (set by :func:`discover_oidc`; empty before
+    discovery completes):
+        ``authorization_endpoint``, ``token_endpoint``, ``userinfo_endpoint``,
+        ``jwks_uri``.
+    """

    enabled: bool = False
    issuer: str = ""
@@ -78,6 +123,7 @@ class OIDCConfig:
    role_map: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
    password_enabled: bool = True
    redirect_base: str = ""
+    trusted_endpoint_hosts: tuple[str, ...] = ()
    # Discovered from .well-known/openid-configuration
    authorization_endpoint: str = ""
    token_endpoint: str = ""
@@ -98,6 +144,32 @@ def _parse_role_map(raw: str) -> dict[str, str]:
    return result


+def _parse_trusted_endpoint_hosts(raw: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Parse a comma-separated host list into a normalised tuple."""
+    hosts: list[str] = []
+    for entry in raw.split(","):
+        host = entry.strip().lower()
+        if host:
+            hosts.append(host)
+    return tuple(hosts)
+
+
+def _env_or_cfg_str(env_name: str, cfg: Mapping[str, Any], key: str, default: str = "") -> str:
+    """Resolve a string field: env var (stripped, non-empty) wins, else config, else default."""
+    val = os.environ.get(env_name, "").strip()
+    if not val:
+        val = str(cfg.get(key, default)).strip()
+    return val
+
+
+def _env_or_cfg_bool(env_name: str, cfg: Mapping[str, Any], key: str, default: bool) -> bool:
+    """Resolve a boolean field: env var (stripped) wins when set, else config, else default."""
+    raw = os.environ.get(env_name, "").strip().lower()
+    if raw:
+        return raw in ("true", "1", "yes")
+    return bool(cfg.get(key, default))
+
+
 def load_oidc_config() -> OIDCConfig:
    """Build :class:`OIDCConfig` from env vars with config.toml fallback.

@@ -108,30 +180,15 @@ def load_oidc_config() -> OIDCConfig:

    cfg = load_config("oidc")

-    # Start with config.toml values, then override with env vars.
-    issuer = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER", "").strip()
-    if not issuer:
-        issuer = str(cfg.get("issuer", "")).strip()
-
-    client_id = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID", "").strip()
-    if not client_id:
-        client_id = str(cfg.get("client_id", "")).strip()
-
-    client_secret = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", "").strip()
-    if not client_secret:
-        client_secret = str(cfg.get("client_secret", "")).strip()
-
-    scopes = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_SCOPES", "").strip()
-    if not scopes:
-        scopes = str(cfg.get("scopes", "openid email profile")).strip()
-
-    provider_name = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME", "").strip()
-    if not provider_name:
-        provider_name = str(cfg.get("provider_name", "SSO")).strip()
-
-    role_claim = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM", "").strip()
-    if not role_claim:
-        role_claim = str(cfg.get("role_claim", "")).strip()
+    issuer = _env_or_cfg_str("TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER", cfg, "issuer")
+    client_id = _env_or_cfg_str("TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID", cfg, "client_id")
+    client_secret = _env_or_cfg_str("TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", cfg, "client_secret")
+    scopes = _env_or_cfg_str("TURNSTONE_OIDC_SCOPES", cfg, "scopes", "openid email profile")
+    provider_name = _env_or_cfg_str("TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME", cfg, "provider_name", "SSO")
+    role_claim = _env_or_cfg_str("TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM", cfg, "role_claim")
+    password_enabled = _env_or_cfg_bool(
+        "TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED", cfg, "password_enabled", True
+    )

    # Role map: env var is "admin:builtin-admin,eng:builtin-operator"
    role_map_raw = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP", "").strip()
@@ -141,16 +198,21 @@ def load_oidc_config() -> OIDCConfig:
        cfg_role_map = cfg.get("role_map", {})
        role_map = dict(cfg_role_map) if isinstance(cfg_role_map, dict) else {}

-    password_raw = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED", "").strip().lower()
-    if password_raw:
-        password_enabled = password_raw in ("true", "1", "yes")
+    trusted_hosts_raw = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS", "").strip()
+    if trusted_hosts_raw:
+        trusted_endpoint_hosts = _parse_trusted_endpoint_hosts(trusted_hosts_raw)
    else:
-        password_enabled = bool(cfg.get("password_enabled", True))
+        cfg_trusted = cfg.get("trusted_endpoint_hosts", "")
+        if isinstance(cfg_trusted, list):
+            trusted_endpoint_hosts = _parse_trusted_endpoint_hosts(
+                ",".join(str(h) for h in cfg_trusted)
+            )
+        else:
+            trusted_endpoint_hosts = _parse_trusted_endpoint_hosts(str(cfg_trusted))

-    redirect_base = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE", "").strip()
-    if not redirect_base:
-        redirect_base = str(cfg.get("redirect_base", "")).strip()
-    redirect_base = redirect_base.rstrip("/")
+    redirect_base = _env_or_cfg_str("TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE", cfg, "redirect_base").rstrip(
+        "/"
+    )
    if redirect_base:
        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(redirect_base)
        if parsed.scheme not in ("https", "http"):
@@ -212,17 +274,25 @@ def load_oidc_config() -> OIDCConfig:
        role_map=role_map,
        password_enabled=password_enabled,
        redirect_base=redirect_base,
+        trusted_endpoint_hosts=trusted_endpoint_hosts,
    )


 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # SSRF validation
+#
+# The actual checks live in :mod:`turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf` so the MCP OAuth
+# flow can reuse them. The wrappers below preserve OIDC's public API by
+# converting :class:`OAuthSSRFError` to :class:`OIDCError`.
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


-def _is_localhost(hostname: str) -> bool:
-    """Return True if *hostname* refers to the loopback interface."""
-    return hostname in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1") or hostname.endswith(".localhost")
+def _validate_url_no_ssrf(url: str, *, allow_http: bool) -> urllib.parse.ParseResult:
+    """OIDC-flavoured wrapper around :func:`oauth_ssrf.validate_url_no_ssrf`."""
+    try:
+        return _ssrf_validate_url_no_ssrf(url, allow_http=allow_http)
+    except OAuthSSRFError as exc:
+        raise OIDCError(str(exc)) from exc


 def validate_issuer_url(url: str) -> None:
@@ -235,39 +305,44 @@ def validate_issuer_url(url: str) -> None:

    Raises :class:`OIDCError` on validation failure.
    """
-    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
+    _validate_url_no_ssrf(url, allow_http=True)

-    # Require a hostname.
-    hostname = parsed.hostname
-    if not hostname:
-        raise OIDCError(f"OIDC issuer URL has no hostname: {url}")

-    # Reject embedded credentials — redact userinfo from error message.
-    if parsed.username or parsed.password:
-        raise OIDCError("OIDC issuer URL must not contain embedded credentials (userinfo)")
+def validate_discovered_endpoint(
+    url: str,
+    issuer_parsed: urllib.parse.ParseResult,
+    *,
+    allow_http: bool,
+    trusted_endpoint_hosts: frozenset[str],
+) -> None:
+    """Validate an endpoint pulled from an IdP discovery document.

-    # Require HTTPS (allow HTTP only for localhost development).
-    if parsed.scheme != "https":
-        if parsed.scheme == "http" and _is_localhost(hostname):
-            pass  # Allow http://localhost for dev
-        else:
-            raise OIDCError(f"OIDC issuer URL must use HTTPS (got {parsed.scheme}://): {url}")
+    Applies the same scheme/userinfo/SSRF rules as :func:`validate_issuer_url`,
+    then constrains the host: by default the endpoint must share the issuer's
+    hostname. Strict equality is intentional — a hostile or compromised IdP
+    must not be able to redirect ``token_endpoint`` to a third-party host where
+    ``client_secret`` would leak. Multi-origin IdPs (e.g. Google) are
+    accommodated via :data:`turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf.KNOWN_TRUSTED_OAUTH_ENDPOINT_HOSTS`
+    plus an operator-configurable ``trusted_endpoint_hosts`` list.

-    # Resolve hostname and reject non-globally-routable addresses.
+    The scheme must match the issuer's scheme, and the *effective* port (with
+    scheme defaults applied) must match — so ``https://host`` and
+    ``https://host:443`` are treated as identical.
+
+    ``allow_http`` should track whether the *issuer* URL was localhost, so the
+    whole flow is allowed to be HTTP only in dev mode.
+
+    Raises :class:`OIDCError` on validation failure.
+    """
    try:
-        addr_infos = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None, proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP)
-    except socket.gaierror as exc:
-        raise OIDCError(f"OIDC issuer hostname cannot be resolved: {hostname}") from exc
-
-    for _family, _type, _proto, _canonname, sockaddr in addr_infos:
-        try:
-            addr = ipaddress.ip_address(sockaddr[0])
-        except ValueError as exc:
-            raise OIDCError(
-                f"OIDC issuer hostname resolved to invalid IP {sockaddr[0]!r}: {hostname}"
-            ) from exc
-        if not addr.is_global and not _is_localhost(hostname):
-            raise OIDCError(f"OIDC issuer URL resolves to non-public address ({addr}): {url}")
+        _ssrf_validate_discovered_endpoint(
+            url,
+            issuer_parsed,
+            allow_http=allow_http,
+            trusted_endpoint_hosts=trusted_endpoint_hosts,
+        )
+    except OAuthSSRFError as exc:
+        raise OIDCError(str(exc)) from exc


 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -275,28 +350,50 @@ def validate_issuer_url(url: str) -> None:
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


-async def discover_oidc(config: OIDCConfig) -> OIDCConfig:
+async def discover_oidc(
+    config: OIDCConfig,
+    *,
+    client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,
+) -> OIDCConfig:
    """Fetch OIDC discovery document and return updated config with endpoints.

    On failure, logs a warning and returns config with ``enabled=False``.
+
+    A long-lived ``client`` may be supplied to amortise TLS / connection
+    setup across calls; when ``None`` a transient client is used (the
+    legacy shape, kept so tests don't need lifecycle management).
    """
    if not config.issuer:
        return dataclasses.replace(config, enabled=False)

    try:
-        validate_issuer_url(config.issuer)
+        issuer_parsed = _validate_url_no_ssrf(config.issuer, allow_http=True)
    except OIDCError as exc:
        log.warning("OIDC issuer URL rejected: %s", exc)
        return dataclasses.replace(config, enabled=False)

    url = config.issuer.rstrip("/") + "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
    try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
-            resp = await client.get(url)
+        if client is not None:
+            resp = await client.get(url, timeout=10.0)
            resp.raise_for_status()
            doc = resp.json()
-    except Exception as exc:
-        log.warning("OIDC discovery failed for %s: %s", config.issuer, exc)
+        else:
+            async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as transient:
+                resp = await transient.get(url)
+                resp.raise_for_status()
+                doc = resp.json()
+    except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError, KeyError) as exc:
+        # ValueError covers json.JSONDecodeError (subclass).
+        log.warning("OIDC discovery failed for %s: %s", config.issuer, exc, exc_info=True)
+        return dataclasses.replace(config, enabled=False)
+
+    if not isinstance(doc, dict):
+        log.warning(
+            "OIDC discovery document for %s is not a JSON object (got %s)",
+            config.issuer,
+            type(doc).__name__,
+        )
        return dataclasses.replace(config, enabled=False)

    authorization_endpoint = str(doc.get("authorization_endpoint", ""))
@@ -311,6 +408,41 @@ async def discover_oidc(config: OIDCConfig) -> OIDCConfig:
        )
        return dataclasses.replace(config, enabled=False)

+    allow_http = is_localhost(issuer_parsed.hostname or "")
+    trusted_hosts = frozenset(h.lower() for h in config.trusted_endpoint_hosts)
+    required = (
+        ("authorization_endpoint", authorization_endpoint),
+        ("token_endpoint", token_endpoint),
+        ("jwks_uri", jwks_uri),
+    )
+    for name, endpoint_url in required:
+        try:
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                endpoint_url,
+                issuer_parsed,
+                allow_http=allow_http,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=trusted_hosts,
+            )
+        except OIDCError as exc:
+            log.warning("OIDC discovered %s rejected (url=%s): %s", name, endpoint_url, exc)
+            return dataclasses.replace(config, enabled=False)
+
+    if userinfo_endpoint:
+        try:
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                userinfo_endpoint,
+                issuer_parsed,
+                allow_http=allow_http,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=trusted_hosts,
+            )
+        except OIDCError as exc:
+            log.warning(
+                "OIDC discovered userinfo_endpoint rejected (url=%s): %s",
+                userinfo_endpoint,
+                exc,
+            )
+            return dataclasses.replace(config, enabled=False)
+
    log.info("OIDC discovery complete: %s", config.issuer)
    return dataclasses.replace(
        config,
@@ -326,38 +458,154 @@ async def discover_oidc(config: OIDCConfig) -> OIDCConfig:
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


-async def fetch_jwks(jwks_uri: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+async def fetch_jwks(
+    jwks_uri: str,
+    *,
+    client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
    """Fetch the JWKS key set from the IdP.

    Returns the parsed JSON document (``{"keys": [...]}``) .  Called during
    startup discovery and on-demand when an unknown ``kid`` is encountered
    (key rotation).  Uses ``httpx.AsyncClient`` — never blocks the event loop.

-    Raises :class:`OIDCError` on network failures or malformed responses.
+    A long-lived ``client`` may be supplied to share connection pooling;
+    when ``None`` a transient client is used.
+
+    Raises :class:`OIDCError` on HTTP error or malformed JSON.
    """
    try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
-            resp = await client.get(jwks_uri)
+        if client is not None:
+            resp = await client.get(jwks_uri, timeout=10.0)
            resp.raise_for_status()
            result: dict[str, Any] = resp.json()
-    except Exception as exc:
+        else:
+            async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as transient:
+                resp = await transient.get(jwks_uri)
+                resp.raise_for_status()
+                result = resp.json()
+    except (httpx.HTTPError, ValueError) as exc:
+        # ValueError covers json.JSONDecodeError (subclass).
        raise OIDCError(f"JWKS fetch failed: {exc}") from exc
+    if not isinstance(result, dict):
+        raise OIDCError("JWKS document is not a JSON object")
    if not isinstance(result.get("keys"), list):
        raise OIDCError("JWKS document missing 'keys' array")
    return result


+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Lifespan integration
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def initialize_oidc_state(app_state: Any) -> None:
+    """Run OIDC discovery + JWKS prefetch and stash results on ``app_state``.
+
+    Reads ``app_state.oidc_config`` (already set to a non-discovered config
+    by the lifespan), runs :func:`discover_oidc` and :func:`fetch_jwks`, and
+    writes back the populated ``oidc_config`` plus ``jwks_data``.
+
+    Post-conditions on ``app_state``:
+
+    - On disable (config flag off, discovery failure, discovery-returned-disabled,
+      missing ``redirect_base``): ``oidc_config.enabled is False``,
+      ``jwks_data is None``, ``oidc_http_client is None``.
+    - On JWKS-prefetch failure with otherwise-valid config: ``oidc_config.enabled``
+      stays ``True`` and ``jwks_data is None`` so the callback's lazy-fetch
+      retry path can recover from a transient IdP failure at startup. The
+      long-lived ``oidc_http_client`` stays open for that retry.
+    - On full success: ``oidc_config`` populated with discovered endpoints,
+      ``jwks_data`` populated, ``oidc_http_client`` open for the runtime
+      callback path. Pair with :func:`close_oidc_state` in lifespan teardown.
+    """
+    cfg: OIDCConfig = app_state.oidc_config
+    app_state.jwks_refetch_lock = asyncio.Lock()
+    if not cfg.enabled:
+        app_state.jwks_data = None
+        app_state.oidc_http_client = None
+        return
+
+    # Use a transient client for discovery so the long-lived client is only
+    # installed once we know OIDC will actually be enabled.  The disable
+    # branches below would otherwise leak sockets until shutdown.
+    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as transient_client:
+        # Discovery is operator-controlled config; any unexpected failure
+        # must disable OIDC rather than escape and bring down the service.
+        try:
+            cfg = await discover_oidc(cfg, client=transient_client)
+        except Exception:
+            log.warning("OIDC discovery failed -- OIDC login disabled", exc_info=True)
+            app_state.oidc_config = dataclasses.replace(cfg, enabled=False)
+            app_state.jwks_data = None
+            app_state.oidc_http_client = None
+            return
+
+    if not cfg.enabled:
+        app_state.oidc_config = cfg
+        app_state.jwks_data = None
+        app_state.oidc_http_client = None
+        return
+
+    if not cfg.redirect_base:
+        log.error(
+            "OIDC enabled but TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE is unset. "
+            "This is required to prevent Host-header-derived redirect_uri spoofing. "
+            "Set it to your service's externally-visible URL "
+            "(e.g. https://idp.example.com). OIDC will be disabled."
+        )
+        app_state.oidc_config = dataclasses.replace(cfg, enabled=False)
+        app_state.jwks_data = None
+        app_state.oidc_http_client = None
+        return
+
+    http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0)
+    app_state.oidc_http_client = http_client
+
+    try:
+        jwks_data = await fetch_jwks(cfg.jwks_uri, client=http_client)
+    except OIDCError:
+        # Keep enabled=True so the callback's lazy-fetch retry path can
+        # recover if the IdP transiently failed during startup. The
+        # http_client stays open for that retry.
+        log.warning("OIDC JWKS prefetch failed -- will retry on first login", exc_info=True)
+        app_state.oidc_config = cfg
+        app_state.jwks_data = None
+        return
+
+    app_state.oidc_config = cfg
+    app_state.jwks_data = jwks_data
+    log.info("OIDC enabled: %s (%s)", cfg.provider_name, cfg.issuer)
+
+
+async def close_oidc_state(app_state: Any) -> None:
+    """Close the long-lived OIDC HTTP client installed by :func:`initialize_oidc_state`.
+
+    Safe to call when OIDC was never enabled — does nothing.
+    """
+    client = getattr(app_state, "oidc_http_client", None)
+    if client is not None:
+        try:
+            await client.aclose()
+        except Exception:
+            log.debug("OIDC http client close failed", exc_info=True)
+        app_state.oidc_http_client = None
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # PKCE helpers
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


-def generate_pkce_pair() -> tuple[str, str]:
-    """Generate a PKCE code_verifier and code_challenge pair."""
-    code_verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
-    digest = hashlib.sha256(code_verifier.encode("ascii")).digest()
-    code_challenge = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
-    return code_verifier, code_challenge
+def generate_pkce_verifier() -> str:
+    """Generate a PKCE code_verifier.
+
+    The matching code_challenge is recomputed from the verifier inside
+    :func:`build_authorize_url`, so callers that only need the verifier
+    (the value stored in pending state for the callback's token exchange)
+    don't have to discard a separately-returned challenge.
+    """
+    return secrets.token_urlsafe(48)


 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -399,9 +647,14 @@ async def exchange_code(
    code: str,
    redirect_uri: str,
    code_verifier: str,
+    *,
+    client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
    """Exchange authorization code for tokens at the token endpoint.

+    A long-lived ``client`` may be supplied; when ``None`` a transient
+    client is used.
+
    Raises :class:`OIDCError` on non-200 response.
    """
    data = {
@@ -413,16 +666,24 @@ async def exchange_code(
        "code_verifier": code_verifier,
    }
    try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
-            resp = await client.post(config.token_endpoint, data=data)
+        if client is not None:
+            resp = await client.post(config.token_endpoint, data=data, timeout=10.0)
+        else:
+            async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as transient:
+                resp = await transient.post(config.token_endpoint, data=data)
    except Exception as exc:
        raise OIDCError(f"Token exchange request failed: {exc}") from exc

    if resp.status_code != 200:
-        raise OIDCError(f"Token endpoint returned {resp.status_code}: {resp.text[:500]}")
+        raise OIDCError(
+            f"Token endpoint returned {resp.status_code}: {_sanitize_log_text(resp.text, 500)}"
+        )

-    result: dict[str, Any] = resp.json()
-    return result
+    result = resp.json()
+    if not isinstance(result, dict):
+        raise OIDCError("Token endpoint returned non-dict body")
+    typed: dict[str, Any] = result
+    return typed


 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -479,7 +740,7 @@ def validate_id_token(
                raise OIDCError(f"Failed to parse signing key: {exc}") from exc

    if signing_key is None:
-        raise OIDCError(f"Signing key '{kid}' not found in JWKS")
+        raise OIDCKeyNotFoundError(f"Signing key '{kid}' not found in JWKS")

    try:
        claims: dict[str, Any] = jwt.decode(
@@ -503,6 +764,41 @@ def validate_id_token(
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


+def _ensure_default_role(
+    storage: Any,
+    user_id: str,
+    desired_role_ids: set[str] | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    """Self-heal safety-net: assign builtin-viewer if the user has zero roles.
+
+    Runs after :func:`apply_role_mapping` on both the new-user and
+    existing-identity paths so a user stranded by a transient failure
+    during initial role mapping (e.g. a DB blip after ``create_oidc_user``
+    committed) recovers on next login.  ``assigned_by="oidc-default"``
+    deliberately differs from ``"oidc"`` so claim-driven revocation in
+    ``apply_role_mapping`` leaves it alone.
+
+    The optional ``desired_role_ids`` is a hint: when the caller already
+    knows claim-driven mapping populated at least one role, we skip the
+    ``list_user_roles`` query.
+
+    No-op when builtin-viewer is unavailable (admin removed it from the
+    role table) or the user already has at least one role.
+
+    Note: if an admin manually strips all roles from an OIDC user, this
+    helper will re-grant viewer on the next login.  The documented way to
+    deny an OIDC user access is to unlink their OIDC identity, not to
+    strip roles.
+    """
+    if desired_role_ids:
+        return
+    if storage.get_role("builtin-viewer") is None:
+        return
+    if storage.list_user_roles(user_id):
+        return
+    storage.assign_role(user_id, "builtin-viewer", "oidc-default")
+
+
 def provision_oidc_user(
    storage: Any,
    config: OIDCConfig,
@@ -512,10 +808,13 @@ def provision_oidc_user(

    Looks up an existing OIDC identity by (issuer, sub).  If found,
    updates ``last_login`` and applies role mapping.  Otherwise creates
-    a new user and OIDC identity record.
+    a new user and OIDC identity record atomically.

-    Raises :class:`OIDCError` if user creation fails.
+    Raises :class:`OIDCError` if user creation fails or if a concurrent
+    callback wins the username / identity race.
    """
+    from turnstone.core.storage import StorageConflictError
+
    issuer = config.issuer
    sub = str(claims["sub"])
    email = str(claims.get("email", ""))
@@ -526,25 +825,32 @@ def provision_oidc_user(
    if identity is not None:
        user_id = identity["user_id"]
        storage.update_oidc_identity_login(issuer, sub)
-        apply_role_mapping(storage, user_id, claims, config)
+        desired_role_ids = apply_role_mapping(storage, user_id, claims, config)
+        _ensure_default_role(storage, user_id, desired_role_ids)
        user: dict[str, str] | None = storage.get_user(user_id)
        if user is None:
            raise OIDCError(f"OIDC identity references missing user: {user_id}")
        return user

-    # New user -- derive username
+    # New user -- derive username, then create user + identity atomically.
    username = _derive_username(storage, claims)
    user_id = uuid.uuid4().hex

-    storage.create_user(user_id, username, display_name, OIDC_PASSWORD_SENTINEL)
-    storage.create_oidc_identity(issuer, sub, user_id, email)
-    apply_role_mapping(storage, user_id, claims, config)
+    try:
+        storage.create_oidc_user(
+            user_id,
+            username,
+            display_name,
+            OIDC_PASSWORD_SENTINEL,
+            issuer,
+            sub,
+            email,
+        )
+    except StorageConflictError as exc:
+        raise OIDCError(f"OIDC provisioning failed: {exc}") from exc

-    # Ensure new OIDC users have at least a default role so they can
-    # access the application.  builtin-viewer grants read-only access.
-    user_roles = storage.list_user_roles(user_id)
-    if not user_roles and storage.get_role("builtin-viewer") is not None:
-        storage.assign_role(user_id, "builtin-viewer", "oidc-default")
+    desired_role_ids = apply_role_mapping(storage, user_id, claims, config)
+    _ensure_default_role(storage, user_id, desired_role_ids)

    created_user: dict[str, str] | None = storage.get_user(user_id)
    if created_user is None:
@@ -570,14 +876,13 @@ def _derive_username(storage: Any, claims: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
    if not sanitised:
        sanitised = "user"

-    # Check validity and uniqueness.
-    if is_valid_username(sanitised) and storage.get_user_by_username(sanitised) is None:
-        return sanitised
-
-    # Deduplicate: append suffix.
-    for suffix in range(2, 11):
-        candidate = f"{sanitised[:60]}{suffix}"
-        if is_valid_username(candidate) and storage.get_user_by_username(candidate) is None:
+    # Build the full set of bounded candidates (base + 2..10 suffixes), strip
+    # invalid forms, then ask storage which ones are already taken in one query.
+    candidates = [sanitised, *(f"{sanitised[:60]}{n}" for n in range(2, 11))]
+    valid_candidates = [c for c in candidates if is_valid_username(c)]
+    existing = storage.find_existing_usernames(valid_candidates)
+    for candidate in valid_candidates:
+        if candidate not in existing:
            return candidate

    # Last resort: full UUID suffix with validation + uniqueness check.
@@ -600,18 +905,22 @@ def apply_role_mapping(
    user_id: str,
    claims: dict[str, Any],
    config: OIDCConfig,
-) -> None:
-    """Sync Turnstone roles from OIDC claims.
+) -> set[str]:
+    """Sync Turnstone roles from OIDC claims.  Returns desired role id set.

    If ``config.role_claim`` is set, reads the corresponding claim value,
    normalises it to a list, and maps each value via ``config.role_map``
    to a Turnstone role ID.  Roles assigned by OIDC on previous logins
    that are no longer present in the claims are revoked (IdP demotions
-    propagate).  Roles assigned manually or by other sources are never
-    touched.
+    propagate).  Roles assigned manually or by other sources (including
+    the ``oidc-default`` builtin-viewer fallback) are never touched.
+
+    The returned ``desired_role_ids`` lets the caller decide whether to
+    apply the new-user fallback role without a second ``list_user_roles``
+    round-trip.
    """
    if not config.role_claim or not config.role_map:
-        return
+        return set()

    claim_value = claims.get(config.role_claim)

@@ -632,16 +941,10 @@ def apply_role_mapping(
        if role_id and storage.get_role(role_id) is not None:
            desired_role_ids.add(role_id)

-    # Add new roles from claims.
-    for role_id in desired_role_ids:
-        storage.assign_role(user_id, role_id, "oidc")
+    added, removed = storage.replace_oidc_roles(user_id, desired_role_ids)
+    for role_id in added:
        log.debug("Assigned role %s to user %s via OIDC claim", role_id, user_id)
+    for role_id in removed:
+        log.info("Revoked role %s from user %s (removed from IdP claims)", role_id, user_id)

-    # Revoke OIDC-assigned roles no longer present in claims.
-    current_roles = storage.list_user_roles(user_id)
-    for role in current_roles:
-        if role.get("assigned_by") == "oidc" and role["role_id"] not in desired_role_ids:
-            storage.unassign_role(user_id, role["role_id"])
-            log.info(
-                "Revoked role %s from user %s (removed from IdP claims)", role["role_id"], user_id
-            )
+    return desired_role_ids
@@ -2269,7 +2269,10 @@ def make_history_handler(cfg: SessionEndpointConfig) -> Handler:
        messages: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
        if storage is not None:
            try:
-                messages = await asyncio.to_thread(storage.load_messages, ws_id, limit=limit)
+                # repair=False — display read; see reconstruct_messages docstring.
+                messages = await asyncio.to_thread(
+                    storage.load_messages, ws_id, limit=limit, repair=False
+                )
            except Exception:
                log.debug("ws.history.load_failed ws=%s", ws_id[:8], exc_info=True)
        # Audit-trail decoration — attach persisted intent_verdict and
@@ -2287,7 +2290,14 @@ def make_history_handler(cfg: SessionEndpointConfig) -> Handler:
                )

                indexes = await asyncio.to_thread(load_verdict_indexes, ws_id)
-                decorate_history_messages(messages, indexes[0], indexes[1])
+                # Pure transform but iterates every message and every
+                # tool_call dict — for a long workstream the pass takes
+                # tens of milliseconds and would otherwise block the
+                # event loop's hot path on the request handler.
+                # ``decorate_history_messages`` is thread-safe (no
+                # shared mutable state beyond the per-call message
+                # list) so the off-loop hop is free.
+                await asyncio.to_thread(decorate_history_messages, messages, indexes[0], indexes[1])
            except Exception:
                # Operationally interesting: a persistent decoration
                # failure (missing migration, driver mismatch, schema
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More