Compare commits

...

174 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Patrick Buckley b3934a2d14 bump: v0.8.6
Hotfix: DDG web search returning empty results.

- Switch dependency from duckduckgo-search (deprecated shim, empty
  results) to ddgs>=9.0 (actively maintained successor)
- Include ddg extra in Docker image for free web search fallback
- Update all user-facing install instructions to reference ddgs
2026-03-23 16:17:28 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 3d02cf66b4 review: update stale duckduckgo-search references to ddgs 2026-03-23 16:09:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7631b88792 fix: switch DDG dependency from duckduckgo-search to ddgs
duckduckgo-search 8.x is a deprecated shim that returns empty results
(upstream temporarily disabled HTML/Lite backends, Bing backend broken).
The package was renamed to ddgs in v9.x which works correctly.
2026-03-23 16:09:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley a07172b0c0 fix: include ddg extra in Docker image for free web search fallback 2026-03-23 15:23:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f3d33bf44a bump: v0.8.5
Features:
- Pluggable web search backends — DDG as free default, Tavily, MCP (#166)
- --config flag and $TURNSTONE_CONFIG env var (#160)
- Live session config via ConfigStore point-of-use reads (#154)
- PostgreSQL CI integration tests (#156)
- Skill priority ordering (#144)
- Raise scaling limits for 1000-node clusters (#129)

Security:
- Output guard wired into agent loops — plan + task agents (#168)
- Tool policy enforcement in CLI, bridge, and channel (#168)
- Subprocess environment scrubbing — API keys stripped (#168)
- OIDC issuer SSRF validation (#140)
- MCP registry URL scheme validation (#133)
- Output guard enabled in CLI mode (#134)

Reliability:
- Bridge approval/plan review TOCTOU races fixed (#167)
- SQLite WAL mode, eviction cancel, title retry (#151)
- Health monitor OPEN → HALF_OPEN autonomous probe (#152)
- ConfigStore spec alignment (#153)
- Critical production readiness fixes (#147)
- Server startup stampede prevention (#132)
- Python 3.14 CancelledError guard (#146)

Performance:
- Conversations index, batch config saves, capabilities cache (#149)

Quality:
- Bridge stress tests (6 scenarios, 100 iterations each) (#157)
- Governance SDK, MCP reload, skill config integration tests
- Structlog standardization across 19 modules (#150)
- Dead code removal (#148)
2026-03-23 15:00:08 -07:00
Patrick Buckley fdb1a189e8 fix: show policy deny reason in CLI approval output
Denied tools now print the error text (e.g. "Blocked by tool policy")
in red below the header, so the user sees why a tool was blocked.
2026-03-23 14:55:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 58e2d9348f review: fix mypy, tighten env scrub, bridge storage safety
Address Copilot + code review feedback:
- Fix mypy: rename tool_names → _policy_names in CLI to avoid type clash
- Tighten env scrub from substring to suffix matching (_KEY, _TOKEN, etc.)
  to avoid false positives on MONKEYTYPE, KEYBOARD_LAYOUT
- Add DATABASE_URL/TURNSTONE_DB_URL to explicit scrub list
- Bridge: use _storage directly instead of get_storage() which
  auto-initializes a local SQLite DB with no admin policies
- Discord bot: add self.storage None guard
- Add tests for suffix-only matching and false positive avoidance
2026-03-23 14:55:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 771d03b8e6 review: fix LESS prefix leak, move policy before auto-approve, add tests
- Move LESS/LESSOPEN/LESSCLOSE/LESSPIPE/LESSCHARSET to _SAFE_NAMES
  instead of prefix matching (prevents LESS_SECRET_TOKEN leak)
- Move bridge policy evaluation before auto-approve check so deny
  policies override auto-approve
- Add storage None guard in Discord bot
- Clean up _policy_handled pattern in Discord bot
- Add debug logging on policy evaluation exceptions
- Add tests: extra overrides scrub, LESS prefix safety
2026-03-23 14:55:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d147aaea36 security: scrub secrets from subprocess environments
New turnstone/core/env.py provides scrubbed_env() that strips API keys,
tokens, passwords, and credentials from os.environ before passing to
subprocesses. Applied to all 5 subprocess call sites: _exec_bash,
_exec_search, _exec_man, watch _run_command, and MCP stdio servers.

Pattern-based scrubbing (KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASSWORD, CREDENTIAL
substrings) plus explicit blocklist for known secrets. Safe vars
(PATH, HOME, locale, etc.) always preserved. Passthrough list for
operator overrides.
2026-03-23 14:55:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8b747178e0 security: enforce tool policies in CLI, bridge, and channel
evaluate_tool_policies_batch() was only called in the server WebUI.
CLI, bridge, and channel entry points now evaluate admin-defined tool
policies before auto-approve checks. Deny policies block tools, allow
policies auto-approve. Best-effort: gracefully skipped if storage is
unavailable.
2026-03-23 14:55:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d57280d807 security: wire output guard into agent loops
_run_agent (plan + task agents) now passes tool results through
_evaluate_output() before appending to context — same as the main
session loop. Runs before truncation so the guard sees full output.
Catches prompt injection, credential leakage, and encoded payloads
in agent tool results that were previously unscanned.
2026-03-23 14:55:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley b9870f279c fix: bridge approval & plan review TOCTOU races (#158, #159) (#167)
* fix: bridge approval & plan review TOCTOU races (#158, #159)

Replace "pop on completion" with a tombstone pattern — pending entries
are marked resolved=True instead of being removed, eliminating the
window where stale SSE reconnect events bypass the duplicate guard.
Resolved tombstones are cleaned up on ws_state events and ws_closed.

Stress tests now pass reliably (previously ~12-16% failure rate).

* review: extract _mark_resolved helper, use real ws_closed path in test, add refinement loop test

Address code review suggestions:
- Extract _mark_resolved() helper in _wait_plan to reduce duplication
- Document cross-stream ordering assumption for plan review refinement
- Race 6 test now calls _handle_global_event instead of manual dict pops
- New Race 7 test validates plan review refinement loop (tombstone → cleanup → re-entry)

* fix: add TTL fallback for tombstone cleanup when global SSE lags

If the global SSE stream is temporarily down while per-WS SSE continues,
resolved tombstones would block legitimate new approvals/plan reviews.
Add a 30s TTL so stale tombstones are expired in the duplicate guard
as a fallback to the normal ws_state-based cleanup.

Also changes tombstone type from (request_id, bool) to
(request_id, float) where 0.0 = active, >0 = resolved_at monotonic time.

* fix: use 3x approval_timeout for tombstone TTL instead of hardcoded 30s

Tie the TTL to the configurable approval_timeout (default 300s = 900s TTL)
rather than a short hardcoded value. The TTL is only a fallback for when
the global SSE stream is completely down — a conservative value is safer.
2026-03-23 14:04:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 71ee340bc6 feat: pluggable web search backends (DDG, Tavily, MCP) (#166)
* feat: pluggable web search backends (DDG, Tavily, MCP)

web_search is now an abstract capability with swappable backends:

- DuckDuckGoClient — free, no API key, uses duckduckgo-search library
- TavilyClient — existing behavior, requires API key
- MCPSearchClient — delegates to any MCP server tool

New tools.web_search_backend setting (ConfigStore + --web-search-backend
CLI flag): '' (auto), 'tavily', 'ddg', or 'mcp:server:tool'.

Auto-detection (default): Tavily if key present, else DDG if installed,
else disabled. This means users with duckduckgo-search installed get
web search for free with local models — no API key needed.

Closes #131

* fix: address Copilot review on pluggable web search

- Unknown backend values now log warning + return None (not silent
  fallthrough to auto-detect)
- Pass timeout to DDGS constructor
- MCP: use math.ceil for timeout, forward topic kwarg
- Fix agent mode web_search gating to use _resolve_search_client()
  instead of get_tavily_key() (was still using old check)
- Update docstring to reflect new backend resolution
- Fix DDG test to patch DDGS import properly
- Add test for unknown backend rejection
2026-03-23 13:21:04 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c5d5d0b7cd fix: update-vendored-js.sh detects old version from filesystem
The script detected the old version from pyproject.toml, which Renovate
had already updated. This caused OLD_DIR == NEW_DIR, so the script
downloaded files then immediately deleted them.

Fix: detect old version from the actual directory on disk. Add a guard
that errors if old == new version to prevent silent data loss.

Also: run the fixed script to vendor katex 0.16.40 (fonts + css + js).
2026-03-23 13:03:49 -07:00
renovate[bot] 1f9d03c3e0 chore(deps): update dependency katex to v0.16.40 2026-03-23 13:03:49 -07:00
renovate[bot] 24e082df05 chore(deps): update postgres docker tag to v18 2026-03-23 12:55:27 -07:00
renovate[bot] 4a78d20eea chore(deps): update dependency typescript to v6 2026-03-23 12:55:18 -07:00
renovate[bot] e0d17e0f99 chore(deps): update ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv docker tag to v0.10.12 2026-03-23 12:55:08 -07:00
renovate[bot] cd6c49dd01 chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v4.1.1 (#162)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 19:53:13 +00:00
Patrick Buckley 8454e961ba feat: --config flag and $TURNSTONE_CONFIG env var (#160)
* feat: --config flag and $TURNSTONE_CONFIG env var for config.toml path

Add set_config_path() to config.py with three-tier resolution:
  1. --config CLI flag (via set_config_path)
  2. $TURNSTONE_CONFIG environment variable
  3. ~/.config/turnstone/config.toml (default)

--config added to all 5 entry points that load config.toml: CLI,
server, console, bridge, eval. Uses parse_known_args pre-parse so
the path is resolved before apply_config reads the file.

Closes #130

* fix: centralize --config pre-parse, fix help and docstrings

- Add add_config_arg() helper with separate pre-parser (add_help=False)
  so --help still shows config-derived defaults
- Replace duplicated pre-parse blocks in all 5 entry points
- Fix set_config_path docstring (works after load_config too)
- Fix module docstring precedence description
- Remove redundant import os in get_tavily_key
2026-03-23 12:26:41 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4ae38bc2ae test: bridge race condition stress tests (#157)
* test: bridge race condition stress tests (5 scenarios)

Repetition-based stress harness (100 iterations per scenario) targeting
threading races in bridge.py:

1. Duplicate approval on SSE reconnect — xfail, confirms known TOCTOU
   race where _wait_approval pops pending entry allowing duplicate
2. Duplicate plan review on SSE reconnect — xfail, same pattern
3. approve_set consistency during concurrent update — passes
4. _running flag visibility across threads — passes
5. Workstream closure during blocked pop_response — passes
6. Concurrent approval + workstream close — passes (no orphaned state)

Two real races confirmed (marked xfail with fix descriptions).

* fix: address Copilot feedback on bridge stress tests

- Fix plan review mock to use correct message type ("plan_feedback")
- Replace fixed sleeps with bounded _wait_pending_clear() polling
- Add assert not t.is_alive() after all thread joins
- Update Race 5 description to reflect timeout validation (not
  closure-unblocks-pop)
- Update plan review xfail reason to mention generation counters
2026-03-23 11:36:42 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ab1a71c86c feat: add PostgreSQL CI integration tests (#156)
* feat: add PostgreSQL CI integration tests

Add --storage-backend pytest option and shared storage_backend fixture
in conftest.py that creates SQLiteBackend or PostgreSQLBackend based
on the flag. Migrate 13 storage test files to use shared fixture
instead of local SQLiteBackend fixtures.

Add test-postgres CI job with PostgreSQL 17 service container that
runs the full test suite against real PostgreSQL.

* fix: use TRUNCATE CASCADE for PG cleanup, wrap in try/finally

TRUNCATE is faster than per-table DELETE and resets autoincrement
sequences. try/except ensures reset_storage() always runs even if
cleanup fails due to a corrupted connection from a failing test.

* fix: document _engine coupling in PG cleanup comment
2026-03-23 11:11:40 -07:00
renovate[bot] ce57df6888 chore(deps): lock file maintenance 2026-03-23 11:04:43 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 275f40eebb feat: live session config via ConfigStore point-of-use reads (#154)
* feat: live session config via ConfigStore point-of-use reads

Existing sessions now pick up admin settings changes without requiring
workstream recreation. ChatSession reads MemoryConfig and JudgeConfig
behavioral flags from ConfigStore at point-of-use via _mem_cfg and
_judge_cfg properties. Judge LLM client config (model, provider,
base_url, api_key) stays frozen from creation time.

Falls back to frozen dataclasses when ConfigStore is absent (CLI mode).

* fix: type config_store param, clarify _ensure_judge guard comment

* fix: re-check live judge.enabled on every _ensure_judge call

Copilot correctly identified that the cached judge was returned without
re-checking the live enabled flag. Move the enabled check before the
cache check so disabling the judge via admin takes immediate effect.
Also defer JudgeConfig import to local scope in _judge_cfg property
to avoid pulling in the full judge module at import time.
Add test for disable-after-init scenario.
2026-03-21 19:16:06 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2c510f8617 fix: medium reliability — SQLite WAL, eviction cancel, title retry (#151)
* fix: medium reliability — SQLite WAL + timeout, eviction cancel, title retry

M1: Increase SQLite busy timeout to 30s and enable WAL journal mode
    for better concurrent read/write. Prevents OperationalError under
    multi-workstream write contention.

M2: Call session.cancel() during workstream eviction cleanup so
    in-flight worker threads stop promptly instead of running to
    completion on an evicted workstream.

M3: Reset _title_generated flag on exception so title generation
    retries on the next successful exchange instead of permanently
    giving up after one failure.

* fix: address review — WAL pragma error handling, title retry ws_id guard

Wrap WAL pragma in try/except and verify returned mode. Log warning if
WAL is not enabled (e.g., filesystem permissions) instead of aborting
connection.

Guard title retry flag reset with ws_id comparison to prevent
re-enabling titling for a different workstream after /resume.

* fix: address review — add title retry tests

Two tests verifying _title_generated flag behavior: reset on failure
(allows retry on next turn), stays True on success. Covers the new
retry logic added in this PR.

* fix: guard title update success path against ws_id change during resume

Use captured ws_id on success path (not just failure path) so a
concurrent resume() can't cause the background title thread to rename
the wrong workstream. Add test for the race scenario.
2026-03-21 17:02:25 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2afb9c7f72 fix: health monitor probe loop transitions OPEN → HALF_OPEN autonomously (#152)
The probe loop continued probing while the circuit was OPEN but never
transitioned to HALF_OPEN — that only happened inside
acquire_request_permit() which requires a user request. If no user
sends a message during the cooldown, the circuit never recovers.

Now the probe loop checks cooldown elapsed and transitions to HALF_OPEN
before probing, so recovery happens automatically without user
interaction.
2026-03-21 16:35:47 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 5b8ab94446 fix: align ConfigStore implementation with spec (#153)
* fix: align ConfigStore implementation with spec

- Add cluster + skills sections to admin UI settings order and labels
- Return default value in DELETE /v1/api/admin/settings response per spec
- Document 4 missing settings in docs/settings.md (trusted_proxies,
  output_guard, redact_secrets, discovery_url) and correct count to 48
- Wire ConfigStore into console server replacing 4 raw
  get_system_setting() calls with validated/cached config_store.get()
- Reload console ConfigStore on settings mutations via
  _publish_config_change()
- Update registry URL tests for ConfigStore-based resolution

* fix: address Copilot review feedback on ConfigStore PR

- Move config_store.reload() before collector guard in
  _publish_config_change() so cache refreshes even without collector
- Add DeleteSettingResponse schema and update OpenAPI spec to match
  the actual delete response (status + key + default)
- Add test asserting default field in delete response
- Fix stale docstring in test helper
2026-03-21 16:12:50 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 30828e9f9c perf: conversations index, batch config saves, capabilities cache (#149)
* perf: add conversations.timestamp index, batch config saves, cache capabilities

P1: Add idx_conversations_timestamp index (migration 025) to eliminate
    full table scans on search_history_recent ORDER BY timestamp DESC.

P2: Batch save_workstream_config — replace N separate SQL statements
    with single executemany call. SQLite uses INSERT OR REPLACE,
    PostgreSQL uses INSERT ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE.

P3: Cache _get_capabilities() result on ChatSession — called 4-6x per
    turn but deterministic for session lifetime. Invalidated on model
    switch.

* fix: address review — capabilities cache bypassed for fallback models

Cache only applies to the primary session model. Fallback models
(different provider/model passed to _get_capabilities) resolve fresh
to avoid stale capability flags affecting tool selection and web search.
2026-03-21 04:29:43 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 6d0dc6df94 chore: standardize logging to structlog get_logger across 19 modules (#150)
Replace bare `import logging` / `logging.getLogger(__name__)` with
`from turnstone.core.log import get_logger` / `get_logger(__name__)`
across all core modules and server.py. This enables structured log
context injection (node_id, ws_id, request_id) in modules that
previously used plain stdlib logging.

Also adds _ensure_stdlib_factory() to log.py for pytest caplog
compatibility when configure_logging() hasn't been called.

Renames `logger` to `log` in skill_sources.py for naming consistency.
2026-03-21 04:29:40 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7e680ee883 chore: remove dead code — chat.py, singular touch, unused vars, inline imports (#148)
* chore: remove dead code — chat.py shim, singular touch method, unused vars

- Delete turnstone/chat.py (backward-compat re-export shim, zero importers)
- Remove touch_structured_memory() singular method from protocol + both
  backends + 6 tests (only plural batch form is used)
- Remove unused _last_err variable in _compact_messages
- Remove redundant _AGENT_AUTO_TOOLS / _TASK_AUTO_TOOLS class aliases,
  use module-level constants directly
- Consolidate ~76 inline schema imports to top-level in both storage
  backends (channel_users, channel_routes, oidc_*, scheduled_tasks,
  watches, services)

Net: -219 lines

* fix: address review — remove stale inline timedelta imports in prune_task_runs

timedelta is already imported at module scope in both backends.
2026-03-21 04:29:37 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e950219246 docs: add beta status warning to README
Mark platform as experimental beta with explicit disclaimers: no
guarantees of determinism, reliability, or backward compatibility.
Advise thorough evaluation before deployment.
2026-03-21 03:43:13 -07:00
Patrick Buckley b3764a8035 fix: critical reliability fixes for production readiness (#147)
* fix: critical reliability fixes for production readiness

C1: Add 1-hour timeout to _approval_event.wait() and _plan_event.wait()
    to prevent permanent worker thread hangs when users disconnect.

C2: Atomically check-and-start worker thread under Workstream._lock to
    prevent race condition where two concurrent send_message requests
    spawn duplicate workers on the same non-thread-safe ChatSession.

C3: Bound _watch_pending queue to maxsize=20 to prevent OOM under
    heavy watch load with busy workstreams.

H1: Add timeout to proc.wait() (10s) and stderr_thread.join() (5s)
    after SIGKILL to prevent indefinite hang on D-state processes.

H2: Protect _pending_verdicts with _ws_lock at all three mutation sites
    (reset in approve_tools, append in on_intent_verdict, swap-and-clear
    in resolve_approval) to prevent lost verdicts from concurrent
    judge daemon and approval threads.

H3: Bound global SSE queue to maxsize=10000 with put_nowait() and
    contextlib.suppress(queue.Full) for backpressure. Prevents
    unbounded memory growth when fanout thread is overloaded.

H4: Bridge SSE threads for closed workstreams now check ws_id membership
    in _ws_threads before reconnecting, preventing thread leak on
    workstream close.

* fix: address review — verdict lock consistency, watch queue non-blocking, SSE drop logging

- Move _last_verdict_decision set inside _ws_lock in resolve_approval()
  so swap+decision is atomic with on_intent_verdict() reads
- Read _last_verdict_decision under _ws_lock in on_intent_verdict()
- Build heuristic_verdicts locally then assign under lock in approve_tools()
- Use resolve_approval() for timeout path so verdicts are updated consistently
- Watch queue producer uses put_nowait with log on Full (prevents WatchRunner hang)
- Global SSE state broadcasts log on queue.Full instead of silent suppress
- Plan event wait also gets 1-hour timeout (same class of bug as approval)
2026-03-21 03:28:01 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 756c4d8929 fix: guard against CancelledError on MCP startup future (Python 3.14) (#146)
On Python 3.14, Future.exception() raises CancelledError on cancelled
futures instead of returning None. Check future.cancelled() before
calling exception() to prevent crash when the MCP event loop shuts down
before _connect_all completes.
2026-03-21 01:06:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 04c50568e9 feat: add priority column for skill ordering control (#144)
* feat: add priority column for skill ordering control

Add priority INTEGER DEFAULT 0 column to prompt_templates (migration
024). Skills with activation="default" are now ordered by priority ASC,
name ASC instead of name-only. Admins can set priority via create/update
API. Lower values run first. Priority is editable on readonly/installed
skills. 4 new tests. Python SDK, TypeScript SDK, and Pydantic models
updated.

* fix: address review — apply priority ordering to list_default_templates

list_default_templates() still ordered by name only, so priority had
no effect on default skill execution order. Update both SQLite and
PostgreSQL backends to order by (priority, name).

* fix: address review — regenerate OpenAPI snapshot, add default template ordering test

Regenerate openapi-console.json to include priority field on skill
models. Add test_list_default_templates_ordered_by_priority to verify
the execution path for default skills respects priority ordering.
2026-03-21 00:53:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 3bf220c503 fix: use approval_label for per-tool always-approve in CLI and bridge (#143)
* fix: use approval_label for per-tool always-approve in CLI and bridge

The server stores approval_label (e.g. mcp__server__tool) for per-tool
auto-approve, but CLI and bridge extracted only func_name (bare tool
name). This caused always-approve decisions to not carry over across
access paths. Align CLI and bridge to prefer approval_label with
func_name fallback, matching the server's WebUI.approve_tools() pattern.

* fix: address review — exclude errored items from bridge auto-approve check

Filter out items with error set from the auto-approve subset check,
matching the server's WebUI.approve_tools() behavior. Prevents
policy-denied items from affecting auto-approve decisions.
2026-03-21 00:42:33 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4b853e329e test: verify skill_id/skill_version populated in workstreams table (#145)
The workstreams.skill_id and skill_version columns were already being
populated correctly (wired in the skills unification PR #106). Add two
tests confirming: lineage columns set when skill is applied, and
defaults when no skill is used. Check off the PROGRESS.md item.
2026-03-21 00:40:30 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 29ffdc36d0 test: add governance SDK integration tests against real Starlette app (#142)
* test: add governance SDK integration tests against real Starlette app

24 TestClient-based tests verifying round-trip serialization of SDK
governance methods (roles, policies, orgs) against actual route
handlers with SQLite storage. Covers create/list/update/delete
lifecycles, error cases, and Pydantic model field validation.

* fix: address review — close AsyncClient in sdk_client fixture teardown

Convert sdk_client fixture to async context manager so the httpx
AsyncClient is properly closed after tests, avoiding resource leak
warnings.
2026-03-21 00:31:53 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ada8b80509 test: add MCP reload and reconcile endpoint integration tests (#141)
* test: add MCP reload and reconcile endpoint integration tests

11 new tests covering POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/reload (console)
and POST /v1/api/_internal/mcp-reload (node). Verifies reconcile_sync
invocation, fan-out results, permission checks, missing storage
handling, and mixed node error propagation.

* fix: address review — lazy-import internal_mcp_reload to avoid heavy module load

Move turnstone.server import inside _routes_with_internal() helper so
the full server module (which reads UI static assets) is only loaded
when node-side endpoint tests actually run, not during test collection.
2026-03-21 00:14:50 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1f47ca62de fix: validate OIDC issuer URLs against SSRF before discovery fetch (#140)
* fix: validate OIDC issuer URLs against SSRF before discovery fetch

Add validate_issuer_url() that rejects private/loopback/link-local IPs,
non-HTTPS (except localhost for dev), embedded credentials, and
unresolvable hostnames. Called before the HTTP fetch in discover_oidc()
so the request is never made for invalid URLs. 17 new tests.

* fix: address review — use is_global, redact userinfo, catch ValueError

Use `not addr.is_global` instead of individual range checks to cover
all non-routable addresses (CGNAT, unspecified, multicast). Redact
credentials from error messages to prevent log leakage. Catch ValueError
from ip_address() for zone-indexed IPv6 addresses.
2026-03-21 00:14:46 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 83d9233304 test: skill session config application to workstreams (#139)
* test: skill session config application to workstreams

13 TestClient-based integration tests verifying that skill session
config fields (model, temperature, token_budget, auto_approve,
allowed_tools, reasoning_effort, agent_max_turns) are correctly applied
to ChatSession and WebUI when creating a workstream with a skill.

Covers: individual fields, combined application, disabled/unknown skill
rejection, zero-value no-ops.

* fix: address review — pass skill kwarg, clarify no-op test assertions

Pass skill=kwargs.get("skill") into ChatSession in test factory to
match production behavior. Clarify zero-value no-op test docstrings
to document they verify the handler's guard conditions, not observable
state changes.
2026-03-20 23:09:59 -07:00
Patrick Buckley bf06102d37 fix: memory access tracking and BM25 context caching (#138)
* fix: memory access tracking and BM25 context caching

Add touch_structured_memory/touch_structured_memories to storage
protocol + SQLite/PostgreSQL backends. Bumps last_accessed and
access_count on memory retrieval (BM25 injection + search results).
9 new storage tests.

Cache the scored BM25 memory context string on ChatSession, invalidated
on memory save/delete. Eliminates ~12 redundant storage queries + index
rebuilds per session lifecycle.

* fix: address review — deduplicate keys in touch facade, clarify contract

Deduplicate keys in the memory.py facade before calling storage so each
distinct memory is touched at most once. Update protocol docstring to
clarify per-call increment semantics. Add deduplication unit test.

* fix: replace unused-import test with real batch duplicate test

Replace facade dedup test (which only tested Python set logic) with a
real storage-level test that verifies duplicate keys each increment
access_count. Fixes ruff F401 lint failure.
2026-03-20 23:08:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e015b4512d fix: return typed Pydantic models from SDK skill methods (#137)
Skill methods on TurnstoneConsole and AsyncTurnstoneConsole returned
dict[str, Any] instead of validated Pydantic models. Update list_skills,
create_skill, get_skill, update_skill, list_skill_resources,
create_skill_resource, and install_skill to use response_model= with
ListSkillsResponse, SkillInfo, SkillResourceInfo, and
SkillInstallResponse.
2026-03-20 20:02:06 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 0c1afff7fc test: add _get_registry_url three-tier fallback tests (#136)
8 tests covering the DB setting → config.toml → default URL resolution
chain, including storage errors, empty values, malformed JSON, and
documenting that RuntimeError propagates uncaught through the except
clause.
2026-03-20 20:01:58 -07:00
Patrick Buckley a94051a995 fix: add split pane button to tab bar for discoverability (#135)
* fix: add split pane button to tab bar for discoverability

The split pane feature was only accessible via right-click context menu
or Ctrl+\ keyboard shortcut. Add a subtle split icon (⧉) to the tab
bar that appears at low opacity in single-pane mode. Hidden in
multi-pane mode where pane headers already provide split/close controls.

* fix: address review — change tab-bar from tablist to toolbar role

The tab bar contains both tabs and action buttons (new workstream,
split pane), which is invalid for role=tablist. Change to role=toolbar
which correctly describes a container of mixed interactive controls.

* fix: address design review — WCAG contrast, ARIA structure, mobile

- Drop opacity approach, use border: dashed var(--border) matching
  #new-tab-btn pattern (fixes WCAG contrast failure at 35% opacity)
- Nest tabs in #tab-list[role=tablist] inside toolbar (fixes invalid
  role=tab children inside role=toolbar)
- Hide split button on mobile (<600px) where splits can't work
- Add aria-keyshortcuts to both action buttons
2026-03-20 20:01:35 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2f906ea1f9 fix: enable output guard in CLI mode (#134)
* fix: enable output guard in CLI mode

The heuristic output guard (credential redaction, prompt injection
detection) only ran in server mode because cli.py never constructed a
JudgeConfig. Additionally, the guard condition in session.py required
enabled=True, coupling the zero-cost heuristic (<5ms) to the full LLM
judge.

Wire JudgeConfig from existing CLI args into the session factory.
Decouple the output_guard condition from the enabled flag so the
heuristic guard runs even when the LLM judge is disabled via --no-judge.

* fix: address review — pass config.toml judge fields to CLI JudgeConfig

apply_config() merges [judge] section from config.toml into args as
judge_base_url and judge_api_key. Pass these through to JudgeConfig so
the CLI respects config.toml judge settings (e.g. separate judge
endpoint).
2026-03-20 20:01:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley b61bfd1aa6 fix: validate URL scheme after MCP registry template substitution (#133)
* fix: validate URL scheme after MCP registry template substitution

resolve_install_config() substitutes user-provided values into URL
templates via string replacement without validating the resulting URL.
Add urlparse check after substitution to reject non-HTTP(S) schemes,
preventing SSRF-style redirection through crafted template variables.

* fix: address review — reject empty hostname and embedded credentials

Add hostname presence check and userinfo rejection after URL scheme
validation. Prevents URLs like https:///path (no host) and
https://user:pass@host (credential leakage in config). Two new tests.
2026-03-20 20:01:26 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 19c3a48b10 fix: server startup stampede — timeout model detection, non-fatal PG … (#132)
* fix: server startup stampede — timeout model detection, non-fatal PG migrations

detect_model() blocked the main thread for up to 400s when the LLM backend
was unreachable (OpenAI SDK default: 600s read timeout × 2 retries × TCP
retransmit). Cap startup detection at 10s with no retries — the
BackendHealthMonitor handles ongoing availability probing after startup.

PostgreSQL migrations via _run_with_pg_lock() crashed the server on lock
contention when 10 containers stampeded the advisory lock simultaneously.
Wrap in try/except matching the SQLite path — the entrypoint script already
runs migrations before the server process starts.

Health check start_period increased from 15s to 60s to accommodate the
startup sequence under load.

* fix: address review — narrow PG migration except, add detect_model test

Narrow the PG migration except clause to (OSError, EOFError) so DDL
errors still propagate. Add two unit tests for detect_model() verifying
with_options(timeout=10, max_retries=0) is called and that connection
errors in non-fatal mode return (None, None).
2026-03-20 20:01:21 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 414eb52d67 feat: raise scaling limits for 1000-node clusters (#129)
* feat: raise scaling limits for 1000-node clusters

Raise hardcoded limits throughout the codebase so clusters up to 1000
nodes work without configuration changes.

Scaling limits:
- max_workstreams default 10 → 50 (configurable via settings)
- Console fan-out concurrency 50 → 200 (configurable: cluster.node_fan_out_limit)
- MCP max servers 50 → 200 (configurable: cluster.mcp_max_servers)
- Console SSE queue 500 → 2000, server global SSE queue 500 → 1000
- httpx proxy pool: explicit max_connections on both proxy clients
- PostgreSQL pool 5+10 → 2+3 per process (right-sized for short-burst queries)
- Redis pool: explicit max_connections=200 on both sync and async brokers

Performance optimizations:
- Redis list_nodes(): replace N+1 SCAN+GET with SCAN+MGET
- Collector poll: raise thread pool to 200 (matches fan-out limit)
- Server SSE: dedicated ThreadPoolExecutor(200) for queue polling
- Fan-out: new get_all_nodes() removes hardcoded limit=1000 ceiling

Bug fixes:
- Settings reload notification was silently failing (called .get() on tuple)
- Watch fan-out only queried 500 nodes instead of full cluster

New cluster settings (configurable via admin Settings tab):
- cluster.node_fan_out_limit (default 200, range 10-1000)
- cluster.mcp_max_servers (default 200, range 1-2000)

Adds docs/pgbouncer.md for PostgreSQL connection pooling at scale.
Adds ddgStressCluster compose profile (100 nodes, 10 groups of 10).
Updates architecture, console, docker, settings, and API reference docs.

* fix: add image tag to compose anchors to avoid redundant builds

All cluster/stress services inherit `build:` from the anchor, causing
Docker to attempt 200+ separate builds. Adding `image: turnstone:local`
means Docker builds once and all services reuse the cached image.

* fix: address Copilot review feedback on scaling PR

- Remove magic number in get_all_nodes (limit=None instead of 2**31)
- Size httpx proxy pool from fan-out limit setting (not hardcoded 250)
- Cap cluster.node_fan_out_limit max_value to 500, mark restart_required
- Convert _publish_config_change from sync to async (was blocking event loop)
- Use shutdown(wait=True, cancel_futures=True) for SSE executor

* fix: add PostgreSQL env vars to cluster bridge anchor

Bridges initialize storage for auth/migrations but the bridge anchor
was missing TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND and TURNSTONE_DB_URL, causing all
bridges to fall back to SQLite. With 100 bridges sharing the same
volume, concurrent SQLite migrations corrupt the database.

* fix: address Copilot round 2 + PG connection exhaustion at startup

Copilot feedback:
- Raise cluster.node_fan_out_limit max_value to 1000 (matches target)
- Cache fan-out limit on app.state at startup instead of re-reading DB
  per request (pool and semaphore now use the same value consistently)
- Remove unused params from _publish_config_change

Stress cluster fix:
- Raise PG max_connections to 300 (configurable via POSTGRES_MAX_CONNECTIONS)
  to handle 200 processes connecting simultaneously at startup
- Bump PG shared_buffers to 128MB and memory limit to 1G to match
- Add DB env vars to production bridge service

* fix readme

* fix: startup resilience for large clusters

Server no longer crashes when LLM backend is unreachable at startup.
detect_model() accepts fatal=False, returning (None, None) so the
server starts in degraded mode with circuit breaker open. The health
monitor will detect when the backend becomes available.

Migration runner retries with jittered exponential backoff (up to 10
attempts) when PostgreSQL rejects connections during startup stampedes.

Collector httpx pool sized to match poll workers (was using default of
100 connections with 200 workers).

Also addresses Copilot round 2:
- Raise cluster.node_fan_out_limit max_value to 1000
- Cache fan-out limit on app.state at startup
- Remove unused params from _publish_config_change
- Add DB env vars to production bridge service

* fix: replace silent error suppression with structured logging

Audit and fix 30+ instances of silently swallowed exceptions across 8
files. No-raise contracts are preserved — all changes add logging
while keeping the same return-value behavior.

memory.py (26 changes):
  Every storage operation now logs on failure. Previously the entire
  persistence facade had zero logging — messages, workstream state,
  and structured memories could silently stop being saved.

server.py:
  Usage recording failures now log at warning (was pass).
  Global SSE fan-out errors log at debug (was pass).

console/server.py:
  Config reload notification logs per-node failures at warning.
  Settings read fallbacks log at warning with the default value used.

auth.py:
  User existence check logs at warning (was pass).
  Setup rollback failures log at error (was suppress).
  OIDC state cleanup logs at debug (was suppress).

mcp_client.py:
  DB-managed MCP server list failure logs at warning (was pass).

collector.py:
  Node poll failure upgraded from debug to warning with exc_info.
  Health fetch failure logs at debug with exc_info (was silent).

bridge.py:
  Best-effort plan rejection logs at warning (was suppress).
  Malformed SSE data logs at debug (was suppress).

session.py:
  Tool output UI callback failure logs at debug (was suppress).

* fix: stagger collector poll with deterministic per-node jitter

Each node gets a stable offset within the first half of the poll
interval, derived from hashing the node_id against a Mersenne prime
(2^31 - 1). This spreads HTTP requests across the cycle instead of
firing all 100+ at the same instant.

Also raises poll interval from 10s to 15s and HTTP timeout from 5s
to 30s for large-cluster resilience.

* fix: add startup jitter to bridge heartbeat and health monitor probe

Bridge heartbeat: deterministic per-node jitter (from node_id hash)
spreads initial registration across the first quarter of the heartbeat
TTL. At 100 bridges with 60s TTL, heartbeats spread across 15s instead
of all firing at T=0.

Health monitor probe: deterministic per-process jitter (from PID hash)
spreads initial LLM backend probes across half the probe interval. At
100 servers with 30s interval, probes spread across 15s instead of all
hitting the LLM at T=30.

Both use the same Mersenne prime hashing approach as the collector poll
jitter for consistency.

* fix: split collector httpx timeout and raise keepalive pool

Use separate connect/read/write/pool timeouts instead of a single 30s
for all phases. Raise keepalive connections from 50 to 200 so the
collector reuses TCP connections across poll cycles instead of
constantly tearing down and re-establishing them.

* fix: narrow detect_model return type for CLI and eval callers

detect_model() now returns tuple[str | None, int | None] to support
fatal=False. CLI and eval always use fatal=True (the default), which
guarantees a non-None model or SystemExit. Add assert to narrow the
type for mypy.
2026-03-19 04:53:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 86b404177b chore: bump version to 0.8.4
- feat: split-pane layout for chat UI (#127)
- fix: enforce CSS min dimensions during split handle drag
- feat: add OpenShell sandbox policy for turnstone-server (#128)
- fix: collector JWT expiry causes silent workstream data wipe (#126)
- fix: auto-titler SSE event + SSE reconnection after restart (#125)
- fix: wire resume_ws through console + expose max_ws in heartbeat (#124)
2026-03-18 18:13:18 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 10165bb8a1 feat: add OpenShell sandbox policy for turnstone-server (#128)
* feat: add OpenShell sandbox policy for turnstone-server

Curated policy for running turnstone-server inside an OpenShell sandbox
with kernel-enforced security boundaries (Landlock, netns, seccomp).

- Filesystem: workdir read-write, /usr+/etc read-only, /tmp+/dev/null
  read-write, Landlock best_effort compatibility
- Network: default-deny with allowlisted LLM APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic),
  Tavily, skills.sh, GitHub (read-only L7), MCP registry (read-only L7),
  Redis localhost, package registries, curated web_fetch domains
- Git: L7-enforced read-only (info/refs + git-upload-pack only)
- Process: privilege drop to sandbox:sandbox
- Inference routing template for credential isolation (real API keys
  never enter the sandbox, resolved at proxy layer)

* fix: address PR #128 review feedback + add integration guide

Review fixes:
- Use python3 (not python) in usage examples to match binary allowlist
- Fix network_policy → network_policies in comment
- Remove /usr/bin/git from github_api (git uses github.com not
  api.github.com; already covered by git_operations policy)
- Remove pip/uv from bash_network_tools (package_registries already
  covers their PyPI access; no need for StackOverflow/Wikipedia reach)
- Restructure routes.yaml so commented blocks are indented under
  routes: key (uncomment without restructuring YAML)

New: docs/openshell.md covering policy customization, inference routing,
domain allowlisting, MCP subprocess inheritance, and the dual-layer
security model.
2026-03-18 18:09:47 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 5d478573cc fix: enforce CSS min dimensions during split handle drag
Drag ratio bounds were hardcoded at 0.1/0.9 which allowed panes to be
resized below their CSS min-width (200px) / min-height (150px), causing
input areas and text to overflow and clip. Now compute bounds dynamically
from the container size and CSS minimums.
2026-03-18 18:08:35 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1b24e4717f feat: split-pane layout for chat UI (#127)
* feat: split-pane layout for chat UI

Refactor the server UI from a single-pane global-state design to a
multi-pane architecture with per-workstream Pane instances and a binary
layout tree. Each pane has its own SSE connection, message area, input,
and state (busy, approval, streaming).

Phase 1 — Pane class with 25 prototype methods encapsulating all
per-workstream state. Phase 2 — binary split tree (leaf/split nodes)
with recursive flexbox rendering and drag-to-resize handles. Phase 3 —
keyboard shortcuts (Ctrl+\, Ctrl+Shift+\, Ctrl+Shift+W, Ctrl+Alt+Arrow)
and right-click context menu. Phase 4 — layout persistence via
localStorage.

Key design decisions:
- No duplicate workstreams across panes (split refused if no unused ws,
  auto-close redundant pane on ws deletion)
- Max 6 panes to avoid exhausting browser SSE connections
- Viewport guard prevents splitting below min-width/min-height
- Only focused pane refreshes workstream list on SSE reconnect (prevents
  race when multiple panes disconnect simultaneously)
- Tab click focuses existing pane showing that ws in multi-pane mode
- Pointer events on drag handles for mouse + touch support
- Full a11y: ARIA roles/labels, keyboard nav in context menu, focus
  restoration, prefers-reduced-motion coverage

* fix: address PR #127 review feedback

- Add focusin handler so keyboard focus (Tab) updates focusedPaneId
- Context menu skips interactive elements (textarea, input, links,
  buttons) so native copy/paste and link context menus work
- Split handles get ARIA role=separator, aria-orientation, aria-valuenow,
  keyboard resizing (arrow keys, Home/End), and tabindex=0
- Enforce MAX_PANES limit in deserializeLayout to prevent corrupted
  localStorage from creating too many panes/SSE connections
- Update architecture.md to document split-pane layout
2026-03-18 18:03:46 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 9a2db63c07 fix: collector JWT expiry causes silent workstream data wipe (#126)
* fix: collector JWT expiry causes silent workstream data wipe

The console collector baked a one-time JWT snapshot into its httpx
client headers at startup. After 1 hour (JWT expiry), every poll to
server nodes returned 401. The error JSON was silently parsed as valid
empty data, wiping all workstream state while nodes still appeared
reachable — the cluster showed "10 nodes, 0 workstreams."

Root causes fixed:
- Collector: no auth baked into httpx.Client; per-request headers
  from ServiceTokenManager.token (auto-rotating) or static fallback
- Proxy: same pattern — proxy_client/proxy_sse_client created without
  auth headers; _proxy_auth_headers() injects fresh token per-request
- main(): static token snapshot only passed when no token_manager
  exists, preventing stale JWT from being stored anywhere
- _fetch_node: raise_for_status() before .json() so 401s throw
  instead of returning error JSON as "0 workstreams"
- Auth errors (401/403) logged at warning level for operator visibility

* fix: address PR #126 review — type annotation, regression tests, log messages

Tighten token_manager type from Any to ServiceTokenManager | None.
Add two regression tests verifying 401/403 poll responses preserve
existing workstream data and mark nodes unreachable. Fix misleading
log messages: "jwt_minted" → "token_manager_created" since
ServiceTokenManager mints lazily on first .token access.
2026-03-18 15:45:53 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e159837b74 fix: auto-titler SSE event + SSE reconnection after restart (#125)
* fix: auto-titler SSE event + SSE reconnection after restart

_generate_title() now calls self.ui.on_rename() after persisting the
title, so the tab bar, bridge, and console all update in real time.
Also handles multi-part (vision) content and replaces silent except
with log.debug.

SSE onerror handler now parses the workstreams response, replaces the
stale workstreams map, and switches to the first available workstream
if the current ws_id no longer exists (e.g. after server restart).
Previously it retried the stale ws_id forever.

* fix: address PR #125 review — avoid double reconnect + sync tab bar

Return immediately after switchTab/showDashboard on stale ws_id to
prevent scheduling a redundant connectContentSSE via setTimeout.
Always re-render tab bar after replacing the workstreams map so DOM
stays in sync even when currentWsId is still valid.
2026-03-18 15:14:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ec3454ee2e fix: wire resume_ws through console + expose max_ws in heartbeat (#124)
* fix: wire resume_ws through console + expose max_ws in heartbeat

Console create_workstream handler now reads resume_ws from the request
body and passes it to CreateWorkstreamMessage on all three dispatch paths
(pool, auto, explicit). Previously resume only worked via channel router
and direct CLI — the console layer never plumbed it through.

Server /health now includes max_ws from WorkstreamManager. Bridge reads
it on startup and includes it in heartbeat metadata so the console's
_pick_best_node gets accurate capacity instead of always defaulting to 10.
Collector also updates max_ws on subsequent heartbeats (not just discovery).

Schemas, Python SDK, TypeScript SDK, and OpenAPI specs updated. Test mocks
fixed for new max_workstreams property access in /health.

* fix: address PR #124 review — resume_ws tests + max_ws fetch on pre-set node_id

Add _fetch_server_metadata() so bridge reads max_ws from /health even
when node_id is pre-set (skipping _fetch_node_id). Without this, heartbeats
would advertise max_ws=10 regardless of actual server config.

Add 3 test cases verifying resume_ws flows through all three console
dispatch paths (directed, pool, auto-select).
2026-03-18 14:24:10 -07:00
renovate[bot] 5cbb832162 chore(deps): lock file maintenance 2026-03-18 13:20:49 -07:00
renovate[bot] 4e4ae2a91d chore(deps): update ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv docker tag to v0.10.11 2026-03-18 13:20:47 -07:00
renovate[bot] c7d0bac638 chore(deps): update astral-sh/setup-uv digest to 37802ad 2026-03-18 13:20:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e86305c143 chore: bump version to 0.8.3 2026-03-17 17:06:00 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d0fc42195a chore: remove dead code and fix noisy JWT test warnings
Remove unused methods (ToolSearchManager.should_activate, get_all_tools),
dead attributes (_all_tools, _threshold), unused constant (DEFAULT_INTERVAL),
unused Scenario protocol class, and vestigial parameters (judge._evaluate_single
heuristic, SimEngine.simulate_llm_response turn_number). Lengthen JWT test
secrets to >= 32 bytes to suppress InsecureKeyLengthWarning from PyJWT.
2026-03-17 17:02:25 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 760321f7ee refactor: extract _resolve_capabilities and _without_tool helpers
Extract _resolve_capabilities() shared helper so _get_capabilities()
and _run_agent() use the same config-override logic instead of
duplicating inline. Add _without_tool() module-level helper to
deduplicate the tool-filtering listcomp.
2026-03-17 16:49:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 693e51f782 fix: address PR #119 review feedback
Add UI error notification and exc_info logging to run_one() exception
handler so tool failures are visible in the frontend. Apply config.toml
capability overrides when gating web_search in _run_agent(), matching
the pattern used by _get_capabilities().
2026-03-17 16:49:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ba07409724 fix: isolate parallel tool exceptions + gate web_search without backend
Two bugs: (1) an uncaught exception in one parallel tool call killed the
entire batch via pool.map(), losing all results including successful ones.
Wrap run_one() in try/except so failures return error strings instead of
propagating. (2) web_search was offered to local models even without a
Tavily API key — the model would attempt it, only to fail at execution
time. Filter web_search from _get_active_tools() and _run_agent() when
neither native support nor Tavily is available.

Closes https://github.com/turnstonelabs/turnstone/issues/117
2026-03-17 16:49:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c76a61841e fix: PR #118 round 2 — null-safe parser, docs, consistency
- Null-safe extraction for description, license, and compatibility in
  skill_parser.py — YAML bare keys (e.g. `description:`) no longer
  produce the literal string "None"
- Log warning on skill catalog storage failure instead of silent swallow
- Use `enabled == 1` in list_skills_by_activation for consistency with
  other prompt_templates queries in both storage backends
- Add parser tests for YAML null description, license, and compatibility
- Update governance.md: document runtime config editing on installed
  skills, two-column modal layout, SPDX license dropdown, origin badge
2026-03-17 16:09:06 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 341d2f604f fix: address PR #118 review feedback
- Regenerate OpenAPI snapshots (openapi-console.json) to include license
  and compatibility fields in SkillInfo/CreateSkillRequest/UpdateSkillRequest
- Omit version from create/update payloads when blank so server applies
  default "1.0.0" instead of storing empty string
- Push enabled_only + limit filters into list_skills_by_activation storage
  query (protocol, SQLite, PostgreSQL) instead of loading all rows and
  filtering in Python; session.py now passes enabled_only=True, limit=30
- License length cap ([:128]) was already applied in previous commit
2026-03-17 16:09:06 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 3f7f8495d6 feat: skills modal redesign + runtime config editing for installed skills
Redesigns the create/edit/view skill modal into a two-column spec manifest
layout (Identity/Manifest/Deployment | Skill Content) matching the Agent
Skills spec structure. Installed (readonly) skills can now have their runtime
config (model, temperature, token limits, enabled) edited independently of
the locked spec/content fields.

- Two-column spec layout with section headings (Identity, Manifest, Deployment,
  Skill Content); content textarea uses monospace font and fills the column
- h3 section headings for screen-reader nav; h3 UA stylesheet reset in CSS
- Runtime Config collapsible uses 3-column grid; license field is now a select
  of SPDX identifiers (MIT, Apache-2.0, GPL-3.0, AGPL-3.0, etc.)
- Origin badge (cyan) shows source URL for installed skills in view mode
- server.py: _SKILL_RUNTIME_CONFIG_FIELDS frozenset; readonly skills filter
  updates to config-only fields (spec fields silently dropped); audit action
  distinguishes skill.update.config from skill.update; license field capped
  at 128 chars in both create and update paths
- governance.js: spec fields disabled for readonly; config fields always
  editable; Save button shown for all skills (labeled "Save Config" when
  readonly); collapsible state reset between modal opens prevents state leak;
  esk-allowed-tools disabled state driven by auto_approve not readonly
- Tests: spec-only body on readonly skill → 400; config-only → 200 with
  spec fields unchanged; mixed body → config fields applied, spec dropped
2026-03-17 16:09:06 -07:00
Patrick Buckley dc464ac313 feat: Agent Skills standard compliance + frontend spec fields
Brings skills implementation into full compliance with agentskills.io:

Parser:
- Read `allowed-tools` (hyphenated, standard) only; stored as
  `allowed_tools` internally — no underscore fallback
- Reject consecutive hyphens in skill names
- Extract author/version from standard `metadata:` map with top-level
  fallback; null-safe (no "None" string for bare YAML keys)
- Truncate description at 1024 chars, compatibility at 500 chars (spec
  caps) with log warnings
- Lenient parsing mode (lenient=True) for cross-client import: sanitizes
  names, returns None on skip, malformed-YAML colon-value retry
- Type overloads: strict mode returns ParsedSkill, lenient returns
  ParsedSkill | None

Session:
- `<available-skills>` XML catalog in system messages for
  activation="search" skills (disabled ones filtered out, capped at 30)

Tool rename:
- `load_skill` tool → `skill` (JSON, session preparers/executors,
  approval labels, tests, docs)

Storage (migration 023):
- Add `license` and `compatibility` columns to prompt_templates
- skill_license / compatibility params on create_prompt_template across
  protocol, SQLite, PostgreSQL backends
- Add to SKILL_MUTABLE for update_prompt_template

API + server:
- SkillInfo, CreateSkillRequest, UpdateSkillRequest: license +
  compatibility fields
- Create/update/install endpoints extract and persist both fields
- Install endpoint maps parsed.license + parsed.compatibility from
  imported SKILL.md (previously discarded)
- _skill_to_response() includes both fields

Admin UI:
- Create + edit modals: version, license, compatibility fields
- Readonly (imported) skills: "edit" → "view" button, modal title
  "View Skill", all fields disabled, Save hidden, Cancel → "Close",
  collapsibles auto-expand, focus on Close button
- :disabled CSS for dark-theme modal inputs (bg-highlight, cursor
  not-allowed, dimmed text)
- Fix addEventListener stacking on auto-approve checkboxes → .onchange

SDK: license + compatibility on SkillInfo, CreateSkillRequest,
UpdateSkillRequest TypeScript interfaces

Docs: governance.md, judge.md, tools.md, README, diagram updated
2026-03-17 16:09:06 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 52d59cf7b7 chore: bump version to 0.8.2 2026-03-17 02:20:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2dc885ab4d fix: output guard detects single secret-bearing env lines (#115)
* fix: output guard detects single secret-bearing env lines

The credential leak check required 3+ env-style lines before flagging.
A single AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=... line was missed. Now flags whenever
any env line has a secret-bearing key name (SECRET, KEY, TOKEN,
PASSWORD, CREDENTIAL), regardless of how many total env lines exist.

* fix: tighten env secret key matching, add tests

Tighten _RE_ENV_SECRET_KEY to word-boundary segments so MONKEY/TURKEY
don't false-positive. Use any() for short-circuit. Add test for single
secret line detection and substring false-positive prevention.
2026-03-17 02:19:22 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 14488f43e0 feat: metacognitive nudge on tool error — search memories for guidance
Add tool_error nudge type that fires when a tool returns an error,
prompting the model to search memories for prior feedback about the
tool or error pattern before retrying.

- Gated on nudges config (respects nudges=false)
- Only fires when memories exist (no noise on fresh workstreams)
- Broad error detection: Error*, *error:*, Command timed out, Unknown tool
- Nudge wording aligned to memory(action='search') convention
- Respects existing cooldown (5 min) and rate limiting
- 4 new tests
2026-03-17 02:06:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 90f2070146 chore: bump version to 0.8.1 2026-03-17 01:28:14 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1e551830ea fix: allow deleting installed (readonly) skills
Readonly guard should prevent editing content, not uninstalling.
Remove readonly check from admin_delete_skill so batch-installed
skills can be individually deleted. Enable delete button in UI
for all skills regardless of readonly flag.
2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 84cc212ecd ui: tighten category and risk columns (100px -> 80px) 2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley da4025d338 ui: skills table — category first, risk column, remove variables
- Move category column before name
- Remove variables column (rarely useful in table view)
- Add dedicated RISK column with scan badge, unicode shape indicators
  (checkmark/triangle/diamond/warning), and multi-line tooltip showing
  composite score and flagged axes from scan report
- Risk badge is keyboard-focusable (tabindex=0) with aria-label
- Unscanned skills show em-dash placeholder at 40% opacity
- Balanced grid: 100px 1.5fr 100px 120px
- Risk + category hidden on mobile (<700px)
2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 88085c29ff fix: normalize install response + review fixes
Address 5 Copilot review items + code review findings:

- Normalize install endpoint to always return envelope response:
  {installed: [...], skipped: [...], total: N} — eliminates dual
  response shape (single SkillInfo vs batch). Breaking change to
  install endpoint response, SDKs and OpenAPI spec updated.
- Add SkillInstallResponse + SkillInstallSkipped Pydantic models
- POST /resources spec now correctly documents response_code=201
- SQLite count_skill_resources_bulk chunks IN clause at 900 to stay
  under SQLITE_MAX_VARIABLE_NUMBER (999)
- Fix installDiscoveredSkill() JS handler for envelope response
- Add error key to 409 duplicate response for error handler compat
- Update Python SDK install_skill return type (dict, not SkillInfo)
- Add TypeScript SkillInstallResponse + SkillInstallSkipped types
- Regenerate openapi-console.json
- Update all install tests for envelope response shape
2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 3152667a0c fix: update test_skill_sources for 5-tuple _parse_github_url
_parse_github_url now returns (owner, repo, branch, path, branch_explicit).
Update all test unpackings and add assertions for branch_explicit.
2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4b44d88401 fix: harden batch skill install — 7 review items + OpenAPI snapshot
- Race condition: wrap create_prompt_template in try/except, append
  to skipped on conflict instead of crashing
- HTTP timeout: per-request timeout (10s+5s connect) instead of shared
  15s pool; parallelize SKILL.md and resource fetches with semaphore
  (5 concurrent)
- Branch detection: return branch_explicit from _parse_github_url(),
  eliminate duplicated regex matching and type: ignore comments
- Content-length: check len(resp.content) after fetch instead of
  unreliable content-length header; add size check in batch path
- Rate limits: _check_rate_limit() inspects x-ratelimit-remaining,
  raises actionable error on 403, warns when remaining < 10
- Root resources: fix _find_resource_files skipping root-level
  resources like scripts/foo.sh for root SKILL.md
- resource_count: pass accurate count in update and install responses
- Regenerate openapi-console.json with new resource endpoints
2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8957b9ce0e feat: batch install skills from multi-skill GitHub repos
When a GitHub repo URL has no root SKILL.md (monorepo pattern like
anthropics/skills), automatically scan the repo tree for all SKILL.md
files and install every discovered skill in one operation.

- Add fetch_skills_from_github_repo() — scans recursive tree, parses
  each SKILL.md, collects per-skill resources via shared helpers
- Extract _find_resource_files() and _fetch_resource_contents() to
  eliminate duplication between single and batch fetch paths
- Extend admin_skill_install to fall back to batch scanning when
  single-skill fetch returns 404
- Each skill gets a specific source_url pointing to its subdirectory
- Backward compatible: single-skill repos return same response shape
- Frontend handles both shapes with contextual toast messages
- Filter tree scan to URL path subtree when path is provided
- Cap at 50 skills per repo scan

Also addresses review feedback:
- Fix path prefix check (scripts/ not scriptsX/)
- Use count_skill_resources_bulk for single skill GET
- Add content field to SkillResourceInfo schema
- Fix OpenAPI spec paths ({path} not {path:path})
- Check r.ok on resource upload promises
- Preserve / in URL-encoded paths (split/map/join pattern)
- URL-encode path in Python SDK delete method
- Fix test_install_not_found to mock batch fallback
- Fix test_search_empty_results for required q param
- Narrow except clause to ValueError in batch parser
2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 28a6b0dd33 feat: skill resources — API, admin UI, runtime injection, and SDK
Complete the resource surface for skills (scripts/, references/, assets/):

- 4 admin API endpoints: list, get, create, delete skill resources
- Storage: delete_skill_resource_by_path + count_skill_resources_bulk
- Admin UI: resource count badge in skills table, resource sections in
  create/edit modals with add/delete, readonly guard for installed skills
- Runtime: _load_skills populates skill resources, _init_system_messages
  injects <skill-resources> catalog (inlined if <8KB)
- Python SDK: list/create/delete_skill_resource (async + sync)
- TypeScript SDK: listSkillResources, createSkillResource, deleteSkillResource
- Path traversal protection (normpath + .. rejection + null byte check)
- Block empty skill discover searches (frontend toast + backend 400)
- Rename MCP "Registry" tab to "Discover" for consistency with skills
- Move Skills + MCP Servers into new "Extensions" sidebar group
- 25 tests (7 storage, 16 API + 2 security)
2026-03-17 01:26:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7bc17cc072 fix: populate func_args for all tools in intent judge evaluation
The heuristic engine was seeing empty {} for web_fetch, web_search,
watch, notify, task, and load_skill — only bash, file ops, and MCP
tools had their arguments forwarded. The judge could not pattern-match
on URLs, queries, commands, or messages for these tools.
2026-03-16 19:33:16 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 10a1800492 chore: bump version to 0.8.0 2026-03-16 19:22:17 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1010f163f0 feat: load_skill built-in tool — model-driven skill discovery and act… (#112)
* feat: load_skill built-in tool — model-driven skill discovery and activation

Two-action tool: 'search' finds skills by multi-word query with substring
matching on name/description/tags/category (auto-approved, read-only);
'load' activates a skill by name via set_skill() (requires approval).

Guards: filters disabled skills from search + load; short-circuits when
skill is already active; approval_label includes skill name for granular
tool policies (load_skill__<name>); main session only (excluded from
sub-agents). Logs storage errors in search path.

25 tests covering registration, preparer validation, executor logic,
disabled/already-active edge cases, multi-word queries, approval labels.

* refactor: use BM25 relevance ranking for load_skill search

Replace substring matching with BM25Index from turnstone/core/bm25.py,
matching the pattern used by memory relevance and tool search. Handles
multi-word queries, term frequency, and document length normalization.

* fix: address copilot review — BM25 tags parsing, primary_key, test cleanup

- Parse JSON tags into space-separated text before BM25 indexing so
  individual tag terms match queries (was passing raw '["foo","bar"]')
- Add primary_key: "name" to load_skill.json for PRIMARY_KEY_MAP
- Remove dead resolve_workstream patch from test helper
- Update diagram: "substring match" → "BM25 ranking"
2026-03-16 19:20:19 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c28bfc1e58 feat: skill discovery — search and install skills from external sources (#111)
* feat: skill discovery — search and install skills from external sources

Add discovery UI and API for finding and installing skills from
skills.sh registries and GitHub repositories with one-click install,
SKILL.md frontmatter parsing, and security scan integration.

Core modules:
- skill_parser.py: ParsedSkill dataclass, parse_skill_md() with YAML
  frontmatter support (Anthropic + Hermes tag formats), name validation
- skill_sources.py: SkillsShClient (async search + resolve),
  fetch_skill_from_github (SKILL.md + bundled resource fetching with
  256KB cap, text extension filter, GitHub API tree traversal)

API:
- GET /v1/api/admin/skills/discover — search with installed annotation
  and scan_status for installed skills
- POST /v1/api/admin/skills/install — fetch, parse, duplicate check,
  create with origin="source" readonly=true, store resources, audit

Also fixes pre-existing bug where _skill_to_response omitted scan_status,
scan_report, scan_version fields — scan tier badges in the installed
skills table were silently empty despite data existing in storage.

Admin UI: pill toggle (Installed/Discover), discovery cards with scan
tier badges, GitHub import modal with proper focus trap/Escape/backdrop,
scoped selectors preventing MCP↔Skills cross-tab state corruption.

SDK: discover_skills() + install_skill() on Python (async+sync) and
TypeScript console clients.

48 new tests across 3 test files. All 2632 tests pass.

* fix: address copilot review — 404 vs 502, O(n) lookups, branch fallback

- SkillNotFoundError subclass: install returns 404 when SKILL.md is
  missing, 502 only for connectivity/upstream errors
- get_skill_by_source_url() + list_installed_skill_urls(): indexed
  storage lookups replace O(n) full-table scans with content blobs
- Default branch fallback: tries main then master when URL doesn't
  specify a branch
- Path normalization: strip trailing slash once, remove redundant
  candidate
- SDK install_skill() returns typed SkillInfo with response_model
- Tree size guard: skip resource tree if response >2MB
2026-03-16 18:42:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e71ea38953 feat: output guard data pipeline — persist assessments, SSE events, a… (#110)
* feat: output guard data pipeline — persist assessments, SSE events, admin UI

Complete the output guard pipeline: persist assessments for v2 calibration,
surface warnings in every UI layer, and add scan badges to admin skills tab.

Storage: migration 022 adds output_assessments table (flags, risk_level,
annotations, output_length, redacted — raw output never stored) and
scan_version column on prompt_templates. Three new protocol methods with
SQLite + PostgreSQL implementations.

Server/CLI: on_output_warning now persists assessments fire-and-forget.
CLI shows flags, annotations, and redaction notice. Session emits on_info
warning when high/critical scan_status skill is loaded.

MQ: OutputWarningEvent dataclass + bridge SSE forwarding.

Web UI: output_warning SSE handler with inline warning rendering
(role="alert" for accessibility), semantic risk colors.

Console admin: scan badges on skills list (dedicated scope-scan-* CSS with
green/yellow/red risk vocabulary), scan report breakdown in edit modal with
4-axis scores, POST /admin/skills/{id}/rescan endpoint, GET
/admin/output-assessments endpoint with date-filtered pagination.

Security fixes: ReDoS in connection string regex ([^@\s]+ → [^:@\s]+),
negative limit bypass in all admin endpoints (max(1, ...)), to_dict()
excludes sanitized output by default.

False-positive fixes: credentials pattern anchored to path context,
env secret key check restricted to key portion only.

* fix: address PR #110 review — list redaction, test fixture, OpenAPI snapshot

Per-part redaction: evaluate each text part independently in structured
output instead of joining all parts and replacing only the first one.

Fix test annotations default from "{}" to "[]" matching schema.

Regenerate TypeScript OpenAPI snapshots for new admin endpoints.
2026-03-16 17:39:24 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 5378b33641 feat: output guard — evaluate tool results before they enter context (#109)
* feat: output guard — evaluate tool results before they enter context

Add turnstone/core/output_guard.py — a time-budgeted heuristic that
evaluates tool execution results after execution but before they
enter the conversation context window.

Priority-ordered detection (5s budget, highest priority first):
1. Prompt injection: override phrases, role injection, instruction
   override markers, meta-injection patterns
2. Credential leakage: API keys (OpenAI/GitHub/AWS/Google), PEM
   private key blocks, connection strings, .env secret format
3. Encoded payloads: script data URIs, hex shellcode sequences
4. Adversarial URLs: cloud metadata endpoints, credential query params
5. System info disclosure: private IPs, sensitive file paths

Annotates and optionally redacts (credentials → [REDACTED:<type>]).
Does NOT gate — surfaces warnings via on_output_warning callback.

Integration:
- Wired into session.py tool result loop via _evaluate_output()
- JudgeConfig gains output_guard + redact_secrets fields (both default true)
- SessionUI protocol gains on_output_warning callback
- 25 compiled regex patterns, pure function, no I/O

29 tests covering all detection categories, benign output false
positive checks, credential redaction, and time budget behavior.

* fix: address PR #109 review — protocol, config, and guard fixes

Copilot review feedback:
- Replace _CLEAN singleton with _clean() factory to prevent mutable
  shared state (OutputAssessment has list fields)
- Remove redundant second _CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS loop in _check_credentials
- Evaluate text parts of list outputs (images) not just string outputs
- Wire output_guard + redact_secrets through ConfigStore settings
  registry and _build_judge_config() so operators can configure via
  admin Settings tab
- Remove --no-output-guard CLI flag claim from docs (use Settings tab)

Typecheck fix:
- Add on_output_warning to all SessionUI implementations: NullUI
  (eval, 5 test files), WebUI (server — emits SSE event), TerminalUI
  (CLI — ANSI colored warning), RecordingUI, FakeUI
2026-03-16 16:22:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 9b605f81a3 feat: skill scanner — evaluate SKILL.md content at install time
Add turnstone/core/skill_scanner.py — a production content scanner
that evaluates skill risk across four axes:

1. Content risk: command execution, external downloads, credential
   handling, data exfiltration, eval/exec, sudo, browser automation
2. Supply chain risk: pipe-to-shell, transitive installs, obfuscation,
   download-exec chains, executable URLs from untrusted domains
3. Vulnerability risk: prompt injection (E004), insecure credential
   handling (W007), third-party content exposure (W011)
4. Declared capability risk: parsed from allowed_tools field —
   Bash(*) is high, Bash(git:*) is low, read-only tools are safe

Composite score with equal 25% weights per axis. Floor rule: any
single axis at critical forces composite to at least medium tier.

Wired into both SQLite and PostgreSQL storage backends:
- scan_skill() runs at create_prompt_template time
- Re-scan triggers on update when content or allowed_tools change
- Results populate the existing scan_status and scan_report columns
- Silent failure on scanner errors (never blocks skill creation)

Scanner helper factored into _utils.py (shared across backends).
23 unit tests covering tier classification, capability scoring,
negation filtering, floor rule, serialization, and trusted domains.
2026-03-16 15:45:21 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f05e6bddad feat(judge): enrich heuristic rules from 23 to 36 (#107)
* feat(judge): enrich heuristic rules from 23 to 36

Add 13 new pattern-based rules to the intent validation heuristic,
calibrated from analysis of 25K public agent skill security audits
across three independent auditors.

New critical: download-then-execute chains.
New high: browser+data export, transitive installs from untrusted
sources, control plane mutations (crontab, systemctl).
New medium: content ingestion pipelines (curl|python3), interpreter
execution (python3 script.py), cloud CLI mutations (az/gcloud/aws/
kubectl/terraform create/delete/destroy).
New low: tool_search, read_resource, web_search.

Fixes: crontab -l no longer false-positives, systemctl stop/disable
now flagged, az/gcloud subcommand patterns work correctly.

* fix(judge): address PR #107 review feedback

- content-ingestion: narrow second pattern to specific interpreters/
  processors (python3, node, ruby, perl, php, jq) instead of any word.
  Prevents false positives on read-only downstream (wget -O - | head).
- cloud-infra-mutation: split kubectl into its own pattern with specific
  verbs (apply, create, delete, scale, rollout, drain, cordon) to avoid
  false positive on resource types (kubectl get deploy).
- cloud-infra-mutation: split terraform/pulumi to specific verbs only
  (apply, destroy, import) — terraform plan no longer matches.
- control-plane-mutation: exclude -h and -V flags from crontab pattern
  alongside existing -l exclusion.
- Add 35 heuristic rule tests covering all 13 new rules with positive
  matches and negative (false-positive prevention) cases.
2026-03-16 15:09:36 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 75eda9a096 feat: unified skills system — merge prompt templates + workstream tem… (#106)
* feat: unified skills system — merge prompt templates + workstream templates

Evolves prompt_templates into a first-class skills entity and merges
workstream templates into the same model, collapsing two concepts into
one.

Migration 021: 21 new columns on prompt_templates (skills metadata,
security scan fields, session config from WS templates), skill_resources
table for bundled files, skill_versions table for auto-snapshot version
history. Data migration converts existing WS templates into skills with
name collision handling, migrates version history, renames workstreams
and scheduled_tasks columns, cleans orphaned permissions, drops old
tables.

Key changes:
- All public interfaces renamed: templates → skills (API, CLI, SDK, UI)
- Session config (model, temperature, token_budget, auto_approve, etc.)
  now lives on the skill and is applied at workstream creation
- /skill slash command, set_skill() API, --skill CLI flag
- BM25 skill search via SkillSearchManager for activation="search" skills
- Admin UI: Skills tab with collapsible Session Config section,
  description subtitles, activation/origin/MCP badges, pagination
- Shared validation helper (_parse_skill_session_config) for DRY CRUD
- Version history with auto-snapshot on every edit + API endpoint
- Cascade delete (resources + versions) on skill removal
- Security: range validation, activation allowlist, fail-closed enabled
  check, duplicate name 409, readonly guard, JSON validation
- 77 new tests across storage, runtime, search, API integration, and
  migration behavior verification (2521 total)

* fix: address Copilot review + rename admin.templates → admin.skills

- Skip skill lookup when resume_ws is set (avoids spurious 400)
- Fix _applied_skill_version mismatch (1 in both workstreams table and session)
- Remove stale template field from MQ protocol diagram
- Rename admin.templates permission to admin.skills everywhere (runtime,
  frontend, tests, docs) with migration step for persisted role data
- Fix stale /api/templates references in docs and diagrams
- Update docstrings/comments for skills terminology

* fix: address Copilot round 2 — skill version lineage + stale doc refs

- Compute actual skill version from skill_versions count (not hardcoded 1)
- Use same version in both workstreams table and session metadata
- Fix response payload example: "templates" → "skills" key
- Fix "Each template summary" → "Each skill summary"
2026-03-16 14:47:06 -07:00
renovate[bot] 4c00d71150 chore(deps): lock file maintenance (#105)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-16 02:18:02 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 80e1924d7f feat: enable prompt caching for Anthropic and OpenAI providers (#104)
* feat: enable prompt caching for Anthropic and OpenAI providers

Activate automatic prompt caching on both LLM providers to reduce input
token costs on multi-turn conversations. Anthropic gets cache_control:
ephemeral (90% savings on cache hits), OpenAI GPT-5.x gets 24h extended
cache retention (free). Cache metrics flow end-to-end through the entire
data pipeline: provider → session → server SSE → MQ protocol → storage →
Prometheus metrics → admin Usage tab.

- AnthropicProvider: top-level cache_control on all requests, extract
  cache_creation_input_tokens and cache_read_input_tokens from streaming
  and non-streaming responses
- OpenAIProvider: prompt_cache_retention=24h for GPT-5.x, extract
  cached_tokens from usage.prompt_tokens_details
- UsageInfo: new cache_creation_tokens and cache_read_tokens fields
- Migration 020: add cache columns to usage_events table
- Storage: record_usage_event and query_usage updated (sqlite + pg)
- Metrics: turnstone_tokens_total{type="cache_creation|cache_read"}
- Server: on_status passes cache tokens to SSE, storage, and metrics
- MQ: StatusEvent carries cache fields through bridge
- SDKs: Python and TypeScript StatusEvent types updated
- OpenAPI: UsageBreakdownItem schema includes cache fields
- Console UI: Usage tab shows cache write/read as secondary readouts
  with visual separator, dimmed when zero
- 16 new tests, docs and 3 diagrams updated

* fix: address Copilot review feedback

- Fix MQ protocol diagram clipping by switching to vertical package
  layout (inbound on top, outbound below) with package aliases
- Regenerate OpenAPI snapshots to include cache_creation_tokens and
  cache_read_tokens on UsageBreakdownItem
- Replace fragile MagicMock(spec=[]) + del pattern with
  types.SimpleNamespace in cache metrics missing-attributes test
2026-03-16 01:59:55 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 471bf89c8b Merge pull request #101 from turnstonelabs/feat/mcp-registry
feat: MCP Registry integration — discover and install servers from th…
2026-03-15 22:01:25 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 35785d3a0e fix: address round 2 Copilot feedback
- Pass table_name to op.drop_index in migration 019 downgrade for
  dialect portability
- Fix dedup comment accuracy (first occurrence wins, not highest version)
- Re-render registry cards on install failure to reset stuck
  "Installing..." button state
2026-03-15 21:53:07 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2ff0cd8240 Merge pull request #103 from turnstonelabs/renovate/lock-file-maintenance
chore(deps): lock file maintenance
2026-03-15 21:47:29 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f9f0ff0b53 Merge pull request #102 from turnstonelabs/renovate/github-actions
chore(deps): update softprops/action-gh-release digest to 153bb8e
2026-03-15 21:47:26 -07:00
Patrick Buckley df8a36ced4 fix: add timeout to MCP server disconnect to prevent hung removals
stack.aclose() on a stuck streamable-http transport hangs indefinitely,
causing 50% CPU on all nodes when removing a broken remote server via
reconcile_sync. Wrap with asyncio.wait_for(timeout=10s) so cleanup
proceeds even if the transport refuses to close cleanly.
2026-03-15 21:42:05 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ef6cac6428 fix: address review feedback and add sync-pending indicator
Review fixes:
- Rename query param from `q` to `search` across endpoint, frontend,
  SDKs, OpenAPI spec, docs, and tests to match upstream registry API
- Validate variables/env/headers are dicts in install endpoint (400 on
  malformed input instead of 500)
- Block javascript: and unsafe URL schemes on repo and website links
  rendered from registry data (XSS prevention)
- Add roving tabindex to Servers/Registry pill toggle for correct
  keyboard focus behavior
- Add noreferrer to website link in detail modal

Sync-pending indicator:
- "Sync to Nodes" button pulses yellow after create/edit/delete/import
  to alert admin that nodes have unseen changes
- Clears after successful sync
- Reduced-motion safe
2026-03-15 21:41:02 -07:00
renovate[bot] f4c3b3a9c4 chore(deps): lock file maintenance 2026-03-16 04:11:10 +00:00
renovate[bot] d06db3feee chore(deps): update softprops/action-gh-release digest to 153bb8e 2026-03-16 04:10:39 +00:00
Patrick Buckley 50544c0d1b feat: MCP Registry integration — discover and install servers from the official registry
Backend: standalone MCPRegistryClient (httpx async) queries the official MCP
Registry API (registry.modelcontextprotocol.io, v0.1). Two new console admin
endpoints: GET /v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/search (proxy with installed-status
annotation, dedup, uninstallable server filtering) and POST
/v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/install (auto-reloads all cluster nodes). Migration
019 adds registry_name/version/meta columns to mcp_servers with partial unique
index. Configurable registry URL via mcp.registry_url setting for
enterprise/private registries. resolve_install_config() handles both remote
(streamable-http) and package (npm→npx, pypi→uvx) installs. Pydantic models,
OpenAPI spec, Python + TypeScript SDK methods.

Frontend: unified MCP admin tab with Servers/Registry pill toggle (ARIA
tablist). Servers view: tri-state source badges (CONFIG/MANUAL/REGISTRY).
Registry view: search bar with type filter (remote/npm/pypi), auto-browse on
tab switch, result cards with source-type badges and repo links, one-click
install for zero-config remotes, install modal with dynamic form for servers
needing env vars/headers/URL variables. Package install warning banner.
Post-install status polling with connection/error feedback toasts. Trust
notice banner linking to the official registry.

Safety: 30s connect timeout on streamablehttp_client and session.initialize()
prevents hung connections from blocking the MCP event loop indefinitely.
Required-only headers in install config prevents empty auth headers from
causing silent 401s.

71 new tests (registry client, API endpoints, storage columns). Docs:
dedicated docs/mcp-registry.md, updated api-reference, architecture, console,
sdk, settings docs. Updated MCP architecture diagram.
2026-03-15 21:09:27 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d1c484737f fix(ci): regenerate lockfile for v0.7.0 and exclude local package from pip-audit
uv lock --check fails after version bump because the lockfile is stale.
pip-audit --strict fails because turnstone 0.7.0 isn't on PyPI yet.

Fix: regenerate uv.lock, and audit only third-party deps via
uv export --no-emit-project piped to pip-audit -r.
2026-03-15 17:28:13 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c2c6689a8e chore: bump version to 0.7.0 2026-03-15 17:15:27 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f5af4875ba fix: surface MCP server errors in admin UI instead of silent logging (#100)
* fix: surface MCP server errors in admin UI instead of silent logging

get_server_status() hardcoded error="" — connection and refresh failures
were logged but never surfaced to the admin panel.

Added _last_error dict to MCPClientManager: set on failure (connect,
refresh, periodic refresh, notification handler), cleared on success,
cleaned up on remove. Read in get_server_status().

Admin UI: error tooltip on list row status span, error text in red
in detail modal per-node list. Schema already had the field.

6 new tests for error tracking lifecycle.

* feat: add turnstone_mcp_server_errors Prometheus gauge

Exposes the count of MCP servers currently in error state via
/metrics for alerting and reliability tracking.

* fix: address copilot review — sanitize error strings, clear on notification success

- Add _set_error() helper: strips newlines, truncates to 256 chars
- All error-setting sites now use _set_error() for consistent sanitization
- Notification handler clears _last_error on successful refresh (fixes
  stale error for push-notification servers that skip _periodic_refresh)
2026-03-15 17:12:13 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 0d77d65266 test: add OIDC handler integration tests (22 tests) (#99)
TestClient-based integration tests for the 4 OIDC HTTP endpoints: authorize, callback, admin list identities, admin delete identity.

Uses real SQLite storage with mocked external OIDC calls (exchange_code, validate_id_token, provision_oidc_user) to exercise the full handler→module→storage contract. Covers happy paths, error flows, rate limiting, JWKS key rotation retry, and state expiration.
2026-03-15 16:44:44 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c11991819e fix: apt-get upgrade in Dockerfile to resolve CVE-2026-0861
Trivy scan fails on HIGH for libc-bin/libc6 (2.41-12+deb13u1).
The fix (2.41-12+deb13u2) is available in Debian repos but the
base python:3.14-slim image hasn't been rebuilt yet. Adding
apt-get upgrade pulls in all pending security patches at build time.
2026-03-15 16:40:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley fc948d711d fix: use pgautoupgrade for seamless postgres major version upgrades
Replaces postgres:18-alpine with pgautoupgrade/pgautoupgrade:18-alpine
in compose.yaml. Sets PGDATA=/var/lib/postgresql/data so pgautoupgrade
detects existing pg17 data and runs pg_upgrade automatically on first
start. No manual migration needed.

Also increases healthcheck start_period to 30s to accommodate the
one-time upgrade process.
2026-03-15 16:26:19 -07:00
renovate[bot] d9722f3578 chore(config): migrate config .github/renovate.json (#97)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 16:24:39 -07:00
renovate[bot] f494553020 chore(deps): update helm release redis to v25 (#93)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:58:41 -07:00
renovate[bot] c766c81f25 chore(deps): update helm release postgresql to v18 (#92)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:58:38 -07:00
renovate[bot] 3b746fb28d chore(deps): update docker images (#90)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:58:34 -07:00
renovate[bot] b82fa4923c chore(deps): lock file maintenance (#94)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:56:18 -07:00
renovate[bot] 4ac316dc0e chore(deps): update github actions (#91)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:56:16 -07:00
renovate[bot] 387ef06da7 chore(deps): update helm release redis to ~20.13.0 (#89)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:56:13 -07:00
renovate[bot] e4e2200c33 chore(deps): update helm release postgresql to ~16.7.0 (#88)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:56:11 -07:00
renovate[bot] 8b94d553e4 chore(deps): update docker images (#87)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:55:53 -07:00
renovate[bot] cf16724137 chore(deps): pin dependencies (#86)
Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 15:53:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 22402e89de feat: add dependency management with Renovate, uv.lock, and security … (#83)
* feat: add dependency management with Renovate, uv.lock, and security scanning

Adds automated dependency update detection and vulnerability scanning
across all dependency layers (Python, vendored JS, TypeScript SDK, Docker,
GitHub Actions).

- Renovate config with 10 package groups and custom regex managers for
  vendored JS (KaTeX, Highlight.js, Mermaid) tracking via npm registry
- uv.lock for reproducible builds (80 packages)
- Dockerfile switched to uv sync --frozen with layer caching
- CI: pip-audit (via lock file), npm audit, lock-check jobs
- CI: lint job uses pre-commit for ruff version consistency
- Docker security scan workflow (weekly Trivy, HIGH/CRITICAL)
- Helper script for vendored JS library updates

* fix: resolve CI failures and address review feedback

- Update pre-commit hooks: ruff v0.9.10 -> v0.15.6 (fixes deprecated
  UP038 rule), mypy v1.14.1 -> v1.19.1
- Add per-file-ignore for N802 on sandbox.py (ast visitor convention)
- Fix pip-audit: install into uv venv so uv run can find it
- Pin uv-version in CI to match lock file generator (0.9.18)
- Upgrade vitest ^2.0 -> ^4.1 to fix esbuild GHSA-67mh-4wv8-2f99
- Vendored JS script: use grep -rl for auto-discovery of version refs
  (catches docs/architecture.md), fix LICENSE comment, portable grep
2026-03-15 15:46:48 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e7743fd079 feat: per-tool "Always" approve instead of blanket auto-approve (#82)
* feat: per-tool "Always" approve instead of blanket auto-approve

Interactive "Always" button now adds specific tool names to
auto_approve_tools instead of setting blanket auto_approve=True.
Only the tool types in the current batch are auto-approved going
forward — new tool types still prompt for approval.

Server uses approval_label (with func_name fallback) matching the
existing approve_tools() lookup. CLI and bridge use func_name.
Budget override excluded from all paths.

UI: dashed border on Always button signals persistent action,
dynamic tooltip/badge show tool names, aria-label for screen
readers, focus-visible outline fix, overflow-wrap on badge.

Bridge: seeds with DEFAULT_SAFE_TOOLS on first "always" to avoid
losing existing safe-tool auto-approvals.

16 new tests (10 unit + 6 TestClient integration). Updated tool
pipeline diagram and docs.

* fix: address copilot review — filter errored items, hide Always on budget-only

- Server/bridge/JS: add `not it.get("error")` filter so policy-denied
  items aren't added to auto_approve_tools
- Hide Always button when no eligible tools (budget-override-only batch)
- Docs: clarify CLI/bridge use func_name (coarser MCP granularity)
2026-03-15 15:25:40 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 27349e1c13 refactor: move bridge content buffer to server-side single source of truth
Eliminate dual accumulation by piggybacking assistant response text on
the server's ws_state:idle SSE event.  The bridge no longer maintains
its own _ws_content_buffer — it reads content directly from the idle
event and passes it through to TurnCompleteEvent unchanged.

Server-side: WebUI accumulates tokens in on_content_token(), joins and
includes in the idle broadcast, then resets (with 256 KB cap).

Downstream consumers (Discord bidi DM forwarding, catch-up) are
unaffected — TurnCompleteEvent.content is still populated.
2026-03-15 15:04:22 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 37a48bb30d fix: validate scope_id requires scope in memory API (#80)
* fix: validate scope_id requires scope in memory API

Prevent misleading scope_id usage: reject scope_id with global scope,
require scope when scope_id is provided, require scope_id for
workstream/user scopes on writes. Belt-and-suspenders guard in storage
backends ignores scope_id when scope is empty.

* fix: strip whitespace in scope validation, relax user scope_id requirement

Address Copilot review: .strip() whitespace-only values in all three
validation helpers; SaveMemoryRequest no longer requires scope_id for
user scope since the server auto-resolves it from auth context.
2026-03-15 14:28:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 730f5704ff fix: inject prompt template guardrails into plan agent system message (#79)
* fix: inject prompt template guardrails into plan agent system message

Safety/behavioral templates were silently bypassed by the plan agent,
which only used _PLAN_IDENTITY. Now _plan_system_content() prepends
_template_content (when present) so admin-configured guardrails apply
to both _exec_plan and _refine_plan, matching the task agent pattern.

* fix: address Copilot review — log truncation, comment clarity, test robustness

- Log warning on template truncation in _plan_system_content() for
  consistency with _init_system_messages()
- Clarify comment that prior plan pairs (not general history) are forwarded
- Use ChatSession._PLAN_IDENTITY for index assertions instead of substring
2026-03-15 14:24:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 9b3b1c1ddd fix: reorder new-workstream modal so Task is the primary field (#77)
* fix: reorder new-workstream modal so Task is the primary field

Users were typing their prompt into the Name field (first text input,
auto-focused) and leaving Task empty, creating idle workstreams. Move
Task textarea to the top of the form, auto-focus it, and add
Ctrl/Cmd+Enter submit shortcut. Accessibility fixes: cancel button
focus-visible, label-hint contrast raised to WCAG AA, platform-aware
keyboard hint, Ctrl+Enter added to shortcuts overlay.

* fix: Enter on Cancel button no longer triggers submit

Copilot review caught that pressing Enter while focused on the Cancel
button bypassed native click and called submitNewWs(). Skip the
Enter-to-submit handler for BUTTON elements so native activation fires.
Also make keyboard shortcuts overlay platform-aware (Ctrl vs ⌘).
2026-03-15 14:23:57 -07:00
Patrick Buckley a9ed8a954b fix: convert _pending_nudge from single-slot to list for defensive correctness
Every append site immediately drains via _init_system_messages(), so this
is defensive — ensures multiple nudges survive if the drain flow is ever
refactored to batch calls.
2026-03-15 14:17:34 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1efcbcf2ba perf: parallelize _collect_mcp_status and _notify_nodes_mcp_reload wi… (#73)
* perf: parallelize _collect_mcp_status and _notify_nodes_mcp_reload with asyncio.gather

Both functions queried cluster nodes sequentially, making latency
O(N × timeout). Use asyncio.gather to query all nodes concurrently,
matching the existing admin_list_watches pattern. Also reuse the
shared proxy_client instead of creating throwaway httpx clients per
node, and add debug logging on MCP status fetch failures.

* perf: bound node fan-out concurrency and improve debug logging

Add _NODE_FAN_OUT_LIMIT (50) semaphore to all three gather fan-out
sites (_collect_mcp_status, _notify_nodes_mcp_reload, admin_list_watches)
to cap concurrent outbound connections below the httpx pool limit,
leaving headroom for other proxy traffic at 1000-node scale.

Add exc_info=True to all debug log calls for actionable diagnostics.

* test: add unit tests for _collect_mcp_status and _notify_nodes_mcp_reload

11 tests covering success, non-200, missing URL, exceptions, empty
cluster, and mixed multi-node scenarios for both fan-out helpers.
2026-03-15 13:54:49 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1d36d80fe5 fix: reduce metacognition false positives with strong/weak pattern tiers (#76)
* fix: reduce metacognition false positives with strong/weak pattern tiers

Correction detection: split "no" handling — "no," and "no." are strong
(always fire), "no <word>" uses an allowlist of correction-context words
(pronouns, demonstratives, verbs) instead of a blocklist. Phrases like
"no problem", "no worries", "no rush" are excluded automatically.

Completion detection: move most patterns to weak tier, gated by message
length (<80 chars) and absence of continuation markers ("?", "can you",
"but", "now", "please", etc.). "thanks for X" excluded at regex level.
Strong tier (always fire): "that's all", "lgtm".

* fix: align allowlist comment with implementation (include articles)
2026-03-15 13:53:39 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e603a6a7d1 fix(oidc): pin redirect URI via TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE env var (#74)
* fix(oidc): pin redirect URI via TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE env var

OIDC redirect_uri was derived from the request Host header, which is
unreliable behind reverse proxies. Add TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE
(env var / config.toml) to pin the externally-reachable origin.

Extract _build_oidc_redirect_uri() helper to deduplicate the authorize
and callback handlers. Validate redirect_base at load time (must be
scheme://host[:port], rejects paths/query strings/invalid schemes).

* fix(oidc): reject redirect_base with missing hostname

Addresses Copilot review: values like `https://` or `https://:443`
passed validation but would produce invalid redirect URIs.

* fix(oidc): reject redirect_base with userinfo or invalid port

Addresses Copilot round 2: urlparse silently accepts user:pass@host
and non-numeric ports. Now explicitly rejects both.
2026-03-15 13:52:05 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2e95f2ac73 test: add scope coverage for internal MCP/config reload endpoints (#75)
* test: add scope coverage for internal MCP/config reload endpoints

Verify required_scope() returns "approve" for _internal endpoints
across all access patterns (bare, /v1/-prefixed, console proxy with
and without /v1/), plus a GET negative test confirming only POST is
elevated. Closes the "internal endpoints accept read scope" item in
PROGRESS.md — the endpoints were already in APPROVE_PATHS.

* test: add config-reload v1/proxy scope tests per review feedback

Add /v1/-prefixed and console proxy variants for config-reload to
match the mcp-reload coverage, as flagged by Copilot review.
2026-03-15 13:45:35 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 5f27ed9fca feat: OIDC identity management inline in Users admin tab (#72)
Expandable user rows in the console Users tab reveal OIDC identities
linked to each user. Issuer badge, truncated subject, email, relative
last-login time, and unlink action with confirmation modal + audit trail.

Keyboard accessible (tabindex, Enter/Space, aria-expanded, focus-visible).
In-place refresh after unlink (no close/reopen flicker). Audit captures
user_id before delete. Mobile responsive (3-column at <700px).
Reduced-motion support. 2 new admin API endpoints reusing admin.users
permission and existing storage methods.
2026-03-15 03:52:42 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 20df7b3034 feat: OIDC SSO authentication with PKCE, auto-provisioning, and role … (#71)
* feat: OIDC SSO authentication with PKCE, auto-provisioning, and role mapping

Add OpenID Connect as a fourth authentication method, enabling single sign-on
via any OIDC provider (Okta, Azure AD, Google, Keycloak). Opt-in via env vars
(TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER, CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET).

Security:
- Authorization Code Flow with PKCE (S256)
- State/nonce parameters with database-backed pending store (multi-node safe)
- JWKS signature validation with async fetch + key rotation retry
- Algorithm allowlist from JWKS key (not token header) prevents confusion
- Identity matching exclusively by (issuer, sub) — prevents account takeover
- password_enabled=false enforced server-side, not just UI
- Rate limiting on both authorize and callback endpoints
- OIDC users get "!oidc" password sentinel (bcrypt rejects naturally)
- ID token validated for iss, aud, exp, nonce

Features:
- Auto-provisioning with username deduplication on first login
- Claim-based role mapping with IdP demotion propagation (revokes stale roles)
- "Continue with [Provider]" SSO button on login page
- OIDC-only mode hides password form
- Setup wizard required before OIDC login (admin bootstrap)

Storage: migration 018 (oidc_identities + oidc_pending_states tables),
8 new protocol methods on both SQLite and PostgreSQL backends.
66 new tests (2273 total).

* fix: address PR #71 review feedback (18 items)

Bugs fixed:
- OIDC success redirect now fetches permissions via new /auth/whoami
  endpoint before completing login (fixes permission-gating in UI)
- Remove double decodeURIComponent on oidc_error (URLSearchParams
  already decodes; extra call throws on stray %)
- Authorize rate limiter returns redirect instead of JSON 429
  (endpoint reached via browser navigation, not fetch)
- Lazy JWKS fetch in callback when startup discovery failed (IdP
  recovery without restart)
- Startup exception handlers now log with exc_info=True
- PostgreSQL pop_oidc_pending_state uses DELETE...RETURNING for
  true atomicity (eliminates TOCTOU)

Behavior:
- New OIDC users without role mapping get builtin-viewer by default
  (assigned_by="oidc-default", not revoked by role sync)

Documentation fixes:
- Role mapping: sync semantics (add + revoke stale), not "additive only"
- PASSWORD_ENABLED=false blocks ALL password logins including admin
- Algorithm: asymmetric allowlist, not per-key derivation
- PlantUML diagram updated for role revocation

API spec fixes:
- Removed error_codes=[302] from callback (302 is success redirect)
- Added /auth/whoami to both server + console specs
- Regenerated TypeScript SDK OpenAPI snapshots (23 + 51 paths)

* fix: address PR #71 round 2 review feedback (10 items)

Rate limiting:
- Authorize endpoint now calls record() after check() so the rate
  limiter actually counts attempts (was a no-op before)

OIDC resilience:
- Split startup try/except: discovery failure disables OIDC, JWKS
  prefetch failure leaves OIDC enabled for lazy retry on first login
- JWKS unavailable message changed to "temporarily unavailable"
  (was misleadingly "not configured")
- create_oidc_pending_state raises on collision instead of OR IGNORE
  (prevents silent insert drop on state collision)
- SQLite pop_oidc_pending_state uses BEGIN IMMEDIATE for write lock
  (eliminates TOCTOU race)

Frontend:
- OIDC error display deferred 300ms so showLogin()'s async status
  fetch doesn't clear it via _switchMode → _clearError

API spec:
- OIDC authorize/callback endpoints now declare response_code=302
- Added AuthWhoamiResponse Pydantic model for /auth/whoami
- Regenerated TypeScript SDK OpenAPI snapshots

Documentation:
- Diagram: JWKS "cached at startup, refreshed on-demand" (was "hourly")
- Added TODO(tech-debt) comments on Host header redirect_uri sites
2026-03-15 03:44:18 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 68c991fbdd fix: restore safe HTML element rendering and suppress plantuml warning (#70)
* fix: restore safe HTML element rendering and suppress plantuml warning

- Add safe HTML tag allowlist in inlineMarkdown: br, hr, kbd, mark,
  sub, sup, ins, wbr, details, summary, abbr, small, u, s
  (attribute-free only — XSS safe, tags with attributes stay escaped)
- Add <details>/<summary> block-level protection pass with recursive
  markdown rendering of inner content
- Add plantuml to _NO_HIGHLIGHT_LANGS (suppresses highlight.js warning
  for unsupported language)
- CSS for details (collapsible, overflow hidden), kbd (mono font,
  key style), mark (yellow-glow token for theme adaptation)

* fix: restrict safe tags to inline-only, broaden details regex

- Remove hr, details, summary from inline _SAFE_TAGS allowlist (they
  are block-level and produce invalid HTML inside <p> wrappers)
- Make <details> regex newline-optional so same-line
  <details><summary>Title</summary> patterns are captured
2026-03-15 02:34:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 376da3d084 feat: prompt template tech debt — tests, read-only endpoints, double-… (#67)
* feat: prompt template tech debt — tests, read-only endpoints, double-load fix, server creation modal

Close test coverage gaps for prompt templates:
- Resume with deleted template: verifies graceful degradation (template_content=None, warning logged)
- Threading safety: concurrent set_template/init_system_messages with no race conditions
- Factory passthrough: template kwarg propagation through WorkstreamManager.create()

Add read-only template listing endpoints (read scope, no content exposed):
- GET /v1/api/templates — prompt template summaries (name, category, is_default, origin)
- GET /v1/api/ws-templates — enabled workstream template summaries (name, description, model)
- Available on both server and console; Python + TypeScript SDK methods added
- Console creation modal switched from admin endpoint to read-scope endpoint

Eliminate double-load inefficiency in workstream creation:
- Template validation moved before mgr.create() (no create-then-rollback on invalid template)
- template kwarg plumbed through WorkstreamManager.create() and session factory
- _SessionFactory Protocol added for proper mypy typing

Add workstream creation modal to server web UI:
- Name, model, template dropdown, ws_template/profile dropdown
- Instrument panel aesthetic: gradient top border, blur backdrop, amber accent
- Focus trap, Escape/Enter keyboard handling, loading state, error display
- WCAG AA contrast compliance, reduced-motion support

* fix: add list_ws_templates SDK methods + regenerate OpenAPI snapshots

Add list_ws_templates() to Python SDK (async + sync) and listWsTemplates()
to TypeScript SDK for the new GET /v1/api/ws-templates server endpoint.
Add WsTemplateSummary + ListWsTemplateSummaryResponse TypeScript types.
Regenerate openapi-server.json and openapi-console.json snapshots.

Addresses Copilot review feedback on PR #67.

* fix: skip template pre-validation when resuming a workstream

When resume_ws is set, the request's template field is irrelevant —
resume() restores the template from workstream_config. Pre-validating
a stale template name would incorrectly return 400 before the resume
even runs.

Addresses Copilot review feedback on PR #67.
2026-03-15 02:09:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e2a199c9c3 feat: mermaid diagram rendering with lazy loading and theme integration (#69)
* feat: mermaid diagram rendering with lazy loading and theme integration

Integrate mermaid.js 11.13.0 (self-hosted, MIT, ~2.9MB) for rendering
```mermaid code blocks as inline SVG diagrams. Covers flowcharts,
sequence, class, ER, state, gantt, pie, timeline, and mindmap.

- Lazy-loaded via dynamic script injection on first mermaid block
  detection (not eagerly loaded on every page view)
- 3-state loader (idle/loading/ready) with callback queue
- Serialized rendering to avoid mermaid internal state corruption
- Theme integration via getComputedStyle reading CSS design tokens;
  re-renders all diagrams on dark/light theme toggle
- Source preserved in data-mermaid-source for theme re-rendering
- Error handling with source code fallback display
- securityLevel: "strict" (DOMPurify) for SVG XSS prevention
- THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES updated with mermaid MIT license

* fix: mermaid render fixes from Copilot review

- Call result.bindFunctions(container) after SVG insertion for
  interactive diagram elements (click handlers, links, tooltips)
- Clear mermaid-error class on successful render (fixes stale error
  styling after theme toggle re-render)
- Clear mermaid-error in reRenderAllMermaid before re-render sequence
- Restructure postRenderMarkdown so mermaid rendering runs even when
  highlight.js is unavailable (hljs guard changed from early return
  to conditional block)
2026-03-15 02:09:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4152ea2352 fix: widen code fence regex and skip auto-detect on unlabeled blocks
- Regex changed from (\w*) to ([^\s`]*) to capture language names with
  special chars (c++, c#, objective-c, shell-session)
- Alias map normalizes c++ → cpp, c# → csharp, f# → fsharp for CSS
  class names
- Empty language no longer emits class="language-", preventing
  highlight.js auto-detect across all 37 bundled languages on
  unlabeled code blocks (performance fix for large blocks)
2026-03-15 02:04:58 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 44cc14b46f feat: syntax highlighting via highlight.js with code block variants (#68)
Integrate highlight.js 11.11.1 (self-hosted, BSD-3-Clause, ~125KB) for
language-aware syntax highlighting on fenced code blocks.

- postRenderMarkdown() hook applies highlighting at stream_end and
  history load — not during streaming (innerHTML replaced per token)
- Custom theme using CSS design tokens (auto-adapts dark/light)
- Code block variants: diff (green/red line coloring), bash/shell
  (terminal left-border), ascii/text/plaintext (no highlighting)
- Class prefix changed from lang- to language- (CommonMark standard)
- Graceful degradation when highlight.js unavailable
- THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES file for bundled dependency attribution
- pyproject.toml package-data glob for vendored hljs directory
2026-03-15 01:36:57 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 83b0cde32f feat: GFM extended syntax renderers (callouts, footnotes, definition … (#66)
* feat: GFM extended syntax renderers (callouts, footnotes, definition lists)

Add three GFM extended syntax features to the server web UI markdown
renderer, with no external library dependencies (pure JS/CSS):

- Callouts/Alerts: > [!NOTE], [!TIP], [!IMPORTANT], [!WARNING], [!CAUTION]
  with color-coded left borders, icons, and recursive markdown body
- Definition Lists: Term + `: Definition` pattern with multi-term support
- Footnotes: [^id] inline superscript references, [^id]: definitions
  collected into a numbered section with bidirectional navigation

Design review fixes: scoped footnote IDs (prevent collisions across
messages), aria-hidden on callout icons, aria-label on callout containers,
focus-visible on footnote links, smooth-scroll footnote navigation.

* fix: use getElementById for footnote scroll to handle special chars in IDs

querySelector throws on fragment IDs containing &, . or : characters
(produced by escapeHtml on footnote labels). getElementById accepts any
string and is the correct API for ID-based element lookup.
2026-03-15 01:33:54 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2ef8a8711b feat: rich markdown renderer with LaTeX support for server web UI (#65)
* feat: rich markdown renderer with LaTeX support for server web UI

Extract markdown rendering from app.js into dedicated renderer.js with
full GFM support: tables (alignment, hover, striping), nested lists,
task list checkboxes, nested blockquotes, images (click-to-load for
privacy), and inline/display LaTeX math via self-hosted KaTeX 0.16.38.

Security: escape image/link URLs to prevent attribute injection, block
javascript: scheme in links, add rel="noopener noreferrer", images
require explicit click to load (no automatic external requests).

Accessibility: scope="col" on table headers, tabindex on scrollable
table containers, aria-labels on task checkboxes and image placeholders,
KaTeX error color override for WCAG AA contrast, reduced-motion support.

* fix: address code review — XSS hardening and list type splitting

- Escape all text through escapeHtml() at start of inlineMarkdown()
  so only renderer-generated tags appear in innerHTML (prevents raw
  HTML/script injection from LLM output)
- Replace inline onclick handler on image placeholders with data-*
  attributes and delegated DOM event listeners (prevents entity
  decoding XSS in event handler attributes)
- Split list blocks into separate <ul>/<ol> when marker type changes
  at the same indent level (mixed ordered/unordered sequences)
2026-03-15 00:04:01 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 3658b77de8 feat: Discord content catch-up + bidirectional notification replies (… (#64)
* feat: Discord content catch-up + bidirectional notification replies (#64)

Two improvements to the Discord channel adapter:

1. Fix intermittent dropped responses caused by a race between the
   bridge's two independent SSE connections (global SSE detects idle
   before per-ws SSE delivers all content tokens). The bridge now
   accumulates content in _ws_content_buffer and attaches it to
   TurnCompleteEvent.content. The Discord bot uses this as a catch-up
   when streaming events were missed.

2. Bidirectional notification replies — when the notify tool sends a DM,
   the message is tracked with the originating ws_id. Users can reply to
   the DM and the reply is routed to the workstream. The response is
   forwarded back to the DM, with the response itself tracked for
   multi-turn conversations. Includes user identity verification,
   stale notification feedback, and FIFO-capped tracking (100 entries).

* fix: address Copilot review — re-insert on unlinked user, deque buffer

- Re-insert _notify_ws_map entry when resolve_user returns None so the
  user can retry after linking (same pattern as user-mismatch re-insert)
- Rename _MAX_CONTENT_BUFFER_BYTES → _MAX_CONTENT_BUFFER_CHARS (len()
  returns characters, not bytes)
- Use deque + running total for O(1) popleft instead of list.pop(0)
2026-03-14 23:58:27 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 83577739e0 chore: bump version to 0.6.2
- MCP admin tab: database-backed server management, hot-reload,
  reconcile, unified config view, paste-based import
- Catch-up migration for builtin-admin permissions (017)
- `[all]` optional dependency group (@Burhan-Q)
2026-03-14 17:25:58 -07:00
Burhan 71d13936fe add "all" optional dep (#61) 2026-03-14 17:05:49 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 0cd061196c fix: catch-up migration ensuring builtin-admin has all 20 permissions (#63)
Migrations 011-016 each appended a permission to the builtin-admin role
via conditional UPDATE, but on some deployments these never applied.
Migration 017 idempotently sets the complete permission string rather
than appending incrementally.

Must be merged after feat/admin-mcp-servers (migration 016).
2026-03-14 17:03:21 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 19abc0cc65 feat: admin MCP Servers tab — database-backed MCP server management w… (#62)
* feat: admin MCP Servers tab — database-backed MCP server management with live status

Add MCP Servers admin tab (14th tab, System group) for managing MCP server
definitions via the database instead of static JSON config files.

Storage: `mcp_servers` table (migration 016), 6 CRUD methods on both SQLite
and PostgreSQL backends, `MCP_SERVER_MUTABLE` field allowlist.

Config priority chain: DB rows (if any enabled) → CLI `--mcp-config` →
`mcp.config_path` setting → none. Nodes auto-load from DB on startup via
`load_mcp_config(storage=)`.

Hot-reload: `reconcile_sync(storage)` diffs running servers against DB —
adds missing, removes stale, reconnects changed. `_db_managed` set tracks
DB-sourced servers so config-file servers (MCP_CONFIG env) are never removed
by reconcile. Per-server `AsyncExitStack` for clean teardown.

Reload pattern: console writes to DB then signals nodes via
`POST /_internal/mcp-reload` (update by reference, no config payload).

Console admin API: 7 endpoints under `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers` (CRUD +
reload + import), `admin.mcp` permission, secret masking (env/headers
replaced with *** unless ?reveal=true), audit log sanitization.

Unified view: tab merges DB-managed servers with config-sourced servers
detected on nodes. Config servers shown as read-only rows with "config"
badge — no edit/delete.

Admin UI: 7-column grid with magenta status dots, transport badges,
single-column create/edit modal, paste-based JSON import (mcpServers format),
detail modal with per-node status. Mobile 3-column collapse, reduced-motion
support, backdrop-click dismiss, focus trapping.

SDKs: 7 methods on Python (async+sync) and TypeScript SDKs.

Also fixes: Settings tab permission gate (admin.users → admin.settings),
_ALL_PERMISSIONS list in governance.js (5 missing permissions added),
_internal/mcp-reload added to APPROVE_PATHS.

Docs: architecture.md (14 tabs), api-reference.md (7 endpoints),
20-mcp-architecture.puml updated with admin-driven lifecycle.

66 new tests (2232 total).

* fix: address Copilot review feedback on MCP admin PR

- Docs: fix "merges both sources" → "first-match-wins priority" (architecture.md)
- Validation: require command for stdio, url for streamable-http transport
- Validation: check args/headers/env types in import handler before storing
- Schema: add transport/command/url to McpServerStatus, source to McpServerDetail
- Thread safety: move all remove_server_sync mutations onto MCP event loop thread
- Regenerate OpenAPI JSON snapshots for TypeScript SDK
2026-03-14 17:02:50 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c5cdfc8f44 chore: bump version to 0.6.1 2026-03-14 13:19:40 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8895bf07eb feat: admin Settings tab — form-based editor replacing "coming soon" … (#60)
* feat: admin Settings tab — form-based editor replacing "coming soon" stub

Section-grouped layout with collapsible headers for all ~40 ConfigStore
settings (model, session, tools, server, mcp, ratelimit, health, judge,
memory). Type-appropriate inputs: CSS toggle for bools, number with
min/max/step, select for choices, text for strings. Secret fields shown
read-only. Source badge (storage/default), amber restart indicator.

Inline save per field with dirty detection, row flash on success, reset
to default via styled confirm modal. Full WCAG keyboard accessibility
(Enter/Space on section headers, aria-labels, focus-visible). Mobile
responsive single-column at <700px. Reduced-motion safe.

* fix: Settings tab polish — help tooltips, context_window auto-detect, UX fixes

Settings UI:
- Help tooltips: ? button on ~25 settings with plain-English explanations
  and optional reference links (arXiv, Fowler, MCP spec). Click to toggle
  popover, Escape to dismiss, aria-expanded for accessibility.
- Sections start collapsed for scannable overview.
- Restart badge: hidden by default, shows when dirty, persists after save
  with amber glow. Positioned left of source badge.
- Secret row alignment fixed (transparent border matches input box model).
- Docs link in toolbar → Swagger UI Settings section.
- Number inputs: spin buttons hidden (Firefox/WebKit), empty value guard,
  numeric dirty detection (0.1 vs 0.10 no longer false positive).
- Secret reset button enabled when source=storage (clear legacy overrides).
- Space key repeat guard on section headers.
- Sidebar: sticky + max-height:100vh, no longer stretches with content.

Backend:
- context_window default changed from 131072 to 0 (auto-detect). Fallback
  lowered from 131K to 32K (realistic for local models when detection fails).
  Session normalizes 0→32768 defensively.
- Settings registry: help + reference_url fields on SettingDef, richer
  descriptions for model/session/tools/judge/memory settings.
- Schema API includes help + reference_url.
- Bootstrap system prompt: added Runtime Settings section.

Docs: tab counts updated to 13 across README, architecture, console, governance.
2026-03-14 13:12:40 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 101afd84da feat: database-backed settings (ConfigStore) with admin API (#59)
* feat: database-backed settings (ConfigStore) with admin API

Replace config.toml for non-bootstrap settings on the server with a
database-backed ConfigStore.  ~40 settings across model, session,
tools, server, mcp, ratelimit, health, judge, and memory sections are
now managed via the admin Settings API.  CLI flags for these settings
removed from the server entry point (CLI standalone tool unchanged).

Storage: system_settings table (migration 015) with composite PK
(key, node_id) for per-node overrides.  ON CONFLICT upsert in both
SQLite and PostgreSQL.  admin.settings permission granted to
builtin-admin role.

Settings registry (settings_registry.py): code-defined catalog of
all known settings with types, defaults, validation, descriptions.
Registry defaults aligned with previous argparse defaults.

ConfigStore (config_store.py): thread-safe in-memory cache loaded
from storage on init.  Lock-free reads via dict snapshot swap.
reload() for hot-reload via internal endpoint.

Secret settings (judge.api_key) blocked from write via admin API
(403) — must be configured via config.toml or env vars.

warn_migrated_settings() logs warnings for config.toml keys that
overlap with ConfigStore-managed settings.

Console admin API: GET /v1/api/admin/settings (list with effective
values), GET .../schema (registry catalog), PUT .../{key} (update),
DELETE .../{key} (reset to default).  Audit trail on mutations.

MQ: ConfigChangeEvent for cross-node cache invalidation (emission
from console deferred to bridge integration).

Python + TypeScript SDK methods.  63 new tests.  Feature docs at
docs/settings.md, PlantUML diagram 24-settings-architecture.

* fix: address PR review — config-reload scope, registry defaults, doc alignment

- config-reload endpoint requires approve scope (was write)
- config-reload handler is sync def (avoids blocking event loop)
- reasoning_effort passes empty string through (removes `or "medium"`)
- ratelimit.requests_per_second changed to float (matches RateLimiter)
- session.retention_days allows 0 (disable pruning)
- ratelimit.trusted_proxies added to registry + wired in server
- admin_list_settings filters to global settings only (no node_id ambiguity)
- admin_update_setting validates "value" key presence (400 if missing)
- Console config change fans out reload to nodes directly (no MQ dep)
- Docs aligned with actual API response shapes and masking ("***")
2026-03-14 11:42:18 -07:00
Patrick Buckley efd98712e9 feat: [memory] admin panel Memories tab — browse, search, inspect, de… (#57)
* feat: [memory] admin panel Memories tab — browse, search, inspect, delete

Add 13th admin tab in the Observe group for cluster-wide memory
management.  List view with type/scope filter dropdowns and debounced
search input.  Detail modal shows full metadata grid and scrollable
content block.  Delete from both list row and detail modal with
confirmation and audit trail.

Permission-gated behind admin.memories.  Escape key, backdrop click,
and focus trap wired for the detail modal.  Mobile responsive: hides
description and updated columns below 700px.

* fix: memory detail modal — focus, delete safety, CSS shorthand order

Address Copilot review feedback: move focus to close button on modal
open for keyboard accessibility, disable delete button and clear stale
handler during loading/error states to prevent wrong-memory deletion,
and fix font shorthand/font-size ordering in toolbar filter styles.
2026-03-14 02:42:43 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 67f43a7ee0 feat: [memory] REST API endpoints + SDK methods + docs (#56)
* feat: [memory] REST API endpoints + SDK methods + docs

Server API (4 endpoints):
- GET /v1/api/memories — list with type/scope/scope_id/limit filters
- POST /v1/api/memories — save (upsert) with validation
- POST /v1/api/memories/search — search by query (read scope)
- DELETE /v1/api/memories/{name} — delete by name+scope

Console admin API (4 endpoints):
- GET /v1/api/admin/memories — list all memories
- GET /v1/api/admin/memories/search — search with ?q= param
- GET /v1/api/admin/memories/{memory_id} — get by ID
- DELETE /v1/api/admin/memories/{memory_id} — delete by ID with audit

Storage: add delete_structured_memory_by_id, add mem_type filter to
count_structured_memories. Auth: memory DELETE requires write scope,
admin.memories permission added to valid set + builtin-admin role.

Python SDK: list_memories, save_memory, search_memories, delete_memory
on both server (async+sync) and console (async+sync) clients.

TypeScript SDK: matching methods + types on both clients.

Pydantic schemas with Literal type/scope validation, OpenAPI endpoint
specs on both servers. 33 endpoint tests + 8 auth scope tests.

Docs: docs/memory.md feature guide, api-reference.md endpoint docs,
23-memory-architecture.puml diagram.

Also fixes stray `total: int` on CreateChannelUserRequest.

* fix: [memory] address PR review — cross-user scope, schema types, snapshots

Security: user-scoped memory endpoints now bind scope_id to the
authenticated user's identity.  Providing a mismatched scope_id
returns 403, preventing cross-user memory access on all 4 server
endpoints.

Schema: MemoryInfo response uses MemoryType/MemoryScope Literals.
SearchMemoriesRequest uses filter Literals (empty string allowed).
Limit query params declare schema_type="integer" for correct OpenAPI.

Regenerate sdk/typescript/openapi-{server,console}.json snapshots.
Update count_structured_memories docstring for mem_type param.
Fix fallback response to use normalized name after save.

6 new security tests for user-scope access control.
2026-03-14 02:28:47 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2888e8ce0a feat: MCP cluster-ops example — reference MCP server + SDK implementa… (#55)
* feat: MCP cluster-ops example — reference MCP server + SDK implementation

Standalone MCP server under examples/mcp-cluster-ops/ that exposes
tools for executing commands across a Turnstone cluster via the MQ
client SDK. Serves as a reference implementation for both MCP server
patterns (FastMCP, lifespan, tool handlers) and TurnstoneClient usage.

4 tools: list_nodes, run_on_node, run_on_nodes, run_on_all_nodes.
Parallel dispatch via asyncio.gather, raw ToolResultEvent output
capture, UTF-8 safe truncation, input validation, concurrency caps.

35 tests, ruff clean, mypy --strict clean.

* fix: address review feedback on MCP cluster-ops example

- Remove REDIS_SSL support (RedisBroker doesn't accept ssl kwarg)
- Move max-nodes check from _dispatch_parallel into tool handlers
  for consistent error shape (always returns {"error": ...} object)
- Propagate KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit from asyncio.gather instead
  of swallowing them as per-node failures
- Fix _truncate omitted bytes count to reflect actual bytes dropped
  after multi-byte boundary adjustment
- Apply strip/dedup to node IDs in run_on_all_nodes (matching
  run_on_nodes behavior)
- Add __name__ guard to __main__.py
- Fix misleading UTF-8 byte count comment in tests
2026-03-14 02:23:43 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d1a248b413 feat: [memory] config section — configurable relevance_k, fetch_limit… (#54)
* feat: [memory] config section — configurable relevance_k, fetch_limit, max_content, nudge_cooldown, nudges

MemoryConfig dataclass in memory_relevance.py, constructed from
config.toml [memory] section via argparse defaults. Replaces
hardcoded constants in session.py. Master nudges=false switch
disables all metacognitive prompting.

* fix: wire memory config into apply_config and correct error wording

Add "memory" to apply_config sections so [memory] config.toml values
actually propagate. Fix "byte limit" → "character limit" since
len(content) measures characters.
2026-03-14 00:51:27 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 723cad24bb feat: structured memory system — typed/scoped memories with BM25 rele… (#53)
* feat: structured memory system — typed/scoped memories with BM25 relevance and metacognitive prompting

Replace flat key-value memories table with structured_memories (migration 014).
Four memory types (user/project/feedback/reference), three scopes
(global/workstream/user). Consolidate remember/recall/forget into two tools:
memory (action-based: save/search/delete/list) and recall (conversation
history only).

BM25 relevance scoring (extracted to turnstone/core/bm25.py) selects top-5
memories for system message injection based on conversation context.
Metacognitive prompting injects ephemeral nudges after corrections, tool
denials, workstream resume, and completion signals.

Scope isolation enforced: system message injection and nudge counts filtered
to visible memories only (global + current workstream + authenticated user).
User scope requires authentication. Content capped at 32KB. ILIKE/LIKE
metacharacters escaped in both backends.

113 new tests (2053 total).

* fix: CI failure + copilot review feedback

- Fix time.monotonic() cooldown: use None sentinel instead of 0.0
  default (monotonic clock starts at boot, not epoch — fresh CI
  runners have uptime < 300s so cooldown check always triggered)
- Catch sa.exc.IntegrityError specifically in upsert instead of
  broad Exception (copilot review)
- Preserve existing description/type on upsert when caller doesn't
  explicitly set them (copilot review)
- Add last_accessed + access_count columns to schema/migration for
  future LRU/LFU eviction support
2026-03-13 21:21:09 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 73cacc8ad6 feat: admin panel — right-aligned sidebar navigation with two-column … (#52)
* feat: admin panel — right-aligned sidebar navigation with two-column modals

Replace the horizontal tab bar (11 tabs, overflowing on standard monitors)
with a grouped sidebar on the right side, matching the admin button's
position in the header for natural spatial flow.

Sidebar: 5 groups (Identity, Automation, Governance, Observe, System) with
12 nav items including new Settings stub. Always visible on desktop (180px),
off-canvas drawer on mobile (<700px) sliding from right with backdrop.

Admin button: toggle behavior (click again to return to overview), active
state with amber highlight + top accent line, aria-expanded management.

Breadcrumb: shows active tab ("Admin / Users", "Admin / Audit", etc).

Modals: WS Template and Schedule create/edit forms restructured into
two-column grid (820px) with "Identity"/"Model Config" and
"Schedule"/"Execution" column headings. All modals gain max-height: 85vh
+ overflow-y: auto safety net. Modal z-index bumped to 600 (above sidebar).

Also: "Tokens" renamed to "API Tokens", redundant "Server default"
placeholders removed from model config fields, view fade-in transition,
comprehensive ARIA (grouped sidebar, aria-hidden on mobile, focus return
on drawer close), reduced-motion support.

* fix: address Copilot review — aria-orientation, settings permission gate, inert sidebar

- Add aria-orientation="vertical" to sidebar tablist for assistive tech
- Gate Settings tab behind admin.users permission so empty-state logic
  works correctly when user has no admin permissions
- Use inert attribute on mobile sidebar when closed to prevent keyboard
  focus from reaching off-canvas controls
- Add resize listener to sync aria-hidden/inert when crossing the
  700px mobile breakpoint
2026-03-13 19:50:35 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ccd1c1a9ad chore: bump version to 0.6.0
Workstream templates (#49), intent validation (#50), conversation schema redesign (#51).
2026-03-13 14:43:01 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1295919613 fix: simplify conversation storage — atomic assistant rows with tool_… (#51)
* fix: simplify conversation storage — atomic assistant rows with tool_calls JSON

Replace the denormalized storage model (separate rows for assistant
content, tool_call, tool_result) with atomic assistant rows carrying
tool_calls as a JSON column. Eliminates the 100-line heuristic
reconstruct_messages function and its cross-turn merge bug.

Schema: add tool_calls TEXT column to conversations (migration 013).
Migration backfills existing data — merges tool_call rows into their
parent assistant row as JSON, renames tool_result to tool, deletes
consumed tool_call rows.

Session save path: assistant content + tool_calls saved in one
save_message call before tool execution (crash resilient). Tool
results saved as role="tool".

Extract shared storage utilities to _utils.py: row_to_dict, mutable
field frozensets, reconstruct_messages. Both backends import from
_utils — PostgreSQL no longer depends on _sqlite.py.

Includes denied/blocked tool call badge fix on resume: _build_history
detects denied results and propagates flag to parent assistant entry.
Frontend uses flag for correct badge-denied rendering. Denied tools
visually muted. role="status" on badges for accessibility.

Net -45 lines. 8 new tests for reconstruction, all 1914 tests pass.

* fix: migration 013 uses parameterized deletes and ordered downgrade

- DELETE of consumed tool_call rows now uses parameterized batches
  (chunks of 500) instead of string interpolation
- Downgrade rebuilds via temp table to preserve chronological id
  ordering when re-inserting tool_call rows
2026-03-13 14:26:05 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 09ea3d164d feat: intent validation v1 — advisory LLM judge for tool approvals (#50) (#50)
* feat: intent validation v1 — advisory LLM judge for tool approvals (#50)

Two-tier evaluation pipeline for non-auto-approved tool calls:
- Heuristic tier (instant): 23 pattern-based rules across 4 severity
  levels (critical/high/medium/low) with first-match-wins priority
- LLM judge tier (async): multi-turn evaluation with read_file/
  list_directory tool access, security-hardened path blocking, forcing
  message on final turn, four-stage JSON parsing with retry nudge

Progressive UI: heuristic verdict badge + judge spinner, LLM verdict
upgrade via intent_verdict SSE event, glow on action buttons. Verdict
persisted to intent_verdicts table for audit. Prometheus metrics for
verdict counts and LLM latency. Enabled by default (--no-judge to opt
out). 132 new tests (1938 total).

Integration: session, server/WebUI, CLI, MQ bridge, console admin API,
Discord channel adapter. Config via [judge] in config.toml or CLI flags.

* fix: address PR #50 Copilot review feedback

- Fix double JSON encoding of func_args in both heuristic and LLM
  verdict persistence paths — use pre-serialized string from verdict
- Fix confidence 0.0 treated as falsy in channel verdict formatter
- Fix timestamp format inconsistency in storage backends (isoformat
  vs strftime) — now uses strftime consistently
- Add on_intent_verdict to eval.py NullUI (mypy fix)
- Fix late verdict after approval resolved — store last decision and
  apply immediately to late-arriving verdicts
- Add permission rollback to migration 012 downgrade
- Update docs to reflect judge enabled by default
- Document confidence_threshold as reserved for v2

* fix: judge per-call timeout and credential recon heuristic

- Wrap create_completion() in ThreadPoolExecutor with per-call timeout
  to prevent indefinite hangs on slow local models. On timeout, replace
  the executor so subsequent batch items don't queue behind lingering
  API calls
- Add IntentJudge.shutdown() and wire into session.close() for cleanup
- Add credential-recon heuristic rule: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow,
  /etc/master.passwd access flagged as HIGH/review (reconnaissance
  pattern even though the command itself is read-only)
- 3 new tests for credential file access patterns

* fix: denied/blocked tool calls show correct badge on resume

- _build_history() detects denied results ("Denied by user") and
  blocked results ("Blocked") and propagates denied flag to parent
  assistant entry for frontend consumption
- Frontend history replay uses denied flag for badge-denied class
  instead of hardcoding badge-approved for all historical tool calls
- Denial feedback always prefixed with "Denied by user:" so content
  detection works with custom user feedback
- Denied tools visually muted (opacity 0.55, muted tool name)
- role="status" on all approval badge elements (accessibility)
- Broadened "Blocked" prefix match (catches "Blocked by tool policy")
2026-03-13 04:12:46 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 02d9c5c797 feat: workstream templates — behavioral profiles for workstream creation (#49)
* feat: workstream templates — behavioral profiles for workstream creation

Workstream templates define the complete configuration for workstream
creation: system prompt, model, auto-approve policy, per-tool
auto-approve, temperature, reasoning effort, max tokens, agent max
turns, token budget, and completion notifications. Applied once at
creation time (snapshot, not live binding). Auto-versioning captures
pre-update state on every edit.

Schema & storage:
- workstream_templates + workstream_template_versions tables (migration 011)
- ws_template_id/ws_template_version columns on workstreams table
- ws_template column on scheduled_tasks table
- Full CRUD + versioning on SQLite and PostgreSQL backends
- prompt_template_hash (SHA-256) for drift detection

Runtime:
- Template resolution before mgr.create() for model override
- Post-creation settings application (prompt, temperature, approval, budget)
- Token budget enforcement in session.send() — 80% warning, approval gate
  at 100% via __budget_override__ synthetic tool
- WebUI.auto_approve_tools server-side per-tool auto-approve
- Prompt template drift detection (hash comparison, log warning on mismatch)

Integration:
- ws_template field on CreateWorkstreamMessage, bridge, channel router,
  scheduler dispatch, MQ client
- Console admin "WS Templates" tab (11th) with CRUD, version history modal
- Profile dropdown on workstream creation modal
- WS template dropdown on scheduler create/edit modals
- Prompt template name validation on ws_template create/update
- 7 console admin API endpoints + read-only summary endpoint
- Full OpenAPI spec entries in console_spec.py
- Python SDK (sync + async) and TypeScript SDK methods
- Pydantic schemas for all request/response models

Docs & diagrams:
- New 21-ws-template-architecture.puml sequence diagram
- Updated governance, storage, MQ protocol diagrams + PNGs
- Updated architecture.md, governance.md, api-reference.md, console.md, sdk.md

48 new tests (1788 total). mypy clean. ruff clean.

* fix: address PR #49 review feedback

- auto_approve_tools uses approval_label (not just func_name) for
  consistency with tool policy evaluation
- inline system_prompt from ws_template persisted as
  _ws_template_system_prompt in workstream_config, restored on resume
  (previously lost because _template_content wasn't persisted)
- budget gate (__budget_override__) no longer bypassed by blanket
  auto_approve — requires explicit approval or tool policy allow
- diagram 21 field list corrected (removed tool_search/threshold,
  added prompt_template_hash/notify_on_complete)

* fix: address PR #49 review feedback (round 2)

- Grant admin.ws_templates permission in migration 011 (tab was hidden)
- Center WS template modals and fix radio button alignment
- Skip template validation when ws_template overrides prompt
- Guard against empty version snapshots on no-op updates
- Replace setTimeout race with Promise chain in schedule ws_template select
- Validate numeric fields in admin create/update handlers (400 not 500)
- Add ws_template to TypeScript OpenAPI specs
- Use typed Pydantic response models in SDK ws_template methods
2026-03-12 21:06:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f1f448277f chore: bump version to 0.5.6
Prompt template runtime wiring, security hardening, scheduler/channel/MQ
template support, migration 010.
2026-03-12 16:58:20 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 2f7f70825b feat: wire prompt templates into session startup with full creation-p… (#47)
* feat: wire prompt templates into session startup with full creation-path support

Prompt templates (prompt_templates table) now have runtime effect:

- is_default=true templates auto-apply as system message content,
  concatenated in name order before user instructions
- Per-workstream template selection via --template CLI flag, template
  field on POST /v1/api/workstreams/new, console creation modal dropdown,
  scheduled task config, and channel adapter config
- {{model}}, {{ws_id}}, {{node_id}} variable substitution via single-pass
  regex (prevents cross-variable injection)
- /template slash command for runtime switching, persisted across resume
- set_template() public API on ChatSession

Security hardening:
- MCP sync resets is_default=False on content update (prevents compromised
  server from injecting defaults)
- 32KB content cap on template create/update + defensive truncation
- Template existence validation returns 400 before workstream creation
- Single-pass regex eliminates cross-variable expansion

Template field plumbed through all creation paths: CLI, server API, MQ
protocol/bridge, console backend, scheduler dispatch, channel router,
MQ client. Migration 010 adds template column to scheduled_tasks.

Frontend: console workstream modal template dropdown, scheduler
create/edit template field, governance template UI variables auto-detected
from content (read-only display replaces editable input). Focus trap and
Enter-key accessibility fixes in workstream modal.

Docs: governance.md template runtime section, api-reference.md template
field, governance + MCP architecture diagrams updated.

Python + TypeScript SDKs, Pydantic schemas all updated. 29 new tests.

* fix: address PR #47 review feedback

- Defer template validation until after resume_ws — a bad template name
  no longer 400s when resume would have ignored it anyway
- Add template field to OpenAPI JSON specs (openapi-server.json,
  openapi-console.json) for SDK/docs consistency
- Validate template existence in schedule create and update endpoints —
  reject unknown template names with 400 instead of allowing schedules
  that would silently fail at dispatch time
2026-03-12 16:57:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4866c9873c feat: ddgCluster compose profile with DuckDuckGo Search MCP sidecar (#48)
Add ddgCluster profile extending the 10-node cluster with a DuckDuckGo
Search MCP sidecar. All cluster nodes connect via streamable-http and
gain duckduckgo_web_search + duckduckgo_fetch_content tools. No API
key required.

Key implementation details learned during testing:
- MCP SDK DNS rebinding protection must be disabled for Docker
  internal networking (Host header uses container names)
- FastMCP server binds to 127.0.0.1 by default; must set
  mcp.settings.host='0.0.0.0' for cross-container access
- DDG CLI lacks --host/--port flags; settings configured via Python
  entry point that patches FastMCP.settings directly
- Safe search disabled by default

Also adds MCP_CONFIG env var support to all server commands (shell
conditional, no-op when empty) and moves default server/bridge to
production profile for cleaner profile separation.
2026-03-12 16:51:53 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8b2e2130fc fix: MCP resource template URI expansion via prefix matching (#46)
* fix: MCP resource template URI expansion via prefix matching

Resource templates (RFC 6570 URI patterns like `db://tables/{table}/rows/{id}`)
were discovered from MCP servers but non-functional — `read_resource_sync()`
only accepted exact URIs from `_resource_map`, which excludes templates.

Add prefix-based fallback: extract the static prefix from each template
(everything before the first `{`), store a prefix→server mapping, and
fall back to longest-prefix matching when exact URI lookup fails. MCP
servers handle URI routing internally so we just need to route the
expanded URI to the correct server.

Also surface templates in the system message catalog and `/mcp` command
so the model knows they exist and can construct expanded URIs.

* fix: address PR #46 review feedback

- Template prefix collision now keeps more specific (longer) template
  URI instead of blindly overriding
- Fix _match_template docstring to accurately describe startswith
  matching on static prefixes (not full template matching)
- Add missing loop.close() in integration test finally block
- Rewrite test_template_longest_prefix_wins with genuinely different
  prefix lengths to avoid brittle collision-order dependency
2026-03-12 15:46:00 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f81c06761d chore: remove dead code, add MCP integration + collector tests (#45)
* chore: remove dead code, add MCP integration + collector tests

Remove unused delete_prompt_templates_by_server from protocol and
both storage backends (sync uses per-template deletion).

Add 10 MCP integration tests exercising full lifecycle: rebuild
resources/prompts, read_resource_sync/get_prompt_sync with real
asyncio loop, governance sync to real SQLite, shutdown cleanup,
listener notification isolation.

Add 3 console collector MCP aggregation tests: multi-node sums,
absent when zero, mixed nodes with/without MCP.

* fix: close event loops and SQLite backend in MCP integration tests
2026-03-12 15:16:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley be165c1971 feat: MCP resource and prompt discovery with read_resource tool (#44)
* feat: MCP resource and prompt discovery with read_resource tool

Extends MCPClientManager with resource and prompt discovery alongside
existing tool support. Resources and prompts are discovered on connect,
cached per-server with copy-on-write rebuilds, and refreshed via push
notifications, periodic polling, or manual /mcp refresh.

New read_resource built-in tool reads MCP resources by URI. Requires
user approval (same as MCP tool calls) since resources are served by
external MCP servers. Resource catalog injected into system message
with XML delimiters. Error messages sanitized to prevent leaking
server internals to the model.

Prompt discovery stores prefixed names (mcp__server__prompt) and
exposes get_prompt_sync() for future use_prompt tool (Chunk D).

/mcp command now shows tools, resources, and prompts. Docs and
diagrams updated.

* feat: MCP prompt governance sync with origin tracking and readonly guards

Migration 009 adds origin, mcp_server, and readonly columns to
prompt_templates. MCP prompts discovered by MCPClientManager are
automatically synced into the governance table as read-only templates
with origin="mcp".

Sync engine handles: create on connect, update on prompt refresh,
delete when prompts are removed from server. Manual templates take
precedence on name collision (MCP prompt skipped with warning).

Admin API returns 403 on update/delete of readonly templates. Console
UI shows MCP origin badge and disables edit/delete buttons. Storage
backends gain get_prompt_template_by_name, list_prompt_templates_by_origin,
and delete_prompt_templates_by_server methods.

Also addresses PR #44 review feedback: concurrent.futures.TimeoutError
handling in sync dispatch, XML-escape resource catalog descriptions,
resource template entries excluded from _resource_map, URI collision
warnings, needs_periodic capability-aware computation, malformed JSON
primary key fallback for read_resource.

* feat: use_prompt tool, prompt catalog, and PR review hardening

New use_prompt built-in tool invokes MCP prompt templates by name,
expanding them into messages. Requires user approval (external MCP
servers). Prompt catalog injected into system message with XML
delimiters (up to 30 prompts, HTML-escaped).

Prompt listener registered in session for catalog rebuild on changes.

Addresses PR #44 review feedback:
- _init_system_messages() now uses copy-on-write (build locally,
  assign atomically) so background thread callbacks never see
  partial system messages
- sync_prompts_to_storage() serialized behind _sync_lock to prevent
  races between set_storage() (main thread) and MCP background thread
- shutdown() clears listener lists to release callback references

Docs and diagrams updated for 18 built-in tools.

* feat: granular tool policies for MCP resources, prompts, and tools

Policy evaluation now uses approval_label (falling back to func_name)
for fnmatch pattern matching, enabling fine-grained per-URI and
per-server policies:
- read_resource: mcp_resource__{normalized_uri}
- use_prompt: mcp__{server}__{prompt} (prefixed name)
- MCP tools: mcp__{server}__{tool} (was static "mcp_tool")

URI normalization resolves .. path segments to prevent traversal
bypasses in policy matching. Resource templates filtered from system
message catalog (not directly readable). use_prompt arguments
validated as dict with string coercion.

TypeScript SDK PromptTemplateInfo gains origin, mcp_server, readonly
fields. Governance docs updated with MCP policy patterns.

* feat: MCP visibility in server and console UIs

Server health endpoint includes mcp.servers, mcp.resources, mcp.prompts
counts. Server UI status bar shows magenta MCP indicator with tooltip.
Console cluster status bar shows MCP metrics with magenta LED dot.
Console node detail view shows per-node MCP summary. Console collector
aggregates MCP counts across nodes in overview.

Uses var(--magenta) design token with new --magenta-glow for theme
adaptation. ARIA roles on MCP status elements. Tooltips on console
MCP metric labels. Node MCP summary hidden on mobile (< 700px).

New diagram: 20-mcp-architecture.puml covering full MCP lifecycle
(connection, discovery, refresh, governance sync, policy, UI).

* fix: McpStatus in health schema, count properties, catalog name fidelity

Adds McpStatus model to HealthResponse (Python + TypeScript SDKs) so
typed clients see the mcp field from /health.

Addresses Copilot review feedback:
- resource_count/prompt_count properties avoid list allocation on
  /health and /metrics polls
- get_tools/resources/prompts return shallow-copied dicts to prevent
  callers from mutating internal cache
- Prompt names and arg names in system message catalog are NOT
  HTML-escaped (model must use exact strings in use_prompt calls);
  only descriptions are escaped

* fix: OpenAPI spec McpStatus + diagram approval column accuracy

Adds McpStatus schema and optional mcp field to HealthResponse in
openapi-server.json, matching the Python schema and TypeScript types.

Fixes tool pipeline diagram: math, web_fetch, web_search correctly
shown as auto-approve (not "Yes" for approval).
2026-03-12 14:49:58 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 3264fdefca fix: channel bidirectional routing — emit TurnCompleteEvent on all id… (#43)
* fix: channel bidirectional routing — emit TurnCompleteEvent on all idle transitions

Bridge previously only emitted TurnCompleteEvent for MQ-initiated turns
(those with a correlation_id in _active_sends). Server-UI-initiated turns
went idle without emitting TurnCompleteEvent, so the Discord bot's
StreamingMessage never finalized — content accumulated in the buffer and
collided with the next Discord-triggered response.

Now TurnCompleteEvent is emitted unconditionally on every idle transition.
correlation_id is empty for non-MQ turns; SDK client filters by
correlation_id so existing consumers are unaffected.

* fix: remove unused variable flagged by ruff
2026-03-12 11:57:15 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 28cb3a5c51 fix: approval timeout UI state and content flush before tool calls (#42)
* fix: approval timeout UI state and content flush before tool calls

Two bug fixes:

1. Approval timeout now shows denied state in UI — resolve_approval()
   emits an approval_resolved SSE event so the browser transitions
   from pending to denied (red border + badge). Also fixes the cancel-
   during-approval path. Frontend resolveInlineApproval() gains a
   skipPost parameter to avoid redundant POST when server-initiated.
   ApprovalResolvedEvent added to Python and TypeScript SDKs.

2. Content streaming flushes pending buffer before tool call deltas —
   _stream_response() held up to 13 trailing chars in the pending
   buffer (for <think> tag detection) when transitioning to tool calls.
   Now flushed eagerly when tool_call_deltas arrive, before clearing
   in_think so reasoning text is correctly categorized.

* fix: address Copilot review feedback on PR #42

Patch _execute_tools in stream flush test to prevent real bash execution,
simplify confusing nested comprehension, and update resolve_approval()
docstring to reflect cancel/timeout call paths.
2026-03-12 11:43:06 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8b11e0a6f9 fix: bridge retries node_id fetch indefinitely with capped backoff 2026-03-12 11:12:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 648ba477e1 refactor: list_user_roles uses _row_to_dict instead of positional row mapping 2026-03-11 21:14:58 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7960784786 fix: usage events now record per-request tool_calls delta, not cumulative total 2026-03-11 21:12:03 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e06554d1ec feat: add channel admin endpoints to console OpenAPI spec 2026-03-11 21:08:28 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8eb8722346 Bump version to 0.5.5 2026-03-11 20:24:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley a2e2ffacd8 feat: robust plan quality gate, iterative refinement, and amend UX (#41)
* feat: robust plan quality gate, iterative refinement, and amend UX

Plan agent output from weak models often produced garbage (11-char plans
that echo the prompt). Two fixes:

1. Quality validation (_validate_plan) checks length, section structure,
   echo detection, and refusal patterns. Fails trigger one automatic
   retry with a coaching message injected into the agent's existing
   conversation, preserving all prior exploration context.

2. Iterative feedback loop — user feedback at plan review re-runs the
   plan agent via _refine_plan() instead of appending text to the tool
   result. Up to 5 refinement rounds. The plan file path is always
   included in the tool result so the outer model knows where it lives.

UI improvements:
- Web: Reject button dynamically becomes "Amend" (amber) when feedback
  is typed. Key hint badges (Esc/Enter) on plan buttons. Main input
  disabled during review. Light-theme contrast fix via --on-color var.
- CLI: Prompt shows all three actions (approve/amend/reject).
- Bridge: Race condition fix — clear pending entry before HTTP POST so
  sequential plan reviews from the refinement loop aren't skipped.

15 new tests covering validation, retry, and refinement.

* fix: address PR 41 review feedback

- Escape key in plan dialog now mirrors the Amend button: if feedback is
  typed, Esc sends the feedback (amend); if empty, Esc rejects. Previously
  Esc always hard-coded "reject", discarding typed feedback.

- Coaching message for plan retry now says "should include at least two of"
  instead of "MUST include these", matching the actual validation rule
  (_MIN_PLAN_SECTIONS = 2).

* feat: render plan inline in chat after approval

After the plan review dialog closes, the plan content is now rendered
as a collapsible inline block in the chat stream — styled with a
status header (approved/rejected/amending), markdown-rendered body,
and feedback note when amending. Uses the same makeCollapsible pattern
as tool output blocks.

* fix: prevent plan approval hang when inline render fails

The authFetch call that unblocks the server must fire before the
cosmetic inline plan rendering. Previously _addInlinePlan ran first
and any JS error (e.g. from renderMarkdown) prevented the API call,
leaving the session thread blocked forever.

- Move authFetch before _addInlinePlan
- Wrap _addInlinePlan in try-catch
- Guard against empty content
- Only auto-collapse plans longer than 12 lines

* fix: address PR 41 review feedback (round 2)

- Max refinement rounds no longer implicitly approve: the loop now
  shows the final plan for explicit approve/reject before proceeding.
  Previously exhausting 5 rounds silently accepted the last revision.

- Plan inline block: correct aria-label from "Tool output" to
  "Plan content" when makeCollapsible is applied.

- XSS concern (not applicable): renderMarkdown is used for all
  assistant messages — plan content follows the same trust model.

- Test loop concern (acknowledged): refinement tests verify component
  logic; full _execute_tools integration would require extensive
  mocking for marginal coverage gain.

* feat: thinking spinner + inline plan hardening

* fix lint
2026-03-11 20:22:41 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c6ba8d59b0 feat: bootstrap wizard — LLM-guided interactive setup for deployments
Add `turnstone-bootstrap`, a new entry point that uses any LLM (OpenAI,
Anthropic, or local/vLLM) to conversationally walk users through
configuring a Turnstone deployment. Generates .env files, setup.sh
scripts, and optional docker-compose overrides.

- Fully interactive startup (zero CLI args) with provider/model selection
- Auto-detects available models on local OpenAI-compatible endpoints
- 7 tools: read_file, write_file, generate_secret, check_port,
  validate_api_key, check_docker, finish
- Path traversal protection on file read/write
- Duplicate write detection (skips identical content)
- Bounded retry loop (3 attempts) on LLM errors
- Anthropic message conversion with consecutive-role merging
2026-03-11 01:58:39 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 087f5b49f6 Bump version to 0.5.4 2026-03-10 20:47:40 -07:00
Patrick Buckley fd507c6a3c feat: generation cancellation — stop button, cancel API, cooperative … (#40)
* feat: generation cancellation — stop button, cancel API, cooperative cancel

Add cooperative cancellation via threading.Event on ChatSession. The cancel
signal is set from outside the worker thread (HTTP handler, MQ bridge, or
Escape key) and checked at defined checkpoints: per streaming chunk, before
tool execution, inside bash commands, and at each sub-agent turn.

Core: GenerationCancelled(BaseException) exception, cancel()/_check_cancelled()
methods, partial content preservation in _stream_response, clean rollback in
send() with idle state emission (no re-raise).

Server: POST /v1/api/cancel endpoint, CancelledEvent SSE emission, worker
thread safety net.

Frontend: Stop button (■ Stop) with send/stop swap via setBusy(), Escape key
shortcut, cancelled event handler. Accessible: aria-label, focus-visible
override, light theme contrast, non-color differentiation.

MQ: CancelMessage inbound type, bridge _handle_cancel routed handler.

SDK: cancel() on Python async+sync clients, CancelledEvent in Python+TypeScript
event registries, isCancelledEvent type guard.

OpenAPI: CancelRequest schema + endpoint spec.

Docs: API reference, architecture, SDK docs updated. Diagrams: conversation
turn, tool pipeline, MQ protocol, workstream states, SDK architecture.

* fix: address PR #40 review feedback

- setBusy() now resets stopBtn.disabled so stop button is re-enabled on
  next generation after a successful cancel
- Gate cancel side effects (resolve_approval, resolve_plan, cancelled SSE
  event) on worker_thread.is_alive() to avoid spurious events when idle
- Add /v1/api/cancel endpoint and CancelRequest schema to TypeScript
  openapi-server.json to keep it in sync with Python-generated spec
2026-03-10 20:43:52 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 562c3c8ab7 docs: add governance section and missing diagrams to README 2026-03-10 19:50:07 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4773535bb8 docs: add governance architecture diagram PNG 2026-03-10 19:41:35 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7492816ab2 feat: governance — RBAC, tool policies, prompt templates, usage track… (#39)
* feat: governance — RBAC, tool policies, prompt templates, usage tracking, audit logging

Add comprehensive governance layer for the admin console:

- RBAC with 15 granular permissions, 3 builtin roles (admin, operator, viewer),
  custom role CRUD, user-role assignment with privilege escalation prevention
- Tool policies with glob pattern matching, priority-ordered evaluation
  (allow/deny/ask), enforced before auto-approve in WebUI.approve_tools()
- Prompt templates with variable substitution, categories, default flag
- Usage tracking: per-LLM-request token/tool metrics, aggregated queries
  (group by day/model/user), automatic 90-day pruning via scheduler
- Audit logging: append-only event trail for all admin mutations,
  filterable/paginated queries, automatic 365-day pruning, X-Forwarded-For
  aware IP extraction
- require_permission() enforced on all 35+ admin endpoints (users, tokens,
  channels, schedules, watches, roles, orgs, policies, templates, usage, audit)
- Field allowlists on storage update methods prevent mass-assignment bugs
- Self-deletion guard on admin_delete_user, delete_user cascades user_roles
- _row_to_dict helper eliminates ~400 lines of fragile positional row mapping
- _audit_context helper deduplicates 18 instances of audit boilerplate
- Migration 008: 7 new tables, 3 builtin roles, org_id on users
- Console admin panel: 5 new tabs (Roles, Policies, Templates, Usage, Audit)
  with permission-gated visibility, 7 modal dialogs, full keyboard accessibility
- Python + TypeScript SDK methods for all governance endpoints
- 120+ new tests (1554 total)

* fix: address PR #39 review feedback

- Rebuild serialized items after policy evaluation so denied/allowed
  verdicts are reflected in tool_info/approve_request SSE payloads
- Make `since` query param optional in usage OpenAPI spec (handler
  already defaults to last 7 days)
- Add response_model=StatusResponse to DELETE role/policy/template
  and POST/DELETE role assignment endpoints in OpenAPI spec
- Add missing org_id/created/updated fields to UserRoleInfo schema
- Add missing created field to AuditEventInfo schema
- Show "no permissions" empty state instead of loading inaccessible
  tab when all admin tabs are permission-gated
- Fix "13 permissions" → "15 permissions" in architecture.md and
  security.md
- Fix import sorting in test_audit.py and test_tool_policy.py

* fix: address PR #39 round 2 review feedback

- Clear stale permissions from sessionStorage on config-token login
  (auth.js _storePermissions)
- Only trust X-Forwarded-For when behind a proxy that sets
  X-Forwarded-Proto (conditional on is_secure_request trust model)
- Thread user_id from auth into WebUI.on_status for usage events
- Add created field to TS AuditEventInfo type
- Return typed Pydantic models from all SDK governance methods instead
  of dict[str, Any] — both async and sync clients
- Validate group_by param against allowed enum in admin_usage handler
- Add deterministic secondary sort (event_id DESC) to
  list_audit_events in both SQLite and PostgreSQL backends
2026-03-10 19:32:37 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d6ba1d5e25 fix: mypy no-any-return in agent context overflow handler 2026-03-10 14:11:09 -07:00
342 changed files with 84101 additions and 3951 deletions
+208
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
{
"$schema": "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json",
"extends": [
"config:recommended",
"helpers:pinGitHubActionDigests",
":separateMajorReleases"
],
"labels": [
"dependencies"
],
"prConcurrentLimit": 5,
"prHourlyLimit": 2,
"schedule": [
"before 9am on Monday"
],
"timezone": "America/New_York",
"lockFileMaintenance": {
"enabled": true,
"schedule": [
"before 9am on Monday"
]
},
"customManagers": [
{
"customType": "regex",
"description": "Track vendored KaTeX version",
"managerFilePatterns": [
"/pyproject\\.toml$/"
],
"matchStrings": [
"katex-(?<currentValue>[\\d.]+)/"
],
"depNameTemplate": "katex",
"datasourceTemplate": "npm"
},
{
"customType": "regex",
"description": "Track vendored Highlight.js version",
"managerFilePatterns": [
"/pyproject\\.toml$/"
],
"matchStrings": [
"hljs-(?<currentValue>[\\d.]+)/"
],
"depNameTemplate": "highlight.js",
"datasourceTemplate": "npm"
},
{
"customType": "regex",
"description": "Track vendored Mermaid version",
"managerFilePatterns": [
"/pyproject\\.toml$/"
],
"matchStrings": [
"mermaid-(?<currentValue>[\\d.]+)/"
],
"depNameTemplate": "mermaid",
"datasourceTemplate": "npm"
}
],
"packageRules": [
{
"description": "LLM SDKs — always review manually",
"groupName": "LLM SDKs",
"matchPackageNames": [
"openai",
"anthropic",
"mcp"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on Monday"
],
"automerge": false
},
{
"description": "Web framework stack",
"groupName": "Web Framework",
"matchPackageNames": [
"starlette",
"uvicorn",
"sse-starlette",
"httpx",
"httpx-sse",
"pydantic"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on Wednesday"
],
"automerge": true,
"matchUpdateTypes": [
"patch"
]
},
{
"description": "Database layer",
"groupName": "Database",
"matchPackageNames": [
"sqlalchemy",
"alembic",
"psycopg"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on Wednesday"
],
"automerge": true,
"matchUpdateTypes": [
"patch"
]
},
{
"description": "Security-critical — always review manually",
"groupName": "Security",
"matchPackageNames": [
"PyJWT",
"pyjwt",
"bcrypt"
],
"automerge": false
},
{
"description": "Infrastructure dependencies",
"groupName": "Infrastructure",
"matchPackageNames": [
"structlog",
"redis",
"croniter",
"discord.py"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on the first day of the month"
],
"automerge": true,
"matchUpdateTypes": [
"patch"
]
},
{
"description": "Vendored JS — requires manual file download after merge",
"groupName": "Vendored JS",
"matchPackageNames": [
"katex",
"highlight.js",
"mermaid"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on the first day of the month"
],
"automerge": false,
"prBodyNotes": [
"This PR updates version references only.",
"After merging, run `scripts/update-vendored-js.sh <lib> <version>` to download the actual files."
]
},
{
"description": "Dev/test tooling",
"groupName": "Tooling",
"matchPackageNames": [
"ruff",
"mypy",
"types-redis",
"pytest",
"pytest-cov",
"pre-commit"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on the first day of the month"
],
"automerge": true,
"matchUpdateTypes": [
"patch"
]
},
{
"description": "Docker base images",
"groupName": "Docker Images",
"matchManagers": [
"dockerfile",
"docker-compose"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on the first day of the month"
],
"automerge": false
},
{
"description": "TypeScript SDK dev dependencies",
"groupName": "TypeScript SDK",
"matchFileNames": [
"sdk/typescript/**"
],
"schedule": [
"before 9am on the first day of the month"
],
"automerge": true,
"matchUpdateTypes": [
"patch"
]
},
{
"description": "GitHub Actions — group all action updates",
"groupName": "GitHub Actions",
"matchManagers": [
"github-actions"
],
"automerge": false
}
]
}
+75 -12
View File
@@ -10,21 +10,21 @@ jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.13"
- run: pip install ruff
- run: ruff check turnstone/ tests/
- run: ruff format --check turnstone/ tests/
python-version: "3.14"
- run: pip install pre-commit
# mypy runs separately in typecheck job with full project deps
- run: SKIP=mypy pre-commit run --all-files
typecheck:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.13"
python-version: "3.14"
- run: pip install mypy types-redis
- run: pip install -e ".[mq]"
- run: mypy turnstone/
@@ -35,14 +35,77 @@ jobs:
matrix:
python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }}
- run: pip install -e ".[test,mq]"
- run: pytest tests/ -m "not live" --cov=turnstone --cov-report=term-missing --cov-report=xml -q
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@bbbca2ddaa5d8feaa63e36b76fdaad77386f024f # v7
if: always()
with:
name: coverage-${{ matrix.python-version }}
path: coverage.xml
test-postgres:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:18
env:
POSTGRES_USER: postgres
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
POSTGRES_DB: turnstone_test
ports:
- 5432:5432
options: >-
--health-cmd="pg_isready -U postgres"
--health-interval=10s
--health-timeout=5s
--health-retries=5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- run: pip install -e ".[test,mq,postgres]"
- run: pytest tests/ -m "not live" --storage-backend=postgresql -q
env:
TURNSTONE_TEST_PG_URL: postgresql+psycopg://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/turnstone_test
lock-check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
with:
uv-version: "0.9.18"
- run: uv lock --check
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@37802adc94f370d6bfd71619e3f0bf239e1f3b78 # v7
with:
uv-version: "0.9.18"
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.14"
- run: uv sync --frozen --all-extras
- run: uv pip install pip-audit
- name: Security audit (dependencies)
run: uv export --no-emit-project --frozen | uv run pip-audit --strict --desc -r /dev/stdin
security-ts:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
defaults:
run:
working-directory: sdk/typescript
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@53b83947a5a98c8d113130e565377fae1a50d02f # v6
with:
node-version: "24"
- run: npm ci
- run: npm audit --audit-level=moderate
+22
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
name: Docker Security Scan
on:
push:
branches: [main]
schedule:
- cron: "0 6 * * 1" # Weekly Monday 06:00 UTC
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- run: docker build -t turnstone:scan .
- uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@57a97c7e7821a5776cebc9bb87c984fa69cba8f1 # 0.35.0
with:
image-ref: "turnstone:scan"
severity: "HIGH,CRITICAL"
exit-code: "1"
+4 -4
View File
@@ -13,16 +13,16 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: pypi
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.13"
python-version: "3.14"
- run: pip install build
- run: python -m build
- uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1
- name: Create GitHub Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@153bb8e04406b158c6c84fc1615b65b24149a1fe # v2
with:
generate_release_notes: true
draft: false
+2
View File
@@ -19,3 +19,5 @@ venv/
.hypothesis/
PROGRESS.md
.coverage
tools/skill_audit_analysis/data/
tools/skill_audit_analysis/output/
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff-pre-commit
rev: v0.9.10
rev: v0.15.6
hooks:
- id: ruff
args: [--fix]
- id: ruff-format
- repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/mirrors-mypy
rev: v1.14.1
rev: v1.19.1
hooks:
- id: mypy
additional_dependencies: [types-redis>=4.6, redis>=7.2]
+22 -24
View File
@@ -1,41 +1,39 @@
# =============================================================================
# Turnstone — multi-stage Docker build
# Turnstone — Docker build with uv for reproducible, locked installs
# Single image for all services: server, bridge, console, sim, eval
# =============================================================================
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Stage 1: Builder — build the wheel
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM python:3.13-slim AS builder
WORKDIR /build
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir hatchling
COPY pyproject.toml README.md LICENSE ./
COPY turnstone/ turnstone/
RUN pip wheel --no-deps --wheel-dir /build/wheels .
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Stage 2: Runtime — slim image with the installed package
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM python:3.13-slim
FROM python:3.14-slim
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="turnstone" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="Multi-node AI orchestration platform"
COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.10.12 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv
# System dependencies for psycopg (PostgreSQL client library)
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libpq5 \
RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libpq5 \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Non-root user
RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash turnstone
# Install the wheel with all optional extras
COPY --from=builder /build/wheels/*.whl /tmp/wheels/
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir "$(ls /tmp/wheels/*.whl)[mq,console,sim,postgres,discord]" \
&& rm -rf /tmp/wheels
WORKDIR /app
# Compile bytecode for faster startup
ENV UV_COMPILE_BYTECODE=1
# Install dependencies first (cached layer — only re-runs when deps change)
COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock README.md LICENSE ./
RUN uv sync --frozen --no-install-project --no-dev \
--extra mq --extra console --extra sim --extra postgres --extra discord --extra anthropic --extra ddg
# Install the project itself
COPY turnstone/ turnstone/
RUN uv sync --frozen --no-dev \
--extra mq --extra console --extra sim --extra postgres --extra discord --extra anthropic --extra ddg
# Add venv to PATH so entry points are found
ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH"
# Health check script (stdlib only, no pip deps needed)
COPY docker/healthcheck.py /usr/local/bin/healthcheck.py
+92
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
# Bootstrap Wizard
Interactive, AI-guided setup for Turnstone deployments. Instead of manually
editing `.env` files and reading deployment docs, the wizard walks you through
every decision conversationally and generates all the config files for you.
## Quick Start
```bash
turnstone-bootstrap
```
That's it — no flags, no arguments. The wizard prompts for everything.
## How It Works
1. **Pick a model** — Choose OpenAI, Anthropic, or a local/vLLM endpoint to
power the wizard. Local endpoints auto-detect available models.
2. **Answer questions** — The AI walks you through deployment mode, LLM
provider, database, authentication, ports, and optional features.
3. **Review generated files** — Each file is previewed before writing. You
confirm or reject every write.
4. **Start the stack** — The wizard prints the exact `docker compose` command
and a `setup.sh` script to create your first admin user, roles, and policies.
## What Gets Generated
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `.env` | All environment variables for `compose.yaml` |
| `setup.sh` | Post-start script: creates admin user, roles, tool policies, prompt templates via the API |
| `docker-compose.override.yaml` | Only if customizations beyond env vars are needed |
## Requirements
- **Python 3.11+** with turnstone installed (`pip install turnstone`)
- **An LLM API key** — for the wizard itself (OpenAI, Anthropic, or a local
model). This can differ from the LLM your deployment will use.
- **Docker & Docker Compose** — needed to run the stack. The wizard detects
whether Docker is installed and gives platform-specific install instructions
if it's missing. You can still generate config files without Docker.
## Deployment Modes
The wizard supports two deployment modes:
- **Single-node production** (`docker compose --profile production up`) —
1 server + bridge + console + PostgreSQL + Redis. Good for most use cases.
- **Multi-node cluster** (`docker compose --profile cluster up`) —
10-node server/bridge fleet + PostgreSQL + Redis. For high-throughput or
HA deployments.
## Example Session
```
$ turnstone-bootstrap
Turnstone Bootstrap Wizard v0.5.4
────────────────────────────────────────────────
Which provider for this wizard?
[1] OpenAI
[2] Anthropic
[3] OpenAI-compatible (local/vLLM)
> 3
Base URL [http://localhost:8000/v1]:
API key (press Enter for 'none'):
Querying http://localhost:8000/v1 for available models...
Found model: Qwen/Qwen3-32B
Connected to Qwen/Qwen3-32B. Handing off to AI assistant...
> (AI walks you through the rest interactively)
```
## Tips
- **Re-run safely** — running the wizard again detects your existing `.env`
and offers to update it rather than overwriting.
- **Duplicate writes are skipped** — if the LLM tries to write the same file
twice with identical content, it's silently ignored.
- **Type `quit` to exit** at any time during the conversation.
- **Ctrl+C** is handled gracefully — press once to interrupt, twice to exit.
## See Also
- [Docker Deployment](docker.md) — manual compose setup and profiles
- [Security](security.md) — auth architecture and token types
- [Governance](governance.md) — roles, policies, and templates
+75 -13
View File
@@ -5,20 +5,26 @@
[![Python](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/turnstone)](https://pypi.org/project/turnstone/)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-BSL--1.1-blue)](LICENSE)
Multi-node AI orchestration platform. Deploy tool-using AI agents across a cluster of servers, driven by message queues or interactive interfaces.
Experimental multi-node AI orchestration platform. Deploy tool-using AI agents across a cluster of servers, driven by message queues or interactive interfaces.
Named after the [Ruddy Turnstone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruddy_turnstone) — a bird that flips rocks to expose what's hiding underneath.
> **Beta — Use at your own risk.** Turnstone is under active development and has not reached a stable release. APIs, configuration formats, and database schemas may change between versions without migration paths. We make no guarantees of determinism, reliability, or backward compatibility. Evaluate thoroughly before deploying to any environment where these properties matter.
Named after the [Ruddy Turnstone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruddy_turnstone) (*Arenaria interpres*) — a shorebird that flips stones to discover what's hiding underneath.
## What it does
Turnstone gives LLMs tools — shell, files, search, web, planning — and orchestrates multi-turn conversations where the model investigates, acts, and reports. Native deferred tool loading for Anthropic and OpenAI APIs reduces token overhead and improves tool selection accuracy when MCP servers expose many tools; local models (vLLM, llama.cpp) get a transparent client-side BM25 fallback. It runs as:
Turnstone gives LLMs tools — shell, files, search, web, planning — and orchestrates multi-turn conversations where the model investigates, acts, and reports. It runs as:
- **Interactive sessions** — terminal CLI or browser UI with parallel workstreams
- **Queue-driven agents** — trigger workstreams via message queue, stream progress, approve or auto-approve tool use
- **Multi-node clusters** — generic work load-balances across nodes, directed work routes to a specific server
- **Cluster dashboard** — real-time view of all nodes and workstreams, workstream creation with node targeting, reverse proxy for server UIs (only the console port needs network access)
- **Cluster dashboard** — real-time view of all nodes and workstreams, reverse proxy for server UIs
- **Intent validation** — an LLM judge evaluates every tool call before approval, presenting risk assessments and evidence-based recommendations so users can make informed decisions instead of blindly approving raw tool calls
- **Governance & compliance** — RBAC, OIDC SSO (Okta, Azure AD, Google, Keycloak), tool policies, skills (reusable behavioral profiles with security scanning), usage tracking, and append-only audit logs
- **Cluster simulator** — test the stack at scale (up to 1000 nodes) without an LLM backend
Works with any OpenAI-compatible API (vLLM, llama.cpp, NVIDIA NIM) or Anthropic's native Messages API. Supports [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/) for external tool servers with native deferred tool loading on Anthropic and OpenAI APIs (BM25 fallback for local models).
<p align="center">
<img src="docs/diagrams/architecture-overview.svg" alt="Turnstone system architecture — data flow from clients through gateways, Redis MQ, cluster nodes, to LLM providers" width="960"/>
</p>
@@ -103,8 +109,6 @@ turnstone-sim --nodes 100 --scenario steady --duration 60 --mps 10
See [docs/simulator.md](docs/simulator.md) for scenarios, CLI reference, and metrics.
All frontends connect to any OpenAI-compatible API (vLLM, NVIDIA NIM/NGC, llama.cpp, OpenAI, etc.) or Anthropic's native Messages API, and auto-detect the model.
## Architecture
### Diagrams
@@ -127,6 +131,54 @@ Detailed UML diagrams are available in [`docs/diagrams/`](docs/diagrams/):
| [Deployment](docs/diagrams/png/12-deployment.png) | Docker Compose service topology |
| [SDK Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/13-sdk-architecture.png) | Python + TypeScript client libraries |
| [Storage Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/14-storage-architecture.png) | Pluggable database backends (SQLite + PostgreSQL) |
| [Auth Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/15-auth-architecture.png) | JWT, scopes, token types, login flows |
| [Channel Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/16-channel-architecture.png) | Discord/Slack adapter protocol and routing |
| [Notify Flow](docs/diagrams/png/17-notify-flow.png) | Channel notification dispatch |
| [Watch Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/18-watch-architecture.png) | Periodic command polling daemon |
| [Governance Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/19-governance-architecture.png) | RBAC, policies, audit, usage enforcement flow |
| [WS Template Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/21-ws-template-architecture.png) | Workstream template application and lifecycle |
| [Judge Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/22-judge-architecture.png) | Intent validation two-tier evaluation pipeline |
| [OIDC Architecture](docs/diagrams/png/25-oidc-architecture.png) | OIDC SSO authorization code flow with PKCE |
### Governance
Turnstone includes a built-in governance layer for enterprise deployments — manage who can do what, which tools run unattended, and where every token goes.
- **RBAC** — 15 granular permissions, 3 built-in roles (admin / operator / viewer), custom roles, privilege escalation prevention
- **OIDC SSO** — single sign-on via any OpenID Connect provider (Okta, Azure AD, Google, Keycloak); Authorization Code Flow with PKCE, auto-provisioning, claim-based role mapping with demotion propagation; see [docs/oidc.md](docs/oidc.md)
- **Tool policies** — glob-pattern rules (`allow` / `deny` / `ask`) with priority ordering; automate approvals or lock down dangerous tools
- **Skills** — reusable behavioral profiles with system prompts, `{{variable}}` substitution, session config (model, temperature, token budget), install-time security scanning, version history, external discovery (skills.sh / GitHub), and runtime `skill` tool for model-driven skill activation
- **Usage tracking** — per-request token and tool metrics, aggregation by day / model / user, automatic 90-day pruning
- **Audit logging** — append-only event trail for all admin mutations, IP-aware, 365-day retention
All governance features are managed through the console admin panel (13 tabs) and the full REST API. Runtime settings (model, tools, rate limiting, health, judge, memory) are configurable via the admin Settings tab — no config file edits or restarts needed for most changes. See [docs/governance.md](docs/governance.md) for setup and [docs/settings.md](docs/settings.md) for the settings reference.
### Intent Validation (LLM Judge)
Every tool call that requires human approval is evaluated by an intent validation judge that provides a structured risk assessment alongside the approval prompt — so instead of "approve this bash command?", users see a verdict with risk level, confidence, recommendation, and reasoning.
The system uses a two-tier evaluation pipeline:
1. **Heuristic tier** (instant, free) — 36 pattern-based rules classify tool calls by severity. Catches destructive commands (`rm -rf /`, `DROP TABLE`), privilege escalation (`sudo`), credential access, supply chain risks, browser data export, cloud infrastructure mutations, and more. Results appear immediately.
2. **LLM judge tier** (async) — A full LLM evaluation runs in the background with access to `read_file` and `list_directory` for evidence gathering. The judge can inspect files that a write would overwrite, check directory contents before a delete, and cite specific evidence in its reasoning. Results update the UI progressively when ready.
The judge defaults to the same model as the session (self-consistency) but can be configured to use a separate model — useful when running a small local model for tasks but wanting a commercial model for safety evaluation.
```toml
[judge]
enabled = true # on by default
model = "" # empty = same as session model
provider = "" # empty = same as session provider
timeout = 60.0 # generous for local models
```
Verdicts are persisted for audit and exposed via Prometheus metrics (`turnstone_judge_verdicts_total`, `turnstone_judge_llm_latency_seconds`).
Skills are also scanned at install time — the scanner evaluates content, supply chain, vulnerability, and declared capability risk across four independent axes. Results populate `scan_status` (tier) and `scan_report` (structured JSON breakdown) on the skill record so administrators can assess risk before enabling a skill.
Tool execution results are evaluated by an output guard before entering the conversation — detecting prompt injection payloads in fetched content, credential leakage in command output, and encoded payloads. Detected credentials are automatically redacted.
See [docs/judge.md](docs/judge.md) for the full guide.
## Multi-node routing
@@ -164,10 +216,10 @@ Bridges BLPOP from their per-node queue (priority) then the shared queue. Direct
| `man` | Read man pages | yes |
| `web_fetch` | Fetch URL content | |
| `web_search` | Web search (provider-native or Tavily) | |
| `remember` | Save persistent facts | yes |
| `recall` | Search memories and history | yes |
| `forget` | Remove a memory | yes |
| `memory` | Structured persistent memory (save/search/delete/list) | yes |
| `recall` | Search conversation history | yes |
| `notify` | Send notifications to linked channels | yes |
| `watch` | Periodic command polling with conditions | |
| `task` | Spawn autonomous sub-agent | |
| `plan` | Explore codebase, write .plan.md | |
| `mcp__*` | External tools from MCP servers | |
@@ -258,7 +310,7 @@ search_max_results = 5 # max tools returned per search query
[server]
host = "0.0.0.0"
port = 8080
max_workstreams = 10 # auto-evicts oldest idle when full
max_workstreams = 50 # auto-evicts oldest idle when full
[redis]
host = "localhost"
@@ -290,7 +342,14 @@ burst = 20
backend = "sqlite" # "sqlite" (default) or "postgresql"
path = ".turnstone.db" # SQLite file path (relative to working directory)
# url = "postgresql+psycopg://user:pass@host:5432/turnstone" # PostgreSQL
# pool_size = 5 # PostgreSQL connection pool size
# pool_size = 2 # PostgreSQL connection pool size (per process)
[judge]
enabled = true # intent validation for tool approvals (--no-judge to disable)
model = "" # empty = same as session model (self-consistency)
provider = "" # empty = same as session provider
timeout = 60.0 # LLM judge timeout in seconds
confidence_threshold = 0.7
[mcp]
config_path = "" # path to MCP JSON config file (alternative to TOML sections)
@@ -333,8 +392,11 @@ Idle workstreams are automatically cleaned up after 2 hours (configurable). In m
- `turnstone_backend_up` — LLM backend reachability (0/1)
- `turnstone_circuit_state` — circuit breaker state (0=closed, 1=open, 2=half_open)
- `turnstone_workstreams_evicted_total` — workstreams auto-evicted at capacity
- `turnstone_judge_verdicts_total{tier,risk_level}` — intent validation verdicts by tier and risk
- `turnstone_judge_llm_latency_seconds` — LLM judge evaluation latency histogram
- `turnstone_judge_enabled` — whether the intent validation judge is active (0/1)
Per-workstream metrics are labeled by `ws_id` (bounded to 10 max workstreams).
Per-workstream metrics are labeled by `ws_id` (bounded by `[server].max_workstreams`).
### Health & Rate Limiting
@@ -344,7 +406,7 @@ Per-workstream metrics are labeled by `ws_id` (bounded to 10 max workstreams).
**Per-IP rate limiting.** When `[ratelimit].enabled` is true, each client IP is tracked with a token-bucket limiter (`requests_per_second` / `burst`). Rate limiting is applied in `do_GET`/`do_POST` after authentication but before route dispatch. `/health` and `/metrics` are exempt. Requests that exceed the limit receive HTTP 429 with a `Retry-After` header.
**Workstream eviction.** When `WorkstreamManager.create()` would exceed `max_workstreams`, the oldest IDLE workstream is automatically evicted and the `turnstone_workstreams_evicted_total` counter is incremented. Configure via `[server].max_workstreams` (default 10).
**Workstream eviction.** When `WorkstreamManager.create()` would exceed `max_workstreams`, the oldest IDLE workstream is automatically evicted and the `turnstone_workstreams_evicted_total` counter is incremented. Configure via `[server].max_workstreams` (default 50).
## Requirements
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
Turnstone — Third-Party Notices
This file contains the licenses and notices for third-party software bundled
with Turnstone. Each bundled dependency retains its original license; the
Turnstone BUSL-1.1 license does not apply to these components.
================================================================================
KaTeX 0.16.38
https://katex.org/
https://github.com/KaTeX/KaTeX
The MIT License (MIT)
Copyright (c) 2013-2020 Khan Academy and other contributors
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
================================================================================
highlight.js 11.11.1
https://highlightjs.org/
https://github.com/highlightjs/highlight.js
BSD 3-Clause License
Copyright (c) 2006, Ivan Sagalaev.
All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its
contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
this software without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
================================================================================
Mermaid 11.13.0
https://mermaid.js.org/
https://github.com/mermaid-js/mermaid
The MIT License (MIT)
Copyright (c) 2014-2022 Knut Sveidqvist
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
+2414 -13
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+2 -2
View File
@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ appVersion: "0.3.0"
dependencies:
- name: postgresql
version: ~16.0
version: ~18.5.0
repository: https://charts.bitnami.com/bitnami
condition: postgresql.enabled
- name: redis
version: ~20.0
version: ~25.3.0
repository: https://charts.bitnami.com/bitnami
condition: redis.enabled
+49
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
# OpenShell inference routing for Turnstone.
#
# When using inference routing, the sandbox process connects to
# https://inference.local instead of the real LLM API. The OpenShell
# proxy intercepts, rewrites credentials, and forwards to the backend.
#
# This keeps real API keys out of the sandbox entirely — the process
# only sees opaque placeholder tokens in its environment.
#
# Usage:
# openshell sandbox run \
# --inference-routes deploy/openshell/routes.yaml \
# ...
#
# Then start turnstone with:
# python3 -m turnstone.server --base-url https://inference.local
#
# CUSTOMIZE: uncomment one of the provider blocks below.
routes:
# --- OpenAI ---
# - name: inference.local
# endpoint: https://api.openai.com/v1
# model: gpt-5
# provider_type: openai
# protocols:
# - openai_chat_completions
# - model_discovery
# api_key_env: OPENAI_API_KEY
# --- Anthropic ---
# - name: inference.local
# endpoint: https://api.anthropic.com
# model: claude-sonnet-4-6
# provider_type: anthropic
# protocols:
# - anthropic_messages
# api_key_env: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
# --- Local model server (vLLM / llama.cpp) ---
# No secret resolution needed — local servers typically have no auth.
# Omit both api_key and api_key_env to skip credential injection.
# - name: inference.local
# endpoint: http://localhost:8000/v1
# model: meta-llama/Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct
# protocols:
# - openai_chat_completions
# - model_discovery
+333
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
# OpenShell sandbox policy for Turnstone AI orchestration platform.
#
# This policy wraps a turnstone-server process (the primary sandbox target).
# The bridge, console, and channel gateway are separate processes that would
# each need their own sandbox with a tailored policy variant.
#
# Usage:
# openshell sandbox run \
# --policy deploy/openshell/turnstone-policy.yaml \
# --workdir /project \
# -- python3 -m turnstone.server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
#
# For inference routing (keeps real API keys out of the sandbox):
# openshell sandbox run \
# --policy deploy/openshell/turnstone-policy.yaml \
# --inference-routes deploy/openshell/routes.yaml \
# --workdir /project \
# -- python3 -m turnstone.server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 \
# --base-url https://inference.local
#
# Note: inference.local is intercepted by the OpenShell proxy before
# network policy evaluation — no network_policies entry is needed for it.
#
# Customization points (search for "CUSTOMIZE"):
# - OIDC issuer endpoint
# - Redis host/port (if not localhost)
# - MCP HTTP server endpoints
# - Additional tool binaries
# - web_fetch domain allowlist
version: 1
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Filesystem: Landlock kernel enforcement
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Static — cannot be changed after sandbox creation.
# include_workdir adds the --workdir path to read_write automatically.
filesystem_policy:
include_workdir: true
read_only:
# Python runtime + installed packages (includes turnstone package)
- /usr
- /lib
- /lib64
# System essentials
- /etc
- /proc
- /dev/urandom
# Turnstone config (read-only — writes go to database)
# CUSTOMIZE: adjust if config lives elsewhere
- /home/sandbox/.config/turnstone
read_write:
# Working directory is added via include_workdir
# Temp files (bash tool scripts, eval workdirs)
- /tmp
# Shell redirections (2>/dev/null)
- /dev/null
# SQLite database (default location is workdir, covered by include_workdir)
# Logs
- /var/log
landlock:
# best_effort: degrade gracefully on kernels without Landlock (< 5.13)
# Change to hard_requirement for production hardened deployments
compatibility: best_effort
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Process: privilege separation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
process:
run_as_user: sandbox
run_as_group: sandbox
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Network: per-endpoint, per-binary allowlisting
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Default-deny. Only listed host:port pairs are reachable.
# Child processes (MCP servers, bash subcommands) inherit the network
# namespace — they cannot bypass the proxy.
network_policies:
# --- LLM API providers ---
openai_api:
name: openai-api
endpoints:
- host: api.openai.com
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
anthropic_api:
name: anthropic-api
endpoints:
- host: api.anthropic.com
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- Web search fallback (Tavily) ---
tavily_api:
name: tavily-search
endpoints:
- host: api.tavily.com
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- Skill discovery ---
skills_registry:
name: skills-registry
endpoints:
- host: skills.sh
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
github_api:
name: github-api
endpoints:
- host: api.github.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
tls: terminate
enforcement: enforce
access: read-only
- host: raw.githubusercontent.com
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
mcp_registry:
name: mcp-registry
endpoints:
- host: registry.modelcontextprotocol.io
port: 443
protocol: rest
tls: terminate
enforcement: enforce
access: read-only
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- OIDC SSO ---
# CUSTOMIZE: replace with your identity provider's hostname
# oidc_provider:
# name: oidc-provider
# endpoints:
# - host: login.example.com
# port: 443
# binaries:
# - path: /usr/bin/python3*
# - path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- Redis (MQ) ---
# CUSTOMIZE: if Redis is not on localhost, add host + allowed_ips.
# localhost is blocked by default SSRF protection, so we need allowed_ips.
redis:
name: redis-mq
endpoints:
- port: 6379
allowed_ips:
- "127.0.0.1"
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- Discord (channel integration) ---
# Uncomment if using turnstone-channel with Discord adapter.
# discord:
# name: discord
# endpoints:
# - host: discord.com
# port: 443
# - host: gateway.discord.gg
# port: 443
# - host: cdn.discordapp.com
# port: 443
# binaries:
# - path: /usr/bin/python3*
# - path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- web_fetch tool: curated domain allowlist ---
#
# This is the hard tradeoff. Turnstone's web_fetch tool lets the LLM
# fetch arbitrary public URLs. OpenShell cannot allow "all HTTPS" —
# every domain must be enumerated.
#
# Strategy: allowlist the domains your workloads actually need.
# The web_fetch tool will return a connection error for unlisted domains,
# which the LLM handles gracefully (it tells the user it can't reach
# that site).
#
# CUSTOMIZE: add domains your workstreams need to fetch from.
web_fetch_common:
name: web-fetch-common
endpoints:
# Documentation sites
- host: "**.readthedocs.io"
port: 443
- host: docs.python.org
port: 443
- host: "**.github.io"
port: 443
# Package registries (metadata lookups)
- host: pypi.org
port: 443
- host: www.npmjs.com
port: 443
# Stack Overflow / reference
- host: stackoverflow.com
port: 443
- host: "**.stackexchange.com"
port: 443
# Wikipedia
- host: "**.wikipedia.org"
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- MCP HTTP servers ---
# CUSTOMIZE: add endpoints for any MCP servers using streamable-http
# transport. stdio-transport MCP servers need no network entry (they
# communicate via stdin/stdout pipes within the sandbox).
# mcp_http_servers:
# name: mcp-http
# endpoints:
# - host: mcp.internal.example.com
# port: 443
# binaries:
# - path: /usr/bin/python3*
# - path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- Bash tool: curl/wget ---
# The bash tool can run curl/wget. These inherit the network namespace
# so they can only reach allowed endpoints. But they need binary entries
# to pass the proxy's identity check.
bash_network_tools:
name: bash-network-tools
endpoints:
# Mirrors web_fetch_common — curl/wget should have the same reach.
- host: "**.readthedocs.io"
port: 443
- host: docs.python.org
port: 443
- host: "**.github.io"
port: 443
- host: pypi.org
port: 443
- host: www.npmjs.com
port: 443
- host: stackoverflow.com
port: 443
- host: "**.stackexchange.com"
port: 443
- host: "**.wikipedia.org"
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/curl
- path: /usr/bin/wget
# --- Package installation ---
# pip install / uv add from the bash tool.
package_registries:
name: package-install
endpoints:
- host: pypi.org
port: 443
- host: files.pythonhosted.org
port: 443
- host: "**.pypi.org"
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/pip*
- path: /usr/local/bin/pip*
- path: /usr/bin/uv
- path: /usr/local/bin/uv
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
# --- Git operations ---
# read-only: clone, fetch, pull. No push (L7 enforcement).
git_operations:
name: git-read-only
endpoints:
- host: github.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
tls: terminate
enforcement: enforce
rules:
- allow:
method: GET
path: "/**/info/refs*"
- allow:
method: POST
path: "/**/git-upload-pack"
- host: gitlab.com
port: 443
protocol: rest
tls: terminate
enforcement: enforce
rules:
- allow:
method: GET
path: "/**/info/refs*"
- allow:
method: POST
path: "/**/git-upload-pack"
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/git
+7
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
{
"mcpServers": {
"ddg": {
"url": "http://ddg-search:3000/mcp"
}
}
}
+821 -10
View File
@@ -402,18 +402,22 @@ Each item in `items` (shared by `tool_info` and `approve_request`):
"total_tokens": 1280,
"context_window": 131072,
"pct": 1.0,
"effort": "medium"
"effort": "medium",
"cache_creation_tokens": 800,
"cache_read_tokens": 200
}
```
| Field | Type | Description |
|---------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------|
| `prompt_tokens` | int | Tokens in the prompt |
| `completion_tokens` | int | Tokens generated by the model |
| `total_tokens` | int | `prompt_tokens + completion_tokens` |
| `context_window` | int | Total context window size in tokens |
| `pct` | float | Percentage of context window used |
| `effort` | string | Reasoning effort level (`low`/`medium`/`high`) |
| Field | Type | Description |
|--------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
| `prompt_tokens` | int | Tokens in the prompt |
| `completion_tokens` | int | Tokens generated by the model |
| `total_tokens` | int | `prompt_tokens + completion_tokens` |
| `context_window` | int | Total context window size in tokens |
| `pct` | float | Percentage of context window used |
| `effort` | string | Reasoning effort level (`low`/`medium`/`high`) |
| `cache_creation_tokens` | int | Tokens written to prompt cache (Anthropic) |
| `cache_read_tokens` | int | Tokens served from prompt cache (Anthropic + OpenAI) |
**`plan_review`** -- the model is proposing a plan and wants feedback. The
client must respond via `POST /v1/api/plan`.
@@ -448,6 +452,58 @@ after `/clear` or `/new` commands).
{"type": "clear_ui"}
```
**`cancelled`** -- the generation was cancelled by the user (via the Stop
button or `POST /v1/api/cancel`). The client should finalize any in-progress
assistant message with whatever partial content was streamed.
```json
{"type": "cancelled"}
```
**`intent_verdict`** -- delivered asynchronously when the LLM judge completes
its evaluation of a pending tool call. Only sent when intent validation is
enabled (`--judge` or `[judge] enabled = true`). The `call_id` correlates with
the item in the preceding `approve_request` event.
```json
{
"type": "intent_verdict",
"verdict_id": "f7e8d9c0b1a2",
"call_id": "call_abc123",
"func_name": "bash",
"intent_summary": "Install Express.js web framework via npm",
"risk_level": "medium",
"confidence": 0.85,
"recommendation": "review",
"reasoning": "The command installs express from npm. This is a well-known package but will modify node_modules and package.json.",
"evidence": ["Checked package.json -- express is not currently a dependency"],
"tier": "llm",
"judge_model": "gpt-5",
"latency_ms": 2340
}
```
| Field | Type | Description |
|------------------|------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| `verdict_id` | string | Unique verdict identifier |
| `call_id` | string | Tool call ID (matches `approve_request` item) |
| `func_name` | string | Tool function name |
| `intent_summary` | string | One-sentence description of the tool call's intent |
| `risk_level` | string | `"low"`, `"medium"`, `"high"`, or `"critical"` |
| `confidence` | float | 0.0--1.0 confidence in the assessment |
| `recommendation` | string | `"approve"`, `"review"`, or `"deny"` |
| `reasoning` | string | Evidence-based explanation |
| `evidence` | list | Supporting evidence (file excerpts, rule names) |
| `tier` | string | Always `"llm"` for this event |
| `judge_model` | string | Model that produced the verdict |
| `latency_ms` | int | Evaluation time in milliseconds |
When intent validation is active, the `approve_request` event is also extended:
each item in `items` gains a `verdict` field containing the heuristic verdict
(same schema as above but with `tier: "heuristic"`), and the event gains a
top-level `judge_pending` boolean indicating whether an LLM verdict is in
flight.
#### Keepalive
The server sends an SSE comment every 5 seconds when no events are pending:
@@ -498,7 +554,7 @@ Possible `state` values:
| `error` | An error occurred |
**Fan-out pattern:** Each connected client receives its own bounded queue
(`maxsize=500`). A dedicated fan-out thread reads from the shared global queue
(`maxsize=1000`). A dedicated fan-out thread reads from the shared global queue
and copies each event to every client queue. If a client queue is full, the
event is silently dropped for that client.
@@ -566,6 +622,38 @@ Each saved workstream object:
---
### `GET /v1/api/skills`
Returns a summary list of all available skills. This is a read-only
endpoint (requires `read` scope) that exposes skill names and categories
without revealing skill content. Useful for populating skill selectors
in UIs or discovering available skills before creating a workstream.
**Response:**
```json
{
"skills": [
{"name": "safety-guidelines", "category": "safety", "is_default": true, "origin": "manual"},
{"name": "mcp__server__code", "category": "", "is_default": false, "origin": "mcp"}
]
}
```
Each skill summary:
| Field | Type | Description |
|--------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
| `name` | string | Skill name (used in `skill` field on workstream creation) |
| `category` | string | Skill category |
| `is_default` | bool | Whether skill is auto-applied to all sessions |
| `origin` | string | Skill origin: `manual` or `mcp` |
> **Note:** For full skill management (create, update, delete, view content),
> use the admin endpoints at `GET /v1/api/admin/skills` (requires `admin.skills` permission).
---
### `POST /v1/api/send`
Sends a user message to a workstream. Spawns a daemon worker thread that calls
@@ -701,6 +789,43 @@ containing the resumed session's messages.
---
### `POST /v1/api/cancel`
Cancels the active generation in a workstream. Sets a cooperative cancellation
flag that is checked at multiple points in the generation loop (per streaming
chunk, before tool execution, inside bash commands). The session transitions to
`idle` state and preserves any partial content already streamed.
If the workstream is waiting for tool approval or plan review, the pending
prompt is automatically denied/rejected to unblock the worker thread.
Calling this endpoint when the workstream is already idle is a harmless no-op.
**Request body:**
```json
{"ws_id": "abc123"}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|--------|--------|----------|----------------------|
| `ws_id`| string | yes | Target workstream ID |
**Response:**
```json
{"status": "ok"}
```
**Error responses:**
| Status | Body | Condition |
|--------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 400 | `{"error": "No session"}` | Session not initialized|
| 404 | `{"error": "Unknown workstream"}` | `ws_id` not found |
---
### `POST /v1/api/workstreams/new`
Creates a new workstream. The server supports up to 10 concurrent workstreams.
@@ -719,6 +844,9 @@ All fields are optional. The body can be empty or an empty JSON object.
| `model` | string | default | Model alias from the registry (`[models.*]`) |
| `auto_approve` | bool | false | Auto-approve all tool calls for this workstream |
| `resume_ws` | string | "" | Workstream ID to resume atomically during creation (empty = fresh)|
| `skill` | string | "" | Skill name. Applies content (system prompt), model, temperature, reasoning effort, max tokens, auto-approve policy, token budget, and other session config from the skill. Returns 400 if not found or disabled. Ignored when `resume_ws` is set (resumed sessions restore their own skill). |
> **Skill behavior:** When `skill` is specified, the skill's content is injected as a system message and its session config fields (model, temperature, auto-approve, token budget, etc.) override system defaults for the new workstream.
**Response (success):**
@@ -847,6 +975,689 @@ Status code: `403`
---
### `GET /v1/api/memories`
List structured memories with optional filters. Requires `read` scope.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|------------------------------|
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by memory type (user, project, feedback, reference) |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope (global, workstream, user) |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Scope qualifier. Auto-resolved for `scope=user` when auth is active. |
| `limit` | int | no | `100` | Max results (capped at 200) |
**Response:**
```json
{
"memories": [
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "project_architecture",
"description": "Core architecture patterns",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "The project uses a hexagonal architecture...",
"created": "2026-03-10T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-12T14:30:00"
}
],
"total": 1
}
```
---
### `POST /v1/api/memories`
Save or upsert a structured memory. Requires `write` scope. Returns `201` on
create, `200` on update.
**Request body:**
```json
{
"name": "deployment_process",
"content": "Deploy via GitHub Actions. Staging auto-deploys on push to main.",
"description": "CI/CD deployment workflow",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": ""
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|--------------|--------|----------|-------------|--------------------------------------|
| `name` | string | yes | -- | Memory name (max 256 chars) |
| `content` | string | yes | -- | Memory content (max 65536 chars) |
| `description`| string | no | `""` | Short description for search ranking |
| `type` | string | no | `"project"` | One of: user, project, feedback, reference |
| `scope` | string | no | `"global"` | One of: global, workstream, user |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Scope qualifier (auto-resolved for user scope) |
**Response (created):** `201`
```json
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "deployment_process",
"description": "CI/CD deployment workflow",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "Deploy via GitHub Actions...",
"created": "2026-03-14T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-14T10:00:00"
}
```
**Error responses:**
| Status | Condition |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| 400 | Missing name, empty content, invalid type/scope, name too long, content too long |
---
### `POST /v1/api/memories/search`
Search memories by query. Uses POST for the request body but is non-mutating
(requires only `read` scope).
**Request body:**
```json
{
"query": "authentication",
"type": "project",
"scope": "",
"limit": 20
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|--------------------------------|
| `query` | string | yes | -- | Search query |
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope ID |
| `limit` | int | no | `20` | Max results (capped at 50) |
**Response:**
```json
{
"memories": [
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "auth_patterns",
"description": "Authentication architecture",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "JWT tokens with HS256...",
"created": "2026-03-10T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-12T14:30:00"
}
],
"total": 1
}
```
**Error:** `400` with `{"error": "query is required"}` if `query` is empty.
---
### `DELETE /v1/api/memories/{name}`
Delete a memory by name and scope. Requires `write` scope.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------------------|
| `name` | string | Memory name |
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|------------|---------------------|
| `scope` | string | no | `"global"` | Scope of the memory |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Scope qualifier |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{"status": "ok", "name": "deployment_process"}
```
**Error (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Memory 'deployment_process' not found"}
```
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/memories` (Console)
List structured memories across all scopes. Requires `admin.memories`
permission.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|------------------------------|
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope ID |
| `limit` | int | no | `100` | Max results (capped at 200) |
**Response:** `200` -- same schema as `GET /v1/api/memories`.
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/memories/search` (Console)
Search memories by query. Requires `admin.memories` permission.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|-------------------------------|
| `q` | string | yes | -- | Search query |
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope ID |
| `limit` | int | no | `20` | Max results (capped at 50) |
**Response:** `200` -- same schema as `GET /v1/api/memories`.
**Error:** `400` with `{"error": "q is required"}` if `q` is empty.
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/memories/{memory_id}` (Console)
Get a single memory by ID. Requires `admin.memories` permission.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-------------|--------|------------------------|
| `memory_id` | string | Memory UUID |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "project_architecture",
"description": "Core architecture patterns",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "The project uses...",
"created": "2026-03-10T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-12T14:30:00"
}
```
**Error (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Memory not found"}
```
---
### `DELETE /v1/api/admin/memories/{memory_id}` (Console)
Delete a memory by ID. Records an audit event (`memory.delete`). Requires
`admin.memories` permission.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-------------|--------|------------------------|
| `memory_id` | string | Memory UUID |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{"status": "ok"}
```
**Error (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Memory not found"}
```
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/verdicts` (Console)
List intent validation verdicts from the `intent_verdicts` table. This endpoint
is on the **console** server and requires the `admin.judge` permission.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|--------------|--------|----------|----------------------------------------------------|
| `ws_id` | string | no | Filter by workstream ID |
| `since` | string | no | ISO timestamp lower bound |
| `until` | string | no | ISO timestamp upper bound |
| `risk_level` | string | no | Filter by risk level (`low`/`medium`/`high`/`critical`) |
| `limit` | int | no | Max results (default 100, max 500) |
| `offset` | int | no | Pagination offset (default 0) |
**Response:**
```json
{
"verdicts": [
{
"verdict_id": "a1b2c3d4e5f6",
"ws_id": "ws-1",
"call_id": "call_abc123",
"func_name": "bash",
"func_args": "{\"command\": \"npm install express\"}",
"intent_summary": "Package installation: npm install express",
"risk_level": "medium",
"confidence": 0.70,
"recommendation": "review",
"reasoning": "Command installs a software package which may modify the environment.",
"evidence": "[\"Matched rule: package-install\"]",
"tier": "heuristic",
"judge_model": "",
"latency_ms": 0,
"user_decision": "approved",
"created": "2026-03-13T10:00:00"
}
],
"total": 42
}
```
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/output-assessments` (Console)
List output guard assessments from the `output_assessments` table. This endpoint
is on the **console** server and requires the `admin.judge` permission.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|--------------|--------|----------|----------------------------------------------------|
| `ws_id` | string | no | Filter by workstream ID |
| `risk_level` | string | no | Filter by risk level (`low`/`medium`/`high`) |
| `since` | string | no | ISO timestamp lower bound |
| `until` | string | no | ISO timestamp upper bound |
| `limit` | int | no | Max results (default 100, max 500) |
| `offset` | int | no | Pagination offset (default 0) |
**Response:**
```json
{
"assessments": [
{
"assessment_id": "a1b2c3d4e5f6",
"ws_id": "ws-1",
"call_id": "call_abc123",
"func_name": "bash",
"flags": "[\"credential_leak\"]",
"risk_level": "high",
"annotations": "[\"API key detected (sk-proj-...)\"]",
"output_length": 1024,
"redacted": 1,
"created": "2026-03-16T10:00:00"
}
],
"total": 7
}
```
---
### `POST /v1/api/admin/skills/{skill_id}/rescan` (Console)
Re-scan a skill's content for security signals using the current scanner
version. Requires the `admin.skills` permission.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|------------|--------|-------------|
| `skill_id` | string | Skill (prompt template) ID |
**Response:**
```json
{
"scan_status": "medium",
"scan_report": "{\"composite\": 1.75, \"details\": {...}}",
"scan_version": "1"
}
```
**Error:** `404` if skill not found.
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/skills/discover` (Console)
Search external skill registries for available skills. Requires the
`admin.skills` permission.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|--------|---------|-------------|
| `q` | string | `""` | Search query |
| `limit` | int | `20` | Max results (1100) |
**Response:**
```json
{
"skills": [
{
"id": "owner/repo/skill-name",
"name": "skill-name",
"description": "A skill description",
"author": "Author Name",
"source": "skills.sh",
"source_url": "https://github.com/owner/repo",
"install_count": 42,
"tags": ["coding", "review"],
"installed": false
}
]
}
```
**Error:** `502` if the registry is unreachable.
---
### `POST /v1/api/admin/skills/install` (Console)
Install a skill from an external source (skills.sh registry or GitHub).
Requires the `admin.skills` permission.
**Request body:**
```json
{
"source": "github",
"url": "https://github.com/owner/skill-repo"
}
```
Or for skills.sh:
```json
{
"source": "skills.sh",
"skill_id": "owner/skill-name"
}
```
**Response:** Same as `GET /v1/api/admin/skills/{skill_id}` — the created
skill object.
**Errors:** `400` invalid source or missing fields, `404` SKILL.md not found,
`409` skill already installed (duplicate source_url or name), `502` source
unreachable.
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/settings` (Console)
List all settings with their effective values, defaults, and metadata. Requires
the `admin.settings` permission.
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"settings": [
{
"key": "model.temperature",
"value": 0.7,
"source": "storage",
"type": "float",
"description": "Sampling temperature",
"section": "model",
"is_secret": false,
"node_id": "",
"changed_by": "admin",
"updated": "2026-03-14T10:00:00",
"restart_required": false
}
]
}
```
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/settings/schema` (Console)
Return the full registry catalog (all defined settings with metadata). Requires
the `admin.settings` permission. Useful for building dynamic admin UIs.
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"schema": [
{
"key": "model.temperature",
"type": "float",
"default": 0.5,
"description": "Sampling temperature",
"section": "model",
"is_secret": false,
"min_value": 0.0,
"max_value": 2.0,
"choices": null,
"restart_required": false
}
]
}
```
---
### `PUT /v1/api/admin/settings/{key}` (Console)
Update a setting. Requires the `admin.settings` permission. The value is
validated against the registry definition (type coercion, range checks, choices).
Secret settings (`is_secret=true`) return `403`.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|--------|-------------|
| `key` | string | Dotted setting key (e.g. `model.temperature`) |
**Request body:**
```json
{
"value": 0.7,
"node_id": ""
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `value` | any | yes | -- | New value (type-coerced against registry) |
| `node_id` | string | no | `""` | Node ID for per-node override |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{
"key": "model.temperature",
"value": 0.7,
"source": "storage",
"type": "float",
"description": "Sampling temperature",
"section": "model",
"is_secret": false,
"node_id": "",
"changed_by": "admin",
"updated": "",
"restart_required": false
}
```
**Errors:**
| Status | Condition |
|--------|-----------|
| 400 | Unknown key, invalid value, type mismatch, out of range, missing `value` field |
| 403 | Secret setting (must use config.toml or env) |
---
### `DELETE /v1/api/admin/settings/{key}` (Console)
Reset a setting to its registry default by removing it from storage. Requires
the `admin.settings` permission.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|--------|-------------|
| `key` | string | Dotted setting key |
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `node_id` | string | no | `""` | Node ID (empty = global) |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{"status": "ok", "key": "model.temperature", "default": 0.5}
```
**Response (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Setting 'model.temperature' has no stored value"}
```
---
### MCP Servers
| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| GET | `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers` | List all MCP server definitions with live node status. Query: `?reveal=true` to show env/header secrets. |
| POST | `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers` | Create an MCP server definition. Body: `{name, transport, command?, args?, url?, headers?, env?, auto_approve?, enabled?}` |
| GET | `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/{server_id}` | Get a single MCP server with per-node connection status. |
| PUT | `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/{server_id}` | Update an MCP server definition. Partial updates supported. |
| DELETE | `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/{server_id}` | Delete an MCP server definition. |
| POST | `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/reload` | Tell all cluster nodes to re-read the `mcp_servers` DB table and reconcile (add new, remove stale, reconnect changed). |
| POST | `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/import` | Import servers from a pasted JSON config. Body: `{config: {mcpServers: {...}}}`. Skips existing names. |
Permission: `admin.mcp`
Secrets (`env`, `headers` fields) are masked with `***` by default. Use `?reveal=true` on GET endpoints to see actual values.
---
### MCP Registry
#### Search Registry
`GET /v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/search`
Search the official MCP Registry for available servers. Permission: `admin.mcp`.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `search` | string | `""` | Search query. Empty returns a browsable listing. |
| `limit` | integer | `20` | Results per page (max 100). |
| `cursor` | string | — | Opaque cursor for pagination. |
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"servers": [
{
"name": "io.example/mcp-server",
"description": "...",
"title": "Example Server",
"version": "1.0.0",
"website_url": "https://example.com",
"repository": {"url": "...", "source": "github"},
"icons": [],
"remotes": [{"type": "streamable-http", "url": "...", "headers": [...], "variables": {...}}],
"packages": [{"registry_type": "npm", "identifier": "@example/server", "version": "1.0.0", "transport_type": "stdio", "environment_variables": [...]}],
"meta": {"status": "active", "is_latest": true},
"installed": false,
"installed_server_id": "",
"installed_version": "",
"update_available": false
}
],
"total": 100,
"next_cursor": "abc123"
}
```
**Errors:** `502` (registry unreachable).
#### Install from Registry
`POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/install`
Install an MCP server from the registry. Auto-reloads all cluster nodes. Permission: `admin.mcp`.
**Request body:**
```json
{
"registry_name": "io.example/mcp-server",
"source": "remote",
"index": 0,
"name": "",
"variables": {},
"env": {"API_KEY": "sk-..."},
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer ..."}
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|-------|------|----------|-------------|
| `registry_name` | string | yes | Server name from registry search results. |
| `source` | string | yes | `"remote"` (streamable-http) or `"package"` (npm/pypi). |
| `index` | integer | no (default `0`) | Which remote or package entry to use. |
| `name` | string | no | Custom server name. Auto-derived from registry name if empty. |
| `variables` | object | no | Values for URL template `{var}` placeholders. |
| `env` | object | no | Environment variable values for package servers. |
| `headers` | object | no | Header values for remote servers. |
**Response:** Same as `POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers` (McpServerDetail).
**Errors:** `400` (validation), `404` (not in registry), `409` (already installed or name collision), `502` (registry unreachable).
---
### `OPTIONS` (any path)
Handles CORS preflight requests.
+182 -31
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Turnstone is an AI orchestration platform with tool use, parallel workstreams, and persistent
memory. It connects to any OpenAI-compatible API (local vLLM, OpenAI, etc.) or
Anthropic's native Messages API via pluggable provider adapters, and gives the
model 14 built-in tools plus external tools via MCP (Model Context Protocol) for
model 17 built-in tools plus external tools via MCP (Model Context Protocol) for
reading, writing, searching, planning, and executing code.
The core design principle is a **UI-agnostic engine with pluggable frontends**.
@@ -45,8 +45,12 @@ turnstone/
mcp_client.py MCPClientManager — MCP server connections, tool discovery, dynamic refresh, async-sync bridge
tool_search.py Dynamic tool search — BM25 index, session-scoped tool visibility
watch.py WatchRunner daemon — periodic command polling, condition DSL, result dispatch
judge.py Intent validation — heuristic rules + LLM judge, advisory verdicts
model_registry.py ModelRegistry — named model configs, lazy client creation, fallback routing
memory.py Persistence facade (delegates to storage backend)
memory.py Persistence facade + structured memory API (delegates to storage backend)
config.py Config file loader (config.toml), apply_config(), warn_migrated_settings()
config_store.py ConfigStore — database-backed settings with in-memory cache, thread-safe get/set
settings_registry.py SettingDef catalog (~40 settings), validation, type coercion, serialization
storage/ Pluggable storage: StorageBackend protocol, SQLite + PostgreSQL
metrics.py Prometheus-compatible metrics collector (MetricsCollector)
healthcheck.py BackendHealthMonitor — periodic probe + circuit breaker
@@ -87,14 +91,16 @@ turnstone/
_config.py Base ChannelConfig dataclass
discord/ Discord adapter (bot, cog, views, streaming, config)
shared_static/ Shared design system (base.css, auth.js, theme.js, toast.js, utils.js, kb.js)
katex-0.16.40/ Vendored KaTeX math rendering library (MIT, woff2 fonts)
ui/
colors.py ANSI color constants with NO_COLOR support
markdown.py Streaming terminal markdown renderer (line-buffered)
spinner.py Braille character spinner (daemon thread)
static/
index.html Single-page app shell (links to CSS and JS)
style.css Page-specific UI styles (dashboard layout, approval blocks)
app.js Page-specific client-side JavaScript (SSE, workstreams, markdown)
style.css Page-specific UI styles (dashboard, markdown elements, approval blocks)
renderer.js Markdown + LaTeX renderer (tables, nested lists, blockquotes, KaTeX math)
app.js Split-pane UI (Pane class, binary layout tree, SSE, tool approval)
tools/
*.json 15 tool schemas (OpenAI function-calling format + turnstone metadata)
```
@@ -129,6 +135,7 @@ A user message flows through the system as follows:
| on_reasoning_token() / on_content_token()
| accumulate tool_calls from deltas
| track finish_reason
| _check_cancelled() per chunk (cooperative cancel)
v
finish_reason check:
+--- "length" --> warn, discard partial tool_calls
@@ -174,11 +181,13 @@ Phase 2: APPROVE (serial, blocking)
_emit_state("running")
Phase 3: EXECUTE (parallel)
_check_cancelled() <-- cancellation checkpoint before execution starts
if len(items) == 1:
run_one(items[0])
else:
ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=4).map(run_one, items)
Bash tool streams stdout line-by-line via ui.on_tool_output_chunk(call_id, line)
(cancel_event also checked per line — kills process group on cancel)
Final output (stdout + stderr) delivered via ui.on_tool_result(call_id, name, output)
call_id links tool_info items → streaming chunks → final result
For plan tool: post-execution gate via ui.on_plan_review()
@@ -209,6 +218,11 @@ The engine emits state changes via `_emit_state()` which calls
"idle" ---> no more tool calls, turn complete
|
(or "error" ---> exception or KeyboardInterrupt)
cancel() may be called from any state. It sets a cooperative flag
checked at each streaming chunk, before tool execution, and inside
bash commands. The session transitions to "idle" with partial
content preserved, emitting on_info("[Generation cancelled]").
```
---
@@ -339,7 +353,7 @@ remove the tab immediately. Controlled by `--workstream-idle-timeout` (default:
**Workstream eviction at capacity:** When `WorkstreamManager.create()` would
exceed `max_workstreams` (configurable via `[server].max_workstreams`, default
10), the oldest IDLE workstream is automatically evicted to make room. The
50), the oldest IDLE workstream is automatically evicted to make room. The
`turnstone_workstreams_evicted_total` counter is incremented on each eviction.
If no IDLE workstream is available the create request fails as before.
@@ -361,12 +375,19 @@ non-idle background workstreams above the input prompt.
### Web Workstreams
- **Tab bar**: Each workstream renders as a tab with a colored state indicator
(CSS `@keyframes pulse` animation per state).
- **Per-tab SSE**: `connectContentSSE(wsId)` opens
`/v1/api/events?ws_id=<id>` for the active tab's event stream.
(CSS `@keyframes pulse` animation per state). Clicking a tab switches the
focused pane's workstream (or focuses an existing pane showing that ws).
- **Split panes**: The UI supports tiling multiple workstreams side-by-side or
stacked via a binary layout tree. Each `Pane` instance encapsulates its own
SSE connection, message area, input, and state (busy, approval, streaming).
Split via right-click context menu, pane header buttons, or keyboard
(`Ctrl+\`, `Ctrl+Shift+\`). Max 6 panes; no duplicate workstreams across panes.
Layout persisted to `localStorage`.
- **Per-pane SSE**: `Pane.connectSSE(wsId)` opens
`/v1/api/events?ws_id=<id>` for each pane's event stream independently.
- **Global SSE**: `connectGlobalSSE()` opens `/v1/api/events/global` which
receives `ws_state` broadcasts from all workstreams, used to update tab
indicators without switching.
indicators and pane headers without switching.
- **New tab / close**: POST `/v1/api/workstreams/new`, POST `/v1/api/workstreams/close`.
### Thread Safety
@@ -427,13 +448,13 @@ from each schema and builds:
- `PRIMARY_KEY_MAP` -- `{name: primary_key}` for JSON fallback recovery
- `merge_mcp_tools(builtin, mcp_tools)` -- merges built-in + MCP tools at session init
### 14 Tools by Category
### 13 Tools by Category
**Read-only (auto-approve)**:
- `read_file` -- read file contents with optional offset/limit
- `search` -- ripgrep-based codebase search
- `man` -- read man pages
- `recall` -- retrieve stored memories
- `recall` -- search conversation history
**Write (requires approval)**:
- `bash` -- execute shell commands (with safety checks via `turnstone.core.safety`)
@@ -447,9 +468,8 @@ from each schema and builds:
- `task` -- delegate to a sub-agent with full tool access (`TASK_AGENT_TOOLS`)
- `plan` -- explore codebase and write a structured plan (`AGENT_TOOLS`)
**Memory (persistent key-value store)**:
- `remember` -- save a fact
- `forget` -- delete a fact
**Memory (structured persistent store)**:
- `memory` -- save, search, delete, or list memories (typed and scoped)
### Prepare / Execute Pattern
@@ -495,8 +515,18 @@ independently, then returns the final content as the tool result.
and exposes their tools alongside built-in tools. The MCP SDK is fully async; turnstone
bridges this with a background asyncio event loop in a daemon thread.
**Configuration sources:** MCP servers can be defined in config files (TOML/JSON)
or in the database via the admin UI. Database-backed definitions are managed
through the console admin panel's MCP Servers tab and stored in the
`mcp_servers` table. On startup, `load_mcp_config(storage=)` uses
first-match-wins priority: DB rows (if any enabled) take precedence over
config files. The console can trigger a cluster-wide reload (`POST
/_internal/mcp-reload`) that causes each node to call `reconcile_sync()`,
which diffs the running MCP connections against the current DB state and
adds, removes, or reconnects servers as needed.
**Lifecycle:**
1. `create_mcp_client()` reads server configs from TOML or JSON
1. `create_mcp_client()` reads server configs from TOML/JSON and database
2. `MCPClientManager.start()` launches the background event loop thread
3. `_connect_all()` connects to each server (stdio subprocess or HTTP), runs
`initialize()` + `list_tools()`, converts schemas to OpenAI format, detects
@@ -527,6 +557,17 @@ at connection time (server names with `__` are rejected).
servers are unaffected. Tool execution errors return error strings to the LLM
rather than crashing the session.
**Registry discovery:** The console admin panel provides a registry discovery
surface backed by the official MCP Registry (registry.modelcontextprotocol.io).
`MCPRegistryClient` (`turnstone/core/mcp_registry.py`) is a standalone httpx
async client that queries the registry's v0.1 API for server discovery. Search
results are annotated with installed status by cross-referencing the
`mcp_servers` table. Installation creates a DB row with `registry_name`,
`registry_version`, and `registry_meta` columns (migration 019), then triggers
cluster-wide node reload via `_notify_nodes_mcp_reload()`. The registry URL is
configurable via the `mcp.registry_url` setting for enterprise/private
registries.
### Provider Adapter Layer
> See also: [Core Engine Classes diagram](diagrams/png/03-core-engine-classes.png)
@@ -562,7 +603,7 @@ LLMProvider (protocol)
| `StreamChunk` | `content_delta`, `reasoning_delta`, `tool_call_deltas`, `info_delta`, `usage`, `finish_reason` |
| `CompletionResult` | `content`, `tool_calls`, `finish_reason`, `usage` |
| `ModelCapabilities` | `context_window`, `max_output_tokens`, `supports_temperature`, `token_param`, `thinking_mode`, `supports_effort`, `supports_web_search`, `supports_tool_search`, `supports_vision` |
| `UsageInfo` | `prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, `total_tokens` |
| `UsageInfo` | `prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, `total_tokens`, `cache_creation_tokens`, `cache_read_tokens` |
**OpenAIProvider** (`_openai.py`): passes messages through unchanged (they are
already in OpenAI format), including multi-part content blocks (text + images)
@@ -570,7 +611,10 @@ in tool results. Model capability lookup table covers GPT-5/5.1/5.2/5.3/5.4,
O-series, and search models (`gpt-5-search-api`) — all with `supports_vision`.
For search models, injects `web_search_options` and removes the `web_search`
function tool (the model always searches). Citations from `url_citation`
annotations are formatted as footnotes. Unknown models (local servers) get
annotations are formatted as footnotes. Extended prompt cache retention
(`prompt_cache_retention: "24h"`) is enabled for GPT-5.x models at no
additional cost. Cached token counts are extracted from
`usage.prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens`. Unknown models (local servers) get
permissive defaults with `supports_vision=False` and use Tavily for web search.
**AnthropicProvider** (`_anthropic.py`): converts OpenAI-format messages to
@@ -584,8 +628,14 @@ Sonnet 4.6. Replaces the `web_search` function tool with Anthropic's native
`web_search_20250305` server-side tool — Claude decides when to search, the
API executes it, and results stream back as `server_tool_use` /
`web_search_tool_result` content blocks (emitted as `info_delta` for UI
display). The `anthropic` SDK is imported lazily so it remains an optional
dependency (`pip install turnstone[anthropic]`).
display). Automatic prompt caching is enabled via top-level `cache_control:
{"type": "ephemeral"}` — the API places the cache breakpoint on the last
cacheable block and advances it as conversations grow (90% input cost
reduction on cache hits, 1.25x write on first turn). Cache metrics
(`cache_creation_input_tokens`, `cache_read_input_tokens`) are extracted from
both streaming and non-streaming responses. The `anthropic` SDK is imported
lazily so it remains an optional dependency (`pip install
turnstone[anthropic]`).
**Factory functions** (`__init__.py`): `create_provider(name)` returns a
singleton provider instance (thread-safe). `create_client(name, base_url,
@@ -655,7 +705,8 @@ supports_vision = true
**Per-workstream selection:** `POST /v1/api/workstreams/new` accepts an optional
`"model"` field. The bridge `CreateWorkstreamMessage` carries the same field
through the MQ protocol.
through the MQ protocol, along with `skill` (skill name)
which can override the model before workstream creation.
### Tool Output Truncation
@@ -784,10 +835,16 @@ and are the single source of truth for both backends and Alembic migrations.
backend = "sqlite" # "sqlite" | "postgresql"
path = ".turnstone.db" # SQLite file path
url = "" # PostgreSQL connection URL
pool_size = 5 # PostgreSQL connection pool size
pool_size = 2 # PostgreSQL connection pool size (per process)
```
Environment variables: `TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND`, `TURNSTONE_DB_URL`, `TURNSTONE_DB_PATH`.
Environment variables: `TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND`, `TURNSTONE_DB_URL`, `TURNSTONE_DB_PATH`,
`TURNSTONE_DB_POOL_SIZE`.
The default pool is intentionally small (2 base + 3 overflow = 5 per process)
because all database operations are short-burst queries that hold connections for
milliseconds. For clusters with many nodes sharing a PostgreSQL instance, use
[PgBouncer](pgbouncer.md) in transaction pooling mode.
### Persistence and Resume
@@ -909,6 +966,9 @@ warns if the summary was truncated.
seeded with `history.replaceState({turnstone: 'dashboard'})` on load. The
`popstate` listener restores the correct tab or shows the dashboard,
guarded by `_historyNavigation = true` to prevent re-entrant pushState.
- **Pane focus**: `mousedown` and `focusin` events on pane containers update
`focusedPaneId`. Approval shortcuts (y/n/a) apply to the focused pane.
`Ctrl+Alt+Arrow` cycles focus between panes.
### Eval Resilience
@@ -1006,8 +1066,8 @@ Three hierarchical scopes control endpoint access:
- **Console** is the auth management hub — it hosts the admin endpoints for
creating users, issuing API tokens, and managing channel mappings. User
records and token hashes live in the shared storage backend. The console
dashboard includes an **admin panel** (Users and Tokens tabs) for managing
credentials through the browser.
dashboard includes an **admin panel** (14 tabs) for managing
credentials, governance, MCP servers, and runtime settings through the browser.
- **Server** is a JWT validator only — it validates tokens on each request but
never creates users or tokens. Both processes share the same `jwt_secret`
(via `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` env var or `[auth].jwt_secret` config).
@@ -1173,9 +1233,18 @@ bridge auto-approves via `POST /v1/api/approve`. Otherwise, it publishes an
`BLPOP` of a Redis response queue (`turnstone:resp:{request_id}`) until the client pushes
a response or the approval timeout (default 3600s / 1 hour) expires.
**Cancellation:** The `CancelMessage` (type `"cancel"`) is a routed inbound message.
The bridge dispatches it to `POST /v1/api/cancel` on the server owning the workstream,
which sets the cooperative cancel flag and unblocks any pending approval/plan waits.
**Completion detection:** The bridge tracks which `correlation_id` maps to which
`ws_id` for active sends. When the global SSE reports `ws_state → idle` for a tracked
workstream, the bridge emits a synthetic `TurnCompleteEvent` with the correlation ID.
`ws_id` for active sends. The server accumulates content tokens in the WebUI and
piggybacks the full response text onto the `ws_state → idle` global SSE event.
When the bridge receives this event, it emits a synthetic `TurnCompleteEvent`
carrying the correlation ID and the server-provided `content`. This lets downstream
consumers (e.g. the Discord bot) recover the full response when individual
`ContentEvent`s were missed, and serves as the primary delivery path for
bidirectional notification DM forwarding.
**Multi-node routing:** Each bridge retrieves its `node_id` from the server's
`/health` endpoint on startup (with exponential backoff retry). The server
@@ -1225,7 +1294,11 @@ The console has two write-path capabilities:
1. **Workstream creation** — pushes `CreateWorkstreamMessage` to Redis inbound
queues targeting specific nodes. The bridge on each node picks up the message
and creates the workstream on the local server. Auto-selects the node with
the most available capacity if no target is specified.
the most available capacity if no target is specified. When a `skill`
field is present, the server resolves the skill BEFORE `mgr.create()`
(applying the model override to the creation request) and snapshot-applies
remaining settings (auto-approve, token budget, temperature, etc.) to the
workstream config AFTER creation.
2. **Reverse proxy** — serves each node's server UI through the console port at
`/node/{node_id}/`. Uses `httpx.AsyncClient` to proxy HTTP and SSE traffic.
@@ -1335,8 +1408,86 @@ directly over HTTP for lower latency: `_exec_notify()` queries the
`services` database table for healthy channel gateways (heartbeat within
120 seconds), authenticates with a service JWT (`aud: turnstone-channel`),
and POSTs to `POST /v1/api/notify` on the first healthy gateway. The
gateway validates the JWT, resolves the target (username lookup via
payload includes the originating `ws_id` for reply routing. The gateway
validates the JWT, resolves the target (username lookup via
`channel_users` or direct `channel_type`+`channel_id`), and delegates to
the appropriate `ChannelAdapter.send()`. Delivery retries up to 3 times
with backoff, re-querying the service registry on each attempt. See
[Notification Flow diagram](diagrams/png/17-notify-flow.png).
`ChannelAdapter.send_notification()` which sends the message and tracks
the outgoing message ID → `(ws_id, target_user_id)` mapping. Delivery
retries up to 3 times with backoff, re-querying the service registry on
each attempt. See [Notification Flow diagram](diagrams/png/17-notify-flow.png).
**Bidirectional replies:** When a user replies to a notification DM, the
Discord bot looks up the originating `ws_id` from the tracked message ID,
verifies the replying user matches the notification recipient, and routes
the reply to the workstream via `router.send_message()`. The workstream's
response is forwarded back to the DM via a temporary entry in
`_notify_reply_channels`. On `TurnCompleteEvent`, the response message is
itself tracked for further replies, enabling multi-turn DM conversations
without requiring the user to open the web UI. Tracking entries are capped
at 100 (FIFO eviction) and cleaned up on workstream close.
---
## Governance
> See also: [Governance documentation](governance.md) | [Governance Architecture diagram](diagrams/19-governance-architecture.puml)
Turnstone governance extends the Phase 1 auth system with role-based access
control (RBAC), tool execution policies, skills, usage tracking,
and audit logging. The permission model has two layers: legacy scopes
(`read`, `write`, `approve`) checked by `AuthMiddleware`, and 15 granular
permissions checked per-endpoint by `require_permission()`. Three built-in
roles (admin, operator, viewer) are seeded by migration 008; custom roles
can be created with any permission subset. JWTs carry both `scopes` and
`permissions` claims for backward compatibility.
Tool policies use glob pattern matching (`fnmatch`) with priority-ordered
first-match-wins evaluation to control tool execution (allow/deny/ask).
Skills provide reusable system messages with `{{variable}}` substitution
plus session configuration (model, temperature, auto-approve, token budget,
etc.). Usage events are recorded per-LLM-request for token accounting.
An append-only audit log captures all admin mutations.
Skills are snapshot-applied once at workstream creation — not a live binding.
The `prompt_templates` table (which stores skills) supports auto-versioning,
and workstreams record which skill and version spawned them. Token budget
enforcement tracks consumption in `session.send()` with 80% warning and
100% approval gate via the `__budget_override__` synthetic tool name.
The console admin panel adds 5 governance tabs (Roles, Policies, Skills,
Usage, Audit), a Memories tab, a Settings tab (form-based editor for all
ConfigStore settings), and an MCP Servers tab (database-backed server
definitions with live connection status and cluster-wide reload) for a
total of 13 tabs, all permission-gated.
Both Python and TypeScript SDKs expose governance methods on the console
client.
## Intent Validation
> See also: [Intent Validation guide](judge.md) | [Judge Architecture diagram](diagrams/png/22-judge-architecture.png)
Intent validation provides advisory risk assessments for tool calls that
require human approval. The system runs a two-tier evaluation pipeline
implemented in `turnstone/core/judge.py`:
1. **Heuristic tier** (synchronous, sub-millisecond) -- A priority-ordered
rule table using fnmatch tool patterns and regex argument patterns. Four
severity levels: critical (deny), high (review), medium (review), low
(approve). First match wins. The heuristic verdict is attached to the
`approve_request` SSE event immediately.
2. **LLM judge tier** (asynchronous, daemon thread) -- A multi-turn evaluation
where the judge LLM receives conversation context and tool call details,
optionally uses `read_file`/`list_directory` to gather evidence (with
security-hardened path blocking), and produces a structured JSON verdict.
If the LLM verdict has higher confidence than the heuristic, it replaces
it via an `intent_verdict` SSE event.
The judge is session-scoped (`IntentJudge`), lazy-initialized on first
approval, and configured via the `[judge]` config section or `--judge` CLI
flags. By default it uses self-consistency (same model), but supports
cross-model and cross-provider configurations. Sub-agents (plan, task)
are exempt. All verdicts are persisted to the `intent_verdicts` table
(migration 012) with the user's final decision, enabling future calibration.
The console exposes `GET /v1/api/admin/verdicts` for audit queries
(requires `admin.judge` permission).
+40 -4
View File
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ Key components:
- **ChannelAdapter protocol** (`turnstone/channels/_protocol.py`) — generic
interface for any messaging platform. Defines `start()`, `stop()`,
`send()`, `edit_message()`, `send_approval_request()`,
`send_plan_review()`, and `create_thread()`.
`send()`, `send_notification()`, `edit_message()`,
`send_approval_request()`, `send_plan_review()`, and `create_thread()`.
- **ChannelRouter** (`turnstone/channels/_routing.py`) — maps
channel/thread IDs to turnstone workstream IDs. Handles workstream
creation via MQ, stale route detection, and user identity resolution.
@@ -271,13 +271,43 @@ gateway directly over HTTP:
2. `_exec_notify()` queries the `services` table for healthy channel
gateways (heartbeat within the last 120 seconds)
3. The server mints a service JWT (`aud: turnstone-channel`) via
`ServiceTokenManager` and POSTs to the first healthy gateway
`ServiceTokenManager` and POSTs to the first healthy gateway. The
payload includes the originating `ws_id` for reply routing.
4. The gateway validates the JWT, resolves the target, and calls
`adapter.send()` on the appropriate platform adapter
`adapter.send_notification()` which sends the message and tracks
the outgoing message ID for reply routing
5. On failure, the server tries the next gateway. If all fail, it
retries up to 2 more times (delays: 1s, 3s), re-querying the
service registry on each attempt
### Bidirectional Replies
Notifications support multi-turn DM conversations. When a user replies
to a notification DM:
1. The bot looks up the originating `ws_id` from the tracked message ID
(`_notify_ws_map`)
2. Verifies the replying user matches the original notification
recipient (defence in depth — Discord DMs are already private)
3. Routes the reply to the workstream via `router.send_message()`
4. Registers the DM channel for response forwarding
(`_notify_reply_channels`)
5. When the workstream responds (`TurnCompleteEvent`), the response is
forwarded to the DM
6. The response message is itself tracked, so the user can reply again
for another turn
This enables scenarios like an oncall engineer responding to a CI/CD
failure notification from their phone before opening a laptop.
**Limits:**
- Tracking map capped at 100 entries (FIFO eviction of oldest)
- Entries cleaned up on workstream close/unsubscribe
- Replying to an expired notification sends
*"This notification is no longer active."*
- DM reply content capped at 4096 characters
### Service Registry
The channel gateway registers itself in the `services` database table
@@ -328,12 +358,18 @@ class ChannelAdapter(Protocol):
async def start(self) -> None: ...
async def stop(self) -> None: ...
async def send(self, channel_id: str, content: str) -> str: ...
async def send_notification(self, channel_id: str, content: str, ws_id: str) -> str: ...
async def edit_message(self, channel_id: str, message_id: str, content: str) -> None: ...
async def send_approval_request(self, channel_id: str, ws_id: str, correlation_id: str, items: list[dict]) -> None: ...
async def send_plan_review(self, channel_id: str, ws_id: str, correlation_id: str, content: str) -> None: ...
async def create_thread(self, parent_channel_id: str, name: str, message_id: str = "") -> str: ...
```
`send_notification()` is like `send()` but associates the outgoing
message with a `ws_id` so that user replies can be routed back to the
originating workstream. Adapters must track the mapping from outgoing
message ID to `(ws_id, target_user_id)` and handle DM replies.
To add a new platform:
1. Create `turnstone/channels/<platform>/` package
+26 -5
View File
@@ -69,10 +69,11 @@ All reads and writes to the node/workstream map are protected by a single `threa
### Scale Considerations
- **10,000 workstreams** at ~500 bytes each = ~5 MB in memory
- **1,000 nodes** polled in parallel with 50 threads at ~100ms each = ~2 second poll cycle
- **50,000 workstreams** (1,000 nodes × 50 per node) at ~500 bytes each = ~25 MB in memory
- **1,000 nodes** polled in parallel — fan-out concurrency is configurable via `cluster.node_fan_out_limit` (default 200), yielding 5 batches at ~100ms each = ~0.5 second poll cycle
- **Filtering and pagination** run in-memory on the full workstream list — sub-millisecond at this scale
- **SSE fan-out** uses the same per-client queue pattern as the per-node server — backed-up clients get events dropped, not blocking
- **SSE fan-out** uses per-client queues (2,000 events) — backed-up clients get events dropped, not blocking
- **Database** — for clusters sharing PostgreSQL, use [PgBouncer](pgbouncer.md) in transaction pooling mode
---
@@ -395,6 +396,7 @@ Breadcrumb: `Cluster > Running` or `Cluster > db-west-04`. Server-side paginated
Triggered by the "+ new" header button. A modal dialog with:
- **Node selector** — dropdown with three targeting modes: "Auto (best available)" picks the node with the most headroom, "General pool (any node)" pushes to the shared queue for any bridge to pick up, or a specific node from the list (showing capacity).
- **Profile** — optional dropdown listing enabled skills. Applies the skill's model, auto-approve policy, token budget, and other behavioral settings at creation time.
- **Name** — optional text input. Auto-generated if left empty.
- **Model** — optional text input for a model alias from the target node's registry.
@@ -407,8 +409,11 @@ The browser maintains a local `clusterState` object that mirrors the cluster sna
### 5. Admin Panel
Accessed via the "admin" button in the header (visible when authenticated
with `approve` scope). Provides user, API token, and channel link management
with three tabs:
with `approve` scope). Provides user, API token, channel link, MCP server,
and skill management with 13 tabs (see also
[Governance](governance.md) for
the Roles, Policies, Skills, Usage, and Audit tabs, and
[Settings](settings.md) for the database-backed configuration editor):
**Users tab:**
@@ -444,6 +449,22 @@ with three tabs:
- Admins can force-link users who have not self-linked via `/link` in
Discord
**MCP Servers tab:**
The tab has two views toggled via a pill control: **Servers** and
**Registry**.
- **Servers view** -- lists all installed MCP servers with source badges
(CONFIG, MANUAL, REGISTRY), transport badges, tool/resource/prompt
counts, per-node connection status, and CRUD actions for DB-managed
servers
- **Registry view** -- search the official MCP Registry to discover and
install servers. Results show server name, description, version, source
type badges (remote/npm/pypi), and Install/Installed/Update buttons.
Remote servers without required configuration are installed with one
click; servers needing env vars, headers, or URL variables open an
install modal for configuration
**Accessibility:**
- Full keyboard navigation: focus traps in modals, Escape to close, arrow
+2 -1
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ package "turnstone/ui/" <<Rectangle>> {
component [colors.py\nANSI colors] as colors <<ui>>
component [markdown.py\nMD rendering] as markdown <<ui>>
component [spinner.py\nTerminal spinner] as spinner <<ui>>
component [renderer.js\nBrowser MD + LaTeX] as renderer <<ui>>
}
' API schemas
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ package "turnstone/sdk/" <<Rectangle>> {
' Tool schemas
package "turnstone/tools/" <<Rectangle>> {
component [*.json\n15 tool schemas] as schemas <<artifact>>
component [*.json\n18 tool schemas] as schemas <<artifact>>
}
' Entry point dependencies
+14 -2
View File
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ class "OpenAIProvider" as OpenAIProv {
in OpenAI format.
Search models: web_search_options
+ url_citation annotations.
Extended cache: 24h retention
for GPT-5.x (free).
--
core/providers/_openai.py
}
@@ -94,6 +96,8 @@ class "AnthropicProvider" as AnthropicProv {
Adaptive + manual thinking.
Native web search via
web_search_20250305 server tool.
Auto prompt caching via
cache_control: ephemeral.
Lazy anthropic SDK import.
--
core/providers/_anthropic.py
@@ -211,15 +215,23 @@ enum "WorkstreamState" as WsState {
class "MCPClientManager" as MCPMgr {
- _sessions: dict[str, ClientSession]
- _per_server_tools: dict[str, list[dict]]
- _per_server_resources: dict[str, list[dict]]
- _per_server_prompts: dict[str, list[dict]]
- _tools: list[dict]
- _tool_map: dict[str, tuple]
- _resource_map: dict[str, tuple]
- _prompt_map: dict[str, tuple]
- _supports_list_changed: dict[str, bool]
- _listeners: list[Callable]
--
+ start()
+ get_tools() → list[dict]
+ get_resources() → list[dict]
+ get_prompts() → list[dict]
+ is_mcp_tool(name) → bool
+ call_tool_sync(name, args) → str
+ read_resource_sync(uri) → str
+ get_prompt_sync(name, args?) → list[dict]
+ refresh_sync(server?) → dict
+ add_listener(callback)
+ remove_listener(callback)
@@ -230,19 +242,19 @@ class "MCPClientManager" as MCPMgr {
bridges async MCP SDK to
sync ChatSession dispatch.
Push + periodic + manual refresh.
Resources + prompts discovered
alongside tools at startup.
--
core/mcp_client.py
}
' ToolSearchManager
class "ToolSearchManager" as ToolSearchMgr {
- _all_tools: list[dict]
- _always_on: list[dict]
- _deferred: list[dict]
- _expanded: dict[str, None]
- _index: BM25Index
--
+ should_activate() → bool
+ get_visible_tools() → list[dict]
+ get_deferred_tools() → list[dict]
+ get_expanded_names() → list[str]
+15 -1
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,14 @@ group loop [while tool_calls present]
end
end
note right of CS
**Cancellation checkpoint:**
_check_cancelled() runs per chunk.
If cancel_event is set, raises
GenerationCancelled — preserves
partial content, emits idle state.
end note
LLM --> CS : stream complete (usage stats)
deactivate LLM
@@ -119,7 +127,7 @@ group loop [while tool_calls present]
math → sandboxed subprocess
web_fetch → httpx + LLM summarize
web_search → provider-native or Tavily fallback
remember/recall/forget → SQLite
memory/recall → SQLite
end note
note right of TP
@@ -144,6 +152,12 @@ group loop [while tool_calls present]
end
note right of CS : Loop back for next LLM call
else GenerationCancelled
CS -> CS : Preserve partial content\nor roll back incomplete tools
CS -> UI : on_info("[Generation cancelled]")
CS -> UI : on_state_change("idle")
CS --> User : return (no re-raise)
end
end
+32 -28
View File
@@ -24,29 +24,30 @@ partition "Phase 1: Prepare" #E8F5E9 {
:Dispatch to _prepare_{func_name}();
note right
**Dispatch table (16 tools):**
┌──────────────┬──────────────────┐
│ Tool │ Needs Approval? │
├──────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ bash │ ✓ Yes │
│ read_file │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ write_file │ ✓ Yes │
│ edit_file │ ✓ Yes │
│ search │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ math │ ✓ Yes
│ man │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ web_fetch │ ✓ Yes
│ web_search │ ✓ Yes
│ tool_search │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ task │ ✓ Yes │
│ plan │ ✓ Yes │
remember │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ recall │ ✗ Auto-approve │
forget │ ✗ Auto-approve │
notify │ ✗ Auto-approve
├──────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ mcp__* │ ✓ Yes (external) │
└──────────────┴──────────────────┘
**Dispatch table (17 tools):**
┌──────────────┬──────────────────┐
│ Tool │ Needs Approval? │
├──────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ bash │ ✓ Yes │
│ read_file │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ write_file │ ✓ Yes │
│ edit_file │ ✓ Yes │
│ search │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ math ✗ Auto-approve
│ man │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ web_fetch ✗ Auto-approve
│ web_search ✗ Auto-approve
│ tool_search │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ task │ ✓ Yes │
│ plan │ ✓ Yes │
│ memory │ ✗ Auto-approve │
│ recall │ ✗ Auto-approve │
notify │ ✗ Auto-approve │
read_resource │ ✓ Yes
│ use_prompt │ ✓ Yes │
├───────────────┼──────────────────┤
│ mcp__* │ ✓ Yes (external) │
└───────────────┴──────────────────┘
end note
:Build item dict:
@@ -68,8 +69,8 @@ partition "Phase 2: Approve" #FFF3E0 {
**TerminalUI**: Print headers/previews,
prompt [y/n/a, optional message]
If user chose "always":
Set ui.auto_approve = True
(auto-approve all future tools in this session)
Add pending tool names to auto_approve_tools
(auto-approve these tool types going forward)
**WebUI**: Enqueue approve_request,
block on _approval_event.wait()
**NullUI**: Return (True, None)
@@ -88,6 +89,8 @@ partition "Phase 2: Approve" #FFF3E0 {
}
partition "Phase 3: Execute" #E3F2FD {
:_check_cancelled();
note right: Cancellation checkpoint:\nraises GenerationCancelled if\ncancel event is set
if (single tool call?) then (yes)
:Execute sequentially:\nrun_one(items[0]);
else (multiple)
@@ -112,9 +115,10 @@ partition "Phase 3: Execute" #E3F2FD {
├─ _exec_task: _run_agent(TASK_AGENT_TOOLS)
├─ _exec_plan: _run_agent(AGENT_TOOLS, read-only)
├─ _exec_notify: HTTP POST to channel gateway
├─ _exec_remember: SQLite INSERT OR REPLACE
├─ _exec_recall: SQLite FTS5/LIKE search
├─ _exec_forget: SQLite DELETE
├─ _exec_memory: structured memory save/search/delete/list
├─ _exec_recall: conversation history FTS5 search
├─ _exec_read_resource: MCPClientManager.read_resource_sync()
├─ _exec_use_prompt: MCPClientManager.get_prompt_sync()
└─ _exec_mcp_tool: MCPClientManager.call_tool_sync()
end note
+16 -2
View File
@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
title Turnstone — Message Queue Protocol Types
skinparam classAttributeIconSize 0
skinparam packageStyle rectangle
skinparam packageBorderThickness 2
package "Inbound Messages (Client → Bridge)" #FFF3E0 {
package "Inbound Messages (Client → Bridge)" as InPkg #FFF3E0 {
abstract class "InboundMessage" as IM {
+ type: str
@@ -59,6 +60,7 @@ package "Inbound Messages (Client → Bridge)" #FFF3E0 {
+ auto_approve_tools: list[str] = []
+ target_node: str = ""
+ initial_message: str = ""
+ skill: str = ""
}
class CloseWorkstreamMessage {
@@ -79,6 +81,12 @@ package "Inbound Messages (Client → Bridge)" #FFF3E0 {
type = "list_nodes"
}
class CancelMessage {
type = "cancel"
--
+ ws_id: str
}
IM <|-- SendMessage
IM <|-- ApproveMessage
IM <|-- PlanFeedbackMessage
@@ -88,9 +96,10 @@ package "Inbound Messages (Client → Bridge)" #FFF3E0 {
IM <|-- ListWorkstreamsMessage
IM <|-- HealthMessage
IM <|-- ListNodesMessage
IM <|-- CancelMessage
}
package "Outbound Events (Bridge → Client)" #E3F2FD {
package "Outbound Events (Bridge → Client)" as OutPkg #E3F2FD {
abstract class "OutboundEvent" as OE {
+ type: str
@@ -158,6 +167,8 @@ package "Outbound Events (Bridge → Client)" #E3F2FD {
+ context_window: int
+ pct: float
+ effort: str
+ cache_creation_tokens: int
+ cache_read_tokens: int
}
class StateChangeEvent {
type = "state_change"
@@ -165,6 +176,7 @@ package "Outbound Events (Bridge → Client)" #E3F2FD {
}
class TurnCompleteEvent {
type = "turn_complete"
+ content: str
}
}
@@ -236,6 +248,8 @@ package "Outbound Events (Bridge → Client)" #E3F2FD {
OE <|-- ClusterStateEvent
}
SendMessage -[hidden]down- OE
note bottom of IM
**Deserialization**: Strict type-dispatch via _INBOUND_REGISTRY.
Unknown type raises ValueError.
+3 -3
View File
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ BridgeA -> Redis : PUBLISH turnstone:events:abc12345\nAckEvent(status:"ok")
... SSE events flow: content, tool_output_chunk, tool_result, status, state_change ...
BridgeA -> Redis : PUBLISH turnstone:events:abc12345\nContentEvent, ToolResultEvent, ...
BridgeA -> Redis : PUBLISH turnstone:events:global\nStateChangeEvent(state:"idle")
BridgeA -> Redis : PUBLISH turnstone:events:abc12345\nTurnCompleteEvent
BridgeA -> Redis : PUBLISH turnstone:events:global\nStateChangeEvent(state:"idle", content:"...")
BridgeA -> Redis : PUBLISH turnstone:events:abc12345\nTurnCompleteEvent(content:"...")
== Scenario B: Directed Message to Specific Node ==
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ note right of BridgeA
1. _ws_auto_approve[ws_id]? → auto
2. All tools in safe set? → auto
(read_file, search, man,
remember, recall, forget)
memory, recall)
3. Otherwise → manual approval
end note
+6
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ running --> error : Exception during\ntool execution
error --> thinking : New send() call\n_emit_state("thinking")
thinking --> idle : cancel() called\n_emit_state("idle")
running --> idle : cancel() called\n_emit_state("idle")
attention --> idle : cancel() unblocks\napproval/plan wait\n_emit_state("idle")
note right of thinking
**Emitted via:**
session._emit_state(state)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ Server -> CC : get_snapshot()
CC --> Server : ClusterSnapshot\n(full current state)
Server -> CC : register_listener(queue)
note right : Per-client queue.Queue(maxsize=500)\nSSE via EventSourceResponse + run_in_executor()
note right : Per-client queue.Queue(maxsize=2000)\nSSE via EventSourceResponse + run_in_executor()
Server -> Browser : data: {"type":"snapshot",...}\n(full state as first SSE event)
+29
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,26 @@ node "Docker Host" as host {
end note
}
node "postgres (profile: production)" <<pgautoupgrade>> as pg_node {
component [PostgreSQL\nport 5432] as postgres
note bottom of postgres
Healthcheck: pg_isready
Volume: postgres-data
Required for cluster
and production profiles
end note
}
node "pgbouncer (optional)" <<bitnami/pgbouncer>> as pgb_node {
component [PgBouncer\nport 6432] as pgbouncer
note bottom of pgbouncer
pool_mode: transaction
Recommended for clusters
> 50 nodes
See docs/pgbouncer.md
end note
}
node "sim (profile: sim)" <<turnstone image>> as sim_node {
component [turnstone-sim] as sim
note bottom of sim
@@ -92,6 +112,11 @@ console --> server : HTTP polling + proxy\n(GET /v1/api/dashboard,\nproxy /node/
sim --> redis : Redis protocol\n(queues + pubsub + keys)
' Database connections (production/cluster profiles)
server ..> pgbouncer : PostgreSQL\n(pool_size=2)
console ..> pgbouncer : PostgreSQL\n(auth/admin)
pgbouncer --> postgres : transaction\npooling
' Environment variables
note right of host
**Environment Variables:**
@@ -99,13 +124,17 @@ note right of host
• OPENAI_API_KEY — API key
• REDIS_PASSWORD — Redis auth
• TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN — API auth
• TURNSTONE_DB_URL — PostgreSQL URL
• POSTGRES_PASSWORD — DB password
end note
' Volumes
database "redis-data" as rv
database "turnstone-data" as tv
database "postgres-data" as pv
redis_node --> rv
server_node --> tv
pg_node --> pv
@enduml
+1
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ package "turnstone/sdk/ (Python)" {
+ approve()
+ plan_feedback()
+ command()
+ cancel(ws_id)
+ stream_events(ws_id)
+ stream_global_events()
+ send_and_wait()
+8 -6
View File
@@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ class "SQLiteBackend" as SQLite <<sqlite>> {
class "PostgreSQLBackend" as PG <<postgres>> {
-_engine: sa.Engine
+__init__(url: str, pool_size: int)
+__init__(url: str, pool_size: int = 2,\n max_overflow: int = 3)
--
tsvector + ILIKE search
Connection pooling
Connection pooling (5 max per process)
}
' -- Schema --
@@ -64,11 +64,12 @@ class "_schema.py" as Schema <<schema>> {
+metadata: MetaData
+memories: Table
+conversations: Table
+workstreams: Table (node_id, alias, title, state)
+workstreams: Table (node_id, alias, title,\n state, skill_id)
+workstream_config: Table
+users: Table (username, password_hash)
+api_tokens: Table (token_hash, scopes)
+channel_users: Table (channel_type)
+scheduled_tasks: Table (..., skill)
--
SQLAlchemy Core
Single source of truth
@@ -150,7 +151,7 @@ note right of Registry
backend = "sqlite" | "postgresql"
url = "postgresql+psycopg://..."
path = ".turnstone.db"
pool_size = 5
pool_size = 2 (+ 3 overflow)
end note
note bottom of SQLite
@@ -161,8 +162,9 @@ end note
note bottom of PG
Production backend.
Multi-node / Docker
default.
Multi-node / Docker default.
Use PgBouncer (transaction mode)
for clusters > 50 nodes.
end note
@enduml
+15 -2
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ class "DiscordBot" as Bot <<service>> {
+on_message(msg)
+on_interaction(interaction)
+send(channel_id, content)
+send_notification(channel_id, content, ws_id)
+run(token)
--
discord.py Client
@@ -61,6 +62,9 @@ class "DiscordBot" as Bot <<service>> {
Creates threads for workstreams
Renders approval buttons
escape_mentions() on send
--
_notify_ws_map: msg_id → (ws_id, user_id)
_notify_reply_channels: ws_id → (dm, user_id)
}
class "ChannelRouter" as Router <<service>> {
@@ -240,11 +244,20 @@ note bottom of SVC
3. Queries services table for healthy gateways
4. Mints JWT (aud: turnstone-channel) via
ServiceTokenManager
5. POSTs to first healthy gateway
5. POSTs to first healthy gateway (incl. ws_id)
6. Gateway validates JWT, resolves target
7. adapter.send() → Discord API
7. adapter.send_notification() → Discord API
(tracks msg_id → ws_id for reply routing)
8. On failure: retry up to 3× (1s, 3s backoff)
9. SSRF: only http(s) URLs allowed
**Bidirectional DM Replies**
1. User replies to notification DM
2. Bot looks up ws_id from _notify_ws_map
3. Verifies author == notification recipient
4. Routes reply via router.send_message()
5. Response forwarded to DM on TurnCompleteEvent
6. Response tracked for multi-turn conversation
end note
@enduml
+35
View File
@@ -103,6 +103,41 @@ alt all retries exhausted
Session --> Session : "Error: notification delivery failed"
end
== Bidirectional Reply (User responds to notification DM) ==
Discord -> Adapter : user replies to\nnotification message
Adapter -> Adapter : lookup message_id\nin _notify_ws_map
note right
Maps message_id →
(ws_id, target_user_id)
Atomic pop prevents TOCTOU
end note
alt message not tracked
Adapter -> Discord : "This notification\nis no longer active."
else tracked
Adapter -> Adapter : verify author ==\ntarget_user_id
Adapter -> Adapter : resolve_user()\n(unlinked → drop)
Adapter -> Adapter : router.send_message(ws_id, content)
note right
Routes reply via MQ to
the originating workstream.
Registers DM channel in
_notify_reply_channels[ws_id]
end note
... workstream processes reply ...
Adapter <- Adapter : TurnCompleteEvent\n(with content)
Adapter -> Discord : forward response to DM
Adapter -> Adapter : track response message\nfor multi-turn replies
note right
Response message_id added
to _notify_ws_map — user can
reply again indefinitely
end note
end
== Service Registry (Background) ==
note over Gateway, Storage
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
@startuml
!theme plain
skinparam backgroundColor #FFFFFF
skinparam defaultFontName "IBM Plex Mono"
skinparam componentStyle rectangle
title Turnstone Governance Architecture
package "Auth Flow" {
[Login/Token Auth] as auth
[_load_user_permissions()] as perms
[_permissions_to_scopes()] as scopes
[create_jwt()] as jwt
}
package "Middleware" {
[AuthMiddleware\n(scope check)] as mw
[require_permission()\n(granular check)] as rp
}
package "Governance Storage" {
database "roles" as roles_db
database "user_roles" as ur_db
database "orgs" as orgs_db
database "tool_policies" as tp_db
database "prompt_templates\n(skills)" as pt_db
database "usage_events" as ue_db
database "audit_events" as ae_db
database "skills" as wt_db
}
package "Runtime Enforcement" {
[evaluate_tool_policies_batch()] as eval
[WebUI.approve_tools()] as approve
[record_usage_event()\n+cache_creation/read_tokens] as usage
[record_audit()] as audit
}
package "Template Runtime" {
[_load_templates()] as tload
[_render_template()\n{{model}}, {{ws_id}}, {{node_id}}] as trender
[_init_system_messages()] as tsys
[set_template() / /template] as tset
}
package "Skill Runtime" {
[resolve_skill()] as wtr
[apply settings\n(model, budget, prompt)] as wta
[budget gate\n(session.send)] as wtb
}
package "Console UI" {
[Admin Panel\n10 tabs] as ui
[governance.js] as govjs
[sessionStorage\npermissions] as ss
}
auth --> perms : user_id
perms --> roles_db : JOIN user_roles + roles
perms --> scopes : permission set
scopes --> jwt : scopes + permissions
jwt --> mw : JWT in cookie/header
mw --> rp : scope OK → check permission
rp --> ui : 403 or allow
eval --> tp_db : list_tool_policies()
approve --> eval : tool names
approve --> ae_db : (via audit)
usage --> ue_db : on_status()
audit --> ae_db : admin handlers
govjs --> roles_db : /v1/api/admin/roles
govjs --> tp_db : /v1/api/admin/policies
govjs --> pt_db : /v1/api/admin/skills
govjs --> ue_db : /v1/api/admin/usage
govjs --> ae_db : /v1/api/admin/audit
tload --> pt_db : list_default_templates()\nor get_by_name()
tload --> trender : template content
trender --> tsys : rendered content
tset --> tload : name or None
note right of pt_db
Read-only listing:
GET /v1/api/skills
(read scope, summary only)
end note
govjs --> wt_db : /v1/api/admin/skills
wtr --> wt_db : get_skill_by_name()
wtr --> wta : skill settings
wta --> pt_db : skill lookup
wtb --> approve : __budget_override__
auth -[hidden]-> mw
mw -[hidden]-> approve
@enduml
+203
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
@startuml
!theme plain
title Turnstone — MCP Architecture (Resources, Prompts, Tools)
skinparam participant {
BackgroundColor<<mcp>> #E1BEE7
BackgroundColor<<session>> #C8E6C9
BackgroundColor<<storage>> #B3E5FC
BackgroundColor<<server>> #FFE0B2
BackgroundColor<<ui>> #E8EAF6
BackgroundColor<<registry>> #F8BBD0
}
participant "MCP Server\n(external)" as MCPSrv <<mcp>>
participant "MCPClientManager\n(mcp_client.py)" as MCPMgr <<mcp>>
participant "ChatSession\n(session.py)" as Session <<session>>
participant "StorageBackend\n(governance)" as Storage <<storage>>
participant "Server / Console\n(health + UI)" as UI <<server>>
participant "Console Admin UI\n(admin panel)" as Admin <<ui>>
participant "Database\n(mcp_servers table)" as DB <<storage>>
participant "MCPRegistryClient\n(mcp_registry.py)" as RegClient <<mcp>>
participant "MCP Registry\n(registry.modelcontextprotocol.io)" as Registry <<registry>>
== Admin-Driven Configuration ==
Admin -> DB : CRUD MCP server definitions\n(POST/PUT/DELETE /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers)
Admin -> UI : POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/reload
UI -> MCPMgr : POST /_internal/mcp-reload\n(forwarded to each node)
MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : reconcile_sync()
note right
Diffs running servers against DB:
- New entries → connect
- Removed entries → disconnect
- Changed entries → reconnect
end note
== Registry Discovery & Install ==
Admin -> UI : GET /v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/search?search=...
UI -> RegClient : search(q, limit, cursor)
RegClient -> Registry : GET /v0.1/servers?search=...&latest=true
Registry --> RegClient : Server entries\n(remotes, packages, meta)
RegClient --> UI : RegistrySearchResult\n(annotated with installed status)
UI --> Admin : Search results\n(Install / Installed badges)
Admin -> UI : POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/install
UI -> DB : create_mcp_server()\n(registry_name, version, meta)
UI -> MCPMgr : POST /_internal/mcp-reload\n(fan-out to nodes)
MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : reconcile_sync()
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : connect to new server
note over RegClient, Registry
MCPRegistryClient is an async httpx client
targeting registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0.1.
resolve_install_config() translates registry
remotes/packages into mcp_servers rows.
end note
== Startup: Connection & Discovery ==
MCPMgr -> DB : load_mcp_config(storage=)\n(merge config file + DB)
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : initialize (stdio or HTTP)
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : capabilities\n(tools, resources, prompts)
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : tools/list
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : Tool[]
opt resources capability
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : resources/list
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : Resource[]
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : resources/templates/list
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : ResourceTemplate[]
end
opt prompts capability
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : prompts/list
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : Prompt[]
end
note over MCPMgr
Per-server storage:
_per_server_tools, _per_server_resources, _per_server_prompts
Copy-on-write rebuild into _tools, _resources, _prompts
Prefix: mcp__{server}__{name}
end note
MCPMgr -> Session : notify tool listeners
MCPMgr -> Session : notify resource listeners
== Governance Sync (on connect & refresh) ==
MCPMgr -> Storage : sync_prompts_to_storage()
note right
For each MCP prompt:
- Manual template exists? → skip
- MCP template exists? → update
(reset is_default=False)
- New? → create (origin="mcp",
readonly=True, is_default=False)
Removed prompts → delete
Protected by _sync_lock
end note
== set_storage() from entry point ==
UI -> MCPMgr : set_storage(backend)
note right
If servers already connected,
triggers immediate sync
end note
== Runtime: Tool Execution ==
Session -> Session : _prepare_mcp_tool(func_name, args)
note right
approval_label = func_name
(e.g. mcp__github__search)
needs_approval = True
end note
Session -> MCPMgr : call_tool_sync(name, args)
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : tools/call
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : ToolResult
MCPMgr --> Session : output (text)
== Runtime: Resource Read ==
Session -> Session : _prepare_read_resource(uri)
note right
approval_label = mcp_resource__{normalized_uri}
URI normalized (.. resolved)
needs_approval = True
end note
Session -> MCPMgr : read_resource_sync(uri)
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : resources/read
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : ReadResourceResult
MCPMgr --> Session : content (text/blob)
== Runtime: Prompt Invocation ==
Session -> Session : _prepare_use_prompt(name, arguments)
note right
approval_label = mcp__srv__prompt
Validated via is_mcp_prompt()
needs_approval = True
end note
Session -> MCPMgr : get_prompt_sync(name, args)
MCPMgr -> MCPSrv : prompts/get
MCPSrv --> MCPMgr : GetPromptResult
MCPMgr --> Session : messages [{role, content}]
== Three-Tier Refresh ==
group Push Notifications
MCPSrv -> MCPMgr : ToolListChangedNotification
MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : _refresh_server_tools()
MCPSrv -> MCPMgr : ResourceListChangedNotification
MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : _refresh_server_resources()
MCPSrv -> MCPMgr : PromptListChangedNotification
MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : _refresh_server_prompts()
MCPMgr -> Storage : sync_prompts_to_storage()
end
group Periodic Polling (default 4h)
MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : _periodic_refresh()
note right
Only polls capabilities
without push support.
Staggered per-server.
end note
end
group Manual Refresh
Session -> MCPMgr : refresh_sync()
note right: /mcp refresh [server]
end
== Policy Evaluation ==
note over Session
Tool policies use fnmatch on approval_label:
- mcp__github__* → allow (all GitHub tools/prompts)
- mcp_resource__file:///docs/* → allow
- mcp_resource__* → deny (block all resource reads)
- mcp__untrusted__* → ask
end note
== UI Visibility ==
UI -> MCPMgr : server_count, get_resources(), get_prompts()
note over UI
/health → mcp.servers, mcp.resources, mcp.prompts
Server UI: magenta status badge
Console: cluster status bar + node detail
System message: <mcp-resources> + <mcp-prompts> catalogs
end note
@enduml
+218
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
@startuml
!theme plain
title Turnstone — Intent Validation (Judge) Architecture
skinparam participant {
BackgroundColor<<session>> #C8E6C9
BackgroundColor<<judge>> #FFE0B2
BackgroundColor<<storage>> #B3E5FC
BackgroundColor<<ui>> #E8EAF6
BackgroundColor<<fs>> #F5F5F5
}
participant "ChatSession\n(session.py)" as Session <<session>>
participant "IntentJudge\n(judge.py)" as Judge <<judge>>
participant "LLM Provider\n(provider)" as LLM <<judge>>
participant "StorageBackend\n(SQLite)" as Storage <<storage>>
participant "WebUI / SSE\n(server.py)" as UI <<ui>>
participant "Filesystem" as FS <<fs>>
== Tool Call Requires Approval ==
Session -> Session : _prepare_tool_calls()
note right
Tool calls parsed from
LLM response. Auto-approved
tools dispatched immediately.
Remaining items need approval.
end note
Session -> Session : _evaluate_intent(pending_items)
== Tier 1: Heuristic (synchronous, sub-ms) ==
Session -> Judge : evaluate(items, messages, callback)
Judge -> Judge : evaluate_heuristic()\nfor each item
note right
**36 rules (first match wins):**
Critical (0.90, deny): rm /, mkfs,
dd, pipe-to-shell, chmod 777 /,
write/edit /etc/ .ssh/,
download-then-execute chains
High (0.80, review): sudo, kill -9,
destructive git, DROP TABLE,
secrets, HTTP mutations, ssh/scp,
browser+data-export, transitive
install, control-plane mutation
Medium (0.70, review): content
ingestion, interpreter exec,
cloud CLI mutations, pkg install,
write_file, MCP tools, docker ops
Low (0.85, approve): read_file,
list_directory, search, recall,
tool_search, read_resource,
web_search, read-only bash
Default: medium, 0.50, review
end note
Judge --> Session : heuristic_verdicts[]
Session -> Session : attach _heuristic_verdict\nto each pending item
Session -> UI : SSE: approve_request\n{items: [{verdict: ...}],\n judge_pending: true}
note right
Heuristic verdict displayed
immediately as risk badge.
Spinner shown while LLM
judge evaluates.
end note
Session -> Storage : create_intent_verdict()\nfor each heuristic verdict
== Tier 2: LLM Judge (daemon thread, async) ==
Judge -> Judge : spawn daemon thread\n"intent-judge"
note over Judge, LLM
**Context preparation:**
1. FIFO-truncate conversation history
to max_context_ratio of context window
2. Append tool call details as user message
3. System prompt defines judge role + JSON schema
end note
loop up to 3 turns (timeout budget)
Judge -> LLM : create_completion(\nmodel, judge_messages,\ntools=[read_file, list_directory])
LLM --> Judge : CompletionResult
alt tool_calls present (turn < 3)
Judge -> Judge : _exec_read_only_tool()
note right
**Security hardening:**
Blocked: /etc/, /root/,
/proc/, /sys/, /dev/,
.ssh, .gnupg, .aws,
*.pem, *.key, *.p12
File cap: 32KB
Dir cap: 200 entries
end note
Judge -> FS : read_file / list_directory
FS --> Judge : file contents
Judge -> Judge : append tool result\nto judge_messages
else text response (final verdict)
Judge -> Judge : _parse_verdict()
note right
**4-stage JSON parsing:**
1. Direct JSON.loads
2. Markdown code block
3. Brace-counting
4. Regex field extraction
end note
end
end
== Tier 3: Arbitration ==
Judge -> Judge : compare confidence:\nLLM vs heuristic
note right
Only deliver LLM verdict
if confidence > heuristic.
Otherwise heuristic stands.
end note
alt LLM confidence > heuristic confidence
Judge -> Session : callback(llm_verdict)
Session -> UI : SSE: intent_verdict\n{tier: "llm", ...}
note right
UI replaces heuristic badge
with LLM verdict. Spinner
resolves to final assessment.
end note
Session -> Storage : create_intent_verdict()\nfor LLM verdict
end
== User Decision ==
UI -> Session : resolve_approval(\napproved, feedback)
Session -> Storage : update_intent_verdict(\nverdict_id, user_decision)
note right
All tracked verdicts
(heuristic + LLM) updated
with "approved" or "denied".
Swap-and-clear avoids racing
with daemon judge thread.
end note
== Tool Execution ==
Session -> Session : _execute_tools()
note right
Tools execute with
user approval.
end note
== Output Guard (synchronous, time-budgeted) ==
Session -> Session : _evaluate_output()\nfor each tool result
note right
**Priority-ordered checks (5s budget):**
P1: Prompt injection (role injection,
override phrases, instruction tags)
P2: Credential leakage (API keys,
PEM blocks, connection strings)
P3: Encoded payloads (data URIs,
hex shellcode)
P4: Adversarial URLs (cloud metadata,
credential query params)
P5: System info disclosure (private
IPs, sensitive paths)
Annotates + optionally redacts.
Does NOT gate.
end note
alt output_warning flags detected
Session -> UI : SSE: output_warning\n{call_id, risk_level, flags,\nfunc_name, redacted}
note right
Credential values replaced
with [REDACTED:<type>] before
output enters conversation.
sanitized text excluded from
SSE payload (defense in depth).
end note
UI -> Storage : record_output_assessment()\nfire-and-forget persistence
note right
Stored: flags, risk_level,
annotations, output_length,
redacted (bool). Raw tool
output is never stored.
end note
end
== Lifecycle ==
note over Session, Judge
**Lazy initialization:**
IntentJudge created on first approval if judge_config.enabled.
Re-uses session's provider/client by default (self-consistency).
Cross-model: separate provider/client from [judge] config.
**Sub-agent exemption:**
Plan agent and task agent skip intent validation entirely.
**Output guard:**
Runs when judge_config.output_guard is true (default).
Credential redaction when judge_config.redact_secrets is true.
**Storage:**
intent_verdicts table (migration 012), output_assessments table
(migration 022). Both queryable via admin API endpoints
(requires admin.judge permission). Skills store scan_status,
scan_report, scan_version for install-time risk assessment.
end note
@enduml
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
@startuml
!theme plain
title Turnstone — Structured Memory Architecture
skinparam participant {
BackgroundColor<<session>> #C8E6C9
BackgroundColor<<facade>> #FFE0B2
BackgroundColor<<storage>> #B3E5FC
BackgroundColor<<api>> #E8EAF6
BackgroundColor<<sdk>> #F5F5F5
}
participant "ChatSession\n(session.py)" as Session <<session>>
participant "MemoryFacade\n(memory.py)" as Facade <<facade>>
participant "MemoryRelevance\n(memory_relevance.py)" as Relevance <<facade>>
participant "StorageBackend\n(SQLite)" as Storage <<storage>>
participant "Server API\n(server.py)" as API <<api>>
participant "Console Admin\n(console/server.py)" as Admin <<api>>
participant "SDK Client\n(sdk/)" as SDK <<sdk>>
== Phase 1: Tool Path (session.send) ==
Session -> Session : _prepare_tool_calls()\nparse memory(action=...)
note right
Tool schema: 4 actions
save, search, delete, list
Auto-approved (no approval needed)
end note
Session -> Session : _exec_memory(item)
alt action = save
Session -> Facade : save_structured_memory(\nname, content, description,\nmem_type, scope, scope_id)
Facade -> Facade : normalize_key(name)
Facade -> Storage : create_structured_memory()
alt unique constraint violation
Storage --> Facade : IntegrityError
Facade -> Storage : get_structured_memory_by_name()
Storage --> Facade : existing row
Facade -> Storage : update_structured_memory()
end
Storage --> Facade : memory_id
Facade --> Session : (memory_id, old_content)
Session -> Session : _init_system_messages()\nrefresh BM25 context
end
alt action = search
Session -> Facade : search_structured_memories(\nquery, mem_type, scope,\nscope_id, limit)
Facade -> Storage : search_structured_memories()
Storage --> Session : matched rows
end
alt action = delete
Session -> Facade : delete_structured_memory(\nname, scope, scope_id)
Facade -> Storage : delete_structured_memory()
Storage --> Session : bool (existed)
Session -> Session : _init_system_messages()\nrefresh BM25 context
end
== Phase 2: BM25 Relevance Injection ==
Session -> Session : _init_system_messages()\nevery conversation turn
Session -> Session : _get_visible_memories(\nlimit=fetch_limit)
note right
**Scope resolution:**
1. global scope (always)
2. workstream scope (ws_id)
3. user scope (user_id, if auth)
Combined and deduplicated.
end note
Session -> Facade : list_structured_memories()\nper scope
Facade -> Storage : list_structured_memories()
Storage --> Session : up to fetch_limit rows
Session -> Relevance : extract_recent_context(\nmessages, max_messages=3)
Relevance --> Session : user text context
Session -> Relevance : score_memories(\nmemories, context,\nk=relevance_k)
note right
**BM25 scoring:**
Index over name + description
+ content[:200] for each memory.
Returns top-k by relevance.
Empty query returns most recent k.
end note
Relevance --> Session : top-k memories
Session -> Relevance : build_memory_context(\nrelevant_memories)
note right
Formats as XML block:
<memories>
<memory name="..." type="..."
scope="..." description="...">
content (max 500 chars)
</memory>
</memories>
end note
Relevance --> Session : XML string
Session -> Session : inject into\nsystem message
== Phase 3: Server API Path ==
SDK -> API : GET /v1/api/memories\n?type=project&limit=20
API -> Facade : list_structured_memories()
Facade -> Storage : list_structured_memories()
Storage --> API : rows
API --> SDK : {"memories": [...], "total": N}
SDK -> API : POST /v1/api/memories\n{name, content, ...}
API -> API : validate type, scope,\nname length, content length
API -> Facade : save_structured_memory()
Facade -> Storage : create / update
Storage --> API : memory row
API --> SDK : 201 (created) / 200 (updated)
SDK -> API : POST /v1/api/memories/search\n{query, type, ...}
API -> Facade : search_structured_memories()
Facade -> Storage : search_structured_memories()
Storage --> API : matched rows
API --> SDK : {"memories": [...], "total": N}
SDK -> API : DELETE /v1/api/memories/{name}\n?scope=global
API -> Facade : delete_structured_memory()
Facade -> Storage : delete row
API --> SDK : {"status": "ok"}
== Phase 4: Console Admin Path ==
SDK -> Admin : GET /v1/api/admin/memories\n?type=&scope=&limit=
Admin -> Admin : require_permission(\n"admin.memories")
Admin -> Storage : list_structured_memories()
Storage --> Admin : rows
Admin --> SDK : {"memories": [...], "total": N}
SDK -> Admin : GET /v1/api/admin/memories/{id}
Admin -> Storage : get_structured_memory(id)
Storage --> Admin : memory row
Admin --> SDK : memory JSON
SDK -> Admin : DELETE /v1/api/admin/memories/{id}
Admin -> Storage : delete_structured_memory_by_id()
Admin -> Admin : record_audit(\n"memory.delete")
Admin --> SDK : {"status": "ok"}
== Configuration ==
note over Session, Relevance
**MemoryConfig** (from [memory] in config.toml):
relevance_k = 5 -- top-k memories per turn
fetch_limit = 50 -- max memories fetched for scoring
max_content = 32768 -- max content length per memory
nudge_cooldown = 300 -- seconds between metacognitive nudges
nudges = true -- enable/disable memory nudges
end note
@enduml
+151
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
@startuml
!theme plain
title Turnstone — Settings Architecture
skinparam participant {
BackgroundColor<<session>> #C8E6C9
BackgroundColor<<config>> #FFE0B2
BackgroundColor<<storage>> #B3E5FC
BackgroundColor<<api>> #E8EAF6
BackgroundColor<<sdk>> #F5F5F5
}
participant "Server\n(main)" as Server <<session>>
participant "ConfigStore\n(config_store.py)" as Store <<config>>
participant "SettingsRegistry\n(settings_registry.py)" as Registry <<config>>
participant "StorageBackend\n(SQLite)" as Storage <<storage>>
participant "Console Admin\n(console/server.py)" as Admin <<api>>
participant "SDK Client\n(sdk/)" as SDK <<sdk>>
participant "ChatSession\n(session.py)" as Session <<session>>
== Phase 1: Server Startup ==
Server -> Server : parse_args()\nCLI flags override defaults
Server -> Server : init_storage()\nSQLite / PostgreSQL
Server -> Store ** : ConfigStore(storage, node_id)
Store -> Storage : get_system_settings_bulk(node_id)
note right
1. Load global settings (node_id="")
2. Overlay per-node settings
Returns {key: json_value} dict
end note
Storage --> Store : raw settings
Store -> Registry : deserialize_value(key, json)\nper entry
Registry --> Store : typed values
Store -> Store : swap _cache atomically\nincrement _version
Server -> Server : warn_migrated_settings()
note right
Scans config.toml for keys
now managed by ConfigStore.
Logs warning for each overlap.
end note
Server -> Server : session_factory captures\nConfigStore reference
== Phase 2: Settings Read (session creation) ==
Server -> Session : session_factory(ws_id)
Session -> Store : get("model.temperature")
Store -> Store : cache[key] lookup\n(lock-free)
alt key in cache
Store --> Session : stored value
else key not in cache
Store -> Registry : SETTINGS[key].default
Registry --> Store : default value
Store --> Session : default value
end
note right of Session
Settings are captured once
at workstream creation.
Not re-read on every turn.
end note
== Phase 3: Admin API — List / Schema ==
SDK -> Admin : GET /v1/api/admin/settings
Admin -> Admin : require_permission(\n"admin.settings")
Admin -> Store : all_effective()
Store -> Store : merge cache with\nregistry defaults
Store --> Admin : {key: effective_value}
Admin -> Registry : SETTINGS (metadata)
note right
Annotates each setting with:
type, default, description,
is_stored, is_secret, constraints,
changed_by, updated
end note
Admin --> SDK : {"settings": [...], "total": N}
SDK -> Admin : GET /v1/api/admin/settings/schema
Admin -> Admin : require_permission(\n"admin.settings")
Admin -> Registry : SETTINGS catalog
Admin --> SDK : {"settings": [...], "total": N}
== Phase 4: Admin API — Update ==
SDK -> Admin : PUT /v1/api/admin/settings/\nmodel.temperature\n{"value": 0.7}
Admin -> Admin : require_permission(\n"admin.settings")
Admin -> Registry : validate_key("model.temperature")
Registry --> Admin : SettingDef
alt is_secret == true
Admin --> SDK : 403 Forbidden
else
Admin -> Registry : validate_value(key, 0.7)
note right
Type coercion: float(0.7)
Range check: 0.0 <= 0.7 <= 2.0
Choices check: (none for this key)
end note
Registry --> Admin : typed value
Admin -> Store : set(key, 0.7, changed_by="admin")
Store -> Registry : serialize_value(0.7)\n=> "0.7"
Store -> Storage : upsert_system_setting(\nkey, "0.7", node_id, ...)
Storage --> Store : ok
Store -> Store : swap _cache atomically
Admin -> Admin : record_audit(\n"setting.update")
Admin --> SDK : {"key": "...", "value": 0.7,\n"previous": 0.5}
end
== Phase 5: Admin API — Delete (reset to default) ==
SDK -> Admin : DELETE /v1/api/admin/settings/\nmodel.temperature
Admin -> Admin : require_permission(\n"admin.settings")
Admin -> Store : delete("model.temperature")
Store -> Registry : validate_key(key)
Store -> Storage : delete_system_setting(key, node_id)
Storage --> Store : bool (existed)
Store -> Store : remove from cache,\nswap atomically
Admin -> Admin : record_audit(\n"setting.delete")
Admin --> SDK : {"status": "ok",\n"key": "...", "default": 0.5}
== Phase 6: Hot Reload ==
SDK -> Admin : POST /v1/api/_internal/\nconfig-reload
Admin -> Store : reload()
Store -> Storage : get_system_settings_bulk(node_id)
Storage --> Store : all settings
Store -> Store : rebuild cache,\nswap atomically,\nincrement _version
note right
Existing sessions: unchanged
(frozen at creation time).
New sessions: pick up
updated values immediately.
end note
Admin --> SDK : {"status": "ok"}
== Precedence Summary ==
note over Server, Registry
**Server entry point:**
CLI flag > ConfigStore (database) > registry default
**CLI entry point:**
CLI flag > config.toml > argparse default
**Bootstrap settings** (database, Redis, auth, server bind):
Always from config.toml / env vars — never in ConfigStore.
end note
@enduml
+147
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
@startuml
!theme plain
title Turnstone — OIDC Authorization Code Flow with PKCE
skinparam participant {
BackgroundColor<<browser>> #E8EAF6
BackgroundColor<<server>> #FFE0B2
BackgroundColor<<storage>> #B3E5FC
BackgroundColor<<idp>> #C8E6C9
}
participant "Browser" as Browser <<browser>>
participant "Turnstone\n(Server / Console)" as Server <<server>>
database "SQLite /\nPostgreSQL" as DB <<storage>>
participant "Identity Provider\n(IdP)" as IdP <<idp>>
== Page Load ==
Browser -> Server : GET /v1/api/auth/status
Server --> Browser : {oidc_enabled: true,\noidc_provider_name: "...",\npassword_enabled: true}
note right of Browser
Login screen renders
"Continue with {provider_name}"
button alongside password form.
If password_enabled=false,
only the SSO button is shown.
end note
== Authorization Request ==
Browser -> Server : GET /v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize
Server -> Server : Generate state (random)\nnonce (random)\nPKCE code_verifier + code_challenge
Server -> DB : create_oidc_pending_state(\nstate, nonce, code_verifier, audience)
note right of DB
Stored with created_at timestamp.
Expires after 5 minutes.
end note
Server --> Browser : 302 Redirect to IdP\nauthorization_endpoint
Browser -> IdP : GET /authorize?\nresponse_type=code&\nclient_id=...&\nredirect_uri=...&\nscope=openid email profile&\nstate=...&nonce=...&\ncode_challenge=...&\ncode_challenge_method=S256
== User Authentication (at IdP) ==
IdP -> Browser : Login page (if no\nexisting IdP session)
Browser -> IdP : User authenticates\n(username/password, MFA, etc.)
IdP --> Browser : 302 Redirect to callback\n?code=AUTH_CODE&state=STATE
== Callback Processing ==
Browser -> Server : GET /v1/api/auth/oidc/callback\n?code=AUTH_CODE&state=STATE
Server -> Server : Rate limit check\n(5 per 5min per IP)
Server -> DB : cleanup_expired_oidc_states(300)
note right of DB
Lazy cleanup of states
older than 5 minutes.
end note
Server -> DB : pop_oidc_pending_state(state)
DB --> Server : {nonce, code_verifier, audience}
note right of Server
Atomic fetch-and-delete.
Returns None if state is
expired or unknown.
end note
== Token Exchange ==
Server -> IdP : POST /token\ngrant_type=authorization_code&\ncode=AUTH_CODE&\nclient_id=...&\nclient_secret=...&\ncode_verifier=...&\nredirect_uri=...
note right of Server
Client secret + PKCE verifier
sent server-side only.
Never exposed to browser.
end note
IdP --> Server : {id_token: "eyJ...",\naccess_token: "..."}
== ID Token Validation ==
Server -> IdP : Fetch JWKS public keys\n(cached at startup, refreshed\non-demand when unknown kid\nencountered — key rotation)
Server -> Server : Validate ID token:\n1. Verify signature (RS256/ES256)\n2. Check iss == configured issuer\n3. Check aud == client_id\n4. Check exp (not expired)\n5. Verify nonce matches
== User Provisioning ==
Server -> DB : get_oidc_identity(issuer, sub)
alt Existing identity found
DB --> Server : {user_id, ...}
Server -> DB : update_oidc_identity_login()\nupdate last_login timestamp
Server -> DB : get_user(user_id)
DB --> Server : user record
else New user (first login)
Server -> Server : Derive username from\npreferred_username / email
Server -> DB : create_user(user_id, username,\ndisplay_name, "!oidc")
note right of DB
Password hash set to sentinel
value "!oidc" — not a valid
bcrypt hash, so password login
is always rejected.
end note
Server -> DB : create_oidc_identity(\nissuer, sub, user_id, email)
end
opt Role mapping configured
Server -> Server : Read role_claim from ID token\nMap values via role_map
Server -> DB : Sync roles: add new,\nrevoke stale OIDC-assigned,\npreserve manually assigned
end
== Issue Turnstone JWT ==
Server -> Server : Load user permissions\nDerive scopes from permissions
Server -> Server : Create JWT (HS256)\nsub: user_id\nscopes: read,write,...\nsrc: "oidc"\naud: turnstone-server\nexp: +24h
Server --> Browser : 302 Redirect to /?oidc_success=1\nSet-Cookie: session=JWT\n(HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure)
== Browser Success Detection ==
Browser -> Browser : Detect ?oidc_success=1\nStrip param from URL\n(history.replaceState)
Browser -> Browser : Hide login overlay\nCall onLoginSuccess()
note right of Browser
Browser is now authenticated.
JWT cookie sent on all
subsequent requests.
end note
== Error Paths ==
note over Browser, IdP
**Error handling:**
- IdP returns error param → redirect to /?oidc_error=...
- State missing/expired → redirect to /?oidc_error=Login+session+expired
- Token exchange fails → redirect to /?oidc_error=...
- ID token validation fails → redirect to /?oidc_error=...
- No admin user exists → redirect to /?oidc_error=Initial+setup+required
- Rate limit exceeded → redirect to /?oidc_error=Too+many+login+attempts
All errors are shown as toast messages on the login screen.
end note
@enduml
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
@startuml
!include https://raw.githubusercontent.com/plantuml-stdlib/C4-PlantUML/master/C4_Component.puml
LAYOUT_LEFT_RIGHT()
title Skills Discovery & Runtime Architecture
skinparam backgroundColor #1e1e2e
skinparam defaultFontColor #cdd6f4
skinparam defaultFontName "JetBrains Mono"
skinparam arrowColor #89b4fa
skinparam rectangleBorderColor #585b70
skinparam rectangleBackgroundColor #313244
skinparam noteBorderColor #585b70
skinparam noteBackgroundColor #45475a
skinparam packageBorderColor #585b70
package "External Sources" as ext #181825 {
rectangle "skills.sh\nRegistry" as skillssh
rectangle "GitHub\nRepositories" as github
}
package "Console Server" as console #181825 {
rectangle "admin_skill_discover\nGET /v1/api/admin/skills/discover" as discover
rectangle "admin_skill_install\nPOST /v1/api/admin/skills/install" as install
rectangle "_get_discovery_url\nsettings fallback" as settings
}
package "Core Modules" as core #181825 {
rectangle "SkillsShClient\nskill_sources.py" as client
rectangle "fetch_skill_from_github\nskill_sources.py" as fetcher
rectangle "parse_skill_md\nskill_parser.py" as parser
rectangle "scan_skill_content\nstorage/_utils.py" as scanner
}
package "Session Runtime" as runtime #181825 {
rectangle "skill tool\nsession.py" as loadtool
rectangle "set_skill()\nsession.py" as setskill
rectangle "_load_skills()\nsession.py" as loadskills
}
package "Storage" as storage #181825 {
rectangle "prompt_templates\n(skills)" as skills_table
rectangle "skill_resources\n(bundled files)" as resources_table
rectangle "system_settings\n(discovery_url)" as settings_table
}
package "Admin UI" as ui #181825 {
rectangle "Skills Tab\nInstalled / Discover pill" as pill
rectangle "Discovery View\nsearch + cards" as discoverui
rectangle "GitHub Import\nmodal" as importui
}
' External discovery flow
discover --> settings : resolve URL
settings --> settings_table : DB -> config -> default
discover --> client : search(query)
client --> skillssh : GET /api/search
install --> client : resolve_github_url()
client --> skillssh : GET /api/skills/{id}
install --> fetcher : fetch SKILL.md + resources
fetcher --> github : raw.githubusercontent.com
fetcher --> github : api.github.com/git/trees
fetcher --> parser : parse frontmatter
install --> scanner : auto-scan on create
install --> skills_table : create_prompt_template
install --> resources_table : create_skill_resource
' Runtime skill loading flow
loadtool --> skills_table : search (BM25 ranking)
loadtool --> setskill : load (name)
setskill --> loadskills : reload + reinit system messages
loadskills --> skills_table : get_skill_by_name
' UI flow
pill --> discoverui : switch view
discoverui --> discover : authFetch()
importui --> install : POST (github source)
' Annotations
note right of parser
YAML frontmatter -> ParsedSkill
allowed-tools (standard) -> allowed_tools (internal)
Anthropic + Hermes tag formats
Name validation (lowercase+hyphens)
end note
note right of loadtool
search: auto-approved (read-only)
load: requires user approval
Main session only (no sub-agents)
end note
note right of scanner
4 risk axes (content, supply chain,
vulnerability, capability)
Auto-triggers on create/update
end note
@enduml
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:0ee0a9391bd19d92e9271bf6bd531e9c2e18baf8c5a11ead49b3c10db4d8939b
size 329625
oid sha256:efcc7cbe8161a54b5ec24bdfd47e8a142f70029e6e66c707e811b99369f85ebf
size 310079
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:760c37e67736588dadee21d500419a48e9fc50f8bdc5667e686c580022bd40e2
size 554869
oid sha256:0e605963c649574c7bf987b2d338257c78bc1fc68b524ac8276bb25365035e06
size 594096
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:e3044c738d6d6853aab5c4990e6c67bab0165eba991a4f5bebdfc4d4a0b305ee
size 289165
oid sha256:da9d32000e3d92d92ce621661ced60f276f9b5be652f5ed6123b400505415f4a
size 319702
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:282820fe416961e735d050f86ecdc079e29824d2b3c4d5c8c174d0533d41f211
size 258045
oid sha256:43844b07d36beb04db871f6795a3f3be17852a6a484fdc0ea207403bd7f512a6
size 274286
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:32a0665cceffcc0517265bde12cfb227688aa8585284b5e946ab23bcc52daee6
size 187650
oid sha256:2636e2d4d2f84f26f93de6e984b780f6ad5bf8d3618a0202ea0a2ee80859c5b5
size 312409
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:e0a3f48cca1b8408862dc4ba04fd340703346f44d84048c99e9900f48e9c7e22
size 158867
oid sha256:7896c6e041b6dbb89d034468fa980c8fe645df5eb969d45ef966ccc6399edac2
size 200083
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:a74b4b8b5dbfb1a51a01100b731477968942b01218bad9451a3d5a9cb3003294
size 411665
oid sha256:e3f1ad0fcd55eaca3b8ad9c5abc07432803641c54ede9fc93c79df144cf77d1c
size 407761
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:84524f4bc900708ac8adf081591d336f862830188eb8505e71a0f071b339d923
size 252599
oid sha256:09065fef028d05e6df425fd8abefaf5a2ca04b66802f2e3975f289fa597f63ed
size 309656
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:435a58aa09d0e6615e78c0be62e5fd9aa6d7329b1e96619744355c42ade649c9
size 196502
oid sha256:e7c3e40c10425d721f833390ae3531c09af501157fd3142531ba4eba86ff719d
size 197112
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:5faa5335152685cf1c8bf77ed93847d751cde59e1afed651e5991113f2f0f31b
size 242670
oid sha256:b047cdc318c505f0f0895a65e14c5cc7552716053055cca57fa0a77db150e618
size 255458
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:1380065cbb5f95b5ea7dc6b2a00986c455b82888af60784980dffbd936460dcf
size 431129
oid sha256:6fc99bb8d84d6e9f3dac9d5c12ac7f569a041b29431c57612c24b50f332982ed
size 462992
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:f0f6097840fccdbfe16cd5e4c9f5d063b2c36942460a944df68b8ec947e63ea3
size 221452
oid sha256:cc4c511c34a2e5d286fd128c3509405a5b240ca02a4bafb395d2e94d002a5b8b
size 293203
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:98ba80fa1dab4d37299e61be079a6fbc8740fc3ab92196f828a765f74caf4556
size 200720
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:a6b7769aa7e732ffbeb1eb7f5b65273a135fb3a78d9802ec36d3b92801c34f6b
size 427745
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:79a690c466a5d6f6d4292d78a27b9474e9e9c1373fa80e17dfe37700238c8af8
size 382508
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:c89628ed917dfd576c1af75c68fe5fed9beadaaee9dcea7aa7a1643867c4f1b9
size 344323
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:83c0e6aad3eb19f6bc475a30a77215e801da3da5930f0462417fe7eb6eda6be2
size 347144
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:1c21910e3916be789b0377c8a0dcc8f47d66a967861a543d5bdd0c26da185259
size 309584
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
oid sha256:ba14003062fec7eb9eaca7a3de945767e40bdd821468e19e7d1edcfa7ce1eb41
size 193581
+5
View File
@@ -109,9 +109,12 @@ All configuration is via environment variables in `.env` (copy from `.env.exampl
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND` | `sqlite` | Storage backend: `sqlite` or `postgresql` |
| `TURNSTONE_DB_URL` | — | Database URL (e.g. `postgresql://user:pass@db:5432/turnstone`). For SQLite, defaults to `/data/.turnstone.db` |
| `TURNSTONE_DB_POOL_SIZE` | `2` | PostgreSQL connection pool size per process (default: 2 base + 3 overflow = 5 max) |
The database stores workstream history, user accounts, and API tokens. When using JWT auth, a database backend is required for user storage.
> **Large clusters:** Each turnstone process maintains a small connection pool (5 max). At hundreds of nodes this adds up — use [PgBouncer](pgbouncer.md) in transaction pooling mode between turnstone and PostgreSQL.
> **First-time setup:** After deploying with auth enabled, create an initial admin user by running `turnstone-admin create-user` inside the container:
>
> ```bash
@@ -151,6 +154,8 @@ POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret docker compose --profile cluster up
The default `server` and `bridge` also run alongside the cluster nodes (11 total). All nodes are accessible via the console dashboard at `:8090`.
For production clusters beyond ~50 nodes, add PgBouncer between turnstone services and PostgreSQL. See [PgBouncer Connection Pooling](pgbouncer.md) for Docker Compose and Helm configuration.
## Volumes
| Volume | Mount | Purpose |
+232
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
# Governance
Turnstone governance provides role-based access control (RBAC), tool execution
policies, skills, usage tracking, and audit logging for the admin console.
## Architecture
See [diagram: 19-governance-architecture.puml](diagrams/19-governance-architecture.puml).
### RBAC (Roles & Permissions)
The permission model has two layers:
1. **Scopes** (legacy) — `read`, `write`, `approve`. Checked by `AuthMiddleware`
on every request based on URL path classification.
2. **Permissions** (granular) — 15 permission strings checked per-endpoint by
`require_permission()`.
**Built-in roles** (seeded by migration 008):
| Role | Permissions |
|------|-------------|
| admin | read, write, approve, admin.users, admin.roles, admin.orgs, admin.policies, admin.skills, admin.audit, admin.usage, admin.schedules, admin.watches, tools.approve, workstreams.create, workstreams.close |
| operator | read, write, workstreams.create, workstreams.close |
| viewer | read |
Custom roles can be created with any subset of the 15 valid permissions.
**Auth flow:**
1. User logs in (password or API token) → `_load_user_permissions()` aggregates
permissions from all assigned roles
2. `_permissions_to_scopes()` derives legacy scopes (any `admin.*``approve`)
3. JWT created with both `scopes` and `permissions` claims
4. Middleware checks scope → handler checks permission via `require_permission()`
### Tool Policies
Admin-defined rules that control tool execution:
- **Pattern matching**: Glob syntax via `fnmatch` (e.g., `bash*`, `file_write`, `*`)
- **Actions**: `allow` (auto-approve), `deny` (block), `ask` (normal approval flow)
- **Priority**: Higher priority evaluated first, first match wins
- **Enforcement**: `evaluate_tool_policies_batch()` called in `WebUI.approve_tools()`
before the `auto_approve` check
- **MCP granular policies**: MCP resources and prompts are evaluated using their
`approval_label` for fine-grained control:
- Resource reads: `mcp_resource__{uri}` (e.g., `mcp_resource__file:///docs/*` to allow,
`mcp_resource__*` to deny all)
- Prompt invocations: `mcp__{server}__{prompt}` (e.g., `mcp__trusted__*` to allow,
`mcp__*` to require approval for all)
- Built-in tools continue to use `func_name` for backward compatibility
### Skills
Admin-curated system message skills injected at workstream startup. Skills also
include session configuration (model, temperature, auto-approve, token budget,
etc.) since workstream templates were merged into the skills system in v0.8.0.
- **Runtime behavior**: Skills are loaded once at session creation and injected
into the system message *before* user `instructions`. Skills set the baseline;
instructions customize per-workstream behavior.
- **Default skills**: All `is_default=true` skills auto-apply to new
workstreams, concatenated in alphabetical order by name. Use name prefixes
(e.g. `01-safety`, `02-style`) to control ordering.
- **Explicit selection**: `--template <name>` CLI flag, `template` field on
`POST /v1/api/workstreams/new`, console creation modal dropdown, scheduled task
config, and channel adapter config. An explicit skill *replaces* defaults.
- **Variables**: Three built-in placeholders resolved at load time:
`{{model}}` (active model name), `{{ws_id}}` (workstream ID),
`{{node_id}}` (server node ID). Unrecognized placeholders are kept as-is.
- **Runtime switching**: `/template <name>` to switch, `/template clear` to revert
to defaults, `/template` to show current. Persisted across resume.
- **Model-driven loading**: The `skill` built-in tool lets the model
discover and activate skills mid-conversation. `search` action finds skills
by query (auto-approved); `load` action activates by name (requires user
approval since it changes session behavior). Main session only.
- **Categories**: general, engineering, support, custom, mcp
- **Content limit**: 32 KB per skill (enforced on create/update)
- **Storage**: `prompt_templates` table (stores skills) with JSON `variables`
array. Migration 010 adds `template` column to `scheduled_tasks`.
- **MCP sync**: MCP server prompts auto-sync into the `prompt_templates` table
with `origin="mcp"`, `mcp_server` set, and `readonly=True`. Manual skills take
precedence on name collision. MCP-synced content updates reset `is_default` to
prevent compromised servers from injecting defaults. Admin UI shows origin badge
and disables edit/delete for MCP-sourced skills.
- **Spec fields**: Skills support the full Agent Skills standard frontmatter:
`name`, `description`, `license`, `compatibility`, `metadata` (author, version),
`allowed-tools`. The `license` and `compatibility` fields are preserved on import
and editable in the admin UI. See https://agentskills.io/specification.
- **Security scanning**: Skills are automatically scanned at creation and update
time. The scanner evaluates four risk axes: content risk (command execution,
data exfiltration), supply chain risk (pipe-to-shell, transitive installs),
vulnerability risk (prompt injection, insecure credentials), and declared
capability risk (from `allowed-tools` in SKILL.md). Results populate the `scan_status`
(safe/low/medium/high/critical) and `scan_report` (JSON breakdown) columns.
These fields are system-managed and cannot be overwritten via the admin API.
- **Discovery**: External skills can be discovered and installed from registries:
- `GET /v1/api/admin/skills/discover?q=...` — search the skills.sh registry
(or a custom registry via `skills.discovery_url` setting)
- `POST /v1/api/admin/skills/install` — install from skills.sh or GitHub.
Fetches the `SKILL.md` file, parses YAML frontmatter, creates a skill with
`origin="source"` and `readonly=True`, stores bundled resources.
- Admin UI: Skills tab has "Installed" / "Discover" pill toggle.
Discovery view has search bar, result cards, and "Import from GitHub" modal.
- SDK: `discover_skills(q)` and `install_skill(source, skill_id=..., url=...)`
on both Python and TypeScript console clients.
- **Runtime config on installed skills**: Installed (readonly) skills can have
their runtime configuration edited — model, temperature, reasoning effort,
token budget, max tokens, agent max turns, auto-approve, allowed tools,
and enabled flag. The server restricts updates to these fields only via
`_SKILL_RUNTIME_CONFIG_FIELDS` filtering; spec/content fields (name,
description, tags, license, compatibility, content, activation) remain
immutable. The admin UI shows "Save Config" instead of "Save" for these
skills. Audit action: `skill.update.config`.
- **Admin UI**: Create/Edit skill modals use a two-column spec manifest layout
(left: Identity / Manifest / Deployment; right: Skill Content editor with
monospace font). Runtime Config is a collapsible 3-column grid below.
License uses an SPDX identifier dropdown (MIT, Apache-2.0, GPL-3.0, etc.).
Installed skills show a cyan origin badge with source URL, spec fields are
disabled, and all collapsible sections auto-expand in view mode.
### Usage Tracking
Per-LLM-request token and tool call metrics:
- **Recording**: `on_status()` in `WebUI` records a `usage_event` after each
LLM response with prompt/completion tokens, cache tokens, tool call count,
model, ws_id
- **Prompt caching**: Anthropic automatic caching (`cache_control: ephemeral`)
and OpenAI extended retention (`prompt_cache_retention: 24h` for GPT-5.x)
are enabled by default. `cache_creation_tokens` and `cache_read_tokens` are
tracked per request in `usage_events` and surfaced in the Usage admin tab
- **Querying**: `GET /v1/api/admin/usage` with `group_by` (day/hour/model/user)
and time range filtering — includes cache token aggregates
- **Prometheus**: `turnstone_tokens_total{type="cache_creation|cache_read"}`
counters on `/metrics`
- **Pruning**: `prune_usage_events(retention_days=90)` and
`prune_audit_events(retention_days=365)` run automatically via the
console scheduler's periodic cleanup cycle
### Audit Logging
Append-only trail of admin actions:
- **Recording**: `record_audit()` helper called from all admin mutation handlers
- **Events captured**: user.create, user.delete, token.create, token.revoke,
channel.link, channel.unlink, role.create, role.update, role.delete,
role.assign, role.unassign, policy.create, policy.update, policy.delete,
template.create, template.update, template.delete,
skill.create, skill.update, skill.delete, org.update
- **Querying**: `GET /v1/api/admin/audit` with action/user/time filters + pagination
## Database Schema
Migration 008 adds 7 tables:
| Table | Purpose |
|-------|---------|
| `orgs` | Organizations (single default org for now) |
| `roles` | Named permission bundles (3 builtin + custom) |
| `user_roles` | User-to-role assignments (composite PK) |
| `tool_policies` | Per-tool approve/deny/ask rules |
| `prompt_templates` | Reusable system message skills |
| `usage_events` | Per-request token/tool/cache metrics |
| `audit_events` | Admin action log |
Also adds `org_id` column to `users` table.
## API Endpoints
All under `/v1/api/admin/` (requires `approve` scope + granular permission).
| Group | Endpoints | Permission |
|-------|-----------|------------|
| Users / Tokens / Channels | 9 (CRUD) | `admin.users` |
| Roles | 7 (CRUD + assignment) | `admin.roles` / `admin.users` |
| Orgs | 3 (list, get, update) | `admin.orgs` |
| Tool Policies | 4 (CRUD) | `admin.policies` |
| Skills | 4 (CRUD) | `admin.skills` |
| Schedules | 6 (CRUD + runs) | `admin.schedules` |
| Watches | 3 (list, create, cancel) | `admin.watches` |
| Usage | 1 (aggregated query) | `admin.usage` |
| Audit | 1 (paginated, filtered) | `admin.audit` |
Full OpenAPI spec at `/openapi.json` and Swagger UI at `/docs`.
## Admin Console UI
6 new tabs added to the admin panel (11 total):
- **Roles** — CRUD roles, permission checkbox grid, user role assignment modal
- **Policies** — CRUD tool policies with colored action badges (green/red/amber)
- **Skills** — CRUD skills with wide modal, textarea editor
- **Usage** — Summary readouts + CSS bar chart, time range + group-by selectors
- **Audit** — Filterable log with relative timestamps, load-more pagination
Tabs are permission-gated: hidden if the user lacks the required permission.
## SDK
Both Python and TypeScript console SDKs expose governance methods:
**Python** (`TurnstoneConsole` / `AsyncTurnstoneConsole`):
- `list_roles()`, `create_role()`, `update_role()`, `delete_role()`
- `list_user_roles()`, `assign_role()`, `unassign_role()`
- `list_orgs()`, `get_org()`, `update_org()`
- `list_policies()`, `create_policy()`, `update_policy()`, `delete_policy()`
- `list_templates()`, `create_template()`, `update_template()`, `delete_template()`
- `get_usage(since, group_by=...)`, `get_audit(action=..., limit=...)`
**TypeScript** (`TurnstoneConsole`):
- Same methods with camelCase naming and typed interfaces
## Security Considerations
- **Privilege escalation prevented**: `admin_assign_role` blocks self-assignment
and requires caller to hold a superset of the target role's permissions
- **Permission validation**: Role create/update validates permissions against
a 15-item allowlist (`_VALID_PERMISSIONS`)
- **Self-deletion blocked**: `admin_delete_user` rejects attempts to delete
your own account (matching the self-assignment guard on role endpoints)
- **Field allowlists**: Storage `update_*` methods filter fields against
allowlists (`_ROLE_MUTABLE`, `_POLICY_MUTABLE`, etc.) — handler bugs
cannot overwrite `role_id`, `builtin`, `created`, or other protected columns
- **Bootstrap safety**: `handle_auth_setup` fails and rolls back if admin role
assignment fails, preventing locked-out first user
- **API token RBAC**: `_authenticate_api_token` loads permissions from user's
roles, ensuring API tokens are subject to RBAC enforcement
- **Policy evaluation is fail-open**: If storage is unavailable, tool policies
degrade to the existing approval flow (not auto-approve)
- **Audit IP resolution**: `_audit_context()` prefers `X-Forwarded-For` for
client IP when behind a reverse proxy, falling back to `request.client.host`
+429
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
# Intent Validation (Judge)
> See also: [Judge Architecture diagram](diagrams/png/22-judge-architecture.png)
Intent validation provides advisory risk assessments for tool calls that require
human approval. An LLM judge evaluates each tool call and presents a structured
verdict alongside the approval prompt, helping users make informed decisions.
## Overview
When a tool call requires approval, the intent validation system runs a two-tier
evaluation:
1. **Heuristic tier** (instant) -- Pattern-based risk classification using a
rule table. Zero cost, sub-millisecond latency.
2. **LLM judge tier** (async) -- Semantic evaluation using an LLM with
read-only tool access. Runs on a daemon thread and delivers its verdict
progressively.
The verdict is purely advisory -- the user always makes the final decision.
The heuristic verdict is attached to the `approve_request` SSE event immediately.
The LLM verdict arrives later via an `intent_verdict` SSE event, allowing the
UI to show a spinner that resolves into a richer assessment. Both verdicts are
persisted to the `intent_verdicts` table for audit and future calibration.
---
## Configuration
### config.toml
```toml
[judge]
enabled = true
model = "" # empty = same as session model
provider = "" # empty = same as session provider
base_url = ""
api_key = ""
confidence_threshold = 0.7 # reserved for v2 smart approvals (not used in v1)
max_context_ratio = 0.5 # max % of judge context window for history
timeout = 60.0 # seconds (generous for local models)
read_only_tools = true # judge can use read_file/list_directory
```
All fields are optional. The judge is enabled by default; use `enabled = false`
(or `--no-judge` on the command line) to disable it.
### CLI flags
```
--judge / --no-judge Enable/disable (default: enabled)
--judge-model MODEL Model for judge
--judge-provider PROVIDER Provider for judge
--judge-timeout SECONDS LLM judge timeout (default: 60)
--judge-confidence FLOAT Confidence threshold (default: 0.7)
```
CLI flags override `config.toml` values.
---
## Judge Model Selection
- **Default (self-consistency)**: When `model` is empty, the session model
evaluates its own tool calls. Research shows self-consistency achieves
comparable accuracy to multi-agent debate at a fraction of the cost.
- **Cross-model**: Use a different model for the judge (e.g. local model for
the session, commercial model for the judge). Set `model` and `provider`
in the `[judge]` config section, or use `--judge-model` / `--judge-provider`
CLI flags.
- **Cross-provider**: When both `model` and `provider` are set, the judge
creates its own LLM client. You can optionally specify `base_url` and
`api_key` for non-default endpoints.
---
## Heuristic Rules
The heuristic tier scans a priority-ordered rule table (critical first, low
last) and returns the first matching rule. Each rule has:
- **Tool pattern**: fnmatch glob matched against `func_name` and `approval_label`
- **Argument patterns**: Regex patterns matched against the tool's primary
argument text (command string for bash, path for file tools, JSON for others)
- **Risk level, confidence, and recommendation**: Pre-assigned per rule
### Rule tiers (36 rules)
| Tier | Confidence | Recommendation | Examples |
|----------|-----------|----------------|----------|
| Critical | 0.90 | deny | `rm -rf /`, `mkfs`, `dd if=`, pipe-to-shell, chmod 777 on root, write/edit to `/etc/` or `.ssh/`, download-then-execute chains (`curl -o file && chmod +x && bash`) |
| High | 0.80 | review | `sudo`, `kill -9`, destructive git, DROP TABLE, write/edit secrets, HTTP mutations, `ssh`/`scp`, credential file access, browser automation + data export, transitive installs (`npx skills add`, `pip install git+`), control plane mutations (`crontab`, `systemctl enable/start/stop`) |
| Medium | 0.70 | review | Content ingestion pipelines (`curl \| python3`), interpreter execution (`python3 script.py`, `node build.js`), cloud CLI mutations (`az/gcloud/aws/kubectl/terraform` with create/delete/destroy verbs), package installs, `write_file`, MCP tools, Docker operations |
| Low | 0.85 | approve | `read_file`, `list_directory`, `search`, `recall`, `man`, `use_prompt`, `tool_search`, `read_resource`, `web_search`, read-only bash (`ls`, `cat`, `head`, `grep`, `find`, etc.) |
When no rule matches, the heuristic returns a default verdict: medium risk,
0.50 confidence, "review" recommendation.
The bash "read-only" rule handles simple pipelines and command chains by
splitting on `|`, `&&`, `||`, and `;`, then checking each segment individually.
### Rules derived from audit data
Several rules were calibrated using analysis of 25K public agent skill
security audits across three independent auditors:
- **`download-exec`**: Two-step download-then-execute chains that bypass the
existing `pipe-to-shell` rule. 8% of critical-tier skills use this pattern.
- **`transitive-install`**: Installing packages from URLs or git repos rather
than vetted registries. Socket flags this as supply-chain critical in 36%
of dangerous skills.
- **`browser-data-export`**: Browser automation combined with cookie/session/
profile export. OpenClaw treats browser profile access as operator-level
capability.
- **`control-plane-mutation`**: Persistent system changes (crontab, systemd)
that outlive the session. OpenClaw denies control-plane tools by default.
- **`content-ingestion`**: Fetch-and-process pipelines where remote content
feeds into an interpreter (Snyk W011 pattern — indirect prompt injection
surface).
- **`interpreter-exec`**: Running a script file whose content hasn't been
inspected. Opaque to command-level heuristics.
- **`cloud-infra-mutation`**: Distinguishes destructive cloud CLI verbs
(`create`, `delete`, `destroy`) from read-only ones (`show`, `list`, `get`).
---
## LLM Judge
The LLM judge runs on a daemon thread and performs a multi-turn evaluation:
1. **Context preparation**: Recent conversation history is FIFO-truncated to
fit within `max_context_ratio` of the judge's context window. The tool call
details (name, approval label, full arguments) are appended as a user message.
2. **Multi-turn loop** (up to 5 turns): The judge can use `read_file` and
`list_directory` to gather evidence before rendering its verdict. Each tool
result is appended to the conversation and the judge is called again. On
the final turn, tools are stripped and a forcing message instructs the
judge to render its verdict immediately.
3. **Verdict parsing**: The judge's final text response is parsed as JSON using
a four-stage strategy: direct parse, markdown code block extraction,
brace-counting, and regex field extraction as a last resort.
4. **Arbitration**: If the LLM verdict has higher confidence than the heuristic,
it replaces the heuristic via the `intent_verdict` SSE event.
### Read-only tools
When `read_only_tools` is enabled (default), the judge can use two tools:
- **`read_file`**: Read file contents (capped at 32 KB)
- **`list_directory`**: List directory entries (capped at 200 entries)
Security hardening blocks access to sensitive paths:
| Category | Blocked patterns |
|----------|-----------------|
| System directories | `/etc/`, `/root/`, `/proc/`, `/sys/`, `/dev/` |
| Credential directories | `.ssh`, `.gnupg`, `.aws`, `.config` |
| Key files | `*.pem`, `*.key`, `*.p12`, `*.pfx` |
### Timeout
The `timeout` setting (default 60 seconds) is a total budget across all judge
turns. Time is decremented after each LLM call. If the budget expires mid-turn,
the judge attempts to parse whatever partial response is available.
---
## Verdict Structure
Each verdict (heuristic or LLM) is an `IntentVerdict` with these fields:
| Field | Type | Description |
|------------------|------------|-------------|
| `verdict_id` | string | Unique identifier (UUID prefix) |
| `call_id` | string | Correlates with the tool call's `call_id` |
| `func_name` | string | Tool function name |
| `intent_summary` | string | One-sentence description of what the tool call does |
| `risk_level` | string | `"low"`, `"medium"`, `"high"`, or `"critical"` |
| `confidence` | float | 0.0--1.0, how certain the assessment is |
| `recommendation` | string | `"approve"`, `"review"`, or `"deny"` |
| `reasoning` | string | Explanation of the assessment |
| `evidence` | list[str] | Supporting evidence (rule name or file excerpts) |
| `tier` | string | `"heuristic"` or `"llm"` |
| `judge_model` | string | Model used (empty for heuristic tier) |
| `latency_ms` | int | Evaluation time in milliseconds |
---
## Session Integration
The judge is lazy-initialized on first use. When `ChatSession` prepares tool
calls for approval, it calls `_evaluate_intent()` which:
1. Instantiates `IntentJudge` if not already created
2. Extracts `func_name`, `func_args`, and `approval_label` from each pending item
3. Calls `judge.evaluate()` which returns heuristic verdicts immediately
4. Attaches each heuristic verdict to its item as `_heuristic_verdict`
5. The daemon thread runs the LLM judge and delivers results via `ui.on_intent_verdict()`
Sub-agents (plan agent, task agent) are exempt from intent validation -- they
always get full tool visibility without judge evaluation.
---
## Storage and Audit
All verdicts are persisted to the `intent_verdicts` table (migration 012):
- Heuristic verdicts are stored when the `approve_request` event is emitted
- LLM verdicts are stored when the `intent_verdict` event is delivered
- The `user_decision` column is updated when the user approves or denies
The console admin panel exposes verdict history via:
```
GET /v1/api/admin/verdicts?ws_id=&since=&until=&risk_level=&limit=100&offset=0
```
This endpoint requires the `admin.judge` permission.
---
## SSE Events
### `approve_request` (extended)
When the judge is active, `approve_request` items include a `verdict` field
with the heuristic verdict, and the event includes a `judge_pending` flag
indicating that an LLM verdict is in flight:
```json
{
"type": "approve_request",
"judge_pending": true,
"items": [
{
"call_id": "call_abc123",
"header": "bash: npm install express",
"preview": "",
"func_name": "bash",
"approval_label": "bash",
"needs_approval": true,
"error": null,
"verdict": {
"verdict_id": "a1b2c3d4e5f6",
"call_id": "call_abc123",
"func_name": "bash",
"intent_summary": "Package installation: npm install express",
"risk_level": "medium",
"confidence": 0.70,
"recommendation": "review",
"reasoning": "Command installs a software package which may modify the environment.",
"evidence": ["Matched rule: package-install"],
"tier": "heuristic",
"judge_model": "",
"latency_ms": 0
}
}
]
}
```
### `intent_verdict`
Delivered asynchronously when the LLM judge completes. The UI replaces the
heuristic verdict badge with the LLM verdict:
```json
{
"type": "intent_verdict",
"verdict_id": "f7e8d9c0b1a2",
"call_id": "call_abc123",
"func_name": "bash",
"intent_summary": "Install Express.js web framework via npm",
"risk_level": "medium",
"confidence": 0.85,
"recommendation": "review",
"reasoning": "The command installs express from npm. This is a well-known package but will modify node_modules and package.json.",
"evidence": ["Checked package.json — express is not currently a dependency"],
"tier": "llm",
"judge_model": "gpt-5",
"latency_ms": 2340
}
```
---
## Skill Scanner
Skills are evaluated by a content scanner at creation and update time. The
scanner runs the same class of pattern analysis as the heuristic rules but
operates on SKILL.md content rather than individual tool calls. It evaluates
four independent risk axes:
1. **Content risk** — command execution scope, external downloads, credential
handling, eval/exec, sudo, data exfiltration, browser automation
2. **Supply chain risk** — pipe-to-shell, transitive installs (`npx skills add`),
obfuscation, download-execute chains, executable URLs from untrusted domains
3. **Vulnerability risk** — prompt injection patterns, insecure credential
handling, third-party content exposure (indirect prompt injection surface)
4. **Declared capability risk** — parsed from `allowed-tools` in the skill's SKILL.md.
`Bash(*)` (unrestricted shell) is high risk. `Bash(git:*)` is low.
Read-only tools are safe.
Results are stored in `scan_status` (tier: safe/low/medium/high/critical) and
`scan_report` (JSON breakdown) on the `prompt_templates` table. These fields are
system-managed and not editable via the admin API.
The scanner is a pure function (~2ms) with no I/O. It runs synchronously in
the storage layer. Scanner failures are silently caught to never block skill
creation.
See [docs/governance.md](governance.md) for the skill governance model.
---
## Output Guard
The output guard evaluates tool execution results *after* execution but *before*
they enter the conversation context. It catches content-level threats that the
input heuristic (which evaluates commands) cannot see — prompt injection
payloads in fetched web pages, credential leakage in command output, encoded
payloads, and adversarial URLs.
The guard runs as a synchronous heuristic on the tool result text with a
configurable time budget (default 5 seconds). Pattern checks run in priority
order: prompt injection first, then credentials, then encoded payloads, then
lower-priority checks. If the budget is exhausted mid-evaluation, whatever
flags have been found so far are returned.
The guard **annotates but does not gate** — it surfaces warnings via the
`on_output_warning` SSE event and optionally redacts detected credentials
from the output before it enters the conversation.
### Detection priorities
| Priority | Category | Risk | Examples |
|----------|----------|------|----------|
| 1 | Prompt injection | high | Override phrases, role injection (`{"role":"system"}`), instruction override markers |
| 2 | Credential leakage | high | API keys, private key blocks, connection strings, `.env` format secrets |
| 3 | Encoded payloads | medium | Script data URIs, hex shellcode sequences |
| 4 | Adversarial URLs | medium | Cloud metadata endpoints, credential-bearing query parameters |
| 5 | System info disclosure | low | Private IP addresses, sensitive file paths |
### Credential redaction
When `redact_secrets` is enabled (default), detected credentials in tool output
are replaced with `[REDACTED:<type>]` markers before the output enters the
conversation. The original unredacted output is never shown to the model.
Redaction types: `api_key`, `private_key`, `password`, `secret`.
### Configuration
```toml
[judge]
output_guard = true # enable output evaluation (default)
redact_secrets = true # auto-redact detected credentials (default)
```
Configurable at runtime via the admin Settings tab.
### SSE event: `output_warning`
When the output guard detects risk signals, an `output_warning` SSE event is
emitted to the frontend:
```json
{
"type": "output_warning",
"call_id": "call_abc123",
"func_name": "bash",
"risk_level": "high",
"flags": ["credential_leak"],
"annotations": ["API key detected (sk-proj-...)"],
"output_length": 1024,
"redacted": true
}
```
The web UI renders this as an inline warning after the tool result. The CLI
shows a colored terminal warning. The MQ bridge forwards it as an
`OutputWarningEvent` for console subscribers.
Assessments are persisted to the `output_assessments` table for v2
calibration. Raw tool output is never stored — only metadata (flags, risk
level, annotations, output length, redaction status).
### Session-level skill scan warning
When a skill with `scan_status` of `high` or `critical` is loaded into a
session, a warning is emitted via `on_info`:
```
⚠ Skill 'my-skill' has scan status: high.
Review scan report in admin panel before enabling in production.
```
This ensures operators see a warning even if they missed the scan badge in
the admin skills tab.
---
## Data Collection for v2 Calibration
All three evaluation systems persist their assessments for future calibration:
| Table | Source | Key columns |
|-------|--------|-------------|
| `intent_verdicts` | Intent judge (heuristic + LLM) | `func_name`, `risk_level`, `confidence`, `user_decision` |
| `output_assessments` | Output guard | `func_name`, `risk_level`, `flags`, `redacted` |
| `prompt_templates` | Skill scanner | `scan_status`, `scan_report`, `scan_version` |
Run v1 with all tools requiring manual approval to build a local dataset.
In v2, calibration tooling will analyze this data to:
- Identify tools that are always approved (candidates for auto-approve policies)
- Detect false positives in heuristic rules (intent + output guard)
- Measure LLM judge accuracy against human decisions
- Recommend policy changes to reduce approval fatigue
- Tune output guard sensitivity per tool (e.g., `bash` output needs more
scrutiny than `read_file`)
Output assessments are queryable via `GET /v1/api/admin/output-assessments`
(requires `admin.judge` permission). Skills can be re-scanned via
`POST /v1/api/admin/skills/{id}/rescan` when the scanner is updated.
This data-driven approach means v1 is both useful on its own and a foundation
for automated policy tuning.
+193
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
# MCP Registry Integration
Turnstone integrates with the [official MCP Registry](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io) to let administrators discover and install MCP servers directly from the console admin panel.
## Overview
The MCP Registry is maintained by the [Agentic AI Foundation](https://www.linuxfoundation.org/press/linux-foundation-announces-the-formation-of-the-agentic-ai-foundation) (Linux Foundation) and serves as the canonical discovery layer for MCP servers. Turnstone queries its REST API (v0.1) for server metadata and provides a one-click install flow.
Three sources of MCP servers coexist in Turnstone:
| Source | Badge | Description |
|--------|-------|-------------|
| **Config** | `CONFIG` (magenta) | Imported from `config.toml` or JSON file. Read-only in admin UI. |
| **Manual** | `MANUAL` (cyan) | Added through the admin UI or API. Full CRUD. |
| **Registry** | `REGISTRY` (green) | Installed from the MCP Registry. Tracked by `registry_name`. |
## Admin UI
The MCP admin tab has two views, toggled by a pill selector:
### Servers View
Lists all installed MCP servers regardless of source. Each server shows:
- **Source badge** — CONFIG, MANUAL, or REGISTRY
- **Transport badge** — stdio or streamable-http
- **Tool/resource/prompt counts** — aggregated across cluster nodes
- **Per-node connection status** — connected (magenta dot), error (red), disabled (gray)
- **Actions** — Edit / Delete (DB-managed servers only)
Clicking a server name opens the detail modal. For registry-installed servers, the detail modal includes a **Registry** section showing the registry name, installed version, description, and website link.
### Registry View
Search and browse the MCP Registry. Switching to this view auto-loads a listing. Type a query and press Enter or click Search to filter.
Each result card shows:
- **Server name and description**
- **Source type badges** — remote (streamable-http), npm, pypi
- **Version number**
- **Install / Installed / Update button**
#### Install flow
- **One-click**: Remote servers with no required headers or URL variables install immediately — no modal, no form. The server is added to the database, all cluster nodes are notified, and a toast confirms success.
- **Modal**: Servers that require configuration (API keys, headers, URL template variables) or offer multiple install sources (both remote and package) open an install modal with:
- Source selector (radio group) — only shown when both remote and package are available
- Dynamic form fields for required/optional configuration
- Secret fields rendered as password inputs
## Configuration
### Registry URL
By default, Turnstone queries `https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io`. Override this for enterprise or private registries:
**Via admin Settings tab:**
Set `mcp.registry_url` to your registry's base URL.
**Via config.toml:**
```toml
[mcp]
registry_url = "https://registry.internal.example.com"
```
The resolution order is: database setting > config.toml > default.
## API Endpoints
Both endpoints require `admin.mcp` permission.
### Search
```
GET /v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/search?search=github&limit=20&cursor=...
```
Query parameters:
| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `search` | string | `""` | Search query. Empty returns a browsable listing. |
| `limit` | integer | `20` | Results per page (max 100). |
| `cursor` | string | — | Opaque cursor from `next_cursor` for pagination. |
The response annotates each server with `installed`, `installed_server_id`, `installed_version`, and `update_available` by cross-referencing the `mcp_servers` table.
### Install
```
POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/install
```
```json
{
"registry_name": "io.example/mcp-server",
"source": "remote",
"index": 0,
"name": "",
"variables": {},
"env": {"API_KEY": "sk-..."},
"headers": {"Authorization": "Bearer ..."}
}
```
| Field | Required | Description |
|-------|----------|-------------|
| `registry_name` | Yes | Server name from registry search results. |
| `source` | Yes | `"remote"` (streamable-http) or `"package"` (npm/pypi). |
| `index` | No | Which remote or package entry to use (default `0`). |
| `name` | No | Custom server name. Auto-derived from registry name if empty. |
| `variables` | No | Values for URL template `{var}` placeholders. |
| `env` | No | Environment variable values for package servers. |
| `headers` | No | Header values for remote servers. |
On success, the server is created in the database and all cluster nodes are automatically reloaded. Returns the created `McpServerDetail`.
Errors: `400` (validation), `404` (not found in registry), `409` (already installed or name collision), `502` (registry unreachable).
## SDK
### Python
```python
from turnstone.sdk.console import TurnstoneConsole
with TurnstoneConsole("http://localhost:8081", token="...") as client:
# Search
results = client.search_mcp_registry(q="github", limit=10)
for srv in results.servers:
print(f"{srv.name} v{srv.version} - {srv.description}")
# Install a remote server
detail = client.install_from_registry(
"io.example/mcp-server",
"remote",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer sk-..."},
)
print(f"Installed: {detail.name}")
```
### TypeScript
```typescript
import { TurnstoneConsole } from "@anthropic/turnstone-sdk";
const client = new TurnstoneConsole({
baseUrl: "http://localhost:8081",
token: "...",
});
// Search
const results = await client.searchMcpRegistry({ q: "github", limit: 10 });
for (const srv of results.servers) {
console.log(`${srv.name} v${srv.version} - ${srv.description}`);
}
// Install
const detail = await client.installFromRegistry({
registry_name: "io.example/mcp-server",
source: "remote",
headers: { Authorization: "Bearer sk-..." },
});
```
## Storage
Registry-installed servers are stored in the existing `mcp_servers` table with three additional columns (migration 019):
| Column | Type | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `registry_name` | TEXT (nullable, unique) | Reverse-DNS name from the registry (e.g. `io.example/mcp-server`). |
| `registry_version` | TEXT | Version at time of install. |
| `registry_meta` | TEXT (JSON) | Snapshot of description, title, website, icons for display. |
The partial unique index on `registry_name` prevents duplicate installs while allowing multiple non-registry servers with `NULL` registry_name.
## Package Type Support
| Registry Type | Transport | Command | Status |
|--------------|-----------|---------|--------|
| Remote (streamable-http) | `streamable-http` | — (URL-based) | Supported |
| `npm` | `stdio` | `npx -y @scope/package@version` | Supported |
| `pypi` | `stdio` | `uvx package==version` | Supported |
| `oci` | — | — | Not supported (no runtime available) |
| `nuget` | — | — | Not supported |
| `mcpb` | — | — | Not supported |
For `npm` and `pypi` packages, the corresponding runtime (`node`/`npx` or `python`/`uvx`) must be available on the cluster nodes. Connection failures due to missing runtimes appear in the per-node MCP status display.
+569
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,569 @@
# Structured Memory
> See also: [Memory Architecture diagram](diagrams/png/23-memory-architecture.png)
The structured memory system gives the AI persistent, typed, scoped memories
that survive across sessions and workstreams. Memories are automatically
surfaced in the system message via BM25 relevance scoring, so the model has
contextual recall without explicit search.
## Overview
Each memory has three dimensions:
- **Type** -- categorizes the memory's purpose
- **Scope** -- controls visibility boundaries
- **Name** -- unique identifier within a scope (snake_case, normalized)
### Memory types
| Type | Purpose |
|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
| `user` | User preferences, conventions, working style |
| `project` | Project-specific knowledge, architecture, patterns |
| `feedback` | Corrections, lessons learned, things to avoid |
| `reference` | Reference material, documentation, specifications |
### Memory scopes
| Scope | Visibility |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| `global` | Visible to all workstreams and users |
| `workstream` | Visible only within the originating workstream |
| `user` | Follows the authenticated user across workstreams |
A memory's identity is the tuple `(name, scope, scope_id)`. Saving a memory
with the same identity upserts -- updating content while preserving the ID.
### BM25 relevance injection
On every conversation turn, the system:
1. Fetches up to `fetch_limit` memories visible in the current scope
2. Extracts context from the last 3 user messages
3. Scores memories against that context using a BM25 index
4. Injects the top `relevance_k` memories into the system message as
`<memories>` XML tags
5. Appends a hint telling the model how many memories are in scope
This means the model always has its most relevant memories available without
explicit recall -- but can still use `memory(action='search')` for deeper
lookup.
### Nudges
The metacognition layer can nudge the model to save memories at appropriate
moments (e.g., after a correction or when resuming a workstream). Nudges are
rate-limited by `nudge_cooldown` and can be disabled entirely.
---
## Configuration
### config.toml
```toml
[memory]
relevance_k = 5 # top-k memories injected per turn
fetch_limit = 50 # max memories fetched from storage for scoring
max_content = 32768 # max content length per memory (characters)
nudge_cooldown = 300 # minimum seconds between memory nudges
nudges = true # enable/disable metacognitive nudges
```
All fields are optional. Defaults are shown above.
---
## Tool Usage
The `memory` tool supports four actions:
### save
Store or update a memory.
```json
{
"action": "save",
"name": "project_architecture",
"content": "The project uses a hexagonal architecture with...",
"description": "Core architecture patterns",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global"
}
```
| Parameter | Required | Default | Description |
|---------------|----------|-------------|------------------------------------------|
| `name` | yes | -- | Snake_case identifier (max 256 chars) |
| `content` | yes | -- | Memory content (max `max_content` chars) |
| `description` | no | `""` | Short description for relevance matching |
| `type` | no | `"project"` | One of: user, project, feedback, reference |
| `scope` | no | `"global"` | One of: global, workstream, user |
### search
Find memories by query (BM25 full-text search).
```json
{
"action": "search",
"query": "authentication patterns",
"type": "project",
"limit": 10
}
```
| Parameter | Required | Default | Description |
|-----------|----------|---------|--------------------------------------|
| `query` | yes | -- | Search query |
| `type` | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `limit` | no | `20` | Max results (capped at 50) |
### delete
Remove a memory by name.
```json
{
"action": "delete",
"name": "outdated_pattern",
"scope": "global"
}
```
| Parameter | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|----------|------------|--------------------------|
| `name` | yes | -- | Memory name to delete |
| `scope` | no | `"global"` | Scope of the memory |
### list
List all memories with optional filters.
```json
{
"action": "list",
"type": "feedback",
"limit": 50
}
```
| Parameter | Required | Default | Description |
|-----------|----------|---------|----------------------------|
| `type` | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `limit` | no | `20` | Max results (capped at 50) |
---
## Server API
Four endpoints on the server for programmatic memory access.
### `GET /v1/api/memories`
List memories with optional filters.
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|------------------------------|
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by memory type |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope ID |
| `limit` | int | no | `100` | Max results (capped at 200) |
When `scope=user` and `scope_id` is omitted, the authenticated user's ID is
used automatically.
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"memories": [
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "project_architecture",
"description": "Core architecture patterns",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "The project uses a hexagonal architecture...",
"created": "2026-03-10T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-12T14:30:00"
}
],
"total": 1
}
```
---
### `POST /v1/api/memories`
Save or upsert a structured memory.
**Request body:**
```json
{
"name": "deployment_process",
"content": "Deploy via GitHub Actions. Staging auto-deploys on push to main.",
"description": "CI/CD deployment workflow",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": ""
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|--------------|--------|----------|-------------|--------------------------------------|
| `name` | string | yes | -- | Memory name (max 256 chars) |
| `content` | string | yes | -- | Memory content (max 65536 chars) |
| `description`| string | no | `""` | Short description for search ranking |
| `type` | string | no | `"project"` | One of: user, project, feedback, reference |
| `scope` | string | no | `"global"` | One of: global, workstream, user |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Scope qualifier (auto-resolved for user scope) |
**Response (created):** `201`
```json
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "deployment_process",
"description": "CI/CD deployment workflow",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "Deploy via GitHub Actions...",
"created": "2026-03-14T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-14T10:00:00"
}
```
**Response (updated):** `200` -- same schema, returned when a memory with the
same `(name, scope, scope_id)` already existed.
**Errors:**
| Status | Condition |
|--------|------------------------------------|
| 400 | Missing name, empty content, invalid type/scope, content too long |
---
### `POST /v1/api/memories/search`
Search memories by query. Uses POST for the request body but is non-mutating
(requires only `read` scope).
**Request body:**
```json
{
"query": "authentication",
"type": "project",
"scope": "",
"scope_id": "",
"limit": 20
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|--------------------------------|
| `query` | string | yes | -- | Search query |
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope ID |
| `limit` | int | no | `20` | Max results (capped at 50) |
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"memories": [
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "auth_patterns",
"description": "Authentication architecture",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "JWT tokens with HS256...",
"created": "2026-03-10T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-12T14:30:00"
}
],
"total": 1
}
```
---
### `DELETE /v1/api/memories/{name}`
Delete a memory by name and scope.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------------------|
| `name` | string | Memory name |
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|------------|---------------------|
| `scope` | string | no | `"global"` | Scope of the memory |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Scope qualifier |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{"status": "ok", "name": "deployment_process"}
```
**Response (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Memory 'deployment_process' not found"}
```
---
## Console Admin API
Four admin endpoints for cross-workstream memory management. All require the
`admin.memories` permission.
### `GET /v1/api/admin/memories`
List memories across all scopes (no automatic scope resolution).
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|------------------------------|
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope ID |
| `limit` | int | no | `100` | Max results (capped at 200) |
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"memories": [
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "project_architecture",
"description": "Core architecture patterns",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "The project uses...",
"created": "2026-03-10T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-12T14:30:00"
}
],
"total": 1
}
```
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/memories/search`
Search memories by query (uses query parameters, not POST body).
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|-------------------------------|
| `q` | string | yes | -- | Search query |
| `type` | string | no | `""` | Filter by type |
| `scope` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope |
| `scope_id` | string | no | `""` | Filter by scope ID |
| `limit` | int | no | `20` | Max results (capped at 50) |
**Response:** `200` -- same schema as `GET /v1/api/admin/memories`.
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/memories/{memory_id}`
Get a single memory by ID.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-------------|--------|------------------------|
| `memory_id` | string | Memory UUID |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{
"memory_id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...",
"name": "project_architecture",
"description": "Core architecture patterns",
"type": "project",
"scope": "global",
"scope_id": "",
"content": "The project uses...",
"created": "2026-03-10T10:00:00",
"updated": "2026-03-12T14:30:00"
}
```
**Response (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Memory not found"}
```
---
### `DELETE /v1/api/admin/memories/{memory_id}`
Delete a memory by ID. Records an audit event (`memory.delete`).
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-------------|--------|------------------------|
| `memory_id` | string | Memory UUID |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{"status": "ok"}
```
**Response (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Memory not found"}
```
---
## SDK
### Python
The server SDK uses `mem_type` (not `type`) to avoid shadowing the Python
builtin.
```python
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneServer
with TurnstoneServer("http://localhost:8080", token="tok_xxx") as client:
# Save a memory
mem = client.save_memory(
"api_conventions",
"All endpoints use /v1/ prefix. JSON responses.",
description="API design patterns",
mem_type="project",
scope="global",
)
print(mem.memory_id)
# Search memories
results = client.search_memories("authentication", mem_type="project", limit=10)
for m in results.memories:
print(f"{m['name']}: {m['description']}")
# List memories
all_mems = client.list_memories(mem_type="feedback", limit=50)
# Delete a memory
client.delete_memory("api_conventions", scope="global")
```
Console admin SDK:
```python
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneConsole
with TurnstoneConsole("http://localhost:9090", token="tok_xxx") as admin:
# List all memories (admin view, no scope auto-resolution)
result = admin.list_memories(scope="global", limit=100)
# Search
result = admin.search_memories("architecture", mem_type="project")
# Get by ID
mem = admin.get_memory("a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...")
# Delete by ID
admin.delete_memory("a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...")
```
### TypeScript
```typescript
import { TurnstoneServer } from "@turnstone/sdk";
const client = new TurnstoneServer({
baseUrl: "http://localhost:8080",
token: "tok_xxx",
});
// Save a memory
const mem = await client.saveMemory({
name: "api_conventions",
content: "All endpoints use /v1/ prefix. JSON responses.",
description: "API design patterns",
type: "project",
scope: "global",
});
// Search memories
const results = await client.searchMemories({
query: "authentication",
type: "project",
limit: 10,
});
// List memories
const all = await client.listMemories({ type: "feedback", limit: 50 });
// Delete a memory
await client.deleteMemory("api_conventions", { scope: "global" });
```
Console admin SDK:
```typescript
import { TurnstoneConsole } from "@turnstone/sdk";
const admin = new TurnstoneConsole({
baseUrl: "http://localhost:9090",
token: "tok_xxx",
});
// List, search, get, delete by ID
const mems = await admin.listMemories({ scope: "global" });
const found = await admin.searchMemories({ q: "auth", limit: 20 });
const one = await admin.getMemory("a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...");
await admin.deleteMemory("a1b2c3d4-e5f6-...");
```
---
## Storage
Memories are stored in the `structured_memories` table (migration 013).
The unique constraint on `(name, scope, scope_id)` ensures upsert semantics.
The name is normalized on save: lowercased, hyphens and spaces replaced with
underscores.
## Architecture
See [Memory Architecture diagram](diagrams/png/23-memory-architecture.png) for
the full data flow covering the session tool path, API path, admin path, and
BM25 relevance injection.
+429
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,429 @@
# OpenID Connect (OIDC) Single Sign-On
Turnstone supports OpenID Connect for federated authentication, allowing
users to log in with their existing corporate identity provider instead of
managing a separate password. OIDC is opt-in: when configured, the login
screen shows a "Continue with SSO" button alongside the existing
username/password form. When not configured, the login experience is
unchanged.
Any OIDC-compliant provider works: Google, Okta, Azure AD, Keycloak,
Auth0, OneLogin, and others that publish a
`.well-known/openid-configuration` discovery document.
---
## Prerequisites
1. A registered **confidential** OIDC client at your identity provider
2. The client's redirect URI must include:
`https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback`
3. A local admin user must exist in Turnstone (complete the initial setup
wizard before enabling OIDC)
---
## Configuration
OIDC is configured via environment variables (preferred) or the `[oidc]`
section of `config.toml`. Environment variables take precedence when both
are set.
| Variable | Required | Default | Description |
|----------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER` | Yes | — | Issuer URL (e.g. `https://accounts.google.com`). Must serve `/.well-known/openid-configuration`. |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID` | Yes | — | OAuth 2.0 client ID from your provider |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` | Yes | — | OAuth 2.0 client secret (confidential client) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_SCOPES` | No | `openid email profile` | Space-separated OAuth scopes to request |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME` | No | `SSO` | Display name for the login button (e.g. "Google", "Okta") |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` | No | — | ID token claim containing role/group values (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` | No | — | Mapping from claim values to Turnstone role IDs (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Set to `false` to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens and config-file tokens still work. |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | No | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Recommended when running behind a reverse proxy. When unset, derived from the request Host header. |
OIDC is enabled when all three required fields (issuer, client ID, client
secret) are non-empty. If any is missing, OIDC is silently disabled and
the login screen shows only the password form.
### Reverse Proxy / Load Balancer
When Turnstone runs behind a reverse proxy, the internal `Host` header may
not match the externally-reachable URL. Set `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE`
to the public origin so the redirect URI sent to the identity provider is
correct:
```bash
TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE=https://app.example.com
```
The resulting callback URL will be
`https://app.example.com/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback` — register this as the
authorized redirect URI in your identity provider.
### config.toml alternative
```toml
[oidc]
issuer = "https://accounts.google.com"
client_id = "your-client-id"
client_secret = "your-client-secret"
scopes = "openid email profile"
provider_name = "Google"
role_claim = "groups"
password_enabled = true
redirect_base = "https://app.example.com"
[oidc.role_map]
admin = "builtin-admin"
engineering = "builtin-operator"
```
---
## Provider-Specific Setup
### Google
1. Go to [Google Cloud Console](https://console.cloud.google.com/) >
**APIs & Services** > **Credentials**
2. Click **Create Credentials** > **OAuth 2.0 Client ID**
3. Application type: **Web application**
4. Add authorized redirect URI:
`https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback`
5. Copy the **Client ID** and **Client secret**
```bash
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://accounts.google.com
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=123456789.apps.googleusercontent.com
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=GOCSPX-...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME=Google
```
### Okta
1. In the Okta Admin Console, go to **Applications** > **Create App
Integration**
2. Sign-in method: **OIDC - OpenID Connect**
3. Application type: **Web Application**
4. Add sign-in redirect URI:
`https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback`
5. Note the **Issuer** (your Okta domain, e.g.
`https://dev-123456.okta.com`)
```bash
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://dev-123456.okta.com
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=0oaXXXXXXXXXXXXX
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME=Okta
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=groups
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,everyone:builtin-operator"
```
### Azure AD (Entra ID)
1. In the Azure Portal, go to **App registrations** > **New registration**
2. Redirect URI: **Web** >
`https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback`
3. Under **Certificates & secrets**, create a new **Client secret** and
copy the value immediately
4. The issuer URL is
`https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/v2.0`
```bash
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://login.microsoftonline.com/YOUR_TENANT_ID/v2.0
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME="Azure AD"
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=roles
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="Admin:builtin-admin,User:builtin-operator"
```
### Keycloak
1. In the Keycloak Admin Console, select your **Realm**
2. Go to **Clients** > **Create client**
3. Client type: **OpenID Connect**
4. Set **Client authentication** to **On** (confidential)
5. Add valid redirect URI:
`https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback`
6. The issuer URL is
`https://keycloak.example.com/realms/your-realm`
```bash
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://keycloak.example.com/realms/your-realm
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=turnstone
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME=Keycloak
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=realm_access.roles
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,operator:builtin-operator"
```
---
## Role Mapping
OIDC role mapping assigns Turnstone roles to users based on claims in the
ID token. This is optional — without it, OIDC users are provisioned with
the `builtin-viewer` role (read-only access) by default.
### Configuration
Set `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` to the name of the claim in the ID token
that contains the user's group or role memberships. Then set
`TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` to map claim values to Turnstone role IDs.
The role map is a comma-separated list of `claim_value:turnstone_role`
pairs:
```bash
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=groups
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,engineering:builtin-operator,viewer:builtin-viewer"
```
### Behavior
- **Synced on every login**: roles are added when new claim values appear,
and OIDC-assigned roles are revoked when the corresponding claim value
is no longer present. Roles assigned manually (or by other sources) are
never touched — only roles with `assigned_by="oidc"` are subject to
revocation.
- **List or string**: the claim value can be a JSON array
(`["admin", "engineering"]`) or a single string (`"admin"`). Both are
handled correctly.
- **Unknown values**: claim values not present in the role map are silently
ignored.
- **Missing roles**: if the role map references a Turnstone role ID that
does not exist in the database, the assignment is skipped (no error).
- **Evaluated on every login**: roles are checked and applied each time
the user authenticates via OIDC, so new group memberships are picked
up on the next login.
### Built-in Roles
| Role ID | Permissions |
|---------|-------------|
| `builtin-admin` | All permissions |
| `builtin-operator` | read, write, workstreams.create, workstreams.close |
| `builtin-viewer` | read |
---
## User Provisioning
When a user logs in via OIDC for the first time, Turnstone automatically
creates a local user account:
1. The OIDC identity (`issuer` + `sub` claim) is stored in the
`oidc_identities` table and linked to the new user
2. The **username** is derived from the `preferred_username` claim,
falling back to the email local part, with deduplication if needed
3. The **display name** comes from the `name` claim, falling back to
`preferred_username` or email
4. The user's password hash is set to a sentinel value (`!oidc`) — OIDC
users cannot log in with a password
On subsequent logins, the existing user is matched by `(issuer, sub)` and
the `last_login` timestamp is updated. Role mapping is re-evaluated on
every login.
---
## OIDC-Only Mode
To enforce OIDC for all logins and hide the password form, set:
```bash
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED=false
```
In this mode the login screen shows only the "Continue with SSO" button.
The password form, token toggle, and sign-in button are all hidden.
All username/password logins are blocked at the API level, including
admin accounts.
The first admin account must be created via the setup wizard (with a
password) before OIDC is enabled. The setup wizard always works
regardless of this setting because it is only available when zero users
exist in the database.
API token login (`POST /v1/api/auth/login` with a `ts_` token) and
config-file tokens (`Authorization: Bearer tok_xxx`) continue to work
regardless of this setting. OIDC-only mode affects password-based
authentication only.
---
## Login Flow
Both the server and console support OIDC login. The flow is identical:
1. The browser fetches `GET /v1/api/auth/status` at page load
2. If the response includes `oidc_enabled: true`, the login screen shows
a "Continue with {provider_name}" button
3. Clicking the button navigates to `GET /v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize`
4. Turnstone generates a state token, nonce, and PKCE verifier, stores
them in the database, and redirects the browser to the identity
provider's authorization endpoint
5. The user authenticates at the identity provider
6. The IdP redirects back to
`GET /v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=...`
7. Turnstone validates the state, exchanges the authorization code for
tokens using the PKCE verifier, validates the ID token against the
provider's JWKS public keys, provisions or matches the user, and
issues a Turnstone JWT
8. The browser is redirected to `/?oidc_success=1` with the JWT set in
an `HttpOnly` session cookie
9. The browser JavaScript detects the `oidc_success` query parameter,
strips it from the URL, hides the login overlay, and calls
`onLoginSuccess()` to initialize the application
---
## API Endpoints
| Method | Path | Auth | Description |
|--------|------|------|-------------|
| GET | `/v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize` | Public | Redirects to identity provider |
| GET | `/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback` | Public | Handles IdP callback, issues JWT |
Both endpoints are public (no authentication required) because they are
part of the login flow itself.
### Auth status response
When OIDC is enabled, `GET /v1/api/auth/status` includes additional
fields:
```json
{
"auth_enabled": true,
"has_users": true,
"setup_required": false,
"oidc_enabled": true,
"oidc_provider_name": "Google",
"password_enabled": true
}
```
---
## Database Schema
Migration 018 creates two tables:
```sql
CREATE TABLE oidc_identities (
issuer TEXT NOT NULL,
subject TEXT NOT NULL,
user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
email TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created TEXT NOT NULL,
last_login TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (issuer, subject)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_oidc_identities_user_id ON oidc_identities(user_id);
CREATE TABLE oidc_pending_states (
state TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
code_verifier TEXT NOT NULL,
audience TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
```
The `oidc_identities` table links an OIDC subject (identified by
`issuer` + `subject`) to a Turnstone `user_id`. A single user can have
multiple OIDC identities (e.g. from different providers).
The `oidc_pending_states` table stores authorization flow state for
callback validation. Entries are automatically cleaned up after 5 minutes.
---
## Security Notes
- **Authorization Code Flow with PKCE**: the recommended OAuth 2.0 flow
for web applications. PKCE prevents authorization code interception
attacks even without a client secret (though the client secret is still
used for additional security).
- **ID token validation**: all tokens are validated using the provider's
JWKS public keys (RS256 or ES256). The signature, issuer, audience,
and expiry are all checked.
- **State parameter**: a cryptographically random state token prevents
CSRF attacks on the callback endpoint. The state is stored server-side
and verified on callback.
- **Nonce**: a random nonce is included in the authorization request and
verified in the ID token to prevent replay attacks.
- **Client secret**: never leaves the server — it is only used in the
server-to-IdP token exchange, not exposed to the browser.
- **OIDC users cannot use password login**: the sentinel password hash
(`!oidc`) ensures `verify_password()` always rejects password attempts
for OIDC-provisioned users.
- **Rate limiting**: the callback endpoint shares the login rate limiter
(5 attempts per 5-minute window per IP).
- **State TTL**: pending authorization states expire after 5 minutes.
Expired states are lazily cleaned up on each callback.
- **Setup guard**: OIDC login requires at least one local admin user to
exist. This ensures the initial admin account is always created via the
setup wizard with a password, not hijacked by an external identity.
---
## Troubleshooting
### "OIDC not configured"
All three required environment variables must be set:
`TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER`, `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`, and
`TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`. Check that none are empty or
whitespace-only.
### "Login session expired"
The authorization flow must complete within 5 minutes. If the user takes
too long at the identity provider, the pending state expires. Try again.
### "Initial setup required"
OIDC login is blocked until at least one local admin user exists.
Complete the setup wizard first (navigate to the Turnstone URL and follow
the prompts to create an admin user with a password).
### Discovery fails at startup
Check that the issuer URL is reachable from the Turnstone server and
serves a valid `/.well-known/openid-configuration` document. The server
logs the discovery attempt at startup:
```
OIDC discovery failed for https://your-issuer.example.com: ...
```
OIDC is automatically disabled when discovery fails. Restart the server
after fixing the connectivity issue.
### Redirect URI mismatch
The redirect URI configured at the identity provider must exactly match
`https://your-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback`. Common issues:
- **Scheme mismatch**: the redirect uses `https://` — make sure TLS is
configured or a reverse proxy sets the `X-Forwarded-Proto` header
- **Port mismatch**: if running on a non-standard port, include it in
the redirect URI
- **Path mismatch**: the path must include the `/v1` API version prefix
### User not assigned expected roles
Check that:
1. `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` matches the exact claim name in the ID
token (case-sensitive)
2. `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` maps the correct claim values to valid
Turnstone role IDs
3. The roles referenced in the map exist in the database (check the
admin panel > Roles tab)
4. The identity provider is configured to include the claim in the ID
token (some providers require explicit scope or claim configuration)
+288
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
# OpenShell Sandbox Integration
Turnstone can run inside an [OpenShell](https://github.com/NVIDIA/OpenShell)
sandbox for kernel-enforced security boundaries around tool execution. OpenShell
provides four layers of defense that Turnstone's application-level safety model
does not cover:
| Layer | Mechanism | What it prevents |
|-------|-----------|------------------|
| Filesystem | Landlock | Writes to `/etc`, `~/.ssh`, system paths |
| Network | Network namespace + seccomp + HTTP CONNECT proxy | Connections to unlisted hosts |
| Process | `setuid` drop + verification | Privilege escalation to root |
| Credentials | Proxy-level secret resolution | API keys in sandbox memory |
Turnstone's own safety layers (human approval, intent judge, tool policies,
output guard) remain active inside the sandbox and handle threats at the semantic
level -- what the LLM *means* to do with its legitimate access.
> See also: [Security and Authentication](security.md),
> [Intent Validation](judge.md), [Governance](governance.md)
---
## Quick Start
```bash
# Run turnstone-server in an OpenShell sandbox
openshell sandbox run \
--policy deploy/openshell/turnstone-policy.yaml \
--workdir /path/to/project \
-- python3 -m turnstone.server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
```
With inference routing (API keys never enter the sandbox):
```bash
openshell sandbox run \
--policy deploy/openshell/turnstone-policy.yaml \
--inference-routes deploy/openshell/routes.yaml \
--workdir /path/to/project \
-- python3 -m turnstone.server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 \
--base-url https://inference.local
```
The `inference.local` hostname is intercepted by the OpenShell proxy before
network policy evaluation -- no network policy entry is needed for it.
---
## Policy Files
### `deploy/openshell/turnstone-policy.yaml`
The main sandbox policy. Covers filesystem, process, and network rules.
### `deploy/openshell/routes.yaml`
Inference routing configuration. Maps `inference.local` to real LLM API
backends. Uncomment and configure the provider(s) you use.
---
## Filesystem Policy
The policy uses Landlock (Linux 5.13+) for kernel-enforced filesystem access
control. Paths are locked at sandbox creation and cannot be changed at runtime.
| Path | Access | Purpose |
|------|--------|---------|
| `--workdir` | read-write | Project files (auto-added via `include_workdir`) |
| `/tmp` | read-write | Bash tool temp scripts, eval workdirs |
| `/dev/null` | read-write | Shell redirections (`2>/dev/null`) |
| `/var/log` | read-write | Log files |
| `/usr`, `/lib`, `/lib64` | read-only | Python runtime, installed packages |
| `/etc` | read-only | System config, SSL certificates |
| `/proc`, `/dev/urandom` | read-only | Process info, entropy |
| `~/.config/turnstone` | read-only | Config file (writes go to database) |
Landlock runs in `best_effort` mode by default -- degrades gracefully on kernels
without Landlock support. Set `compatibility: hard_requirement` for production
hardened deployments.
---
## Network Policy
Default-deny. Only explicitly listed host:port pairs are reachable. All child
processes (MCP servers, bash commands, grep) inherit the network namespace and
cannot bypass the proxy.
### Included endpoints
| Policy | Hosts | Purpose |
|--------|-------|---------|
| `openai_api` | `api.openai.com` | OpenAI LLM API |
| `anthropic_api` | `api.anthropic.com` | Anthropic LLM API |
| `tavily_api` | `api.tavily.com` | Web search fallback |
| `skills_registry` | `skills.sh` | Skill discovery |
| `github_api` | `api.github.com` (read-only L7), `raw.githubusercontent.com` | Skill fetch, GitHub API |
| `mcp_registry` | `registry.modelcontextprotocol.io` (read-only L7) | MCP server discovery |
| `redis` | `127.0.0.1:6379` | Message queue |
| `web_fetch_common` | readthedocs, python docs, GitHub Pages, PyPI, npm, Stack Overflow, Wikipedia | Curated web_fetch domains |
| `bash_network_tools` | Same as `web_fetch_common` | curl/wget from bash tool |
| `package_registries` | `pypi.org`, `files.pythonhosted.org` | pip/uv package installs |
| `git_operations` | `github.com`, `gitlab.com` (L7: clone/fetch only, no push) | Git read-only operations |
### L7 enforcement
Endpoints marked with `protocol: rest` and `tls: terminate` get HTTP-level
inspection. The proxy TLS-terminates using an ephemeral per-sandbox CA, parses
each request, and evaluates method + path against the rules.
The `github_api`, `mcp_registry`, and `git_operations` policies use L7
enforcement:
- **GitHub API / MCP Registry**: `access: read-only` -- only GET, HEAD, OPTIONS
allowed
- **Git operations**: explicit rules allowing only `info/refs` (GET) and
`git-upload-pack` (POST) -- clone and fetch work, push is blocked
### Commented-out sections
The policy includes commented blocks for optional integrations. Uncomment and
configure as needed:
- **OIDC** -- add your identity provider's hostname
- **Discord** -- `discord.com`, `gateway.discord.gg`, `cdn.discordapp.com`
- **MCP HTTP servers** -- any MCP servers using streamable-http transport
---
## Customizing the Domain Allowlist
The `web_fetch` tool lets the LLM fetch arbitrary public URLs, but OpenShell
cannot allow "all HTTPS" -- bare wildcard hosts are rejected by policy
validation. Instead, the policy ships with a curated set of common reference
domains.
To add domains your workloads need:
```yaml
# In turnstone-policy.yaml, under web_fetch_common.endpoints:
- host: docs.example.com
port: 443
# Also add to bash_network_tools.endpoints if curl/wget should reach it:
- host: docs.example.com
port: 443
```
Wildcard patterns are supported:
- `*.example.com` -- matches one subdomain level (e.g. `api.example.com`)
- `**.example.com` -- matches any depth (e.g. `deep.sub.example.com`)
Unlisted domains return connection errors, which the LLM handles gracefully by
telling the user it cannot reach that site.
---
## Inference Routing
Inference routing keeps real API keys completely outside the sandbox. The
sandbox process only sees opaque placeholder tokens in its environment
(`openshell:resolve:env:ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`). The proxy rewrites these to real
credentials on the wire before forwarding to the upstream API.
### Setup
1. Edit `deploy/openshell/routes.yaml` -- uncomment your provider:
```yaml
routes:
# OpenAI
- name: inference.local
endpoint: https://api.openai.com/v1
model: gpt-5
provider_type: openai
protocols:
- openai_chat_completions
- model_discovery
api_key_env: OPENAI_API_KEY
# Or Anthropic
- name: inference.local
endpoint: https://api.anthropic.com
model: claude-sonnet-4-6
provider_type: anthropic
protocols:
- anthropic_messages
api_key_env: ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
```
2. Start with `--inference-routes` and point turnstone at `inference.local`:
```bash
openshell sandbox run \
--inference-routes deploy/openshell/routes.yaml \
--base-url https://inference.local \
...
```
3. When inference routing is active, the `openai_api` and `anthropic_api`
network policies can be removed from the sandbox policy -- the proxy handles
LLM traffic on a separate code path that bypasses OPA entirely.
### Local model servers
For local servers (vLLM, llama.cpp) with no authentication, omit both
`api_key` and `api_key_env` from the route config. No credential resolution
is needed.
---
## MCP Server Subprocesses
MCP servers using stdio transport are spawned as child processes of turnstone.
They automatically inherit all sandbox constraints:
- **Network namespace** -- kernel-level, cannot be bypassed
- **Landlock filesystem** -- kernel-level, cannot be relaxed
- **Seccomp socket filter** -- kernel-level, inherited on fork
No per-subprocess policy entries are needed for these constraints. However, if
an MCP server makes outbound network requests (through the proxy), its binary
must appear in a `binaries[]` entry for the relevant network policy. The proxy
identifies the requesting process via `/proc/<pid>/exe` (not `argv[0]`, which
is spoofable).
Example for a Python-based MCP server that calls an external API:
```yaml
mcp_external_api:
name: mcp-external
endpoints:
- host: api.example.com
port: 443
binaries:
- path: /usr/bin/python3*
- path: /usr/local/bin/python3*
```
MCP servers using streamable-http transport are remote -- they need a network
policy entry for their host:port but no binary entry (the Python process making
the HTTP call is already covered by the standard `python3*` binary entries).
---
## Security Model: Which Layer Enforces What
```
OpenShell (infrastructure) Turnstone (application)
───────────────────────────── ──────────────────────────────
Filesystem access Landlock kernel enforcement (no enforcement)
Network egress Netns + seccomp + proxy + OPA SSRF check on web_fetch
Credentials Placeholder injection + proxy Output guard redaction
Privilege level setuid drop + verification (no enforcement)
Tool semantics (no visibility) Heuristic + LLM judge
Tool policies (no visibility) fnmatch admin policies
Prompt injection (no visibility) Output guard detection
Human approval (no visibility) Approval gate + "always"
```
OpenShell constrains what the process can physically reach. Turnstone constrains
what the LLM does with its legitimate access. Neither layer is sufficient alone:
- Without OpenShell: a bash command can `curl` secrets to any endpoint, write to
`/etc/crontab`, or read `~/.ssh/id_rsa` -- all gated only by human approval
- Without Turnstone: the LLM can `rm -rf` the entire workdir, run destructive
commands, or consume prompt injection payloads -- all within the sandbox's
allowed scope
---
## Hardening Checklist
For production deployments:
- [ ] Set `landlock.compatibility: hard_requirement`
- [ ] Enable inference routing (removes API keys from sandbox)
- [ ] Remove `openai_api`/`anthropic_api` network policies when using inference
routing (traffic goes through the router, not direct)
- [ ] Review and trim `web_fetch_common` domains to your actual needs
- [ ] Remove `package_registries` policy if pip/uv installs are not needed
- [ ] Add your OIDC provider endpoint if using SSO
- [ ] Set Redis `allowed_ips` to your actual Redis host if not localhost
- [ ] Consider removing `bash_network_tools` entirely if bash should not have
network access
+200
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
# PgBouncer Connection Pooling
Turnstone cluster deployments share a single PostgreSQL instance across
all server nodes, bridge processes, and the console. Each process
maintains a small connection pool (2 base + 3 overflow = 5 max). At
scale this adds up — a 100-node cluster opens up to 500 connections,
and a 1000-node cluster up to 5,000.
PostgreSQL's default `max_connections` is 100, and each real connection
allocates ~510 MB of backend memory. PgBouncer sits between turnstone
and PostgreSQL, multiplexing thousands of lightweight client connections
down to a small number of real database connections.
---
## Why PgBouncer works well with turnstone
All turnstone database operations are short-burst queries: acquire a
connection, execute 13 statements, commit, release. No operation holds
a connection for more than a few milliseconds. This makes **transaction
pooling mode** ideal — PgBouncer assigns a real connection only for the
duration of each transaction, then returns it to the pool.
| Cluster size | Client connections (max) | PgBouncer server connections needed |
|--------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 10 nodes | 50 | 1020 |
| 100 nodes | 500 | 2040 |
| 500 nodes | 2,500 | 3060 |
| 1,000 nodes | 5,000 | 4080 |
The server connection count stays low because most client connections
are idle at any given moment.
---
## Docker Compose
Add PgBouncer between turnstone services and PostgreSQL:
```yaml
services:
pgbouncer:
image: bitnami/pgbouncer:latest
environment:
POSTGRESQL_HOST: postgres
POSTGRESQL_PORT: "5432"
POSTGRESQL_DATABASE: turnstone
POSTGRESQL_USERNAME: ${POSTGRES_USER:-turnstone}
POSTGRESQL_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:?}
PGBOUNCER_POOL_MODE: transaction
PGBOUNCER_DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE: "40"
PGBOUNCER_MAX_CLIENT_CONN: "5000"
PGBOUNCER_MAX_DB_CONNECTIONS: "80"
PGBOUNCER_SERVER_IDLE_TIMEOUT: "300"
ports:
- "6432:6432"
networks:
- turnstone-net
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "pg_isready", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-p", "6432"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
```
Then point turnstone services at PgBouncer instead of PostgreSQL
directly by changing the `DATABASE_URL` (or `TURNSTONE_DB_URL`):
```bash
# Before (direct)
TURNSTONE_DB_URL=postgresql://turnstone:secret@postgres:5432/turnstone
# After (via PgBouncer)
TURNSTONE_DB_URL=postgresql://turnstone:secret@pgbouncer:6432/turnstone
```
---
## Helm / Kubernetes
Add a PgBouncer deployment or use a Helm chart like
[bitnami/pgbouncer](https://github.com/bitnami/charts/tree/main/bitnami/pgbouncer).
In `values.yaml`, point the database at PgBouncer:
```yaml
database:
backend: postgresql
external:
host: pgbouncer
port: 6432
database: turnstone
username: turnstone
existingSecret: turnstone-db-secret
```
PgBouncer configuration:
```yaml
pgbouncer:
poolMode: transaction
defaultPoolSize: 40
maxClientConn: 5000
maxDbConnections: 80
```
---
## Configuration reference
| PgBouncer setting | Recommended | Notes |
|-------------------|-------------|-------|
| `pool_mode` | `transaction` | Required — turnstone uses short-burst queries with no session state |
| `default_pool_size` | 40 | Real PostgreSQL connections per database. Start here, increase if you see `no more connections allowed` |
| `max_client_conn` | 5000 | Upper bound on client connections. Set to `cluster_nodes × 5` |
| `max_db_connections` | 80 | Hard cap on real connections to PostgreSQL. Keep below PG `max_connections` minus headroom for admin/monitoring |
| `server_idle_timeout` | 300 | Close idle server connections after 5 minutes |
| `server_lifetime` | 3600 | Recycle server connections after 1 hour |
On the PostgreSQL side:
| PostgreSQL setting | Recommended | Notes |
|--------------------|-------------|-------|
| `max_connections` | 100 | Default is fine — PgBouncer is the only client. Set higher than `max_db_connections` to leave room for admin connections |
| `shared_buffers` | 25% of RAM | Standard PostgreSQL tuning |
---
## Turnstone pool settings
Each turnstone process maintains its own SQLAlchemy connection pool to
PgBouncer (which then multiplexes to PostgreSQL):
| Environment variable | Default | Description |
|---------------------|---------|-------------|
| `TURNSTONE_DB_POOL_SIZE` | 2 | Base pool size per process |
| `TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND` | sqlite | Set to `postgresql` for cluster deployments |
| `TURNSTONE_DB_URL` | — | Connection URL (point at PgBouncer, not PostgreSQL directly) |
The default pool of 2 + 3 overflow = 5 connections per process is
intentionally small to support large clusters. You should not need to
increase this — turnstone's database operations are all short-burst
context-managed queries that hold connections for milliseconds.
SQLAlchemy `pool_pre_ping` is enabled, so stale connections (e.g. after
PgBouncer restarts) are automatically detected and replaced.
---
## Monitoring
PgBouncer exposes stats via its admin console (connect to
PgBouncer port with user `pgbouncer`):
```sql
-- Active and waiting clients
SHOW POOLS;
-- Per-database stats
SHOW STATS;
-- Current client connections
SHOW CLIENTS;
```
Key metrics to watch:
- **`cl_active`** — clients with a server connection assigned. Should be
well below `max_db_connections`.
- **`cl_waiting`** — clients waiting for a server connection. Sustained
non-zero values mean you need more `default_pool_size`.
- **`sv_active`** — active server (PostgreSQL) connections. Should stay
below PostgreSQL `max_connections`.
---
## Troubleshooting
**"no more connections allowed (max_client_conn)"** — PgBouncer is
rejecting new client connections. Increase `max_client_conn` to match
your cluster size × 5.
**"no more connections allowed (max_db_connections)"** — PgBouncer
cannot open more connections to PostgreSQL. Increase
`max_db_connections` and ensure PostgreSQL `max_connections` is higher.
**Connections timing out on startup** — If all nodes start
simultaneously, the burst of initial connections (migrations, health
checks) can temporarily exceed the pool. PgBouncer queues excess
clients by default — this resolves itself within seconds.
**Prepared statements not supported** — PgBouncer in `transaction` mode
does not support prepared statements. Turnstone's SQLAlchemy layer does
not use server-side prepared statements by default, so this is not an
issue.
See also: [Docker deployment](docker.md) · [Security](security.md)
+23 -3
View File
@@ -69,12 +69,13 @@ Both `TurnstoneServer` (sync) and `AsyncTurnstoneServer` (async) expose:
|----------|--------|---------|
| **Workstreams** | `list_workstreams()` | `ListWorkstreamsResponse` |
| | `dashboard()` | `DashboardResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, name, model, auto_approve)` | `CreateWorkstreamResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, name, model, auto_approve, skill)` | `CreateWorkstreamResponse` |
| | `close_workstream(ws_id)` | `StatusResponse` |
| **Chat** | `send(message, ws_id)` | `SendResponse` |
| | `approve(*, ws_id, approved, feedback, always)` | `StatusResponse` |
| | `plan_feedback(*, ws_id, feedback)` | `StatusResponse` |
| | `command(*, ws_id, command)` | `StatusResponse` |
| | `cancel(ws_id)` | `StatusResponse` |
| **Streaming** | `stream_events(ws_id)` | `Iterator[ServerEvent]` |
| | `stream_global_events()` | `Iterator[ServerEvent]` |
| **High-level** | `send_and_wait(message, ws_id, *, timeout, on_event)` | `TurnResult` |
@@ -96,13 +97,17 @@ Both `TurnstoneConsole` (sync) and `AsyncTurnstoneConsole` (async) expose:
| | `workstreams(*, state, node, search, sort, page, per_page)` | `ClusterWorkstreamsResponse` |
| | `node_detail(node_id)` | `NodeDetailResponse` |
| | `snapshot()` | `ClusterSnapshotResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, node_id, name, model, initial_message)` | `ConsoleCreateWsResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, node_id, name, model, initial_message, skill)` | `ConsoleCreateWsResponse` |
| **Schedules** | `list_schedules()` | `ListSchedulesResponse` |
| | `create_schedule(*, name, schedule_type, initial_message, ...)` | `ScheduleInfo` |
| | `get_schedule(task_id)` | `ScheduleInfo` |
| | `update_schedule(task_id, *, name=..., enabled=..., ...)` | `ScheduleInfo` |
| | `delete_schedule(task_id)` | `StatusResponse` |
| | `list_schedule_runs(task_id, *, limit=50)` | `ListScheduleRunsResponse` |
| **MCP Registry** | `search_mcp_registry(q="", *, limit=20, cursor=None)` | `RegistrySearchResponse` |
| | `install_from_registry(registry_name, source, *, index=0, name="", variables=None, env=None, headers=None)` | `McpServerDetail` |
| **Skill Discovery** | `discover_skills(q="", *, limit=20)` | `SkillDiscoverResponse` |
| | `install_skill(source, *, skill_id="", url="")` | `dict` |
| **Streaming** | `stream_cluster_events()` | `Iterator[ClusterEvent]` |
| **Auth** | `login(username=..., password=...)` / `login(token="ts_xxx")` | `AuthLoginResponse` |
| | `logout()` | `StatusResponse` |
@@ -124,11 +129,12 @@ SSE events are deserialized into typed dataclasses. Use `event.type` to discrimi
| `approve_request` | `ApproveRequestEvent` | `items` |
| `tool_result` | `ToolResultEvent` | `call_id`, `name`, `output` |
| `tool_output_chunk` | `ToolOutputChunkEvent` | `call_id`, `chunk` |
| `status` | `StatusEvent` | `prompt_tokens`, `total_tokens`, `pct`, `effort` |
| `status` | `StatusEvent` | `prompt_tokens`, `total_tokens`, `pct`, `effort`, `cache_creation_tokens`, `cache_read_tokens` |
| `plan_review` | `PlanReviewEvent` | `content` |
| `error` | `ErrorEvent` | `message` |
| `info` | `InfoEvent` | `message` |
| `stream_end` | `StreamEndEvent` | — |
| `cancelled` | `CancelledEvent` | — |
**Global events** (from `stream_global_events()`):
@@ -220,6 +226,20 @@ await client.login({ username: "alice", password: "s3cret" });
const overview = await client.overview();
console.log(`Nodes: ${overview.nodes}, Workstreams: ${overview.workstreams}`);
// Search and install from the MCP Registry
const results = await client.searchMcpRegistry({ q: "github", limit: 10 });
const server = await client.installFromRegistry({
registry_name: results.servers[0].name,
source: "remote",
});
// Search and install skills from external registries
const skills = await client.discoverSkills({ q: "code review" });
const skill = await client.installSkill({
source: "github",
url: "https://github.com/owner/skill-repo",
});
// Stream cluster events
for await (const event of client.clusterEvents()) {
console.log(event.type, event);
+129 -2
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Claims:
|-------|-------------|
| `sub` | User ID |
| `scopes` | Comma-separated scope list (`read,write,approve`) |
| `src` | Token source (`password`, `api_token`, `config`) |
| `src` | Token source (`password`, `api_token`, `config`, `oidc`) |
| `iss` | Issuer — always `turnstone` |
| `aud` | Audience — `turnstone-server` or `turnstone-console` |
| `iat` | Issued-at timestamp |
@@ -90,7 +90,36 @@ Scopes are hierarchical — higher scopes imply all lower ones.
Public paths bypass authentication entirely: `/`, `/health`, `/metrics`,
`/static/*`, `/shared/*`, `/docs`, `/openapi.json`, `/api/auth/login`,
`/api/auth/logout`, `/api/auth/status`, `/api/auth/setup`.
`/api/auth/logout`, `/api/auth/status`, `/api/auth/setup`,
`/api/auth/oidc/authorize`, `/api/auth/oidc/callback`.
### RBAC (Granular Permissions)
> See also: [Governance documentation](governance.md)
Scopes provide coarse endpoint-level access control. For finer-grained
enforcement, the governance layer adds 15 named permissions checked
per-endpoint by `require_permission()`. Permissions are bundled into
roles; users are assigned roles via the `user_roles` join table.
At login, `_load_user_permissions()` aggregates all permissions from
the user's assigned roles. `_permissions_to_scopes()` derives legacy
scopes for backward compatibility (e.g., any `admin.*` permission
implies the `approve` scope). The JWT carries both `scopes` and
`permissions` claims.
Three built-in roles are seeded by migration 008:
| Role | Permissions |
|------|-------------|
| admin | All 15 permissions |
| operator | read, write, workstreams.create, workstreams.close |
| viewer | read |
Custom roles can be created with any subset of the valid permissions.
Role creation and update validate permissions against a static allowlist.
Self-assignment is blocked, and assigning a role requires the caller to
hold a superset of the target role's permissions.
---
@@ -171,6 +200,94 @@ Response:
The response also sets an `HttpOnly` session cookie containing the JWT,
so the browser is immediately authenticated after setup completes.
### OIDC SSO (Single Sign-On)
Turnstone supports OIDC Authorization Code Flow with PKCE for
single sign-on with external identity providers (Okta, Azure AD,
Google, etc.). SSO is opt-in — enabled when the three required
environment variables are set. Users are auto-provisioned on first
login.
#### Configuration
| Variable | Required | Description |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER` | Yes | OIDC issuer URL (e.g., `https://accounts.google.com`) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID` | Yes | Client ID from the identity provider |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` | Yes | Client secret (confidential client) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_SCOPES` | No | OIDC scopes (default: `openid email profile`) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME` | No | Display name for the SSO button (default: `SSO`) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` | No | Claim name in the ID token for role mapping (e.g., `groups`) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` | No | Comma-separated `claim_value:role_id` pairs (e.g., `admin:builtin-admin,eng:builtin-operator`) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | Set to `false` to hide password login and force SSO-only |
OIDC is enabled when all three required variables (`ISSUER`,
`CLIENT_ID`, `CLIENT_SECRET`) are set.
#### Login flow
1. User clicks "Continue with [Provider]" on the login page
2. `GET /v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize` generates state, nonce, and PKCE
challenge, stores them in the database, and redirects to the IdP
3. User authenticates at the identity provider
4. IdP redirects to `/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback` with `code` + `state`
5. Server validates state, exchanges the authorization code (with PKCE
verifier), and validates the ID token (JWKS signature, issuer,
audience, nonce)
6. Provisions or matches the user by `(issuer, sub)` — never by
username or email
7. Issues a JWT (`src: oidc`), sets a session cookie, and redirects to
the application
#### Security measures
- **PKCE (S256)** — prevents authorization code interception
- **State parameter** — one-time use, 5-minute TTL, database-backed
(multi-node safe)
- **Nonce** — prevents ID token replay
- **JWKS validation** — asymmetric algorithm allowlist (RS/ES/PS
256-512), HMAC excluded
- **Algorithm allowlist enforced** — the signing key is resolved from
the JWKS by ``kid``; PyJWK infers the key's algorithm from the JWKS
``alg``/``kty`` fields; the token header's ``alg`` must be in the
allowlist AND match the key type, preventing algorithm confusion
- **Identity matching by (issuer, sub) only** — prevents account
takeover via email or username reuse
- **`password_enabled=false` enforced server-side** — not just a UI
toggle
- **Rate limiting** on both authorize and callback endpoints
- **OIDC-provisioned users cannot password-login** — the password hash
is set to the `!oidc` sentinel, which never matches bcrypt verify
#### Role mapping
When `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` is set (e.g., `groups`), the server
reads that claim from the ID token and maps values to Turnstone roles
via `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP`. Roles are synced on every login:
matching claim values are added, and stale OIDC-assigned roles are
revoked. Roles assigned manually (not by OIDC) are never touched.
If no role mapping is configured, OIDC users are provisioned with the
`builtin-viewer` role by default.
#### OIDC-only mode
Setting `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED=false` hides the password
form on the login page and blocks password-based login at the API
level. The setup wizard always works regardless of this setting — the
first admin user is created with a password before OIDC is relevant.
API tokens and config-file tokens are unaffected by this setting.
#### Known limitations
- **No session revocation** — deprovisioned IdP users retain their JWT
until the 24-hour expiry
- **Single IdP** — configuration supports one issuer (the database
schema supports multiple for future expansion)
- **Redirect URI** — defaults to request Host header; deployments behind
reverse proxies should set `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` to the
externally-reachable origin to pin the redirect URI
---
## Token Detection Order
@@ -455,3 +572,13 @@ and browsers enforce same-origin policy.
refresh, eliminating long-lived static tokens for inter-service auth.
- **Secret strength validation** — warning logged when JWT secret is
shorter than 32 characters.
- **OIDC PKCE enforcement** — S256 code challenge on every
authorization request prevents code interception in transit.
- **OIDC state/nonce in database** — one-time-use, TTL-bounded tokens
stored in the database, safe for multi-node deployments.
- **OIDC JWKS-only validation** — ID tokens are verified using the
provider's published JWKS keys with asymmetric algorithms only;
HMAC-based algorithms are rejected to prevent algorithm confusion.
- **OIDC identity binding by (issuer, sub)** — user matching uses the
immutable subject identifier, not email or username, preventing
account takeover via IdP attribute changes.
+355
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
# System Settings
> See also: [Settings Architecture diagram](diagrams/png/24-settings-architecture.png)
The system settings feature provides database-backed configuration for server
nodes. Settings are stored in the `system_settings` table and managed through
the admin API or console Settings tab. This replaces `config.toml` for
non-bootstrap settings on server entry points, while the CLI continues to read
`config.toml` directly.
## Overview
Settings follow a typed registry pattern: every storable setting has a
`SettingDef` entry in `settings_registry.py` with type, default, description,
validation constraints, and a `restart_required` flag. Unknown keys are rejected
at the API boundary.
At runtime, `ConfigStore` loads all settings from storage into an in-memory
cache. Reads are lock-free dict lookups on an immutable snapshot. Writes acquire
a lock, persist to storage, and swap the cache atomically.
---
## Precedence
Settings resolution differs between entry points:
| Entry point | Chain |
|-------------|-------|
| **Server** (`turnstone-server`, `turnstone-bridge`) | CLI flag > ConfigStore > registry default |
| **CLI** (`turnstone`) | CLI flag > config.toml > argparse default |
The server's `apply_config()` ignores config.toml sections that overlap with
ConfigStore. A startup warning is logged for each overlapping key, directing
users to the admin Settings API.
---
## Bootstrap vs ConfigStore
**Bootstrap settings** are required before storage is available (database
connection, Redis, auth secrets, server bind address). These stay in
`config.toml` and environment variables.
| Category | Section | Where |
|----------|---------|-------|
| API credentials | `[api]` | config.toml / env |
| Database | `[database]` | config.toml / env |
| Redis | `[redis]` | config.toml / env |
| Auth | `[auth]` | config.toml / env |
| Bridge identity | `[bridge]` | config.toml / env |
| Console bind | `[console]` | config.toml / env |
**ConfigStore settings** (48 settings) are loaded from the database after
storage initialization:
| Section | Settings |
|---------|----------|
| `model` | name, temperature, max_tokens, reasoning_effort, context_window |
| `session` | instructions, retention_days, compact_max_tokens, auto_compact_pct |
| `tools` | timeout, truncation, agent_max_turns, skip_permissions, search, search_threshold, search_max_results |
| `server` | workstream_idle_timeout, max_workstreams |
| `cluster` | node_fan_out_limit, mcp_max_servers |
| `mcp` | config_path, refresh_interval, registry_url |
| `ratelimit` | enabled, requests_per_second, burst, trusted_proxies |
| `health` | backend_probe_interval, backend_probe_timeout, circuit_breaker_threshold, circuit_breaker_cooldown |
| `judge` | enabled, model, provider, base_url, api_key, confidence_threshold, max_context_ratio, timeout, read_only_tools, output_guard, redact_secrets |
| `skills` | discovery_url |
| `memory` | relevance_k, fetch_limit, max_content, nudge_cooldown, nudges |
Settings are addressed by dotted key (e.g. `memory.relevance_k`). Each has a
declared type (`int`, `float`, `str`, `bool`), optional `min_value`/`max_value`
range, optional `choices` list, and an `is_secret` flag.
---
## Storage
The `system_settings` table (migration 015) stores settings as JSON-encoded
values with a composite primary key of `(key, node_id)`:
| Column | Type | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `key` | text | Dotted setting key (e.g. `model.temperature`) |
| `value` | text | JSON-encoded value |
| `node_id` | text | Node ID for per-node overrides (empty string = global) |
| `is_secret` | int | 1 if the setting contains secrets |
| `changed_by` | text | Username of last editor |
| `created` | text | ISO timestamp |
| `updated` | text | ISO timestamp |
Per-node overrides layer on top of global settings. When `ConfigStore` loads,
it fetches global settings first, then overlays per-node values.
---
## Admin API
Four endpoints on the **console** server, all requiring the `admin.settings`
permission.
### `GET /v1/api/admin/settings`
List all settings with their effective values, defaults, and metadata.
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"settings": [
{
"key": "model.temperature",
"value": 0.7,
"source": "storage",
"type": "float",
"description": "Sampling temperature",
"section": "model",
"is_secret": false,
"node_id": "",
"changed_by": "admin",
"updated": "2026-03-14T10:00:00",
"restart_required": false
}
]
}
```
---
### `GET /v1/api/admin/settings/schema`
Return the full registry catalog (all defined settings with metadata). Useful
for building dynamic admin UIs.
**Response:** `200`
```json
{
"schema": [
{
"key": "model.temperature",
"type": "float",
"default": 0.5,
"description": "Sampling temperature",
"section": "model",
"is_secret": false,
"min_value": 0.0,
"max_value": 2.0,
"choices": null,
"restart_required": false
}
]
}
```
---
### `PUT /v1/api/admin/settings/{key}`
Update a setting. The value is validated against the registry (type coercion,
range, choices). Secret settings (`is_secret=true`) cannot be written via the
API -- they must be configured via config.toml or environment variables.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|--------|-------------|
| `key` | string | Dotted setting key (e.g. `model.temperature`) |
**Request body:**
```json
{
"value": 0.7,
"node_id": ""
}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `value` | any | yes | -- | New value (type-coerced against registry) |
| `node_id` | string | no | `""` | Node ID for per-node override |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{
"key": "model.temperature",
"value": 0.7,
"source": "storage",
"type": "float",
"description": "Sampling temperature",
"section": "model",
"is_secret": false,
"node_id": "",
"changed_by": "admin",
"updated": "",
"restart_required": false
}
```
**Errors:**
| Status | Condition |
|--------|-----------|
| 400 | Unknown key, invalid value, type mismatch, out of range |
| 403 | Secret setting (must use config.toml or env) |
---
### `DELETE /v1/api/admin/settings/{key}`
Reset a setting to its registry default by removing it from storage.
**Path parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|--------|-------------|
| `key` | string | Dotted setting key |
**Query parameters:**
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `node_id` | string | no | `""` | Node ID (empty = global) |
**Response (success):** `200`
```json
{"status": "ok", "key": "model.temperature", "default": 0.5}
```
**Response (not found):** `404`
```json
{"error": "Setting 'model.temperature' has no stored value"}
```
---
## Secret Settings
Settings with `is_secret=True` (currently only `judge.api_key`) are blocked
from the write API with a `403` response. This prevents accidental exposure
through the admin UI or audit logs. Secret settings must be configured via
`config.toml` or environment variables.
The list endpoint masks secret values: stored secrets appear as `"***"`
rather than their actual value.
---
## Hot Reload
`ConfigStore` caches all settings in memory for fast, lock-free reads. To
refresh the cache after external changes (e.g. direct database edits or
cluster-wide propagation):
```
POST /v1/api/_internal/config-reload
```
This triggers `ConfigStore.reload()`, which re-reads all settings from storage
and atomically swaps the cache. The `version` counter increments on every
reload.
**Behavior after reload:**
- New workstreams pick up updated values immediately (via `session_factory`)
- Existing sessions keep their frozen configuration (settings are captured at
workstream creation time, not read on every turn)
- Settings marked `restart_required=True` need a server restart to take effect
---
## Migration from config.toml
On startup, `warn_migrated_settings()` scans `config.toml` for keys that are
now managed by ConfigStore. Each overlap produces a warning:
```
WARNING config.toml [model] temperature is now managed via Settings API —
this value will be ignored. Use the admin Settings tab or
PUT /v1/api/admin/settings/model.temperature to configure.
```
To migrate:
1. Note the values from `config.toml` for sections that overlap with ConfigStore
2. Use `PUT /v1/api/admin/settings/{key}` or the console Settings tab to set
each value
3. Remove the migrated sections from `config.toml`
4. Restart the server to verify no warnings
---
## SDK
### Python
```python
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneConsole
with TurnstoneConsole("http://localhost:9090", token="tok_xxx") as admin:
# List all settings with effective values
result = admin.list_settings()
for s in result["settings"]:
print(f"{s['key']} = {s['value']} (source: {s['source']})")
# Get the schema catalog
schema = admin.get_settings_schema()
# Update a setting
admin.update_setting("model.temperature", value=0.7)
# Update with per-node override
admin.update_setting("model.temperature", value=0.3, node_id="node-2")
# Reset to default
admin.delete_setting("model.temperature")
```
### TypeScript
```typescript
import { TurnstoneConsole } from "@turnstone/sdk";
const admin = new TurnstoneConsole({
baseUrl: "http://localhost:9090",
token: "tok_xxx",
});
// List all settings
const result = await admin.listSettings();
for (const s of result.settings) {
console.log(`${s.key} = ${s.value} (source: ${s.source})`);
}
// Get schema catalog
const schema = await admin.getSettingsSchema();
// Update a setting
await admin.updateSetting("model.temperature", { value: 0.7 });
// Reset to default
await admin.deleteSetting("model.temperature");
```
---
## Architecture
See [Settings Architecture diagram](diagrams/png/24-settings-architecture.png)
for the full data flow covering server startup, admin API writes, hot reload,
and settings precedence.
+214 -45
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Tools Reference
turnstone exposes 16 built-in tools plus any number of external MCP tools to the
turnstone exposes 18 built-in tools plus any number of external MCP tools to the
LLM via the OpenAI function-calling interface. Built-in tools are defined as JSON
files under `turnstone/tools/` and loaded at startup by `turnstone/core/tools.py`.
MCP tools are discovered from configured MCP servers at startup by
@@ -46,12 +46,12 @@ schema plus turnstone-specific metadata keys:
| Name | Description |
|---------------------|-------------|
| `TOOLS` | All 16 tool definitions (sent to the model). |
| `TOOLS` | All 17 tool definitions (sent to the model). |
| `AGENT_TOOLS` | Tools with `agent: true` -- available to plan sub-agents. Read-only tools. |
| `TASK_AGENT_TOOLS` | Tools with `task_agent: true` -- available to task sub-agents. Includes write operations. |
| `AGENT_AUTO_TOOLS` | Set of tool names with `auto_approve: true` -- no user confirmation needed. |
| `TASK_AUTO_TOOLS` | Same as `AGENT_AUTO_TOOLS` (identical filter). |
| `BUILTIN_TOOL_NAMES`| Frozenset of all 16 built-in tool names. Used by tool search to distinguish always-on tools from deferrable MCP tools. |
| `BUILTIN_TOOL_NAMES`| Frozenset of all 17 built-in tool names. Used by tool search to distinguish always-on tools from deferrable MCP tools. |
| `PRIMARY_KEY_MAP` | Dict mapping tool name to its `primary_key` parameter name. |
---
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Tool execution follows a three-phase pipeline inside `ChatSession._execute_tools
- Parses the JSON arguments (with fallback for malformed JSON).
- If JSON parsing fails entirely, uses `PRIMARY_KEY_MAP` to map a bare string
to the correct parameter.
- Dispatches to the matching `_prepare_{func_name}()` handler. There are 15
- Dispatches to the matching `_prepare_{func_name}()` handler. There are 17
built-in tools plus `tool_search` (synthetic, client-side BM25 fallback) and
the generic `_prepare_mcp_tool()` handler for MCP tools.
- Validates arguments and builds a preview dict containing:
@@ -87,8 +87,11 @@ All prepared items are sent to the UI via `ui.approve_tools(items)`.
but do not block execution.
- Items where `needs_approval` is `True` require the user to accept or deny.
- The user can provide feedback alongside their approval (e.g. "y, use full path").
- If `auto_approve` is `True` on the session (headless mode), all tools are
approved automatically.
- Choosing "always" (key `a`) adds the pending tool names to `auto_approve_tools`,
so that specific tool type is auto-approved going forward (other tool types still
prompt). This is per-tool, not blanket.
- If `auto_approve` is `True` on the session (via `--skip-permissions` or workstream
template), all tools are approved automatically.
### Phase 3: Execute
@@ -114,9 +117,8 @@ Each item's `execute` callable is invoked:
- `read_file` -- reads files, no side effects
- `search` -- grep-style search, no side effects
- `man` -- reads man pages, no side effects
- `remember` -- writes to persistent memory database (lightweight, always auto-approved)
- `recall` -- reads from persistent memory database
- `forget` -- deletes from persistent memory database (lightweight, always auto-approved)
- `memory` -- structured persistent memory (save/search/delete/list)
- `recall` -- searches conversation history
- `notify` -- sends notifications to linked channels (time-sensitive, auto-approved for urgency)
**Requires user confirmation** (write operations, network access, side effects):
@@ -164,10 +166,11 @@ Every tool defines a `primary_key`. The mapping is:
| `web_search` | `query` |
| `task` | `prompt` |
| `plan` | `prompt` |
| `remember` | `key` |
| `memory` | `name` |
| `recall` | `query` |
| `forget` | `key` |
| `notify` | `message` |
| `read_resource` | `uri` |
| `use_prompt` | `name` |
---
@@ -351,16 +354,22 @@ Plan before implementing -- an autonomous agent explores the codebase and writes
## Memory
### remember
### memory
Save a persistent memory that persists across sessions.
Structured persistent memory across sessions with typed, scoped entries.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `key` | string | yes | Short identifier (e.g. `user_name`). |
| `value` | string | yes | Content to remember. |
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---------------|---------|----------|-------------|
| `action` | string | yes | `save`, `search`, `delete`, or `list`. |
| `name` | string | save/delete | Short snake_case identifier for the memory. |
| `content` | string | save | Memory content to store. |
| `description` | string | no | Short description for relevance matching (recommended for `save`). |
| `type` | string | no | Memory type: `user`, `project`, `feedback`, or `reference`. Default: `project`. |
| `scope` | string | no | Memory scope: `global`, `workstream`, or `user`. Default: `global`. |
| `query` | string | search | Search query for finding memories. |
| `limit` | integer | no | Max results for `search` or `list`. Default: 20. |
- **What it does**: Stores a key-value pair in the SQLite memory database. Memories persist across sessions and are included in the system prompt on startup.
- **What it does**: Manages structured persistent memories in the database. Memories persist across sessions, have a type classification (user preferences, project knowledge, feedback, reference material) and a scope (global across all workstreams, private to a workstream, or following a user). Relevant memories are included in the system prompt on startup.
- **Auto-approve**: Yes.
- **Agent availability**: Not available to sub-agents (top-level only).
@@ -368,28 +377,14 @@ Save a persistent memory that persists across sessions.
### recall
Search memories and past conversations.
Search conversation history for past messages and tool results.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|-----------|---------|----------|-------------|
| `query` | string | no | Search term or phrase. Omit to list all memories. |
| `limit` | integer | no | Max conversation results to return (default 20). |
| `query` | string | yes | Search term or phrase to find in conversation history. |
| `limit` | integer | no | Max results to return (default 20). |
- **What it does**: With no query, lists all saved memories. With a query, searches both the memory store and conversation history using FTS5 full-text search.
- **Auto-approve**: Yes.
- **Agent availability**: Not available to sub-agents (top-level only).
---
### forget
Remove a persistent memory by key.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `key` | string | yes | The memory key to remove (e.g. `user_name`). |
- **What it does**: Deletes the memory entry with the given key from the SQLite database.
- **What it does**: Searches conversation history across sessions using FTS5 full-text search. Returns matching messages, tool calls, and tool results with timestamps and workstream context.
- **Auto-approve**: Yes.
- **Agent availability**: Not available to sub-agents (top-level only).
@@ -497,6 +492,36 @@ data.get("mergedAt") is not None
---
### skill
Discover and activate skills at runtime during a conversation. The model can
search for available skills and load one by name, replacing the current active
skill. This enables model-driven skill selection without requiring the user to
pre-configure skills at workstream creation.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `action` | string | yes | `load` or `search`. |
| `name` | string | load | Skill name to activate. |
| `query` | string | no | Search query for finding skills (for `search` action). |
**Actions:**
- `load` — Activate a skill by name. Calls `set_skill()` which handles content
rendering with `{{model}}`/`{{ws_id}}`/`{{node_id}}` variables, system message
reinitialization, and config persistence. Returns the skill name, description,
and security scan tier. Warns on high/critical scan status.
- `search` — Find available skills by query. Uses BM25 relevance ranking over
name, description, tags, and category (same `BM25Index` used by memory
relevance and tool search). Returns up to 10 results with name, description,
category, scan status, and activation type.
- **Auto-approve**: `load` requires approval (changes session behavior); `search`
is auto-approved (read-only).
- **Agent availability**: Main session only — not available to plan/task sub-agents.
---
## Summary Table
| Tool | Category | Auto-approve | agent | task_agent | primary_key |
@@ -512,11 +537,13 @@ data.get("mergedAt") is not None
| `web_search` | Info | No | Yes | Yes | `query` |
| `task` | Agent | No | No | No | `prompt` |
| `plan` | Agent | No | No | No | `prompt` |
| `remember` | Memory | Yes | No | No | `key` |
| `memory` | Memory | Yes | No | No | `name` |
| `recall` | Memory | Yes | No | No | `query` |
| `forget` | Memory | Yes | No | No | `key` |
| `notify` | Notify | Yes | Yes | Yes | `message` |
| `watch` | Monitor | No (create) | No | No | `command` |
| `read_resource`| MCP | No | Yes | Yes | `uri` |
| `use_prompt` | MCP | No | Yes | Yes | `name` |
| `skill` | Skills | No (load) | No | No | `name` |
| `tool_search`| Search | Yes | No | No | `query` |
---
@@ -564,12 +591,12 @@ CLI flags override the config file:
### How it works
1. **Threshold check**: At session startup, `ToolSearchManager.should_activate()`
counts total tools (built-in + MCP). If the count is below the threshold, tool
search stays off and all tools are sent to the model directly.
1. **Threshold check**: At session startup, if the total tool count (built-in + MCP)
is below the threshold, tool search stays off and all tools are sent to the model
directly.
2. **Partitioning**: When active, tools are split into two sets:
- **Always-on** -- the 15 built-in tools (members of `BUILTIN_TOOL_NAMES`).
- **Always-on** -- the 17 built-in tools (members of `BUILTIN_TOOL_NAMES`).
These are always visible to the model.
- **Deferred** -- all MCP tools. These are not sent in the tool list unless
the model searches for them.
@@ -593,6 +620,8 @@ where the model can interactively search for tools it needs.
## MCP Tools (External)
> See also: [MCP Architecture diagram](diagrams/png/20-mcp-architecture.png)
Turnstone supports the [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/)
(MCP) for connecting external tool servers — GitHub, databases, filesystems, or any
MCP-compatible service.
@@ -610,7 +639,7 @@ MCP-compatible service.
3. **Schema conversion**: Each MCP tool's `inputSchema` is converted to OpenAI
function-calling format. The tool name is prefixed: `mcp__{server}__{tool}`.
4. **Merging**: MCP tools are appended after the 15 built-in tools via
4. **Merging**: MCP tools are appended after the 17 built-in tools via
`merge_mcp_tools()`. Built-in tools appear first, giving them natural LLM priority.
When dynamic tool search is active, MCP tools are deferred rather than directly
visible -- the model discovers them via search as needed (see
@@ -625,8 +654,11 @@ MCP-compatible service.
MCP tools **require user approval by default** (`needs_approval: True`). turnstone
does not auto-approve MCP tools based on their schema, since it cannot guarantee
that external tools are read-only. However, global overrides such as
`--skip-permissions` or the UI's "always allow" setting will auto-approve all
tools, including MCP tools.
`--skip-permissions` will auto-approve all tools, including MCP tools. The
interactive "Always" button adds specific tool types to the per-tool auto-approve
set. The web UI and server use `approval_label` for MCP tools, giving
per-prompt/per-resource granularity. The CLI and bridge use `func_name`, which
gives per-tool-type granularity (e.g., all `use_prompt` calls).
### Sub-agent availability
@@ -729,3 +761,140 @@ MCP refresh complete:
MCP refresh complete:
github: no changes
```
---
## MCP Resources
MCP servers can expose **resources** -- named data items (files, database rows,
API responses) addressable by URI. turnstone discovers resources at startup and
makes them available to the model via the `read_resource` built-in tool.
### Discovery
During the MCP `initialize` handshake, `MCPClientManager` checks each server's
capabilities for the `resources` capability. For servers that declare it:
1. `list_resources` fetches static resources (fixed URIs).
2. `list_resource_templates` fetches URI templates (parameterized patterns like
`db://tables/{table}/rows/{id}`).
Both are stored as `{uri, name, description, mimeType, server}` dicts and
merged into a unified catalog.
### Resource catalog in system message
The first 50 resources are injected into the system message as an XML-delimited
block so the model knows what URIs are available:
```xml
<mcp-resources>
file:///project/README.md Project readme
db://users/schema User table schema
</mcp-resources>
Use read_resource(uri='...') to access the resources listed above.
```
### read_resource tool
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `uri` | string | yes | The resource URI to read. |
- **What it does**: Reads the resource from its MCP server via `MCPClientManager.read_resource_sync()`. Returns text content for text resources or base64-encoded data for binary resources. Output is truncated by the standard tool output limiter.
- **Auto-approve**: No -- requires user confirmation (reads external data).
- **Agent availability**: `agent` and `task_agent`.
### Capability guards
The `read_resource` tool schema is always loaded (it is a built-in JSON schema),
but resource discovery only runs for servers that declare the `resources`
capability. Servers without the capability contribute zero resources to the
catalog.
### Refresh
Resource lists stay current through the same three-tier mechanism as tool lists:
1. **Push** -- Servers declaring `resources.listChanged: true` send
`notifications/resources/list_changed`, triggering an immediate refresh.
2. **Periodic** -- Servers without push are polled on the configured refresh
interval (default 4 hours, same timer as tools).
3. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches resources alongside tools.
---
## MCP Prompts
MCP servers can also expose **prompts** -- reusable message templates with
optional arguments. turnstone discovers prompts at startup for servers that
declare the `prompts` capability.
### Discovery
Prompt discovery mirrors resource discovery: `list_prompts` is called during
the `initialize` handshake. Each prompt is stored with its prefixed name
(`mcp__{server}__{prompt}`), description, and argument schema.
### use_prompt tool
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|-------------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `name` | string | yes | The prompt name (e.g. `mcp__server__prompt_name`). |
| `arguments` | object | no | Key-value argument pairs for the prompt. Values must be strings. |
- **What it does**: Invokes an MCP prompt by name via `MCPClientManager.get_prompt_sync()`, expanding it into messages. Returns the expanded prompt content formatted as `[role]: content` blocks joined with blank lines. The prompt catalog is listed in the system message so the model knows which prompts are available. Output is truncated by the standard tool output limiter.
- **Auto-approve**: No -- requires user confirmation (invokes external prompt servers).
- **Agent availability**: `agent` and `task_agent`.
### Invocation
`MCPClientManager.get_prompt_sync()` calls the server's `get_prompt` method
with the provided arguments and returns the expanded messages. The `use_prompt`
built-in tool exposes this to the model as a function call.
### Governance Sync
Discovered MCP prompts are automatically synced into the `prompt_templates`
table (which stores skills) as first-class governed skills:
- **Origin tracking**: MCP-sourced skills have `origin="mcp"` and
`mcp_server` set to the server name. Manual skills have
`origin="manual"`.
- **Read-only**: MCP-sourced skills are `readonly=True`. The admin API
returns 403 on update/delete attempts. The admin UI disables edit/delete
buttons and shows an origin badge.
- **Precedence**: If a manual skill and MCP prompt share the same name,
the manual skill wins and the MCP prompt is skipped (with a log
warning).
- **Lifecycle**: Skills are created on connect, updated on prompt list
refresh, and removed when the MCP server no longer exposes the prompt.
The sync runs automatically on connect, on `PromptListChangedNotification`,
and on manual `/mcp refresh`.
- **Schema**: Migration 009 adds `origin`, `mcp_server`, and `readonly`
columns to the `prompt_templates` table.
The `use_prompt` tool allows the model to invoke any discovered MCP prompt at
runtime. A catalog of up to 30 prompts is injected into the system message
inside `<mcp-prompts>` XML tags so the model can discover available prompts.
---
## MCP UI Visibility
MCP server, resource, and prompt counts are surfaced across the UI:
- **Server `/health` endpoint**: Returns `mcp.servers`, `mcp.resources`,
`mcp.prompts` when MCP is configured
- **Server UI**: Magenta status badge in the header showing server count,
with resource/prompt counts in tooltip
- **Console cluster status bar**: MCP metrics (servers/resources/prompts)
with magenta LED dot indicator, shown after a divider from workstream
metrics
- **Console node detail**: Per-node MCP summary showing server, resource,
and prompt counts
- **Console collector**: Aggregates MCP counts across all nodes in the
cluster overview
MCP indicators use the `--magenta` design token for consistent theming
across light and dark modes.
+123
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
# MCP Cluster Ops
An MCP server that exposes tools for executing commands across a [Turnstone](https://github.com/turnstonelabs/turnstone) cluster. Serves as a reference implementation for both MCP server patterns and Turnstone MQ client SDK usage.
## How it works
This server uses Turnstone's MQ client (`TurnstoneClient`) to dispatch shell commands to specific nodes via Redis. Remote agents execute the command and the raw bash output is captured directly from the `ToolResultEvent` stream — bypassing the costly "agent reads output → re-generates output as completion tokens" round-trip.
Multi-node dispatches run in parallel via `asyncio.gather`, so total wall time is bounded by the slowest node rather than the sum.
## Tools
| Tool | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `list_nodes` | Discover active nodes in the cluster |
| `run_on_node` | Execute a command on a specific node |
| `run_on_nodes` | Execute a command on selected nodes in parallel |
| `run_on_all_nodes` | Execute a command on ALL active nodes in parallel |
## Prerequisites
- A running Turnstone cluster (at least one `turnstone-server` + `turnstone-bridge`)
- Redis accessible from wherever this MCP server runs
- Python 3.11+
## Installation
```bash
# From the turnstone repo root:
pip install -e ./examples/mcp-cluster-ops
# Or install turnstone with MQ support first, then the example:
pip install -e ".[mq]"
pip install -e ./examples/mcp-cluster-ops
```
## Configuration
### Environment Variables
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `REDIS_HOST` | `localhost` | Redis host |
| `REDIS_PORT` | `6379` | Redis port |
| `REDIS_PASSWORD` | _(none)_ | Redis password (use env vars, not config files) |
| `MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_TIMEOUT` | `120` | Default command timeout (seconds, clamped 5-3600) |
| `MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_MAX_OUTPUT` | `8192` | Max output bytes per node (0 = unlimited) |
| `MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_MAX_NODES` | `32` | Max concurrent node dispatches |
| `MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_MAX_COMMAND` | `65536` | Max command string length |
### Register with Turnstone
**TOML** (`~/.config/turnstone/config.toml`):
```toml
[mcp.servers.cluster-ops]
command = "mcp-cluster-ops"
[mcp.servers.cluster-ops.env]
REDIS_HOST = "redis.example.com"
```
**JSON** (via `--mcp-config`):
```json
{
"mcpServers": {
"cluster-ops": {
"command": "mcp-cluster-ops",
"env": {
"REDIS_HOST": "redis.example.com"
}
}
}
}
```
## Usage Examples
Once registered, the tools appear in any Turnstone session. The model can:
```
> Check disk usage across the cluster
[calls list_nodes → discovers node-1, node-2, node-3]
[calls run_on_all_nodes with "df -h /"]
node-1: /dev/sda1 500G 320G 180G 64% /
node-2: /dev/sda1 500G 410G 90G 82% /
node-3: /dev/sda1 1.0T 200G 800G 20% /
```
## Why MQ client instead of HTTP SDK?
The HTTP SDK (`TurnstoneServer`) talks to a single server instance. The MQ client (`TurnstoneClient`) routes through Redis with `target_node` support, which is the entire point of cross-node cluster operations.
## Security Considerations
**This MCP server grants the calling agent shell access to cluster nodes.**
- Commands are executed with `auto_approve=True` and the privileges of the
Turnstone server process on the target node.
- Command output (which may contain secrets, credentials, or sensitive data)
is returned through the MCP tool result and becomes part of the LLM context.
- The security boundary is at the MCP host layer -- use Turnstone's tool
policy system to restrict which agents can invoke these tools.
- Set `REDIS_PASSWORD` via your environment or a secrets manager -- avoid
hardcoding passwords in config files.
## Development
```bash
cd examples/mcp-cluster-ops
# Run tests
pip install -e ".[test]"
pytest
# Lint
pip install -e ".[dev]"
ruff check mcp_cluster_ops/
mypy --strict mcp_cluster_ops/
```
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
"""MCP server for Turnstone cluster operations."""
__version__ = "0.1.0"
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
from mcp_cluster_ops.server import main
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
"""MCP server for Turnstone cluster operations.
Exposes tools to execute commands on specific nodes in a Turnstone cluster.
Uses the MQ client (``TurnstoneClient``) for direct node targeting via Redis.
Usage::
mcp-cluster-ops # via entry point
python -m mcp_cluster_ops # via module
Configure in ``~/.config/turnstone/config.toml``::
[mcp.servers.cluster-ops]
command = "mcp-cluster-ops"
[mcp.servers.cluster-ops.env]
REDIS_HOST = "redis.example.com"
Environment variables
---------------------
REDIS_HOST Redis host (default: localhost)
REDIS_PORT Redis port (default: 6379)
REDIS_PASSWORD Redis password (default: none)
MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_TIMEOUT Default command timeout in seconds (default: 120)
MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_MAX_OUTPUT Max output bytes per node (default: 8192, 0=unlimited)
Performance notes
-----------------
Remote agents are told to reply with only "ok" or "failed" the raw bash
output is captured directly from the ToolResultEvent that already flows
through Redis, bypassing the costly "agent reads output then re-generates
output as completion tokens" round-trip.
All multi-node dispatches run in parallel via ``asyncio.gather`` so total
wall time is bounded by the slowest node, not the sum of all nodes.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import os
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
from mcp.server.fastmcp import Context, FastMCP
from turnstone.mq.client import TurnResult, TurnstoneClient
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Configuration
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = int(os.environ.get("MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_TIMEOUT", "120"))
_DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT = int(os.environ.get("MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_MAX_OUTPUT", "8192"))
_MAX_CONCURRENT_NODES = int(os.environ.get("MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_MAX_NODES", "32"))
_MAX_COMMAND_LEN = int(os.environ.get("MCP_CLUSTER_OPS_MAX_COMMAND", "65536"))
_MIN_TIMEOUT = 5
_MAX_TIMEOUT = 3600
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers (pure functions, easily testable)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _redis_kwargs() -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Build Redis connection kwargs from environment variables.
Follows the same env var convention as ``turnstone.mq.broker.add_redis_args``:
``REDIS_HOST``, ``REDIS_PORT``, ``REDIS_PASSWORD``.
"""
kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {"host": os.environ.get("REDIS_HOST", "localhost")}
port = os.environ.get("REDIS_PORT")
if port is not None:
kwargs["port"] = int(port)
password = os.environ.get("REDIS_PASSWORD")
if password:
kwargs["password"] = password
return kwargs
def _exec_prompt(command: str) -> str:
"""Build the prompt sent to the remote agent.
Instructs it to run the command and reply minimally so that the raw
bash output (captured via ToolResultEvent) is the primary result,
avoiding token waste from re-transcription.
"""
return (
"Execute this shell command using the bash tool:\n"
f" {command}\n\n"
"After the tool completes, reply with only 'ok' or 'failed'.\n"
"Do NOT repeat, quote, or summarise the command output in your reply."
)
def _extract_output(result: TurnResult) -> str:
"""Extract useful output from a TurnResult.
Prefers raw bash ToolResultEvent output (zero LLM re-transcription cost)
over agent content. Falls back through tool results and content.
"""
bash_outputs = [out for name, out in result.tool_results if name == "bash"]
if bash_outputs:
return "\n".join(bash_outputs)
content: str = result.content
if content:
return content
if result.tool_results:
return str(result.tool_results[0][1])
return ""
def _truncate(text: str, max_bytes: int) -> str:
"""Truncate *text* to at most *max_bytes* UTF-8 bytes.
Appends a marker when truncation occurs. Handles multi-byte characters
safely by decoding with ``errors='ignore'``.
Pass ``max_bytes=0`` to disable truncation.
"""
if max_bytes <= 0:
return text
encoded = text.encode("utf-8")
if len(encoded) <= max_bytes:
return text
truncated = encoded[:max_bytes].decode("utf-8", errors="ignore")
omitted = len(encoded) - len(truncated.encode("utf-8"))
return truncated + f"\n... [truncated: {omitted} bytes omitted]"
def _clamp_timeout(timeout: int) -> float:
"""Clamp timeout to a safe range."""
return float(max(_MIN_TIMEOUT, min(timeout, _MAX_TIMEOUT)))
def _validate_command(command: str) -> str | None:
"""Validate a command string. Returns an error message or None."""
if not command.strip():
return "command must be a non-empty string"
if len(command) > _MAX_COMMAND_LEN:
return f"command too long ({len(command)} chars, max {_MAX_COMMAND_LEN})"
return None
def _format_node_result(
node_id: str,
result: TurnResult,
max_output: int,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Format a single node's TurnResult for JSON output."""
raw = _extract_output(result)
output = _truncate(raw, max_output)
entry: dict[str, Any] = {
"node": node_id,
"ok": result.ok,
}
if result.timed_out:
entry["timed_out"] = True
if result.ok:
entry["output"] = output
else:
entry["output"] = output or None
if result.errors:
entry["error"] = "; ".join(result.errors)
return entry
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Core dispatch functions (testable with mocked TurnstoneClient)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _exec_on_node_sync(
redis_kw: dict[str, Any],
node_id: str,
command: str,
timeout: float,
) -> tuple[str, TurnResult]:
"""Dispatch *command* to *node_id* and block until complete.
Runs inside ``asyncio.to_thread`` so it does not block the event loop.
Each call creates its own ``TurnstoneClient`` to avoid Redis pub/sub
subscription conflicts between concurrent dispatches.
"""
prompt = _exec_prompt(command)
with TurnstoneClient(**redis_kw) as client:
result = client.send_and_wait(
message=prompt,
target_node=node_id,
auto_approve=True,
timeout=timeout,
)
return node_id, result
async def _dispatch_parallel(
redis_kw: dict[str, Any],
node_ids: list[str],
command: str,
timeout: float,
max_output: int,
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Dispatch *command* to all *node_ids* concurrently.
Total wall time is bounded by the slowest node.
"""
tasks = [
asyncio.to_thread(_exec_on_node_sync, redis_kw, nid, command, timeout) for nid in node_ids
]
outcomes = await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for nid, outcome in zip(node_ids, outcomes, strict=True):
if isinstance(outcome, BaseException):
if not isinstance(outcome, Exception):
raise outcome # propagate KeyboardInterrupt, SystemExit, etc.
results.append({"node": nid, "ok": False, "error": str(outcome)})
else:
_, turn_result = outcome
results.append(_format_node_result(nid, turn_result, max_output))
return results
def _list_nodes_sync(redis_kw: dict[str, Any]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""List active cluster nodes (blocking)."""
with TurnstoneClient(**redis_kw) as client:
nodes: list[dict[str, Any]] = client.list_nodes()
return nodes
async def _list_nodes_impl(redis_kw: dict[str, Any]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
"""List active cluster nodes."""
return await asyncio.to_thread(_list_nodes_sync, redis_kw)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# MCP server
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@asynccontextmanager
async def _lifespan(server: FastMCP[dict[str, Any]]) -> AsyncIterator[dict[str, Any]]:
"""Lifespan context — stores Redis kwargs for tool handlers."""
kw = _redis_kwargs()
yield {"redis_kwargs": kw}
mcp = FastMCP(
"turnstone-cluster-ops",
instructions=(
"Tools for executing commands across a Turnstone AI cluster. "
"Use list_nodes first to discover available nodes, then run_on_node "
"to execute commands on specific nodes or run_on_all_nodes for "
"cluster-wide operations."
),
lifespan=_lifespan,
)
@mcp.tool()
async def list_nodes(ctx: Context[Any, Any, Any]) -> str:
"""List all active nodes in the Turnstone cluster.
Call this before dispatching work to discover available node IDs.
Returns a JSON array of node metadata objects.
"""
redis_kw: dict[str, Any] = ctx.request_context.lifespan_context["redis_kwargs"]
nodes = await _list_nodes_impl(redis_kw)
return json.dumps(nodes, indent=2)
@mcp.tool()
async def run_on_node(
node_id: str,
command: str,
ctx: Context[Any, Any, Any],
timeout: int = _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
) -> str:
"""Execute a shell command on a specific node and return the raw output.
Use list_nodes first to discover available node IDs.
Args:
node_id: Target node ID (e.g. 'worker-1.example.com').
command: Shell command to execute on the target node.
timeout: Timeout in seconds (default: 120).
"""
node_id = node_id.strip()
if not node_id:
return json.dumps({"error": "node_id must be a non-empty string"})
cmd_err = _validate_command(command)
if cmd_err:
return json.dumps({"error": cmd_err})
redis_kw: dict[str, Any] = ctx.request_context.lifespan_context["redis_kwargs"]
max_output = _DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT
log.info("run_on_node node=%s cmd=%r", node_id, command)
_, result = await asyncio.to_thread(
_exec_on_node_sync, redis_kw, node_id, command, _clamp_timeout(timeout)
)
formatted = _format_node_result(node_id, result, max_output)
return json.dumps(formatted, indent=2)
@mcp.tool()
async def run_on_nodes(
node_ids: list[str],
command: str,
ctx: Context[Any, Any, Any],
timeout: int = _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
) -> str:
"""Execute a shell command on specific nodes in parallel.
Results are collected from each node. Total wall time is bounded by
the slowest node rather than the sum.
Args:
node_ids: List of node IDs to target.
command: Shell command to execute.
timeout: Timeout per node in seconds (default: 120).
"""
cmd_err = _validate_command(command)
if cmd_err:
return json.dumps({"error": cmd_err})
redis_kw: dict[str, Any] = ctx.request_context.lifespan_context["redis_kwargs"]
max_output = _DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT
clean_ids = list(dict.fromkeys(nid.strip() for nid in node_ids if nid.strip()))
if not clean_ids:
return json.dumps({"error": "node_ids must be a non-empty list"})
if len(clean_ids) > _MAX_CONCURRENT_NODES:
return json.dumps(
{"error": f"Too many nodes ({len(clean_ids)}), max is {_MAX_CONCURRENT_NODES}"}
)
log.info("run_on_nodes nodes=%s cmd=%r", clean_ids, command)
results = await _dispatch_parallel(
redis_kw, clean_ids, command, _clamp_timeout(timeout), max_output
)
return json.dumps(results, indent=2)
@mcp.tool()
async def run_on_all_nodes(
command: str,
ctx: Context[Any, Any, Any],
timeout: int = _DEFAULT_TIMEOUT,
) -> str:
"""Execute a shell command on ALL active nodes in parallel.
Discovers nodes automatically, then dispatches in parallel. Useful for
cluster-wide operations like checking disk usage, GPU status, or
running processes.
Args:
command: Shell command to execute on every node.
timeout: Timeout per node in seconds (default: 120).
"""
cmd_err = _validate_command(command)
if cmd_err:
return json.dumps({"error": cmd_err})
redis_kw: dict[str, Any] = ctx.request_context.lifespan_context["redis_kwargs"]
max_output = _DEFAULT_MAX_OUTPUT
nodes = await _list_nodes_impl(redis_kw)
if not nodes:
return json.dumps({"error": "No active nodes found in cluster"})
node_ids = list(
dict.fromkeys(
nid.strip() for n in nodes if (nid := n.get("node_id") or n.get("id")) and nid.strip()
)
)
if not node_ids:
return json.dumps({"error": "No nodes with identifiable IDs found"})
if len(node_ids) > _MAX_CONCURRENT_NODES:
return json.dumps(
{"error": f"Too many nodes ({len(node_ids)}), max is {_MAX_CONCURRENT_NODES}"}
)
log.info("run_on_all_nodes nodes=%s cmd=%r", node_ids, command)
results = await _dispatch_parallel(
redis_kw, node_ids, command, _clamp_timeout(timeout), max_output
)
return json.dumps(results, indent=2)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Entry point
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def main() -> None:
"""Run the MCP cluster-ops server via stdio transport."""
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
mcp.run(transport="stdio")
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
[build-system]
requires = ["hatchling>=1.29"]
build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[project]
name = "mcp-cluster-ops"
version = "0.1.0"
description = "MCP server for Turnstone cluster operations — reference implementation."
requires-python = ">=3.11"
license = "BUSL-1.1"
dependencies = [
"turnstone[mq]",
"mcp>=1.6",
]
[project.scripts]
mcp-cluster-ops = "mcp_cluster_ops.server:main"
[project.optional-dependencies]
test = ["pytest>=9.0"]
dev = ["ruff>=0.9", "mypy>=1.14", "types-redis>=4.6"]
[tool.pytest.ini_options]
testpaths = ["tests"]
[tool.ruff]
target-version = "py311"
line-length = 100
[tool.ruff.lint]
select = ["E", "F", "W", "I", "N", "UP", "B", "A", "SIM", "TCH"]
ignore = ["E501"]
[tool.ruff.format]
quote-style = "double"
[tool.mypy]
python_version = "3.11"
strict = true
warn_return_any = true
warn_unused_configs = true
disallow_untyped_defs = true
disallow_incomplete_defs = true
check_untyped_defs = true
no_implicit_optional = true
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = ["mcp", "mcp.*"]
ignore_missing_imports = true
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = ["turnstone", "turnstone.*"]
ignore_missing_imports = true
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = "tests.*"
disallow_untyped_defs = false
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
"""Tests for pure helper functions in mcp_cluster_ops.server."""
from __future__ import annotations
from turnstone.mq.client import TurnResult
from mcp_cluster_ops.server import (
_clamp_timeout,
_exec_prompt,
_extract_output,
_format_node_result,
_truncate,
_validate_command,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _truncate
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestTruncate:
def test_empty_string(self):
assert _truncate("", 100) == ""
def test_under_limit(self):
assert _truncate("hello", 100) == "hello"
def test_at_limit(self):
text = "x" * 50
assert _truncate(text, 50) == text
def test_over_limit(self):
text = "x" * 200
result = _truncate(text, 50)
assert result.startswith("x" * 50)
assert "truncated" in result
assert "150 bytes omitted" in result
def test_unicode_boundary(self):
# U+00E9 (é) is 2 bytes in UTF-8 (0xC3 0xA9), so 5 chars = 10 bytes
text = "\u00e9\u00e9\u00e9\u00e9\u00e9"
result = _truncate(text, 5)
# Should not crash, should truncate cleanly
assert "truncated" in result
def test_zero_disables(self):
text = "x" * 10000
assert _truncate(text, 0) == text
def test_custom_max(self):
text = "abcdefghij" # 10 bytes
result = _truncate(text, 5)
assert result.startswith("abcde")
assert "truncated" in result
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _extract_output
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExtractOutput:
def test_bash_result_preferred(self):
r = TurnResult(
content_parts=["agent said something"],
tool_results=[("bash", "raw output")],
)
assert _extract_output(r) == "raw output"
def test_multiple_bash_results_joined(self):
r = TurnResult(
tool_results=[("bash", "line1"), ("bash", "line2")],
)
assert _extract_output(r) == "line1\nline2"
def test_content_fallback(self):
r = TurnResult(
content_parts=["agent response"],
tool_results=[("read_file", "file contents")],
)
assert _extract_output(r) == "agent response"
def test_any_tool_fallback(self):
r = TurnResult(
tool_results=[("read_file", "file contents")],
)
assert _extract_output(r) == "file contents"
def test_empty_result(self):
r = TurnResult()
assert _extract_output(r) == ""
def test_bash_preferred_over_content(self):
r = TurnResult(
content_parts=["I ran the command"],
tool_results=[("read_file", "data"), ("bash", "output")],
)
assert _extract_output(r) == "output"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _exec_prompt
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExecPrompt:
def test_contains_command(self):
result = _exec_prompt("ls -la /tmp")
assert "ls -la /tmp" in result
def test_suppression_instruction(self):
result = _exec_prompt("echo hello")
assert "Do NOT repeat" in result
assert "ok" in result.lower() or "failed" in result.lower()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _format_node_result
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestFormatNodeResult:
def test_success(self):
r = TurnResult(tool_results=[("bash", "output data")])
fmt = _format_node_result("node-1", r, 8192)
assert fmt["node"] == "node-1"
assert fmt["ok"] is True
assert fmt["output"] == "output data"
assert "timed_out" not in fmt
def test_timeout(self):
r = TurnResult(timed_out=True)
fmt = _format_node_result("node-1", r, 8192)
assert fmt["ok"] is False
assert fmt["timed_out"] is True
def test_error(self):
r = TurnResult(errors=["connection refused"])
fmt = _format_node_result("node-1", r, 8192)
assert fmt["ok"] is False
assert fmt["error"] == "connection refused"
def test_truncation_applied(self):
r = TurnResult(tool_results=[("bash", "x" * 200)])
fmt = _format_node_result("node-1", r, 50)
assert "truncated" in fmt["output"]
def test_unlimited_output(self):
big = "x" * 100000
r = TurnResult(tool_results=[("bash", big)])
fmt = _format_node_result("node-1", r, 0)
assert fmt["output"] == big
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _validate_command
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestValidateCommand:
def test_valid(self):
assert _validate_command("ls -la") is None
def test_empty(self):
assert _validate_command("") is not None
def test_whitespace_only(self):
assert _validate_command(" ") is not None
def test_too_long(self):
err = _validate_command("x" * 100000)
assert err is not None
assert "too long" in err
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _clamp_timeout
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestClampTimeout:
def test_normal(self):
assert _clamp_timeout(60) == 60.0
def test_too_low(self):
assert _clamp_timeout(1) == 5.0
def test_too_high(self):
assert _clamp_timeout(99999) == 3600.0
def test_negative(self):
assert _clamp_timeout(-1) == 5.0
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
"""Tests for MCP tool handlers with mocked TurnstoneClient."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from typing import Any
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from turnstone.mq.client import TurnResult
from mcp_cluster_ops.server import (
_dispatch_parallel,
_exec_on_node_sync,
_list_nodes_impl,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _list_nodes_impl
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestListNodesImpl:
def test_returns_nodes(self):
nodes = [{"node_id": "a", "model": "gpt-5"}, {"node_id": "b", "model": "gpt-5"}]
with patch("mcp_cluster_ops.server.TurnstoneClient") as mock_cls:
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.list_nodes.return_value = nodes
mock_cls.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=mock_client)
mock_cls.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
result = asyncio.run(_list_nodes_impl({"host": "localhost"}))
assert result == nodes
def test_empty_cluster(self):
with patch("mcp_cluster_ops.server.TurnstoneClient") as mock_cls:
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.list_nodes.return_value = []
mock_cls.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=mock_client)
mock_cls.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
result = asyncio.run(_list_nodes_impl({"host": "localhost"}))
assert result == []
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _exec_on_node_sync
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestExecOnNodeSync:
def test_success(self):
turn_result = TurnResult(
tool_results=[("bash", "hello world")],
)
with patch("mcp_cluster_ops.server.TurnstoneClient") as mock_cls:
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.send_and_wait.return_value = turn_result
mock_cls.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=mock_client)
mock_cls.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
node_id, result = _exec_on_node_sync(
{"host": "localhost"}, "node-1", "echo hello", 60.0
)
assert node_id == "node-1"
assert result.ok
mock_client.send_and_wait.assert_called_once()
call_kwargs = mock_client.send_and_wait.call_args
assert call_kwargs.kwargs["target_node"] == "node-1"
assert call_kwargs.kwargs["auto_approve"] is True
def test_timeout(self):
turn_result = TurnResult(timed_out=True)
with patch("mcp_cluster_ops.server.TurnstoneClient") as mock_cls:
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.send_and_wait.return_value = turn_result
mock_cls.return_value.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=mock_client)
mock_cls.return_value.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
_, result = _exec_on_node_sync({"host": "localhost"}, "node-1", "sleep 9999", 1.0)
assert result.timed_out
assert not result.ok
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _dispatch_parallel
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestDispatchParallel:
def test_parallel_success(self):
def fake_exec(redis_kw: Any, node_id: str, command: str, timeout: float) -> Any:
return (node_id, TurnResult(tool_results=[("bash", f"output-{node_id}")]))
with patch("mcp_cluster_ops.server._exec_on_node_sync", side_effect=fake_exec):
results = asyncio.run(
_dispatch_parallel(
{"host": "localhost"},
["a", "b", "c"],
"echo hi",
60.0,
8192,
)
)
assert len(results) == 3
assert all(r["ok"] for r in results)
outputs = {r["node"]: r["output"] for r in results}
assert outputs["a"] == "output-a"
assert outputs["b"] == "output-b"
def test_partial_failure(self):
def fake_exec(redis_kw: Any, node_id: str, command: str, timeout: float) -> Any:
if node_id == "bad":
raise ConnectionError("Redis down")
return (node_id, TurnResult(tool_results=[("bash", "ok")]))
with patch("mcp_cluster_ops.server._exec_on_node_sync", side_effect=fake_exec):
results = asyncio.run(
_dispatch_parallel(
{"host": "localhost"},
["good", "bad"],
"echo hi",
60.0,
8192,
)
)
assert len(results) == 2
good = next(r for r in results if r["node"] == "good")
bad = next(r for r in results if r["node"] == "bad")
assert good["ok"] is True
assert bad["ok"] is False
assert "Redis down" in bad["error"]
def test_all_fail(self):
def fake_exec(redis_kw: Any, node_id: str, command: str, timeout: float) -> Any:
raise RuntimeError(f"fail-{node_id}")
with patch("mcp_cluster_ops.server._exec_on_node_sync", side_effect=fake_exec):
results = asyncio.run(
_dispatch_parallel(
{"host": "localhost"},
["a", "b"],
"echo hi",
60.0,
8192,
)
)
assert all(not r["ok"] for r in results)
assert "fail-a" in results[0]["error"]
assert "fail-b" in results[1]["error"]
+13 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[project]
name = "turnstone"
version = "0.5.3"
version = "0.8.6"
description = "Multi-node AI orchestration platform with tool use, agent routing, and cluster simulation."
readme = "README.md"
license = "BUSL-1.1"
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ dependencies = [
"structlog>=24.1",
"PyJWT>=2.8",
"bcrypt>=4.0",
"python-frontmatter>=1.0",
]
[project.urls]
@@ -50,8 +51,9 @@ console = ["redis>=7.2", "croniter>=3.0"]
sim = ["redis>=7.2"]
anthropic = ["anthropic>=0.39"]
postgres = ["psycopg[binary]>=3.2"]
ddg = ["ddgs>=9.0"]
discord = ["discord.py>=2.4", "redis>=7.2"]
all = ["turnstone[mq,console,sim,anthropic,postgres,discord,ddg]"]
[project.scripts]
turnstone = "turnstone.cli:main"
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ turnstone-console = "turnstone.console.server:main"
turnstone-sim = "turnstone.sim.cli:main"
turnstone-admin = "turnstone.admin:main"
turnstone-channel = "turnstone.channels.cli:main"
turnstone-bootstrap = "turnstone.bootstrap:main"
[tool.hatch.build.targets.wheel]
include = [
@@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ include = [
"turnstone/console/static/*.js",
"turnstone/shared_static/*.css",
"turnstone/shared_static/*.js",
"turnstone/shared_static/katex-0.16.40/**/*",
"turnstone/shared_static/hljs-11.11.1/**/*",
"turnstone/shared_static/mermaid-11.13.0/**/*",
"turnstone/sdk/py.typed",
]
@@ -89,6 +95,7 @@ line-length = 100
[tool.ruff.lint]
select = ["E", "F", "W", "I", "N", "UP", "B", "A", "SIM", "TCH"]
ignore = ["E501"]
per-file-ignores = { "turnstone/core/sandbox.py" = ["N802"] }
[tool.ruff.format]
quote-style = "double"
@@ -154,6 +161,10 @@ ignore_missing_imports = true
module = ["croniter", "croniter.*"]
ignore_missing_imports = true
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = ["frontmatter", "frontmatter.*"]
ignore_missing_imports = true
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = ["turnstone.channels.discord.*"]
disallow_subclassing_any = false
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Update a vendored JavaScript library in turnstone/shared_static/.
#
# Usage:
# scripts/update-vendored-js.sh katex 0.16.39
# scripts/update-vendored-js.sh hljs 11.12.0
# scripts/update-vendored-js.sh mermaid 11.14.0
#
# This script:
# 1. Downloads the new version from CDN
# 2. Creates the new versioned directory
# 3. Updates all version references in source files
# 4. Removes the old versioned directory
set -euo pipefail
STATIC_DIR="turnstone/shared_static"
CDN="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm"
usage() {
echo "Usage: $0 <katex|hljs|mermaid> <version>"
echo "Example: $0 katex 0.16.39"
exit 1
}
[[ $# -eq 2 ]] || usage
LIB="$1"
VERSION="$2"
# Detect current version from the filesystem (not pyproject.toml, which
# Renovate may have already updated). Falls back to pyproject.toml if
# no directory is found.
detect_old_version() {
local pattern="$1"
# Look for existing directory: e.g. turnstone/shared_static/katex-0.16.38
local dir
dir=$(find "${STATIC_DIR}" -maxdepth 1 -type d -name "${pattern}-*" | head -1)
if [[ -n "$dir" ]]; then
basename "$dir" | sed "s/${pattern}-//"
return
fi
# Fallback to pyproject.toml
grep -oE "${pattern}-[0-9.]+" pyproject.toml | head -1 | sed "s/${pattern}-//"
}
# Update version references across all source files
update_refs() {
local old_pattern="$1" # e.g. katex-0.16.38
local new_pattern="$2" # e.g. katex-0.16.39
# Find all files with version references (excludes vendored JS and worktrees)
local files
files=$(grep -rl --include='*.toml' --include='*.html' --include='*.js' --include='*.md' \
-F "$old_pattern" . \
--exclude-dir='.claude' --exclude-dir='node_modules' --exclude-dir='shared_static' \
2>/dev/null || true)
for f in $files; do
sed -i "s|${old_pattern}|${new_pattern}|g" "$f"
echo " Updated $f"
done
}
check_same_version() {
if [[ "$1" == "$2" ]]; then
echo "ERROR: Old version ($1) == new version ($2). Nothing to update."
echo "If the old directory was already removed, re-download with:"
echo " rm -rf ${STATIC_DIR}/${3}-${1} && $0 $3 $2"
exit 1
fi
}
case "$LIB" in
katex)
OLD_VERSION=$(detect_old_version "katex")
check_same_version "$OLD_VERSION" "$VERSION" "katex"
OLD_DIR="${STATIC_DIR}/katex-${OLD_VERSION}"
NEW_DIR="${STATIC_DIR}/katex-${VERSION}"
echo "Updating KaTeX ${OLD_VERSION} -> ${VERSION}"
mkdir -p "${NEW_DIR}/fonts"
echo " Downloading katex.min.js..."
curl -sSfL "${CDN}/katex@${VERSION}/dist/katex.min.js" -o "${NEW_DIR}/katex.min.js"
echo " Downloading katex.min.css..."
curl -sSfL "${CDN}/katex@${VERSION}/dist/katex.min.css" -o "${NEW_DIR}/katex.min.css"
echo " Downloading fonts..."
# Extract font filenames from the CSS
font_files=$(curl -sSfL "${CDN}/katex@${VERSION}/dist/katex.min.css" \
| grep -oE 'fonts/[^")]+' | sort -u)
for font in $font_files; do
if ! curl -sSfL "${CDN}/katex@${VERSION}/dist/${font}" -o "${NEW_DIR}/${font}" 2>/dev/null; then
echo " WARNING: Failed to download font: ${font}"
fi
done
# Copy LICENSE from old dir if present
if [[ -f "${OLD_DIR}/LICENSE" ]]; then
cp "${OLD_DIR}/LICENSE" "${NEW_DIR}/LICENSE"
fi
update_refs "katex-${OLD_VERSION}" "katex-${VERSION}"
rm -rf "${OLD_DIR}"
echo "Done. Old directory removed: ${OLD_DIR}"
;;
hljs)
OLD_VERSION=$(detect_old_version "hljs")
check_same_version "$OLD_VERSION" "$VERSION" "hljs"
OLD_DIR="${STATIC_DIR}/hljs-${OLD_VERSION}"
NEW_DIR="${STATIC_DIR}/hljs-${VERSION}"
echo "Updating Highlight.js ${OLD_VERSION} -> ${VERSION}"
mkdir -p "${NEW_DIR}"
echo " Downloading highlight.min.js..."
curl -sSfL "${CDN}/@highlightjs/cdn-assets@${VERSION}/highlight.min.js" -o "${NEW_DIR}/highlight.min.js"
if [[ -f "${OLD_DIR}/LICENSE" ]]; then
cp "${OLD_DIR}/LICENSE" "${NEW_DIR}/LICENSE"
fi
update_refs "hljs-${OLD_VERSION}" "hljs-${VERSION}"
rm -rf "${OLD_DIR}"
echo "Done. Old directory removed: ${OLD_DIR}"
;;
mermaid)
OLD_VERSION=$(detect_old_version "mermaid")
check_same_version "$OLD_VERSION" "$VERSION" "mermaid"
OLD_DIR="${STATIC_DIR}/mermaid-${OLD_VERSION}"
NEW_DIR="${STATIC_DIR}/mermaid-${VERSION}"
echo "Updating Mermaid ${OLD_VERSION} -> ${VERSION}"
mkdir -p "${NEW_DIR}"
echo " Downloading mermaid.min.js..."
curl -sSfL "${CDN}/mermaid@${VERSION}/dist/mermaid.min.js" -o "${NEW_DIR}/mermaid.min.js"
if [[ -f "${OLD_DIR}/LICENSE" ]]; then
cp "${OLD_DIR}/LICENSE" "${NEW_DIR}/LICENSE"
fi
update_refs "mermaid-${OLD_VERSION}" "mermaid-${VERSION}"
rm -rf "${OLD_DIR}"
echo "Done. Old directory removed: ${OLD_DIR}"
;;
*)
echo "Unknown library: ${LIB}"
usage
;;
esac
echo ""
echo "Verify the update:"
echo " git diff --stat"
echo " python -m turnstone.server # test locally"
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+694 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"openapi": "3.1.0",
"info": {
"title": "turnstone Server API",
"version": "0.4.2",
"version": "0.8.4",
"description": "Single-node workstream management, chat interaction, and real-time streaming."
},
"paths": {
@@ -314,6 +314,57 @@
}
}
},
"/v1/api/cancel": {
"post": {
"summary": "Cancel the active generation in a workstream",
"operationId": "v1_api_cancel_post",
"tags": [
"Chat"
],
"requestBody": {
"required": true,
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/CancelRequest"
}
}
}
},
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "Success",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/StatusResponse"
}
}
}
},
"400": {
"description": "Error 400",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
}
}
}
},
"404": {
"description": "Error 404",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"/v1/api/events": {
"get": {
"summary": "Per-workstream SSE event stream",
@@ -386,6 +437,27 @@
}
}
},
"/v1/api/skills": {
"get": {
"summary": "List available skills (summary)",
"operationId": "v1_api_skills_get",
"tags": [
"Skills"
],
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "Success",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ListSkillSummaryResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"/v1/api/auth/login": {
"post": {
"summary": "Authenticate with a token",
@@ -530,6 +602,274 @@
}
}
},
"/v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize": {
"get": {
"summary": "Redirect to OIDC provider for SSO login",
"operationId": "v1_api_auth_oidc_authorize_get",
"tags": [
"Auth"
],
"responses": {
"302": {
"description": "Success"
},
"404": {
"description": "Error 404",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
}
}
}
},
"503": {
"description": "Error 503",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback": {
"get": {
"summary": "OIDC callback \u2014 validates code, provisions user, sets JWT cookie, redirects to app",
"operationId": "v1_api_auth_oidc_callback_get",
"tags": [
"Auth"
],
"responses": {
"302": {
"description": "Success"
}
}
}
},
"/v1/api/auth/whoami": {
"get": {
"summary": "Return authenticated user info and permissions",
"operationId": "v1_api_auth_whoami_get",
"tags": [
"Auth"
],
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "Success",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/AuthWhoamiResponse"
}
}
}
},
"401": {
"description": "Error 401",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"/v1/api/memories": {
"get": {
"summary": "List structured memories",
"operationId": "v1_api_memories_get",
"tags": [
"Memories"
],
"parameters": [
{
"name": "type",
"in": "query",
"required": false,
"schema": {
"type": "string"
},
"description": "Filter by memory type"
},
{
"name": "scope",
"in": "query",
"required": false,
"schema": {
"type": "string"
},
"description": "Filter by scope"
},
{
"name": "scope_id",
"in": "query",
"required": false,
"schema": {
"type": "string"
},
"description": "Filter by scope identifier"
},
{
"name": "limit",
"in": "query",
"required": false,
"schema": {
"type": "integer",
"default": 100
},
"description": "Max results (default 100, max 200)"
}
],
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "Success",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ListMemoriesResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
},
"post": {
"summary": "Save (upsert) a structured memory",
"operationId": "v1_api_memories_post",
"tags": [
"Memories"
],
"requestBody": {
"required": true,
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/SaveMemoryRequest"
}
}
}
},
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "Success",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/MemoryInfo"
}
}
}
},
"400": {
"description": "Error 400",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"/v1/api/memories/search": {
"post": {
"summary": "Search structured memories by query",
"operationId": "v1_api_memories_search_post",
"tags": [
"Memories"
],
"requestBody": {
"required": true,
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/SearchMemoriesRequest"
}
}
}
},
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "Success",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ListMemoriesResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"/v1/api/memories/{name}": {
"delete": {
"summary": "Delete a structured memory by name and scope",
"operationId": "v1_api_memories_{name}_delete",
"tags": [
"Memories"
],
"parameters": [
{
"name": "name",
"in": "path",
"required": true,
"schema": {
"type": "string"
}
},
{
"name": "scope",
"in": "query",
"required": false,
"schema": {
"type": "string"
},
"description": "Scope (default: global)"
},
{
"name": "scope_id",
"in": "query",
"required": false,
"schema": {
"type": "string"
},
"description": "Scope identifier"
}
],
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "Success",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/StatusResponse"
}
}
}
},
"404": {
"description": "Error 404",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse"
}
}
}
}
}
}
},
"/health": {
"get": {
"summary": "Server health check",
@@ -735,6 +1075,21 @@
"setup_required": {
"title": "Setup Required",
"type": "boolean"
},
"oidc_enabled": {
"default": false,
"title": "Oidc Enabled",
"type": "boolean"
},
"oidc_provider_name": {
"default": "",
"title": "Oidc Provider Name",
"type": "string"
},
"password_enabled": {
"default": true,
"title": "Password Enabled",
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -805,7 +1160,7 @@
},
"always": {
"default": false,
"description": "Enable auto-approve for this tool",
"description": "Auto-approve the tools in this batch going forward",
"title": "Always",
"type": "boolean"
},
@@ -862,6 +1217,20 @@
"title": "CommandRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"CancelRequest": {
"properties": {
"ws_id": {
"description": "Target workstream ID",
"title": "Ws Id",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"ws_id"
],
"title": "CancelRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"CreateWorkstreamRequest": {
"properties": {
"name": {
@@ -887,6 +1256,12 @@
"description": "Workstream ID to resume atomically during creation (empty = fresh start)",
"title": "Resume Ws",
"type": "string"
},
"skill": {
"default": "",
"description": "Skill name (replaces default skills)",
"title": "Skill",
"type": "string"
}
},
"title": "CreateWorkstreamRequest",
@@ -1184,6 +1559,11 @@
"title": "Version",
"type": "string"
},
"node_id": {
"default": "",
"title": "Node Id",
"type": "string"
},
"uptime_seconds": {
"default": 0.0,
"title": "Uptime Seconds",
@@ -1194,6 +1574,12 @@
"title": "Model",
"type": "string"
},
"max_ws": {
"default": 10,
"description": "Maximum concurrent workstreams",
"title": "Max Ws",
"type": "integer"
},
"workstreams": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/WorkstreamCounts",
"default": {
@@ -1215,6 +1601,17 @@
}
],
"default": null
},
"mcp": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/McpStatus"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null
}
},
"required": [
@@ -1250,6 +1647,27 @@
"title": "BackendStatus",
"type": "object"
},
"McpStatus": {
"properties": {
"servers": {
"default": 0,
"title": "Servers",
"type": "integer"
},
"resources": {
"default": 0,
"title": "Resources",
"type": "integer"
},
"prompts": {
"default": 0,
"title": "Prompts",
"type": "integer"
}
},
"title": "McpStatus",
"type": "object"
},
"WorkstreamCounts": {
"properties": {
"total": {
@@ -1285,6 +1703,280 @@
},
"title": "WorkstreamCounts",
"type": "object"
},
"SaveMemoryRequest": {
"properties": {
"name": {
"description": "Memory identifier (normalized to snake_case)",
"title": "Name",
"type": "string"
},
"content": {
"description": "Memory content",
"maxLength": 65536,
"title": "Content",
"type": "string"
},
"description": {
"default": "",
"description": "Short description for relevance matching",
"title": "Description",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"default": "project",
"description": "Memory type",
"enum": [
"user",
"project",
"feedback",
"reference"
],
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
},
"scope": {
"default": "global",
"description": "Memory scope",
"enum": [
"global",
"workstream",
"user"
],
"title": "Scope",
"type": "string"
},
"scope_id": {
"default": "",
"description": "Scope identifier (ws_id for workstream, user_id for user scope)",
"title": "Scope Id",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"name",
"content"
],
"title": "SaveMemoryRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"MemoryInfo": {
"properties": {
"memory_id": {
"title": "Memory Id",
"type": "string"
},
"name": {
"title": "Name",
"type": "string"
},
"description": {
"default": "",
"title": "Description",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"user",
"project",
"feedback",
"reference"
],
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
},
"scope": {
"enum": [
"global",
"workstream",
"user"
],
"title": "Scope",
"type": "string"
},
"scope_id": {
"default": "",
"title": "Scope Id",
"type": "string"
},
"content": {
"title": "Content",
"type": "string"
},
"created": {
"title": "Created",
"type": "string"
},
"updated": {
"title": "Updated",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"memory_id",
"name",
"type",
"scope",
"content",
"created",
"updated"
],
"title": "MemoryInfo",
"type": "object"
},
"ListMemoriesResponse": {
"properties": {
"memories": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/MemoryInfo"
},
"title": "Memories",
"type": "array"
},
"total": {
"default": 0,
"title": "Total",
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"memories"
],
"title": "ListMemoriesResponse",
"type": "object"
},
"SearchMemoriesRequest": {
"properties": {
"query": {
"description": "Search query text",
"title": "Query",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"default": "",
"description": "Filter by memory type",
"enum": [
"",
"user",
"project",
"feedback",
"reference"
],
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
},
"scope": {
"default": "",
"description": "Filter by scope",
"enum": [
"",
"global",
"workstream",
"user"
],
"title": "Scope",
"type": "string"
},
"scope_id": {
"default": "",
"description": "Filter by scope_id",
"title": "Scope Id",
"type": "string"
},
"limit": {
"default": 20,
"description": "Max results (1-50)",
"maximum": 50,
"minimum": 1,
"title": "Limit",
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"query"
],
"title": "SearchMemoriesRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"SkillSummary": {
"properties": {
"name": {
"description": "Skill name",
"title": "Name",
"type": "string"
},
"category": {
"default": "",
"description": "Skill category",
"title": "Category",
"type": "string"
},
"description": {
"default": "",
"description": "Skill description for discovery",
"title": "Description",
"type": "string"
},
"tags": {
"description": "Semantic tags",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"title": "Tags",
"type": "array"
},
"is_default": {
"default": false,
"description": "Whether auto-applied to all sessions",
"title": "Is Default",
"type": "boolean"
},
"activation": {
"default": "named",
"description": "Activation mode: default, named, search",
"title": "Activation",
"type": "string"
},
"origin": {
"default": "manual",
"description": "Source: manual, mcp, skills.sh, github",
"title": "Origin",
"type": "string"
},
"author": {
"default": "",
"description": "Skill author",
"title": "Author",
"type": "string"
},
"version": {
"default": "1.0.0",
"description": "Skill version",
"title": "Version",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"name"
],
"title": "SkillSummary",
"type": "object"
},
"ListSkillSummaryResponse": {
"properties": {
"skills": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/components/schemas/SkillSummary"
},
"title": "Skills",
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"skills"
],
"title": "ListSkillSummaryResponse",
"type": "object"
}
}
}
+766 -847
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+2 -2
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
],
"license": "BUSL-1.1",
"devDependencies": {
"typescript": "^5.4",
"vitest": "^2.0"
"typescript": "^6.0.0",
"vitest": "^4.1"
}
}
+333
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
import { BaseClient, type ClientOptions } from "./base.js";
import type { ClusterEvent } from "./events.js";
import type {
AdminListMemoriesOptions,
AdminMemoryInfo,
AdminSearchMemoriesOptions,
AuditQueryOptions,
AuditResponse,
AuthLoginResponse,
AuthSetupResponse,
AuthStatusResponse,
@@ -11,14 +16,47 @@ import type {
ConsoleCreateWsRequest,
ConsoleCreateWsResponse,
ConsoleHealthResponse,
CreateMcpServerRequest,
CreatePolicyOptions,
CreateRoleOptions,
CreateScheduleRequest,
CreateSkillRequest,
CreateSkillResourceRequest,
ImportMcpConfigResponse,
ListAdminMemoriesResponse,
ListMcpServersResponse,
ListScheduleRunsResponse,
ListSchedulesResponse,
ListSettingSchemaResponse,
ListSettingsResponse,
ListSkillResourcesResponse,
ListSkillsResponse,
McpServerDetail,
RegistryInstallRequest,
RegistrySearchResponse,
SkillDiscoverResponse,
SkillInfo,
SkillInstallRequest,
SkillInstallResponse,
SkillResourceInfo,
NodeDetailResponse,
NodesOptions,
OrgInfo,
RoleInfo,
ScheduleInfo,
SettingInfo,
StatusResponse,
ToolPolicyInfo,
UpdateMcpServerRequest,
UpdateOrgOptions,
UpdatePolicyOptions,
UpdateRoleOptions,
UpdateScheduleRequest,
UpdateSettingOptions,
UpdateSkillRequest,
UsageQueryOptions,
UsageResponse,
UserRoleInfo,
WorkstreamsOptions,
} from "./types.js";
@@ -157,4 +195,299 @@ export class TurnstoneConsole extends BaseClient {
params: { limit: opts?.limit ?? 50 },
});
}
// -- Governance: Roles ------------------------------------------------------
async listRoles(): Promise<{ roles: RoleInfo[] }> {
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/roles");
}
async createRole(opts: CreateRoleOptions): Promise<RoleInfo> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/roles", { json: opts });
}
async updateRole(roleId: string, opts: UpdateRoleOptions): Promise<RoleInfo> {
return this.request("PUT", `/v1/api/admin/roles/${roleId}`, {
json: opts,
});
}
async deleteRole(roleId: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request("DELETE", `/v1/api/admin/roles/${roleId}`);
}
async listUserRoles(userId: string): Promise<{ roles: UserRoleInfo[] }> {
return this.request("GET", `/v1/api/admin/users/${userId}/roles`);
}
async assignRole(userId: string, roleId: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request("POST", `/v1/api/admin/users/${userId}/roles`, {
json: { role_id: roleId },
});
}
async unassignRole(userId: string, roleId: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request(
"DELETE",
`/v1/api/admin/users/${userId}/roles/${roleId}`,
);
}
// -- Governance: Organizations ----------------------------------------------
async listOrgs(): Promise<{ orgs: OrgInfo[] }> {
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/orgs");
}
async getOrg(orgId: string): Promise<OrgInfo> {
return this.request("GET", `/v1/api/admin/orgs/${orgId}`);
}
async updateOrg(orgId: string, opts: UpdateOrgOptions): Promise<OrgInfo> {
return this.request("PUT", `/v1/api/admin/orgs/${orgId}`, { json: opts });
}
// -- Governance: Tool Policies ----------------------------------------------
async listPolicies(): Promise<{ policies: ToolPolicyInfo[] }> {
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/policies");
}
async createPolicy(opts: CreatePolicyOptions): Promise<ToolPolicyInfo> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/policies", { json: opts });
}
async updatePolicy(
policyId: string,
opts: UpdatePolicyOptions,
): Promise<ToolPolicyInfo> {
return this.request("PUT", `/v1/api/admin/policies/${policyId}`, {
json: opts,
});
}
async deletePolicy(policyId: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request("DELETE", `/v1/api/admin/policies/${policyId}`);
}
// -- Governance: Skills -------------------------------------------------------
async listSkills(): Promise<SkillInfo[]> {
const resp = await this.request<ListSkillsResponse>(
"GET",
"/v1/api/admin/skills",
);
return resp.skills;
}
async createSkill(body: CreateSkillRequest): Promise<SkillInfo> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/skills", { json: body });
}
async updateSkill(
skillId: string,
body: UpdateSkillRequest,
): Promise<SkillInfo> {
return this.request("PUT", `/v1/api/admin/skills/${skillId}`, {
json: body,
});
}
async deleteSkill(skillId: string): Promise<void> {
await this.request("DELETE", `/v1/api/admin/skills/${skillId}`);
}
async listSkillResources(skillId: string): Promise<SkillResourceInfo[]> {
const resp = await this.request<ListSkillResourcesResponse>(
"GET",
`/v1/api/admin/skills/${skillId}/resources`,
);
return resp.resources;
}
async createSkillResource(
skillId: string,
body: CreateSkillResourceRequest,
): Promise<SkillResourceInfo> {
return this.request("POST", `/v1/api/admin/skills/${skillId}/resources`, {
json: body,
});
}
async deleteSkillResource(skillId: string, path: string): Promise<void> {
await this.request(
"DELETE",
`/v1/api/admin/skills/${skillId}/resources/${path.split("/").map(encodeURIComponent).join("/")}`,
);
}
// -- Governance: Usage & Audit ----------------------------------------------
async getUsage(opts: UsageQueryOptions): Promise<UsageResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string> = { since: opts.since };
if (opts.until) params.until = opts.until;
if (opts.user_id) params.user_id = opts.user_id;
if (opts.model) params.model = opts.model;
if (opts.group_by) params.group_by = opts.group_by;
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/usage", { params });
}
async getAudit(opts?: AuditQueryOptions): Promise<AuditResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string> = {};
if (opts?.action) params.action = opts.action;
if (opts?.user_id) params.user_id = opts.user_id;
if (opts?.since) params.since = opts.since;
if (opts?.until) params.until = opts.until;
if (opts?.limit !== undefined) params.limit = String(opts.limit);
if (opts?.offset !== undefined) params.offset = String(opts.offset);
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/audit", { params });
}
// -- Admin: Memories ------------------------------------------------------
async listMemories(
opts?: AdminListMemoriesOptions,
): Promise<ListAdminMemoriesResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string | number> = {};
if (opts?.type) params.type = opts.type;
if (opts?.scope) params.scope = opts.scope;
if (opts?.scope_id) params.scope_id = opts.scope_id;
if (opts?.limit !== undefined) params.limit = opts.limit;
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/memories", { params });
}
async searchMemories(
opts: AdminSearchMemoriesOptions,
): Promise<ListAdminMemoriesResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string | number> = { q: opts.q };
if (opts.type) params.type = opts.type;
if (opts.scope) params.scope = opts.scope;
if (opts.scope_id) params.scope_id = opts.scope_id;
if (opts.limit !== undefined) params.limit = opts.limit;
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/memories/search", { params });
}
async getMemory(memoryId: string): Promise<AdminMemoryInfo> {
return this.request("GET", `/v1/api/admin/memories/${memoryId}`);
}
async deleteMemory(memoryId: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request("DELETE", `/v1/api/admin/memories/${memoryId}`);
}
// -- System: Settings -------------------------------------------------------
async listSettings(): Promise<ListSettingsResponse> {
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/settings");
}
async getSettingsSchema(): Promise<ListSettingSchemaResponse> {
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/settings/schema");
}
async updateSetting(
key: string,
opts: UpdateSettingOptions,
): Promise<SettingInfo> {
return this.request("PUT", `/v1/api/admin/settings/${key}`, {
json: opts,
});
}
async deleteSetting(key: string, nodeId?: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string> = {};
if (nodeId) params.node_id = nodeId;
return this.request("DELETE", `/v1/api/admin/settings/${key}`, {
params,
});
}
// -- MCP servers ----------------------------------------------------------
async listMcpServers(opts?: {
reveal?: boolean;
}): Promise<ListMcpServersResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string> = {};
if (opts?.reveal) params.reveal = "true";
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers", { params });
}
async createMcpServer(
body: CreateMcpServerRequest,
): Promise<McpServerDetail> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers", { json: body });
}
async getMcpServer(serverId: string): Promise<McpServerDetail> {
return this.request("GET", `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/${serverId}`);
}
async updateMcpServer(
serverId: string,
body: UpdateMcpServerRequest,
): Promise<McpServerDetail> {
return this.request("PUT", `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/${serverId}`, {
json: body,
});
}
async deleteMcpServer(serverId: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request("DELETE", `/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/${serverId}`);
}
async reloadMcpServers(): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/reload");
}
async importMcpConfig(
config: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<ImportMcpConfigResponse> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/import", {
json: { config },
});
}
// -- MCP Registry ---------------------------------------------------------
async searchMcpRegistry(opts?: {
q?: string;
limit?: number;
cursor?: string;
}): Promise<RegistrySearchResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string> = {};
if (opts?.q) params.search = opts.q;
if (opts?.limit) params.limit = String(opts.limit);
if (opts?.cursor) params.cursor = opts.cursor;
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/search", {
params,
});
}
async installFromRegistry(
body: RegistryInstallRequest,
): Promise<McpServerDetail> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/mcp-registry/install", {
json: body,
});
}
// -- Skill Discovery ------------------------------------------------------
async discoverSkills(opts?: {
q?: string;
limit?: number;
}): Promise<SkillDiscoverResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string> = {};
if (opts?.q) params.q = opts.q;
if (opts?.limit) params.limit = String(opts.limit);
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/admin/skills/discover", {
params,
});
}
async installSkill(body: SkillInstallRequest): Promise<SkillInstallResponse> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/admin/skills/install", {
json: body,
});
}
}
+26
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ export interface ApproveRequestEvent {
items: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
}
export interface ApprovalResolvedEvent {
type: "approval_resolved";
approved: boolean;
feedback: string;
}
export interface ToolResultEvent {
type: "tool_result";
call_id: string;
@@ -69,6 +75,8 @@ export interface StatusEvent {
context_window: number;
pct: number;
effort: string;
cache_creation_tokens?: number;
cache_read_tokens?: number;
}
export interface PlanReviewEvent {
@@ -95,6 +103,10 @@ export interface ClearUiEvent {
type: "clear_ui";
}
export interface CancelledEvent {
type: "cancelled";
}
// Global events
export interface WsStateEvent {
@@ -105,6 +117,8 @@ export interface WsStateEvent {
context_ratio: number;
activity: string;
activity_state: string;
/** Full assistant response text — populated on idle transitions only. */
content?: string;
}
export interface WsActivityEvent {
@@ -137,6 +151,7 @@ export type ServerEvent =
| StreamEndEvent
| ToolInfoEvent
| ApproveRequestEvent
| ApprovalResolvedEvent
| ToolResultEvent
| ToolOutputChunkEvent
| StatusEvent
@@ -145,6 +160,7 @@ export type ServerEvent =
| ErrorEvent
| BusyErrorEvent
| ClearUiEvent
| CancelledEvent
| WsStateEvent
| WsActivityEvent
| WsRenameEvent
@@ -244,6 +260,16 @@ export function isApproveRequestEvent(
return e.type === "approve_request";
}
export function isApprovalResolvedEvent(
e: ServerEvent,
): e is ApprovalResolvedEvent {
return e.type === "approval_resolved";
}
export function isPlanReviewEvent(e: ServerEvent): e is PlanReviewEvent {
return e.type === "plan_review";
}
export function isCancelledEvent(e: ServerEvent): e is CancelledEvent {
return e.type === "cancelled";
}
+64
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ export type {
StreamEndEvent,
ToolInfoEvent,
ApproveRequestEvent,
ApprovalResolvedEvent,
ToolResultEvent,
ToolOutputChunkEvent,
StatusEvent,
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ export type {
ErrorEvent,
BusyErrorEvent,
ClearUiEvent,
CancelledEvent,
WsStateEvent,
WsActivityEvent,
WsRenameEvent,
@@ -66,7 +68,9 @@ export {
isToolResultEvent,
isWsStateEvent,
isApproveRequestEvent,
isApprovalResolvedEvent,
isPlanReviewEvent,
isCancelledEvent,
} from "./events.js";
// Request/response types
@@ -87,6 +91,7 @@ export type {
SavedWorkstreamInfo,
ListSavedWorkstreamsResponse,
BackendStatus,
McpStatus,
WorkstreamCounts,
HealthResponse,
AuthLoginRequest,
@@ -112,10 +117,69 @@ export type {
ScheduleRunInfo,
ListSchedulesResponse,
ListScheduleRunsResponse,
RoleInfo,
CreateRoleOptions,
UpdateRoleOptions,
UserRoleInfo,
OrgInfo,
UpdateOrgOptions,
ToolPolicyInfo,
CreatePolicyOptions,
UpdatePolicyOptions,
SkillSummary,
SkillInfo,
CreateSkillRequest,
UpdateSkillRequest,
ListSkillsResponse,
SkillResourceInfo,
ListSkillResourcesResponse,
CreateSkillResourceRequest,
UsageBreakdownItem,
UsageResponse,
UsageQueryOptions,
AuditEventInfo,
AuditQueryOptions,
AuditResponse,
TurnResult,
SendAndWaitOptions,
NodesOptions,
WorkstreamsOptions,
// Memory types
SaveMemoryRequest,
MemoryInfo,
ListMemoriesResponse,
SearchMemoriesRequest,
ListMemoriesOptions,
DeleteMemoryOptions,
AdminMemoryInfo,
ListAdminMemoriesResponse,
AdminListMemoriesOptions,
AdminSearchMemoriesOptions,
// Settings types
SettingInfo,
ListSettingsResponse,
SettingSchemaInfo,
ListSettingSchemaResponse,
UpdateSettingOptions,
// MCP server types
McpServerStatus,
McpServerDetail,
ListMcpServersResponse,
CreateMcpServerRequest,
UpdateMcpServerRequest,
ImportMcpConfigResponse,
// MCP registry types
RegistryRemoteInfo,
RegistryPackageInfo,
RegistryServerInfo,
RegistrySearchResponse,
RegistryInstallRequest,
// Skill discovery types
SkillDiscoverListing,
SkillDiscoverResponse,
SkillInstallRequest,
SkillInstallResponse,
SkillInstallSkipped,
} from "./types.js";
// SSE parser (for advanced usage)
+56
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,16 @@ import type {
CreateWorkstreamRequest,
CreateWorkstreamResponse,
DashboardResponse,
DeleteMemoryOptions,
HealthResponse,
ListMemoriesOptions,
ListMemoriesResponse,
ListSavedWorkstreamsResponse,
SkillSummary,
ListWorkstreamsResponse,
MemoryInfo,
SaveMemoryRequest,
SearchMemoriesRequest,
SendAndWaitOptions,
SendResponse,
StatusResponse,
@@ -86,6 +93,12 @@ export class TurnstoneServer extends BaseClient {
});
}
async cancel(wsId: string): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/cancel", {
json: { ws_id: wsId },
});
}
// -- Streaming ------------------------------------------------------------
async *streamEvents(wsId: string): AsyncIterableIterator<ServerEvent> {
@@ -184,6 +197,49 @@ export class TurnstoneServer extends BaseClient {
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/workstreams/saved");
}
// -- Skills -----------------------------------------------------------------
async listSkills(): Promise<SkillSummary[]> {
const resp = await this.request<{ skills: SkillSummary[] }>(
"GET",
"/v1/api/skills",
);
return resp.skills;
}
// -- Memories -------------------------------------------------------------
async listMemories(
opts?: ListMemoriesOptions,
): Promise<ListMemoriesResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string | number> = {};
if (opts?.type) params.type = opts.type;
if (opts?.scope) params.scope = opts.scope;
if (opts?.scope_id) params.scope_id = opts.scope_id;
if (opts?.limit !== undefined) params.limit = opts.limit;
return this.request("GET", "/v1/api/memories", { params });
}
async saveMemory(opts: SaveMemoryRequest): Promise<MemoryInfo> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/memories", { json: opts });
}
async searchMemories(
opts: SearchMemoriesRequest,
): Promise<ListMemoriesResponse> {
return this.request("POST", "/v1/api/memories/search", { json: opts });
}
async deleteMemory(
name: string,
opts?: DeleteMemoryOptions,
): Promise<StatusResponse> {
const params: Record<string, string> = {};
if (opts?.scope) params.scope = opts.scope;
if (opts?.scope_id) params.scope_id = opts.scope_id;
return this.request("DELETE", `/v1/api/memories/${name}`, { params });
}
// -- Auth -----------------------------------------------------------------
async login(opts: {
+550
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ export interface CreateWorkstreamRequest {
model?: string;
auto_approve?: boolean;
resume_ws?: string;
skill?: string;
}
export interface CreateWorkstreamResponse {
@@ -141,6 +142,136 @@ export interface ListSavedWorkstreamsResponse {
workstreams: SavedWorkstreamInfo[];
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Server API — Skills
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface SkillSummary {
name: string;
category: string;
description: string;
tags: string[];
is_default: boolean;
activation: string;
origin: string;
author: string;
version: string;
}
export interface SkillInfo {
template_id: string;
name: string;
category: string;
content: string;
description: string;
tags: string[];
variables: string;
is_default: boolean;
activation: string;
org_id: string;
created_by: string;
origin: string;
mcp_server: string;
readonly: boolean;
source_url: string;
version: string;
author: string;
token_estimate: number;
model: string;
auto_approve: boolean;
temperature: number | null;
reasoning_effort: string;
max_tokens: number | null;
token_budget: number;
agent_max_turns: number | null;
notify_on_complete: string;
enabled: boolean;
priority: number;
allowed_tools: string;
license: string;
compatibility: string;
resource_count: number;
created: string;
updated: string;
}
export interface CreateSkillRequest {
name: string;
content: string;
category?: string;
description?: string;
tags?: string;
variables?: string;
is_default?: boolean;
activation?: string;
org_id?: string;
author?: string;
version?: string;
model?: string;
auto_approve?: boolean;
temperature?: number | null;
reasoning_effort?: string;
max_tokens?: number | null;
token_budget?: number;
agent_max_turns?: number | null;
notify_on_complete?: string;
enabled?: boolean;
priority?: number;
allowed_tools?: string;
license?: string;
compatibility?: string;
}
export interface UpdateSkillRequest {
name?: string;
content?: string;
category?: string;
description?: string;
tags?: string;
variables?: string;
is_default?: boolean;
activation?: string;
author?: string;
version?: string;
model?: string;
auto_approve?: boolean;
temperature?: number | null;
reasoning_effort?: string;
max_tokens?: number | null;
token_budget?: number;
agent_max_turns?: number | null;
notify_on_complete?: string;
enabled?: boolean;
priority?: number;
allowed_tools?: string;
license?: string;
compatibility?: string;
}
export interface ListSkillsResponse {
skills: SkillInfo[];
}
export interface SkillResourceInfo {
resource_id: string;
skill_id: string;
path: string;
content?: string;
content_type: string;
size: number;
created: string;
}
export interface ListSkillResourcesResponse {
resources: SkillResourceInfo[];
}
export interface CreateSkillResourceRequest {
path: string;
content: string;
content_type?: string;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Server API — Health
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -159,6 +290,12 @@ export interface WorkstreamCounts {
error?: number;
}
export interface McpStatus {
servers: number;
resources: number;
prompts: number;
}
export interface HealthResponse {
status: string;
version?: string;
@@ -166,6 +303,7 @@ export interface HealthResponse {
model?: string;
workstreams?: WorkstreamCounts;
backend?: BackendStatus | null;
mcp?: McpStatus | null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -266,6 +404,8 @@ export interface ConsoleCreateWsRequest {
name?: string;
model?: string;
initial_message?: string;
skill?: string;
resume_ws?: string;
}
export interface ConsoleCreateWsResponse {
@@ -354,6 +494,139 @@ export interface ListScheduleRunsResponse {
runs: ScheduleRunInfo[];
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Console API — Governance: Roles
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface RoleInfo {
role_id: string;
name: string;
display_name: string;
permissions: string;
builtin: boolean;
org_id: string;
created: string;
updated: string;
}
export interface CreateRoleOptions {
name: string;
display_name?: string;
permissions?: string;
}
export interface UpdateRoleOptions {
display_name?: string;
permissions?: string;
}
export interface UserRoleInfo extends RoleInfo {
assigned_by: string;
assignment_created: string;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Console API — Governance: Orgs
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface OrgInfo {
org_id: string;
name: string;
display_name: string;
settings: string;
created: string;
updated: string;
}
export interface UpdateOrgOptions {
display_name?: string;
settings?: string;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Console API — Governance: Tool Policies
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface ToolPolicyInfo {
policy_id: string;
name: string;
tool_pattern: string;
action: string;
priority: number;
org_id: string;
enabled: boolean;
created_by: string;
created: string;
updated: string;
}
export interface CreatePolicyOptions {
name: string;
tool_pattern: string;
action: string;
priority?: number;
org_id?: string;
enabled?: boolean;
}
export interface UpdatePolicyOptions {
name?: string;
tool_pattern?: string;
action?: string;
priority?: number;
enabled?: boolean;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Console API — Governance: Usage & Audit
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface UsageBreakdownItem {
key?: string;
prompt_tokens: number;
completion_tokens: number;
tool_calls_count: number;
}
export interface UsageResponse {
summary: UsageBreakdownItem[];
breakdown: UsageBreakdownItem[];
}
export interface UsageQueryOptions {
since: string;
until?: string;
user_id?: string;
model?: string;
group_by?: string;
}
export interface AuditEventInfo {
event_id: string;
timestamp: string;
user_id: string;
action: string;
resource_type: string;
resource_id: string;
detail: string;
ip_address: string;
created: string;
}
export interface AuditQueryOptions {
action?: string;
user_id?: string;
since?: string;
until?: string;
limit?: number;
offset?: number;
}
export interface AuditResponse {
events: AuditEventInfo[];
total: number;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// SDK-specific types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -391,5 +664,282 @@ export interface WorkstreamsOptions {
per_page?: number;
}
// -- Server API: Memories ---------------------------------------------------
export interface SaveMemoryRequest {
name: string;
content: string;
description?: string;
type?: "user" | "project" | "feedback" | "reference";
scope?: "global" | "workstream" | "user";
scope_id?: string;
}
export interface MemoryInfo {
memory_id: string;
name: string;
description: string;
type: string;
scope: string;
scope_id: string;
content: string;
created: string;
updated: string;
}
export interface ListMemoriesResponse {
memories: MemoryInfo[];
total: number;
}
export interface SearchMemoriesRequest {
query: string;
type?: string;
scope?: string;
scope_id?: string;
limit?: number;
}
export interface ListMemoriesOptions {
type?: string;
scope?: string;
scope_id?: string;
limit?: number;
}
export interface DeleteMemoryOptions {
scope?: string;
scope_id?: string;
}
// -- Console API: Admin Memories --------------------------------------------
export interface AdminMemoryInfo {
memory_id: string;
name: string;
description: string;
type: string;
scope: string;
scope_id: string;
content: string;
created: string;
updated: string;
last_accessed: string;
access_count: number;
}
export interface ListAdminMemoriesResponse {
memories: AdminMemoryInfo[];
total: number;
}
export interface AdminListMemoriesOptions {
type?: string;
scope?: string;
scope_id?: string;
limit?: number;
}
export interface AdminSearchMemoriesOptions {
q: string;
type?: string;
scope?: string;
scope_id?: string;
limit?: number;
}
// -- Console API: MCP Servers -----------------------------------------------
export interface McpServerStatus {
connected: boolean;
tools: number;
resources: number;
prompts: number;
error: string;
}
export interface McpServerDetail {
server_id: string;
name: string;
transport: string;
command: string;
args: string;
url: string;
headers: string;
env: string;
auto_approve: boolean;
enabled: boolean;
created_by: string;
registry_name: string | null;
registry_version: string;
registry_meta: string;
created: string;
updated: string;
status: Record<string, McpServerStatus>;
}
export interface ListMcpServersResponse {
servers: McpServerDetail[];
}
export interface CreateMcpServerRequest {
name: string;
transport: string;
command?: string;
args?: string[];
url?: string;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
env?: Record<string, string>;
auto_approve?: boolean;
enabled?: boolean;
}
export interface UpdateMcpServerRequest {
name?: string;
transport?: string;
command?: string;
args?: string[];
url?: string;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
env?: Record<string, string>;
auto_approve?: boolean;
enabled?: boolean;
}
export interface ImportMcpConfigResponse {
imported: string[];
skipped: string[];
errors: string[];
}
// -- Console API: MCP Registry ----------------------------------------------
export interface RegistryRemoteInfo {
type: string;
url: string;
headers: Record<string, unknown>[];
variables: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>;
}
export interface RegistryPackageInfo {
registry_type: string;
identifier: string;
version: string;
transport_type: string;
environment_variables: Record<string, unknown>[];
}
export interface RegistryServerInfo {
name: string;
description: string;
title: string;
version: string;
website_url: string;
repository: Record<string, string>;
icons: Record<string, string>[];
remotes: RegistryRemoteInfo[];
packages: RegistryPackageInfo[];
meta: Record<string, unknown>;
installed: boolean;
installed_server_id: string;
installed_version: string;
update_available: boolean;
}
export interface RegistrySearchResponse {
servers: RegistryServerInfo[];
total: number;
next_cursor: string | null;
}
export interface RegistryInstallRequest {
registry_name: string;
source: string;
index?: number;
name?: string;
variables?: Record<string, string>;
env?: Record<string, string>;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
}
// -- Console API: Skill Discovery -------------------------------------------
export interface SkillDiscoverListing {
id: string;
name: string;
description: string;
author: string;
source: string;
source_url: string;
install_count: number;
tags: string[];
installed: boolean;
scan_status?: string;
template_id?: string;
}
export interface SkillDiscoverResponse {
skills: SkillDiscoverListing[];
}
export interface SkillInstallRequest {
source: string;
skill_id?: string;
url?: string;
}
export interface SkillInstallSkipped {
name: string;
reason: string;
}
export interface SkillInstallResponse {
installed: SkillInfo[];
skipped: SkillInstallSkipped[];
total: number;
}
// -- Console API: System Settings -------------------------------------------
export interface SettingInfo {
key: string;
value: unknown;
source: string;
type: string;
description: string;
section: string;
is_secret: boolean;
node_id: string;
changed_by: string;
updated: string;
restart_required: boolean;
}
export interface ListSettingsResponse {
settings: SettingInfo[];
}
export interface SettingSchemaInfo {
key: string;
type: string;
default: unknown;
description: string;
section: string;
is_secret: boolean;
min_value: number | null;
max_value: number | null;
choices: string[] | null;
restart_required: boolean;
}
export interface ListSettingSchemaResponse {
schema: SettingSchemaInfo[];
}
export interface UpdateSettingOptions {
value: unknown;
node_id?: string;
}
// Re-export event types for convenience
export type { ServerEvent, ClusterEvent } from "./events.js";
+10
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
isToolResultEvent,
isWsStateEvent,
isApproveRequestEvent,
isApprovalResolvedEvent,
isPlanReviewEvent,
isReasoningEvent,
} from "../src/events.js";
@@ -62,6 +63,15 @@ describe("event type guards", () => {
expect(isApproveRequestEvent(e)).toBe(true);
});
it("isApprovalResolvedEvent", () => {
const e: ServerEvent = {
type: "approval_resolved",
approved: false,
feedback: "Approval timed out",
};
expect(isApprovalResolvedEvent(e)).toBe(true);
});
it("isPlanReviewEvent", () => {
const e: ServerEvent = { type: "plan_review", content: "## Plan" };
expect(isPlanReviewEvent(e)).toBe(true);
+75 -1
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,23 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
def pytest_addoption(parser: pytest.Parser) -> None:
parser.addoption(
"--storage-backend",
default="sqlite",
choices=["sqlite", "postgresql"],
help="Storage backend for integration tests (default: sqlite)",
)
@pytest.fixture
def tmp_db(tmp_path):
"""Provide a temporary SQLite storage backend."""
"""Provide a temporary SQLite storage backend (singleton registry)."""
from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
db_path = str(tmp_path / "test.db")
@@ -15,6 +27,68 @@ def tmp_db(tmp_path):
reset_storage()
@pytest.fixture
def storage_backend(request, tmp_path):
"""Shared storage backend fixture — respects --storage-backend flag.
Returns a StorageBackend instance (SQLite or PostgreSQL).
Tests that use this fixture run against whichever backend CI selects.
"""
from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
backend_type = request.config.getoption("--storage-backend")
reset_storage()
if backend_type == "postgresql":
pg_url = os.environ.get(
"TURNSTONE_TEST_PG_URL",
"postgresql+psycopg://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/turnstone_test",
)
backend = init_storage("postgresql", url=pg_url, run_migrations=False)
yield backend
# Truncate all tables between tests — faster than DELETE and resets
# autoincrement sequences. CASCADE handles any future FK constraints.
# NOTE: accesses backend._engine (SQLAlchemy internal) — both SQLite
# and PostgreSQL backends expose this. If a non-SQLAlchemy backend is
# ever added, this cleanup will need a protocol-level hook.
try:
import sqlalchemy as sa
from turnstone.core.storage._schema import metadata as db_metadata
with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
table_names = ", ".join(t.name for t in reversed(db_metadata.sorted_tables))
conn.execute(sa.text(f"TRUNCATE {table_names} RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE"))
conn.commit()
except Exception:
pass # best-effort cleanup; reset_storage disposes engine
finally:
reset_storage()
else:
db_path = str(tmp_path / "test.db")
backend = init_storage("sqlite", path=db_path, run_migrations=False)
yield backend
reset_storage()
@pytest.fixture
def backend(storage_backend):
"""Alias for storage_backend — used by test_storage_sqlite.py etc."""
return storage_backend
@pytest.fixture
def db(storage_backend):
"""Alias for storage_backend — used by domain-specific storage tests."""
return storage_backend
@pytest.fixture
def storage(storage_backend):
"""Alias for storage_backend — used by services/skill resource tests."""
return storage_backend
@pytest.fixture
def mock_openai_client():
"""Return a minimal mock OpenAI client."""
+1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ class TestServerVersioning:
mock_mgr = MagicMock()
mock_mgr.list_all.return_value = []
mock_mgr.max_workstreams = 10
app = create_app(
workstreams=mock_mgr,
global_queue=queue.Queue(),
+58
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
"""Tests for turnstone.core.audit."""
import json
import pytest
from turnstone.core.audit import record_audit
from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
@pytest.fixture
def storage(tmp_path):
path = str(tmp_path / "test.db")
backend = SQLiteBackend(path)
yield backend
backend.close()
def test_record_audit_basic(storage):
record_audit(
storage, "user-1", "user.create", "user", "u123", {"username": "alice"}, "127.0.0.1"
)
events = storage.list_audit_events()
assert len(events) == 1
ev = events[0]
assert ev["user_id"] == "user-1"
assert ev["action"] == "user.create"
assert ev["resource_type"] == "user"
assert ev["resource_id"] == "u123"
assert ev["ip_address"] == "127.0.0.1"
detail = json.loads(ev["detail"])
assert detail["username"] == "alice"
def test_record_audit_no_detail(storage):
record_audit(storage, "user-1", "token.revoke", "token", "t456")
events = storage.list_audit_events()
assert len(events) == 1
assert events[0]["detail"] == "{}"
def test_record_audit_silent_on_failure():
"""record_audit should not raise even if storage is broken."""
class BrokenStorage:
def record_audit_event(self, **kw):
raise RuntimeError("boom")
# Should not raise
record_audit(BrokenStorage(), "u1", "test.action")
def test_record_audit_generates_unique_ids(storage):
record_audit(storage, "u1", "a.one")
record_audit(storage, "u1", "a.two")
events = storage.list_audit_events()
assert len(events) == 2
assert events[0]["event_id"] != events[1]["event_id"]
+111 -2
View File
@@ -143,6 +143,61 @@ class TestRequiredScope:
def test_proxy_v1_read_endpoint_needs_read(self):
assert required_scope("GET", "/node/node-a/v1/api/workstreams") == "read"
# Memory endpoints
def test_get_memories_needs_read(self):
assert required_scope("GET", "/api/memories") == "read"
def test_post_memories_needs_write(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/api/memories") == "write"
def test_post_memories_search_needs_read(self):
"""Search via POST is non-mutating — requires only read scope."""
assert required_scope("POST", "/api/memories/search") == "read"
def test_delete_memory_needs_write(self):
assert required_scope("DELETE", "/api/memories/my_key") == "write"
def test_v1_post_memories_needs_write(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/memories") == "write"
def test_v1_delete_memory_needs_write(self):
assert required_scope("DELETE", "/v1/api/memories/test_key") == "write"
def test_admin_memories_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("GET", "/api/admin/memories") == "approve"
def test_admin_memory_delete_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("DELETE", "/api/admin/memories/some-id") == "approve"
# Internal endpoints
def test_internal_mcp_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "approve"
def test_v1_internal_mcp_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "approve"
def test_internal_config_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/api/_internal/config-reload") == "approve"
def test_v1_internal_config_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/_internal/config-reload") == "approve"
def test_proxy_internal_config_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/v1/api/_internal/config-reload") == "approve"
def test_proxy_no_v1_internal_config_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/_internal/config-reload") == "approve"
def test_proxy_internal_mcp_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/v1/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "approve"
def test_proxy_no_v1_internal_mcp_reload_needs_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "approve"
def test_get_internal_mcp_reload_needs_read(self):
"""Only POST is elevated — GET falls through to read."""
assert required_scope("GET", "/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "read"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TestAuthConfig
@@ -728,6 +783,7 @@ class TestServerAuth:
mock_ws.session = mock_session
mock_mgr = MagicMock()
mock_mgr.list_all.return_value = [mock_ws]
mock_mgr.max_workstreams = 10
app = srv_mod.create_app(
workstreams=mock_mgr,
@@ -946,6 +1002,7 @@ class TestServerLogin:
mock_ws.session = mock_session
mock_mgr = MagicMock()
mock_mgr.list_all.return_value = [mock_ws]
mock_mgr.max_workstreams = 10
app = srv_mod.create_app(
workstreams=mock_mgr,
@@ -1314,8 +1371,11 @@ class TestCorsConfigurable:
import turnstone.server as srv_mod
mgr = MagicMock()
mgr.list_all.return_value = []
mgr.max_workstreams = 10
app = srv_mod.create_app(
workstreams=MagicMock(),
workstreams=mgr,
global_queue=queue.Queue(),
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
@@ -1333,8 +1393,11 @@ class TestCorsConfigurable:
import turnstone.server as srv_mod
mgr = MagicMock()
mgr.list_all.return_value = []
mgr.max_workstreams = 10
app = srv_mod.create_app(
workstreams=MagicMock(),
workstreams=mgr,
global_queue=queue.Queue(),
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
@@ -1349,3 +1412,49 @@ class TestCorsConfigurable:
)
assert resp.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin") == "http://example.com"
client.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TestVerifyPassword — OIDC sentinel handling
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestVerifyPassword:
def test_valid_bcrypt_hash(self):
from turnstone.core.auth import hash_password, verify_password
hashed = hash_password("mypassword")
assert verify_password("mypassword", hashed) is True
assert verify_password("wrongpassword", hashed) is False
def test_oidc_sentinel_rejected(self):
from turnstone.core.auth import verify_password
# OIDC sentinel must return False, not crash with ValueError
assert verify_password("anypassword", "!oidc") is False
def test_non_bcrypt_hash_rejected(self):
from turnstone.core.auth import verify_password
assert verify_password("password", "not_a_hash") is False
assert verify_password("password", "") is False
def test_empty_password_against_oidc_sentinel(self):
from turnstone.core.auth import verify_password
assert verify_password("", "!oidc") is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TestOIDCPublicPaths — OIDC endpoints are public
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestOIDCPublicPaths:
def test_oidc_authorize_is_public(self):
assert is_public_path("/api/auth/oidc/authorize") is True
assert is_public_path("/v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize") is True
def test_oidc_callback_is_public(self):
assert is_public_path("/api/auth/oidc/callback") is True
assert is_public_path("/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback") is True
+5 -5
View File
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ class TestParseScopes:
class TestJWT:
SECRET = "test-secret-key-for-jwt"
SECRET = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
def test_round_trip(self):
scopes = frozenset({"read", "write"})
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ class TestJWT:
def test_invalid_signature(self):
token = create_jwt("user1", frozenset({"read"}), "db", self.SECRET)
assert validate_jwt(token, "wrong-secret") is None
assert validate_jwt(token, "wrong-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b") is None
def test_malformed_token(self):
assert validate_jwt("not.a.jwt", self.SECRET) is None
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ class TestAuthenticateToken:
assert result.scopes == frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"})
def test_jwt_token(self):
secret = "test-secret"
secret = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
jwt_tok = create_jwt("user1", frozenset({"read", "write"}), "db", secret)
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
result = _authenticate_token(jwt_tok, cfg, jwt_secret=secret)
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ class TestCheckRequestScopes:
assert result.has_scope("approve")
def test_jwt_with_scopes(self):
secret = "test"
secret = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read", "write"}), "db", secret)
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
allowed, status, msg, result = check_request(
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ class TestCheckRequestScopes:
assert result.user_id == "u1"
def test_jwt_insufficient_scope(self):
secret = "test"
secret = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "db", secret)
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
+71
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
"""Tests for turnstone.core.bm25 — tokenizer and BM25 index."""
from turnstone.core.bm25 import BM25Index, _tokenize
class TestTokenize:
def test_simple_words(self):
assert _tokenize("hello world") == ["hello", "world"]
def test_underscores(self):
assert _tokenize("read_file") == ["read", "file"]
def test_hyphens(self):
assert _tokenize("web-search") == ["web", "search"]
def test_dots(self):
assert _tokenize("foo.bar.baz") == ["foo", "bar", "baz"]
def test_mixed_separators(self):
assert _tokenize("mcp__server__read_file") == ["mcp", "server", "read", "file"]
def test_empty_string(self):
assert _tokenize("") == []
def test_case_folding(self):
assert _tokenize("Hello World") == ["hello", "world"]
class TestBM25Index:
def test_search_returns_relevant(self):
docs = ["read a file from disk", "search for file in directory", "execute a bash command"]
index = BM25Index(docs)
results = index.search("file", k=2)
assert 0 in results
assert 1 in results
def test_search_empty_query(self):
docs = ["hello world"]
index = BM25Index(docs)
assert index.search("") == []
def test_search_no_match(self):
docs = ["hello world", "foo bar"]
index = BM25Index(docs)
assert index.search("zzzznotfound") == []
def test_search_respects_k(self):
docs = [f"document {i} with common word" for i in range(20)]
index = BM25Index(docs)
results = index.search("common", k=3)
assert len(results) <= 3
def test_empty_corpus(self):
index = BM25Index([])
assert index.search("anything") == []
def test_single_document(self):
index = BM25Index(["the only document about turnstone"])
results = index.search("turnstone")
assert results == [0]
def test_ordering_by_relevance(self):
docs = [
"unrelated content about cooking recipes",
"python programming with file operations",
"read file write file file operations disk io",
]
index = BM25Index(docs)
results = index.search("file operations", k=3)
# Doc 2 has more file/operations mentions, should rank higher
assert results[0] == 2
+630
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,630 @@
"""Tests for the bootstrap wizard module."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import socket
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from turnstone.bootstrap import (
SYSTEM_PROMPT,
TOOLS,
_BootstrapLLM,
_FinishError,
_mask_secrets,
_tool_check_docker,
_tool_check_port,
_tool_finish,
_tool_generate_secret,
_tool_read_file,
_tool_validate_api_key,
_tool_write_file,
execute_tool,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool function tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestReadFile:
def test_existing_file(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
f = tmp_path / "test.txt"
f.write_text("hello world")
result = _tool_read_file(tmp_path, {"path": "test.txt"})
assert result == "hello world"
def test_missing_file(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
result = _tool_read_file(tmp_path, {"path": "nope.txt"})
assert "Error: file not found" in result
def test_nested_path(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
sub = tmp_path / "sub"
sub.mkdir()
f = sub / "nested.txt"
f.write_text("nested content")
result = _tool_read_file(tmp_path, {"path": "sub/nested.txt"})
assert result == "nested content"
def test_path_traversal_blocked(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
result = _tool_read_file(tmp_path, {"path": "../../etc/passwd"})
assert "escapes project directory" in result
def test_absolute_path_blocked(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
result = _tool_read_file(tmp_path, {"path": "/etc/passwd"})
assert "escapes project directory" in result
class TestWriteFile:
def test_write_confirmed(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
with patch("builtins.input", return_value="y"):
result = _tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "out.txt", "content": "data\n"})
assert "written successfully" in result
assert (tmp_path / "out.txt").read_text() == "data\n"
def test_write_declined(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
with patch("builtins.input", return_value="n"):
result = _tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "out.txt", "content": "data\n"})
assert "declined" in result
assert not (tmp_path / "out.txt").exists()
def test_write_creates_parent_dirs(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
with patch("builtins.input", return_value="y"):
result = _tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "a/b/c.txt", "content": "deep\n"})
assert "written successfully" in result
assert (tmp_path / "a" / "b" / "c.txt").read_text() == "deep\n"
def test_sh_files_are_executable(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
with patch("builtins.input", return_value="y"):
_tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "setup.sh", "content": "#!/bin/bash\n"})
mode = (tmp_path / "setup.sh").stat().st_mode
assert mode & 0o110 # user + group executable, not world
def test_path_traversal_blocked(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
result = _tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "../../escape.txt", "content": "bad\n"})
assert "escapes project directory" in result
def test_default_enter_confirms(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
with patch("builtins.input", return_value=""):
result = _tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "ok.txt", "content": "ok\n"})
assert "written successfully" in result
def test_duplicate_write_skipped(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
(tmp_path / "dup.txt").write_text("same\n")
result = _tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "dup.txt", "content": "same\n"})
assert "already exists" in result
def test_different_content_still_prompts(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
(tmp_path / "changed.txt").write_text("old\n")
with patch("builtins.input", return_value="y"):
result = _tool_write_file(tmp_path, {"path": "changed.txt", "content": "new\n"})
assert "written successfully" in result
assert (tmp_path / "changed.txt").read_text() == "new\n"
class TestGenerateSecret:
def test_default_length(self) -> None:
secret = _tool_generate_secret({})
assert len(secret) == 64 # 32 bytes -> 64 hex chars
def test_custom_length(self) -> None:
secret = _tool_generate_secret({"length": 16})
assert len(secret) == 32
def test_uniqueness(self) -> None:
s1 = _tool_generate_secret({})
s2 = _tool_generate_secret({})
assert s1 != s2
def test_invalid_length_fallback(self) -> None:
secret = _tool_generate_secret({"length": -1})
assert len(secret) == 64 # falls back to 32 bytes
def test_excessive_length_capped(self) -> None:
secret = _tool_generate_secret({"length": 99999})
assert len(secret) == 64 # falls back to 32 bytes
class TestCheckPort:
def test_available_port(self) -> None:
# Pick a random high port that's likely free
result = _tool_check_port({"port": 59123})
assert "AVAILABLE" in result or "IN USE" in result
def test_in_use_port(self) -> None:
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
port = sock.getsockname()[1]
sock.listen(1)
result = _tool_check_port({"port": port})
assert "IN USE" in result
def test_invalid_port(self) -> None:
result = _tool_check_port({"port": -1})
assert "Error" in result
def test_port_zero(self) -> None:
result = _tool_check_port({"port": 0})
assert "Error" in result
class TestCheckDocker:
def test_docker_installed(self) -> None:
mock_docker = MagicMock()
mock_docker.returncode = 0
mock_docker.stdout = "24.0.7"
mock_compose = MagicMock()
mock_compose.returncode = 0
mock_compose.stdout = "2.24.5"
with patch("subprocess.run", side_effect=[mock_docker, mock_compose]):
result = _tool_check_docker({})
assert "Docker: installed" in result
assert "Docker Compose: installed" in result
def test_docker_not_installed(self) -> None:
with patch("subprocess.run", side_effect=FileNotFoundError):
result = _tool_check_docker({})
assert "NOT installed" in result or "NOT available" in result
def test_docker_daemon_not_running(self) -> None:
mock_docker = MagicMock()
mock_docker.returncode = 1
mock_docker.stderr = "Cannot connect to the Docker daemon"
mock_compose = MagicMock()
mock_compose.returncode = 1
with patch("subprocess.run", side_effect=[mock_docker, mock_compose]):
result = _tool_check_docker({})
assert "NOT running" in result
class TestValidateApiKey:
def test_openai_success(self) -> None:
mock_client = MagicMock()
mock_client.models.list.return_value = []
with patch("openai.OpenAI", return_value=mock_client):
result = _tool_validate_api_key({"provider": "openai", "api_key": "sk-test"})
assert "Success" in result
def test_openai_failure(self) -> None:
with patch("openai.OpenAI") as mock_cls:
mock_cls.return_value.models.list.side_effect = Exception("Invalid key")
result = _tool_validate_api_key({"provider": "openai", "api_key": "bad"})
assert "Failed" in result
def test_unknown_provider(self) -> None:
result = _tool_validate_api_key({"provider": "unknown", "api_key": "x"})
assert "unknown" in result
class TestExecuteTool:
def test_unknown_tool(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
result = execute_tool("nonexistent", {}, tmp_path)
assert "unknown tool" in result
def test_dispatches_correctly(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
f = tmp_path / "hello.txt"
f.write_text("hi")
result = execute_tool("read_file", {"path": "hello.txt"}, tmp_path)
assert result == "hi"
def test_finish_raises(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
import pytest
with pytest.raises(_FinishError, match="All done"):
execute_tool("finish", {"summary": "All done"}, tmp_path)
class TestFinishTool:
def test_raises_with_summary(self) -> None:
import pytest
with pytest.raises(_FinishError) as exc_info:
_tool_finish({"summary": "Configured production deployment."})
assert exc_info.value.summary == "Configured production deployment."
def test_default_summary(self) -> None:
import pytest
with pytest.raises(_FinishError) as exc_info:
_tool_finish({})
assert exc_info.value.summary == "Setup complete."
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Secret masking tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestMaskSecrets:
def test_masks_api_key(self) -> None:
text = "OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-1234567890abcdef"
result = _mask_secrets(text)
assert "sk-1" in result
assert "cdef" in result
assert "1234567890abcde" not in result
def test_preserves_comments(self) -> None:
text = "# OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-1234567890abcdef"
result = _mask_secrets(text)
assert result == text
def test_preserves_short_values(self) -> None:
text = "TOKEN=short"
result = _mask_secrets(text)
assert result == text
def test_preserves_non_sensitive(self) -> None:
text = "MODEL=gpt-5.4"
result = _mask_secrets(text)
assert result == text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Message conversion tests (Anthropic)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestAnthropicConversion:
"""Test the Anthropic message/tool conversion inside _BootstrapLLM."""
def _make_llm(self) -> _BootstrapLLM:
return _BootstrapLLM("anthropic", MagicMock(), "test-model")
def test_tool_format_conversion(self) -> None:
"""OpenAI tool format should convert to Anthropic format."""
llm = self._make_llm()
# The conversion happens inside _complete_anthropic; we test indirectly
# by checking the tools passed to the mock client
mock_response = MagicMock()
mock_response.content = [MagicMock(type="text", text="hello")]
mock_response.stop_reason = "end_turn"
llm.client.messages.create.return_value = mock_response
llm.complete(
[{"role": "system", "content": "sys"}, {"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
TOOLS[:1], # Just read_file
)
call_kwargs = llm.client.messages.create.call_args[1]
api_tools = call_kwargs["tools"]
assert len(api_tools) == 1
assert api_tools[0]["name"] == "read_file"
assert "input_schema" in api_tools[0]
assert "description" in api_tools[0]
def test_system_message_extraction(self) -> None:
"""System message should be extracted to system parameter."""
llm = self._make_llm()
mock_response = MagicMock()
mock_response.content = [MagicMock(type="text", text="ok")]
mock_response.stop_reason = "end_turn"
llm.client.messages.create.return_value = mock_response
llm.complete(
[{"role": "system", "content": "test system"}, {"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
[],
)
call_kwargs = llm.client.messages.create.call_args[1]
assert call_kwargs["system"] == "test system"
# System should NOT appear in messages
for msg in call_kwargs["messages"]:
assert msg["role"] != "system"
def test_tool_result_conversion(self) -> None:
"""OpenAI tool result messages should convert to Anthropic format."""
llm = self._make_llm()
mock_response = MagicMock()
mock_response.content = [MagicMock(type="text", text="got it")]
mock_response.stop_reason = "end_turn"
llm.client.messages.create.return_value = mock_response
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": "sys"},
{"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "",
"tool_calls": [
{
"id": "tc_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {"name": "check_docker", "arguments": "{}"},
}
],
},
{
"role": "tool",
"tool_call_id": "tc_1",
"content": "Docker: installed",
},
]
llm.complete(messages, TOOLS)
call_kwargs = llm.client.messages.create.call_args[1]
api_messages = call_kwargs["messages"]
# Find the tool_result message
tool_result_found = False
for msg in api_messages:
if msg["role"] == "user" and isinstance(msg.get("content"), list):
for block in msg["content"]:
if isinstance(block, dict) and block.get("type") == "tool_result":
assert block["tool_use_id"] == "tc_1"
assert block["content"] == "Docker: installed"
tool_result_found = True
assert tool_result_found
def test_tool_use_blocks_in_assistant(self) -> None:
"""Assistant messages with tool_calls should convert to content blocks."""
llm = self._make_llm()
mock_response = MagicMock()
mock_response.content = [MagicMock(type="text", text="ok")]
mock_response.stop_reason = "end_turn"
llm.client.messages.create.return_value = mock_response
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": "sys"},
{"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
{
"role": "assistant",
"content": "Let me check",
"tool_calls": [
{
"id": "tc_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {"name": "check_docker", "arguments": "{}"},
}
],
},
{"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "tc_1", "content": "ok"},
]
llm.complete(messages, TOOLS)
call_kwargs = llm.client.messages.create.call_args[1]
api_messages = call_kwargs["messages"]
# First message should be user "hi"
assert api_messages[0]["role"] == "user"
# Second should be assistant with content blocks
assistant_msg = api_messages[1]
assert assistant_msg["role"] == "assistant"
assert isinstance(assistant_msg["content"], list)
# Should have text block + tool_use block
types = [b["type"] for b in assistant_msg["content"]]
assert "text" in types
assert "tool_use" in types
class TestOpenAICompletion:
"""Test the OpenAI path of _BootstrapLLM."""
def test_text_response(self) -> None:
llm = _BootstrapLLM("openai", MagicMock(), "gpt-5.4")
mock_choice = MagicMock()
mock_choice.message.content = "Hello!"
mock_choice.message.tool_calls = None
mock_choice.finish_reason = "stop"
llm.client.chat.completions.create.return_value = MagicMock(choices=[mock_choice])
content, tool_calls, reason = llm.complete([{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], TOOLS)
assert content == "Hello!"
assert tool_calls is None
assert reason == "stop"
def test_tool_call_response(self) -> None:
llm = _BootstrapLLM("openai", MagicMock(), "gpt-5.4")
mock_tc = MagicMock()
mock_tc.id = "call_123"
mock_tc.function.name = "check_docker"
mock_tc.function.arguments = "{}"
mock_choice = MagicMock()
mock_choice.message.content = ""
mock_choice.message.tool_calls = [mock_tc]
mock_choice.finish_reason = "tool_calls"
llm.client.chat.completions.create.return_value = MagicMock(choices=[mock_choice])
content, tool_calls, reason = llm.complete(
[{"role": "user", "content": "check docker"}], TOOLS
)
assert tool_calls is not None
assert len(tool_calls) == 1
assert tool_calls[0]["function"]["name"] == "check_docker"
assert tool_calls[0]["id"] == "call_123"
def test_no_content(self) -> None:
llm = _BootstrapLLM("openai", MagicMock(), "gpt-5.4")
mock_choice = MagicMock()
mock_choice.message.content = None
mock_choice.message.tool_calls = None
mock_choice.finish_reason = "stop"
llm.client.chat.completions.create.return_value = MagicMock(choices=[mock_choice])
content, tool_calls, reason = llm.complete([{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}], [])
assert content == ""
assert tool_calls is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Conversation loop tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestConversationLoop:
def test_quit_exits(self) -> None:
"""User typing 'quit' should exit the loop."""
llm = MagicMock(spec=_BootstrapLLM)
llm.complete.return_value = ("What would you like?", None, "stop")
with patch("builtins.input", return_value="quit"):
from turnstone.bootstrap import _run_conversation
_run_conversation(llm, Path("/tmp"))
def test_tool_calls_executed(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""Tool calls should be executed and results fed back."""
llm = MagicMock(spec=_BootstrapLLM)
# First call: LLM returns a tool call
llm.complete.side_effect = [
(
"",
[
{
"id": "tc_1",
"type": "function",
"function": {"name": "generate_secret", "arguments": "{}"},
}
],
"tool_calls",
),
# Second call: LLM responds with text after seeing tool result
("Here's your secret!", None, "stop"),
]
with patch("builtins.input", return_value="quit"):
from turnstone.bootstrap import _run_conversation
_run_conversation(llm, tmp_path)
# Verify two calls were made
assert llm.complete.call_count == 2
# Verify tool result was fed back in second call's messages
second_call_messages = llm.complete.call_args_list[1][0][0]
tool_results = [m for m in second_call_messages if m.get("role") == "tool"]
assert len(tool_results) == 1
assert tool_results[0]["tool_call_id"] == "tc_1"
# Result should be a 64-char hex string
assert len(tool_results[0]["content"]) == 64
def test_empty_input_skipped(self) -> None:
"""Empty user input should be skipped."""
llm = MagicMock(spec=_BootstrapLLM)
llm.complete.return_value = ("Ask me something.", None, "stop")
call_count = 0
def mock_input(prompt: str = "") -> str:
nonlocal call_count
call_count += 1
if call_count <= 2:
return "" # Empty inputs
return "quit"
with patch("builtins.input", side_effect=mock_input):
from turnstone.bootstrap import _run_conversation
_run_conversation(llm, Path("/tmp"))
def test_finish_tool_exits_loop(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""LLM calling finish tool should exit the conversation cleanly."""
llm = MagicMock(spec=_BootstrapLLM)
llm.complete.return_value = (
"",
[
{
"id": "tc_fin",
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": "finish",
"arguments": '{"summary": "All configured."}',
},
}
],
"tool_calls",
)
from turnstone.bootstrap import _run_conversation
# Should return without needing user input
_run_conversation(llm, tmp_path)
assert llm.complete.call_count == 1
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Interactive startup tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestProviderDefaults:
def test_openai_default_model(self) -> None:
from turnstone.bootstrap import _DEFAULT_MODELS
assert _DEFAULT_MODELS["openai"] == "gpt-5.4"
def test_anthropic_default_model(self) -> None:
from turnstone.bootstrap import _DEFAULT_MODELS
assert _DEFAULT_MODELS["anthropic"] == "claude-sonnet-4-6"
class TestSelectProvider:
def test_openai_selection(self) -> None:
"""Selecting '1' should set up OpenAI."""
mock_client = MagicMock()
with (
patch("builtins.input", side_effect=["1", ""]),
patch("getpass.getpass", return_value="sk-test"),
patch("openai.OpenAI", return_value=mock_client),
):
from turnstone.bootstrap import _select_provider
provider, client, model = _select_provider()
assert provider == "openai"
assert model == "gpt-5.4"
def test_local_selection(self) -> None:
"""Selecting '3' should set up local/vLLM."""
mock_client = MagicMock()
# Ensure OPENAI_API_KEY is not in env so we hit the getpass path
env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != "OPENAI_API_KEY"}
with (
patch.dict("os.environ", env, clear=True),
patch("builtins.input", side_effect=["3", "http://localhost:8000/v1", "my-model"]),
patch("getpass.getpass", return_value="none"),
patch("openai.OpenAI", return_value=mock_client),
):
from turnstone.bootstrap import _select_provider
provider, client, model = _select_provider()
assert provider == "openai"
assert model == "my-model"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# System prompt and tools sanity checks
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestConstants:
def test_system_prompt_not_empty(self) -> None:
assert len(SYSTEM_PROMPT) > 500
def test_system_prompt_mentions_turnstone(self) -> None:
assert "Turnstone" in SYSTEM_PROMPT
def test_all_tools_have_required_fields(self) -> None:
for tool in TOOLS:
assert tool["type"] == "function"
func = tool["function"]
assert "name" in func
assert "description" in func
assert "parameters" in func
assert func["parameters"]["type"] == "object"
def test_tool_count(self) -> None:
assert len(TOOLS) == 7
def test_all_tools_have_implementations(self) -> None:
from turnstone.bootstrap import TOOL_FUNCTIONS
for tool in TOOLS:
name = tool["function"]["name"]
assert name in TOOL_FUNCTIONS, f"Missing implementation for tool: {name}"
+120
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
"""Tests for bridge event publishing — TurnCompleteEvent on idle transitions."""
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from turnstone.mq.bridge import Bridge
from turnstone.mq.protocol import ContentEvent, StateChangeEvent, TurnCompleteEvent
def _make_bridge():
"""Create a Bridge with a mock broker (no Redis or HTTP needed)."""
broker = MagicMock()
bridge = Bridge(server_url="http://localhost:8080", broker=broker, node_id="test-node")
return bridge
class TestIdleTurnComplete:
"""TurnCompleteEvent should be emitted on every idle transition."""
def test_idle_emits_turn_complete_with_correlation_id(self):
"""Bridge-initiated turn: TurnCompleteEvent has the correlation_id."""
bridge = _make_bridge()
bridge._active_sends["ws-1"] = "cid-abc"
published = []
with patch.object(
bridge, "_publish_ws", side_effect=lambda ws, ev: published.append((ws, ev))
):
bridge._handle_global_event({"type": "ws_state", "ws_id": "ws-1", "state": "idle"})
turn_completes = [(ws, ev) for ws, ev in published if isinstance(ev, TurnCompleteEvent)]
assert len(turn_completes) == 1
ws, ev = turn_completes[0]
assert ws == "ws-1"
assert ev.correlation_id == "cid-abc"
# correlation_id should be removed from _active_sends
assert "ws-1" not in bridge._active_sends
def test_idle_emits_turn_complete_without_correlation_id(self):
"""Server-UI-initiated turn: TurnCompleteEvent has empty correlation_id."""
bridge = _make_bridge()
# No entry in _active_sends for this workstream
published = []
with patch.object(
bridge, "_publish_ws", side_effect=lambda ws, ev: published.append((ws, ev))
):
bridge._handle_global_event({"type": "ws_state", "ws_id": "ws-2", "state": "idle"})
turn_completes = [(ws, ev) for ws, ev in published if isinstance(ev, TurnCompleteEvent)]
assert len(turn_completes) == 1
ws, ev = turn_completes[0]
assert ws == "ws-2"
assert ev.correlation_id == ""
def test_non_idle_state_does_not_emit_turn_complete(self):
"""Non-idle state transitions should emit StateChangeEvent but not TurnCompleteEvent."""
bridge = _make_bridge()
published = []
with patch.object(
bridge, "_publish_ws", side_effect=lambda ws, ev: published.append((ws, ev))
):
bridge._handle_global_event({"type": "ws_state", "ws_id": "ws-3", "state": "thinking"})
state_changes = [ev for _, ev in published if isinstance(ev, StateChangeEvent)]
turn_completes = [ev for _, ev in published if isinstance(ev, TurnCompleteEvent)]
assert len(state_changes) == 1
assert state_changes[0].state == "thinking"
assert len(turn_completes) == 0
class TestContentPassthrough:
"""Bridge should pass through content from the server's idle SSE event."""
def test_content_passed_through_in_turn_complete(self):
"""Content from idle event should be included in TurnCompleteEvent."""
bridge = _make_bridge()
published = []
with patch.object(
bridge, "_publish_ws", side_effect=lambda ws, ev: published.append((ws, ev))
):
bridge._handle_global_event(
{"type": "ws_state", "ws_id": "ws-1", "state": "idle", "content": "Hello world"}
)
turn_completes = [(ws, ev) for ws, ev in published if isinstance(ev, TurnCompleteEvent)]
assert len(turn_completes) == 1
_, ev = turn_completes[0]
assert ev.content == "Hello world"
def test_content_empty_when_not_in_event(self):
"""TurnCompleteEvent.content should be empty when idle event has no content."""
bridge = _make_bridge()
published = []
with patch.object(
bridge, "_publish_ws", side_effect=lambda ws, ev: published.append((ws, ev))
):
bridge._handle_global_event({"type": "ws_state", "ws_id": "ws-1", "state": "idle"})
turn_completes = [(ws, ev) for ws, ev in published if isinstance(ev, TurnCompleteEvent)]
assert len(turn_completes) == 1
_, ev = turn_completes[0]
assert ev.content == ""
def test_content_event_still_published(self):
"""Content events should still be published to per-ws channel."""
bridge = _make_bridge()
published = []
with patch.object(
bridge, "_publish_ws", side_effect=lambda ws, ev: published.append((ws, ev))
):
bridge._handle_ws_event("ws-1", {"type": "content", "text": "hello"})
content_events = [(ws, ev) for ws, ev in published if isinstance(ev, ContentEvent)]
assert len(content_events) == 1
_, ev = content_events[0]
assert ev.text == "hello"
+351
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
"""Stress tests for bridge.py threading — race conditions in approval,
plan review, and workstream lifecycle.
Each scenario is run many times (ITERATIONS) with threading.Barrier to
maximize timing overlap. Uses mock broker (no Redis) and no HTTP calls.
Races tested:
1. Duplicate approval on SSE reconnect (TOCTOU in _pending_approvals)
2. Duplicate plan review on SSE reconnect (TOCTOU in _pending_plan_reviews)
3. approve_set stale reference escape during concurrent update
4. _running flag visibility across threads on shutdown
5. Approval thread exits within bounded time after timeout
6. Concurrent approval + workstream close leaves no orphaned state
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import threading
import time
from collections import Counter
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from turnstone.mq.bridge import Bridge
ITERATIONS = 100
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _make_bridge(**overrides) -> Bridge:
"""Create a Bridge with a mock broker (no Redis or HTTP)."""
broker = MagicMock()
defaults = dict(
server_url="http://localhost:8080",
broker=broker,
node_id="test-node",
approval_timeout=1,
)
defaults.update(overrides)
return Bridge(**defaults)
def _approval_items(tool_name: str = "bash") -> list[dict]:
return [{"func_name": tool_name, "needs_approval": True, "approval_label": tool_name}]
def _wait_pending_resolved(bridge: Bridge, key: str, attr: str, deadline_s: float = 3.0) -> bool:
"""Poll until the pending entry is resolved (tombstone) or absent."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + deadline_s
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
with bridge._lock:
entries = getattr(bridge, attr)
if key not in entries:
return True
_, resolved_at = entries[key]
if resolved_at > 0:
return True
time.sleep(0.01)
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Race 1: Duplicate approval on SSE reconnect
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestDuplicateApproval:
"""Two threads call _handle_approval for the same ws_id simultaneously.
Only one should create a pending entry; the other should be skipped."""
def test_no_duplicate_approvals(self):
sent_count = Counter()
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
bridge = _make_bridge()
bridge._broker.pop_response.return_value = '{"type": "approve", "approved": true}'
barrier = threading.Barrier(2, timeout=5)
def _call_approval(bridge=bridge, barrier=barrier):
barrier.wait()
bridge._handle_approval("ws-1", {"items": _approval_items()})
t1 = threading.Thread(target=_call_approval)
t2 = threading.Thread(target=_call_approval)
with (
patch.object(bridge, "_api_approve") as mock_approve,
patch.object(bridge, "_publish_ws"),
):
t1.start()
t2.start()
t1.join(timeout=5)
t2.join(timeout=5)
assert not t1.is_alive(), "Thread 1 hung"
assert not t2.is_alive(), "Thread 2 hung"
# Wait for spawned _wait_approval threads to resolve
_wait_pending_resolved(bridge, "ws-1", "_pending_approvals")
sent_count[mock_approve.call_count] += 1
# At most 1 approval should be forwarded per iteration
assert sent_count.get(2, 0) == 0, (
f"Duplicate approvals sent in {sent_count[2]}/{ITERATIONS} iterations"
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Race 2: Duplicate plan review on SSE reconnect
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestDuplicatePlanReview:
"""Two threads call _handle_plan_review simultaneously.
Only one should create a pending entry."""
def test_no_duplicate_plan_reviews(self):
sent_count = Counter()
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
bridge = _make_bridge()
bridge._broker.pop_response.return_value = (
'{"type": "plan_feedback", "feedback": "looks good"}'
)
barrier = threading.Barrier(2, timeout=5)
def _call_plan(bridge=bridge, barrier=barrier):
barrier.wait()
bridge._handle_plan_review("ws-1", {"content": "plan text"})
t1 = threading.Thread(target=_call_plan)
t2 = threading.Thread(target=_call_plan)
with patch.object(bridge, "_publish_ws"), patch.object(bridge._http, "post"):
t1.start()
t2.start()
t1.join(timeout=5)
t2.join(timeout=5)
assert not t1.is_alive(), "Thread 1 hung"
assert not t2.is_alive(), "Thread 2 hung"
# Wait for spawned _wait_plan threads to resolve
_wait_pending_resolved(bridge, "ws-1", "_pending_plan_reviews")
sent_count[bridge._http.post.call_count] += 1
assert sent_count.get(2, 0) == 0, (
f"Duplicate plan reviews sent in {sent_count[2]}/{ITERATIONS} iterations"
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Race 3: approve_set stale reference during concurrent update
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestApproveSetConsistency:
"""One thread reads approve_set for auto-approve check while another
updates it via _wait_approval 'always' path. The auto-approve
decision should be consistent (either all-approved or not)."""
def test_approve_set_never_partially_visible(self):
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
bridge = _make_bridge()
with bridge._lock:
bridge._ws_approve_tools["ws-1"] = {"read_file", "search"}
barrier = threading.Barrier(2, timeout=5)
results = []
def _reader(bridge=bridge, barrier=barrier, results=results):
barrier.wait()
with bridge._lock:
snap = bridge._ws_approve_tools.get("ws-1", set()).copy()
results.append(snap)
def _writer(bridge=bridge, barrier=barrier):
barrier.wait()
with bridge._lock:
existing = bridge._ws_approve_tools.get("ws-1", set())
bridge._ws_approve_tools["ws-1"] = existing | {"bash", "write_file"}
t1 = threading.Thread(target=_reader)
t2 = threading.Thread(target=_writer)
t1.start()
t2.start()
t1.join(timeout=5)
t2.join(timeout=5)
assert not t1.is_alive(), "Reader hung"
assert not t2.is_alive(), "Writer hung"
snap = results[0]
assert snap in (
{"read_file", "search"},
{"read_file", "search", "bash", "write_file"},
), f"Partial set observed: {snap}"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Race 4: _running flag visibility across threads
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestRunningFlagVisibility:
"""All threads reading _running should see False within a bounded time
after the main thread sets it."""
def test_all_threads_observe_shutdown(self):
bridge = _make_bridge()
observed_false = threading.Event()
threads_running = []
def _spin_checker():
while bridge._running:
time.sleep(0.001)
observed_false.set()
for _ in range(5):
t = threading.Thread(target=_spin_checker, daemon=True)
threads_running.append(t)
t.start()
time.sleep(0.01)
bridge._running = False
for t in threads_running:
t.join(timeout=1)
assert not t.is_alive(), "Thread did not observe _running=False"
assert observed_false.is_set()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Race 5: Approval thread exits within bounded time
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestApprovalThreadTimeout:
"""An approval thread blocked on pop_response should exit within the
configured approval_timeout, not hang indefinitely."""
def test_approval_thread_exits_within_timeout(self):
for _ in range(10):
bridge = _make_bridge(approval_timeout=0.5)
def _slow_pop(queue_name, timeout=300):
time.sleep(min(timeout, 0.5))
return None
bridge._broker.pop_response.side_effect = _slow_pop
with patch.object(bridge, "_publish_ws"), patch.object(bridge, "_api_approve"):
bridge._handle_approval("ws-1", {"items": _approval_items()})
# The pending entry should be resolved within the timeout
resolved = _wait_pending_resolved(bridge, "ws-1", "_pending_approvals", deadline_s=3.0)
assert resolved, "Approval thread did not exit within expected timeout"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Race 6: Concurrent approval + workstream close
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestApprovalDuringClose:
"""An approval arriving at the exact same time as a ws_closed event
should not leave orphaned state."""
def test_no_orphaned_pending_after_close(self):
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
bridge = _make_bridge(approval_timeout=0.1)
bridge._broker.pop_response.return_value = None # timeout
barrier = threading.Barrier(2, timeout=5)
def _send_approval(bridge=bridge, barrier=barrier):
barrier.wait()
with patch.object(bridge, "_publish_ws"), patch.object(bridge, "_api_approve"):
bridge._handle_approval("ws-1", {"items": _approval_items()})
def _close_ws(bridge=bridge, barrier=barrier):
barrier.wait()
with (
patch.object(bridge, "_publish_global"),
patch.object(bridge, "_publish_cluster"),
):
bridge._handle_global_event({"type": "ws_closed", "ws_id": "ws-1"})
t1 = threading.Thread(target=_send_approval)
t2 = threading.Thread(target=_close_ws)
t1.start()
t2.start()
t1.join(timeout=5)
t2.join(timeout=5)
assert not t1.is_alive(), "Approval thread hung"
assert not t2.is_alive(), "Close thread hung"
# Wait for spawned _wait_approval thread to resolve (if close
# didn't remove the entry first)
resolved = _wait_pending_resolved(bridge, "ws-1", "_pending_approvals")
assert resolved, "Orphaned pending approval"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Race 7: Plan review refinement loop (tombstone → cleanup → re-entry)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestPlanReviewRefinementLoop:
"""After a plan review is resolved, a ws_state event should clean up the
tombstone so the refinement-loop plan_review event is handled correctly."""
def test_refinement_loop_allows_reentry(self):
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
bridge = _make_bridge()
bridge._broker.pop_response.return_value = (
'{"type": "plan_feedback", "feedback": "refine this"}'
)
# Step 1: first plan review — creates pending entry, resolves it
with patch.object(bridge, "_publish_ws"), patch.object(bridge._http, "post"):
bridge._handle_plan_review("ws-1", {"content": "plan v1"})
_wait_pending_resolved(bridge, "ws-1", "_pending_plan_reviews")
# Verify tombstone is present (resolved_at > 0)
with bridge._lock:
assert "ws-1" in bridge._pending_plan_reviews
assert bridge._pending_plan_reviews["ws-1"][1] > 0
# Step 2: ws_state event cleans up the resolved tombstone
with (
patch.object(bridge, "_publish_ws"),
patch.object(bridge, "_publish_global"),
patch.object(bridge, "_publish_cluster"),
):
bridge._handle_global_event(
{"type": "ws_state", "ws_id": "ws-1", "state": "working"}
)
with bridge._lock:
assert "ws-1" not in bridge._pending_plan_reviews
# Step 3: refinement plan_review arrives — should create new entry
with patch.object(bridge, "_publish_ws"), patch.object(bridge._http, "post"):
bridge._handle_plan_review("ws-1", {"content": "plan v2"})
_wait_pending_resolved(bridge, "ws-1", "_pending_plan_reviews")
with bridge._lock:
assert "ws-1" in bridge._pending_plan_reviews
+409
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
"""Tests for generation cancellation (cooperative cancel via threading.Event)."""
import threading
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
import pytest
from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession, GenerationCancelled
class NullUI:
"""UI adapter that records state changes and discards other output."""
def __init__(self):
self.states = []
self.infos = []
self.stream_ends = 0
def on_thinking_start(self):
pass
def on_thinking_stop(self):
pass
def on_reasoning_token(self, text):
pass
def on_content_token(self, text):
pass
def on_stream_end(self):
self.stream_ends += 1
def approve_tools(self, items):
return True, None
def on_tool_result(self, call_id, name, output):
pass
def on_tool_output_chunk(self, call_id, chunk):
pass
def on_status(self, usage, context_window, effort):
pass
def on_plan_review(self, content):
return ""
def on_info(self, message):
self.infos.append(message)
def on_error(self, message):
pass
def on_state_change(self, state):
self.states.append(state)
def on_rename(self, name):
pass
def on_output_warning(self, call_id, assessment):
pass
def _make_session(ui=None, **kwargs):
"""Helper to construct a ChatSession with minimal setup."""
defaults = dict(
client=MagicMock(),
model="test-model",
ui=ui or NullUI(),
instructions=None,
temperature=0.5,
max_tokens=4096,
tool_timeout=30,
)
defaults.update(kwargs)
return ChatSession(**defaults)
class TestCancelEvent:
"""Basic cancel event mechanics."""
def test_cancel_sets_event(self, tmp_db):
session = _make_session()
assert not session._cancel_event.is_set()
session.cancel()
assert session._cancel_event.is_set()
def test_check_cancelled_raises_when_set(self, tmp_db):
session = _make_session()
session.cancel()
with pytest.raises(GenerationCancelled):
session._check_cancelled()
def test_check_cancelled_noop_when_clear(self, tmp_db):
session = _make_session()
session._check_cancelled() # Should not raise
def test_cancel_is_idempotent(self, tmp_db):
session = _make_session()
session.cancel()
session.cancel() # Double call is harmless
assert session._cancel_event.is_set()
def test_cancel_event_cleared_on_send_start(self, tmp_db):
"""send() clears a stale cancel flag before starting."""
ui = NullUI()
session = _make_session(ui=ui)
session.cancel() # Set stale flag
@dataclass
class FakeChunk:
content_delta: str = ""
reasoning_delta: str = ""
tool_call_deltas: list = field(default_factory=list)
usage: None = None
finish_reason: str = "stop"
info_delta: str = ""
provider_blocks: list = field(default_factory=list)
fake_stream = iter([FakeChunk(content_delta="Hello", finish_reason="stop")])
with (
patch.object(session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=fake_stream),
patch.object(session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
):
session.send("test")
# Should complete normally — cancel flag was cleared
assert "idle" in ui.states
class TestCancelDuringStreaming:
"""Cancel while _stream_response is iterating chunks."""
def test_preserves_partial_content(self, tmp_db):
"""Partial content already streamed should be preserved in messages."""
ui = NullUI()
session = _make_session(ui=ui)
@dataclass
class FakeChunk:
content_delta: str = ""
reasoning_delta: str = ""
tool_call_deltas: list = field(default_factory=list)
usage: None = None
finish_reason: str = ""
info_delta: str = ""
provider_blocks: list = field(default_factory=list)
def cancelling_stream():
"""Yield a few chunks then cancel."""
yield FakeChunk(content_delta="Hello ")
yield FakeChunk(content_delta="world")
session.cancel()
yield FakeChunk(content_delta=" — this should not appear")
with (
patch.object(session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=cancelling_stream()),
patch.object(session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
):
session.send("test")
# Session should be idle (not error)
assert ui.states[-1] == "idle"
# Check that "[Generation cancelled]" was emitted
assert any("cancelled" in i.lower() for i in ui.infos)
# The partial content should be preserved as an assistant message
assistant_msgs = [m for m in session.messages if m["role"] == "assistant"]
assert len(assistant_msgs) == 1
assert assistant_msgs[0]["content"] == "Hello world"
# No tool_calls in the partial message
assert "tool_calls" not in assistant_msgs[0]
class TestCancelDuringToolExecution:
"""Cancel while tools are being executed."""
def test_rollback_incomplete_tool_results(self, tmp_db):
"""When cancelled during tool execution, incomplete results are rolled back."""
ui = NullUI()
session = _make_session(ui=ui)
@dataclass
class FakeChunk:
content_delta: str = ""
reasoning_delta: str = ""
tool_call_deltas: list = field(default_factory=list)
usage: None = None
finish_reason: str = ""
info_delta: str = ""
provider_blocks: list = field(default_factory=list)
@dataclass
class FakeToolDelta:
index: int = 0
id: str = ""
name: str = ""
arguments_delta: str = ""
# First call: return content with a tool call
def stream_with_tool():
yield FakeChunk(
tool_call_deltas=[FakeToolDelta(index=0, id="tc_1", name="bash")],
finish_reason="",
)
yield FakeChunk(
tool_call_deltas=[FakeToolDelta(index=0, arguments_delta='{"command":"echo hi"}')],
finish_reason="tool_calls",
)
call_count = 0
def fake_create_stream(msgs):
nonlocal call_count
call_count += 1
if call_count == 1:
return stream_with_tool()
# Should not be called a second time since cancel happens before phase 3
raise AssertionError("Should not stream again after cancel")
def cancel_before_execute(tool_calls):
"""Simulate cancel happening before tool execution."""
session.cancel()
raise GenerationCancelled()
with (
patch.object(session, "_create_stream_with_retry", side_effect=fake_create_stream),
patch.object(session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
patch.object(session, "_execute_tools", side_effect=cancel_before_execute),
):
session.send("run something")
# Session should be idle
assert ui.states[-1] == "idle"
# No tool result messages should remain (rolled back)
roles = [m["role"] for m in session.messages]
assert "tool" not in roles
# The assistant message with tool_calls should also be rolled back
for m in session.messages:
if m["role"] == "assistant":
assert "tool_calls" not in m or not m["tool_calls"]
class TestCancelWhenIdle:
"""Cancelling when no generation is active is harmless."""
def test_cancel_when_idle_is_noop(self, tmp_db):
session = _make_session()
session.cancel()
# Next send should work normally (cancel cleared at start)
@dataclass
class FakeChunk:
content_delta: str = ""
reasoning_delta: str = ""
tool_call_deltas: list = field(default_factory=list)
usage: None = None
finish_reason: str = "stop"
info_delta: str = ""
provider_blocks: list = field(default_factory=list)
fake_stream = iter([FakeChunk(content_delta="ok", finish_reason="stop")])
with (
patch.object(session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=fake_stream),
patch.object(session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
):
session.send("hello")
# Should complete normally
assistant_msgs = [m for m in session.messages if m["role"] == "assistant"]
assert len(assistant_msgs) == 1
assert assistant_msgs[0]["content"] == "ok"
class TestCancelThreadSafety:
"""Cancel from a different thread while generation is running."""
def test_cancel_from_another_thread(self, tmp_db):
ui = NullUI()
session = _make_session(ui=ui)
@dataclass
class FakeChunk:
content_delta: str = ""
reasoning_delta: str = ""
tool_call_deltas: list = field(default_factory=list)
usage: None = None
finish_reason: str = ""
info_delta: str = ""
provider_blocks: list = field(default_factory=list)
barrier = threading.Event()
def slow_stream():
yield FakeChunk(content_delta="Start")
barrier.set() # Signal that streaming has started
time.sleep(2) # Simulate slow streaming
yield FakeChunk(content_delta=" end", finish_reason="stop")
with (
patch.object(session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=slow_stream()),
patch.object(session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
):
# Run send() in a thread
error = []
def run():
try:
session.send("test")
except Exception as e:
error.append(e)
t = threading.Thread(target=run)
t.start()
barrier.wait(timeout=5)
# Cancel from main thread
session.cancel()
t.join(timeout=5)
assert not error
assert ui.states[-1] == "idle"
assert any("cancelled" in i.lower() for i in ui.infos)
class TestGenerationCancelledException:
"""GenerationCancelled is a BaseException, not Exception."""
def test_is_base_exception(self):
assert issubclass(GenerationCancelled, BaseException)
def test_not_caught_by_except_exception(self):
"""Verify GenerationCancelled is NOT caught by except Exception."""
with pytest.raises(GenerationCancelled):
try:
raise GenerationCancelled()
except Exception:
pytest.fail("GenerationCancelled was caught by except Exception")
class TestStreamFlushBeforeToolCalls:
"""Content pending buffer must be flushed before tool call processing."""
def test_pending_content_flushed_before_tool_calls(self, tmp_db):
"""All content tokens arrive via on_content_token before tool calls."""
events: list[tuple[str, ...]] = []
class TrackingUI(NullUI):
def on_content_token(self, text):
events.append(("content", text))
def on_stream_end(self):
events.append(("stream_end",))
super().on_stream_end()
ui = TrackingUI()
session = _make_session(ui=ui)
@dataclass
class FakeChunk:
content_delta: str = ""
reasoning_delta: str = ""
tool_call_deltas: list = field(default_factory=list)
usage: None = None
finish_reason: str = ""
info_delta: str = ""
provider_blocks: list = field(default_factory=list)
@dataclass
class FakeToolDelta:
index: int = 0
id: str = ""
name: str = ""
arguments_delta: str = ""
def stream_content_then_tool():
# Content long enough to leave chars in pending buffer
# (_MAX_TAG_LEN = 13, so _drain_pending retains last 13 chars)
yield FakeChunk(content_delta="Hello world, this is a test message")
yield FakeChunk(
tool_call_deltas=[FakeToolDelta(index=0, id="tc_1", name="bash")],
)
yield FakeChunk(
tool_call_deltas=[FakeToolDelta(index=0, arguments_delta='{"command":"echo hi"}')],
finish_reason="tool_calls",
)
with (
patch.object(
session,
"_create_stream_with_retry",
return_value=stream_content_then_tool(),
),
patch.object(session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
# Prevent real tool execution (e.g., bash) during this test.
patch.object(session, "_execute_tools", return_value=([], None)),
):
session.send("test")
# All content should have been emitted
total = "".join(e[1] for e in events if e[0] == "content")
assert total == "Hello world, this is a test message"
# No content events after stream_end
stream_end_idx = next(i for i, e in enumerate(events) if e[0] == "stream_end")
late_content = [e for e in events[stream_end_idx + 1 :] if e[0] == "content"]
assert late_content == [], f"Content after stream_end: {late_content}"

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More