chore: bump version to 1.5.17

Async LLM-tier "llm_fallback" verdicts (judge.py:1073, judge.py:1131
via _deliver_fallbacks) deliberately reuse the heuristic verdict's
``verdict_id`` so the row gets "upgraded in place" from heuristic →
llm_fallback when the LLM judge times out, is cancelled, or returns
no content.  The consumer ``_persist_intent_verdict`` was doing a
plain INSERT via ``create_intent_verdict``, hitting the
``intent_verdicts_pkey`` constraint on every llm_fallback delivery.
Postgres logged the duplicate-key error; the application try/except
swallowed it at log.debug — so the row never actually got upgraded
and the LLM judge's annotation ("(LLM judge did not return a
verdict)") was lost.

The collision rate exploded on stable/1.5 smoke tests because
PR #527 (just merged) added two new heuristic-INSERT paths in the
auto-approve early-return branches of ``approve_tools`` — previously
those branches dropped heuristic verdicts on the floor, leaving no
row for the fallback to collide with.

Fix:
- New ``upsert_intent_verdict`` method on the storage protocol +
  sqlite + postgres impls, using dialect-specific
  ``insert(...).on_conflict_do_update(index_elements=["verdict_id"],
  set_={...})``.  Set_ clause updates ONLY the three fields that
  genuinely change between heuristic and llm_fallback: ``tier``,
  ``reasoning``, ``judge_model``.
- Every other column is excluded from set_: identity columns
  (verdict_id, ws_id, call_id, func_name, func_args), carried-
  verbatim columns (intent_summary, risk_level, confidence,
  recommendation, evidence, latency_ms), and ``user_decision``.
- ``user_decision`` exclusion is load-bearing: ``IntentVerdict
  .to_dict()`` doesn't project it, so a fallback verdict reaching
  ``_persist_intent_verdict`` carries the kwarg's ``"pending"``
  default.  If the operator already resolved the approval between
  heuristic INSERT and fallback delivery, the row's user_decision
  has been stamped to ``"approved"``/``"denied"``/``"timeout"`` (or
  an auto-approve reason at heuristic-INSERT time per PR #527).
  Including ``user_decision`` in set_ would silently clobber that
  back to ``"pending"``.
- ``_persist_intent_verdict`` switched from ``create_*`` to
  ``upsert_*``.  Bulk path ``create_intent_verdicts_bulk`` stays as
  plain INSERT — every heuristic ``verdict_id`` is freshly minted
  in ``judge.evaluate`` so in-turn dups can't happen.  The inverse
  race (daemon-judge verdict lands BEFORE the bulk write) IS
  reachable today but its observable behavior is unchanged by the
  per-row UPSERT switch; documented at the bulk site for a future
  hardening pass.

Test coverage:
- TestIntentVerdictUpsert × 4 — fresh-id insert, conflict-upgrade,
  user_decision preservation across heuristic→approved→fallback,
  identity + carried-field preservation.
- Existing tests in test_session_ui_base.py updated to mock the
  new upsert method instead of create_intent_verdict.

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ jobs:
       # explicit setup, that suite silently skips if the runner
       # image happens not to ship Node, masking regressions in
       # the browser-side renderer.
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@a0853c24544627f65ddf259abe73b1d18a591444 # v5
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6
         with:
-          node-version: "20"
+          node-version: "24"
       - run: pip install -e ".[test]"
       - run: pytest tests/ -m "not live" --cov=turnstone --cov-report=term-missing --cov-report=xml -q
       - uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
         with:
           python-version: "3.14"
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@a0853c24544627f65ddf259abe73b1d18a591444 # v5
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6
         with:
-          node-version: "20"
+          node-version: "24"
       - run: pip install -e ".[test,postgres]"
       - run: pytest tests/ -m "not live" --storage-backend=postgresql -q
         env:

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,13 +8,634 @@ version numbers (`X.Y.Z`, with `X.Y.ZaN` / `bN` / `rcN` for pre-releases).
 
 Three release tracks are maintained:
 
-- **`stable/1.0`** — patch-only (`v1.0.x`)
-- **`stable/1.3`** — patch-only (`v1.3.x`)
 - **`stable/1.4`** — patch-only (`v1.4.x`)
-- **`main`** — experimental (`v1.5.0aN`)
+- **`stable/1.5`** — patch-only (`v1.5.x`)
+- **`main`** — experimental (next major)
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.5.17]
+
+Backports a clutch of coordinator-tool clarity fixes plus a watch-delivery
+correctness fix from `main` to the `stable/1.5` track, plus a previously-
+latent intent-verdicts persistence bug exposed by the new heuristic-verdict
+INSERT paths.  No schema changes.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`intent_verdicts` PK collisions on every llm_fallback delivery** —
+  async LLM-tier "llm_fallback" verdicts (`turnstone/core/judge.py` —
+  `_deliver_fallbacks` and the in-loop fallback path) deliberately
+  reuse the heuristic verdict's `verdict_id` so the row gets
+  "upgraded in place" from `tier="heuristic"` → `tier="llm_fallback"`
+  when the LLM judge times out, is cancelled, or returns no content.
+  The consumer `_persist_intent_verdict` was doing a plain INSERT,
+  hitting the `intent_verdicts_pkey` constraint on every fallback
+  delivery; Postgres logged the duplicate-key error, the application
+  try/except swallowed it at `log.debug`, and the row never actually
+  got upgraded — the LLM judge's annotation
+  (`"(LLM judge did not return a verdict)"`) was lost.  The collision
+  rate exploded on this release because the new heuristic-INSERT
+  paths in the auto-approve early-return branches of `approve_tools`
+  (introduced below) leave no gap for the fallback to land cleanly
+  into.  Fix: new `upsert_intent_verdict` storage method using
+  `ON CONFLICT (verdict_id) DO UPDATE` that updates only `tier`,
+  `reasoning`, `judge_model` — the three fields that genuinely
+  change between heuristic and llm_fallback.  Every other column
+  (identity, carried-verbatim, and `user_decision`) is excluded;
+  `user_decision` in particular would otherwise be clobbered back
+  to `"pending"` when a fallback arrives after the operator has
+  already resolved the approval.  The bulk-INSERT path stays as
+  plain INSERT — fresh UUIDs in `judge.evaluate` make in-turn dups
+  impossible; the inverse race (fallback wins before bulk lands) is
+  reachable but unchanged in observable behavior by this fix,
+  documented at the bulk site for a future hardening pass.
+- **Coordinator LLM re-spawn loops on large fan-outs** — the spawn-tool
+  return JSON used `ws_id` as its key, which primed the model's recency
+  bias to feed the spawn result straight back into another
+  `spawn_workstream(ws_id=...)` call instead of progressing to
+  `wait_for_workstream(ws_ids=[...])`.  On 10+ child fan-outs this cascaded
+  into self-inflicted re-spawn loops.  The LLM-facing tool result now emits
+  `child_ws_id` (the storage column / HTTP API contract is unchanged); the
+  field name is already an existing project term so the rename aligns
+  rather than introduces new vocabulary.  Also handles the silent
+  upstream-omits-ws_id success-shape edge that previously emitted
+  `{"child_ws_id": null}` to the LLM — now surfaces a tool error so the
+  model retries rather than chasing a null id.
+- **`inspect_workstream` blowing the coordinator context budget** — a
+  coord doing a fan-out wave against tool-heavy children could land
+  >100 KB of raw output per inspect call, and the previous safety net
+  (`_truncate_output`'s head+tail strategy) silently dropped *middle*
+  messages — exactly the wrong shape for understanding a child's
+  trajectory (the FIRST sets the brief, the LAST shows the conclusion,
+  the middle is the connective tissue).  Output now goes through a
+  three-tier degradation ladder mirroring the search tool's
+  `_format_search_results`: `_tier="full"` (every message verbatim) →
+  `_tier="compact"` (per-message head/tail-snipped content + snipped
+  `tool_calls.arguments`, falling through a `(20,30)` / `(10,20)` /
+  `(5,10)` message-list trim ladder) → `_tier="skeleton"` (counts, role
+  distribution, last-assistant preview).  Budget 32 KiB matches the
+  search tool's; the chosen tier is annotated on the response so the
+  model can recall with a tighter `message_limit` if signal was lost.
+- **Auto-approved verdicts indistinguishable from pending review** —
+  `intent_verdict` rows for auto-approved tool calls landed with
+  `user_decision=""`, which read identically to "still waiting for the
+  operator" in the audit trail and led to a real misdiagnosis incident.
+  The column now carries an explicit vocabulary at insert: `pending` /
+  `approved` / `denied` / `timeout` / `policy` / `blanket` / `skill` /
+  `always` / `auto_approve_tools`.  The auto-approve early-return
+  branches in `approve_tools` now persist heuristic verdicts stamped
+  with their reason (previously dropped on the floor), and late LLM-tier
+  verdicts that arrive for an already-auto-approved call_id are stamped
+  via a TTL-pruned lookup map — so the audit row carries the
+  auto-approve reason even when the LLM judge daemon completes after
+  the synchronous approval cycle finished.  `resolve_approval` gains a
+  `timeout` kwarg writing `"timeout"` (the previous shape collapsed
+  passive timeouts and active denials into the same column).
+- **`list_skills` empty `allowed_tools` misread as "no tool access"** —
+  the response previously emitted `"allowed_tools": []` for every skill
+  that hadn't declared an auto-approve allowlist, which a coordinator
+  model read as "this skill can't use any tools" (real misdiagnosis: a
+  code-review child appeared to have been spawned with zero tool
+  access).  The field is now omitted entirely when empty — absence
+  carries the unambiguous meaning "no tool is pre-approved for this
+  skill", presence (non-empty list) keeps the standard Claude Code
+  skill-spec shape.  The tool description rewrite makes the
+  auto-approve-allowlist semantics explicit so a future reader doesn't
+  re-derive the gating misread.
+- **Watch terminal-fires silently dropped on backpressure** —
+  delivery now routes terminal events through the same path as
+  normal fires instead of being filtered out when the consumer was
+  saturated.
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **Storage `LIKE_ESCAPE` contract** — clarify that callers passing
+  `.like(escape=...)` must use the same escape character that the
+  storage helper assumes; previous wording let a reader pass a
+  different escape and silently produce no matches.
+
+## [1.5.15]
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Admin console blank-page on MCP server rows with consented users** — a
+  Phase 9 (1.5.14) regression in `admin.js` used double-quote string
+  delimiters on the bulk-revoke button HTML literal, but the literal embeds
+  a `"` mid-attribute. JS closed the string early, turned `bulk-revoke (`
+  into bare tokens, and the resulting `SyntaxError` wiped out every global
+  in `admin.js` — `showAdmin` and all other admin entry points became
+  undefined, so the console UI was non-functional whenever the rendered MCP
+  server list contained at least one row with `consented_users_count > 0`.
+  Switch the literal to single-quote delimiters to match the surrounding
+  block.
+
+## [1.5.14]
+
+Backports OAuth-MCP Phase 9 from `main` to the `stable/1.5` track.
+
+### Added
+
+- **OAuth-MCP Phase 9 — admin status, deferred-consent persistence, operator
+  docs** — completes the per-(user, server) OAuth-MCP build-out. The sync pool
+  dispatchers now upsert into a new `mcp_pending_consent` table on
+  `mcp_consent_required` / `mcp_insufficient_scope`, so a non-interactive run
+  (scheduled / channel) that hits an unconsented server surfaces the deferred
+  prompt to the user on their next dashboard load via the gear-icon badge —
+  rows are cleared automatically by the OAuth callback handler on consent
+  completion, or via new DELETE endpoints for manual dismiss. The MCP Servers
+  admin row gains a `consented_users_count` pill and a two-step-confirm
+  bulk-revoke button for `auth_type=oauth_user` servers (upstream RFC 7009
+  revoke is intentionally not attempted in bulk to avoid N synchronous
+  round-trips against the provider). Operator-facing docs land at
+  `docs/mcp-oauth.md` and `docs/operations/mcp-oauth-headless.md`.
+
+  Introduces forward-only migrations `054_mcp_pending_consent` and
+  `055_mcp_user_tokens_server_index`.
+
+## [1.5.13]
+
+This release introduces one forward-only schema migration:
+`053_services_notify_trigger` — installs the `services_notify` PostgreSQL
+trigger that backs the new LISTEN/NOTIFY dispatcher (no-op on SQLite, where
+the dispatcher uses in-process fan-out).
+
+### Added
+
+- **Reactive node discovery via PG LISTEN/NOTIFY** — the console gains a
+  `NotifyDispatcher` that holds a dedicated session-mode PostgreSQL `LISTEN`
+  connection (bypasses pgbouncer transaction pooling) and fans wake-ups out to
+  per-channel handlers on a separate dispatch thread. The cluster collector
+  subscribes to a new `services` channel and reacts to node register /
+  deregister within ~500 ms instead of waiting up to 60 s for the next discovery
+  loop; the 60 s loop is retained as the backstop for crash-shaped loss
+  (NOTIFY only fires on real writes). The storage layer also gains a uniform
+  `notify` / `listen` API with an SQLite synthetic-sweep fallback so consumer
+  code is identical across backends. `TURNSTONE_DB_LISTEN_URL` (or
+  `[database] listen_url` in `config.toml`) points the dispatcher at a
+  direct-to-Postgres URL; defaults to the main DB URL when unset.
+- **Event-driven `wait_for_workstream`** — coord's block-wait tool no longer
+  polls storage every 500 ms. A new in-process `ChildEventBus` notifies waiters
+  whenever a child state change is dispatched to the UI, and the wait loop
+  blocks on `threading.Event.wait` with a 2 s heartbeat cap (matching the
+  existing `wait_progress` SSE cadence). A 600 s wait that previously hit
+  storage ~2400 times now wakes only on real state transitions, with ~4× lower
+  SSE traffic in the quiescent case.
+- **Memory tool audit trail** — the memory tool now emits `memory.save`,
+  `memory.update`, and `memory.delete` audit events (the admin-console DELETE
+  route previously emitted only `memory.delete`, so tool-initiated mutations
+  had no audit footprint). All emissions are best-effort and never break the
+  tool call itself.
+- **`task_agent` per-call personas via `skill=`** — `task_agent` now accepts
+  an optional `skill=<name>` argument that loads the named skill's content as
+  the sub-agent's persona in place of the hardcoded identity statement. The
+  fixed operating-guidance block (one-shot, tool-use over narration,
+  no follow-up questions) is still layered on top of every persona. High- and
+  critical-risk skills surface their risk tier in the approval header and
+  emit a `task_agent.high_risk_skill` warning, matching the existing
+  session-load gate.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Per-role plan / task model overrides could be bypassed by the LLM** — the
+  back-compat `default` alias auto-synthesised by `load_model_registry`
+  remained visible to the model even when an operator had configured
+  `model.task_alias` / `model.plan_alias`, so `task_agent(model="default")`
+  routed to whichever backend the synthesised alias was attached to at boot
+  instead of the configured per-role default. The synthesised alias is now
+  only added when neither the DB nor `[models.*]` populates the registry,
+  filtered out of the LLM-visible alias list, and explicitly rejected at the
+  validator chokepoint as defense-in-depth.
+- **Mermaid streaming parse errors + progressive `hljs`** — live-streamed
+  mermaid blocks with bare `(`, `[`, `{` inside unquoted edge or rectangle
+  node labels were re-entering the shape parser and producing
+  `Parse error, got 'PS'` messages. The renderer now autoquotes the two
+  affected label forms (`|content|` and `ID[content]`) before the SVG cache
+  lookup; shapes whose syntax already nests delimiters (cylinders, subroutines,
+  trapezoids, etc.) are intentionally left alone. The companion `hljs` change
+  highlights code blocks progressively as they stream rather than only after
+  completion.
+- **Re-auth from inside the proxy-prefixed UI** — on a proxied node page
+  (`/node/{id}/...`), an expiring JWT triggered an in-page login modal whose
+  POST went to `/v1/api/auth/login` and was rewritten to
+  `/node/{id}/v1/api/auth/login`. Two latent bugs both blocked re-auth: the
+  console's `AuthMiddleware` didn't recognise the `/node/{id}/` prefix over a
+  public path, and `proxy_api` would have forwarded the login request to the
+  upstream node (which mints `JWT_AUD_SERVER` tokens the console then rejects).
+  Both fixed: proxied public paths stay public, and `proxy_api` now dispatches
+  every entry in `_PROXY_AUTH_LOCAL_HANDLERS` (login, logout, setup, refresh,
+  status, whoami, oidc/authorize, oidc/callback) to the console's own auth
+  handlers. The dispatch table is a single `(method, path) → handler` mapping
+  so the test parametrize list can't drift from the implementation.
+- **Appbar visibility + gear-icon dropdown on the dashboard** — the dashboard
+  overlay was covering the entire appbar, hiding the proxy-injected node
+  picker. The overlay now starts at `top: 48px` and the dashboard's role
+  downgrades from `dialog+aria-modal` to `region` so the appbar above it
+  remains reachable. The gear icon converts from a direct settings-panel
+  click into a dropdown with "MCP connections" and "Logout" (the latter with
+  `.destructive` styling). The settings-menu keydown handler is now attached
+  synchronously so `Escape` can't fall through the brief window between the
+  menu opening and its listeners being installed.
+- **PostgreSQL test backend on the notify dispatcher suite** — migration 053's
+  `services_notify` trigger lives only in the alembic chain, but the test
+  fixture creates tables via `metadata.create_all`. The trigger function +
+  trigger are now declared in `_schema.py` and attached via
+  `sa.event.listen(services, "after_create", ...)` DDL events gated on the
+  PostgreSQL dialect, with the same SQL constants imported by migration 053
+  so there's a single source of truth.
+
+## [1.5.12]
+
+### Added
+
+- **Enriched backend error messages** — provider name and attempted URL are now
+  included in session error responses, so operators can triage connectivity
+  failures without enabling debug logging.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`/rewind` always emits a `history` SSE event** — pre-fix, if the session
+  had no messages remaining after a rewind the history event was skipped,
+  leaving connected UIs with stale content and blocking edit-and-resend flows.
+
+## [1.5.11]
+
+This release introduces one forward-only schema migration:
+`052_model_reasoning_persistence` — `surface_persisted_reasoning` and
+`replay_reasoning_to_model` flag columns on `model_definitions`.
+
+### Added
+
+- **SSE refresh-resume** — clients that reload mid-stream (browser refresh, tab
+  restore) now receive an `in_progress_snapshot` event carrying the buffered
+  partial response, so the UI can resume rendering the in-flight turn without
+  losing content. The snapshot is keyed by a monotonic `_ws_inflight_seq`
+  counter so a reconnecting client can skip events it already saw.
+- **Reasoning persistence** (Phases 1–4) — model reasoning text can now be
+  persisted to conversation history and optionally replayed to the model on
+  subsequent turns. Phase 1 persists reasoning text on the history payload.
+  Phase 2 wires a build-time shape filter and a per-model
+  `replay_reasoning_to_model` flag. Phases 3+4 add full OpenAI Responses API
+  (`include=["reasoning.encrypted_content"]`) and Chat Completions support;
+  an `ANTHROPIC_VALID_BLOCK_TYPES` shape filter guards the Anthropic path. Two
+  new per-model capability flags (`surface_persisted_reasoning`,
+  `replay_reasoning_to_model`) both default `False` on unknown and
+  local-server models.
+- **Console home composer: placeholders + toggle** — the console landing-page
+  composer now shows context-aware placeholder text and a toggle component for
+  advanced options; an admin polish pass tightened spacing and focus behaviour
+  across the form.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`judge.model` now requires a named alias** — raw provider model IDs on
+  `judge.model` in config are no longer accepted; the judge must reference an
+  alias registered in the model registry. The session-provider raw-model
+  fallback is removed. Existing configs using an unregistered model ID need a
+  corresponding alias entry.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`replay_reasoning_to_model` AND-gated with model capability** — setting the
+  flag for a model that does not declare reasoning-replay support now silently
+  no-ops instead of forwarding reasoning blocks and triggering a provider error.
+- **Coordinator alias resolution unified across placeholder + factory** — a
+  placeholder coordinator and the real coordinator factory could previously
+  resolve to different model aliases, producing a visible mismatch in the model
+  display. Both paths now share the same resolution logic.
+- **Console `cs=None` fallback in `/v1/api/models` placeholder** — an
+  under-initialised coordinator state no longer 500s when the models endpoint
+  is hit before the coordinator subsystem is fully bootstrapped.
+- **SSE `_ws_inflight_seq` always advances** — sequence numbers were previously
+  skipped when an emit was past the buffer cap, leaving gaps in the monotonic
+  counter that broke `state_change` / `in_progress_snapshot` ordering on
+  reconnect.
+- **Reasoning persistence shape + replay fixes** — per-block
+  `ANTHROPIC_VALID_BLOCK_TYPES` filter applied; `reasoning_text` is now
+  synthesised alongside non-reasoning `provider_blocks` so both appear
+  together in the history payload.
+
+## [1.5.10]
+
+This release introduces one forward-only schema migration:
+`051_skill_notify_on_complete_array_default` — backfills
+`prompt_templates.notify_on_complete` from `'{}'` to `'[]'`.
+
+### Added
+
+- **Skills unlock action** — operators can unlock an installed skill to allow
+  local customisation. Once unlocked, the skill's resource content, system
+  prompt additions, and notify configuration are editable through the admin UI.
+  Skills shipped as part of a bundle remain locked (read-only) until explicitly
+  unlocked; the unlock is logged to the audit trail. A lock icon in the
+  top-right of the Skills detail pane doubles as the unlock trigger.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`skills.sh` install endpoint** — the install script was targeting an
+  endpoint removed in an earlier refactor; switched to `/api/download`.
+- **Skills `notify_on_complete` default** — the field defaulted to `{}`
+  (object) instead of `[]` (array), causing notify configurations to be
+  rejected at schema validation.
+- **Skills admin UI modal errors** — `.is-visible` class used consistently
+  instead of inline `style.display`; stale error text is cleared on submit;
+  designer-review lock-icon UX applied.
+
+## [1.5.9]
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **`repair=False` on all display-read `load_messages` call sites** —
+  passing `repair=True` on display paths was silently mutating the stored
+  message list, causing divergence between what the UI showed and what the
+  model received on the next turn.
+
+## [1.5.8]
+
+This release introduces two forward-only schema migrations:
+`049_mcp_oauth_schema` — OAuth token + consent tables for MCP servers;
+`050_conversations_source_and_reminders` — `_source` and `_reminders` columns
+on `conversations`.
+
+### Added
+
+- **MCP OAuth 2.1 + PKCE** — MCP servers that require OAuth can now be
+  configured with a client ID and secret through the admin UI. The full token
+  lifecycle (acquire → refresh → rotate) is managed automatically; tokens are
+  stored encrypted at rest using a key derived from the JWT secret. The consent
+  flow runs in-browser via a provider redirect. Rolled out in phases:
+
+  - Minimum admin form and OAuth schema (`21663d15`).
+  - Token-at-rest AES-GCM encryption layer (`a4c335d7`).
+  - Per-(user, server) OAuth 2.1 + PKCE flow (`b0f7029f`).
+  - Per-(user, server) `ClientSession` pool with OAuth dispatch (`1a1043c4`).
+  - SDK 401/403 introspection via httpx response hook (`bde09134`).
+  - Phase 7 — per-user tool catalog scoping: each user sees only the tools
+    their OAuth token is permitted to call (`cfc8a6c8`).
+  - Phase 7b — per-user resource + prompt pool dispatch (`b368bdee`).
+  - Phase 8 — per-user MCP consent UX: users see a consent dialog on first
+    use of an OAuth-gated server and can revoke consent from their profile;
+    admins see per-server consent counts in the MCP Servers tab (`61051339`).
+
+- **Metacognition NudgeQueue** — all advisory channels (repeat-tool nudges,
+  watch reminders, wake triggers) are unified into a pull-model `NudgeQueue`
+  that delivers at most one nudge per turn, preventing multi-channel pile-ups
+  that inflate context. Observable changes:
+
+  - Watch results carry metadata (watch ID, `valid_until`, trigger type)
+    through to the system message so the model can reason about recency.
+  - Coordinator idle-children observer: a coordinator with no in-flight
+    children for longer than the configured idle threshold receives a nudge.
+  - Wake trigger (`IdleNudgeWatcher`): sessions waiting on an external event
+    can be unblocked via `ChatSession.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue`.
+  - Watch switchover: watch results are now enqueued on the `NudgeQueue`
+    rather than the previous `_watch_pending` list, giving them the same
+    delivery guarantees and priority handling as other advisories.
+
+- **Structured watch-result card** — the UI renders watch results as a styled
+  card with a system-nudge marker, distinct from the assistant message body.
+  On history replay, system-nudge turns are visually distinguished from normal
+  assistant turns.
+- **Side-channel persistence** — `_source` and `_reminders` side-channel
+  fields are persisted to the `conversations` storage table and restored on
+  session resume, so metacognitive context survives process restarts. A
+  `REMINDER_TEXT_STORAGE_CAP` byte clamp prevents unbounded growth.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Replay consistency** — queued user messages captured mid-loop are now
+  persisted and replayed in the correct order on a subsequent `events`
+  subscription. Coordinator history replay fixed: blank assistant cards and
+  out-of-order tool results on the coordinator tree no longer occur when the
+  coordinator has mixed queued + delivered messages.
+- **Session reminder preservation on fork + resume** — `_source` and
+  `_reminders` are carried through workstream fork and restored from storage
+  on resume.
+- **NUL-byte sanitization in storage** — PostgreSQL rejects `\x00` in text
+  columns; `_source` and `_reminders` now strip NUL bytes on write.
+- **Console coordinator subsystem bootstrap** — the coordinator subsystem is
+  now committed atomically on first model add; startup teardown is offloaded
+  to avoid blocking the event loop.
+- **MCP `asyncio.timeout` over `asyncio.wait_for`** — Python 3.11's
+  `wait_for` wraps the coroutine in a fresh task, breaking anyio's `aclose`
+  scope exit. Replaced with `async with asyncio.timeout(N)` for safe cleanup.
+- **MCP pool-reuse 401 recovery** — a reused `ClientSession` returning 401
+  now replaces the pool entry with a fresh session; the carrier token is
+  owned by the pool entry to prevent a race between the 401 handler and a
+  concurrent request.
+- **OIDC hardening** — multiple security and correctness fixes:
+  SSRF + plaintext credential exfil via discovery document (sec-1, sec-3);
+  `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` now required, Host-header fallback removed
+  (sec-2); atomic user + identity provisioning prevents orphan rows (bug-1);
+  callback robustness — typed exceptions, shape checks, log sanitization, JS
+  race (bug-4–6, sec-4); role-mapping concurrency serialized (bug-2, perf-1);
+  stranded-user self-heal on role-mapping failure (cumulative bug-1).
+
+## [1.5.7]
+
+### Added
+
+- **Inline node picker** — a compact node-switcher dropdown in the console
+  header replaces the "← Back to console" banner, so operators can switch
+  between nodes without a full navigation.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Queued user messages injected mid-loop** — messages queued while a
+  generation was in progress were not being delivered at the correct seam and
+  could be dropped or reordered when the worker consumed the queue.
+- **Search tool output bounded** — pathological inputs (very long lines with
+  no whitespace) could produce search results exceeding the context budget.
+  Output is now clamped before reaching the message.
+
+## [1.5.6]
+
+### Added
+
+- **`api_surface` toggle** — model definitions gain an `api_surface` field
+  (`"chat"` | `"responses"`) that selects which OpenAI-compatible API surface
+  the provider client uses. Enables Mistral Medium reasoning via the Responses
+  surface; Chat Completions remains the default for all other models.
+- **Healthy model aliases per node** — `GET /v1/api/cluster/nodes` now
+  includes a `healthy_aliases` list per node, so the coordinator and operators
+  can see which model aliases are currently reachable without a separate
+  per-model health probe.
+- **Plan/task agent settings in Models → Roles** — the Models admin tab's
+  Roles sub-tab gains `plan_agent` and `task_agent` rows so operators can
+  configure per-kind reasoning effort and alias overrides from the UI rather
+  than editing `config.toml`. Live-refresh dropdowns update in place when
+  model definitions change.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Memory candidate selection** — recall now uses OR-of-terms BM25 with
+  query-aware candidate-set selection, dramatically improving recall for
+  queries whose terms span multiple stored entries.
+- **Workstream model + config preserved on rehydrate** — reopening a closed
+  workstream no longer overwrites the model alias and per-workstream config
+  with session defaults.
+- **Console home composer: attachments + user-message pills** — multipart
+  attachments in the home composer were not forwarded correctly; user-message
+  pills in the coordinator chat pane were missing.
+
+## [1.5.5]
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Saved-workstream tool result rendering** — tool results in closed
+  workstreams were not rendering on history replay. Audit-trail decoration for
+  tool calls is now applied on the replay path.
+
+## [1.5.4]
+
+### Added
+
+- **Stage 3 SessionManager Children primitive lift** — child workstreams are
+  first-class citizens in the cluster event bus. `child_ws_state` events are
+  pushed through the cluster SSE stream so the console tree view updates in
+  real time without polling. `list_children` and `get_child` primitives on
+  `SessionManager` provide a consistent cross-node view of the coordinator's
+  spawn tree.
+- **Multi-select delete for Saved Coordinators** — the Saved Coordinators grid
+  in the console admin panel now supports checkbox multi-select with a
+  bulk-delete action.
+
+## [1.5.3]
+
+This release introduces one forward-only schema migration:
+`048_workstream_reaper_index` — partial composite index on `workstreams` for
+the orphan-reaper query.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Coordinator orphan reaping scoped by heartbeat** — the session manager's
+  `close_idle` pass now scopes the DB-orphan reaper by
+  `services.last_heartbeat` so workstreams belonging to a live node are not
+  incorrectly reaped. `bulk_close_stale_orphans` and `touch_workstream`
+  storage primitives added; a partial composite index keeps the reaper scan
+  cheap.
+- **Coordinator pool idle cleanup** — a periodic task on the console now
+  closes coordinator pool entries whose session has gone idle past the
+  configurable threshold, preventing pool exhaustion on long-running consoles.
+
+## [1.5.2]
+
+### Added
+
+- **Metacognition themed reminder bubble** — repeat-tool and user-reminder
+  nudges are rendered as a distinct styled bubble rather than being injected
+  inline into the assistant message, making it easier to distinguish model
+  output from metacognitive annotations. The CLI REPL gains matching
+  `on_user_reminder` / `on_tool_reminder` callbacks.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Metacog streak detector** — the N≥3 sequential-same-call streak detector
+  now fires correctly on the third repetition; a write-success-clear that
+  reset the counter after a successful tool call (preventing streaks across
+  mixed-outcome sequences) was removed.
+- **Metacog reminders isolated to side-channel** — reminder text no longer
+  appears in the user content turn; it flows through a dedicated side-channel
+  the session injects into the system context, preventing the model from
+  attributing it to the user.
+
+## [1.5.1]
+
+### Added
+
+- **`pending_approval_detail` on child `ws_state` SSE events** — coordinators
+  now receive the child's pending approval detail in `child_ws_state` events,
+  enabling the coordinator to surface approval prompts without a separate poll.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Coordinator registry auto-refresh** — the console coordinator registry now
+  refreshes when model definitions change, so a newly added alias is visible
+  to coordinators without restarting.
+- **Coordinator fan-out default** — coordinators now fan out to independent
+  child workstreams by default instead of serialising them, matching the
+  documented contract for parallel-work patterns.
+- **`wait_for_workstream` message cap raised to 10 KiB** — large plan
+  summaries and tool results from child workstreams were silently truncated at
+  the previous 4 KiB cap.
+- **Coordinator SSE isolated on dedicated thread pool** — coordinator SSE
+  polling now runs on a dedicated 200-thread executor, matching interactive's
+  `sse_executor`, so coordinator long-poll blocking no longer contends with
+  storage and routing workers on the default pool.
+
+## [1.5.0]
+
+User-visible additions: a unified workstream HTTP surface (interactive and
+coordinator under one URL family), inline child approvals, coordinator
+composer parity, progressive rendering, OIDC authentication, MCP OAuth
+foundations, and a redesigned UI built on the Design System v1 token layer.
+
+This release removes the pre-1.5 body-keyed and query-keyed URL family.
+See **Removed (BREAKING)** below before upgrading from a 1.x stable line.
+
+This release introduces the following forward-only schema migrations that the
+server applies automatically on first startup. All are additive; no data loss.
+
+- `039_workstream_kind` — `kind` + `parent_ws_id` columns on `workstreams`.
+- `040_coord_cluster_admin_perms` — grants `admin.coordinator` +
+  `admin.cluster.inspect` to the builtin-admin role.
+- `041_workstream_index_tuning` — refined indexes for the workstream query mix
+  introduced by 039.
+- `042_coord_trust_send_perm` — adds `coordinator.trust.send` permission to
+  builtin-admin.
+- `043_skill_description_required` — backfills empty `description` rows in
+  `prompt_templates`.
+- `044_skill_kind` — adds `kind` classifier column to `prompt_templates`
+  (`interactive` / `coordinator` / `any`).
+- `045_skill_risk_level_rename` — renames `prompt_templates.scan_status` →
+  `risk_level`.
+- `046_drop_hash_ring_tables` — drops the hash-ring bucket tables superseded
+  by rendezvous routing in 1.4.
+- `047_drop_coord_spawn_quota_settings` — removes the spawn-quota settings
+  rows removed from the coordinator in 1.5.0a4.
+
+### Added
+
+- **Inline child approvals** — pending tool approvals on coordinator child
+  workstreams surface directly in the coordinator tree view. A risk pill shows
+  the judge verdict (or "pending" while the judge evaluates); Approve/Deny
+  buttons appear inline so operators do not need to navigate to the child's
+  workstream. `pending_approval_detail` is exposed on
+  `GET /v1/api/dashboard` and passed through the cluster live-bulk SSE payload
+  so all connected clients render approval prompts simultaneously. LLM judge
+  verdicts are cached client-side and replayed on SSE reconnect.
+- **Coordinator composer parity** — the coordinator composer now supports
+  Stop, Send-to-queue, and Attach (file upload), matching the interactive
+  workstream composer feature set.
+- **Per-call model and judge override on coordinator composer** — operators
+  can override the model alias and judge model for a single coordinator send
+  from the composer, without changing the node-wide or role-wide defaults. Bad
+  aliases return a corrective error listing available choices.
+- **Coordinator status bar + richer history replay** — each coordinator
+  workstream gains a per-coordinator status bar showing active children, token
+  spend, and generation state. History replay in the coordinator panel is
+  extended to include tool results and thinking blocks.
+- **Coordinator child error surfacing + memory tool** — child workstream
+  errors are surfaced as distinct error rows in the coordinator tree view
+  rather than disappearing silently. The coordinator gains access to a
+  `memory` tool (same interface as interactive) for retrieving stored facts.
+- **Coordinator inline tool-batch construct** — the coordinator tool approval
+  UI replaces the separate approval dock with an inline batch construct that
+  groups all pending tool calls for a given turn into a single review card.
+- **Node capability auto-detection** — nodes report kernel-level capabilities
+  (available memory, CPU count, accelerator presence) via
+  `/v1/api/node/capabilities` at startup, enabling the console to filter model
+  aliases offered to coordinators routing to that node.
+- **Skills: paste `SKILL.md` to auto-fill the Create Skill modal** — pasting
+  a `SKILL.md` file's content into the modal auto-populates the name,
+  description, and configuration fields.
+- **Progressive mermaid rendering** — Mermaid diagrams begin rendering as
+  soon as a complete diagram block is detected in the stream rather than
+  waiting for the full response; the diagram re-renders in place as the model
+  extends it.
+- **LaTeX and MathML delimiter support** — `\(…\)` inline and `\[…\]` block
+  math delimiters are now recognised alongside the existing `$$` fences.
+
 ### Removed (BREAKING — 1.5.0)
 
 - **Legacy body-keyed and query-keyed URL family for the workstream

Dockerfile

@@ -8,14 +8,17 @@ FROM python:3.14-slim
 LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="turnstone" \
       org.opencontainers.image.description="Multi-node AI orchestration platform"
 
-COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.7 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv
+COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.14 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv
 
 # Remove the slim image's man page exclusion so man-db has actual content
 RUN rm -f /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/docker
 
-# System dependencies: psycopg (libpq5), developer tooling for agent workflows
+# System dependencies: psycopg (libpq5), developer tooling for agent workflows.
+# ripgrep is the preferred backend for the search tool — natively bounds
+# per-line, per-file, and per-filesize so pathological inputs (minified
+# bundles, training-data JSONL with multi-MB single records) can't OOM us.
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-    libpq5 git curl jq man-db manpages procps file \
+    libpq5 git curl jq man-db manpages procps file ripgrep \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # Node.js LTS (for npx-based MCP servers like @modelcontextprotocol/server-github)

docs/api-reference.md

@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ Each message in the `messages` array has:
 | `role`       | string            | `"user"`, `"assistant"`, or `"tool"`          |
 | `content`    | string or null    | Text content of the message                   |
 | `tool_calls` | array or null     | Present only on assistant messages with calls  |
+| `reasoning`  | string (optional) | Concatenated reasoning / chain-of-thought text on assistant turns whose `provider_data` carried reasoning-bearing blocks (Anthropic `thinking`, OpenAI Responses `reasoning`, or synthetic `reasoning_text` from local-model servers). Present only when the active model's `surface_persisted_reasoning` flag is True. |
 
 Each entry in `tool_calls`:
 
@@ -325,6 +326,44 @@ finalize any in-progress assistant message.
 {"type": "stream_end"}
 ```
 
+**`state_change`** -- the worker thread transitioned to a new state. Drives
+the client's busy-mode (composer in send vs. stop, spinner indicators,
+auto-focus on idle). Sent live during normal operation AND on every fresh
+SSE subscribe (so a mid-stream page refresh restores the correct composer
+state without waiting for the next live transition).
+
+```json
+{"type": "state_change", "state": "running"}
+```
+
+| Field    | Type   | Description                                                          |
+|----------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `state`  | string | One of `"running"`, `"thinking"`, `"attention"`, `"idle"`, `"error"` |
+
+**`in_progress_snapshot`** -- one-shot replay of the in-progress turn's
+content + reasoning text-so-far when this client connects mid-stream.
+Lets a refreshing browser tab restore partial assistant text immediately
+instead of waiting for the response to complete. Yielded once after the
+kind-specific replay phase (history + pending), only when at least one
+of `content` / `reasoning` is non-empty. Both halves render into the same
+assistant bubble the live `content` / `reasoning` events would target;
+clients should treat the snapshot as idempotent (skip overwrite if the
+current local buffer is already a superset prefix — covers EventSource
+auto-reconnect re-replays).
+
+```json
+{
+  "type": "in_progress_snapshot",
+  "content": "Here is the answer so far: it depends on ",
+  "reasoning": "The user is asking about a comparison; let me think about..."
+}
+```
+
+| Field        | Type   | Description                                                |
+|--------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `content`    | string | Joined assistant content text accumulated this turn        |
+| `reasoning`  | string | Joined reasoning / chain-of-thought text accumulated       |
+
 **`tool_info`** -- one or more tool calls that were auto-approved (no user
 action required).
 
@@ -522,7 +561,13 @@ Each SSE connection to a workstream receives its own delivery queue.  Events
 produced by the worker thread are fanned out to all registered listener queues,
 so multiple consumers (browser, console proxy, SDK) can connect
 simultaneously and each receives every event.  On reconnect the client receives
-a full history replay, so no catch-up mechanism is needed.
+the kind-specific replay (`connected` + `status` + `history` + pending
+approval / plan for interactive; `connected` + `status` + pending for coord)
+followed by a `state_change` carrying the current worker state and an
+optional `in_progress_snapshot` carrying any partial content / reasoning
+buffered for the in-progress turn — so a mid-stream refresh restores both
+the busy-mode UI and the partial assistant text without waiting for the
+response to complete.
 
 ---
 

docs/architecture.md

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ turnstone/
     discord/          Discord adapter (bot, cog, views, streaming, config)
     slack/            Slack adapter (Socket Mode bot, DM routing, approval buttons)
   shared_static/      Shared design system (base.css, auth.js, theme.js, toast.js, utils.js, kb.js)
-    katex-0.16.45/    Vendored KaTeX math rendering library (MIT, woff2 fonts)
+    katex-0.16.47/    Vendored KaTeX math rendering library (MIT, woff2 fonts)
   ui/
     colors.py         ANSI color constants with NO_COLOR support
     markdown.py       Streaming terminal markdown renderer (line-buffered)
@@ -231,11 +231,13 @@ The engine emits state changes via `_emit_state()` which calls
 
 > See also: [Core Engine Classes diagram](diagrams/png/03-core-engine-classes.png)
 
-Defined in `turnstone.core.session.SessionUI` as a `typing.Protocol` with 14
+Defined in `turnstone.core.session.SessionUI` as a `typing.Protocol` with 16
 methods. Every frontend must implement all of them.
 
 ```python
 class SessionUI(Protocol):
+    def on_turn_start(self) -> None: ...
+    def on_turn_committed(self) -> None: ...
     def on_thinking_start(self) -> None: ...
     def on_thinking_stop(self) -> None: ...
     def on_reasoning_token(self, text: str) -> None: ...
@@ -252,6 +254,14 @@ class SessionUI(Protocol):
     def on_rename(self, name: str) -> None: ...  # propagate alias to tab/UI label
 ```
 
+`on_turn_start` fires at the top of each iteration of the send-loop;
+`on_turn_committed` fires immediately after `messages.append(assistant_msg)`.
+`SessionUIBase` uses both to reset the per-turn inflight buffers
+(`_ws_inflight_content` / `_ws_inflight_reasoning` / `_ws_inflight_seq`)
+that fuel the SSE refresh-resume `in_progress_snapshot` event — see
+the per-workstream events stream in
+[`docs/api-reference.md`](api-reference.md#get-v1apiworkstreamsws_idevents).
+
 `on_rename` is called by the `/name` command (on success) and after a successful `/resume` (if the resumed session has an alias or title). `WebUI.on_rename` broadcasts a `ws_rename` event on the global SSE channel and updates the in-memory `Workstream.name`; `TerminalUI.on_rename` is a no-op.
 
 ### Three Implementations
@@ -546,11 +556,9 @@ adds, removes, or reconnects servers as needed.
 6. `_exec_mcp_tool()` calls `call_tool_sync()` which dispatches to the async loop
    via `asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe()`
 
-**Tool refresh:** Three mechanisms keep tools up-to-date without restart:
+**Tool refresh:** Two mechanisms keep tools up-to-date without restart:
 - **Push:** Servers declaring `tools.listChanged` send `ToolListChangedNotification`;
   the registered `message_handler` triggers immediate single-server refresh.
-- **Periodic:** Servers without push support are polled on a staggered interval
-  (default 4 h, configurable via `[mcp] refresh_interval` or `--mcp-refresh-interval`).
 - **Manual:** `/mcp refresh [server]` calls `refresh_sync()` for on-demand refresh
   (also attempts reconnection for disconnected servers).
 
@@ -572,10 +580,11 @@ from a healthy connection do not trip the breaker. When the cooldown expires
 (`call_tool_sync`, `read_resource_sync`, `get_prompt_sync`, `refresh_sync`)
 cancel orphaned futures on timeout to prevent coroutine accumulation on the
 background event loop. Push notification refreshes are debounced (5 s per
-server) to protect against notification storms. The periodic refresh loop
-attempts reconnection for disconnected servers with exponential backoff
-(60 s–1 h). Transport stream references are pre-closed before stack teardown to
-work around the MCP SDK's anyio cancel-scope CPU busy-loop (SDK #2147).
+server) to protect against notification storms. Operators can force a
+catalog refresh or full reconnect from the admin panel; reconnects clear
+the circuit breaker and run a fresh handshake. Transport stream references
+are pre-closed before stack teardown to work around the MCP SDK's anyio
+cancel-scope CPU busy-loop (SDK #2147).
 
 **Error isolation:** Per-server connection/refresh failures are caught and logged; other
 servers are unaffected. Tool execution errors return error strings to the LLM
@@ -620,14 +629,15 @@ LLMProvider (protocol)
 | `get_capabilities()` | Per-model flags (`ModelCapabilities`) |
 | `convert_tools()` | Translate OpenAI tool schemas to provider format |
 | `retryable_error_names` | Exception class names that trigger retry |
+| `extract_reasoning_text()` | Walk stored `provider_blocks`, return concatenated reasoning text for UI rehydration (per-provider block-type knowledge: Anthropic `thinking`, OpenAI Responses `reasoning`, OpenAI Chat synthetic `reasoning_text`) |
 
 **Normalized data types:**
 
 | Type | Fields |
 |------|--------|
-| `StreamChunk` | `content_delta`, `reasoning_delta`, `tool_call_deltas`, `info_delta`, `usage`, `finish_reason` |
-| `CompletionResult` | `content`, `tool_calls`, `finish_reason`, `usage` |
-| `ModelCapabilities` | `context_window`, `max_output_tokens`, `supports_temperature`, `token_param`, `thinking_mode`, `supports_effort`, `supports_web_search`, `supports_tool_search`, `supports_vision` |
+| `StreamChunk` | `content_delta`, `reasoning_delta`, `tool_call_deltas`, `info_delta`, `usage`, `finish_reason`, `provider_blocks` |
+| `CompletionResult` | `content`, `tool_calls`, `finish_reason`, `usage`, `provider_blocks` |
+| `ModelCapabilities` | `context_window`, `max_output_tokens`, `supports_temperature`, `token_param`, `thinking_mode`, `supports_effort`, `supports_web_search`, `supports_tool_search`, `supports_vision`, `supports_reasoning_replay` |
 | `UsageInfo` | `prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, `total_tokens`, `cache_creation_tokens`, `cache_read_tokens` |
 
 **OpenAIProvider** (`_openai.py`): passes messages through unchanged (they are
@@ -715,6 +725,35 @@ and `"openai-compatible"`.
 `max_tokens`, and `reasoning_effort` to override the global defaults from
 ConfigStore. When unset (`NULL`), the global default is used.
 
+**Per-model reasoning persistence:** Two booleans on `model_definitions`
+(migration 052) control how reasoning text round-trips:
+
+* `surface_persisted_reasoning` (default `True`) — gates whether stored
+  reasoning text is surfaced on `/history` payloads for UI rehydration.
+  **Storage of reasoning bytes happens regardless of this flag** — they
+  ride in `provider_data` independently. Phase-1 admin UI label "Surface
+  persisted reasoning."
+* `replay_reasoning_to_model` (default `False`) — gates whether stored
+  reasoning blocks are sent back to the provider on subsequent turns.
+  Capability-gated: `ModelCapabilities.supports_reasoning_replay` must
+  also be `True` for the wire path to actually replay (canonical OpenAI
+  gpt-5*/o-series and Anthropic Claude entries set it; unknown / local-
+  server models default to `False`).
+
+Three reasoning paths are recognised:
+
+| Path | Provider | Capture | Persist | Replay |
+|------|----------|---------|---------|--------|
+| 1 | Anthropic Messages API | `thinking_delta` | `provider_blocks` (`type="thinking"`) | Verbatim via `_provider_content` |
+| 2 | OpenAI Responses (gpt-5*, o-series) | `response.reasoning_text.delta` events | `provider_blocks` (`type="reasoning"`) — only when `include=["reasoning.encrypted_content"]` | `ResponseReasoningItemParam` input items |
+| 3 | OpenAI Chat Completions (vLLM, llama.cpp, Gemini-compat) | `delta.reasoning_content` Pydantic extras | Synthetic `{type: "reasoning_text", text, source}` block stamped at end-of-stream | None — no API surface for replay on Chat Completions |
+
+Cross-provider safety is enforced by `ANTHROPIC_VALID_BLOCK_TYPES` (a
+shape filter in `_anthropic.py:_convert_messages`): foreign blocks
+(OpenAI `reasoning`, synthetic `reasoning_text`) fall through to the
+text+tool_calls rebuild path rather than reaching Anthropic's input
+boundary as malformed content.
+
 ```toml
 [models.local]
 base_url = "http://localhost:8000/v1"

docs/bulk-endpoints.md

@@ -110,11 +110,18 @@ owns it; the node is just currently unreachable.
 
 ### Example — `spawn_batch`
 
+This is the coordinator-tool result shape (the JSON the LLM receives),
+not an HTTP API response — the table above keys it under "model tool"
+to distinguish it from the `/v1/api/...` endpoints in the same table.
+The underlying HTTP spawn endpoint still returns `ws_id`; the tool
+result re-keys it to `child_ws_id` to defuse a coordinator-LLM recency
+bias (see `docs/coordinator-skills.md`).
+
 ```json
 {
   "results": {
-    "0": {"ws_id": "d4e5f6...", "name": "csrf-audit", "node_id": "gpu-3"},
-    "2": {"ws_id": "f1a2b3...", "name": "xss-audit",  "node_id": "gpu-1"}
+    "0": {"child_ws_id": "d4e5f6...", "name": "csrf-audit", "node_id": "gpu-3"},
+    "2": {"child_ws_id": "f1a2b3...", "name": "xss-audit",  "node_id": "gpu-1"}
   },
   "denied": [
     {"idx": 1, "reason": "skill not found: nonexistent-skill"}

docs/coordinator-api-tour.md

@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ with a `type` field.  The recurring shapes a UI has to handle:
 | `approve_request`   | One or more tool calls need operator approval                                              | `items: [{call_id, header, preview, func_name, approval_label, needs_approval}]` |
 | `approval_resolved` | Operator answered the approval prompt                                                      | `approved`, `feedback` |
 | `state_change`      | Worker-thread state transition (also re-emitted with the current state on every fresh subscribe so refresh-mid-stream restores composer mode) | `state` ∈ `running`, `thinking`, `attention`, `idle`, `error` |
-| `status`            | Token usage + context-window snapshot (fires on every streaming tick)                      | `prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, `total_tokens`, `context_window`, `pct`, `effort`, `cache_creation_tokens`, `cache_read_tokens` |
+| `in_progress_snapshot` | One-shot replay of the in-progress turn's content + reasoning when this client connects mid-stream                              | `content`, `reasoning` |
+| `status`            | Token usage + context-window snapshot (fires on every streaming tick)                      | `prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, `total_tokens`, `context_window`, `pct`, `effort`, `cache_creation_tokens`, `cache_read_tokens` |
 | `rename`            | Session's display name changed                                                             | `name` |
 | `intent_verdict`    | Intent judge produced a verdict on a pending tool call                                     | `risk_level`, `recommendation`, `reasons` |
 | `output_warning`    | Output guard flagged a tool result                                                         | `call_id`, `risk_level`, `flags` |
@@ -130,9 +131,13 @@ with a `type` field.  The recurring shapes a UI has to handle:
 **Reconnection contract:** a freshly-opened SSE connection receives
 the current snapshot of any pending tool approval (`approve_request`
 is re-sent if unresolved), any in-flight `wait_*` / `batch_*`
-indicator — so a tab refresh mid-approval doesn't strand the
-operator.
-
+indicator, the worker's current `state_change`, and an
+`in_progress_snapshot` carrying any partial content / reasoning the
+model has produced for the in-progress turn — so a tab refresh
+mid-approval, mid-tool-execution, or mid-stream restores both the
+correct composer mode and the partial assistant text without waiting
+for the response to complete.
+
 ---
 
 ## 3. Send the first user message

docs/coordinator-skills.md

@@ -169,14 +169,21 @@ validates ws_id against `parent_ws_id=coord_ws_id` AND
   the wait into reporting "complete".
 
 Pattern: capture each spawn result in the next tool call's input.
-The JSON tool-result carries `{"ws_id": "...", "name": "...",
+The JSON tool-result carries `{"child_ws_id": "...", "name": "...",
 "node_id": "...", "routing_strategy": "..."}`; the model should
-extract the ws_id and pass it to `inspect_workstream` /
-`wait_for_workstream` / `send_to_workstream` / `close_workstream`
-verbatim.
+extract the `child_ws_id` and pass it as `ws_id` (or in the `ws_ids`
+list) to `inspect_workstream` / `wait_for_workstream` /
+`send_to_workstream` / `close_workstream` verbatim.  The asymmetry
+— spawn returns `child_ws_id` but the other tools accept `ws_id` /
+`ws_ids` — is intentional: it defuses a coordinator-LLM recency
+bias where seeing `ws_id` in a spawn return primed re-spawn loops
+instead of progression to the wait phase.
 
 A UI that wants human-readable identifiers should render the `name`
-field and keep the ws_id as the click-through key.
+field and keep the workstream id as the click-through key — note
+that the id *value* is the same regardless of whether it arrived
+under the `child_ws_id` key (spawn return) or the `ws_id` key
+(every other tool's input/output); only the field name differs.
 
 ---
 

docs/diagrams/02-package-structure.puml

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ package "turnstone/core/" <<Rectangle>> {
     component [auth.py\nAuthentication] as auth <<core>>
     component [healthcheck.py\nBackendHealthMonitor] as healthcheck <<core>>
     component [ratelimit.py\nRateLimiter] as ratelimit <<core>>
-    component [mcp_client.py\nMCPClientManager\n(push + periodic refresh)] as mcp <<core>>
+    component [mcp_client.py\nMCPClientManager\n(push + manual refresh)] as mcp <<core>>
     component [tool_search.py\nToolSearchManager, BM25] as toolsearch <<core>>
     component [model_registry.py\nModelRegistry] as registry <<core>>
 }

docs/diagrams/03-core-engine-classes.puml

@@ -69,9 +69,10 @@ class "NullUI" as NullUI {
 interface "LLMProvider" as LLMProvider <<Protocol>> {
     + provider_name: str {property}
     + get_capabilities(model) → ModelCapabilities
-    + create_streaming(client, model, messages, ...) → Iterator[StreamChunk]
-    + create_completion(client, model, messages, ...) → CompletionResult
+    + create_streaming(client, model, messages, ..., replay_reasoning_to_model) → Iterator[StreamChunk]
+    + create_completion(client, model, messages, ..., replay_reasoning_to_model) → CompletionResult
     + convert_tools(tools) → list[dict]
+    + extract_reasoning_text(provider_blocks) → str
     + retryable_error_names: frozenset[str] {property}
     --
     core/providers/_protocol.py
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ class "ModelCapabilities" as ModelCaps <<frozen>> {
     + supports_web_search: bool
     + supports_tool_search: bool
     + supports_vision: bool
+    + supports_reasoning_replay: bool
 }
 
 ' ChatSession
@@ -253,7 +255,7 @@ class "MCPClientManager" as MCPMgr {
     Background asyncio event loop
     bridges async MCP SDK to
     sync ChatSession dispatch.
-    Push + periodic + manual refresh.
+    Push + manual refresh.
     Resources + prompts discovered
     alongside tools at startup.
     --

docs/diagrams/04-conversation-turn.puml

@@ -24,6 +24,14 @@ CS -> DB : save_message(ws_id, "user", input)
 
 group loop [while tool_calls present]
 
+    CS -> UI : on_turn_start()
+    note right of UI
+      SessionUIBase resets the per-turn inflight
+      buffers (_ws_inflight_content / reasoning /
+      seq) that fuel the SSE in_progress_snapshot
+      event for mid-stream refresh resume.
+    end note
+
     CS -> UI : on_state_change("thinking")
     CS -> UI : on_thinking_start()
 
@@ -73,6 +81,14 @@ group loop [while tool_calls present]
 
     CS -> CS : _update_token_table()\ncalibrate chars_per_token ratio
     CS -> CS : messages.append(assistant_msg)
+    CS -> UI : on_turn_committed()
+    note right of UI
+      Drops the per-turn inflight buffers — the
+      assistant message is now in the history
+      list, so the in_progress_snapshot must
+      not re-render it during the next tool-
+      execution window or the next streaming turn.
+    end note
     CS -> DB : save_message(ws_id, "assistant", content)
     CS -> DB : save_message(ws_id, "tool_call", ...) ×N
 

docs/diagrams/20-mcp-architecture.puml

@@ -190,21 +190,25 @@ group Push Notifications (debounced 5s per server)
   MCPMgr -> Storage : sync_prompts_to_storage()
 end
 
-group Periodic Polling (default 4h)
-  MCPMgr -> MCPMgr : _periodic_refresh()
+group Manual Refresh
+  Session -> MCPMgr : refresh_sync()
   note right
-    Only polls capabilities
-    without push support.
-    Staggered per-server.
-    Disconnected servers get
-    reconnect attempts with
-    exponential backoff (60s-1h).
+    /mcp refresh [server] —
+    re-fetches catalog and
+    attempts reconnect for
+    disconnected servers.
   end note
 end
 
-group Manual Refresh
-  Session -> MCPMgr : refresh_sync()
-  note right: /mcp refresh [server]
+group Manual Reconnect
+  Session -> MCPMgr : reconnect_sync(name)
+  note right
+    Operator-driven via the
+    console admin panel —
+    tears down session, clears
+    circuit breaker, runs a
+    fresh handshake.
+  end note
 end
 
 == Policy Evaluation ==

docs/diagrams/png/02-package-structure.png

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
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-oid sha256:a3b5c59403a6febd81667fc8fd2a7d22bc59da6130eba0dea5449c42668d0ede
-size 387044
+oid sha256:95dd5ebc899a1261d516686a5aa3319a7f45015d411302825fa28afbfc82e1ce
+size 326766

docs/diagrams/png/03-core-engine-classes.png

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
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-oid sha256:474b900448ec04d1117b48a2b55614524721b2f04ac4bda66170bd0a06aae0f2
-size 624573
+oid sha256:9857db23fe3c4316d492073aac69c7e7558b1abe3b95ad7756d4a5933bd0ece7
+size 620214

docs/diagrams/png/04-conversation-turn.png

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
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-oid sha256:3aa8d972bba40d78152f9f0c762b9f5ec616d8052c45fa52b7dd1c679ed81d61
-size 325245
+oid sha256:c14dfbb2db8dcb22cd332b2cf0e53ba75141adb213dae47dd9dbfd389ed482fe
+size 354799

docs/diagrams/png/20-mcp-architecture.png

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
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-oid sha256:7623df33be9baf7647ca1c2450640df57e1cd73e8be1f8168aae16e546ad683c
-size 459941
+oid sha256:d6aff446a062aa08f316985d00c2183148694f786d7f22172bc50b30046c728b
+size 379259

docs/docker.md

@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ Auth is always enabled. `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` is required.
 |----------|---------|-------------|
 | `TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND` | `sqlite` | Storage backend: `sqlite` or `postgresql` |
 | `TURNSTONE_DB_URL` | — | Database URL (e.g. `postgresql+psycopg://user:pass@postgres:5432/turnstone`). For SQLite, defaults to `/data/.turnstone.db` |
+| `TURNSTONE_DB_LISTEN_URL` | (falls back to `TURNSTONE_DB_URL`) | Direct-to-PostgreSQL URL for the console's dedicated `LISTEN` connection. Set this when `TURNSTONE_DB_URL` points at PgBouncer in transaction pooling mode — LISTEN is session state and the transaction-pooled connection can't hold it. See [pgbouncer.md](pgbouncer.md). |
 | `TURNSTONE_DB_POOL_SIZE` | `2` | PostgreSQL connection pool size per process (default: 2 base + 3 overflow = 5 max) |
 | `POSTGRES_USER` | `turnstone` | PostgreSQL container username (used in default `TURNSTONE_DB_URL` for cluster/channel) |
 | `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | — | PostgreSQL container password (required for production and cluster profiles) |

docs/mcp-oauth.md

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# MCP OAuth — per-user authorization for MCP servers
+
+Turnstone supports **per-(user, MCP server) OAuth 2.1 + PKCE** delegation so each Turnstone user authorizes a remote MCP server with their own identity, rather than sharing a single bearer token across the deployment. This is the right shape for MCP servers that expose user-specific data (a personal CRM, an email inbox, a calendar) and for MCP servers that want per-user audit attribution.
+
+Per-user OAuth is opt-in per `mcp_servers` row. Local-auth Turnstone installs with no `oauth_user` rows exercise zero new code paths — the entire feature is dark by default.
+
+> **Note**: This is a separate authorization layer from Turnstone's own user authentication. A user who logs into Turnstone with a local username + password can still authorize a per-server OAuth MCP server. OIDC SSO and per-server OAuth are orthogonal.
+
+---
+
+## When to use which `auth_type`
+
+The MCP server admin form exposes three authorization modes ("Multitenant Authorization"):
+
+| `auth_type` | What it means | When to use |
+|---|---|---|
+| `none` | No headers attached. Open MCP server (or one gated by network policy only). | Internal MCP servers on a trusted network. |
+| `static` | One static bearer token, configured per server, sent on every request from every user. | Service-to-service MCP servers where per-user attribution doesn't matter, or single-tenant deployments. |
+| `oauth_user` *(recommended for user-data servers)* | Each user authorizes separately via OAuth 2.1 + PKCE; Turnstone stores per-user tokens encrypted at rest. | MCP servers that expose user-specific data or that want per-user audit attribution. |
+
+Switching `auth_type` away from `oauth_user` orphans existing per-user tokens. Use the admin **bulk-revoke** affordance on the server row (Phase 9) to clear them, or let them expire naturally — they're inert without the matching `auth_type` value.
+
+---
+
+## Prerequisites for `auth_type=oauth_user`
+
+1. **Encryption key**. Tokens are stored encrypted with Fernet. Set `[security] mcp_token_encryption_key` in `config.toml` (Turnstone won't start with an `oauth_user` row configured but no key installed). Rotate via `MultiFernet` — add the new key first, then later remove the old one once all rows have been re-encrypted.
+
+2. **MCP server publishes RFC 9728 PRM and RFC 8414 AS metadata** *or* you configure the AS URL override on the server row. PKCE S256 is mandatory; Turnstone refuses to connect to authorization servers that don't advertise `code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"]`.
+
+3. **OAuth client registration**. Two paths:
+   - **Pre-registered** (most common): you create an OAuth client at the authorization server (manually, via admin console, or via Terraform), then paste the `client_id` / `client_secret` into the Turnstone admin form.
+   - **Dynamic client registration** (RFC 7591): if the AS supports it and you select that mode in the admin form, Turnstone registers a client at first use and persists the `client_id` automatically.
+
+4. **Redirect URI** registered at the authorization server: `https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/mcp/oauth/callback`.
+
+---
+
+## Configuration
+
+### Per-server fields (admin UI)
+
+| Field | Required | Description |
+|---|---|---|
+| Server URL | Yes | The MCP server's `streamable-http` base URL. |
+| Multitenant Authorization | Yes | `none` / `static` / `oauth_user` (recommended). |
+| Authorization Server URL | No | Override for RFC 9728 PRM discovery. Set when your AS endpoint differs from the MCP server URL (e.g., corporate AS protecting a third-party MCP). When unset, Turnstone falls back to PRM discovery against the MCP server itself. |
+| Client Registration | Yes (oauth_user) | `preregistered` or `dynamic`. |
+| Client ID | Yes (preregistered) | OAuth 2.0 client ID. Stored unencrypted. |
+| Client Secret | Optional (write-only) | OAuth 2.0 client secret (confidential client). Encrypted at rest. Written but never re-read by the API; field stays masked. |
+| Scopes | No | Space-separated default scope set requested at the authorize endpoint. Per-tool step-up may union additional scopes from a server's `insufficient_scope` response. |
+| Audience | No | RFC 8707 `resource=` parameter sent on every authorize and token request. Defaults to the MCP server URL when unset. Validate against the `aud` claim in returned JWT tokens. |
+
+### Encryption key
+
+```toml
+[security]
+mcp_token_encryption_key = "base64-fernet-key"
+# For rotation, list the keys in priority order — first is used for new
+# writes, all are tried for reads.
+# mcp_token_encryption_keys = ["new-key", "old-key"]
+```
+
+Keep this in `config.toml` rather than environment variables. An in-process LLM with shell-tool access can read the server's environment via `env` / `os.environ` and exfiltrate any secret stored there; secrets in `config.toml` are only loaded into the server at startup and never re-read on a tool-driven path, so a prompt-injection attack against the agent cannot reach them.
+
+---
+
+## Lifecycle
+
+1. **First tool call** for a user against an `oauth_user` MCP server: pool dispatch finds no stored token, returns `mcp_consent_required` to the agent. Dashboard renders an inline "Connect" action card.
+
+2. **User clicks Connect**: opens `/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=<name>` in a popup. Browser redirects through the AS authorize endpoint, user grants consent, AS redirects back to `/v1/api/mcp/oauth/callback`. Turnstone exchanges code → tokens via PKCE, validates audience, encrypts, persists in `mcp_user_tokens`, redirects user back to the originating URL.
+
+3. **Subsequent tool calls** by the same user against the same server reuse the persisted token via the per-(user, server) session pool. Tokens auto-refresh via the refresh-token grant when expired; failed refresh emits `mcp_consent_required` to drive re-consent.
+
+4. **Step-up scope**: when a tool call hits `403` with `WWW-Authenticate: error="insufficient_scope"`, Turnstone emits `mcp_insufficient_scope` with the parsed scope set; the dashboard offers a "Connect with additional scopes" affordance that opens `/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=<name>&scopes=<extra>` so the union of original + new scopes flows into the AS authorize request.
+
+5. **User revoke** (settings modal): `DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name}` runs the authoritative local delete + best-effort RFC 7009 upstream revoke (fire-and-forget, capped at 256 concurrent in-flight tasks).
+
+6. **Admin bulk-revoke** (Phase 9): `POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/{name}/bulk-revoke` drops every user's token for the server. Upstream RFC 7009 revoke is intentionally **not** attempted in bulk (avoids N upstream HTTP calls per admin click); tokens at the AS expire naturally. Use the per-user revoke endpoint if you need guaranteed upstream invalidation.
+
+---
+
+## Admin status indicators
+
+The MCP Servers admin tab shows per-server status pills (Phase 9):
+
+- **Consented users count** — distinct users with a non-expired token for this server. Surfaced as a `bulk-revoke (N)` button when ≥1; clicking it opens a confirmation dialog. Hidden when 0.
+- **Last refresh** — timestamp + outcome (`ok` / `error:ClassName`) of the most recent manual or auto-reconnect refresh. Per node. Absent until at least one refresh has occurred (renders as "never" in the admin UI).
+
+Additional indicators (circuit-breaker state, encryption-key mismatch) are exposed via `get_server_status` on the API but do not yet have a dedicated admin pill — operators see them today via the per-server status text + error tooltip and in audit logs. A future phase may surface these as discrete pills.
+
+---
+
+## Auth-type transitions
+
+| From | To | What happens |
+|---|---|---|
+| `none` / `static` → `oauth_user` | — | New code path activates for this server. Existing static headers (if any) are no longer sent. Users must authorize on first use. |
+| `oauth_user` → `none` / `static` | — | Existing `mcp_user_tokens` rows are **orphaned** — inert without a matching `auth_type`. Use admin bulk-revoke to drop them, or let them expire. Switching back to `oauth_user` later re-activates the orphaned rows if they haven't been deleted. |
+| OAuth `client_id` or `client_secret` rotated | — | Existing tokens may stop refreshing if the AS treats them as bound to the previous client. Bulk-revoke after rotation. |
+
+The orphan-by-default behavior is chosen so switching back to `oauth_user` is non-destructive. Bulk-revoke is the explicit cleanup path.
+
+---
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+| Symptom | Likely cause | Action |
+|---|---|---|
+| `mcp_consent_required` even after consenting | Token persistence failed, or refresh-token rejected by AS | Check audit log for `mcp_server.oauth.persist_failed` or `mcp_server.oauth.token_revoked`. Re-consent via settings modal. |
+| `mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown` | Encryption key rotated without keeping the previous key in the keyring | Add the previous key back to `mcp_token_encryption_keys` until all rows have been re-encrypted, then drop. |
+| `mcp_oauth_url_insecure` | MCP server URL is `http://` (not `https://`) on a non-loopback host | Use `https://`. Per-user bearers must not transit cleartext. |
+| Tools fail in scheduled / Discord / Slack runs | OAuth-MCP requires browser-based consent | Users must pre-consent via the web UI. Phase 9 dashboard badge surfaces deferred consents from these runs on next login. |
+| Circuit breaker open repeatedly | Transport-level errors on the MCP server (DNS, TLS, 5xx) | Check the per-server error pill; auth errors do not trip the breaker. |
+
+See also: `docs/operations/mcp-oauth-headless.md` for the cron / channel-driven run caveat.

docs/oidc.md

@@ -39,18 +39,19 @@ are set.
 | `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` | No | — | ID token claim containing role/group values (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
 | `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` | No | — | Mapping from claim values to Turnstone role IDs (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
 | `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Set to `false` to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens continue to work. |
-| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | No | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Recommended when running behind a reverse proxy. When unset, derived from the request Host header. |
+| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | Yes | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Without this, OIDC will refuse to start. The previous Host-header fallback was unsafe under permissive reverse proxies. |
+| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS` | No | — | Comma-separated list of additional hostnames whose endpoints the IdP discovery document is allowed to reference. See [Cross-host endpoints](#cross-host-endpoints). |
 
-OIDC is enabled when all three required fields (issuer, client ID, client
-secret) are non-empty. If any is missing, OIDC is silently disabled and
-the login screen shows only the password form.
+All four required fields — issuer, client ID, client secret, and
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` — must be set. If any are missing OIDC
+is disabled at startup (an error is logged when only `redirect_base`
+is missing) and the login screen shows only the password form.
 
-### Reverse Proxy / Load Balancer
+### Redirect base (required)
 
-When Turnstone runs behind a reverse proxy, the internal `Host` header may
-not match the externally-reachable URL. Set `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE`
-to the public origin so the redirect URI sent to the identity provider is
-correct:
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` pins the redirect URI sent to the identity
+provider to a known externally-visible origin. Set it to the public origin
+of your Turnstone deployment:
 
 ```bash
 TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE=https://app.example.com
@@ -60,6 +61,44 @@ The resulting callback URL will be
 `https://app.example.com/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback` — register this as the
 authorized redirect URI in your identity provider.
 
+OIDC will refuse to start when this variable is unset. There is no
+Host-header fallback: a permissive reverse proxy or direct backend access
+would otherwise let an attacker spoof `Host` and steer the IdP redirect
+to a callback origin they control.
+
+### Cross-host endpoints
+
+By default, every endpoint in the IdP discovery document
+(`token_endpoint`, `jwks_uri`, `userinfo_endpoint`) must share the
+issuer's `(scheme, host, port)`. This prevents a hostile or compromised
+IdP from redirecting the token-exchange POST (which carries
+`client_secret`) to an arbitrary host, and prevents JWKS fetches from
+being aimed at internal services.
+
+A few public IdPs legitimately split endpoints across hostnames. Google
+is the canonical example:
+
+| Field | Hostname |
+|-------|----------|
+| issuer | `accounts.google.com` |
+| token_endpoint | `oauth2.googleapis.com` |
+| jwks_uri | `www.googleapis.com` |
+| userinfo_endpoint | `openidconnect.googleapis.com` |
+
+Google's set is built in — operators using `https://accounts.google.com`
+need no extra configuration.
+
+For other IdPs whose discovery document references a non-issuer host,
+extend the allow-list explicitly:
+
+```bash
+TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS=token.example.com,keys.example.com
+```
+
+The same scheme / no-userinfo / SSRF rules apply to allow-listed hosts —
+this knob only relaxes the same-origin check, not the security gates.
+Each entry is a hostname (no scheme, no path).
+
 ### config.toml alternative
 
 ```toml
@@ -198,6 +237,19 @@ TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,engineering:builtin-operator,viewer
   the user authenticates via OIDC, so new group memberships are picked
   up on the next login.
 
+### `assigned_by` markers
+
+Role assignments record an `assigned_by` value that controls how the
+sync logic treats them. OIDC-driven flows use two distinct markers:
+
+- `oidc` — set by claim-driven role mapping; revoked automatically on
+  the next login when the corresponding claim value is no longer
+  present.
+- `oidc-default` — applied to brand-new OIDC users who have no
+  claim-mapped roles, as a safety net so they still get
+  `builtin-viewer` access on first login. Survives subsequent logins
+  regardless of claim contents and is never revoked by `apply_role_mapping`.
+
 ### Built-in Roles
 
 | Role ID | Permissions |
@@ -375,10 +427,27 @@ callback validation. Entries are automatically cleaned up after 5 minutes.
 
 ### "OIDC not configured"
 
-All three required environment variables must be set:
-`TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER`, `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`, and
-`TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`. Check that none are empty or
-whitespace-only.
+All four required environment variables must be set:
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER`, `TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID`,
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, and `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE`.
+Check that none are empty or whitespace-only.
+
+### "OIDC enabled but TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE is unset"
+
+This error is logged when the three credential variables are set but
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` is missing. OIDC is disabled at startup
+to prevent Host-header-derived redirect URI spoofing. Set the variable
+to your service's externally-visible origin (e.g.
+`https://app.example.com`) and restart the server. See
+[Redirect base](#redirect-base-required) for the rationale.
+
+### Discovery silently disables OIDC with "host does not match issuer"
+
+The IdP discovery document points `token_endpoint`, `jwks_uri`, or
+`userinfo_endpoint` at a hostname that doesn't share the issuer's
+origin. If the IdP is legitimate, add the additional hostname(s) to
+`TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS`. Google is allow-listed
+automatically; see [Cross-host endpoints](#cross-host-endpoints).
 
 ### "Login session expired"
 

docs/operations/mcp-oauth-headless.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# MCP OAuth in headless / scheduled / channel-driven runs
+
+**Constraint**: OAuth-MCP servers (`auth_type=oauth_user`) require browser-based user consent. Users must pre-consent via the web UI before any run that cannot drive a browser redirect.
+
+**Affected surfaces**:
+
+- Scheduled workstreams (`turnstone-console` task scheduler).
+- Discord adapter runs.
+- Slack adapter runs.
+- Any future channel adapter without an interactive browser session.
+
+**What happens when consent is missing**:
+
+A tool call against an `oauth_user` server returns a structured `mcp_consent_required` error to the agent. The agent surfaces the deferred work in its output. Turnstone persists a record to `mcp_pending_consent` so the dashboard badge surfaces the deferred consent need to the user on next login.
+
+**Recovery**:
+
+The user opens the dashboard, sees the gear-icon badge counting pending consents, opens the settings modal, clicks Connect for each affected server, and completes the OAuth dance. The pending-consent record is cleared by the OAuth callback handler on success. Subsequent scheduled / channel runs use the freshly-stored token.
+
+**Pre-consent recipe**:
+
+Before scheduling a workstream that depends on an `oauth_user` MCP server, the user should:
+
+1. Open the dashboard.
+2. Open the settings modal (gear icon).
+3. Click Connect on each MCP server the schedule will use.
+4. Confirm consent in the popup.
+
+This stores tokens that the scheduled run will reuse. Refresh-token rotation is handled transparently on the run side; only the first consent requires browser interaction.

docs/pgbouncer.md

@@ -199,4 +199,28 @@ does not support prepared statements. Turnstone's SQLAlchemy layer does
 not use server-side prepared statements by default, so this is not an
 issue.
 
+**LISTEN / NOTIFY not supported in transaction mode** — PgBouncer's
+transaction pooling assigns a real server connection only for the
+duration of each transaction, then returns it to the pool. PostgreSQL
+`LISTEN` is session state — a transaction-pooled client can't hold the
+multi-statement session a long-lived `LISTEN` needs. The console's
+`NotifyDispatcher` (reactive node discovery via the `services` channel)
+therefore opens a **dedicated, direct-to-Postgres** connection that
+bypasses PgBouncer.
+
+Configure via `config.toml` `[database] listen_url` (preferred —
+co-located with the main `url`) or the `TURNSTONE_DB_LISTEN_URL` env var
+(config.toml wins when both are set). Defaults to the main DB URL when
+unset.
+
+| Setting | Behaviour |
+|---|---|
+| unset | Listener uses `TURNSTONE_DB_URL` as-is. Fine when PgBouncer is in **session** mode, or when there's no pooler in front of Postgres. With transaction-mode PgBouncer the listener's `LISTEN` will fail and the dispatcher retries with exponential backoff (1 s → 30 s cap) without ever succeeding. Reactive NOTIFY-driven node discovery is silently lost; the cluster collector's 60 s `_discovery_loop` is the only remaining backstop. |
+| set to direct-to-PG URL (e.g. `postgresql://…/turnstone`) | Listener bypasses PgBouncer for its one dedicated connection. Reactive discovery latency drops from up-to-60 s to ~500 ms. The rest of the storage layer continues to go through PgBouncer in transaction mode. |
+
+Set this whenever PgBouncer is in transaction mode (the recommended
+setting per this doc). The override only adds one long-lived PG
+connection per console process — sized into the cluster's
+`max_connections` budget alongside the pool.
+
 See also: [Docker deployment](docker.md) · [Security](security.md)

docs/sdk.md

@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ SSE events are deserialized into typed dataclasses. Use `event.type` to discrimi
 | `error` | `ErrorEvent` | `message` |
 | `info` | `InfoEvent` | `message` |
 | `stream_end` | `StreamEndEvent` | — |
+| `state_change` | `StateChangeEvent` | `state` ∈ `running`/`thinking`/`attention`/`idle`/`error` |
+| `in_progress_snapshot` | `InProgressSnapshotEvent` | `content`, `reasoning` (one-shot mid-stream refresh resume) |
+| `approval_resolved` | `ApprovalResolvedEvent` | `approved`, `feedback` |
 | `cancelled` | `CancelledEvent` | — |
 
 **Global events** (from `stream_global_events()`):

docs/settings.md

@@ -59,6 +59,21 @@ from ConfigStore. Model names and context windows are now configured per-model
 in the Models tab. A startup warning is logged if these keys appear in
 `config.toml`.
 
+### Reasoning persistence (per-model)
+
+Two boolean flags on `model_definitions` (migration 052) control how
+reasoning text round-trips per model:
+
+| Flag | Default | Effect |
+|------|---------|--------|
+| `surface_persisted_reasoning` | `True` | Surface stored reasoning text on `/history` payloads so a page reload re-renders the reasoning bubble. **Storage of reasoning bytes is independent of this flag** — they ride in `provider_data` regardless. |
+| `replay_reasoning_to_model` | `False` | Send stored reasoning blocks back to the provider on subsequent turns. Capability-gated: only takes effect when the model's `ModelCapabilities.supports_reasoning_replay` is also `True`. Set on canonical OpenAI gpt-5*/o-series and Anthropic Claude entries; unknown / local-server models default to `False` so an operator who flips the flag on a model whose API doesn't understand reasoning replay silently no-ops rather than 400-ing. |
+
+Edit both via the admin Models tab. See the architecture doc for the
+provider-side mechanics (Anthropic `thinking`, OpenAI Responses
+`reasoning` + `include=["reasoning.encrypted_content"]`, synthetic
+`reasoning_text` for Chat Completions / vLLM / llama.cpp / Gemini-compat).
+
 ### Plan / task agent overrides
 
 `plan_agent` and `task_agent` sub-sessions resolve independently from the
@@ -100,7 +115,7 @@ initialization:
 | `tools` | timeout, truncation, agent_max_turns, skip_permissions, search, search_threshold, search_max_results |
 | `server` | workstream_idle_timeout, max_workstreams |
 | `cluster` | node_fan_out_limit, mcp_max_servers |
-| `mcp` | config_path, refresh_interval, registry_url |
+| `mcp` | config_path, registry_url |
 | `ratelimit` | enabled, requests_per_second, burst, trusted_proxies |
 | `health` | backend_probe_interval, backend_probe_timeout, circuit_breaker_threshold, circuit_breaker_cooldown |
 | `judge` | enabled, model, provider, base_url, api_key, confidence_threshold, max_context_ratio, timeout, read_only_tools, output_guard, redact_secrets, cancel_on_approval |

docs/skills/import-conversation-history/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+---
+name: import-conversation-history
+description: Use this skill when the user wants to import or migrate conversation history from another LLM chat or coding tool (e.g. ChatGPT, Claude.ai, Cursor, Copilot Chat, Aider, Gemini, a custom JSON export) into Turnstone. The skill teaches Turnstone's destination contracts — workstream identity, the OpenAI-shaped message rows, tool-call/result pairing, provider-fidelity blobs, attachments, and archive-vs-resumable choice — so the agent can map any source format onto them. Trigger phrases: "import my chats", "migrate this transcript into Turnstone", "bring my Claude.ai history over", "load this export as a workstream".
+version: 1.0.0
+---
+
+# Importing Conversation History into Turnstone
+
+## Overview
+
+Source formats vary; the destination does not. Your job is to translate whatever the user hands you (JSON dump, ZIP export, scraped HTML, screenshot OCR, raw transcript) into Turnstone's internal shape: **one workstream row** plus an ordered sequence of **conversation rows** in OpenAI message format. This skill documents the destination so you can write a correct mapper for any source.
+
+Two questions to settle with the user before writing anything:
+
+1. **Archive or resumable?** An archive ("saved" workstream — `state="closed"`) is read-only history. A resumable workstream (`state="idle"`) lets the user continue the conversation; this only works cleanly when the source LLM matches a Turnstone-supported provider/model and tool definitions still resolve.
+2. **One workstream per source thread, or merge?** Default to one-to-one unless the user explicitly asks to merge.
+
+Default to **archive** when in doubt — resuming a foreign transcript with mismatched tool schemas or stale provider signatures will fail at the next turn.
+
+## Turnstone Data Model (the destination)
+
+Two tables carry the conversation:
+
+### `workstreams` (one row per imported thread)
+
+| Column | Required | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `ws_id` | yes | 32-char lowercase hex. Auto-generate with `secrets.token_hex(16)` if you don't already have one. **First 4 hex chars are the routing bucket** — see "Identity & Routing" below. |
+| `name` | yes | Short title. Pull from source thread title; fall back to first ~60 chars of first user message. |
+| `state` | yes | `"closed"` for archive, `"idle"` for resumable. Never set `"running"` on import. |
+| `kind` | yes | `"interactive"` for normal threads. Do NOT use `"coordinator"` for imports — that's reserved for cluster-spawned coordinator workstreams. |
+| `parent_ws_id` | no | Leave NULL. Only set if you're importing a coordinator-spawned subtree and re-parenting it; rare. |
+| `user_id` | yes | Owner. Must exist in `users`; importer must know which Turnstone user owns the imported history. |
+| `node_id` | yes (multi-node) | Denormalized cache of the node that owns this `ws_id`'s bucket. Single-node deployments can leave it NULL or set it to the only node. |
+| `alias` | no | Human-typeable short name. Optional; must be unique cluster-wide if set. |
+| `title` | no | Auto-titled later by the LLM; safe to leave NULL on import. |
+| `skill_id`, `skill_version` | yes | Default `""` and `0` unless the source thread was scoped to a Turnstone skill. |
+| `created`, `updated` | yes | ISO8601 strings. Use the source's first/last message timestamps when available. |
+
+### `conversations` (many rows per thread, ordered by `id`/`timestamp`)
+
+| Column | Notes |
+|---|---|
+| `ws_id` | The workstream this row belongs to. |
+| `timestamp` | ISO8601 string. Preserve source timestamps; fall back to monotonically increasing values if unknown. **Order is canonical via `id` (autoincrement), not `timestamp`** — but always insert in conversational order so both agree. |
+| `role` | One of `system`, `user`, `assistant`, `tool`, `developer`. See role mapping below. |
+| `content` | Text. May be NULL for assistant rows that are *only* tool calls. |
+| `tool_name` | Set on `role="tool"` rows (the tool whose result this is). NULL otherwise. |
+| `tool_call_id` | Set on `role="tool"` rows (matches the assistant row's `tool_calls[].id`). NULL otherwise. |
+| `tool_calls` | JSON-encoded list, on `role="assistant"` rows that issued tool calls. OpenAI shape — see "Tool Calls" below. |
+| `provider_data` | JSON blob preserving provider-native content blocks (Anthropic `signature`, Gemini `thought_signature`, etc.). Optional; only matters for **resumable** imports against the same provider. Skip for archives. |
+
+The internal format is **OpenAI-shaped**, even when the source was Anthropic or Gemini. Providers translate at their own API boundary; storage stays uniform.
+
+## Identity & Routing (`ws_id`)
+
+- `ws_id` is **32-char lowercase hex** (i.e. `secrets.token_hex(16)`).
+- The **routing bucket** is `int(ws_id[:4], 16)` — the first 4 hex chars place this workstream on a specific node via the consistent hash ring.
+- For multi-node imports: either insert through the console's routing proxy (which forwards to the owning node), or generate `ws_id`s and write directly to each node's database in batches grouped by bucket.
+- For single-node imports: bucket math is irrelevant; any `ws_id` works.
+- **Do not reuse the source platform's IDs as `ws_id`** unless they happen to be 32-char hex. Generate fresh; if you need the old ID for traceability, store it in `workstream_config` under a key like `import.source_id`.
+
+## Recommended Import Path
+
+Three options, in order of preference:
+
+### 1. Storage protocol (recommended for full history)
+
+Use `turnstone.core.storage.Storage.save_messages_bulk(rows)`. This is the canonical bulk-insert primitive and bypasses the LLM round-trip entirely.
+
+```python
+from turnstone.core.storage import get_storage  # construct via the same path the server uses
+
+storage = get_storage(...)  # see turnstone.core.storage.__init__ for the project's wiring
+
+storage.create_workstream(  # or whatever the project's exposed creator is — check turnstone/core/storage/_protocol.py
+    ws_id=ws_id,
+    user_id=user_id,
+    name=name,
+    state="closed",
+    kind="interactive",
+    ...
+)
+
+storage.save_messages_bulk([
+    {"ws_id": ws_id, "role": "user", "content": "Hello"},
+    {"ws_id": ws_id, "role": "assistant", "content": "Hi! What can I help with?"},
+    {"ws_id": ws_id, "role": "assistant", "content": None,
+     "tool_calls": json.dumps([{"id": "call_1", "type": "function",
+                                "function": {"name": "search", "arguments": "{\"q\":\"x\"}"}}])},
+    {"ws_id": ws_id, "role": "tool", "tool_name": "search", "tool_call_id": "call_1",
+     "content": "result text"},
+    # ...
+])
+```
+
+`save_messages_bulk` handles `timestamp` and the workstream's `updated` column internally, so you don't need to compute them per row. **Verify the exact creator signature** by reading `turnstone/core/storage/_protocol.py` — table layout has shifted across migrations and the Storage protocol is the source of truth.
+
+### 2. SDK `create_workstream(resume_ws=...)` (when the source is already a Turnstone workstream)
+
+Only useful for *Turnstone → Turnstone* re-parenting. Not relevant for foreign sources.
+
+### 3. SDK `create_workstream(initial_message=...)` + `send()` per turn (last resort)
+
+Only fits archives where the source had **no tool calls** and you don't care about preserving assistant turns verbatim. Each `send()` triggers a real LLM round-trip, which is expensive and rewrites assistant content. Don't use this for full history.
+
+## Role Mapping
+
+Common source-role conventions and how they map to Turnstone:
+
+| Source role | Turnstone `role` | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `user`, `human` | `user` | Direct map. |
+| `assistant`, `ai`, `model`, `bot` | `assistant` | Direct map. |
+| `system` | `system` | Preserve only if it's content the user wrote (custom instructions). Drop boilerplate provider preambles — Turnstone composes its own system message. |
+| `developer` (OpenAI o-series) | `developer` | Preserve. |
+| `tool`, `function`, `tool_result` | `tool` | Must carry `tool_name` and `tool_call_id` matching the prior assistant row's `tool_calls[].id`. |
+| `tool_use` (Anthropic) | `assistant` with `tool_calls` | Anthropic emits tool calls *inside* an assistant message; flatten to OpenAI shape. |
+| `human_feedback`, `revision` | `user` | Treat as a follow-up user turn. |
+
+## Tool Calls (the most error-prone part)
+
+Turnstone stores tool calls in OpenAI's nested-function shape on the assistant row, and matches them with `role="tool"` result rows by `tool_call_id`.
+
+### Assistant row with tool calls
+
+```json
+{
+  "role": "assistant",
+  "content": null,
+  "tool_calls": [
+    {
+      "id": "call_abc123",
+      "type": "function",
+      "function": {
+        "name": "search_web",
+        "arguments": "{\"query\":\"turnstone import\"}"
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+`tool_calls[].function.arguments` is **a JSON-encoded string**, not an object. Source formats commonly get this wrong — Anthropic stores arguments as a parsed object, Gemini as a struct. Always re-serialize to a string.
+
+### Tool result row
+
+```json
+{
+  "role": "tool",
+  "tool_name": "search_web",
+  "tool_call_id": "call_abc123",
+  "content": "..."
+}
+```
+
+Pairing rules:
+- Every assistant `tool_calls[].id` MUST be followed by exactly one `role="tool"` row with the matching `tool_call_id`, before the next user/assistant turn.
+- If the source dropped the tool result (cut-off transcript), insert a synthetic `role="tool"` row with `content="[tool result missing in source]"` to keep the chain valid. An assistant row with an unanswered `tool_calls[].id` will break replay and any LLM round-trip.
+- Multi-tool assistant turns: one `role="tool"` row per call, in any order, all before the next non-tool row.
+
+### Tool ID generation
+
+If the source used opaque tool IDs that aren't unique within a thread (some platforms reuse them), regenerate with a stable scheme like `f"call_{i}"` where `i` is a per-thread counter. Update both the assistant and tool rows together.
+
+## Provider Fidelity (`provider_data`)
+
+Skip this entirely for **archive** imports.
+
+For **resumable** imports against the same provider, populate `provider_data` to preserve provider-specific tool-call metadata that the next API round-trip will require:
+
+- **Anthropic**: `signature` field on thinking blocks; required for round-tripping extended-thinking responses.
+- **Gemini**: `thought_signature` on tool calls; required for fidelity.
+- **OpenAI**: typically nothing to preserve.
+
+The runtime-side dict key is `_provider_content` (a list of provider-native blocks); the persisted column is `provider_data` (the same list, JSON-encoded). If you don't have provider-native blocks from the source — and you usually won't, because a foreign export won't include them — leave `provider_data` NULL. The first new turn will succeed without it, but the previous assistant turn's reasoning won't replay back to the model.
+
+## Attachments
+
+If the source thread had image or file attachments:
+
+- **Size limits**: images ≤ 4 MiB, text documents ≤ 512 KiB. Reject or downsample anything bigger.
+- **Allowed types**: server validates magic bytes for images and UTF-8-decodes for text. Binary blobs that aren't images won't pass.
+- **Lifecycle**: pending → reserved → consumed. For imports, the cleanest path is to upload as pending and immediately consume by attaching to the relevant `conversations.id`.
+
+Two import paths:
+
+1. **Bulk-insert + post-attach**: insert messages first, get back the assistant/user `conversations.id`, then write `workstream_attachments` rows linking the file to `message_id`.
+2. **SDK multipart create**: `create_workstream(attachments=[...], initial_message=...)` for the *first* turn only — the server reserves and consumes them onto that turn. Doesn't help for mid-thread attachments.
+
+For full-history imports with multiple attachments at different turns, path (1) is the only option.
+
+## Validation Checklist
+
+Before declaring success, verify:
+
+- [ ] `ws_id` is 32-char lowercase hex.
+- [ ] `workstreams` row exists with the right `user_id`, `state`, `kind`.
+- [ ] Conversation rows are inserted **in order** (autoincrement `id` will reflect insert order).
+- [ ] Every assistant `tool_calls[].id` has a matching `role="tool"` row with the same `tool_call_id`.
+- [ ] `tool_calls[].function.arguments` is a JSON-encoded **string**, not a parsed object.
+- [ ] First message is typically `role="user"` (not `system`) — Turnstone composes its own system prompt at runtime.
+- [ ] No empty assistant rows (`content=NULL` AND `tool_calls=NULL` is invalid).
+- [ ] If multi-node: the `ws_id`'s bucket maps to a node that exists; `workstreams.node_id` matches.
+- [ ] Round-trip test: run `Storage.load_messages(ws_id)` and confirm the reconstructed list matches what you inserted (modulo timestamps).
+
+## Anti-patterns
+
+- **Don't import the source provider's system prompt verbatim.** Provider boilerplate ("You are Claude...", "You are ChatGPT...") will conflict with Turnstone's composed system message and confuse the model on resume. Drop it; preserve only user-authored custom instructions.
+- **Don't preserve foreign tool definitions as Turnstone tools.** If the source had custom tools that don't exist in Turnstone, the assistant rows that called them are still valid history (archive), but the workstream is **not resumable** — mark `state="closed"`.
+- **Don't fabricate `tool_call_id`s without re-pairing.** Mismatched ids silently break the replay chain on the next turn.
+- **Don't skip the `tool_name` field on `role="tool"` rows.** Some load paths use it for display and audit; NULL there will render as "unknown tool".
+- **Don't write through the LLM (`send()` per turn) for full history.** It's expensive, rewrites assistant turns, and rate-limits will bite long imports.
+
+## Quick Reference
+
+| Task | Path |
+|---|---|
+| Generate ws_id | `secrets.token_hex(16)` |
+| Bulk insert messages | `Storage.save_messages_bulk(rows)` |
+| Archive (read-only) | `state="closed"`, skip `provider_data` |
+| Resumable | `state="idle"`, populate `provider_data` if same provider |
+| Tool call id | OpenAI shape: `{"id": ..., "type": "function", "function": {"name": ..., "arguments": "<json string>"}}` |
+| Tool result row | `role="tool"`, `tool_name`, `tool_call_id`, `content` |
+| Source role → Turnstone role | See "Role Mapping" table |
+| Per-thread metadata | Store source IDs in `workstream_config` under `import.*` keys |
+
+## Files to read before writing the importer
+
+- `turnstone/core/storage/_schema.py` — authoritative table definitions.
+- `turnstone/core/storage/_protocol.py` — `save_message`, `save_messages_bulk`, `load_messages` signatures.
+- `turnstone/core/session.py` (around the message-save section) — how the runtime constructs in-memory message dicts; mirror this shape on import to round-trip cleanly.
+- `turnstone/api/server_schemas.py` — Pydantic shapes for the SDK paths if you go through HTTP.

docs/tools.md

@@ -758,22 +758,18 @@ MCP tools (3):
 
 ### Dynamic tool refresh
 
-MCP tool lists stay up-to-date without restart through three mechanisms:
+MCP tool lists stay up-to-date without restart through two mechanisms:
 
 1. **Push notifications** -- MCP servers that declare `tools.listChanged: true` in
    their capabilities send `notifications/tools/list_changed` when their tool list
    changes. `MCPClientManager` registers a `message_handler` on each `ClientSession`
    that triggers an immediate refresh for that server.
 
-2. **Periodic timer** -- Servers that do *not* support push notifications are polled
-   on a configurable interval (default 4 hours). The timer is staggered using a
-   launch-time seed (`monotonic_ns ^ pid`) so cluster nodes don't all hit MCP
-   servers simultaneously. Configure via `[mcp] refresh_interval` in `config.toml`
-   or `--mcp-refresh-interval SECONDS` on the CLI. Set to `0` to disable.
-
-3. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches tools from all servers immediately.
+2. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches tools from all servers immediately.
    `/mcp refresh <server>` targets a single server. If a server has disconnected,
-   manual refresh attempts reconnection.
+   manual refresh attempts reconnection. The console admin panel exposes the
+   same controls (refresh / reconnect buttons per server) for cluster-wide
+   fan-out.
 
 When tools change, `MCPClientManager` rebuilds its merged tool list using copy-on-write
 (new list/dict objects assigned atomically) and notifies all active `ChatSession`
@@ -781,11 +777,6 @@ instances via registered listener callbacks. Each session rebuilds its `_tools`,
 `_task_tools`, `_agent_tools`, and reconstructs its `ToolSearchManager` (if active),
 preserving the set of previously expanded (discovered) tools.
 
-```toml
-[mcp]
-refresh_interval = 14400  # seconds (default 4h), 0 to disable
-```
-
 ```
 /mcp refresh
 MCP refresh complete:

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "turnstone"
-version = "1.5.0"
+version = "1.5.17"
 description = "Multi-node AI orchestration platform with tool use, agent routing, and cluster simulation."
 readme = "README.md"
 license = "BUSL-1.1"
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ classifiers = [
 dependencies = [
     "openai>=2.24",
     "httpx>=0.28",
-    "mcp>=1.6",
+    "mcp>=1.27",
     "starlette>=0.45",
     "uvicorn>=0.34",
     "sse-starlette>=2.0",
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ dependencies = [
     "structlog>=24.1",
     "PyJWT>=2.8",
     "bcrypt>=4.0",
+    "cryptography>=42",
     "python-frontmatter>=1.0",
 ]
 
@@ -81,9 +82,9 @@ include = [
   "turnstone/console/static/coordinator/*.js",
   "turnstone/shared_static/*.css",
   "turnstone/shared_static/*.js",
-  "turnstone/shared_static/katex-0.16.45/**/*",
+  "turnstone/shared_static/katex-0.16.47/**/*",
   "turnstone/shared_static/hljs-11.11.1/**/*",
-  "turnstone/shared_static/mermaid-11.14.0/**/*",
+  "turnstone/shared_static/mermaid-11.15.0/**/*",
   "turnstone/shared_static/hls-1.6.16/**/*",
   "turnstone/sdk/py.typed",
   "turnstone/deploy/*.yaml",

scripts/update-vendored-js.sh

@@ -50,11 +50,14 @@ update_refs() {
     local old_pattern="$1"  # e.g. katex-0.16.38
     local new_pattern="$2"  # e.g. katex-0.16.39
 
-    # Find all files with version references (excludes vendored JS and worktrees)
+    # Find all files with version references. Excludes the old versioned vendor
+    # directory itself (about to be rm -rf'd anyway) so we don't bother rewriting
+    # self-references inside it — but does NOT exclude all of shared_static/,
+    # because shared_static/renderer.js loads the vendored libs and needs the bump.
     local files
-    files=$(grep -rl --include='*.toml' --include='*.html' --include='*.js' --include='*.md' \
+    files=$(grep -rl --include='*.toml' --include='*.html' --include='*.js' --include='*.md' --include='*.py' \
         -F "$old_pattern" . \
-        --exclude-dir='.claude' --exclude-dir='node_modules' --exclude-dir='shared_static' \
+        --exclude-dir='.claude' --exclude-dir='node_modules' --exclude-dir="$old_pattern" \
         2>/dev/null || true)
     for f in $files; do
         sed -i "s|${old_pattern}|${new_pattern}|g" "$f"

sdk/typescript/package-lock.json

@@ -74,9 +74,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@oxc-project/types": {
-      "version": "0.127.0",
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+      "integrity": "sha512-YhsdE6xAVfTDmzjxL2ZDUvjj+ZsgyOKe+TdQzqkD72wIOmHka8NuGQ6NpTNZv9D2Z63fbwWKJPeVpEw4EQgYxw==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.5",
+        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.6",
         "magic-string": "^0.30.21",
         "pathe": "^2.0.3"
       },
@@ -497,9 +497,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@vitest/spy": {
-      "version": "4.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/spy/-/spy-4.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-2lNOsh6+R2Idnf1TCZqSwYlKN2E/iDlD8sgU59kYVl+OMDmvldO1VDk39smRfpUNwYpNRVn3w4YfuC7KfbBnkQ==",
+      "version": "4.1.6",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/spy/-/spy-4.1.6.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-JFKxMx6udhwKh/Ldo270e17QX710vgunMkuPAvXjHSvC6oqLWAHhVhjg/I71q0u0CBSErIODV1Kjv0FQNSWjdg==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "funding": {
@@ -507,13 +507,13 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/@vitest/utils": {
-      "version": "4.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/utils/-/utils-4.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-76wdkrmfXfqGjueGgnb45ITPyUi1ycZ4IHgC2bhPDUfWHklY/q3MdLOAB+TF1e6xfl8NxNY0ZYaPCFNWSsw3Ug==",
+      "version": "4.1.6",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@vitest/utils/-/utils-4.1.6.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-FxIY+U81R3LGKCxaHHFRQ5+g6/iRgGLmeHWdp2Amj4ljQRrEIWHmZyDfDYBRZlpyqA7qKxtS9DD1dhk8RnRIVQ==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.5",
+        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.6",
         "convert-source-map": "^2.0.0",
         "tinyrainbow": "^3.1.0"
       },
@@ -902,9 +902,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/nanoid": {
-      "version": "3.3.11",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.11.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-N8SpfPUnUp1bK+PMYW8qSWdl9U+wwNWI4QKxOYDy9JAro3WMX7p2OeVRF9v+347pnakNevPmiHhNmZ2HbFA76w==",
+      "version": "3.3.12",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nanoid/-/nanoid-3.3.12.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-ZB9RH/39qpq5Vu6Y+NmUaFhQR6pp+M2Xt76XBnEwDaGcVAqhlvxrl3B2bKS5D3NH3QR76v3aSrKaF/Kiy7lEtQ==",
       "dev": true,
       "funding": [
         {
@@ -959,9 +959,9 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/postcss": {
-      "version": "8.5.12",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.12.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-W62t/Se6rA0Az3DfCL0AqJwXuKwBeYg6nOaIgzP+xZ7N5BFCI7DYi1qs6ygUYT6rvfi6t9k65UMLJC+PHZpDAA==",
+      "version": "8.5.14",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/postcss/-/postcss-8.5.14.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-SoSL4+OSEtR99LHFZQiJLkT59C5B1amGO1NzTwj7TT1qCUgUO6hxOvzkOYxD+vMrXBM3XJIKzokoERdqQq/Zmg==",
       "dev": true,
       "funding": [
         {
@@ -988,14 +988,14 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/rolldown": {
-      "version": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/rolldown/-/rolldown-1.0.0-rc.17.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-ZrT53oAKrtA4+YtBWPQbtPOxIbVDbxT0orcYERKd63VJTF13zPcgXTvD4843L8pcsI7M6MErt8QtON6lrB9tyA==",
+      "version": "1.0.1",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/rolldown/-/rolldown-1.0.1.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-X0KQHljNnEkWNqqiz9zJrGunh1B0HgOxLXvnFpCOcadzcy5qohZ3tqMEUg00vncoRovXuK3ZqCT9KnnKzoInFQ==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@oxc-project/types": "=0.127.0",
-        "@rolldown/pluginutils": "1.0.0-rc.17"
+        "@oxc-project/types": "=0.130.0",
+        "@rolldown/pluginutils": "^1.0.0"
       },
       "bin": {
         "rolldown": "bin/cli.mjs"
@@ -1004,21 +1004,21 @@
         "node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0"
       },
       "optionalDependencies": {
-        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-freebsd-x64": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-gnu": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-musl": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-ppc64-gnu": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-s390x-gnu": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-gnu": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-musl": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-openharmony-arm64": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-wasm32-wasi": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-win32-arm64-msvc": "1.0.0-rc.17",
-        "@rolldown/binding-win32-x64-msvc": "1.0.0-rc.17"
+        "@rolldown/binding-android-arm64": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-arm64": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-darwin-x64": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-freebsd-x64": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm-gnueabihf": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-gnu": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-arm64-musl": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-ppc64-gnu": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-s390x-gnu": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-gnu": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-linux-x64-musl": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-openharmony-arm64": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-wasm32-wasi": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-win32-arm64-msvc": "1.0.1",
+        "@rolldown/binding-win32-x64-msvc": "1.0.1"
       }
     },
     "node_modules/siginfo": {
@@ -1060,9 +1060,9 @@
       "license": "MIT"
     },
     "node_modules/tinyexec": {
-      "version": "1.1.1",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyexec/-/tinyexec-1.1.1.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-VKS/ZaQhhkKFMANmAOhhXVoIfBXblQxGX1myCQ2faQrfmobMftXeJPcZGp0gS07ocvGJWDLZGyOZDadDBqYIJg==",
+      "version": "1.1.2",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/tinyexec/-/tinyexec-1.1.2.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-dAqSqE/RabpBKI8+h26GfLq6Vb3JVXs30XYQjdMjaj/c2tS8IYYMbIzP599KtRj7c57/wYApb3QjgRgXmrCukA==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "engines": {
@@ -1119,16 +1119,16 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/vite": {
-      "version": "8.0.10",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.0.10.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-rZuUu9j6J5uotLDs+cAA4O5H4K1SfPliUlQwqa6YEwSrWDZzP4rhm00oJR5snMewjxF5V/K3D4kctsUTsIU9Mw==",
+      "version": "8.0.13",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vite/-/vite-8.0.13.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-MFtjBYgzmSxmgA4RAfjIyXWpGe1oALnjgUTzzV7QLx/TKxCzjtMH6Fd9/eVK+5Fg1qNoz5VAwsmMs/NofrmJvw==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "lightningcss": "^1.32.0",
         "picomatch": "^4.0.4",
-        "postcss": "^8.5.10",
-        "rolldown": "1.0.0-rc.17",
+        "postcss": "^8.5.14",
+        "rolldown": "1.0.1",
         "tinyglobby": "^0.2.16"
       },
       "bin": {
@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@
       },
       "peerDependencies": {
         "@types/node": "^20.19.0 || >=22.12.0",
-        "@vitejs/devtools": "^0.1.0",
+        "@vitejs/devtools": "^0.1.18",
         "esbuild": "^0.27.0 || ^0.28.0",
         "jiti": ">=1.21.0",
         "less": "^4.0.0",
@@ -1197,19 +1197,19 @@
       }
     },
     "node_modules/vitest": {
-      "version": "4.1.5",
-      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vitest/-/vitest-4.1.5.tgz",
-      "integrity": "sha512-9Xx1v3/ih3m9hN+SbfkUyy0JAs72ap3r7joc87XL6jwF0jGg6mFBvQ1SrwaX+h8BlkX6Hz9shdd1uo6AF+ZGpg==",
+      "version": "4.1.6",
+      "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/vitest/-/vitest-4.1.6.tgz",
+      "integrity": "sha512-6lvjbS3p9b4CrdCmguzbh2/4uoXhGE2q71R4OX5sqF9R1bo9Xd6fGrMAfvp5wnCzlBnFVdCOp6onuTQVbo8iUQ==",
       "dev": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
-        "@vitest/expect": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/mocker": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/runner": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/snapshot": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/spy": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.5",
+        "@vitest/expect": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/mocker": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/pretty-format": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/runner": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/snapshot": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/spy": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/utils": "4.1.6",
         "es-module-lexer": "^2.0.0",
         "expect-type": "^1.3.0",
         "magic-string": "^0.30.21",
@@ -1237,12 +1237,12 @@
         "@edge-runtime/vm": "*",
         "@opentelemetry/api": "^1.9.0",
         "@types/node": "^20.0.0 || ^22.0.0 || >=24.0.0",
-        "@vitest/browser-playwright": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/browser-preview": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/browser-webdriverio": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/coverage-istanbul": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/coverage-v8": "4.1.5",
-        "@vitest/ui": "4.1.5",
+        "@vitest/browser-playwright": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/browser-preview": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/browser-webdriverio": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/coverage-istanbul": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/coverage-v8": "4.1.6",
+        "@vitest/ui": "4.1.6",
         "happy-dom": "*",
         "jsdom": "*",
         "vite": "^6.0.0 || ^7.0.0 || ^8.0.0"

sdk/typescript/src/events.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,20 @@ export interface ConnectedEvent {
 
 export interface HistoryEvent {
   type: "history";
+  /**
+   * Per-message dicts the frontend consumes directly. Common optional keys:
+   * - `role`: "user" | "assistant" | "tool"
+   * - `content`: string or list (image/document parts)
+   * - `tool_calls`: assistant turns — list of `{id, name, arguments, verdict?, output_assessment?}`
+   * - `tool_call_id`: tool turns — id of the originating call
+   * - `reminders`: metacognitive nudge bubbles (user/tool channels)
+   * - `advisories`: extracted `UserInterjection` payloads on tool turns
+   * - `reasoning`: concatenated reasoning text for assistant turns whose
+   *   `provider_data` carried reasoning-bearing blocks (Anthropic
+   *   `thinking`, OpenAI Responses `reasoning`, or synthetic
+   *   `reasoning_text` from path-3 servers). Present only when the
+   *   active model's `surface_persisted_reasoning` flag is true.
+   */
   messages: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
 }
 
@@ -38,6 +52,14 @@ export interface StreamEndEvent {
   type: "stream_end";
 }
 
+/** One-shot replay of the in-progress turn's content + reasoning emitted
+ *  by the events SSE handler when a fresh subscriber connects mid-stream. */
+export interface InProgressSnapshotEvent {
+  type: "in_progress_snapshot";
+  content: string;
+  reasoning: string;
+}
+
 export interface StateChangeEvent {
   type: "state_change";
   state: "idle" | "thinking" | "running" | "attention" | "error";
@@ -162,6 +184,7 @@ export type ServerEvent =
   | ContentEvent
   | ReasoningEvent
   | StreamEndEvent
+  | InProgressSnapshotEvent
   | StateChangeEvent
   | ToolInfoEvent
   | ApproveRequestEvent
@@ -261,6 +284,12 @@ export function isStreamEndEvent(e: ServerEvent): e is StreamEndEvent {
   return e.type === "stream_end";
 }
 
+export function isInProgressSnapshotEvent(
+  e: ServerEvent,
+): e is InProgressSnapshotEvent {
+  return e.type === "in_progress_snapshot";
+}
+
 export function isStateChangeEvent(e: ServerEvent): e is StateChangeEvent {
   return e.type === "state_change";
 }

tests/_coord_test_helpers.py

@@ -35,11 +35,10 @@ def _seed_children(
     The production path populates the registry via the cluster-event
     fan-out thread observing ``ws_created`` events. These tests just
     need a known-children set for the endpoint handlers to iterate —
-    inject directly under ``_children_lock`` rather than spinning up
-    the collector + fan-out plumbing.
+    inject directly via the registry's bulk-merge surface rather than
+    spinning up the collector + fan-out plumbing.
     """
-    with adapter._children_lock:
-        adapter._merge_child_ids_locked(coord_ws_id, child_ws_ids)
+    adapter._registry.merge_children(coord_ws_id, child_ws_ids)
 
 
 class _AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):

tests/_helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""Shared test helpers — kept out of conftest.py since these are factories,
+not fixtures, and several test files want to import them directly."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+
+def make_chat_session(**overrides: Any) -> Any:
+    """Build a minimal ``ChatSession`` with sane test defaults.
+
+    Caller passes any constructor arg as a kwarg to override the default —
+    e.g. ``make_chat_session(memory_config=MemoryConfig(fetch_limit=5))``.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
+
+    defaults: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "client": MagicMock(),
+        "model": "test-model",
+        "ui": MagicMock(),
+        "instructions": None,
+        "temperature": 0.5,
+        "max_tokens": 4096,
+        "tool_timeout": 30,
+    }
+    defaults.update(overrides)
+    return ChatSession(**defaults)
+
+
+def patch_session_storage(
+    monkeypatch: Any,
+    *,
+    active: bool = True,
+    raise_on_is_active: bool = False,
+) -> list[str]:
+    """Patch ``session.get_storage`` to a stub whose ``is_watch_active``
+    returns *active* (or raises if *raise_on_is_active*).  Returns the
+    list of ``watch_id``s the predicate was called with.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core import session as session_mod
+
+    calls: list[str] = []
+
+    class _Stub:
+        def is_watch_active(self, watch_id: str) -> bool:
+            calls.append(watch_id)
+            if raise_on_is_active:
+                raise RuntimeError("storage down")
+            return active
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(session_mod, "get_storage", lambda: _Stub())
+    return calls

tests/_session_helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+"""Shared session-test helpers.
+
+Two reasoning-test modules (``test_session_replay_reasoning.py`` and
+``test_session_synth_reasoning_block.py``) need the same minimal
+``ChatSession`` factory + a ``SessionUIBase`` no-op subclass.  Hoisting
+keeps a future third caller from drifting on the defaults — the third
+existing ``_make_session`` (``test_model_registry.py``) deliberately
+takes a different signature (registry / model_alias / reasoning_effort
++ ``_FakeUI``) and is NOT a candidate for sharing this helper.
+
+Module is named with a leading underscore so pytest doesn't try to
+collect it as a test file — it's an importable utility, not a test.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
+from turnstone.core.session_ui_base import SessionUIBase
+
+
+class NullUI(SessionUIBase):
+    """Bare-bones UI satisfying the SessionUIBase contract for tests
+    that don't care about UI side effects."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        super().__init__()
+
+
+def make_session(**kwargs: Any) -> ChatSession:
+    """Build a ChatSession with minimal defaults; tests override
+    individual fields via kwargs."""
+    defaults: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "client": MagicMock(),
+        "model": "test-model",
+        "ui": NullUI(),
+        "instructions": None,
+        "temperature": 0.5,
+        "max_tokens": 4096,
+        "tool_timeout": 30,
+    }
+    defaults.update(kwargs)
+    return ChatSession(**defaults)

tests/conftest.py

@@ -1,10 +1,79 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import os
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock
 
 import pytest
 
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager, StaticServerState
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenCipher
+    from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig
+
+
+def make_mcp_token_cipher() -> MCPTokenCipher:
+    """Build a single-key MCP token cipher for tests.
+
+    Used by test files that need to exercise ``MCPTokenStore`` round-
+    trips without the lifespan-side configuration loader; centralised
+    here so the key/material defaults stay aligned across files.
+    """
+    import base64
+
+    from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenCipher, MCPTokenCipherConfig
+
+    raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+    return MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,)))
+
+
+def _seed_static_state(mgr: MCPClientManager, name: str, **overrides: Any) -> StaticServerState:
+    """Get-or-create a ``StaticServerState`` on ``mgr`` and apply ``overrides``.
+
+    Shared across MCP test files so the helper stays in one place. Imported
+    where needed; ``StaticServerState`` is constructed lazily so non-MCP
+    tests don't pay the import cost.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+    state = mgr._static_servers.get(name)
+    if state is None:
+        state = StaticServerState(name=name)
+        mgr._static_servers[name] = state
+    for k, v in overrides.items():
+        setattr(state, k, v)
+    return state
+
+
+def make_oidc_test_config(**overrides: Any) -> OIDCConfig:
+    """Build a test ``OIDCConfig`` with sensible defaults.
+
+    Shared between ``test_oidc.py`` and ``test_oidc_handlers.py`` so the
+    defaults (including the now-required ``redirect_base``) stay aligned.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig
+
+    defaults: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "enabled": True,
+        "issuer": "https://idp.example.com",
+        "client_id": "my-client",
+        "client_secret": "my-secret",
+        "scopes": "openid email profile",
+        "provider_name": "TestIDP",
+        "role_claim": "",
+        "role_map": {},
+        "password_enabled": True,
+        "redirect_base": "https://app.example.com",
+        "authorization_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/authorize",
+        "token_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/token",
+        "userinfo_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/userinfo",
+        "jwks_uri": "https://idp.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
+    }
+    defaults.update(overrides)
+    return OIDCConfig(**defaults)
+
 
 def pytest_addoption(parser: pytest.Parser) -> None:
     parser.addoption(

tests/spike_sdk_concurrency.py

@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+"""Spike 1 — validate MCP SDK behavior for the per-(user, server) session pool.
+
+Three scenarios:
+
+1. N=20 concurrent ClientSession instances to the same URL.
+   Verifies: no FD blow-up, no shared transport state, each session's
+   tools/list returns independently.
+
+2. Two concurrent tools/call on a shared ClientSession with interleaving
+   payloads. Verifies: request_id demux works under contention.
+
+3. Per-session Authorization header isolation. Verifies: different Bearer
+   tokens per ClientSession reach the server with the expected
+   Authorization header — i.e. httpx connection pooling does not cross
+   headers between sessions.
+
+Run: uv run python tests/spike_sdk_concurrency.py
+
+Outcome gates Phase 5's pool architecture; if any scenario fails, fall
+back to per-call header injection (Alternative F in the OAuth-MCP RFC).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import logging
+import os
+import socket
+import sys
+import threading
+import time
+from collections import defaultdict
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+import uvicorn
+from mcp import ClientSession
+from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+# Reduce uvicorn / mcp log noise so spike output is readable.
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+# Records (auth_header, tool_name) per request — populated by the
+# AuthHeaderRecorder middleware below. Indexed by call sequence.
+SERVER_OBSERVATIONS: list[tuple[str | None, str | None]] = []
+# Tool-call payloads observed (for request_id demux verification).
+TOOL_CALL_PAYLOADS: list[str] = []
+
+
+class AuthHeaderRecorder(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Records the Authorization header on every request the server sees."""
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable) -> Response:
+        auth = request.headers.get("authorization")
+        # We only record the auth header here; tool name comes from the
+        # body payload which we can't read non-destructively. The tool
+        # handler logs the payload it received.
+        SERVER_OBSERVATIONS.append((auth, None))
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def find_free_port() -> int:
+    """Bind to port 0, return the assigned port."""
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def build_server(port: int) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    """Create a minimal FastMCP server with one echo tool."""
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="spike-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.tool()
+    async def echo(payload: str) -> str:
+        """Echo the payload back. Records the payload server-side."""
+        TOOL_CALL_PAYLOADS.append(payload)
+        # Add a small await so two concurrent calls can interleave
+        # on the wire if the SDK pools the requests.
+        await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
+        return f"echoed:{payload}"
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(AuthHeaderRecorder)
+
+    config = uvicorn.Config(
+        app,
+        host="127.0.0.1",
+        port=port,
+        log_level="warning",
+        access_log=False,
+    )
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def run_server_in_thread(server: uvicorn.Server) -> threading.Thread:
+    """Boot the server in a background thread on its own asyncio loop."""
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="spike-server")
+    t.start()
+    return t
+
+
+async def wait_for_server_ready(url: str, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    """Poll the server until it accepts connections."""
+    import urllib.parse
+
+    parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            reader, writer = await asyncio.open_connection(parsed.hostname, parsed.port)
+            writer.close()
+            await writer.wait_closed()
+            return
+        except OSError:
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"server at {url} not ready within {timeout}s")
+
+
+def fd_count() -> int:
+    """Count open file descriptors for the current process."""
+    try:
+        return len(os.listdir(f"/proc/{os.getpid()}/fd"))
+    except OSError:
+        return -1
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Scenario 1: N=20 concurrent ClientSession instances
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def scenario_1_concurrent_sessions(url: str, n: int = 20) -> dict:
+    """Open N concurrent ClientSession instances and call tools/list on each."""
+    print(f"\n=== Scenario 1: {n} concurrent ClientSession instances ===")
+    fd_before = fd_count()
+
+    async def one_session(idx: int) -> dict:
+        headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer test-token-{idx}"}
+        async with (
+            streamablehttp_client(url=url, headers=headers) as (read, write, _),
+            ClientSession(read, write) as session,
+        ):
+            await session.initialize()
+            tools = await session.list_tools()
+            return {
+                "idx": idx,
+                "tool_count": len(tools.tools),
+                "tool_names": [t.name for t in tools.tools],
+            }
+
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    results = await asyncio.gather(*[one_session(i) for i in range(n)], return_exceptions=True)
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+    fd_after = fd_count()
+    # Allow some settling time for FDs to release.
+    await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+    fd_settled = fd_count()
+
+    successes = [r for r in results if isinstance(r, dict)]
+    failures = [r for r in results if isinstance(r, Exception)]
+
+    # Verify every session got the same tool catalog.
+    catalog_consistent = (
+        len(successes) == n and len({tuple(r["tool_names"]) for r in successes}) == 1
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "scenario": "concurrent_sessions",
+        "n": n,
+        "successes": len(successes),
+        "failures": len(failures),
+        "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed, 3),
+        "fd_before": fd_before,
+        "fd_during_peak": fd_after,
+        "fd_settled": fd_settled,
+        "fd_growth_during": fd_after - fd_before,
+        "fd_growth_settled": fd_settled - fd_before,
+        "catalog_consistent": catalog_consistent,
+        "first_failure": str(failures[0]) if failures else None,
+    }
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Scenario 2: 2 concurrent tools/call on a shared session
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def scenario_2_concurrent_calls_shared_session(url: str) -> dict:
+    """Two concurrent tools/call on one ClientSession with interleaving payloads.
+
+    The echo tool sleeps 50ms, so concurrent calls overlap on the wire.
+    Each call passes a distinct payload (~10KB) to make request bodies
+    spannable across multiple stream frames.
+    """
+    print("\n=== Scenario 2: 2 concurrent tools/call on shared session ===")
+
+    # Generous-size payloads so both bodies live during the await.
+    payload_a = "A" * 10000
+    payload_b = "B" * 10000
+
+    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer shared-session-token"}
+    async with (
+        streamablehttp_client(url=url, headers=headers) as (read, write, _),
+        ClientSession(read, write) as session,
+    ):
+        await session.initialize()
+
+        TOOL_CALL_PAYLOADS.clear()
+
+        start = time.monotonic()
+        results = await asyncio.gather(
+            session.call_tool("echo", {"payload": payload_a}),
+            session.call_tool("echo", {"payload": payload_b}),
+            return_exceptions=True,
+        )
+        elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+    successes = [r for r in results if not isinstance(r, Exception)]
+    failures = [r for r in results if isinstance(r, Exception)]
+
+    # Each result.content[0].text should be "echoed:{payload}".
+    response_payloads: list[str] = []
+    if len(successes) == 2:
+        for r in successes:
+            text = r.content[0].text if r.content else ""
+            response_payloads.append(text)
+
+    # Order may not match call order — what matters is both payloads echo.
+    expected = {f"echoed:{payload_a}", f"echoed:{payload_b}"}
+    received = set(response_payloads)
+    demux_ok = received == expected
+
+    # Did both calls actually overlap? If sequential, elapsed ~= 0.1+s;
+    # if concurrent, ~0.05s.
+    concurrent_observed = elapsed < 0.09
+
+    return {
+        "scenario": "concurrent_calls_shared_session",
+        "successes": len(successes),
+        "failures": len(failures),
+        "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed, 3),
+        "demux_ok": demux_ok,
+        "expected_payloads_received": list(received) if demux_ok else None,
+        "actual_payloads_received_count": len(received),
+        "appears_concurrent_on_wire": concurrent_observed,
+        "first_failure": str(failures[0]) if failures else None,
+    }
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Scenario 3: per-session header isolation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def scenario_3_header_isolation(url: str, n: int = 5) -> dict:
+    """Open N sessions with distinct Authorization headers, call echo on each.
+
+    Verifies the server sees each session's own header — i.e. httpx
+    connection pooling does not cross headers between concurrent
+    ClientSession instances against the same URL.
+    """
+    print(f"\n=== Scenario 3: {n}-session Authorization-header isolation ===")
+    SERVER_OBSERVATIONS.clear()
+
+    async def one_session(idx: int) -> str | None:
+        headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer iso-token-{idx}"}
+        async with (
+            streamablehttp_client(url=url, headers=headers) as (read, write, _),
+            ClientSession(read, write) as session,
+        ):
+            await session.initialize()
+            # One call per session.
+            await session.call_tool("echo", {"payload": f"session-{idx}"})
+            return f"Bearer iso-token-{idx}"
+
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    expected_tokens = await asyncio.gather(*[one_session(i) for i in range(n)])
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+    # Tally observed Authorization headers, ignoring None entries (initial
+    # handshake sometimes lacks auth).
+    observed_auth = [auth for auth, _ in SERVER_OBSERVATIONS if auth]
+    expected_set = set(expected_tokens)
+    observed_set = set(observed_auth)
+
+    # Every expected token must show up at least once on the server.
+    all_present = expected_set.issubset(observed_set)
+    # No spurious tokens.
+    no_extras = observed_set.issubset(expected_set)
+    # Frequency: at least one observation per token.
+    counts = defaultdict(int)
+    for a in observed_auth:
+        counts[a] += 1
+    each_seen = all(counts[t] >= 1 for t in expected_tokens)
+
+    return {
+        "scenario": "header_isolation",
+        "n": n,
+        "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed, 3),
+        "expected_tokens": sorted(expected_set),
+        "observed_tokens": sorted(observed_set),
+        "all_expected_present": all_present,
+        "no_extra_tokens_observed": no_extras,
+        "each_token_seen_at_least_once": each_seen,
+        "header_counts_per_token": dict(counts),
+        "total_requests_observed": len(observed_auth),
+    }
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Driver
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def main() -> None:
+    port = find_free_port()
+    url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp"
+
+    server = build_server(port)
+    server_thread = run_server_in_thread(server)
+    try:
+        await wait_for_server_ready(url)
+        print(f"server up at {url}\n")
+
+        result_1 = await scenario_1_concurrent_sessions(url, n=20)
+        print_scenario_result(result_1)
+
+        result_2 = await scenario_2_concurrent_calls_shared_session(url)
+        print_scenario_result(result_2)
+
+        result_3 = await scenario_3_header_isolation(url, n=5)
+        print_scenario_result(result_3)
+
+        # Final verdict
+        verdict_1 = (
+            result_1["successes"] == result_1["n"]
+            and result_1["catalog_consistent"]
+            and result_1["fd_growth_settled"] < 30  # 20 sessions, generous bound
+        )
+        verdict_2 = result_2["demux_ok"] and result_2["successes"] == 2
+        verdict_3 = (
+            result_3["all_expected_present"]
+            and result_3["no_extra_tokens_observed"]
+            and result_3["each_token_seen_at_least_once"]
+        )
+
+        print("\n=== VERDICT ===")
+        print(f"  Scenario 1 (concurrent sessions):    {'PASS' if verdict_1 else 'FAIL'}")
+        print(f"  Scenario 2 (concurrent calls shared): {'PASS' if verdict_2 else 'FAIL'}")
+        print(f"  Scenario 3 (header isolation):        {'PASS' if verdict_3 else 'FAIL'}")
+        all_pass = verdict_1 and verdict_2 and verdict_3
+        print(
+            f"\n  Phase 5 per-(user, server) pool architecture: "
+            f"{'VIABLE' if all_pass else 'NEEDS REWORK (Alternative F fallback)'}"
+        )
+        sys.exit(0 if all_pass else 1)
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        server_thread.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+def print_scenario_result(result: dict) -> None:
+    print(f"\nresult[{result['scenario']}]:")
+    for k, v in result.items():
+        if k == "scenario":
+            continue
+        print(f"  {k}: {v}")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    with contextlib.suppress(KeyboardInterrupt):
+        asyncio.run(main())

tests/test_app_js.py

@@ -92,3 +92,437 @@ def test_tool_error_does_not_overwrite_approval_badge() -> None:
         "badge instead so the approval verdict stays visible alongside "
         "the error."
     )
+
+
+def test_replay_history_renders_content_before_tool_block() -> None:
+    """In ``replayHistory``'s ``role === "assistant"`` branch, the
+    ``msg.content`` render must precede the ``msg.tool_calls`` render.
+
+    Two reasons, both load-bearing:
+
+    1. **Structural** — the next loop iteration's ``role === "tool"``
+       message anchors to ``lastToolBlock``. The tool-block branch sets
+       that anchor; the content branch clears it. If content runs after
+       the tool block, the clear silently drops the upcoming tool
+       result. Pre-fix, every interactive tool result was missing from
+       saved-workstream replays whenever the assistant turn carried
+       both narration and tool calls (very common output shape).
+
+    2. **Visual** — the live SSE path renders content first
+       (``stream_text`` streams before ``tool_info`` /
+       ``approve_request``), so replay should match.
+
+    The test pins the order via the offsets of the ``msg.content`` and
+    ``msg.tool_calls`` branch headers inside the function body."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("Pane.prototype.replayHistory = function")
+    end = body.index("Pane.prototype._attachRetryToLastAssistant", start)
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    # Locate the assistant branch and bound the search to its body —
+    # the function also handles user / tool roles which would otherwise
+    # confuse the offset comparison.
+    asst_start = fn.index('msg.role === "assistant"')
+    asst_end = fn.index('msg.role === "tool"', asst_start)
+    asst = fn[asst_start:asst_end]
+    # ``if (msg.content && msg.content.trim())`` guards against a
+    # whitespace-only content row (Qwen-style "\n\n" left over after a
+    # reasoning-parser model strips ``<think>…</think>`` and emits
+    # nothing else before the tool call).  Pre-trim guard, those rows
+    # rendered as a visible-but-empty ``.msg.assistant`` card on
+    # replay.  Match the substring up to ``msg.content`` so the test
+    # tolerates either guard shape without locking the trim() in.
+    content_idx = asst.index("if (msg.content")
+    tool_calls_idx = asst.index("if (msg.tool_calls && msg.tool_calls.length)")
+    assert content_idx < tool_calls_idx, (
+        "replayHistory must render msg.content BEFORE msg.tool_calls "
+        "inside the assistant branch — otherwise the lastToolBlock "
+        "anchor is clobbered before the next iteration's tool result "
+        "can attach to it (and the visual order also drifts from the "
+        "live SSE flow)."
+    )
+
+
+def test_replay_history_renders_persisted_verdict_badge() -> None:
+    """Saved-workstream replays must paint the persisted intent verdict
+    next to each tool div, using the same ``renderVerdictBadge`` helper
+    the live ``showInlineToolBlock`` path uses. Pre-fix the audit trail
+    was complete in storage (``intent_verdicts`` table) but never
+    surfaced on replay — operators reviewing a saved workstream
+    couldn't see what the heuristic / LLM judge thought of any tool
+    call. This test pins the call site so a refactor that drops the
+    decoration regresses the audit surface."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("Pane.prototype.replayHistory = function")
+    end = body.index("Pane.prototype._attachRetryToLastAssistant", start)
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    # Match a `renderVerdictBadge(<something>.verdict, ...)` call inside
+    # the replay loop.  Loose on whitespace + identifier so a future
+    # rename of the iteration variable doesn't trip CI.
+    badge_call_re = re.compile(
+        r"renderVerdictBadge\(\s*\w+\.verdict\b",
+    )
+    assert badge_call_re.search(fn), (
+        "replayHistory must call renderVerdictBadge(tc.verdict, ...) "
+        "when a persisted verdict is attached to a tool_call entry — "
+        "otherwise the audit-trail data persisted to intent_verdicts "
+        "doesn't surface on saved-workstream replays."
+    )
+
+
+def test_shared_utils_defines_replay_advisories_after_tool() -> None:
+    """The shared ``replayAdvisoriesAfterTool`` helper in
+    ``shared_static/utils.js`` is the single source of advisory-walk +
+    type-filter logic for both ``app.js`` (interactive) and
+    ``coordinator.js`` (coord).  A refactor that drops the helper
+    breaks both surfaces, so guard its definition + filter shape here.
+    """
+    utils_js = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone/shared_static/utils.js"
+    body = utils_js.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "function replayAdvisoriesAfterTool" in body, (
+        "shared/utils.js must define replayAdvisoriesAfterTool — "
+        "interactive and coord both invoke it."
+    )
+    # The type filter — ``adv.type !== 'user_interjection'`` — must
+    # remain in the helper so a future advisory shape (output_guard,
+    # metacognitive nudge, etc.) doesn't silently render as a user
+    # bubble.
+    assert 'adv.type !== "user_interjection"' in body, (
+        "replayAdvisoriesAfterTool must filter by advisory type so a "
+        "future non-user_interjection advisory shape doesn't silently "
+        "render as a user bubble."
+    )
+
+
+def test_replay_renders_user_interjection_advisory_after_tool_block() -> None:
+    """Queued user messages spliced into the last tool-result envelope
+    of a batch (Seam 1) persist on the tool DB row as a wrapped
+    ``<tool_output>`` envelope.  ``decorate_history_messages`` extracts
+    the advisory back out and the wire layer projects it onto
+    ``msg.advisories``; ``replayHistory`` must invoke the shared
+    ``replayAdvisoriesAfterTool`` helper (defined in
+    ``shared/utils.js``) so each ``user_interjection`` renders through
+    ``addUserMessage`` and the bubble looks identical to a Seam 2/3
+    user row.
+
+    This test pins the call site so a refactor that drops the helper
+    invocation regresses the queued-during-batch replay shape
+    silently."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("Pane.prototype.replayHistory = function")
+    end = body.index("Pane.prototype._attachRetryToLastAssistant", start)
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    # The replay loop must invoke the shared helper, passing
+    # ``msg.advisories`` and a renderer that routes through
+    # ``addUserMessage``.  The helper itself filters on
+    # ``adv.type !== "user_interjection"``; that branch lives in
+    # ``shared/utils.js`` (test_shared_utils_js or runtime smoke covers
+    # the helper's body).
+    assert "replayAdvisoriesAfterTool(msg.advisories" in fn, (
+        "replayHistory must invoke replayAdvisoriesAfterTool with "
+        "msg.advisories so queued messages spliced into the tool "
+        "envelope render as user bubbles after the tool block."
+    )
+    assert "addUserMessage(text" in fn, (
+        "replayHistory's renderer callback must route the extracted "
+        "advisory text through addUserMessage so the rendered bubble "
+        "matches a normal user-row replay."
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Phase 8 — Chunk D: MCP error embed + settings panel UX
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_INDEX_HTML = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone/ui/static/index.html"
+_STYLE_CSS = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone/ui/static/style.css"
+
+# The Phase-8 D-chunk pins the absence of an unsafe DOM-write API
+# in two regions of app.js. Spell the property name out of literal
+# concatenation so the tooling that flags occurrences in code
+# strings doesn't false-positive on the test source.
+_UNSAFE_DOM_WRITE_RE = re.compile(r"\.inner" + r"HTML\s*=")
+
+
+def test_phase8_mcp_error_helpers_defined_in_app_js() -> None:
+    """The Phase 8 dashboard renderer adds three load-bearing helpers
+    next to the existing media-embed pattern: ``tryParseMcpError``
+    (envelope detector), ``buildMcpErrorEmbed`` (interactive card),
+    and the ``_pendingConsentServers`` set that drives the gear-icon
+    badge. A regression that drops any of them silently degrades the
+    OAuth consent UX to a plain JSON dump, so guard their existence
+    here."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert "function tryParseMcpError" in body, (
+        "tryParseMcpError must remain defined — appendToolOutput's "
+        "error branch depends on it to detect the MCP error envelope."
+    )
+    assert "function buildMcpErrorEmbed" in body, (
+        "buildMcpErrorEmbed must remain defined — it renders the "
+        "interactive consent / forbidden / operator card."
+    )
+    assert "_pendingConsentServers" in body, (
+        "_pendingConsentServers state must remain — it backs the "
+        "gear-icon badge so a user who scrolls past a consent prompt "
+        "still has a stable signal that consent is pending."
+    )
+    # The buildMcpErrorEmbed pattern must also wire the "actionable"
+    # branch (consent_required / insufficient_scope) into the badge
+    # via _onConsentDetected; pin the helper name.
+    assert "_onConsentDetected" in body, (
+        "_onConsentDetected must remain — buildMcpErrorEmbed calls it "
+        "for the actionable category to surface the gear-icon badge."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_settings_panel_handlers_defined() -> None:
+    """The settings modal exposes four entry points that the inline
+    ``onclick`` attributes in index.html depend on. Renaming or
+    deleting any of them breaks the modal silently (the buttons are
+    still rendered but click-to-action is dead). Catch that here."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    for name in [
+        "function openSettingsPanel",
+        "function closeSettingsPanel",
+        "function confirmRevokeMcp",
+        "function cancelRevokeMcp",
+    ]:
+        assert name in body, f"Missing required handler: {name}"
+    # The connections list is fetched against the Phase-7 endpoint —
+    # pin the URL so a server-side rename forces an explicit UI bump.
+    assert "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections" in body, (
+        "Settings panel must fetch /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections — "
+        "a server-side rename needs an explicit UI update."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_appendtooloutput_dispatches_mcp_error_before_renderer() -> None:
+    """``appendToolOutput`` must call ``tryParseMcpError`` inside its
+    ``isError`` branch BEFORE falling through to the plain
+    ``renderToolOutput`` path. The ordering is what makes the
+    interactive consent card replace the JSON dump; reverse the calls
+    and the user sees the raw error envelope as text again."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("Pane.prototype.appendToolOutput = function")
+    end = body.index("Pane.prototype.", start + 10)
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    parse_idx = fn.find("tryParseMcpError(")
+    render_idx = fn.find("renderToolOutput(")
+    assert parse_idx >= 0, (
+        "appendToolOutput must call tryParseMcpError on the error path "
+        "before renderToolOutput, otherwise the consent card never "
+        "replaces the plain JSON output."
+    )
+    assert render_idx >= 0, "renderToolOutput call must remain present"
+    assert parse_idx < render_idx, (
+        "tryParseMcpError must run BEFORE renderToolOutput so the "
+        "interactive card path takes precedence over plain rendering."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_no_unsafe_dom_write_in_settings_panel() -> None:
+    """Defensive XSS guard: the settings panel renders user-controlled
+    server names, scope strings, and timestamp values into the DOM.
+    The whole section MUST go through ``textContent``-style APIs; an
+    unsafe-DOM-write assignment would be a regression vector. Bound
+    the check to the section 15 body to avoid false positives
+    elsewhere."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("//  15. MCP server connections settings panel")
+    # Bound to the full settings section (terminates at the next
+    # top-level keydown handler block).
+    end = body.index('document.addEventListener("keydown"', start)
+    section = body[start:end]
+    assert not _UNSAFE_DOM_WRITE_RE.search(section), (
+        "Section 15 must not assign to the unsafe DOM-write property — "
+        "server names and scope values flow through here and would be "
+        "XSS-injectable. Use textContent / DOM APIs instead."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_settings_button_in_index_html() -> None:
+    """The gear-icon entry-point for the settings menu must remain
+    in the appbar's actions span. The console proxy IIFE prepends a
+    node pill to ``header.firstChild`` (turnstone/console/server.py:
+    202); our button is appended inside ``<span class='appbar-actions'>``
+    on the right, so they don't collide. Pin both shape constraints
+    here so a future appbar refactor keeps them disjoint."""
+    body = _INDEX_HTML.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'id="settings-btn"' in body, (
+        "index.html must keep the #settings-btn — onclick handlers "
+        "and the consent badge target it by id."
+    )
+    assert 'onclick="toggleSettingsMenu(this)"' in body, (
+        "settings-btn must wire onclick=toggleSettingsMenu(this) — "
+        "the gear opens a dropdown with MCP connections + Logout; "
+        "losing the binding leaves the menu unreachable."
+    )
+    # The button must live inside <span class="appbar-actions"> so the
+    # console proxy's header.insertBefore(pill, header.firstChild)
+    # leaves it untouched.
+    actions_open = body.index('class="appbar-actions"')
+    actions_close = body.index("</span>", actions_open)
+    assert 'id="settings-btn"' in body[actions_open:actions_close], (
+        "settings-btn must be inside <span class='appbar-actions'> "
+        "so the console proxy's firstChild prepend doesn't shift it."
+    )
+
+
+def test_settings_menu_handlers_defined() -> None:
+    """The gear-icon dropdown exposes a toggle/open/close trio that the
+    inline ``onclick="toggleSettingsMenu(this)"`` in index.html depends
+    on, plus the menu items themselves must wire to existing entry
+    points (``openSettingsPanel`` for MCP connections, ``logout`` for
+    sign-out). Pin all four so a rename or deletion fails loudly here
+    instead of silently leaving the gear's menu broken or wired to a
+    stale function."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    for name in [
+        "function toggleSettingsMenu",
+        "function openSettingsMenu",
+        "function closeSettingsMenu",
+    ]:
+        assert name in body, f"Missing required handler: {name}"
+    # Bound to the settings-menu region so we don't accidentally match
+    # an unrelated openSettingsPanel/logout call elsewhere in the file.
+    start = body.index("function openSettingsMenu(")
+    end = body.index("function closeSettingsMenu(", start)
+    section = body[start:end]
+    assert "openSettingsPanel()" in section, (
+        "Settings menu's MCP-connections item must call openSettingsPanel() "
+        "— otherwise the existing settings overlay is unreachable from the "
+        "new dropdown."
+    )
+    assert "logout()" in section, (
+        "Settings menu's Logout item must call logout() — that's the "
+        "shared auth.js entry point that clears the cookie + session state."
+    )
+
+
+def test_dashboard_overlay_is_region_not_dialog() -> None:
+    """The dashboard overlay must be role='region' (not role='dialog' +
+    aria-modal='true').  The role downgrade is what allows ui-header to
+    stay interactive while the dashboard is open — see the comment at
+    showDashboard() in app.js.  A revert to role='dialog' + aria-modal
+    would re-trap focus and break the gear/theme buttons + the console
+    proxy's node-picker pill while the dashboard is open."""
+    body = _INDEX_HTML.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    idx = body.index('id="dashboard"')
+    # Bound to ~600 chars after the tag so we only check this element's
+    # attributes — same shape as test_phase8_settings_modal_in_index_html.
+    chunk = body[idx : idx + 600]
+    assert 'role="region"' in chunk, (
+        "dashboard must be role='region' — see showDashboard() comment."
+    )
+    assert "aria-modal" not in chunk, (
+        "dashboard must NOT be aria-modal — re-trapping focus breaks "
+        "the appbar's interactive controls (theme toggle, settings menu, "
+        "proxy node-picker pill) while the dashboard is open."
+    )
+
+
+def test_close_settings_menu_resets_aria() -> None:
+    """closeSettingsMenu must reset aria-expanded='false' AND remove
+    aria-controls from the gear trigger.  Without the reset the gear
+    keeps reporting 'expanded' to assistive tech after the menu closes;
+    without the removal aria-controls points at a dead DOM id."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("function closeSettingsMenu(")
+    # Bound to ~600 chars so we don't catch unrelated handlers.
+    section = body[start : start + 600]
+    assert 'setAttribute("aria-expanded", "false")' in section, (
+        "closeSettingsMenu must set aria-expanded='false' on the gear."
+    )
+    assert 'removeAttribute("aria-controls")' in section, (
+        "closeSettingsMenu must remove aria-controls from the gear."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_settings_modal_in_index_html() -> None:
+    """Both the settings overlay and the revoke-confirmation overlay
+    must remain in the modal area. The Escape-key deferral list in
+    app.js targets these ids, so removing them silently breaks the
+    handler chain."""
+    body = _INDEX_HTML.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'id="settings-overlay"' in body
+    assert 'id="revoke-mcp-overlay"' in body
+    # Each overlay must have role="dialog" + aria-modal="true" so
+    # screen readers and the existing modal-deferral handlers can
+    # treat them like the rest of the modal stack.
+    for overlay_id in ("settings-overlay", "revoke-mcp-overlay"):
+        idx = body.index(f'id="{overlay_id}"')
+        # Bound to ~600 chars after the open tag so we only check this
+        # overlay's attributes.
+        chunk = body[idx : idx + 600]
+        assert 'role="dialog"' in chunk, f"{overlay_id} missing role=dialog"
+        assert 'aria-modal="true"' in chunk, f"{overlay_id} missing aria-modal=true"
+
+
+def test_phase8_xss_safe_render_in_build_mcp_error_embed() -> None:
+    """Adversarial input — the renderer for an MCP error envelope
+    must use ``textContent`` (not the unsafe DOM-write API) for every
+    field that flows from the server: ``err.detail``, ``err.server``,
+    scopes list. The card builder uses createElement + textContent
+    throughout so a script-tag server name renders harmlessly. Pin
+    the absence of the unsafe-write inside ``buildMcpErrorEmbed``."""
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    start = body.index("function buildMcpErrorEmbed(")
+    # Bound to the function body — find its closing brace at column 0.
+    rest = body[start:]
+    # Closing function brace at line start (matches existing functions)
+    end_match = re.search(r"\n}\n", rest)
+    assert end_match is not None
+    fn = rest[: end_match.end()]
+    assert not _UNSAFE_DOM_WRITE_RE.search(fn), (
+        "buildMcpErrorEmbed must not use the unsafe-DOM-write API — "
+        "server names and detail strings flow through here. An "
+        "adversarial server name must render harmlessly via "
+        "textContent."
+    )
+
+
+def test_phase8_css_classes_present_in_stylesheet() -> None:
+    """The card / badge / modal classes referenced from app.js must
+    have CSS rules. Without them the DOM still works but the visual
+    treatment is gone, which would silently degrade the consent UX."""
+    css = _STYLE_CSS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    for selector in [
+        ".mcp-error-card",
+        ".mcp-error-icon",
+        ".mcp-error-action-btn",
+        ".mcp-scope-pill",
+        "#settings-overlay",
+        "#settings-box",
+        ".settings-revoke-btn",
+        ".settings-consent-badge",
+        "#revoke-mcp-overlay",
+    ]:
+        assert selector in css, f"Missing CSS rule for {selector}"
+
+
+def test_phase8_consent_url_prefix_check_in_click_handler() -> None:
+    """Defence-in-depth: the consent button's click handler must reject
+    any ``consent_url`` that doesn't start with the dispatcher's known
+    prefix (``/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start``). ``_build_consent_url`` always
+    emits a path-relative URL with that exact prefix; a non-prefix
+    value implies the producer drifted (or was compromised) and a
+    ``window.open("javascript:...")`` would be catastrophic.
+
+    The renderer is the last line of defence before ``window.open`` and
+    must not rely on the producer-side guarantee alone. Pin the prefix
+    string and the ``startsWith`` form so a future refactor can't
+    silently weaken the guard.
+    """
+    body = _APP_JS.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    # Bound the search to the click handler region (between the
+    # ``buildMcpErrorEmbed`` function and the next top-level helper) to
+    # avoid false positives from unrelated string occurrences.
+    start = body.index("function buildMcpErrorEmbed(")
+    end = body.index("\n}\n", start) + 1
+    fn = body[start:end]
+    assert 'consentUrl.startsWith("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start")' in fn, (
+        "Click handler must guard window.open with "
+        'consentUrl.startsWith("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start"). Without it '
+        "a future producer drift to a non-path-relative URL (or a "
+        '"javascript:" injection) would be passed straight to '
+        "window.open."
+    )

tests/test_auth.py

@@ -83,6 +83,39 @@ class TestIsPublicPath:
     def test_shared_static_public(self):
         assert is_public_path("/shared/base.css") is True
 
+    # Console proxy: a public proxied path must still be public, otherwise
+    # the login modal can never re-authenticate from inside a ``/node/{id}/``
+    # proxied page once the cookie expires.
+    def test_proxy_v1_login_public(self):
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/login") is True
+
+    def test_proxy_no_v1_login_public(self):
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/api/auth/login") is True
+
+    def test_proxy_v1_status_public(self):
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/status") is True
+
+    def test_proxy_v1_setup_public(self):
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/setup") is True
+
+    def test_proxy_v1_logout_public(self):
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/logout") is True
+
+    def test_proxy_v1_oidc_authorize_public(self):
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize") is True
+
+    def test_proxy_v1_oidc_callback_public(self):
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback") is True
+
+    def test_proxy_v1_workstreams_still_not_public(self):
+        """Proxy prefix must not turn protected paths into public ones."""
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/workstreams") is False
+
+    def test_proxy_v1_refresh_still_requires_auth(self):
+        """Refresh isn't in PUBLIC_PATHS — the caller must already have
+        a valid cookie. Proxy-prefix shouldn't change that."""
+        assert is_public_path("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/refresh") is False
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # TestRequiredRole
@@ -207,6 +240,30 @@ class TestRequiredScope:
         """Only POST is elevated — GET falls through to read."""
         assert required_scope("GET", "/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "read"
 
+    def test_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_v1_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/v1/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_no_v1_internal_mcp_refresh_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/_internal/mcp-refresh/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_v1_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/v1/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
+    def test_proxy_no_v1_internal_mcp_reconnect_one_needs_approve(self):
+        assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/_internal/mcp-reconnect/srv") == "approve"
+
     # Workstream sub-resource mutations (parametric paths)
     def test_ws_delete_needs_write(self):
         assert required_scope("POST", "/api/workstreams/abc123/delete") == "write"

tests/test_build_history_reminders.py

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+"""Tests for ``turnstone.server._build_history`` reminder + source surfacing.
+
+The replay path (``_build_history``) projects the ``_source`` and
+``_reminders`` side-channels onto the wire entry the frontend
+consumes.  Persisted via migration 050 (Commit 1) so multi-tab /
+multi-device replay sees the same metacognitive bubble shape the
+originating tab saw live.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from turnstone.server import _build_history
+
+
+def _make_stub_session(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> Any:
+    """Minimal ChatSession-shaped stub.  ``_build_history`` only reads
+    ``session.messages`` plus calls ``_load_verdict_indexes(ws_id)`` —
+    the latter we patch out below.
+    """
+    return SimpleNamespace(messages=messages, _ws_id="ws-test")
+
+
+def _build(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Run ``_build_history`` against a stub session, bypassing the
+    verdicts / output-assessment storage round-trip (no tool_calls in
+    these tests, so the indexes are unused anyway).
+    """
+    session = _make_stub_session(messages)
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.server._load_verdict_indexes",
+        return_value=({}, {}),
+    ):
+        return _build_history(session)
+
+
+class TestSourceSurfacing:
+    def test_source_surfaces_when_set(self) -> None:
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "",
+            "_source": "system_nudge",
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert len(history) == 1
+        assert history[0]["source"] == "system_nudge"
+
+    def test_source_absent_when_unset(self) -> None:
+        msg = {"role": "user", "content": "hello"}
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert "source" not in history[0]
+
+
+class TestRemindersWidening:
+    def test_watch_triggered_optional_fields_propagate(self) -> None:
+        """The widened payload (Commit 2) carries watch_name / command /
+        poll_count / max_polls / is_final on each ``watch_triggered``
+        reminder so the frontend renders ``.msg.watch-result``.
+        """
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "",
+            "_source": "system_nudge",
+            "_reminders": [
+                {
+                    "type": "watch_triggered",
+                    "text": "$ ls\nfile.txt",
+                    "watch_name": "w1",
+                    "command": "ls",
+                    "poll_count": 2,
+                    "max_polls": 100,
+                    "is_final": False,
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert history[0]["source"] == "system_nudge"
+        assert history[0]["reminders"] == [
+            {
+                "type": "watch_triggered",
+                "text": "$ ls\nfile.txt",
+                "watch_name": "w1",
+                "command": "ls",
+                "poll_count": 2,
+                "max_polls": 100,
+                "is_final": False,
+            }
+        ]
+
+    def test_legacy_two_field_reminders_still_work(self) -> None:
+        """Producers without optional fields (correction / denial /
+        idle_children) keep the legacy ``{type, text}`` shape — the
+        widened filter just doesn't add anything beyond that."""
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "noted",
+            "_reminders": [{"type": "correction", "text": "watch out"}],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert history[0]["reminders"] == [{"type": "correction", "text": "watch out"}]
+
+    def test_unknown_keys_are_dropped(self) -> None:
+        """The wire-layer filter projects on a known set of keys so a
+        future producer accidentally stuffing arbitrary fields can't
+        leak them through replay.
+        """
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "x",
+            "_reminders": [
+                {
+                    "type": "correction",
+                    "text": "hi",
+                    "secret": "leak-me",
+                    "internal_id": 42,
+                }
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        clean = history[0]["reminders"][0]
+        assert "secret" not in clean
+        assert "internal_id" not in clean
+        assert clean == {"type": "correction", "text": "hi"}
+
+    def test_malformed_reminder_skipped(self) -> None:
+        """A non-dict / empty entry is filtered out instead of breaking
+        the rest of the list (mirrors the defensive filter in
+        ``_apply_reminders_for_provider``).
+        """
+        msg = {
+            "role": "user",
+            "content": "x",
+            "_reminders": [
+                "garbage string",
+                {"type": "", "text": ""},  # empty type + text → drop
+                {"type": "denial", "text": "ok"},
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build([msg])
+        assert history[0]["reminders"] == [{"type": "denial", "text": "ok"}]
+
+
+class _StubRegistry:
+    """Minimal model registry — only ``get_config`` is read by
+    ``_build_history``."""
+
+    def __init__(self, surface_persisted_reasoning: bool = True) -> None:
+        self._cfg = SimpleNamespace(surface_persisted_reasoning=surface_persisted_reasoning)
+
+    def get_config(self, alias: str) -> Any:
+        return self._cfg
+
+
+def _build_with_registry(
+    messages: list[dict[str, Any]],
+    surface_persisted_reasoning: bool = True,
+) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    session = SimpleNamespace(
+        messages=messages,
+        _ws_id="ws-test",
+        _registry=_StubRegistry(surface_persisted_reasoning=surface_persisted_reasoning),
+        _model_alias="claude-opus-4-7",
+    )
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.server._load_verdict_indexes",
+        return_value=({}, {}),
+    ):
+        return _build_history(session)
+
+
+class TestReasoningSurfacing:
+    """Phase 1 — surface stored Anthropic thinking blocks on the
+    history payload so refresh-the-page rehydrates the reasoning bubble.
+    Drives through the real ``AnthropicProvider`` extractor (no mock-of-
+    extractor) — only the model registry is stubbed.
+    """
+
+    def test_reasoning_surfaces_for_anthropic_thinking_msg(self) -> None:
+        msg = {
+            "role": "assistant",
+            "content": "Final answer.",
+            "_provider_content": [
+                {"type": "thinking", "thinking": "let me think", "signature": "s"},
+                {"type": "text", "text": "Final answer."},
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build_with_registry([msg], surface_persisted_reasoning=True)
+        assert len(history) == 1
+        assert history[0]["reasoning"] == "let me think"
+
+    def test_reasoning_empty_when_persist_flag_false(self) -> None:
+        msg = {
+            "role": "assistant",
+            "content": "Final answer.",
+            "_provider_content": [
+                {"type": "thinking", "thinking": "hidden", "signature": "s"},
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build_with_registry([msg], surface_persisted_reasoning=False)
+        assert "reasoning" not in history[0]
+
+    def test_provider_content_never_in_wire_entry(self) -> None:
+        # The build path does not copy ``_provider_content`` into the
+        # entry dict regardless of flag — wire payload stays tight.
+        msg = {
+            "role": "assistant",
+            "content": "Final answer.",
+            "_provider_content": [
+                {"type": "thinking", "thinking": "x", "signature": "s"},
+            ],
+        }
+        history = _build_with_registry([msg], surface_persisted_reasoning=True)
+        assert "_provider_content" not in history[0]
+
+    def test_no_reasoning_field_when_provider_content_missing(self) -> None:
+        msg = {"role": "assistant", "content": "plain answer"}
+        history = _build_with_registry([msg], surface_persisted_reasoning=True)
+        assert "reasoning" not in history[0]
+
+    def test_no_reasoning_field_for_non_assistant_messages(self) -> None:
+        # Defensive — user/tool messages with a stray _provider_content
+        # do not get the reasoning field stamped.
+        msgs: list[dict[str, Any]] = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
+            {
+                "role": "tool",
+                "tool_call_id": "c1",
+                "content": "out",
+                "_provider_content": [{"type": "thinking", "thinking": "leak", "signature": "s"}],
+            },
+        ]
+        history = _build_with_registry(msgs, surface_persisted_reasoning=True)
+        assert "reasoning" not in history[0]
+        assert "reasoning" not in history[1]
+
+    def test_default_true_when_registry_lookup_raises(self) -> None:
+        # Conservative default — Phase 1 spec mandates rehydration on
+        # refresh.  A registry/alias mismatch must not silently kill the
+        # bubble.
+        class BrokenRegistry:
+            def get_config(self, alias: str) -> Any:
+                raise KeyError(alias)
+
+        session = SimpleNamespace(
+            messages=[
+                {
+                    "role": "assistant",
+                    "content": "x",
+                    "_provider_content": [
+                        {"type": "thinking", "thinking": "still works", "signature": "s"}
+                    ],
+                }
+            ],
+            _ws_id="ws-test",
+            _registry=BrokenRegistry(),
+            _model_alias="missing-alias",
+        )
+        with patch(
+            "turnstone.server._load_verdict_indexes",
+            return_value=({}, {}),
+        ):
+            history = _build_history(session)
+        assert history[0]["reasoning"] == "still works"

tests/test_cancel.py

@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ class NullUI:
         self.infos = []
         self.stream_ends = 0
 
+    def on_turn_start(self):
+        pass
+
+    def on_turn_committed(self):
+        pass
+
     def on_thinking_start(self):
         pass
 
@@ -820,3 +826,109 @@ class TestForceCancelThreaded:
         assert "idle" in ui.states
         assistant_msgs = [m for m in session.messages if m["role"] == "assistant"]
         assert any("Fresh response" in m.get("content", "") for m in assistant_msgs)
+
+
+class TestSynthesizeCancelledResults:
+    """Regression coverage for ``_synthesize_cancelled_results`` — must
+    fire ``on_tool_result`` for each synthesized cancellation so live
+    SSE listeners (e.g. coord's ``--running`` indicator added by
+    tool_info) can complete the in-DOM tool batch. Without this, the
+    coord JS would spin the running indicator forever on cancelled
+    batches because ``state_change`` doesn't strip ``--running`` from
+    individual batches."""
+
+    def _ui_with_tool_result_tracking(self):
+        class _TrackingUI(NullUI):
+            def __init__(self) -> None:
+                super().__init__()
+                self.tool_results: list[tuple[str, str, str, bool]] = []
+
+            def on_tool_result(self, call_id, name, output, **kwargs):
+                self.tool_results.append(
+                    (call_id, name, output, bool(kwargs.get("is_error", False))),
+                )
+
+        return _TrackingUI()
+
+    def test_synthesizes_tool_result_for_unanswered_calls(self, tmp_db):
+        ui = self._ui_with_tool_result_tracking()
+        session = _make_session(ui=ui)
+        session.messages.append(
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "calling tools",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "call_a", "function": {"name": "search", "arguments": "{}"}},
+                    {"id": "call_b", "function": {"name": "compute", "arguments": "{}"}},
+                ],
+            },
+        )
+        session._msg_tokens.append(1)
+
+        session._synthesize_cancelled_results("Cancelled by user.")
+
+        # Both unanswered calls fired ``on_tool_result``.
+        assert len(ui.tool_results) == 2
+        ids = {tr[0] for tr in ui.tool_results}
+        assert ids == {"call_a", "call_b"}
+        # All emitted as errors so the live UI renders them as
+        # ``coord-tool-row-result--error``.
+        assert all(tr[3] is True for tr in ui.tool_results)
+        # Reason text propagates as the synthetic tool output.
+        assert all(tr[2] == "Cancelled by user." for tr in ui.tool_results)
+        # And the message list has the synthesized tool entries
+        # (preserves the prior contract).
+        tool_msgs = [m for m in session.messages if m.get("role") == "tool"]
+        assert len(tool_msgs) == 2
+
+    def test_skips_calls_already_answered(self, tmp_db):
+        ui = self._ui_with_tool_result_tracking()
+        session = _make_session(ui=ui)
+        session.messages.append(
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "call_a", "function": {"name": "search", "arguments": "{}"}},
+                    {"id": "call_b", "function": {"name": "compute", "arguments": "{}"}},
+                ],
+            },
+        )
+        session._msg_tokens.append(1)
+        # call_a already answered.
+        session.messages.append(
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": "result"},
+        )
+        session._msg_tokens.append(1)
+
+        session._synthesize_cancelled_results("Cancelled by user.")
+
+        # Only call_b synthesized.
+        assert len(ui.tool_results) == 1
+        assert ui.tool_results[0][0] == "call_b"
+
+    def test_ui_emit_failure_does_not_break_synthesis(self, tmp_db):
+        """The UI hook is wrapped in try/except — a hook failure
+        during cancel must NOT compound the problem. Synthesis still
+        appends to messages + storage."""
+
+        class _ExplodingUI(NullUI):
+            def on_tool_result(self, call_id, name, output, **kwargs):
+                raise RuntimeError("ui hook blew up")
+
+        ui = _ExplodingUI()
+        session = _make_session(ui=ui)
+        session.messages.append(
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "call_a", "function": {"name": "search", "arguments": "{}"}},
+                ],
+            },
+        )
+        session._msg_tokens.append(1)
+
+        # Must not raise.
+        session._synthesize_cancelled_results("Cancelled by user.")
+
+        tool_msgs = [m for m in session.messages if m.get("role") == "tool"]
+        assert len(tool_msgs) == 1

tests/test_chat_session_interactivity_flag.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""ChatSession interactivity flag tests (Phase 9).
+
+Validates that ``ChatSession._is_interactive_for_consent`` is computed
+correctly from ``client_type`` on construction.  This is the front of
+the Phase 9 plumb-through: the flag flows from here to
+``_dispatch_pool_sync`` to the structured-error → pending-consent
+write path.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from tests._session_helpers import make_session
+from turnstone.prompts import INTERACTIVE_CONSENT_CLIENT_TYPES, ClientType
+
+
+def test_web_is_interactive() -> None:
+    s = make_session(client_type=ClientType.WEB)
+    assert s._is_interactive_for_consent is True
+
+
+def test_cli_is_interactive() -> None:
+    s = make_session(client_type=ClientType.CLI)
+    assert s._is_interactive_for_consent is True
+
+
+def test_chat_is_not_interactive() -> None:
+    # Discord / Slack adapters cannot drive a browser redirect from
+    # inside the channel — consent prompts must be deferred to the
+    # dashboard badge.
+    s = make_session(client_type=ClientType.CHAT)
+    assert s._is_interactive_for_consent is False
+
+
+def test_scheduled_is_not_interactive() -> None:
+    # The scheduler runs autonomously; the user isn't online to
+    # complete the OAuth redirect.
+    s = make_session(client_type=ClientType.SCHEDULED)
+    assert s._is_interactive_for_consent is False
+
+
+def test_interactive_set_matches_module_constant() -> None:
+    # Pin the module-level frozenset against the flag computation —
+    # a future reorganisation that drifts the set vs the per-session
+    # logic would silently break the gating.
+    for ct in ClientType:
+        s = make_session(client_type=ct)
+        assert s._is_interactive_for_consent == (ct in INTERACTIVE_CONSENT_CLIENT_TYPES), ct
+
+
+def test_default_client_type_is_cli_interactive() -> None:
+    # Defaults preserved — make_session uses ChatSession's default
+    # which is CLI.  Sanity check that the default user experience
+    # stays interactive-for-consent.
+    s = make_session()
+    assert s._client_type == ClientType.CLI
+    assert s._is_interactive_for_consent is True
+
+
+def test_scheduled_env_file_exists() -> None:
+    """The SCHEDULED env module must exist; otherwise
+    ``compose_system_message`` for a scheduled session would 500."""
+    from turnstone.prompts import _load
+
+    text = _load("env/scheduled.md")
+    assert "Output Environment" in text
+    assert "consent" in text.lower()

tests/test_child_event_bus.py

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`turnstone.core.child_event_bus.ChildEventBus`.
+
+The bus is the in-process wakeup primitive for ``wait_for_workstream``
+(see :mod:`turnstone.console.coordinator_client`).  It's a small dict
+of ws_id → set[threading.Event] under a lock — focused tests for
+register/notify symmetry, no-subscriber notify, multi-waiter fan-out,
+multi-child waiter, and concurrent register/notify (smoke).  End-to-end
+integration with the dispatch sink lives in
+``test_coordinator_adapter.py`` and ``test_coordinator_client.py``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
+
+
+def test_register_returns_event_that_starts_unset() -> None:
+    """A waiter must not see leftover state from before it registered —
+    a fresh wait should always block until the first notify."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    assert isinstance(event, threading.Event)
+    assert not event.is_set()
+
+
+def test_notify_wakes_waiter_on_matching_ws_id() -> None:
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    bus.notify("ws-1")
+    assert event.is_set()
+
+
+def test_notify_does_not_wake_waiter_on_unrelated_ws_id() -> None:
+    """Different ws_ids must keep independent waiter sets — a notify on
+    a stranger ws can't wake the wait or the bus stops being keyed."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    bus.notify("ws-other")
+    assert not event.is_set()
+
+
+def test_notify_with_no_subscribers_is_noop() -> None:
+    """The dispatch sink calls notify on every translated event; the
+    steady state has no wait tool active.  Must not raise."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    bus.notify("ws-nobody-cares")  # no exception
+
+
+def test_multi_waiter_each_gets_independent_event() -> None:
+    """Two waits on the same ws_id must wake independently — clearing
+    one Event must not silence the other."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    e1 = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    e2 = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    assert e1 is not e2
+    bus.notify("ws-1")
+    assert e1.is_set()
+    assert e2.is_set()
+
+
+def test_multi_child_waiter_fires_on_any_listed_ws_id() -> None:
+    """A wait on [A, B, C] returns a single Event registered against
+    all three.  Notify on ANY of A/B/C must wake the wait — the
+    caller's snapshot re-read disambiguates which one changed."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-a", "ws-b", "ws-c"])
+    bus.notify("ws-b")
+    assert event.is_set()
+
+
+def test_unregister_removes_event_from_all_listed_ws_ids() -> None:
+    """After unregister, notify on any of the previously-watched ws_ids
+    must NOT wake the Event — leaks would mean every future notify on
+    that ws_id wakes a long-dead wait."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-a", "ws-b"])
+    bus.unregister_waiter(["ws-a", "ws-b"], event)
+    bus.notify("ws-a")
+    bus.notify("ws-b")
+    assert not event.is_set()
+
+
+def test_unregister_is_idempotent() -> None:
+    """A double-unregister must silently no-op — finally blocks may
+    run twice in odd shutdown paths, the bus must not raise."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    bus.unregister_waiter(["ws-1"], event)
+    bus.unregister_waiter(["ws-1"], event)  # no exception
+
+
+def test_unregister_pops_empty_buckets() -> None:
+    """Empty per-ws_id buckets must be popped so a long-lived bus
+    doesn't accumulate dead keys after many waits have churned through.
+    Reaches into the private state — the property is structural, not
+    behavioral, so the assertion is also."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    assert "ws-1" in bus._waiters
+    bus.unregister_waiter(["ws-1"], event)
+    assert "ws-1" not in bus._waiters
+
+
+def test_unregister_keeps_bucket_with_remaining_waiters() -> None:
+    """Removing one waiter from a multi-waiter bucket must not drop
+    the others — popping the bucket would silently disable notifies
+    for every concurrent wait on the same ws_id."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    e1 = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    e2 = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    bus.unregister_waiter(["ws-1"], e1)
+    bus.notify("ws-1")
+    assert not e1.is_set()
+    assert e2.is_set()
+
+
+def test_empty_and_falsy_ws_ids_are_skipped_on_register() -> None:
+    """Defensive: ``wait_for_workstream`` cleans its inputs but the bus
+    is reachable from other callers in future use; falsy ids should be
+    silently dropped, not registered against an empty-string key."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["", "ws-1", ""])
+    # Only the real ws_id should bucket the waiter.
+    assert list(bus._waiters.keys()) == ["ws-1"]
+    bus.notify("")  # no crash, no spurious wake
+    assert not event.is_set()
+    bus.notify("ws-1")
+    assert event.is_set()
+
+
+def test_notify_wakes_waiter_blocking_on_event_wait() -> None:
+    """End-to-end wake-up latency: a wait blocked on ``Event.wait``
+    must return promptly after a notify on a watched ws_id.  This is
+    the property that retires the 0.5s polling cadence."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    woken_at = [0.0]
+
+    def _waiter() -> None:
+        event.wait(timeout=2.0)
+        woken_at[0] = time.monotonic()
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_waiter, daemon=True)
+    t.start()
+    # Give the waiter a beat to enter Event.wait, then notify.
+    time.sleep(0.05)
+    notified_at = time.monotonic()
+    bus.notify("ws-1")
+    t.join(timeout=1.0)
+    assert not t.is_alive(), "waiter did not wake within 1s of notify"
+    # Latency budget is generous; the contract is "well under the legacy
+    # 0.5s poll cadence", not microsecond timing.
+    assert woken_at[0] - notified_at < 0.2
+
+
+def test_clear_before_check_race_does_not_lose_wake() -> None:
+    """The wait-loop pattern is ``clear(); snapshot(); ...; wait()``.
+    A notify between clear and wait must leave the Event set, so the
+    next wait returns immediately and the loop re-snapshots.  Same
+    standard subscribe/check race the wait loop guards against."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    # Simulate wait-loop ordering: clear, then notify "between" clear
+    # and the next wait.
+    event.clear()
+    bus.notify("ws-1")
+    # The next wait must return True immediately (set is sticky until
+    # the next clear).
+    assert event.wait(timeout=0.1) is True
+
+
+def test_concurrent_register_and_notify_is_safe() -> None:
+    """Smoke test: many threads registering / notifying / unregistering
+    in parallel must not raise or deadlock.  Doesn't assert specific
+    interleavings — only structural safety of the lock discipline."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    stop = threading.Event()
+    errors: list[BaseException] = []
+
+    def _worker(ws_id: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            for _ in range(200):
+                if stop.is_set():
+                    return
+                ev = bus.register_waiter([ws_id])
+                bus.notify(ws_id)
+                bus.unregister_waiter([ws_id], ev)
+        except BaseException as e:  # noqa: BLE001
+            errors.append(e)
+
+    threads = [threading.Thread(target=_worker, args=(f"ws-{i}",), daemon=True) for i in range(8)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join(timeout=5.0)
+    stop.set()
+    assert not errors, f"worker threads raised: {errors!r}"
+    # All buckets should have been popped (every register paired with
+    # unregister).
+    assert bus._waiters == {}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("ws_id", ["", None])
+def test_notify_silently_ignores_falsy_ws_id(ws_id: object) -> None:
+    """Defensive: the dispatch sink already guards against empty
+    ws_ids, but a falsy slip-through must not raise."""
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-1"])
+    bus.notify(ws_id)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    assert not event.is_set()

tests/test_child_source.py

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+"""Unit tests for :mod:`turnstone.core.child_source`.
+
+Covers both strategies in isolation against fakes — no live collector,
+no live SessionManager. Adapter-level integration coverage continues to
+live in ``test_coordinator_adapter.py``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import time
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+
+from turnstone.core.child_source import ClusterChildSource, SameNodeChildSource
+from turnstone.core.children_registry import ChildrenRegistry
+from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamState
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    import queue
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# SameNodeChildSource
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _FakeManager:
+    """Minimal SessionManager stand-in implementing the subscribe API."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.subscribers: list[Any] = []
+
+    def subscribe_to_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        self.subscribers.append(callback)
+
+    def unsubscribe_from_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
+            self.subscribers.remove(callback)
+
+    def fire(self, ws_id: str, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+        for cb in self.subscribers:
+            cb(ws_id, state)
+
+
+class TestSameNodeChildSource:
+    def test_start_subscribes_to_manager(self) -> None:
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = SameNodeChildSource(mgr, registry)
+        sink_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        src.start(sink=sink_calls.append)
+        assert len(mgr.subscribers) == 1
+
+    def test_state_change_for_known_child_pushes_to_sink(self) -> None:
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        registry.install("p1", object())
+        registry.add_child("p1", "c1")
+        src = SameNodeChildSource(mgr, registry)
+        sink_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        src.start(sink=sink_calls.append)
+
+        mgr.fire("c1", WorkstreamState.RUNNING)
+
+        assert len(sink_calls) == 1
+        ev = sink_calls[0]
+        assert ev["type"] == "cluster_state"
+        assert ev["ws_id"] == "c1"
+        assert ev["state"] == "running"
+
+    def test_state_change_for_unknown_workstream_is_dropped(self) -> None:
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = SameNodeChildSource(mgr, registry)
+        sink_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        src.start(sink=sink_calls.append)
+
+        # No registry entry — pre-filter drops the event without
+        # invoking the sink.
+        mgr.fire("ws-unknown", WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert sink_calls == []
+
+    def test_shutdown_unsubscribes(self) -> None:
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = SameNodeChildSource(mgr, registry)
+        src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+        assert len(mgr.subscribers) == 1
+        src.shutdown()
+        assert mgr.subscribers == []
+
+    def test_start_is_idempotent(self) -> None:
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = SameNodeChildSource(mgr, registry)
+        src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+        src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+        # Second start is a no-op; only one subscription.
+        assert len(mgr.subscribers) == 1
+
+    def test_sink_exception_does_not_propagate(self) -> None:
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        registry.install("p1", object())
+        registry.add_child("p1", "c1")
+        src = SameNodeChildSource(mgr, registry)
+
+        def bad_sink(ev: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+            raise RuntimeError("sink boom")
+
+        src.start(sink=bad_sink)
+        # Should not raise — the strategy catches sink failures and logs.
+        mgr.fire("c1", WorkstreamState.RUNNING)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# ClusterChildSource
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _FakeCollector:
+    """Minimal ClusterCollector stand-in providing the listener API."""
+
+    def __init__(self, snapshot: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> None:
+        self._snapshot = snapshot or {"nodes": []}
+        self.queues: list[queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]]] = []
+        self.unregistered: list[queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]]] = []
+
+    def get_snapshot_and_register(self, q: queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        self.queues.append(q)
+        return self._snapshot
+
+    def unregister_listener(self, q: queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]]) -> None:
+        self.unregistered.append(q)
+
+    def emit(self, event: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        """Push an event to all registered listener queues."""
+        for q in self.queues:
+            q.put(event)
+
+
+class TestClusterChildSource:
+    def test_start_subscribes_to_collector(self) -> None:
+        coll = _FakeCollector()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = ClusterChildSource(
+            collector=coll,
+            registry=registry,
+            parents_provider=list,
+        )
+        try:
+            src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+            assert len(coll.queues) == 1
+        finally:
+            src.shutdown()
+
+    def test_start_primes_registry_from_snapshot(self) -> None:
+        snapshot = {
+            "nodes": [
+                {
+                    "workstreams": [
+                        {"id": "c1", "parent_ws_id": "p1"},
+                        {"id": "c2", "parent_ws_id": "p1"},
+                        # Unknown parent — dropped
+                        {"id": "x", "parent_ws_id": "p-unknown"},
+                    ],
+                },
+            ],
+        }
+        coll = _FakeCollector(snapshot)
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        registry.install("p1", object())
+        src = ClusterChildSource(
+            collector=coll,
+            registry=registry,
+            parents_provider=lambda: ["p1"],
+        )
+        try:
+            src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+            assert set(registry.children_of("p1")) == {"c1", "c2"}
+            assert registry.parent_for("x") is None
+        finally:
+            src.shutdown()
+
+    def test_event_dispatched_to_sink(self) -> None:
+        coll = _FakeCollector()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = ClusterChildSource(
+            collector=coll,
+            registry=registry,
+            parents_provider=list,
+        )
+        sink_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+        try:
+            src.start(sink=sink_calls.append)
+            coll.emit({"type": "cluster_state", "ws_id": "c1", "state": "running"})
+            # Daemon thread loop has 1.0s queue timeout; poll briefly.
+            for _ in range(20):
+                if sink_calls:
+                    break
+                time.sleep(0.05)
+            assert len(sink_calls) == 1
+            assert sink_calls[0]["ws_id"] == "c1"
+        finally:
+            src.shutdown()
+
+    def test_shutdown_unregisters_and_joins_thread(self) -> None:
+        coll = _FakeCollector()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = ClusterChildSource(
+            collector=coll,
+            registry=registry,
+            parents_provider=list,
+        )
+        src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+        src.shutdown()
+        assert coll.unregistered == coll.queues
+        # Second shutdown is a no-op (idempotent).
+        src.shutdown()
+
+    def test_start_is_idempotent(self) -> None:
+        coll = _FakeCollector()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = ClusterChildSource(
+            collector=coll,
+            registry=registry,
+            parents_provider=list,
+        )
+        try:
+            src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+            src.start(sink=lambda ev: None)
+            assert len(coll.queues) == 1
+        finally:
+            src.shutdown()
+
+    def test_sink_exception_does_not_kill_thread(self) -> None:
+        coll = _FakeCollector()
+        registry = ChildrenRegistry()
+        src = ClusterChildSource(
+            collector=coll,
+            registry=registry,
+            parents_provider=list,
+        )
+        survived_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        call_count = [0]
+
+        def flaky_sink(ev: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+            call_count[0] += 1
+            if call_count[0] == 1:
+                raise RuntimeError("first one boom")
+            survived_calls.append(ev)
+
+        try:
+            src.start(sink=flaky_sink)
+            coll.emit({"type": "cluster_state", "ws_id": "c1", "state": "x"})
+            coll.emit({"type": "cluster_state", "ws_id": "c2", "state": "y"})
+            for _ in range(40):
+                if survived_calls:
+                    break
+                time.sleep(0.05)
+            assert len(survived_calls) == 1
+            assert survived_calls[0]["ws_id"] == "c2"
+        finally:
+            src.shutdown()
+
+
+# Multi-subscriber observer tests for ``SessionManager.subscribe_to_state``
+# / ``unsubscribe_from_state`` live in ``test_session_manager.py`` where
+# the proper FakeAdapter / FakeStorage construction helpers already exist.

tests/test_children_registry.py

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`turnstone.core.children_registry.ChildrenRegistry`.
+
+The registry was lifted from ``CoordinatorAdapter`` in Stage 3 Step 1.
+Adapter-level coverage for the integrated behavior already lives in
+``test_coordinator_adapter.py``; this file pins the data structure
+invariants in isolation so the registry can be reused by future
+``ChildSource`` strategies (Step 2) without re-deriving the behavior
+from the adapter test surface.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.children_registry import ChildrenRegistry
+
+
+class _Sentinel:
+    """Lightweight UI stand-in; identity-comparable, no behavior."""
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def registry() -> ChildrenRegistry:
+    return ChildrenRegistry()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# install / uninstall
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestInstallUninstall:
+    def test_install_seeds_empty_child_set_and_presence(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        ui = _Sentinel()
+        registry.install("p1", ui)
+        assert registry.children_of("p1") == []
+        assert registry.ui_for("p1") is ui
+        assert registry.parents() == ["p1"]
+
+    def test_install_is_idempotent_repoints_ui_keeps_children(
+        self, registry: ChildrenRegistry
+    ) -> None:
+        ui_a = _Sentinel()
+        ui_b = _Sentinel()
+        registry.install("p1", ui_a)
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1", "c2"])
+        registry.install("p1", ui_b)
+        assert registry.ui_for("p1") is ui_b
+        assert set(registry.children_of("p1")) == {"c1", "c2"}
+
+    def test_uninstall_clears_forward_reverse_and_presence(
+        self, registry: ChildrenRegistry
+    ) -> None:
+        ui = _Sentinel()
+        registry.install("p1", ui)
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1", "c2"])
+        registry.uninstall("p1")
+        assert registry.children_of("p1") == []
+        assert registry.ui_for("p1") is None
+        assert registry.parents() == []
+        assert registry.parent_for("c1") is None
+        assert registry.parent_for("c2") is None
+
+    def test_uninstall_unknown_parent_is_noop(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        registry.uninstall("never-installed")  # must not raise
+
+    def test_uninstall_does_not_clobber_other_parents(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        registry.install("p1", _Sentinel())
+        registry.install("p2", _Sentinel())
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1"])
+        registry.merge_children("p2", ["c2"])
+        registry.uninstall("p1")
+        assert registry.parent_for("c1") is None
+        assert registry.parent_for("c2") == "p2"
+        assert registry.parents() == ["p2"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# add_child — atomic check-and-route
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestAddChild:
+    def test_add_child_returns_ui_on_success(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        ui = _Sentinel()
+        registry.install("p1", ui)
+        assert registry.add_child("p1", "c1") is ui
+        assert registry.parent_for("c1") == "p1"
+        assert registry.children_of("p1") == ["c1"]
+
+    def test_add_child_returns_none_when_parent_not_installed(
+        self, registry: ChildrenRegistry
+    ) -> None:
+        assert registry.add_child("absent", "c1") is None
+        assert registry.parent_for("c1") is None
+
+    def test_add_child_returns_none_on_duplicate(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        ui = _Sentinel()
+        registry.install("p1", ui)
+        assert registry.add_child("p1", "c1") is ui
+        # second add for same child returns None — caller must not
+        # double-dispatch.
+        assert registry.add_child("p1", "c1") is None
+        assert registry.children_of("p1") == ["c1"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# merge_children — bulk seeding
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestMergeChildren:
+    def test_merge_seeds_forward_and_reverse(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1", "c2", "c3"])
+        assert set(registry.children_of("p1")) == {"c1", "c2", "c3"}
+        for cid in ("c1", "c2", "c3"):
+            assert registry.parent_for(cid) == "p1"
+
+    def test_merge_is_idempotent(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1"])
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1"])
+        assert registry.children_of("p1") == ["c1"]
+
+    def test_merge_skips_empty_or_falsy_ids(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["", "c1", "", "c2"])
+        assert set(registry.children_of("p1")) == {"c1", "c2"}
+
+    def test_merge_does_not_require_install(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        # Snapshot-priming may run before the parent's install fires —
+        # the merge still seeds the forward set so the install picks
+        # the children up. (Storage-seeded rebuild relies on this.)
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1"])
+        assert registry.children_of("p1") == ["c1"]
+        # ui_for is still None because install hasn't run
+        assert registry.ui_for("p1") is None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Lookups — return copies, not live refs
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestLookups:
+    def test_children_of_returns_copy(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        registry.install("p1", _Sentinel())
+        registry.merge_children("p1", ["c1", "c2"])
+        snap = registry.children_of("p1")
+        snap.append("c3-injected")
+        assert "c3-injected" not in registry.children_of("p1")
+
+    def test_children_of_unknown_parent_returns_empty(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        assert registry.children_of("absent") == []
+
+    def test_parent_for_unknown_child_returns_none(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        assert registry.parent_for("absent") is None
+
+    def test_parents_returns_copy(self, registry: ChildrenRegistry) -> None:
+        registry.install("p1", _Sentinel())
+        snap = registry.parents()
+        snap.append("p2-injected")
+        assert "p2-injected" not in registry.parents()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Concurrency — concurrent add_child must not exceed the unique-set
+# invariant or leave a half-installed reverse-index entry.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestConcurrency:
+    def test_concurrent_add_child_returns_ui_exactly_once_per_unique(
+        self, registry: ChildrenRegistry
+    ) -> None:
+        ui = _Sentinel()
+        registry.install("p1", ui)
+        results: list[object] = []
+        results_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        def attempt_add(child_id: str) -> None:
+            r = registry.add_child("p1", child_id)
+            with results_lock:
+                results.append(r)
+
+        threads = [threading.Thread(target=attempt_add, args=("c1",)) for _ in range(20)]
+        for t in threads:
+            t.start()
+        for t in threads:
+            t.join()
+
+        # Exactly one thread sees the UI; the remaining 19 see None
+        # (duplicate). The forward + reverse indexes carry exactly one
+        # entry for c1.
+        successes = [r for r in results if r is ui]
+        nones = [r for r in results if r is None]
+        assert len(successes) == 1
+        assert len(nones) == 19
+        assert registry.children_of("p1") == ["c1"]
+        assert registry.parent_for("c1") == "p1"
+
+    def test_concurrent_install_and_add_child_no_resurrect(
+        self, registry: ChildrenRegistry
+    ) -> None:
+        # add_child racing with uninstall: either lands first (registry
+        # populated) or the parent is gone (returns None). Must NOT
+        # leave a forward-set entry without presence — that would be
+        # the "resurrected after close" leak the locked dispatch path
+        # was guarding against.
+        ui = _Sentinel()
+        registry.install("p1", ui)
+
+        outcomes: list[object] = []
+
+        def adder() -> None:
+            outcomes.append(registry.add_child("p1", "c1"))
+
+        def uninstaller() -> None:
+            registry.uninstall("p1")
+
+        threads = [
+            threading.Thread(target=adder),
+            threading.Thread(target=uninstaller),
+        ]
+        for t in threads:
+            t.start()
+        for t in threads:
+            t.join()
+
+        # If add_child landed first: c1 is in the forward set, then
+        # uninstall clears everything. End state: nothing.
+        # If uninstall landed first: add_child sees no presence,
+        # returns None, no entry added. End state: nothing.
+        # Either way, the leak invariant holds: child set is empty or
+        # parent is gone, never "child set populated but no presence".
+        children = registry.children_of("p1")
+        ui_present = registry.ui_for("p1") is not None
+        if children:
+            assert ui_present, "registry leaked: children set without presence"

tests/test_close_reason_persistence.py

@@ -30,9 +30,25 @@ def _full_hdr() -> dict[str, str]:
     }
 
 
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _isolate_metrics(monkeypatch):
+    """Swap ``turnstone.server._metrics`` for a fresh collector
+    per-test, with auto-restore.
+
+    Bare ``srv_mod._metrics = MetricsCollector()`` (the prior
+    pattern) leaks into any test file that already bound the name
+    via ``from turnstone.server import _metrics`` at import time —
+    those tests' patches then operate on a different instance from
+    the one the live ``_publish_models_metadata`` reads, and the
+    monkeypatch silently no-ops.  ``monkeypatch.setattr`` restores
+    after the test, so the leak is contained.
+    """
+    fresh = MetricsCollector()
+    fresh.model = "test-model"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(srv_mod, "_metrics", fresh)
+
+
 def _make_app(storage: Any) -> TestClient:
-    srv_mod._metrics = MetricsCollector()
-    srv_mod._metrics.model = "test-model"
     mock_session = MagicMock()
     mock_ws = MagicMock()
     mock_ws.id = "ws-target"

tests/test_console.py

@@ -3,11 +3,13 @@
 import asyncio
 import json
 import queue
+from typing import Any
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock
 
 import pytest
 
 from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector, NodeSnapshot
+from turnstone.console.server import _PROXY_AUTH_LOCAL_HANDLERS
 
 # Shared test auth — JWT-based
 _TEST_JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
@@ -149,6 +151,78 @@ class TestCollectorDiscovery:
         assert c._nodes["node-a"].started == 1234567890.0
 
 
+class TestCollectorNotifyWireIn:
+    """NotifyDispatcher-driven discovery — reactive node visibility."""
+
+    def test_start_subscribes_to_services_channel(self):
+        # Stub dispatcher records subscriptions without spawning threads.
+        class _StubDispatcher:
+            def __init__(self):
+                self.subscriptions: list[tuple[str, Any]] = []
+
+            def subscribe(self, channel, handler):
+                self.subscriptions.append((channel, handler))
+                return lambda: None
+
+        stub = _StubDispatcher()
+        storage = MockStorage()
+        c = ClusterCollector(
+            storage=storage,
+            discovery_interval=999,
+            notify_dispatcher=stub,
+        )
+        try:
+            c.start()
+            assert len(stub.subscriptions) == 1
+            channel, handler = stub.subscriptions[0]
+            assert channel == "services"
+            assert handler == c._on_services_notify
+        finally:
+            c.stop()
+
+    def test_no_dispatcher_means_no_subscribe(self):
+        # Collector without a dispatcher (single-node / SQLite dev) just
+        # falls back to the 60 s discovery-loop polling — no error.
+        c = _make_collector(MockStorage())
+        try:
+            c.start()
+            assert c._notify_unsubscribe is None
+        finally:
+            c.stop()
+
+    def test_on_notify_runs_discovery(self):
+        # Construct a synthetic Notify and invoke the handler directly —
+        # asserts the wire-in delegates back to ``_discover_nodes``.
+        from turnstone.core.storage._notify import Notify
+
+        storage = MockStorage()
+        c = _make_collector(storage)
+        c._running = True  # bypass start() so we don't spawn threads
+        q: queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        storage.services = [
+            {"service_id": "node-z", "url": "http://z:8080", "metadata": "{}"},
+        ]
+        c._on_services_notify(Notify(channel="services", payload="{}", pid=0))
+
+        event = q.get_nowait()
+        assert event["type"] == "node_joined"
+        assert event["node_id"] == "node-z"
+
+    def test_on_notify_when_not_running_is_noop(self):
+        # If a stray notify arrives after stop, the handler doesn't run
+        # discovery on a half-torn-down collector.
+        from turnstone.core.storage._notify import Notify
+
+        storage = MockStorage()
+        storage.services = [{"service_id": "node-y", "url": "http://y:8080", "metadata": "{}"}]
+        c = _make_collector(storage)
+        # _running stays False (never called start()).
+        c._on_services_notify(Notify(channel="services", payload="{}", pid=0))
+        assert c.get_overview()["nodes"] == 0
+
+
 class TestCollectorSnapshot:
     """Applying node_snapshot SSE events."""
 
@@ -314,6 +388,46 @@ class TestCollectorSnapshot:
         assert event["ws_id"] == "ws1"
         assert event["state"] == "running"
 
+    def test_apply_snapshot_state_change_does_not_carry_pending_approval_detail(self):
+        """Stage 3 cleanup — the snapshot-resync cluster_state event no
+        longer piggybacks ``pending_approval_detail`` (the field is
+        gone from cluster_state entirely). On reconnect the browser's
+        bulk fetch — triggered by the ``activity_state="approval"``
+        transition in the reducer — pulls the items directly from
+        ``ui.serialize_pending_approval_detail()`` via the dashboard
+        endpoint."""
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(
+            node_id="node-a",
+            server_url="http://a:8080",
+            workstreams={"ws1": {"id": "ws1", "name": "same", "state": "idle"}},
+        )
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        c._apply_snapshot(
+            "node-a",
+            {
+                "type": "node_snapshot",
+                "node_id": "node-a",
+                "workstreams": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "ws1",
+                        "name": "same",
+                        "state": "running",
+                        "activity_state": "approval",
+                    }
+                ],
+                "health": {},
+                "aggregate": {},
+            },
+        )
+
+        event = q.get_nowait()
+        assert event["type"] == "cluster_state"
+        assert event["activity_state"] == "approval"
+        assert "pending_approval_detail" not in event
+
     def test_apply_snapshot_skips_empty_id_workstream(self):
         c = _make_collector()
         c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(node_id="node-a", server_url="http://a:8080")
@@ -359,6 +473,36 @@ class TestCollectorDelta:
         # Verify in-memory state was updated
         assert c._nodes["node-a"].workstreams["ws1"]["state"] == "running"
 
+    def test_apply_delta_ws_state_does_not_carry_pending_approval_detail(self):
+        """Stage 3 cleanup — ``cluster_state`` no longer carries the
+        ``pending_approval_detail`` piggyback. Approval items now arrive
+        via bulk fetch on activity_state transition; verdicts via the
+        explicit ``intent_verdict`` event class. Symmetric event flow,
+        no piggyback to dedupe against."""
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(
+            node_id="node-a",
+            server_url="http://a:8080",
+            workstreams={"ws1": {"id": "ws1", "name": "test", "state": "idle"}},
+        )
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        c._apply_delta(
+            "node-a",
+            {
+                "type": "ws_state",
+                "ws_id": "ws1",
+                "state": "running",
+                "activity_state": "approval",
+            },
+        )
+
+        event = q.get_nowait()
+        assert event["type"] == "cluster_state"
+        assert event["activity_state"] == "approval"
+        assert "pending_approval_detail" not in event
+
     def test_apply_delta_ws_created(self):
         c = _make_collector()
         c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(node_id="node-a", server_url="http://a:8080")
@@ -404,6 +548,139 @@ class TestCollectorDelta:
         assert event["name"] == "new-name"
         assert c._nodes["node-a"].workstreams["ws1"]["name"] == "new-name"
 
+    def test_apply_delta_intent_verdict_forwards_verbatim(self):
+        """Stage 3 Step 5 — node-emitted intent_verdict events flow
+        through _apply_delta to cluster fan-out so coord adapters can
+        re-emit as child_ws_intent_verdict on the parent's SSE."""
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(
+            node_id="node-a",
+            server_url="http://a:8080",
+            workstreams={"ws1": {"id": "ws1", "name": "test", "state": "idle"}},
+        )
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        verdict = {
+            "call_id": "c1",
+            "risk_level": "low",
+            "confidence": 0.9,
+            "recommendation": "approve",
+        }
+        c._apply_delta(
+            "node-a",
+            {"type": "intent_verdict", "ws_id": "ws1", "verdict": verdict},
+        )
+
+        event = q.get_nowait()
+        assert event["type"] == "intent_verdict"
+        assert event["ws_id"] == "ws1"
+        assert event["node_id"] == "node-a"
+        assert event["verdict"] == verdict
+
+    def test_apply_delta_intent_verdict_drops_when_ws_id_missing(self):
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(node_id="node-a", server_url="http://a:8080")
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        c._apply_delta("node-a", {"type": "intent_verdict", "verdict": {}})
+
+        assert q.empty()
+
+    def test_apply_delta_approval_resolved_forwards_verbatim(self):
+        """Stage 3 Step 5 — paired with intent_verdict; clears the
+        coord tree's pending-approval pill in lockstep with the
+        actual decision rather than waiting for the state-change
+        piggyback."""
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(
+            node_id="node-a",
+            server_url="http://a:8080",
+            workstreams={"ws1": {"id": "ws1", "name": "test", "state": "idle"}},
+        )
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        c._apply_delta(
+            "node-a",
+            {
+                "type": "approval_resolved",
+                "ws_id": "ws1",
+                "approved": True,
+                "feedback": "lgtm",
+                "always": False,
+            },
+        )
+
+        event = q.get_nowait()
+        assert event["type"] == "approval_resolved"
+        assert event["ws_id"] == "ws1"
+        assert event["node_id"] == "node-a"
+        assert event["approved"] is True
+        assert event["feedback"] == "lgtm"
+        assert event["always"] is False
+
+    def test_apply_delta_approve_request_forwards_detail(self):
+        """Push path for the initial approval items — eliminates the
+        bulk-fetch race that left the coord row stuck on a loading
+        placeholder when the bulk fetch landed in the gap between
+        _emit_state(ATTENTION) and approve_tools setting _pending_approval."""
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(
+            node_id="node-a",
+            server_url="http://a:8080",
+            workstreams={"ws1": {"id": "ws1", "name": "test", "state": "idle"}},
+        )
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        detail = {
+            "type": "approve_request",
+            "items": [{"call_id": "c1", "header": "tool x"}],
+            "judge_pending": True,
+        }
+        c._apply_delta(
+            "node-a",
+            {"type": "approve_request", "ws_id": "ws1", "detail": detail},
+        )
+
+        event = q.get_nowait()
+        assert event["type"] == "approve_request"
+        assert event["ws_id"] == "ws1"
+        assert event["node_id"] == "node-a"
+        assert event["detail"] == detail
+
+    def test_apply_delta_approve_request_drops_when_ws_id_missing(self):
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(node_id="node-a", server_url="http://a:8080")
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        c._apply_delta("node-a", {"type": "approve_request", "detail": {}})
+
+        assert q.empty()
+
+    def test_apply_delta_approval_resolved_coerces_missing_fields(self):
+        """Defensive: ``approved`` / ``always`` / ``feedback`` may be
+        omitted by older nodes mid-rolling-upgrade; collector coerces
+        to safe defaults."""
+        c = _make_collector()
+        c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(
+            node_id="node-a",
+            server_url="http://a:8080",
+            workstreams={"ws1": {"id": "ws1", "name": "test", "state": "idle"}},
+        )
+        q: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue()
+        c.register_listener(q)
+
+        c._apply_delta("node-a", {"type": "approval_resolved", "ws_id": "ws1"})
+
+        event = q.get_nowait()
+        assert event["approved"] is False
+        assert event["feedback"] == ""
+        assert event["always"] is False
+
     def test_apply_delta_health_changed(self):
         c = _make_collector()
         c._nodes["node-a"] = NodeSnapshot(
@@ -1286,6 +1563,142 @@ class TestConsoleProxy:
             assert sse_mock.await_count == 1
             assert sse_mock.await_args.kwargs.get("use_service_auth") is False
 
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Proxied auth endpoints — handled locally by the console, not
+    # forwarded to the upstream node.  Cases derive directly from
+    # ``_PROXY_AUTH_LOCAL_HANDLERS`` so a new dispatch entry can't be
+    # added without a matching test (or vice versa).  See proxy_api's
+    # docstring for the JWT-audience reasoning.
+    # -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        ("method", "path", "handler_name"),
+        [
+            (method, path, handler_name)
+            for (method, path), handler_name in sorted(_PROXY_AUTH_LOCAL_HANDLERS.items())
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_proxy_auth_endpoint_dispatches_to_local_handler(
+        self, client, method, path, handler_name
+    ):
+        """Every entry in ``_PROXY_AUTH_LOCAL_HANDLERS`` must route to its
+        local console handler and never reach the upstream proxy.  The
+        lockout class of bug this dispatch was added to fix is exactly
+        what a regression here would reintroduce silently — covering all
+        eight branches keeps each path tied to its handler."""
+        from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
+
+        from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
+
+        with (
+            patch(
+                f"turnstone.console.server.{handler_name}",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+                return_value=JSONResponse({"status": "ok"}),
+            ) as local_mock,
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.console.server._proxy_post",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+                return_value=JSONResponse({"status": "should-not-be-called"}),
+            ) as post_mock,
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.console.server._proxy_get",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+                return_value=JSONResponse({"status": "should-not-be-called"}),
+            ) as get_mock,
+        ):
+            resp = client.request(method, f"/node/node-a/v1/api/{path}")
+            assert resp.status_code == 200
+            assert local_mock.await_count == 1
+            assert post_mock.await_count == 0
+            assert get_mock.await_count == 0
+
+    def test_proxy_auth_login_works_without_cookie(self, mock_collector):
+        """Without this fix the AuthMiddleware 401s before any handler
+        runs — the user is locked out of the proxied UI once the cookie
+        expires.  Test bypasses _TEST_AUTH_HEADERS to reproduce."""
+        from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
+
+        from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
+        from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+        from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
+
+        _load_static()
+        app = create_app(collector=mock_collector, jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET)
+        unauth_client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        try:
+            with patch(
+                "turnstone.console.server.auth_login",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+                return_value=JSONResponse({"status": "ok"}),
+            ) as local_mock:
+                resp = unauth_client.post(
+                    "/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/login",
+                    json={"username": "x", "password": "y"},
+                )
+                # AuthMiddleware must classify the proxied login path as
+                # public (is_public_path change) AND proxy_api must
+                # dispatch to the local handler (proxy_api change).
+                assert resp.status_code == 200, (
+                    f"login locked out: got {resp.status_code}, body={resp.text}"
+                )
+                assert local_mock.await_count == 1
+        finally:
+            unauth_client.close()
+
+    def test_proxy_auth_wrong_method_returns_405_not_forwarded(self, client):
+        """A non-canonical method on an auth path (e.g. PUT on auth/login)
+        must short-circuit with 405 instead of falling through to the
+        upstream proxy — falling through would forward the request
+        authenticated as the console's service token (``_proxy_auth_headers``
+        fallback)."""
+        from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
+
+        from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
+
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.console.server._proxy_post",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+                return_value=JSONResponse({"status": "should-not-be-called"}),
+            ) as post_mock,
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.console.server._proxy_get",
+                new_callable=AsyncMock,
+                return_value=JSONResponse({"status": "should-not-be-called"}),
+            ) as get_mock,
+        ):
+            # PUT on a POST-only auth path → 405
+            put_resp = client.put("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/login")
+            assert put_resp.status_code == 405
+            # POST on a GET-only auth path → 405
+            post_resp = client.post("/node/node-a/v1/api/auth/status")
+            assert post_resp.status_code == 405
+            assert post_mock.await_count == 0
+            assert get_mock.await_count == 0
+
+    def test_proxy_non_auth_endpoint_still_forwarded(self, client, mock_collector):
+        """Sanity: only auth/* paths intercept.  Other API paths still
+        forward to the upstream node."""
+        from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
+
+        from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
+
+        mock_collector.get_node_detail.return_value = {
+            "node_id": "node-a",
+            "server_url": "http://a:8080",
+            "reachable": True,
+        }
+        with patch(
+            "turnstone.console.server._proxy_get",
+            new_callable=AsyncMock,
+            return_value=JSONResponse({"ok": True}),
+        ) as proxy_mock:
+            resp = client.get("/node/node-a/v1/api/workstreams")
+            assert resp.status_code == 200
+            assert proxy_mock.await_count == 1
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Proxy URL rewriting unit tests (no HTTP needed)
@@ -1309,11 +1722,62 @@ class TestProxyRewriting:
         assert "window.fetch" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
         assert "window.EventSource" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
 
-    def test_console_banner_contains_placeholder(self):
-        from turnstone.console.server import _CONSOLE_BANNER_TEMPLATE
+    def test_js_shim_carries_node_id_placeholder(self):
+        """The picker reads the current node_id from the shim's _nodeId
+        closure variable; the placeholder must be present and substitutable."""
+        from turnstone.console.server import _JS_PROXY_SHIM
 
-        assert "NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER" in _CONSOLE_BANNER_TEMPLATE
-        assert "Console" in _CONSOLE_BANNER_TEMPLATE
+        assert "NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+        replaced = _JS_PROXY_SHIM.replace("NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER", "node-a")
+        assert "node-a" in replaced
+        assert "NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER" not in replaced
+
+    def test_js_shim_includes_picker_pieces(self):
+        """Picker logic ships in the same IIFE as the prefix shim — verify
+        the moving parts are present so a future refactor doesn't silently
+        drop them.  /v1/api/cluster/nodes is the lazy-fetch target;
+        #ui-header is the DOM anchor; console-node-pill is the trigger
+        class; ws-tab-dropdown is the menu shell we share with the
+        workstream chevron menu (style + behaviour parity); ArrowDown is
+        the keyboard-nav primitive that disambiguates this from a plain
+        click-only menu."""
+        from turnstone.console.server import _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+
+        # limit=1000 matches the collector's hard cap; without it the
+        # picker would silently drop nodes past the 100-default in
+        # clusters with >100 nodes.
+        assert "/v1/api/cluster/nodes?limit=1000" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+        assert "ui-header" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+        assert "console-node-pill" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+        assert "ws-tab-dropdown" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+        assert "ArrowDown" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+        assert "DOMContentLoaded" in _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+
+    def test_proxy_style_drops_banner_styles(self):
+        """The legacy banner CSS classes (.console-banner, .ts-header-back-link
+        offsets, .dashboard-overlay top:32px hack) should be gone — the new
+        picker lives inside #ui-header and doesn't need overlay offsets."""
+        from turnstone.console.server import _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE
+
+        assert ".console-banner" not in _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE
+        assert "dashboard-overlay" not in _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE
+        assert ".console-node-pill" in _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE
+        assert ".console-node-menu" in _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE
+
+    def test_proxy_style_uses_canonical_degraded_color(self):
+        """Degraded health dot must use --accent (the canonical "needs
+        attention" token used by the cluster-overview node table at
+        console/static/style.css:548) and not --yellow.  Yellow is reserved
+        for the dash-state attention dot, a stronger signal."""
+        from turnstone.console.server import _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE
+
+        assert "console-node-menu-item-dot--degraded" in _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE
+        # The degraded rule sits on its own line; assert it uses --accent
+        # by checking the CSS substring has --accent and not --yellow.
+        idx = _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE.find("console-node-menu-item-dot--degraded")
+        rule = _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE[idx : idx + 200]
+        assert "var(--accent)" in rule
+        assert "var(--yellow)" not in rule
 
     def test_html_rewriting_changes_static_paths(self):
         """Simulate the proxy_index rewriting logic."""
@@ -1330,16 +1794,24 @@ class TestProxyRewriting:
         assert 'href="/static/' not in rewritten
         assert 'src="/static/' not in rewritten
 
-    def test_banner_injection_after_body(self):
-        """Simulate the banner injection logic."""
-        from turnstone.console.server import _CONSOLE_BANNER_TEMPLATE
+    def test_shim_injection_after_body(self):
+        """Simulate the proxy shim injection — the shim ships the node-id
+        and prefix as JS literals and renders the picker at runtime, so
+        we assert the substituted JS literals land in the page."""
+        from turnstone.console.server import _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE, _JS_PROXY_SHIM
 
         sample_html = "<html><body><div>content</div></body></html>"
-        banner = _CONSOLE_BANNER_TEMPLATE.replace("NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER", "node-a")
-        result = sample_html.replace("<body>", "<body>" + banner, 1)
-        assert "node-a" in result
-        assert "Console" in result
-        assert result.startswith("<html><body><div")
+        prefix = "/node/node-a"
+        shim_js = _JS_PROXY_SHIM.replace('"PREFIX_PLACEHOLDER"', json.dumps(prefix)).replace(
+            '"NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER"', json.dumps("node-a")
+        )
+        injection = _CONSOLE_PROXY_STYLE + "<script>" + shim_js + "</script>"
+        result = sample_html.replace("<body>", "<body>" + injection, 1)
+        assert '"node-a"' in result
+        assert '"/node/node-a"' in result
+        assert "PREFIX_PLACEHOLDER" not in result
+        assert "NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER" not in result
+        assert result.startswith("<html><body><style>")
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1574,17 +2046,15 @@ class TestProxySharedStatic:
     def test_proxy_shim_injected_in_html(self):
         """Verify shim is injected as inline script in proxied HTML."""
 
-        from turnstone.console.server import _CONSOLE_BANNER_TEMPLATE, _JS_PROXY_SHIM
+        from turnstone.console.server import _JS_PROXY_SHIM
 
         sample_html = "<html><body><div>content</div></body></html>"
         prefix = "/node/test-node"
-        banner = _CONSOLE_BANNER_TEMPLATE.replace("NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER", "test-node")
-        shim = (
-            "<script>"
-            + _JS_PROXY_SHIM.replace('"PREFIX_PLACEHOLDER"', json.dumps(prefix))
-            + "</script>"
+        shim_js = _JS_PROXY_SHIM.replace('"PREFIX_PLACEHOLDER"', json.dumps(prefix)).replace(
+            '"NODE_ID_PLACEHOLDER"', json.dumps("test-node")
         )
-        result = sample_html.replace("<body>", "<body>" + banner + shim, 1)
+        shim = "<script>" + shim_js + "</script>"
+        result = sample_html.replace("<body>", "<body>" + shim, 1)
         assert "<script>" in result
         assert "/node/test-node" in result
         assert "window.fetch" in result

tests/test_console_available_models.py

@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+"""``GET /v1/api/models`` resolution-chain coverage.
+
+The console handler resolves four defaults from settings + the enabled
+model list:
+
+* ``default_alias`` ← ``model.default_alias``
+* ``channel_default_alias`` ← ``channels.default_model_alias``
+* ``coordinator_default_alias`` ← ``coordinator.model_alias``, falling
+  back to ``default_alias`` when empty *or* pointing at a disabled /
+  removed alias (mirrors :mod:`turnstone.console.session_factory`).
+* ``judge_default_alias`` ← ``judge.model``, falling back to the
+  resolved coordinator alias when empty *or* pointing at a value that
+  isn't an enabled alias.  ``judge.model`` is alias-only — same
+  contract as the other model roles — and
+  :class:`turnstone.core.judge.IntentJudge` silently inherits the
+  session model when an unknown value is configured, so the API
+  surfaces the resolved coordinator alias rather than echoing the
+  misconfigured string.
+
+These tests pin each branch so the home composer's resolved-alias
+placeholder stays correct as the precedence rules evolve.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+import pytest
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.middleware import Middleware
+from starlette.routing import Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from tests._coord_test_helpers import _AuthMiddleware, _FakeConfigStore
+from turnstone.console.server import list_available_models
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "available_models.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_model(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    definition_id: str,
+    alias: str,
+    model: str = "model-x",
+    enabled: bool = True,
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_model_definition(
+        definition_id=definition_id,
+        alias=alias,
+        model=model,
+        provider="openai-compatible",
+        base_url="http://localhost:8000/v1",
+        api_key="sk-test",
+        context_window=8192,
+        capabilities="{}",
+        enabled=enabled,
+        created_by="admin",
+    )
+
+
+class _StubRegistry:
+    """Mimics the surface ``resolve_coordinator_alias`` reads from
+    ``coord_registry``: ``.default`` and ``.has_alias()``.
+
+    Production wires this through ``ModelRegistry``, which in turn
+    pulls aliases from both DB rows and config.toml.  The fixture
+    mirrors the storage's enabled-row set so ``has_alias()`` agrees
+    with what the placeholder's enabled-row filter would accept —
+    without that alignment the helper rejects every tier-2 candidate
+    and the placeholder goes blank in cases that production handles
+    fine."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *, default: str, known: set[str]) -> None:
+        self.default = default
+        self._known = known
+
+    def has_alias(self, alias: str) -> bool:
+        return alias in self._known
+
+
+def _make_client(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    settings: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    registry_default: str = "",
+    config_store: bool = True,
+) -> TestClient:
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=[Route("/v1/api/models", list_available_models)],
+        middleware=[Middleware(_AuthMiddleware)],
+    )
+    app.state.auth_storage = storage
+    if config_store:
+        app.state.config_store = _FakeConfigStore(dict(settings or {}))
+    # ``coord_registry`` is always set in production after lifespan
+    # startup; mirror that here.  ``has_alias`` answers from the same
+    # enabled-rows set the handler filters against.
+    enabled = {r["alias"] for r in storage.list_model_definitions(enabled_only=True)}
+    app.state.coord_registry = _StubRegistry(default=registry_default, known=enabled)
+    client = TestClient(app)
+    client.headers.update({"X-Test-User": "admin", "X-Test-Perms": ""})
+    return client
+
+
+def _get_models(client: TestClient) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    resp = client.get("/v1/api/models")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    return resp.json()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Coordinator resolution
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_no_settings_leaves_all_defaults_blank(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    """No model.default_alias, no per-role overrides → every default
+    field is empty and ``models`` is an empty list."""
+    body = _get_models(_make_client(storage))
+    assert body == {
+        "models": [],
+        "default_alias": "",
+        "channel_default_alias": "",
+        "coordinator_default_alias": "",
+        "judge_default_alias": "",
+    }
+
+
+def test_coordinator_inherits_default_alias_when_unset(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    body = _get_models(_make_client(storage, settings={"model.default_alias": "primary"}))
+    assert body["default_alias"] == "primary"
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "primary"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_explicit_enabled_alias_passes_through(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m2", alias="fast")
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={
+                "model.default_alias": "primary",
+                "coordinator.model_alias": "fast",
+            },
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "fast"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_set_to_disabled_alias_falls_back_to_default(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """Operator disabled the alias the coordinator was pinned to —
+    fall back to the registry default rather than advertising a model
+    that workstream creation would refuse to use."""
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m2", alias="legacy", enabled=False)
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={
+                "model.default_alias": "primary",
+                "coordinator.model_alias": "legacy",
+            },
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "primary"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_set_to_unknown_alias_falls_back_to_default(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={
+                "model.default_alias": "primary",
+                "coordinator.model_alias": "ghost",
+            },
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "primary"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_falls_back_to_registry_default_when_config_store_empty(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """Match ``console/session_factory.py:109-110``: when both
+    ``coordinator.model_alias`` and ``model.default_alias`` are unset, new
+    coordinator sessions run on ``registry.default`` (loaded from
+    config.toml ``[model].default``).  The placeholder must report the
+    same alias rather than going blank — otherwise the home composer
+    advertises "Default model" while sessions actually launch on a
+    concrete alias."""
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    body = _get_models(_make_client(storage, registry_default="primary"))
+    assert body["default_alias"] == ""
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "primary"
+    assert body["judge_default_alias"] == "primary"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_skips_registry_default_when_alias_disabled(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """Registry default points at an alias that's been disabled in the DB
+    — the placeholder stays blank rather than advertising a model that
+    workstream creation would refuse to use."""
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="legacy", enabled=False)
+    body = _get_models(_make_client(storage, registry_default="legacy"))
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == ""
+
+
+def test_coordinator_falls_back_to_registry_default_when_config_store_missing(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """Edge case from PR #500 review: lifespan can leave
+    ``app.state.config_store`` as None (e.g. a startup exception) while
+    ``coord_registry`` still binds successfully.  The placeholder must
+    still advertise ``registry.default`` (filtered against enabled rows)
+    rather than going blank — otherwise the home composer is uselessly
+    empty in a degraded-but-recoverable state."""
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    body = _get_models(_make_client(storage, registry_default="primary", config_store=False))
+    assert body["default_alias"] == ""
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "primary"
+    assert body["judge_default_alias"] == "primary"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Judge resolution
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_judge_empty_inherits_resolved_coordinator_alias(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m2", alias="fast")
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={
+                "model.default_alias": "primary",
+                "coordinator.model_alias": "fast",
+            },
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "fast"
+    assert body["judge_default_alias"] == "fast"
+
+
+def test_judge_explicit_enabled_alias_passes_through(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m2", alias="judge-fast")
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={
+                "model.default_alias": "primary",
+                "judge.model": "judge-fast",
+            },
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["judge_default_alias"] == "judge-fast"
+
+
+def test_judge_set_to_unknown_value_inherits_coordinator(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """``judge.model`` is alias-only — same contract as the other model
+    roles.  An unknown value silently inherits the session model in
+    :class:`IntentJudge`, so the API surfaces the resolved coordinator
+    alias rather than echoing the misconfigured string."""
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={
+                "model.default_alias": "primary",
+                "judge.model": "anthropic/claude-haiku-4-5",  # raw, not an alias
+            },
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["coordinator_default_alias"] == "primary"
+    assert body["judge_default_alias"] == "primary"
+
+
+def test_judge_set_to_disabled_alias_inherits_coordinator(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """Disabled-alias case is handled identically to the unknown-value
+    case — both trip the alias-not-resolved path."""
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m2", alias="judge-old", enabled=False)
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={
+                "model.default_alias": "primary",
+                "judge.model": "judge-old",
+            },
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["judge_default_alias"] == "primary"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Pre-existing fields stay correct under the new resolution code
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_channel_default_alias_blanked_when_disabled(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary", enabled=False)
+    body = _get_models(
+        _make_client(
+            storage,
+            settings={"channels.default_model_alias": "primary"},
+        )
+    )
+    assert body["channel_default_alias"] == ""
+
+
+def test_models_payload_strips_secret_fields(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    """Regression guard: only alias/model/provider land in the response,
+    never api_key / base_url / context_window / capabilities."""
+    _seed_model(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="primary")
+    body = _get_models(_make_client(storage))
+    assert body["models"] == [
+        {"alias": "primary", "model": "model-x", "provider": "openai-compatible"}
+    ]

tests/test_console_idle_cleanup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+"""Tests for the console's coordinator idle-cleanup thread helper.
+
+The helper itself is a tiny loop wrapping ``mgr.close_idle``; the heavy
+lifting is in ``SessionManager.close_idle`` (covered in
+``test_session_manager.py``) and ``bulk_close_stale_orphans`` (covered
+in ``test_storage_sqlite.py``).  These tests verify the glue:
+
+- the helper runs an initial sweep BEFORE its first wait (cold-start
+  cleanup without blocking the lifespan),
+- the helper swallows exceptions so a transient DB blip can't kill the
+  daemon thread,
+- the helper exits cleanly when ``stop_event`` is set,
+- the helper subscribes to ``mgr.subscribe_to_state`` and a state-change
+  event wakes the next sweep early (event-driven, not polling),
+- the helper unsubscribes when the thread exits so the subscriber
+  doesn't leak past one cleanup-thread lifetime.
+
+The ``stop_event`` parameter is exclusively for tests — production
+callers pass ``None`` and the daemon runs for process lifetime.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import threading
+import time
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+from turnstone.console.server import _coord_idle_cleanup_thread
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+
+class _StubMgr:
+    """Minimal SessionManager substitute exposing only what the cleanup
+    thread touches: ``close_idle``, ``subscribe_to_state``,
+    ``unsubscribe_from_state``.  Records call ordering for assertions
+    and lets the test fire state-change events manually via
+    :meth:`fire_state_change`.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self, *, stop_event: threading.Event, expected_calls: int, raise_after: int = -1
+    ) -> None:
+        self.calls: list[float] = []
+        self._stop_event = stop_event
+        self._expected = expected_calls
+        self._raise_after = raise_after
+        self._subscribers: list[Callable[[str, object], None]] = []
+        self._sub_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def close_idle(self, timeout_sec: float) -> list[str]:
+        self.calls.append(timeout_sec)
+        try:
+            if 0 <= self._raise_after < len(self.calls):
+                raise RuntimeError("simulated DB blip")
+        finally:
+            # Set stop after the helper has been exercised enough,
+            # regardless of whether this call raised.
+            if len(self.calls) >= self._expected:
+                self._stop_event.set()
+        return []
+
+    def subscribe_to_state(self, callback: Callable[[str, object], None]) -> None:
+        with self._sub_lock:
+            self._subscribers.append(callback)
+
+    def unsubscribe_from_state(self, callback: Callable[[str, object], None]) -> None:
+        with self._sub_lock, contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
+            self._subscribers.remove(callback)
+
+    @property
+    def subscribers_count(self) -> int:
+        with self._sub_lock:
+            return len(self._subscribers)
+
+    def fire_state_change(self, ws_id: str = "ws-x", state: object = "idle") -> None:
+        with self._sub_lock:
+            snapshot = list(self._subscribers)
+        for cb in snapshot:
+            cb(ws_id, state)
+
+
+def _run_until_done(mgr: _StubMgr, stop_event: threading.Event, timeout_sec: float) -> None:
+    # ``min_sweep_interval=0.0`` disables the production cadence floor
+    # (default 5 s) so tests can fire many close_idle calls back-to-back
+    # without waiting real time between them.  The floor is exercised
+    # in its own dedicated test below.
+    thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=_coord_idle_cleanup_thread,
+        args=(mgr, timeout_sec, stop_event),
+        kwargs={"min_sweep_interval": 0.0},
+        daemon=True,
+    )
+    thread.start()
+    thread.join(timeout=2.0)
+    assert not thread.is_alive(), "helper failed to exit on stop_event"
+
+
+def test_coord_idle_cleanup_runs_initial_sweep_before_wait() -> None:
+    """The first close_idle call must happen BEFORE the first wait —
+    otherwise cold-start orphans wait one ``check_every`` interval (~30 min
+    on default 2h timeout) for the first reap.  Crucial because the
+    lifespan no longer does a synchronous initial sweep.
+
+    Verified structurally: a single ``expected_calls=1`` run completes
+    in well under one ``check_every`` (here 0.04 s timeout → 0.01 s
+    check_every), so the initial sweep must have happened before any
+    real wait could have blocked it.
+    """
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=1)
+    started = time.monotonic()
+    _run_until_done(mgr, stop_event, timeout_sec=0.04)
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
+    assert len(mgr.calls) == 1
+    # check_every = min(300.0, 0.04/4) = 0.01 s.  An initial sweep
+    # gated behind one full wait would have taken ~0.01+ s anyway, so
+    # the upper bound here is "much less than one check_every plus
+    # process noise" — the explicit 1.0 s gives generous CI headroom
+    # while still asserting the test is testing the right thing.
+    assert elapsed < 1.0
+
+
+def test_coord_idle_cleanup_calls_close_idle_each_tick() -> None:
+    """Heartbeat path: with no state-change events, close_idle fires
+    each ``check_every`` interval.  Test uses a tiny timeout so the
+    test runs fast — the contract under test is "the loop iterates",
+    not the production cadence.
+    """
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=3)
+    _run_until_done(mgr, stop_event, timeout_sec=0.04)
+    assert len(mgr.calls) == 3
+    assert all(t == 0.04 for t in mgr.calls)
+
+
+def test_coord_idle_cleanup_survives_close_idle_exceptions() -> None:
+    """A transient DB error must not kill the daemon thread — the next
+    tick should still fire close_idle.  Without the try/except, a single
+    blip would silently leak orphans forever."""
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=4, raise_after=1)
+    _run_until_done(mgr, stop_event, timeout_sec=0.04)
+    # All four calls must have fired despite calls 2-4 raising.
+    assert len(mgr.calls) == 4
+
+
+def test_coord_idle_cleanup_exits_cleanly_on_stop_event() -> None:
+    """The stop_event mechanism is the test contract; verify the thread
+    actually exits when the event is set, without needing exceptions or
+    daemon-process termination."""
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=2)
+    _run_until_done(mgr, stop_event, timeout_sec=0.04)
+    assert stop_event.is_set()
+
+
+def test_state_change_wakes_close_idle_before_heartbeat() -> None:
+    """The event-driven path is the whole point of the refactor: a
+    workstream state-change must wake the cleanup sweep without
+    waiting one ``check_every`` interval.  Tested with a long
+    timeout_sec so the heartbeat would NOT have fired in the test
+    window — the close_idle call past the initial sweep must come
+    from a state-change wake.
+    """
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=2)
+    # check_every = min(300.0, 120.0/4) = 30 s — well outside the test
+    # window.  Any close_idle call past the initial sweep must come
+    # from a fire_state_change-driven wake-up.
+    thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=_coord_idle_cleanup_thread,
+        args=(mgr, 120.0, stop_event),
+        kwargs={"min_sweep_interval": 0.0},
+        daemon=True,
+    )
+    thread.start()
+    # Wait for the initial sweep to complete AND the thread to enter
+    # its first ``tick_now.wait`` (signalled here by the subscriber
+    # being registered + calls advancing to 1).
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + 1.0
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if mgr.subscribers_count == 1 and len(mgr.calls) >= 1:
+            break
+        time.sleep(0.01)
+    assert mgr.subscribers_count == 1, "thread didn't subscribe to state"
+    assert len(mgr.calls) == 1, "initial sweep didn't fire"
+    # One state-change fire wakes the first ``wait`` → close_idle runs
+    # again → stop_event is set (expected_calls=2) → thread exits.
+    mgr.fire_state_change()
+    thread.join(timeout=2.0)
+    assert not thread.is_alive(), "thread didn't exit after state-change-driven sweep"
+    # 2 = initial + state-change-driven.  If the state change weren't
+    # being honoured, close_idle would have stalled on the 30 s wait
+    # and the thread.join would have timed out.
+    assert len(mgr.calls) == 2
+
+
+def test_subscriber_unregisters_when_thread_exits() -> None:
+    """The cleanup thread's state-change subscriber must be removed
+    when the thread exits — otherwise long-running processes that
+    restart their cleanup threads (admin model-CRUD path, tests) leak
+    subscribers and every state change fires N stale callbacks.
+    """
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=1)
+    _run_until_done(mgr, stop_event, timeout_sec=0.04)
+    assert mgr.subscribers_count == 0, "subscriber leaked past thread exit"
+
+
+def test_state_change_during_close_idle_triggers_followup_sweep() -> None:
+    """A state-change fired during the initial sweep (e.g. close_idle's
+    own ``close()`` calls firing subscribers) must wake the next
+    ``tick_now.wait`` rather than being lost to the clear-before-sweep
+    ordering.  The clear runs INSIDE the loop just before close_idle,
+    so a fire during the initial sweep — which precedes the loop —
+    arrives at an already-set event that the first wait sees set and
+    returns on immediately.
+    """
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=2)
+
+    real_close_idle = mgr.close_idle
+
+    # One-shot fire during the initial sweep, mirroring what
+    # close_idle's own close() calls do in production (set_state →
+    # state-change subscribers).
+    fired = [False]
+
+    def _instrumented_close_idle(timeout_sec: float) -> list[str]:
+        result = real_close_idle(timeout_sec)
+        if not fired[0]:
+            fired[0] = True
+            mgr.fire_state_change()
+        return result
+
+    mgr.close_idle = _instrumented_close_idle  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+    thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=_coord_idle_cleanup_thread,
+        args=(mgr, 120.0, stop_event),
+        kwargs={"min_sweep_interval": 0.0},
+        daemon=True,
+    )
+    thread.start()
+    thread.join(timeout=2.0)
+    assert not thread.is_alive(), "thread blocked on the next wait — mid-sweep wake was lost"
+    # 2 = initial sweep + state-change-driven follow-up.  Without the
+    # event surviving the clear-before-sweep ordering, the thread
+    # would have blocked on the 30 s ``wait`` and the test would have
+    # timed out at thread.join.
+    assert len(mgr.calls) == 2
+
+
+def test_min_sweep_interval_floors_close_idle_cadence_under_sustained_wakes() -> None:
+    """Cadence floor: even when state-change events keep firing
+    ``tick_now.set()``, ``close_idle`` must not run more often than
+    ``min_sweep_interval`` — otherwise the loop tight-spins close_idle
+    at the rate of its own DB latency, doing 600-1500x more DB work
+    than the pre-refactor fixed-30 s cadence.
+
+    Wires a state-change subscriber that fires another state change
+    from inside close_idle, so the bus would tick forever if not
+    floored.  Asserts the elapsed-between-sweeps is at least
+    ``min_sweep_interval`` modulo small wall-clock noise.
+    """
+    stop_event = threading.Event()
+    mgr = _StubMgr(stop_event=stop_event, expected_calls=3)
+
+    real_close_idle = mgr.close_idle
+    sweep_times: list[float] = []
+
+    def _instrumented_close_idle(timeout_sec: float) -> list[str]:
+        sweep_times.append(time.monotonic())
+        result = real_close_idle(timeout_sec)
+        # Always fire another state-change to simulate sustained
+        # activity (each turn fires thinking/running/attention/idle).
+        # If the floor were absent, the next wake would race the next
+        # close_idle immediately and ``sweep_times`` deltas would be
+        # bounded by close_idle latency (microseconds), not the floor.
+        mgr.fire_state_change()
+        return result
+
+    mgr.close_idle = _instrumented_close_idle  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+    # 0.15 s floor keeps the test fast (~0.3 s total) while still
+    # representing a meaningful gap relative to close_idle's
+    # near-zero stub latency.
+    thread = threading.Thread(
+        target=_coord_idle_cleanup_thread,
+        args=(mgr, 120.0, stop_event),
+        kwargs={"min_sweep_interval": 0.15},
+        daemon=True,
+    )
+    thread.start()
+    thread.join(timeout=3.0)
+    assert not thread.is_alive(), "thread didn't exit"
+    assert len(sweep_times) >= 2, "fewer than two sweeps fired"
+    # Gap between sweep 1 (post-initial) and sweep 2 must respect
+    # the floor.  Initial sweep at sweep_times[0] is unfloored
+    # (no prior sweep to compare against), so the meaningful
+    # assertion is on sweep_times[1] - sweep_times[0].
+    gap = sweep_times[1] - sweep_times[0]
+    assert gap >= 0.12, f"floor breached: gap {gap:.3f}s < min_sweep_interval 0.15s"

tests/test_console_session_factory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+"""``console/session_factory.py`` alias-resolution coverage.
+
+The console session factory resolves the coordinator alias through a
+three-tier chain that must stay in lockstep with the placeholder logic
+in ``console/server.py:list_available_models`` — otherwise the home
+composer advertises one alias while sessions launch on another.
+
+Tier order (highest priority first):
+
+1. Per-call ``model_alias`` arg, or the ``coordinator.model_alias``
+   ConfigStore setting (admin-pinned coordinator-specific override).
+2. ``model.default_alias`` ConfigStore setting (admin-managed system
+   default surfaced in the Models tab).
+3. ``registry.default`` (config.toml ``[model].default``, the boot-time
+   fallback).
+
+These tests pin each branch by intercepting ``registry.resolve`` —
+they short-circuit before ChatSession construction so the test never
+has to satisfy ChatSession's full kwarg contract.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests._coord_test_helpers import _FakeConfigStore
+from turnstone.console.session_factory import build_console_session_factory
+
+
+class _StopBeforeChatSessionError(Exception):
+    """Sentinel raised by the capturing registry to short-circuit
+    factory execution after alias resolution but before ChatSession is
+    built.  The factory's outer code path is irrelevant to alias
+    resolution and would force the test to satisfy a long kwarg
+    contract for no extra coverage."""
+
+
+class _CapturingRegistry:
+    """Records the alias passed to ``resolve()`` and short-circuits.
+
+    ``has_alias`` answers from the configured known set so the
+    ``model.default_alias`` validation tier behaves realistically.
+    Mirrors the public surface ``ModelRegistry`` exposes to
+    session_factory: ``has_alias``, ``resolve``, and ``default``.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, *, default: str, known: set[str]) -> None:
+        self.default = default
+        self._known = known
+        self.captured_alias: str | None = None
+
+    def has_alias(self, alias: str) -> bool:
+        return alias in self._known
+
+    def resolve(self, alias: str) -> Any:
+        self.captured_alias = alias
+        raise _StopBeforeChatSessionError()
+
+
+def _build_factory(
+    *,
+    registry_default: str = "registry-default",
+    known_aliases: set[str] | None = None,
+    settings: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[Any, _CapturingRegistry]:
+    """Construct the factory with stub deps.  Returns ``(factory_callable,
+    registry)`` so tests can read back ``registry.captured_alias``."""
+
+    registry = _CapturingRegistry(
+        default=registry_default,
+        known=known_aliases if known_aliases is not None else {registry_default},
+    )
+    config_store = _FakeConfigStore(dict(settings or {}))
+    factory = build_console_session_factory(
+        registry=registry,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        config_store=config_store,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        node_id="console",
+        coord_client_factory=lambda ws_id, uid: MagicMock(),
+    )
+    return factory, registry
+
+
+def _invoke(factory: Any, **factory_kwargs: Any) -> None:
+    """Call the factory with a stub UI and absorb the sentinel.
+
+    Forwards ``factory_kwargs`` to the factory so per-call overrides
+    (e.g. ``model_alias``) can flow through.  Raises if any other
+    exception comes out — the test should fail loudly when alias
+    resolution itself errors rather than swallowing it.
+    """
+    ui = MagicMock()
+    ui._user_id = ""  # skip storage-backed username lookup branch
+    with pytest.raises(_StopBeforeChatSessionError):
+        factory(ui, **factory_kwargs)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Tier 1 — explicit pin (per-call arg or coordinator.model_alias)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_per_call_model_alias_arg_wins_over_everything() -> None:
+    """The ``model_alias`` kwarg on the factory call (e.g. body field on
+    POST /workstreams/new) wins over both ConfigStore tiers and the
+    registry default."""
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        known_aliases={"per-call", "coord-pin", "admin-default", "registry-default"},
+        settings={
+            "coordinator.model_alias": "coord-pin",
+            "model.default_alias": "admin-default",
+        },
+    )
+    _invoke(factory, model_alias="per-call")
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "per-call"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_model_alias_wins_when_no_per_call_override() -> None:
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        known_aliases={"coord-pin", "admin-default", "registry-default"},
+        settings={
+            "coordinator.model_alias": "coord-pin",
+            "model.default_alias": "admin-default",
+        },
+    )
+    _invoke(factory)
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "coord-pin"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_model_alias_passed_through_unvalidated() -> None:
+    """Tier 1 is an *explicit* operator pin — when it's stale or typoed
+    we deliberately pass it through to ``registry.resolve`` so the
+    request layer turns it into a 503 with the alias surfaced in the
+    error.  Falling through silently would mask the misconfiguration."""
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        known_aliases={"admin-default", "registry-default"},
+        settings={
+            "coordinator.model_alias": "ghost",  # unknown
+            "model.default_alias": "admin-default",
+        },
+    )
+    _invoke(factory)
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "ghost"
+
+
+def test_per_call_model_alias_arg_passed_through_unvalidated() -> None:
+    """The per-call ``model_alias`` kwarg (POST body field — the more
+    common production trigger) is the same kind of explicit pin as the
+    ConfigStore setting, so a stale value passes through to
+    ``registry.resolve`` rather than silently falling through to the
+    system default."""
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        known_aliases={"registry-default"},
+        settings={"model.default_alias": "registry-default"},
+    )
+    _invoke(factory, model_alias="ghost")
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "ghost"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Tier 2 — model.default_alias (admin-managed system default)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_model_default_alias_used_when_coordinator_unset() -> None:
+    """Regression for the historical drift: admin sets the system
+    default in the Models tab, the home composer advertises it, and new
+    coordinator sessions must launch on the same alias rather than
+    silently falling through to ``registry.default``."""
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        known_aliases={"admin-default", "registry-default"},
+        settings={"model.default_alias": "admin-default"},
+    )
+    _invoke(factory)
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "admin-default"
+
+
+def test_unknown_model_default_alias_falls_through_to_registry_default() -> None:
+    """Tier 2 is *not* an explicit pin — operators set
+    ``model.default_alias`` once in the UI and forget about it; an alias
+    that's later disabled or typo'd should not 503 the coordinator,
+    since tier 3 (``registry.default``) is guaranteed to resolve."""
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        known_aliases={"registry-default"},  # admin-default got removed
+        settings={"model.default_alias": "admin-default"},
+    )
+    _invoke(factory)
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "registry-default"
+
+
+def test_blank_model_default_alias_falls_through_to_registry_default() -> None:
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        settings={"model.default_alias": ""},
+    )
+    _invoke(factory)
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "registry-default"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Tier 3 — registry.default (config.toml [model].default)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_no_settings_uses_registry_default() -> None:
+    factory, registry = _build_factory()
+    _invoke(factory)
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "registry-default"
+
+
+def test_whitespace_only_coord_alias_falls_through() -> None:
+    """``"   "`` is not an explicit pin — ``.strip()`` reduces it to
+    "", which the chain should treat as unset."""
+    factory, registry = _build_factory(
+        settings={"coordinator.model_alias": "   "},
+    )
+    _invoke(factory)
+    assert registry.captured_alias == "registry-default"

tests/test_coord_ui_approve_tools.py

@@ -464,3 +464,148 @@ def test_coord_budget_override_survives_wildcard_allow_policy() -> None:
     assert approved is True
     types = [e.get("type") for e in captured_events]
     assert "approve_request" in types, "Wildcard allow must not strip the budget-override prompt"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Cluster-bus broadcast hooks — _broadcast_intent_verdict / _approval_resolved
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestBroadcastIntentVerdict:
+    """``ConsoleCoordinatorUI._broadcast_intent_verdict`` overrides the
+    no-op base hook to push the verdict onto the cluster bus via
+    ``ClusterCollector.emit_console_ws_intent_verdict``. The far more
+    common path is the per-node ``WebUI`` override (covered in
+    test_webui_content.py); this lights up the rare coord-self path
+    (a coord that runs its own LLM judge).
+    """
+
+    def test_calls_collector_emit_with_ws_id_and_verdict(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        collector = MagicMock()
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = collector
+        try:
+            verdict = {
+                "call_id": "c1",
+                "risk_level": "high",
+                "confidence": 0.91,
+            }
+            ui._broadcast_intent_verdict(verdict)
+            collector.emit_console_ws_intent_verdict.assert_called_once_with(
+                "coord-a",
+                verdict,
+            )
+        finally:
+            ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+
+    def test_no_op_when_collector_unset(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+        # Doesn't raise.
+        ui._broadcast_intent_verdict({"call_id": "c1"})
+
+    def test_collector_exception_swallowed(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        collector = MagicMock()
+        collector.emit_console_ws_intent_verdict.side_effect = RuntimeError("boom")
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = collector
+        try:
+            # Doesn't raise — collector failures are observational only.
+            ui._broadcast_intent_verdict({"call_id": "c1"})
+        finally:
+            ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+
+
+class TestBroadcastApprovalResolved:
+    """``ConsoleCoordinatorUI._broadcast_approval_resolved`` overrides
+    the base hook to push the resolution onto the cluster bus via
+    ``ClusterCollector.emit_console_ws_approval_resolved``."""
+
+    def test_calls_collector_with_decision_fields(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        collector = MagicMock()
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = collector
+        try:
+            ui._broadcast_approval_resolved(True, "lgtm", always=True)
+            collector.emit_console_ws_approval_resolved.assert_called_once_with(
+                "coord-a",
+                approved=True,
+                feedback="lgtm",
+                always=True,
+            )
+        finally:
+            ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+
+    def test_normalises_none_feedback_to_empty_string(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        collector = MagicMock()
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = collector
+        try:
+            ui._broadcast_approval_resolved(False, None)
+            collector.emit_console_ws_approval_resolved.assert_called_once_with(
+                "coord-a",
+                approved=False,
+                feedback="",
+                always=False,
+            )
+        finally:
+            ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+
+    def test_no_op_when_collector_unset(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+        # Doesn't raise.
+        ui._broadcast_approval_resolved(True, None)
+
+    def test_collector_exception_swallowed(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        collector = MagicMock()
+        collector.emit_console_ws_approval_resolved.side_effect = RuntimeError("boom")
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = collector
+        try:
+            # Doesn't raise.
+            ui._broadcast_approval_resolved(True, "ok")
+        finally:
+            ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+
+
+class TestBroadcastApproveRequest:
+    """Coord-side override for the approve_request push. Same rationale
+    as the WebUI override — the coord-self path is rare today, but
+    parity keeps the override symmetric with the rest of the broadcast
+    family."""
+
+    def test_calls_collector_emit_with_ws_id_and_detail(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        collector = MagicMock()
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = collector
+        try:
+            detail = {
+                "type": "approve_request",
+                "items": [{"call_id": "c1", "header": "tool x"}],
+                "judge_pending": True,
+            }
+            ui._broadcast_approve_request(detail)
+            collector.emit_console_ws_approve_request.assert_called_once_with(
+                "coord-a",
+                detail,
+            )
+        finally:
+            ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+
+    def test_no_op_when_collector_unset(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None
+        # Doesn't raise.
+        ui._broadcast_approve_request({"items": []})
+
+    def test_collector_exception_swallowed(self) -> None:
+        ui = ConsoleCoordinatorUI(ws_id="coord-a", user_id="u1")
+        collector = MagicMock()
+        collector.emit_console_ws_approve_request.side_effect = RuntimeError("boom")
+        ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = collector
+        try:
+            # Doesn't raise.
+            ui._broadcast_approve_request({"items": []})
+        finally:
+            ConsoleCoordinatorUI._collector = None

tests/test_coordinator_adapter.py

@@ -378,13 +378,21 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterWorkerDispatch:
 
 
 class TestCoordinatorAdapterChildrenRegistry:
-    def test_emit_created_seeds_empty_children_set(self) -> None:
+    """Adapter-level integration with :class:`ChildrenRegistry`.
+
+    Pure-registry invariants (forward/reverse consistency, idempotent
+    merge, locking) live in ``test_children_registry.py``. These
+    tests cover the adapter's wiring: that ``emit_*`` paths drive the
+    registry correctly and that the snapshot-priming bridge between
+    a collector snapshot and the registry preserves merge semantics.
+    """
+
+    def test_emit_created_installs_parent(self) -> None:
         adapter, _ = _make_adapter()
         ws = _make_ws()
         adapter.emit_created(ws)
-        assert ws.id in adapter._children
-        assert adapter._children[ws.id] == set()
-        assert adapter._active_coords[ws.id] is ws.ui
+        assert adapter._registry.children_of(ws.id) == []
+        assert adapter._registry.ui_for(ws.id) is ws.ui
 
     def test_emit_rehydrated_calls_rebuild(self) -> None:
         adapter, _ = _make_adapter()
@@ -398,42 +406,36 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterChildrenRegistry:
         adapter.emit_rehydrated(ws)
         assert calls == [ws.id]
 
-    def test_emit_closed_clears_forward_and_reverse_indexes(self) -> None:
+    def test_emit_closed_uninstalls_parent_and_clears_children(self) -> None:
         adapter, _ = _make_adapter()
-        with adapter._children_lock:
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-a", ["child-a1", "child-a2"])
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-b", ["child-b1"])
-            adapter._active_coords["coord-a"] = object()
-            adapter._active_coords["coord-b"] = object()
+        adapter._registry.install("coord-a", object())
+        adapter._registry.install("coord-b", object())
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1", "child-a2"])
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-b", ["child-b1"])
 
         adapter.emit_closed("coord-a")
 
-        assert "coord-a" not in adapter._children
-        assert "coord-a" not in adapter._active_coords
-        assert "child-a1" not in adapter._child_to_coord
-        assert "child-a2" not in adapter._child_to_coord
+        assert adapter._registry.ui_for("coord-a") is None
+        assert adapter._registry.children_of("coord-a") == []
+        assert adapter._registry.parent_for("child-a1") is None
+        assert adapter._registry.parent_for("child-a2") is None
         # coord-b untouched
-        assert adapter._child_to_coord["child-b1"] == "coord-b"
-        assert "coord-b" in adapter._children
-
-    def test_merge_child_ids_locked_is_idempotent(self) -> None:
-        adapter, _ = _make_adapter()
-        with adapter._children_lock:
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-a", ["child-1"])
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-a", ["child-1"])
-        assert adapter._children["coord-a"] == {"child-1"}
-        assert adapter._child_to_coord == {"child-1": "coord-a"}
+        assert adapter._registry.parent_for("child-b1") == "coord-b"
+        assert adapter._registry.ui_for("coord-b") is not None
 
     def test_prime_children_from_snapshot_merges_without_overwriting(self) -> None:
+        # Snapshot priming now lives on ClusterChildSource (production
+        # path). The adapter no longer carries its own duplicate copy.
+        from turnstone.core.child_source import ClusterChildSource
+
         adapter, _ = _make_adapter()
-        # Seed one in-memory coord + one existing child
-        coord_ws = _make_ws()
-        coord_ws.id = "coord-a"
-        mgr = MagicMock()
-        mgr.list_all.return_value = [coord_ws]
-        adapter.attach(mgr)
-        with adapter._children_lock:
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+
+        source = ClusterChildSource(
+            collector=MagicMock(),
+            registry=adapter._registry,
+            parents_provider=lambda: ["coord-a"],
+        )
 
         snapshot = {
             "nodes": [
@@ -448,10 +450,13 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterChildrenRegistry:
                 },
             ],
         }
-        adapter._prime_children_from_snapshot(snapshot)
-        assert adapter._children["coord-a"] == {"child-a1", "child-a2"}
-        assert adapter._child_to_coord["child-a2"] == "coord-a"
-        assert "child-x" not in adapter._child_to_coord
+        source._prime_from_snapshot(snapshot)
+        assert set(adapter._registry.children_of("coord-a")) == {
+            "child-a1",
+            "child-a2",
+        }
+        assert adapter._registry.parent_for("child-a2") == "coord-a"
+        assert adapter._registry.parent_for("child-x") is None
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -478,9 +483,7 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterDispatchChildEvent:
         coord_ws.id = coord_id
         recorder = _UIRecorder()
         coord_ws.ui = recorder  # type: ignore[assignment]
-        with adapter._children_lock:
-            adapter._children.setdefault(coord_id, set())
-            adapter._active_coords[coord_id] = recorder
+        adapter._registry.install(coord_id, recorder)
         adapter.attach(_StubManager(coord_ws))  # type: ignore[arg-type]
         return adapter, recorder, coord_ws
 
@@ -510,12 +513,11 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterDispatchChildEvent:
         assert payload["child_ws_id"] == "child-a1"
         assert payload["parent_ws_id"] == "coord-a"
         # Reverse index updated for subsequent cluster_state events.
-        assert adapter._child_to_coord["child-a1"] == "coord-a"
+        assert adapter._registry.parent_for("child-a1") == "coord-a"
 
     def test_dispatch_cluster_state_routes_via_reverse_index(self) -> None:
         adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
-        with adapter._children_lock:
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
         adapter._dispatch_child_event(
             {
                 "type": "cluster_state",
@@ -533,8 +535,7 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterDispatchChildEvent:
 
     def test_dispatch_ws_closed_routes_to_parent_coord(self) -> None:
         adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
-        with adapter._children_lock:
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
         adapter._dispatch_child_event(
             {"type": "ws_closed", "ws_id": "child-a1", "reason": "evicted"}
         )
@@ -548,8 +549,7 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterDispatchChildEvent:
         """perf-6: _enqueue_on_ui mutates the payload dict in place with
         the coord's ws_id so the browser can discriminate child events."""
         adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
-        with adapter._children_lock:
-            adapter._merge_child_ids_locked("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
         adapter._dispatch_child_event(
             {
                 "type": "cluster_state",
@@ -558,3 +558,240 @@ class TestCoordinatorAdapterDispatchChildEvent:
             }
         )
         assert recorder.enqueued[0]["ws_id"] == "coord-a"
+
+    def test_dispatch_cluster_state_does_not_carry_pending_approval_detail(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Stage 3 cleanup — the ``pending_approval_detail`` piggyback
+        on ``cluster_state`` is gone. Approval items now arrive via
+        bulk fetch (triggered by ``activity_state="approval"`` in the
+        browser); verdicts via ``child_ws_intent_verdict``; resolution
+        via ``child_ws_approval_resolved``. The state event carries
+        only state + activity_state — no detail field."""
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "cluster_state",
+                "ws_id": "child-a1",
+                "state": "running",
+                "activity_state": "approval",
+            }
+        )
+        assert len(recorder.enqueued) == 1
+        payload = recorder.enqueued[0]
+        assert payload["type"] == "child_ws_state"
+        assert payload["activity_state"] == "approval"
+        assert "pending_approval_detail" not in payload
+
+    def test_dispatch_intent_verdict_emits_child_ws_intent_verdict(self) -> None:
+        """Stage 3 Step 6 — explicit verdict events are re-emitted as
+        child_ws_intent_verdict on the parent's SSE so the tree UI
+        renders the risk pill without polling."""
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        verdict = {
+            "call_id": "c1",
+            "risk_level": "low",
+            "confidence": 0.92,
+            "recommendation": "approve",
+        }
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "intent_verdict",
+                "ws_id": "child-a1",
+                "node_id": "node-1",
+                "verdict": verdict,
+            }
+        )
+        assert len(recorder.enqueued) == 1
+        payload = recorder.enqueued[0]
+        assert payload["type"] == "child_ws_intent_verdict"
+        assert payload["child_ws_id"] == "child-a1"
+        assert payload["parent_ws_id"] == "coord-a"
+        assert payload["node_id"] == "node-1"
+        assert payload["verdict"] == verdict
+
+    def test_dispatch_intent_verdict_unknown_child_drops(self) -> None:
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "intent_verdict",
+                "ws_id": "ws-orphan",
+                "verdict": {"call_id": "c1"},
+            }
+        )
+        assert recorder.enqueued == []
+
+    def test_dispatch_approval_resolved_emits_child_ws_approval_resolved(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Stage 3 Step 6 — paired with intent_verdict; clears the
+        pending-approval pill on the parent's tree UI in lockstep
+        with the actual decision."""
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "approval_resolved",
+                "ws_id": "child-a1",
+                "node_id": "node-1",
+                "approved": True,
+                "feedback": "lgtm",
+                "always": False,
+            }
+        )
+        assert len(recorder.enqueued) == 1
+        payload = recorder.enqueued[0]
+        assert payload["type"] == "child_ws_approval_resolved"
+        assert payload["child_ws_id"] == "child-a1"
+        assert payload["parent_ws_id"] == "coord-a"
+        assert payload["approved"] is True
+        assert payload["feedback"] == "lgtm"
+        assert payload["always"] is False
+
+    def test_dispatch_approval_resolved_coerces_missing_fields(self) -> None:
+        """Older nodes mid-rolling-upgrade may omit approved / always /
+        feedback; dispatch coerces to safe defaults."""
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event({"type": "approval_resolved", "ws_id": "child-a1"})
+        assert len(recorder.enqueued) == 1
+        payload = recorder.enqueued[0]
+        assert payload["approved"] is False
+        assert payload["feedback"] == ""
+        assert payload["always"] is False
+
+    def test_dispatch_approval_resolved_unknown_child_drops(self) -> None:
+        """Symmetric to the intent_verdict drop test — events for
+        ws_ids the registry doesn't know about silently drop instead
+        of fanning out to a parent that has no business seeing them."""
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "approval_resolved",
+                "ws_id": "ws-orphan",
+                "approved": True,
+            },
+        )
+        assert recorder.enqueued == []
+
+    def test_dispatch_approve_request_emits_child_ws_approve_request(
+        self,
+    ) -> None:
+        """Push path for the initial approval items — eliminates the
+        bulk-fetch race that left the coord row stuck on a loading
+        placeholder when the bulk fetch landed in the gap between
+        _emit_state(ATTENTION) and approve_tools setting _pending_approval."""
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        detail = {
+            "type": "approve_request",
+            "items": [{"call_id": "c1", "header": "tool x"}],
+            "judge_pending": True,
+        }
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "approve_request",
+                "ws_id": "child-a1",
+                "node_id": "node-1",
+                "detail": detail,
+            },
+        )
+        assert len(recorder.enqueued) == 1
+        payload = recorder.enqueued[0]
+        assert payload["type"] == "child_ws_approve_request"
+        assert payload["child_ws_id"] == "child-a1"
+        assert payload["parent_ws_id"] == "coord-a"
+        assert payload["node_id"] == "node-1"
+        assert payload["detail"] == detail
+
+    def test_dispatch_approve_request_unknown_child_drops(self) -> None:
+        adapter, recorder, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "approve_request",
+                "ws_id": "ws-orphan",
+                "detail": {"items": []},
+            },
+        )
+        assert recorder.enqueued == []
+
+    def test_dispatch_notifies_child_event_bus_on_state_event(self) -> None:
+        """Every translated state-class event must call
+        ``ChildEventBus.notify(ws_id)`` so a registered
+        ``wait_for_workstream`` waiter wakes promptly.  Notify fires
+        AFTER the UI enqueue so the SSE fan-out keeps priority — the
+        order assertion here is structural (one notify call, matching
+        ws_id) since the bus side-effect lookup is what guards against
+        regressions, not the relative event ordering.
+        """
+        adapter, _, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        bus = adapter.child_event_bus
+        event = bus.register_waiter(["child-a1"])
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "cluster_state",
+                "ws_id": "child-a1",
+                "state": "idle",
+            }
+        )
+        assert event.is_set(), "bus notify did not fire on cluster_state dispatch"
+
+    def test_dispatch_notifies_for_all_state_class_event_types(self) -> None:
+        """The dispatch sink translates six event types into the
+        ``child_ws_*`` SSE shape; all six must also fire the bus so
+        a wait on any of them wakes.  ``ws_created`` is intentionally
+        NOT in this set — waiters register against ws_ids they already
+        know exist (the wait tool takes a pre-known list)."""
+        for etype, extra in [
+            ("cluster_state", {"state": "running"}),
+            ("ws_closed", {"reason": "evicted"}),
+            ("ws_rename", {"name": "renamed"}),
+            ("intent_verdict", {"verdict": {"call_id": "c1"}}),
+            ("approval_resolved", {"approved": True}),
+            ("approve_request", {"detail": {}}),
+        ]:
+            adapter, _, _ = self._setup()
+            adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+            bus = adapter.child_event_bus
+            event = bus.register_waiter(["child-a1"])
+            adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+                {"type": etype, "ws_id": "child-a1", **extra},
+            )
+            assert event.is_set(), f"bus notify did not fire on {etype} dispatch"
+
+    def test_dispatch_does_not_notify_for_unrelated_ws_id(self) -> None:
+        """Bus is keyed by ws_id — a dispatch for ws X must not wake a
+        waiter registered against ws Y, or every state change anywhere
+        in the system would shake every concurrent wait."""
+        adapter, _, _ = self._setup()
+        adapter._registry.merge_children("coord-a", ["child-a1"])
+        bus = adapter.child_event_bus
+        event = bus.register_waiter(["child-other"])
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "cluster_state",
+                "ws_id": "child-a1",
+                "state": "idle",
+            }
+        )
+        assert not event.is_set(), "bus notify spuriously fired on unrelated ws_id"
+
+    def test_dispatch_does_not_notify_for_unknown_child(self) -> None:
+        """Events whose ws_id isn't in any coord's registry are dropped
+        BEFORE the bus notify (early return at ``coord_id is None``).
+        Notify only fires for events the dispatch sink fully translated,
+        keeping the bus side-effect aligned with the UI enqueue."""
+        adapter, _, _ = self._setup()
+        bus = adapter.child_event_bus
+        event = bus.register_waiter(["ws-orphan"])
+        adapter._dispatch_child_event(
+            {
+                "type": "cluster_state",
+                "ws_id": "ws-orphan",
+                "state": "idle",
+            }
+        )
+        assert not event.is_set(), "bus notify fired for ws_id the dispatch dropped"

tests/test_coordinator_client.py

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ storage-call path.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
+import time
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
 
 import httpx
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import (
     CoordinatorTokenManager,
 )
 from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE, validate_jwt
+from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
 from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -145,6 +147,7 @@ def _mock_client(
         coord_ws_id="coord-1",
         user_id="user-1",
         http_client=http,
+        child_event_bus=ChildEventBus(),
     )
     return client, captured
 
@@ -470,6 +473,7 @@ def _make_read_client(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> CoordinatorClient:
         coord_ws_id="coord-1",
         user_id="user-1",
         http_client=http,
+        child_event_bus=ChildEventBus(),
     )
 
 
@@ -663,6 +667,7 @@ def _make_client_with_cluster_response(
         coord_ws_id="coord-1",
         user_id="user-1",
         http_client=http,
+        child_event_bus=ChildEventBus(),
     )
 
 
@@ -949,6 +954,137 @@ def test_list_nodes_empty_on_no_matching_filters(storage_with_nodes):
     assert result["truncated"] is False
 
 
+def test_list_nodes_surfaces_healthy_model_aliases(tmp_path):
+    """The node's heartbeat loop projects its registry into a ``models``
+    metadata entry shaped like ``[{alias, provider, healthy}, ...]``.
+    ``list_nodes`` flattens that to the healthy-alias list at the top
+    level (under ``model_aliases``) so a coordinator can pass aliases
+    straight to ``spawn_workstream(model=)`` without having to
+    introspect the metadata blob.  The provider-side model identifier
+    (``cfg.model``) is intentionally NOT in the payload — coords kept
+    reaching for it when they should pass the local alias."""
+    st = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "nodes.db"))
+    _set_meta(
+        st,
+        "node-x",
+        [
+            ("arch", "x86_64", "auto"),
+            (
+                "models",
+                [
+                    {"alias": "gpt5", "provider": "openai", "healthy": True},
+                    {"alias": "claude-opus-47", "provider": "anthropic", "healthy": True},
+                    {"alias": "broken", "provider": "openai", "healthy": False},
+                ],
+                "auto",
+            ),
+        ],
+    )
+    _register_service(st, "node-x")
+    client = _make_read_client(st)
+    result = client.list_nodes()
+    node = result["nodes"][0]
+    assert node["model_aliases"] == ["gpt5", "claude-opus-47"]
+    # Full per-alias info still available under metadata for callers
+    # that want provider / healthy detail (e.g. surfacing degraded
+    # aliases in a UI).
+    full = node["metadata"]["models"]["value"]
+    assert {row["alias"] for row in full} == {"gpt5", "claude-opus-47", "broken"}
+    # ``model`` (the provider-side identifier) is intentionally absent
+    # — keep the payload to the three values a coord actually uses.
+    for row in full:
+        assert "model" not in row
+
+
+def test_list_nodes_model_aliases_distinct_from_metadata_models(tmp_path):
+    """Pin the naming distinction explicitly: the top-level shortlist
+    (``model_aliases``, list of strings) and the rich metadata blob
+    (``metadata.models.value``, list of dicts) live under different
+    keys so a caller that confuses them gets a clear KeyError rather
+    than a silent shape mismatch."""
+    st = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "nodes.db"))
+    _set_meta(
+        st,
+        "node-x",
+        [
+            (
+                "models",
+                [{"alias": "a", "provider": "openai", "healthy": True}],
+                "auto",
+            ),
+        ],
+    )
+    _register_service(st, "node-x")
+    client = _make_read_client(st)
+    node = client.list_nodes()["nodes"][0]
+    # No top-level ``models`` field — only ``model_aliases``.
+    assert "models" not in node
+    assert node["model_aliases"] == ["a"]
+    # Rich shape stays under metadata.
+    assert isinstance(node["metadata"]["models"]["value"], list)
+    assert isinstance(node["metadata"]["models"]["value"][0], dict)
+
+
+def test_list_nodes_model_aliases_empty_when_node_has_not_published(tmp_path):
+    """Nodes from older builds — or a node mid-startup before its first
+    metadata write — won't have a ``models`` entry.  The top-level
+    ``model_aliases`` field defaults to ``[]`` rather than being
+    omitted so coordinators can rely on the key being present."""
+    st = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "nodes.db"))
+    _set_meta(st, "node-y", [("arch", "x86_64", "auto")])
+    _register_service(st, "node-y")
+    client = _make_read_client(st)
+    result = client.list_nodes()
+    assert result["nodes"][0]["model_aliases"] == []
+
+
+def test_list_nodes_models_tolerates_malformed_entries(tmp_path):
+    """If a node ever stores a malformed ``models`` entry (wrong outer
+    type, missing alias, non-bool healthy), the projection drops the
+    bad rows rather than raising — the rest of the response should
+    still be useful."""
+    st = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "nodes.db"))
+    _set_meta(
+        st,
+        "node-z",
+        [
+            (
+                "models",
+                [
+                    {"alias": "ok", "provider": "p", "healthy": True},
+                    "not-a-dict",
+                    {"provider": "p", "healthy": True},  # missing alias
+                    {"alias": "", "healthy": True},  # empty alias
+                    {"alias": "degraded", "healthy": False},
+                    {"alias": 42, "healthy": True},  # non-string alias
+                ],
+                "auto",
+            ),
+        ],
+    )
+    _register_service(st, "node-z")
+    client = _make_read_client(st)
+    result = client.list_nodes()
+    assert result["nodes"][0]["model_aliases"] == ["ok"]
+
+
+def test_list_nodes_models_handles_non_list_payload(tmp_path):
+    """A node with a corrupted models entry (dict, scalar, null) shouldn't
+    blow up the whole list_nodes call.  ``model_aliases`` falls back to ``[]``."""
+    st = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "nodes.db"))
+    _set_meta(
+        st,
+        "node-w",
+        [
+            ("models", {"oops": "not a list"}, "auto"),
+        ],
+    )
+    _register_service(st, "node-w")
+    client = _make_read_client(st)
+    result = client.list_nodes()
+    assert result["nodes"][0]["model_aliases"] == []
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # list_skills
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1092,6 +1228,49 @@ def test_list_skills_hides_interactive_only_skills(tmp_path):
         assert skill["kind"] in {"coordinator", "any"}
 
 
+def test_list_skills_omits_allowed_tools_when_empty(tmp_path):
+    """``allowed_tools`` is the auto-approve allowlist (tools exempt
+    from the operator approval gate), NOT the set of tools the skill
+    can use.  An empty list reads as "no tool access" to a model
+    that doesn't know the semantics — real misdiagnosis source: a
+    code-review skill with no auto-approve allowlist looked like it
+    had been spawned with zero tools.  Dropping the key when empty
+    removes the ambiguity at the source; absence of the field carries
+    the unambiguous meaning "no tool is pre-approved for this skill"
+    while a tool list reads as "these specific tools bypass the prompt".
+    """
+    st = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "skills_empty.db"))
+    st.create_prompt_template(
+        template_id="s-empty",
+        name="empty-skill",
+        category="ops",
+        content="",
+        variables="[]",
+        is_default=False,
+        org_id="",
+        created_by="test",
+        tags="[]",
+        allowed_tools="[]",
+    )
+    st.create_prompt_template(
+        template_id="s-nonempty",
+        name="nonempty-skill",
+        category="ops",
+        content="",
+        variables="[]",
+        is_default=False,
+        org_id="",
+        created_by="test",
+        tags="[]",
+        allowed_tools='["read_file"]',
+    )
+    client = _make_read_client(st)
+    result = client.list_skills()
+    by_name = {s["name"]: s for s in result["skills"]}
+    assert "allowed_tools" not in by_name["empty-skill"]
+    assert by_name["nonempty-skill"]["allowed_tools"] == ["read_file"]
+
+
 def test_list_skills_projects_allowed_tools_capped_with_sentinel(tmp_path):
     """Each row carries the skill's allowed_tools (capped at the projection
     cap with a +N more sentinel) so coordinators can pick a skill without
@@ -1312,6 +1491,23 @@ def test_wait_for_workstream_denies_foreign_ws_id(populated_storage):
     assert result["elapsed"] < 1.0
 
 
+def test_wait_for_workstream_denies_cross_tenant_child(populated_storage):
+    """Defense-in-depth (Copilot #506): a row whose ``parent_ws_id``
+    matches the coordinator but whose ``user_id`` belongs to a
+    different tenant must collapse to ``denied`` — otherwise a
+    forged / migration-era / pre-tenant-gate row would let a
+    coordinator's LLM observe foreign-tenant state through
+    ``wait_for_workstream``.  The ``populated_storage`` fixture's
+    ``cross-tenant-child`` row has exactly this shape
+    (parent_ws_id="coord-1", user_id="user-2").
+    """
+    client = _make_read_client(populated_storage)
+    result = client.wait_for_workstream(["cross-tenant-child"], timeout=5, mode="any")
+    assert result["results"]["cross-tenant-child"]["state"] == "denied"
+    assert result["complete"] is False
+    assert result["elapsed"] < 1.0
+
+
 def test_wait_for_workstream_missing_ws_id_indistinguishable_from_denied(populated_storage):
     """A ws_id that doesn't exist collapses into the same 'denied'
     shape as a foreign ws_id so wait can't be used as an existence
@@ -1400,10 +1596,22 @@ def test_wait_for_workstream_dedupes_ws_ids(populated_storage):
     assert list(result["results"].keys()) == ["child-a"]
 
 
-def test_wait_for_workstream_uses_batched_storage_calls(populated_storage, monkeypatch):
-    """Per-tick polling must issue batched storage calls — at the
-    documented cap (32 ws_ids over a 600s wait) the naive per-id
-    shape produced ~38k row reads.  Guard against regression."""
+def test_wait_for_workstream_never_falls_back_to_per_id_storage_calls(
+    populated_storage, monkeypatch
+):
+    """All storage reads issued by ``wait_for_workstream`` must go
+    through the batched paths.  At the documented cap (32 ws_ids over
+    a 600 s wait) the naive per-id shape produced ~38k row reads, so
+    a regression to per-id is the meaningful failure mode this test
+    guards against.
+
+    The primary safety net is the ``pytest.fail`` mock on the per-id
+    ``get_workstream`` / ``sum_workstream_tokens`` paths — any call
+    there blows up loudly with the regression message.  The
+    additional ``batch_calls`` / ``sum_calls`` assertions cover the
+    subtler regression where the call IS batched but only covers a
+    subset of ws_ids (e.g. one ws_id per call in a loop).
+    """
     client = _make_read_client(populated_storage)
     batch_calls: list[list[str]] = []
     sum_calls: list[list[str]] = []
@@ -1434,11 +1642,16 @@ def test_wait_for_workstream_uses_batched_storage_calls(populated_storage, monke
 
     result = client.wait_for_workstream(["child-a", "child-b"], timeout=5, mode="any")
     assert result["complete"] is True
-    # One tick is enough since child-a is already idle (terminal).
-    assert len(batch_calls) == 1
-    assert len(sum_calls) == 1
-    assert set(batch_calls[0]) == {"child-a", "child-b"}
-    assert set(sum_calls[0]) == {"child-a", "child-b"}
+    # Every batched call carried the full ws_id set.  The exact count
+    # (currently 2: one pre-loop ownership filter + one snapshot tick)
+    # is incidental; if either gains another batched read it stays
+    # batched, which is the property under test.
+    assert batch_calls, "no batched get_workstreams_batch call observed"
+    assert sum_calls, "no batched sum_workstream_tokens_batch call observed"
+    first_batch = set(batch_calls[0])
+    first_sum = set(sum_calls[0])
+    assert first_batch == {"child-a", "child-b"}
+    assert first_sum == {"child-a", "child-b"}
 
 
 def test_wait_for_workstream_handles_non_string_mode(populated_storage):
@@ -1450,6 +1663,205 @@ def test_wait_for_workstream_handles_non_string_mode(populated_storage):
     assert "invalid mode" in result["error"]
 
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# wait_for_workstream — event-driven (ChildEventBus wired in)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# When the coord adapter wires its ``child_event_bus`` into the client,
+# the wait loop blocks on a per-call ``threading.Event`` keyed by ws_id
+# and only re-snapshots storage on state-change wakes or the heartbeat
+# cap.  The legacy ``time.sleep`` poll path remains intact for tests
+# that don't wire the bus (above), so this section adds focused
+# coverage of the bus-driven behaviour without re-running the full
+# matrix of mode / since / cross-tenant cases.
+
+
+def _make_read_client_with_bus(storage, bus) -> CoordinatorClient:
+    """Like ``_make_read_client`` but wires a real ``ChildEventBus``.
+
+    Caller owns the bus so the test can call ``bus.notify(ws_id)`` to
+    simulate the dispatch-sink wake-up.
+    """
+    transport = httpx.MockTransport(lambda r: httpx.Response(200))
+    http = httpx.Client(transport=transport)
+    return CoordinatorClient(
+        console_base_url="http://x",
+        storage=storage,
+        token_factory=lambda: "t",
+        coord_ws_id="coord-1",
+        user_id="user-1",
+        http_client=http,
+        child_event_bus=bus,
+    )
+
+
+def test_wait_with_bus_returns_immediately_when_already_terminal(populated_storage):
+    """Subscribe-after-terminal race: the wait registers its waiter
+    BEFORE the first snapshot, then re-snapshots — an already-terminal
+    child must return at once without spinning the heartbeat cap.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
+
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    client = _make_read_client_with_bus(populated_storage, bus)
+    result = client.wait_for_workstream(["child-a"], timeout=5, mode="any")
+    assert result["complete"] is True
+    assert result["results"]["child-a"]["state"] == "idle"
+    assert result["elapsed"] < 1.0
+    # Waiter must be unregistered on exit so a long-lived bus doesn't
+    # accumulate dead keys across many waits.
+    assert "child-a" not in bus._waiters
+
+
+def test_wait_with_bus_wakes_on_notify(populated_storage):
+    """The core property of the refactor: a state-change ``notify``
+    must wake the wait promptly — well under the legacy 0.5 s poll
+    cadence AND the 2 s heartbeat cap.  Test fires a state update
+    + notify after a short delay and asserts the wait returns quickly.
+    """
+    import threading as _t
+
+    from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
+
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    client = _make_read_client_with_bus(populated_storage, bus)
+    # child-b starts running; flip to idle + notify after the wait
+    # blocks.  100 ms is enough that the wait is parked in event.wait()
+    # but short enough that the test runs fast.
+    timer = _t.Timer(
+        0.1,
+        lambda: (
+            populated_storage.update_workstream_state("child-b", "idle"),
+            bus.notify("child-b"),
+        ),
+    )
+    timer.start()
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    result = client.wait_for_workstream(["child-b"], timeout=5.0, mode="any")
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+    assert result["complete"] is True
+    assert result["results"]["child-b"]["state"] == "idle"
+    # Bus-driven wake should fire well under 1 s; legacy poll would
+    # take ~0.5 s but bus-driven should be ~0.1 s (the timer delay)
+    # plus a few ms.  Generous 0.6 s budget for CI noise.
+    assert elapsed < 0.6, f"wake-up too slow: {elapsed}s"
+
+
+def test_wait_with_bus_unrelated_notify_does_not_wake(populated_storage):
+    """A notify on a ws_id the wait isn't watching must NOT wake it —
+    otherwise every state change anywhere on the system would shake
+    every concurrent wait into a redundant storage snapshot.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
+
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    client = _make_read_client_with_bus(populated_storage, bus)
+    # child-b is running indefinitely; mode='all' will time out unless
+    # a relevant notify fires.  Fire only unrelated notifies — wait
+    # should still hit the full timeout.
+    import threading as _t
+
+    def _fire_unrelated() -> None:
+        for _ in range(5):
+            bus.notify("ws-unrelated-1")
+            bus.notify("ws-unrelated-2")
+            time.sleep(0.05)
+
+    t = _t.Thread(target=_fire_unrelated, daemon=True)
+    t.start()
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    result = client.wait_for_workstream(["child-b"], timeout=0.5, mode="all")
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+    assert result["complete"] is False, "unrelated notify falsely satisfied wait"
+    # Wait should burn its full timeout (give or take heartbeat
+    # granularity).  The bus path doesn't have a 0.5 s poll, so the
+    # bound is "approximately timeout".
+    assert elapsed >= 0.5
+    t.join(timeout=1.0)
+
+
+def test_wait_with_bus_heartbeat_still_progresses_without_notify(populated_storage):
+    """Without any notify, the wait must still progress through ticks
+    via the heartbeat cap so ``progress_callback`` keeps firing for
+    the sidebar UI.  Verified by counting callback firings over an
+    interval longer than the heartbeat.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
+
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    client = _make_read_client_with_bus(populated_storage, bus)
+    # Shrink the heartbeat for test speed via the ClassVar seam —
+    # instance attribute shadows the class-level default.  Production
+    # stays at 2.0 s; the test exercises the heartbeat-fires-without-
+    # notify property in well under 1 s.
+    client._WAIT_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL = 0.1  # type: ignore[misc]
+    snapshots: list[dict[str, dict[str, object]]] = []
+
+    def _cb(snap: dict[str, dict[str, object]], _elapsed: float) -> None:
+        snapshots.append(snap)
+
+    # child-b is running indefinitely; wait will time out at 0.4 s.
+    # With heartbeat = 0.1 s, we expect ~3-5 callback firings
+    # (initial tick + ~3-4 heartbeats).  Loose lower bound to avoid
+    # CI flakiness.
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    result = client.wait_for_workstream(["child-b"], timeout=0.4, mode="all", progress_callback=_cb)
+    elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+    assert result["complete"] is False
+    assert elapsed >= 0.4
+    # At least 2 callback firings: the initial snapshot plus at least
+    # one heartbeat-driven re-tick.  Tight upper bound would be
+    # ~ceil(0.4/0.1) + 1 = 5 firings.
+    assert len(snapshots) >= 2, f"heartbeat didn't fire: {len(snapshots)} snapshots"
+
+
+def test_wait_with_bus_unregisters_waiter_on_exit(populated_storage):
+    """Both the success path and the timeout path must unregister the
+    waiter — otherwise a long-lived bus accumulates dead
+    ``threading.Event`` instances forever.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
+
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    client = _make_read_client_with_bus(populated_storage, bus)
+    # Success path (already-terminal child).
+    client.wait_for_workstream(["child-a"], timeout=5, mode="any")
+    assert bus._waiters == {}, "success path leaked waiter"
+    # Timeout path (running child, mode='all' that times out).
+    client.wait_for_workstream(["child-a", "child-b"], timeout=0.3, mode="all")
+    assert bus._waiters == {}, "timeout path leaked waiter"
+
+
+def test_wait_with_bus_multi_waiter_independence(populated_storage):
+    """Two concurrent waits on the same ws_id must be independent —
+    one wait completing must not affect the other's wake-up state.
+    Smoke-tests the multi-Event-per-bucket bus behaviour against the
+    real wait-loop.
+    """
+    import threading as _t
+
+    from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
+
+    bus = ChildEventBus()
+    client = _make_read_client_with_bus(populated_storage, bus)
+
+    results: dict[str, dict[str, object]] = {}
+
+    def _do_wait(label: str) -> None:
+        results[label] = client.wait_for_workstream(["child-a"], timeout=5, mode="any")
+
+    threads = [_t.Thread(target=_do_wait, args=(f"t{i}",), daemon=True) for i in range(3)]
+    for t in threads:
+        t.start()
+    for t in threads:
+        t.join(timeout=5.0)
+    for label in ("t0", "t1", "t2"):
+        assert results[label]["complete"] is True
+        assert results[label]["results"]["child-a"]["state"] == "idle"
+    # All waiters must be unregistered after exit.
+    assert bus._waiters == {}
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # wait_for_workstream — last-message bundling
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -2247,3 +2659,362 @@ def test_cleanup_dead_task_child_refs_storage_batch_failure_swallows(populated_s
 
     populated_storage.get_workstreams_batch = _boom  # type: ignore[method-assign]
     assert client.cleanup_dead_task_child_refs("coord-1") == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# inspect_workstream — three-tier output compression
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# A coord doing a fan-out wave against tool-heavy children would
+# otherwise blow the context budget on raw output alone.  Mirrors the
+# search tool's Tier-1/Tier-2/Tier-3 ladder.
+
+
+def _make_inspect_result(
+    *, ws_id: str = "ws-test", state: str = "running", n_messages: int = 5
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Build an inspect-result dict shaped like ``coordinator_client.inspect()``.
+
+    Production output keys (``ws_id``, ``skill_id``) mirror the storage
+    row that ``inspect()`` spreads from ``get_workstream``.  Tests that
+    synthesize an inspect result must match these keys — otherwise a
+    formatter that looks at the production keys silently emits null
+    values against a fixture that uses different ones (real bug-1
+    regression source: skeleton tier read ``skill`` from a fixture
+    that wrote ``skill`` while production wrote ``skill_id``).
+    """
+    return {
+        "ws_id": ws_id,
+        "state": state,
+        "title": "test workstream",
+        "skill_id": "researcher",
+        "messages": [
+            {"role": "user" if i % 2 == 0 else "assistant", "content": f"msg {i} content"}
+            for i in range(n_messages)
+        ],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_full_fits_returns_full_tier():
+    """Small payloads pass through with `_tier='full'` — no compression."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import _format_inspect_tiered
+
+    result = _make_inspect_result(n_messages=3)
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "full"
+    # Every message verbatim.
+    assert len(parsed["messages"]) == 3
+    assert parsed["messages"][0]["content"] == "msg 0 content"
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_compact_when_full_exceeds_budget():
+    """Large messages trigger the compact tier — head/tail-snipped
+    content with the rest of the row intact."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import (
+        _INSPECT_MSG_CONTENT_HEAD,
+        _INSPECT_MSG_CONTENT_TAIL,
+        _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET,
+        _format_inspect_tiered,
+    )
+
+    # Each message ~5KB; with 20 messages, full tier blows the 32KB budget.
+    fat = "X" * 5000
+    result = {
+        "id": "ws-fat",
+        "state": "running",
+        "messages": [{"role": "assistant", "content": fat} for _ in range(20)],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "compact"
+    # Every message preserved (compact keeps the count, just snips content).
+    assert len(parsed["messages"]) == 20
+    # Head/tail snip kicked in.
+    msg_content = parsed["messages"][0]["content"]
+    assert msg_content.startswith("X" * _INSPECT_MSG_CONTENT_HEAD)
+    assert msg_content.endswith("X" * _INSPECT_MSG_CONTENT_TAIL)
+    assert "chars elided" in msg_content
+    # Budget invariant — the load-bearing contract of the formatter.
+    # Without this assertion, a future change to ``_tier_note`` or
+    # ``_compact_message`` could push the output over budget and the
+    # ``_truncate_output`` head+tail safety net would silently mask
+    # the regression, re-introducing the middle-message-drop pathology.
+    assert len(out) <= _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_compact_when_content_below_snip_threshold():
+    """When per-message content is below the snip threshold but the
+    message COUNT alone overflows the budget, compact tier must still
+    stay within budget — by trimming the message list (head + tail of
+    messages) rather than degrading straight to skeleton.  Bug-3
+    regression cover: with 400 × 100-char messages, the original
+    formatter fell through to skeleton because adding ``_tier_note``
+    to an un-snipped tier-2 produced output strictly larger than
+    tier-1 (both over budget).  The fix preserves messages from both
+    ends of the list and inserts an ``_omitted`` sentinel."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import (
+        _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET,
+        _format_inspect_tiered,
+    )
+
+    # 400 × ~100 chars → Tier-1 ~53 KB (over budget), per-message
+    # content under the 964-char snip threshold so content-snipping
+    # saves nothing.  Without the list-trim rung the formatter would
+    # fall to skeleton and drop all 400 messages.
+    smallish = "S" * 100
+    result = {
+        "ws_id": "ws-many-small",
+        "state": "running",
+        "messages": [
+            {"role": "assistant" if i % 2 == 0 else "user", "content": smallish} for i in range(400)
+        ],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    # Should NOT fall through to skeleton — message-list trim preserves
+    # head + tail of the conversation.
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "compact"
+    assert "messages" in parsed
+    # Some messages must survive; the trim shape is head + tail with an
+    # ``_omitted`` sentinel between them.
+    assert len(parsed["messages"]) > 0
+    assert len(parsed["messages"]) < 400
+    # Budget invariant.
+    assert len(out) <= _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_skeleton_when_compact_also_exceeds_budget():
+    """Tier 3 fallback: counts + last assistant preview only.  Trigger by
+    flooding with messages whose content is a multi-block list — the
+    snipper correctly leaves non-string content unchanged (mirrors
+    Anthropic/OpenAI multi-block content shape), so even after the
+    (5, 10) message-list trim the surviving 15 messages don't fit in
+    the 32 KB budget."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import (
+        _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET,
+        _format_inspect_tiered,
+    )
+
+    # 50 messages × multi-block content (~30 KB each — list-shape
+    # content bypasses the head/tail string snipper because lists
+    # aren't strings).  Even (5, 10) trim leaves 15 × 30 KB which
+    # blows the 32 KB budget — forces skeleton.
+    fat_block = {"type": "text", "text": "Y" * 3000}
+    result = {
+        "ws_id": "ws-flood",
+        "state": "running",
+        "title": "flood",
+        "skill_id": "researcher",
+        "messages": [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant" if i % 2 == 0 else "user",
+                "content": [fat_block] * 10,
+            }
+            for i in range(50)
+        ],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "skeleton"
+    assert parsed["message_count"] == 50
+    # Role distribution surfaces — the "what shape of activity" signal.
+    assert parsed["roles"]["assistant"] == 25
+    assert parsed["roles"]["user"] == 25
+    # No `messages` field at skeleton tier — only the aggregate signal.
+    assert "messages" not in parsed
+    # Budget invariant.
+    assert len(out) <= _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_skeleton_keeps_terminal_state_fields():
+    """``close_reason`` / ``last_error`` survive the skeleton fall — they're
+    small, load-bearing, and the operator needs them to understand WHY
+    a terminal child landed in its state."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import (
+        _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET,
+        _format_inspect_tiered,
+    )
+
+    # Same flood pattern as the bare-skeleton test (multi-block content
+    # bypasses the string snipper) — paired with terminal-state fields
+    # that must survive the skeleton fall.
+    fat_block = {"type": "text", "text": "Z" * 3000}
+    result = {
+        "ws_id": "ws-closed",
+        "state": "closed",
+        "title": "done",
+        "skill_id": "researcher",
+        "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": [fat_block] * 10} for _ in range(50)],
+        "verdicts": [],
+        "close_reason": "task complete: report attached",
+        "live": None,  # filtered by truthy check
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "skeleton"
+    assert parsed["close_reason"] == "task complete: report attached"
+    # Falsy ``live`` doesn't bleed through.
+    assert "live" not in parsed
+    assert len(out) <= _INSPECT_OUTPUT_BUDGET
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_error_shapes_bypass_tiering():
+    """Cross-tenant / not-found responses keep their original shape — they
+    carry no messages, are already tiny, and changing them would break
+    callers that key on the ``error`` field."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import _format_inspect_tiered
+
+    result = {"error": "workstream not found", "ws_id": "ws-foreign"}
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed == {"error": "workstream not found", "ws_id": "ws-foreign"}
+    # No `_tier` annotation — error shapes are self-describing.
+    assert "_tier" not in parsed
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_compact_preserves_tool_call_linkage():
+    """Compact tier keeps ``tool_name`` / ``tool_call_id`` / ``name`` so a
+    model reading the snipped trace can still pair a tool call to its
+    response — the linkage is load-bearing for "what happened" signal."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import _format_inspect_tiered
+
+    fat = "Q" * 5000
+    result = {
+        "ws_id": "ws-tools",
+        "state": "running",
+        "messages": [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": fat,
+                "tool_name": "bash",
+                "tool_call_id": "call-1",
+            }
+            for _ in range(20)
+        ],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "compact"
+    first = parsed["messages"][0]
+    assert first["tool_name"] == "bash"
+    assert first["tool_call_id"] == "call-1"
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_compact_preserves_assistant_tool_calls():
+    """Compact tier must preserve the assistant-side ``tool_calls`` list
+    (OpenAI shape: ``[{id, type, function: {name, arguments}}]``) so a
+    model reading the snipped trace can see WHICH tool was called and
+    pair it with the corresponding result row via ``id`` ↔ ``tool_call_id``.
+    Bug-2 regression cover: the pre-fix compactor stripped ``tool_calls``,
+    leaving the audit reader with a tool-result orphan against an
+    invisible call.
+
+    ``function.arguments`` strings are snipped head/tail (analogous to
+    content) because they can be multi-KB JSON; ``id`` and
+    ``function.name`` are preserved verbatim — they're the linkage."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import (
+        _INSPECT_TOOL_ARG_HEAD,
+        _INSPECT_TOOL_ARG_TAIL,
+        _format_inspect_tiered,
+    )
+
+    fat_content = "C" * 5000  # forces compact tier
+    fat_args = "A" * 5000  # forces argument snipping
+    tool_calls = [
+        {
+            "id": "call-abc-123",
+            "type": "function",
+            "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": fat_args},
+        },
+        {
+            "id": "call-def-456",
+            "type": "function",
+            "function": {"name": "read_file", "arguments": fat_args},
+        },
+    ]
+    result = {
+        "ws_id": "ws-tool-calls",
+        "state": "running",
+        "messages": [
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": fat_content, "tool_calls": tool_calls}
+            for _ in range(20)
+        ],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "compact"
+    first = parsed["messages"][0]
+    # tool_calls survives compaction.
+    assert "tool_calls" in first
+    assert len(first["tool_calls"]) == 2
+    # Linkage fields verbatim.
+    assert first["tool_calls"][0]["id"] == "call-abc-123"
+    assert first["tool_calls"][0]["function"]["name"] == "bash"
+    assert first["tool_calls"][1]["id"] == "call-def-456"
+    assert first["tool_calls"][1]["function"]["name"] == "read_file"
+    # arguments snipped head/tail — both prefix and suffix preserved.
+    snipped_args = first["tool_calls"][0]["function"]["arguments"]
+    assert snipped_args.startswith("A" * _INSPECT_TOOL_ARG_HEAD)
+    assert snipped_args.endswith("A" * _INSPECT_TOOL_ARG_TAIL)
+    assert "chars elided" in snipped_args
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_compact_passes_small_messages_through_unsnipped():
+    """Messages under the snip threshold pass through verbatim at compact
+    tier — snipping a 100-byte message costs more bytes (the elision
+    marker) than it saves."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import _format_inspect_tiered
+
+    # Mix: a few large messages force compact tier; small messages must
+    # not be snipped.
+    big = "B" * 5000
+    small = "S" * 50
+    result = {
+        "id": "ws-mixed",
+        "state": "running",
+        "messages": [{"role": "assistant", "content": big} for _ in range(15)]
+        + [{"role": "user", "content": small}],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "compact"
+    # The trailing small message is exact, not snipped.
+    assert parsed["messages"][-1]["content"] == small
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_emits_tier_note_when_compressed():
+    """The ``_tier_note`` advisory tells the LLM how to ask for a tighter
+    or fuller view next time — actionable feedback rather than a bare
+    "we compressed your output" signal."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import _format_inspect_tiered
+
+    fat = "F" * 5000
+    result = {
+        "id": "ws-noted",
+        "state": "running",
+        "messages": [{"role": "assistant", "content": fat} for _ in range(20)],
+        "verdicts": [],
+    }
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(result)
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert "_tier_note" in parsed
+    assert "message_limit" in parsed["_tier_note"]
+
+
+def test_format_inspect_tiered_full_tier_omits_tier_note():
+    """When the full tier fits, no note is emitted — the absence of a
+    note is the signal that nothing was compressed."""
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_client import _format_inspect_tiered
+
+    out = _format_inspect_tiered(_make_inspect_result(n_messages=2))
+    parsed = json.loads(out)
+    assert parsed["_tier"] == "full"
+    assert "_tier_note" not in parsed

tests/test_coordinator_end_to_end.py

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ from turnstone.console.server import (
     _require_coord_mgr,
 )
 from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult
+from turnstone.core.child_event_bus import ChildEventBus
 from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
 from turnstone.core.session_routes import (
     SessionEndpointConfig,
@@ -286,6 +287,7 @@ def test_coordinator_client_spawn_close_delete(tmp_path):
         coord_ws_id="coord-42",
         user_id="user-1",
         http_client=http,
+        child_event_bus=ChildEventBus(),
     )
 
     # spawn ---------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -387,6 +389,7 @@ def _read_client(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> CoordinatorClient:
         coord_ws_id="coord-root",
         user_id="user-1",
         http_client=http,
+        child_event_bus=ChildEventBus(),
     )
 
 

tests/test_coordinator_idle_observer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`CoordinatorIdleObserver`.
+
+Drives a fake :class:`SessionManager` that mirrors the real one's
+``subscribe_to_state`` / ``get`` contract, plus a fake storage with the
+``list_workstreams`` slice the observer queries.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import threading
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.console.coordinator_idle_observer import CoordinatorIdleObserver
+from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import NudgeQueue
+from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamKind, WorkstreamState
+
+
+class _FakeRow:
+    """SQLAlchemy-Row-like wrapper exposing ``_mapping``."""
+
+    def __init__(self, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        self._mapping = kwargs
+
+
+class _FakeStorage:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.children: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.list_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.count_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self.list_raises: bool = False
+        self.count_raises: bool = False
+
+    def list_workstreams(
+        self,
+        node_id: str | None = None,
+        limit: int = 100,
+        *,
+        parent_ws_id: str | None = None,
+        kind: WorkstreamKind | str | None = None,
+        user_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> list[Any]:
+        self.list_calls.append(
+            {
+                "limit": limit,
+                "parent_ws_id": parent_ws_id,
+                "kind": kind,
+                "user_id": user_id,
+            }
+        )
+        if self.list_raises:
+            raise RuntimeError("storage forced failure")
+        return [_FakeRow(**c) for c in self.children]
+
+    def count_workstreams_by_state(
+        self,
+        *,
+        parent_ws_id: str | None = None,
+        user_id: str | None = None,
+    ) -> dict[str, int]:
+        self.count_calls.append({"parent_ws_id": parent_ws_id, "user_id": user_id})
+        if self.count_raises:
+            raise RuntimeError("count forced failure")
+        counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+        for c in self.children:
+            counts[c["state"]] = counts.get(c["state"], 0) + 1
+        return counts
+
+
+class _FakeSession:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._nudge_queue = NudgeQueue()
+        self.messages: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+        self._wake_source_tag: str = ""
+        self._metacog_state: dict[str, float] = {}
+        self._mem_cfg = MagicMock(nudge_cooldown=300)
+
+    def _visible_memory_count(self) -> int:
+        return 0
+
+
+class _FakeWorkstream:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        ws_id: str = "ws-coord",
+        kind: WorkstreamKind = WorkstreamKind.COORDINATOR,
+        user_id: str = "u1",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.id = ws_id
+        self.kind = kind
+        self.user_id = user_id
+        self.session: _FakeSession | None = _FakeSession()
+
+
+class _FakeManager:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._workstreams: dict[str, _FakeWorkstream] = {}
+        self._subscribers: list[Any] = []
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def add_ws(self, ws: _FakeWorkstream) -> None:
+        self._workstreams[ws.id] = ws
+
+    def remove_ws(self, ws_id: str) -> None:
+        self._workstreams.pop(ws_id, None)
+
+    def get(self, ws_id: str) -> _FakeWorkstream | None:
+        return self._workstreams.get(ws_id)
+
+    def subscribe_to_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            self._subscribers.append(callback)
+
+    def unsubscribe_from_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._lock, contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
+            self._subscribers.remove(callback)
+
+    def fire_state(self, ws_id: str, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+        with self._lock:
+            subs = list(self._subscribers)
+        for cb in subs:
+            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+                cb(ws_id, state)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def coord_setup() -> tuple[_FakeManager, _FakeStorage, _FakeWorkstream]:
+    mgr = _FakeManager()
+    storage = _FakeStorage()
+    ws = _FakeWorkstream()
+    mgr.add_ws(ws)
+    return mgr, storage, ws
+
+
+def _add_active_child(storage: _FakeStorage, **overrides: Any) -> None:
+    storage.children.append(
+        {
+            "ws_id": overrides.get("ws_id", "child-1"),
+            "name": overrides.get("name", "research"),
+            "state": overrides.get("state", "running"),
+        }
+    )
+
+
+class TestEnqueueOnIdle:
+    def test_idle_with_active_children_enqueues(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-a", state="running")
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-b", state="thinking")
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        snap = ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")
+        assert len(snap) == 1
+        nudge_type, text = snap[0]
+        assert nudge_type == "idle_children"
+        assert "child-a" in text
+        assert "child-b" in text
+
+    def test_idle_with_no_active_children_no_enqueue(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        # storage.children is empty
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_idle_only_idle_state_children_no_enqueue(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        # All children "idle" — terminal-from-coord-perspective; not active.
+        _add_active_child(storage, state="idle")
+        _add_active_child(storage, state="closed")
+        _add_active_child(storage, state="error")
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_non_idle_state_no_enqueue(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        for state in (
+            WorkstreamState.RUNNING,
+            WorkstreamState.THINKING,
+            WorkstreamState.ATTENTION,
+            WorkstreamState.ERROR,
+        ):
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, state)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+
+class TestKindFilter:
+    def test_interactive_workstream_skipped(self):
+        mgr = _FakeManager()
+        storage = _FakeStorage()
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        ws = _FakeWorkstream(kind=WorkstreamKind.INTERACTIVE)
+        mgr.add_ws(ws)
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # Observer ignored the non-coord workstream entirely.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+        # Storage was NOT queried — kind check happens before list_workstreams.
+        assert storage.list_calls == []
+
+
+class TestWaitForWorkstreamSkip:
+    def test_skips_when_last_assistant_used_wait(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "kick off"},
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": None,
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "call-1",
+                        "function": {"name": "wait_for_workstream", "arguments": "{}"},
+                    }
+                ],
+            },
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # Don't pile on — model is already using the right tool.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_fires_when_last_assistant_used_different_tool(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": None,
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {"id": "call-1", "function": {"name": "spawn_workstream", "arguments": "{}"}}
+                ],
+            },
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 1
+
+
+class TestHardCap:
+    def test_hard_cap_blocks_after_n_fires(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        # Bypass cooldown for this test: each call burns a per-type slot
+        # in ``_metacog_state`` so we need to clear it between fires.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        # Cap = 3 fires.  Even with cooldown bypassed, the 4th doesn't fire.
+        ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # We enqueued 3 entries total; cap blocked the 4th.
+        snap = ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")
+        assert len(snap) == 3
+
+    def test_cap_resets_when_state_leaves_idle_without_wake(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        # Burn the cap.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 3
+
+        # Drain the queue (simulate the watcher delivering them).
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+
+        # Real (non-wake) leave-IDLE: tag is empty.  Cap resets.
+        ws.session._wake_source_tag = ""
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.RUNNING)
+
+        # New IDLE — cap is fresh, fires again.
+        ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 1
+
+    def test_cap_does_not_reset_during_wake_driven_exit(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        # Burn the cap.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+
+        # Wake-driven leave-IDLE: tag is set during the wake send.
+        ws.session._wake_source_tag = "system_nudge"
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.RUNNING)
+        ws.session._wake_source_tag = ""  # tag cleared at end of wake send
+
+        # Cap should NOT have reset — re-IDLE shouldn't fire.
+        ws.session._metacog_state.clear()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 0
+
+
+class TestCooldown:
+    def test_cooldown_blocks_within_window(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 1
+
+        # Drain so the queue isn't the gate.
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.drain({"any"})
+
+        # Second fire within the cooldown window → should_nudge returns False.
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 0
+
+
+class TestStorageFailure:
+    def test_storage_exception_is_swallowed(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        storage.list_raises = True
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        # Must not raise / propagate.
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+
+class TestValidUntilPredicate:
+    def test_predicate_drops_when_children_finish_before_drain(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-a", state="running")
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 1
+
+        # Children now complete (storage shows none active).
+        storage.children.clear()
+
+        # Drain at the user seam — predicate re-queries, finds 0 active,
+        # drops the entry without delivering.
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import USER_DRAIN
+
+        delivered = ws.session._nudge_queue.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert delivered == []
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_predicate_delivers_when_children_still_active(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage, ws_id="child-a", state="running")
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        # Children still active → predicate returns True → entry delivers.
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import USER_DRAIN
+
+        delivered = ws.session._nudge_queue.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert len(delivered) == 1
+        assert delivered[0][0] == "idle_children"
+
+    def test_predicate_drops_on_storage_failure(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+        # Storage failure at drain time.  Predicate treats raises as
+        # "no longer valid" (drop) — see NudgeQueue.drain's predicate
+        # exception handling.
+        storage.count_raises = True
+
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import USER_DRAIN
+
+        delivered = ws.session._nudge_queue.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert delivered == []
+
+
+class TestLifecycle:
+    def test_start_idempotent(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        observer.start()  # no-op
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        # Double-subscribe would have produced 2 entries.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue.pending("any")) == 1
+
+    def test_shutdown_unsubscribes(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, storage, ws = coord_setup
+        _add_active_child(storage)
+        # ≥2 messages so should_nudge's message_count > 1 gate clears.
+        ws.session.messages = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "go"},
+            {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+        ]
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+        observer.start()
+        observer.shutdown()
+        mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+    def test_shutdown_idempotent(self, coord_setup):
+        mgr, _storage, _ws = coord_setup
+        observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, _storage)
+        observer.start()
+        observer.shutdown()
+        observer.shutdown()  # no error

tests/test_coordinator_page.py

@@ -79,9 +79,10 @@ def test_coordinator_js_exposes_inline_approval_helpers():
     assert "function submitChildApproval" in body or "submitChildApproval(" in body
     # The shared approve POST helper (parameterized for child ws_ids)
     assert "function approveWorkstream" in body or "approveWorkstream(" in body
-    # The urgent live-bulk fetch option that fires on activity_state
-    # transitions in/out of "approval"
-    assert "{ urgent: true }" in body or "urgent: true" in body
+    # The 409 stale-call_id retry path uses invalidateLiveBadge +
+    # scheduleLiveFetch (Stage 3 cleanup removed the urgent flag —
+    # cache invalidation makes the TTL gate fall through naturally).
+    assert "invalidateLiveBadge(targetWsId)" in body
     # Server-side payload field — drift here means the JS reads stale keys
     assert "pending_approval_detail" in body
     # Reconnect parity (chunk 4): the SSE re-open handler must drop
@@ -90,10 +91,10 @@ def test_coordinator_js_exposes_inline_approval_helpers():
     # can't render zombie approve/deny buttons on a row whose
     # approval was resolved during the gap. The implementation
     # iterates the cache and deletes only !permanent entries —
-    # asserting the literal Map iteration form keeps a refactor
-    # back to liveBadgeCache.clear() (which would re-pay 403s on
-    # every reconnect for denied ids) from sneaking in.
-    assert "liveBadgeCache.delete" in body
+    # asserting the literal helper call keeps a refactor back to
+    # _liveBadgeCacheClear() (which would re-pay 403s on every
+    # reconnect for denied ids) from sneaking in.
+    assert "_liveBadgeCacheDelete" in body
     # Edge-case matrix sentinel labels — POLICY-BLOCKED renders when
     # an item has error set + needs_approval=False (server-side
     # tool policy already blocked the call); "(judge unavailable)"
@@ -113,15 +114,19 @@ def test_coordinator_js_exposes_inline_approval_helpers():
     # coord-self ws_id (the coord lives on the console process).
     # Children live on cluster nodes and 404 without the prefix.
     assert "/v1/api/route/workstreams/" in body
-    # Late-judge polling — the LLM judge runs async on the child
-    # node and never pushes a signal that reaches the coord, so
-    # the row's pending_approval_detail with judge_pending=true
-    # would freeze on heuristic verdicts forever without this
-    # poll loop. The poller is GLOBAL (not per-row) so off-screen
-    # rows still refresh — a per-row poller's scheduleLiveFetch
-    # call short-circuits on non-visible rows, leaving them stuck.
-    assert "_maybeStartJudgePoll" in body
-    assert "_judgePollTick" in body
+    # Late-arriving LLM judge verdicts — Stage 3 Step 5 promoted
+    # ``intent_verdict`` and ``approval_resolved`` to first-class
+    # cluster-bus event types, so the coord adapter dispatches them
+    # as ``child_ws_intent_verdict`` / ``child_ws_approval_resolved``
+    # on the parent's SSE stream. The browser handlers write
+    # directly to liveBadgeCache (bypassing scheduleLiveFetch's
+    # visibility gate cleanly) so off-screen rows pick up verdicts
+    # without polling. Replaced the old ``_judgePollTick`` 90-second
+    # global poll loop and its visibility-gate-bypass workaround.
+    assert "handleChildIntentVerdict" in body
+    assert "handleChildApprovalResolved" in body
+    assert "child_ws_intent_verdict" in body
+    assert "child_ws_approval_resolved" in body
     # Reload parity for the coord-self approval gate: init() must
     # consume the authoritative GET /workstreams snapshot's
     # pending_approval_detail so a freshly opened tab can render
@@ -152,3 +157,188 @@ def test_coordinator_js_exposes_inline_approval_helpers():
     # any prior denial.  bug-1 / bug-3 from the second /review pass.
     assert "Denied by user" in body
     assert "callOutcomes" in body
+    # User-message attachment pills — both live send (coordSend) and
+    # history replay route through appendUserMessageWithAttachments.
+    # Renaming or dropping the helper would silently regress the
+    # attachment affordance to the pre-fix plain-text bubble, which
+    # would only surface in manual testing of an attached-file flow.
+    # The CSS class is the visual anchor (coordinator.css) — keeping
+    # both literals in the smoke layer covers JS↔CSS drift in either
+    # direction.
+    assert "function appendUserMessageWithAttachments" in body
+    assert "msg-user-attach" in body
+    # PR #487 — whitespace-only assistant content (Qwen3 with vLLM
+    # ``--reasoning-parser`` strips ``<think>…</think>`` and emits only
+    # ``"\n\n"`` as content before a tool call) must be skipped on
+    # history replay or the empty ``.msg.assistant`` card surfaces as
+    # a phantom row.  The literal substring ``content.trim()`` is the
+    # single-line guard the rendering branch uses; a refactor that
+    # drops the trim() (e.g. simplifies to ``if (!content)``) silently
+    # regresses the phantom-card fix on the multi-node coord path.
+    # Mirrors ``test_app_js.py``'s same-shape pin on ``app.js``.
+    assert "content.trim()" in body
+    # PR #487 — coord history replay must render the assistant content
+    # card BEFORE the tool batch, not after, so DOM order matches the
+    # chronological order the model emitted (text → dispatch → results).
+    # Pre-fix the tool_calls branch sat at the role-agnostic top of the
+    # loop and rendered ahead of the assistant text that announced the
+    # batch, putting parallel fan-outs visually above their narrating
+    # message.  The fix hoisted the synthesis into ``renderAssistantToolBatch``
+    # called from inside the assistant branch AFTER the content card —
+    # asserting the helper name lets a refactor that re-inlines or
+    # renames it surface here instead of via manual reload testing.
+    assert "function renderAssistantToolBatch" in body
+    assert "renderAssistantToolBatch(m)" in body
+
+
+def test_coordinator_js_handle_child_state_no_longer_reads_sse_pending_approval_detail():
+    """Stage 3 cleanup — ``pending_approval_detail`` is no longer
+    piggybacked on child_ws_state events. Approval items now arrive
+    via bulk fetch on the activity_state="approval" transition;
+    verdicts via the explicit ``child_ws_intent_verdict`` event class;
+    resolution via ``child_ws_approval_resolved``. A refactor that
+    re-introduces the piggyback would silently re-open the
+    duplicate-path race the dedicated event classes were added to
+    eliminate.
+
+    Structural assertions (regex against multi-line source) — symbol-
+    presence alone wouldn't catch a guard that keeps the names but
+    inverts the comparison or drops the ``prev.live`` check. This
+    codebase has no JS test framework, so locking the guard's shape
+    here is the next-best thing to a behavioral test."""
+    import re
+    from pathlib import Path
+
+    coord_js = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / (
+        "turnstone/console/static/coordinator/coordinator.js"
+    )
+    body = coord_js.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    # The piggyback read is gone from handleChildState. (The string
+    # may still appear elsewhere — e.g. handleChildIntentVerdict
+    # reading from cache, or comments — but never as ``ev.pending_approval_detail``.)
+    assert "ev.pending_approval_detail" not in body
+    # The pre-fix urgent-fetch on activity_state transitions is gone.
+    assert "enteredApproval" not in body
+    assert "leftApproval" not in body
+    # ``pendingApproval`` flag derivation must check BOTH state and
+    # activity_state. The worker thread can fire the state transition
+    # to "attention" before approve_tools updates activity_state, so
+    # checking only activity_state misses children that legitimately
+    # need approval. Pin the disjunction so the regression doesn't
+    # silently re-introduce.
+    assert re.search(
+        r'existing\.state\s*===\s*"attention"\s*\|\|\s*'
+        r'existing\.activity_state\s*===\s*"approval"',
+        body,
+    ), (
+        "handleChildState must derive pendingApproval from "
+        "(state==='attention' || activity_state==='approval')"
+    )
+
+    # SSE-authoritative window constant is defined and used.
+    assert re.search(r"\bconst\s+SSE_AUTHORITATIVE_MS\s*=\s*\d+", body), (
+        "SSE_AUTHORITATIVE_MS constant must be defined as a numeric literal"
+    )
+
+    # SSE writers tag entries with sseUpdatedAt: Date.now() so the
+    # merge guard in flushLiveFetches preserves them against stale
+    # bulk-fetch responses. handleChildState only stamps when it
+    # AUTHORITATIVELY clears the detail (off-approval transition);
+    # writers that stamp unconditionally are intent_verdict (verdict
+    # stamp), approval_resolved (clear), and the optimistic-clear
+    # path in submitChildApproval. Pinning the literal Date.now()
+    # call keeps a refactor that drops the SSE-source tag entirely
+    # from sneaking in.
+    assert re.search(
+        r"sseUpdatedAt:\s*Date\.now\(\)",
+        body,
+    ), "Critical SSE writers must stamp sseUpdatedAt: Date.now()"
+
+    # flushLiveFetches' merge guard structure: SSE-set pending_approval
+    # / _detail wins over a stale bulk-poll snapshot when (live) AND
+    # (prev exists) AND (prev.sseUpdatedAt set) AND (within window)
+    # AND (prev.live exists).  Inverting the comparison or dropping
+    # any of these guards reopens the clobber bug.
+    merge_guard = re.search(
+        r"if\s*\(\s*live\s*&&\s*prev\s*&&\s*prev\.sseUpdatedAt\s*&&\s*"
+        r"now\s*-\s*prev\.sseUpdatedAt\s*<\s*SSE_AUTHORITATIVE_MS\s*&&\s*"
+        r"prev\.live\s*\)",
+        body,
+    )
+    assert merge_guard is not None, (
+        "flushLiveFetches merge guard must be the conjunction "
+        "(live && prev && prev.sseUpdatedAt && now - prev.sseUpdatedAt < "
+        "SSE_AUTHORITATIVE_MS && prev.live).  An inverted comparison or "
+        "missing prev.live check would let a stale bulk-poll clobber a "
+        "fresh SSE-set approval."
+    )
+
+    # The merge body must preserve BOTH pending_approval and
+    # pending_approval_detail from prev — preserving only one would
+    # render a row with a phantom badge but no buttons (or vice versa).
+    merge_body = re.search(
+        r"mergedLive\s*=\s*Object\.assign\(\s*\{\}\s*,\s*live\s*,\s*\{"
+        r"[^}]*pending_approval:\s*prev\.live\.pending_approval[^}]*"
+        r"pending_approval_detail:\s*prev\.live\.pending_approval_detail",
+        body,
+    )
+    assert merge_body is not None, (
+        "Merge body must preserve both pending_approval AND "
+        "pending_approval_detail from prev.live — preserving only one "
+        "creates a half-rendered approval row."
+    )
+
+    # flushLiveFetches must forward sseUpdatedAt onto the new cache
+    # entry so the SSE-source tag survives the bulk-poll write back —
+    # without this, every bulk-poll resets the window and the next
+    # late-arriving poll silently clobbers.
+    assert re.search(
+        r"sseUpdatedAt:\s*prev\s*\?\s*prev\.sseUpdatedAt",
+        body,
+    ), (
+        "flushLiveFetches must forward prev.sseUpdatedAt onto the new "
+        "cache entry (preserving the SSE-source window across bulk-poll "
+        "cycles) — without this, the second bulk-poll after an SSE "
+        "transition silently clobbers."
+    )
+
+
+def test_coord_history_renders_user_interjection_advisory_after_tool_block():
+    """Queued user messages spliced into the last tool-result envelope
+    of a batch (Seam 1) persist on the tool DB row as a wrapped
+    ``<tool_output>`` envelope.  ``decorate_history_messages`` extracts
+    the advisory back out and the wire layer projects it onto
+    ``m.advisories``; the coord history loop must invoke the shared
+    ``replayAdvisoriesAfterTool`` helper (defined in
+    ``shared/utils.js``) so each ``user_interjection`` renders through
+    ``appendUserMessageWithAttachments`` and the bubble looks identical
+    to a Seam 2/3 user row.
+
+    This test pins the call site so a refactor that drops the helper
+    invocation regresses the queued-during-batch replay shape silently.
+    Mirrors ``test_app_js.py``'s same-shape pin on interactive's
+    ``replayHistory``."""
+    import re
+    from pathlib import Path
+
+    coord_js = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / (
+        "turnstone/console/static/coordinator/coordinator.js"
+    )
+    body = coord_js.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+    assert "replayAdvisoriesAfterTool(m.advisories" in body, (
+        "Coord history loop must invoke replayAdvisoriesAfterTool with "
+        "m.advisories so queued messages spliced into the tool envelope "
+        "render as user bubbles after the tool block."
+    )
+    # The renderer callback routes through appendUserMessageWithAttachments
+    # so the bubble matches a normal user-row replay.
+    assert re.search(
+        r"appendUserMessageWithAttachments\(\s*text",
+        body,
+    ), (
+        "Coord history loop's renderer callback must route the extracted "
+        "advisory text through appendUserMessageWithAttachments so the "
+        "rendered bubble matches a normal user-row replay."
+    )

tests/test_coordinator_tools.py

@@ -215,7 +215,12 @@ def test_spawn_exec_does_not_surface_misleading_status_field(coord_session):
     summary tempted callers to write ``if result["status"] == "idle"``
     which silently never matched.  The summary now omits the field
     entirely; lifecycle state lives on the workstream row and is read
-    via inspect_workstream."""
+    via inspect_workstream.
+
+    Also asserts the return key is ``child_ws_id`` (not ``ws_id``) so
+    the coordinator LLM doesn't recency-bias toward feeding the spawn
+    output back into another ``spawn_workstream(ws_id=...)`` call.
+    """
     sess, coord, _ui = coord_session
     coord.spawn.return_value = {
         "ws_id": "child-7",
@@ -227,8 +232,9 @@ def test_spawn_exec_does_not_surface_misleading_status_field(coord_session):
     _call_id, output = sess._exec_spawn_workstream(item)
     body = json.loads(output)
     assert "status" not in body
+    assert "ws_id" not in body
     # The substantive fields are still here.
-    assert body["ws_id"] == "child-7"
+    assert body["child_ws_id"] == "child-7"
     assert body["node_id"] == "node-1"
 
 
@@ -248,6 +254,10 @@ def test_spawn_batch_exec_does_not_surface_misleading_status_field(coord_session
     body = json.loads(output)
     assert "0" in body["results"]
     assert "status" not in body["results"]["0"]
+    # Per-result entries surface ``child_ws_id``, not ``ws_id`` — same
+    # recency-bias rationale as the spawn_workstream test above.
+    assert body["results"]["0"]["child_ws_id"] == "c-x"
+    assert "ws_id" not in body["results"]["0"]
 
 
 def test_spawn_exec_surfaces_client_error(coord_session):
@@ -260,6 +270,21 @@ def test_spawn_exec_surfaces_client_error(coord_session):
     assert ui.tool_results[-1][3] is True  # is_error
 
 
+def test_spawn_exec_treats_missing_ws_id_on_success_path_as_error(coord_session):
+    """A malformed upstream response (200-success-shape with no
+    ``ws_id``) used to emit ``{"child_ws_id": null}`` to the LLM,
+    which then chased a null id through follow-up tools.  Now matches
+    the matching guard in ``_exec_spawn_batch``: surface as a tool
+    error so the model retries instead of acting on garbage."""
+    sess, coord, ui = coord_session
+    # No ``error`` field, but ``ws_id`` is missing — the silent-null path.
+    coord.spawn.return_value = {"name": "c", "node_id": "node-1", "status": 200}
+    item = sess._prepare_tool(_tc("spawn_workstream", {"initial_message": "hi"}))
+    _call_id, output = sess._exec_spawn_workstream(item)
+    assert "no ws_id" in output
+    assert ui.tool_results[-1][3] is True  # is_error
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # inspect_workstream
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1410,9 +1435,13 @@ def test_spawn_batch_exec_serialises_spawns_and_returns_results(coord_session):
     assert body["denied"] == []
     # Keyed by input index (stringified).
     assert set(body["results"].keys()) == {"0", "1", "2"}
-    assert body["results"]["0"]["ws_id"] == "child-0"
+    assert body["results"]["0"]["child_ws_id"] == "child-0"
     assert body["results"]["1"]["node_id"] == "n-1"
-    assert body["results"]["2"]["ws_id"] == "child-2"
+    assert body["results"]["2"]["child_ws_id"] == "child-2"
+    # Confirm we don't leak the old ``ws_id`` key alongside the new
+    # ``child_ws_id`` — see test_spawn_exec_does_not_surface_misleading_status_field
+    # for the rationale on the rename.
+    assert "ws_id" not in body["results"]["0"]
 
 
 def test_spawn_batch_exec_surfaces_per_item_errors_in_denied(coord_session):

tests/test_env_scrub.py

@@ -15,6 +15,16 @@ class TestIsSecret:
         assert _is_secret("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET") is True
         assert _is_secret("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY") is True
 
+    def test_tool_config_paths_scrubbed(self):
+        """Tool-config env vars whose target files load executable
+        directives must be scrubbed even though they don't match a
+        secret-suffix pattern. Defence-in-depth alongside on-CLI
+        ``--no-config`` for ripgrep and friends."""
+        assert _is_secret("RIPGREP_CONFIG_PATH") is True
+        assert _is_secret("GIT_CONFIG") is True
+        assert _is_secret("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL") is True
+        assert _is_secret("GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM") is True
+
     def test_suffix_matching(self):
         assert _is_secret("MY_CUSTOM_API_KEY") is True
         assert _is_secret("DB_PASSWORD") is True

tests/test_governance_storage.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from datetime import UTC, datetime
 
+import pytest
 import sqlalchemy as sa
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -317,6 +318,13 @@ class TestPromptTemplateCRUD:
     def test_get_prompt_template_nonexistent(self, db):
         assert db.get_prompt_template("missing") is None
 
+    def test_create_prompt_template_duplicate_id_raises_conflict(self, db):
+        from turnstone.core.storage._protocol import StorageConflictError
+
+        db.create_prompt_template("dup", "first", "general", "A")
+        with pytest.raises(StorageConflictError, match="prompt_template conflict"):
+            db.create_prompt_template("dup", "second", "general", "B")
+
     def test_list_prompt_templates_ordered_by_name(self, db):
         db.create_prompt_template("t2", "beta", "general", "B")
         db.create_prompt_template("t1", "alpha", "general", "A")

tests/test_history_decoration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
+"""Unit tests for ``turnstone.core.history_decoration``.
+
+The decoration helpers are shared between two surfaces — interactive's
+SSE replay (``_build_history``) and the lifted ``/history`` REST
+endpoint (``make_history_handler``, used by both interactive and
+coord). Pinning the wire shape here lets a future schema/projection
+change land in one file rather than spread across the two surfaces.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from turnstone.core.history_decoration import (
+    build_output_assessment_payload,
+    build_verdict_payload,
+    decorate_history_messages,
+    decorate_tool_call,
+)
+
+
+class TestBuildVerdictPayload:
+    """The wire-shape projection that's the single source of truth for
+    what intent_verdict fields ship to the client."""
+
+    def test_skips_unflagged_baseline(self) -> None:
+        """``risk_level`` "none" is the unflagged-tool baseline; the
+        client filters those anyway, so projecting None at the wire
+        layer keeps the payload tight on long workstreams."""
+        row = {"risk_level": "none", "recommendation": "approve", "tier": "heuristic"}
+        assert build_verdict_payload(row) is None
+
+    def test_drops_call_id_and_func_name(self) -> None:
+        """The client already has these on ``tc.id`` / ``tc.name``;
+        re-shipping them per-tool_call would balloon long replays."""
+        row = {
+            "call_id": "call_abc",
+            "func_name": "bash",
+            "risk_level": "medium",
+            "recommendation": "review",
+            "confidence": 0.8,
+            "intent_summary": "summary",
+            "tier": "heuristic",
+        }
+        out = build_verdict_payload(row)
+        assert out is not None
+        assert "call_id" not in out
+        assert "func_name" not in out
+        # Sanity — the kept fields are the ones renderVerdictBadge reads.
+        assert out["risk_level"] == "medium"
+        assert out["recommendation"] == "review"
+        assert out["confidence"] == 0.8
+        assert out["intent_summary"] == "summary"
+        assert out["tier"] == "heuristic"
+
+    def test_includes_reasoning_for_either_tier_when_present(self) -> None:
+        """Heuristic verdicts in this project emit structured
+        rationales (one per matched pattern) — e.g.
+        ``policy.py`` writes a reasoning string per heuristic hit.
+        Ship the field for either tier when it has content; only
+        omit when the row didn't write one."""
+        for tier in ("heuristic", "llm"):
+            row = {
+                "risk_level": "high",
+                "tier": tier,
+                "reasoning": "The command exfiltrates ~/.ssh/id_rsa over an external connection.",
+            }
+            out = build_verdict_payload(row)
+            assert out is not None
+            assert "id_rsa" in out["reasoning"]
+
+    def test_omits_reasoning_when_empty(self) -> None:
+        """An absent / empty reasoning string shouldn't ship as
+        ``reasoning: ""`` — the rationale ``<details>`` block on the
+        client renders an empty disclosure when the field is present
+        but empty."""
+        row = {"risk_level": "high", "tier": "heuristic", "reasoning": ""}
+        out = build_verdict_payload(row)
+        assert out is not None
+        assert "reasoning" not in out
+
+    def test_includes_judge_model_when_present(self) -> None:
+        """``judge_model`` rides through so the batch tier badge can
+        render ``⚖ llm:claude-haiku-4`` on history-only replays
+        rather than the bare ``⚖ llm`` label."""
+        row = {"risk_level": "high", "tier": "llm", "judge_model": "claude-haiku-4"}
+        out = build_verdict_payload(row)
+        assert out is not None
+        assert out["judge_model"] == "claude-haiku-4"
+
+    def test_omits_judge_model_when_empty(self) -> None:
+        row = {"risk_level": "medium", "tier": "heuristic", "judge_model": ""}
+        out = build_verdict_payload(row)
+        assert out is not None
+        assert "judge_model" not in out
+
+
+class TestBuildOutputAssessmentPayload:
+    """Output-guard wire shape — flags decoded from JSON string at
+    this layer so the client never has to parse twice."""
+
+    def test_skips_unflagged_baseline(self) -> None:
+        row = {"risk_level": "none", "flags": "[]"}
+        assert build_output_assessment_payload(row) is None
+
+    def test_decodes_flags_from_json(self) -> None:
+        row = {"risk_level": "high", "flags": '["api_key","email"]', "redacted": 1}
+        out = build_output_assessment_payload(row)
+        assert out is not None
+        assert out["flags"] == ["api_key", "email"]
+        assert out["redacted"] is True
+        assert out["risk_level"] == "high"
+
+    def test_handles_malformed_flags_json(self) -> None:
+        """Bad JSON in ``flags`` must not block the rest of the
+        assessment from rendering — degrade to empty list."""
+        row = {"risk_level": "medium", "flags": "not-json", "redacted": 0}
+        out = build_output_assessment_payload(row)
+        assert out is not None
+        assert out["flags"] == []
+        assert out["redacted"] is False
+
+
+class TestDecorateToolCall:
+    """In-place mutation of either OpenAI-format or flattened tool_call
+    entries — both shapes carry ``id`` at the top level."""
+
+    def test_attaches_verdict_when_present(self) -> None:
+        tc: dict[str, object] = {"id": "call_1", "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": "{}"}}
+        verdicts = {
+            "call_1": {
+                "risk_level": "medium",
+                "recommendation": "review",
+                "confidence": 0.7,
+                "intent_summary": "summary",
+                "tier": "heuristic",
+            }
+        }
+        decorate_tool_call(tc, verdicts, {})
+        assert "verdict" in tc
+        assert tc["verdict"]["risk_level"] == "medium"  # type: ignore[index]
+
+    def test_skips_when_no_call_id_match(self) -> None:
+        tc: dict[str, object] = {"id": "call_other", "name": "bash"}
+        verdicts = {
+            "call_1": {"risk_level": "medium", "tier": "heuristic"},
+        }
+        decorate_tool_call(tc, verdicts, {})
+        assert "verdict" not in tc
+
+    def test_skips_unflagged_verdict(self) -> None:
+        """``build_verdict_payload`` returns None for unflagged rows;
+        decorate_tool_call must not stamp ``verdict`` in that case."""
+        tc: dict[str, object] = {"id": "call_1", "name": "bash"}
+        verdicts = {"call_1": {"risk_level": "none", "tier": "heuristic"}}
+        decorate_tool_call(tc, verdicts, {})
+        assert "verdict" not in tc
+
+    def test_handles_empty_id(self) -> None:
+        """A tool_call with no id can't be paired against the lookup
+        table — must not raise (or stamp the wrong row's verdict)."""
+        tc: dict[str, object] = {"id": "", "name": "bash"}
+        verdicts = {"call_1": {"risk_level": "high", "tier": "heuristic"}}
+        decorate_tool_call(tc, verdicts, {})
+        assert "verdict" not in tc
+
+
+class TestDecorateHistoryMessages:
+    """End-to-end mutation of a /history-shaped message list — covers
+    the full transform applied by ``make_history_handler``."""
+
+    def test_decorates_tool_calls_with_verdict_and_assessment(self) -> None:
+        verdicts = {
+            "call_a": {
+                "risk_level": "high",
+                "recommendation": "deny",
+                "confidence": 0.95,
+                "intent_summary": "exfil",
+                "tier": "llm",
+                "reasoning": "ssh key access",
+            }
+        }
+        assessments = {
+            "call_a": {"risk_level": "high", "flags": '["secret"]', "redacted": 1},
+        }
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "running",
+                "tool_calls": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "call_a",
+                        "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": "{}"},
+                    }
+                ],
+            },
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": "long output"},
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_b", "content": "short"},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, verdicts, assessments)
+        # Assistant tool_calls got both decorations.
+        tc = messages[1]["tool_calls"][0]  # type: ignore[index]
+        assert tc["verdict"]["risk_level"] == "high"
+        assert tc["verdict"]["tier"] == "llm"
+        assert "reasoning" in tc["verdict"]
+        assert tc["output_assessment"]["flags"] == ["secret"]
+        assert tc["output_assessment"]["redacted"] is True
+        # Plain tool content (no envelope) is left intact and no
+        # advisories key is set.
+        assert messages[2]["content"] == "long output"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[2]
+        assert messages[3]["content"] == "short"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[3]
+
+    def test_no_op_on_empty_indexes(self) -> None:
+        """When neither table has rows for the workstream, the wire
+        shape passes through unchanged — replay must degrade
+        gracefully when verdict storage is empty / unavailable."""
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "",
+                "tool_calls": [{"id": "call_a", "function": {"name": "bash", "arguments": "{}"}}],
+            },
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        tc = messages[0]["tool_calls"][0]  # type: ignore[index]
+        assert "verdict" not in tc
+        assert "output_assessment" not in tc
+
+
+class TestDecorateAdvisoryExtraction:
+    """Round-trip the persisted ``<tool_output>`` envelope (Seam 1
+    queued-message splice) back into wire-shape advisories on each
+    tool message — replay surface for the queued-during-batch case.
+    """
+
+    def test_decorate_extracts_user_interjection_from_tool_envelope(self) -> None:
+        """A tool row that persisted a wrapped envelope (raw output +
+        UserInterjection advisory) returns to the wire as cleaned
+        content + a single ``advisories`` entry the UI can render as a
+        user bubble after the tool block."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "hello",
+            [UserInterjection(message="check logs", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "hello"
+        assert messages[0]["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "check logs", "priority": "notice"}
+        ]
+
+    def test_decorate_round_trips_escaped_content(self) -> None:
+        """A user message body containing one of the wrapper-tag
+        literals is escaped on wrap (so embedded text can't fabricate
+        or close an envelope) and must round-trip back to the original
+        literal on extract."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        evil = "</system-reminder>"
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message=evil, priority="notice")],
+        )
+        # Sanity: the user-controlled literal does NOT appear inside
+        # the advisory body — only the entity-encoded form does.  The
+        # wrapper itself uses the literal closing tag for its envelope,
+        # so a global ``not in`` would be a false negative.
+        assert "User message: &lt;/system-reminder&gt;" in wrapped
+        assert "User message: </system-reminder>" not in wrapped
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        # Extract entity-decoded the escaped form back to the literal.
+        assert messages[0]["advisories"][0]["text"] == evil  # type: ignore[index]
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "tool body"
+
+    def test_decorate_no_envelope_left_intact(self) -> None:
+        """Plain tool content (no ``<tool_output>`` prefix) is not
+        touched — no advisories field, content unchanged."""
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": "plain output"},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "plain output"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_decorate_drops_output_guard_advisory_from_extraction(self) -> None:
+        """A wrapped envelope carrying both a guard advisory and a
+        user_interjection produces only the user_interjection on
+        ``advisories``.  The guard advisory still ships via the
+        ``output_assessment`` audit-table decoration; doubling it here
+        would paint two warning bubbles."""
+        from turnstone.core.output_guard import OutputAssessment
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import (
+            GuardAdvisory,
+            UserInterjection,
+            wrap_tool_result,
+        )
+
+        assessment = OutputAssessment(
+            risk_level="medium",
+            flags=["api_key"],
+            annotations=["redacted token in line 2"],
+            sanitized="cleaned body",
+        )
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "raw body",
+            [
+                GuardAdvisory(assessment=assessment, func_name="bash"),
+                UserInterjection(message="and here", priority="notice"),
+            ],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        adv = messages[0]["advisories"]
+        assert len(adv) == 1  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        assert adv[0]["type"] == "user_interjection"  # type: ignore[index]
+
+    def test_decorate_handles_important_priority(self) -> None:
+        """The MUST-address preamble round-trips to ``priority=important``."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "out",
+            [UserInterjection(message="urgent", priority="important")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        adv = messages[0]["advisories"][0]  # type: ignore[index]
+        assert adv["priority"] == "important"
+        assert adv["text"] == "urgent"
+
+    def test_decorate_suppresses_empty_advisory_body(self) -> None:
+        """``queue_message`` doesn't reject empty / whitespace-only
+        text, so an advisory with an empty body can round-trip through
+        ``wrap_tool_result``.  ``_classify_advisory`` must filter those
+        out so replay doesn't paint a featureless empty user bubble.
+
+        Removing the ``if not body.strip(): return None`` guard in
+        ``_classify_advisory`` breaks this test."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message="", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        # Envelope is still stripped from content (the cleaning side
+        # of decoration runs unconditionally), but no advisories
+        # surface — the empty body is filtered.
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "tool body"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_decorate_suppresses_whitespace_only_advisory_body(self) -> None:
+        """Whitespace-only bodies are similarly suppressed — same
+        reasoning as the empty-body case."""
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message="   \n\t  ", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "call_a", "content": wrapped},
+        ]
+        decorate_history_messages(messages, {}, {})
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "tool body"
+        assert "advisories" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_wrap_extract_round_trips_preexisting_entities(self) -> None:
+        """A user message body containing literal HTML-entity references
+        matching the wrapper-escape forms must round-trip identically
+        through ``wrap_tool_result + extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope``.
+        Without escaping ``&`` first in the encode step, encode→decode
+        would produce the bare wrapper tag, fabricating an envelope the
+        wrapper layer never produced.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import (
+            extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope,
+        )
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        tricky = "I describe XML tags like &lt;tool_output&gt; in my docs."
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "tool body",
+            [UserInterjection(message=tricky, priority="notice")],
+        )
+        result = extract_advisories_from_tool_envelope(wrapped)
+        assert result is not None
+        cleaned, advisories = result
+        assert cleaned == "tool body"
+        assert len(advisories) == 1
+        # The original literal entity-reference text round-trips
+        # identically — the parser does not silently turn it into a
+        # bare wrapper tag.
+        assert advisories[0]["text"] == tricky
+
+    def test_save_load_decorate_round_trips_envelope(self, backend) -> None:
+        """End-to-end round-trip pinning the persisted-envelope
+        contract.  Persists a wrapped tool-output envelope via
+        ``save_message``, loads via ``load_messages``, runs
+        ``decorate_history_messages``, asserts the wire shape carries
+        the extracted advisory + cleaned content.  Pins the contract
+        every component in the chain participates in (persistence
+        layer ↔ in-memory replay ↔ wire projection) so a schema drift,
+        an envelope-format change, or a parser regression surfaces
+        here rather than only in production.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.tool_advisory import UserInterjection, wrap_tool_result
+
+        wrapped = wrap_tool_result(
+            "command output",
+            [UserInterjection(message="check the logs", priority="notice")],
+        )
+        backend.register_workstream("ws_rt_1")
+        backend.save_message("ws_rt_1", "user", "go")
+        backend.save_message(
+            "ws_rt_1",
+            "assistant",
+            None,
+            tool_calls='[{"id":"call_a","type":"function","function":{"name":"bash","arguments":"{}"}}]',
+        )
+        backend.save_message(
+            "ws_rt_1",
+            "tool",
+            wrapped,
+            tool_call_id="call_a",
+        )
+        msgs = backend.load_messages("ws_rt_1")
+        # Persisted shape — content survives the storage layer
+        # untouched.  Symmetry with in-memory ``self.messages[i]['content']``
+        # is what makes envelope extraction lossless on replay.
+        tool_msg = next(m for m in msgs if m["role"] == "tool")
+        assert tool_msg["content"] == wrapped
+        # Decorate (the /history shared transform) — extracts the
+        # advisory and strips the envelope.
+        decorate_history_messages(msgs, {}, {})
+        tool_msg = next(m for m in msgs if m["role"] == "tool")
+        assert tool_msg["content"] == "command output"
+        assert tool_msg["advisories"] == [
+            {"type": "user_interjection", "text": "check the logs", "priority": "notice"}
+        ]
+
+
+class TestExtractReasoningForHistory:
+    """``extract_reasoning_for_history`` — Phase 1 surfaces stored
+    Anthropic thinking blocks on assistant messages and strips
+    ``_provider_content`` from the wire payload.
+
+    Drives through the real ``AnthropicProvider.extract_reasoning_text``
+    (no mock-of-extractor) — the helper test and the provider unit
+    test (``tests/test_provider_anthropic_reasoning.py``) together
+    catch a regression at either layer distinctly.
+    """
+
+    def _anthropic_thinking_msg(self, text: str = "let me think") -> dict[str, object]:
+        return {
+            "role": "assistant",
+            "content": "Final answer.",
+            "_provider_content": [
+                {"type": "thinking", "thinking": text, "signature": "sig"},
+                {"type": "text", "text": "Final answer."},
+            ],
+        }
+
+    def test_extract_thinking_surfaces_reasoning_field(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [self._anthropic_thinking_msg("let me think")]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert messages[0]["reasoning"] == "let me think"
+
+    def test_strips_provider_content_after_extraction(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [self._anthropic_thinking_msg("anything")]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_strips_provider_content_when_flag_false(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [self._anthropic_thinking_msg("anything")]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=False)
+        # Strip is unconditional; reasoning is the conditional bit.
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+        assert "reasoning" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_first_block_thinking_dispatches_to_anthropic(self) -> None:
+        # Even when text and tool_use blocks follow, the first-block-type
+        # discriminator routes thinking-prefixed payloads correctly.
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "x",
+                "_provider_content": [
+                    {"type": "thinking", "thinking": "first", "signature": "s"},
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "spoken"},
+                    {"type": "tool_use", "id": "t1", "name": "f", "input": {}},
+                ],
+            }
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert messages[0]["reasoning"] == "first"
+
+    def test_first_block_reasoning_dispatches_to_openai_responses(self) -> None:
+        # Phase 3: dispatcher routes type=="reasoning" to the
+        # OpenAI Responses extractor, which now returns the
+        # summary[*].text concatenation.  Pre-Phase-3 this asserted
+        # "" (the stub); the assertion was tightened once the wire
+        # path landed.
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "x",
+                "_provider_content": [
+                    {"type": "reasoning", "summary": [{"type": "summary_text", "text": "s"}]}
+                ],
+            }
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert messages[0]["reasoning"] == "s"
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_unknown_first_block_type_no_op(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "x",
+                "_provider_content": [{"type": "text", "text": "no reasoning here"}],
+            }
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert "reasoning" not in messages[0]
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_skips_messages_without_provider_content(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [{"role": "assistant", "content": "plain"}]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert "reasoning" not in messages[0]
+        assert messages[0]["content"] == "plain"
+
+    def test_user_and_tool_messages_untouched(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
+            {"role": "tool", "tool_call_id": "c1", "content": "out"},
+            self._anthropic_thinking_msg("only this one"),
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert "reasoning" not in messages[0]
+        assert "reasoning" not in messages[1]
+        assert messages[2]["reasoning"] == "only this one"
+
+    def test_empty_provider_content_no_extraction(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [{"role": "assistant", "content": "x", "_provider_content": []}]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert "reasoning" not in messages[0]
+        # Empty-list provider_content is still stripped from the wire.
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_first_block_not_a_dict_skipped(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages: list[dict[str, object]] = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "x",
+                "_provider_content": ["bogus"],
+            }
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert "reasoning" not in messages[0]
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_first_block_reasoning_text_dispatches_to_openai_chat(self) -> None:
+        # Phase 3 path 3: synthetic ``reasoning_text`` blocks (stamped
+        # by ChatSession._maybe_synth_reasoning_block for vLLM /
+        # llama.cpp / Gemini-compat conversations) dispatch to
+        # OpenAIChatCompletionsProvider.extract_reasoning_text.
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "answer",
+                "_provider_content": [
+                    {"type": "reasoning_text", "text": "synth thought", "source": "vllm"},
+                ],
+            }
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert messages[0]["reasoning"] == "synth thought"
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_dispatcher_scans_past_unrecognized_first_blocks(self) -> None:
+        # Regression for Copilot finding: dispatcher used to inspect
+        # only provider_content[0]['type'].  OpenAI Responses captures
+        # EVERY output_item.done event into provider_blocks (not just
+        # reasoning), so a hypothetical [message, reasoning, ...]
+        # ordering would have silently dropped the reasoning.  Now
+        # walks the list for the first recognised reasoning-bearing
+        # type and dispatches the whole list to that provider.
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "answer",
+                "_provider_content": [
+                    # First block is a non-reasoning OpenAI Responses item.
+                    {"type": "message", "role": "assistant", "content": "answer"},
+                    # Reasoning sits later in the list.
+                    {
+                        "type": "reasoning",
+                        "id": "r_1",
+                        "summary": [{"type": "summary_text", "text": "deferred"}],
+                    },
+                ],
+            }
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert messages[0]["reasoning"] == "deferred"
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]
+
+    def test_first_block_redacted_thinking_dispatches_to_anthropic(self) -> None:
+        # Anthropic's extended-thinking API documents that
+        # ``redacted_thinking`` blocks (sealed by the safety system)
+        # can appear before, after, or interleaved with regular
+        # ``thinking`` blocks.  When the redacted block lands first,
+        # the dispatcher must still route to AnthropicProvider so the
+        # surrounding real thinking text surfaces — without this the
+        # reasoning bubble silently disappears on history rehydration.
+        # Pinned by registering "redacted_thinking" as a second key
+        # in _BLOCK_TYPE_PROVIDER_FACTORY pointing at the Anthropic
+        # factory; Anthropic's extractor's type=="thinking" filter
+        # already correctly skips the redacted block.
+        from turnstone.core.history_decoration import extract_reasoning_for_history
+
+        messages = [
+            {
+                "role": "assistant",
+                "content": "answer",
+                "_provider_content": [
+                    {"type": "redacted_thinking", "data": "sealed-blob"},
+                    {"type": "thinking", "thinking": "real thought", "signature": "s"},
+                    {"type": "text", "text": "answer"},
+                ],
+            }
+        ]
+        extract_reasoning_for_history(messages, surface_persisted_reasoning_flag=True)
+        assert messages[0]["reasoning"] == "real thought"
+        assert "_provider_content" not in messages[0]

tests/test_idle_nudge_wake_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+"""Boundary-crossing integration test for the wake trigger pipeline.
+
+Drives a *real* :class:`SessionManager` + a *real* :class:`ChatSession`
++ a *real* :class:`IdleNudgeWatcher` end-to-end.  The only stub is the
+LLM provider (patched ``_create_stream_with_retry``); every other layer
+is production code:
+
+* ``SessionManager.set_state`` snapshotting + iterating subscribers
+* ``IdleNudgeWatcher._on_state`` peeking the queue
+* ``session_worker.send`` atomic-spawn + daemon thread
+* ``ChatSession.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue`` opening / closing
+  ``_wake_source_tag``
+* ``ChatSession.send`` chat loop short-circuiting metacog detection
+* ``_append_user_turn`` stamping ``_source = "system_nudge"``
+* ``_attach_pending_user_reminders`` draining ``USER_DRAIN``
+* ``_apply_reminders_for_provider`` splicing the rendered envelope
+  onto empty content
+
+Per ``feedback_tests_through_boundaries.md``: direct injection tests
+that bypass these boundaries silently mask wiring bugs.  This test is
+the structural integration gate.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.test_session_manager import FakeStorage
+from turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher import IdleNudgeWatcher
+from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
+from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
+from turnstone.core.workstream import Workstream, WorkstreamKind, WorkstreamState
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Minimal fake adapter / UI for this integration test.  Storage reuses
+# the canonical FakeStorage from test_session_manager.py to avoid the
+# drift risk of a parallel fake.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _FakeUI:
+    """Minimal UI surface for ChatSession + SessionManager.cleanup_ui."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.events: list[tuple[str, Any]] = []
+
+    def _unblock(self) -> None:  # SessionManager.close calls this
+        pass
+
+    def broadcast_ws_closed(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    # ChatSession callbacks (no-op for this test)
+    def on_turn_start(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_turn_committed(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_thinking_start(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_thinking_end(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_state_change(self, state: str) -> None:
+        self.events.append(("state", state))
+
+    def on_user_reminder(self, reminders: Any, source: str | None = None) -> None:
+        self.events.append(("user_reminder", reminders, source))
+
+    def on_error(self, message: str) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_rename(self, name: str) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def on_output_warning(self, call_id: Any, assessment: Any) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def __getattr__(self, name: str) -> Any:
+        # Catch-all for any UI hook not enumerated above so the chat
+        # loop's ``self.ui.<something>()`` call doesn't blow up.
+        return MagicMock()
+
+
+class _BuildRealSessionAdapter:
+    """Adapter that returns a real :class:`ChatSession` instead of a stub.
+
+    Tracks emit_* events the integration test asserts on.  Mirrors the
+    ``SessionKindAdapter`` + ``SessionEventEmitter`` Protocol surface
+    that production ``WebUI`` / coord adapters expose.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, kind: WorkstreamKind = WorkstreamKind.INTERACTIVE) -> None:
+        self.kind = kind
+        self.events: list[str] = []
+        self.cleaned_up: list[str] = []
+
+    def emit_created(self, ws: Workstream) -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"created:{ws.id}")
+
+    def emit_rehydrated(self, ws: Workstream) -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"rehydrated:{ws.id}")
+
+    def emit_state(self, ws: Workstream, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"state:{ws.id}:{state.value}")
+
+    def emit_closed(self, ws_id: str, *, reason: str = "closed", name: str = "") -> None:
+        self.events.append(f"closed:{ws_id}")
+
+    def cleanup_ui(self, ws: Workstream) -> None:
+        # Real production cleanup_ui calls ws.session.cancel() + close().
+        # We don't need that here — the test exits cleanly via pytest
+        # teardown without exercising the cleanup path.  Just record
+        # the call for any test that wants to assert on it.
+        self.cleaned_up.append(ws.id)
+
+    def build_ui(self, ws: Workstream) -> Any:
+        return _FakeUI()
+
+    def build_session(
+        self,
+        ws: Workstream,
+        *,
+        skill: Any = None,
+        model: Any = None,
+        client_type: Any = None,
+        **extra: Any,
+    ) -> Any:
+        # Mirror SessionManager.create's keyword set so config-threading
+        # bugs surface here rather than being silently swallowed by
+        # **kwargs.  ``model`` flows to the real ChatSession; the rest
+        # are accepted but not used by this test.
+        client = MagicMock()
+        return ChatSession(
+            client=client,
+            model=str(model) if model else "test-model",
+            ui=ws.ui,
+            instructions=None,
+            temperature=0.5,
+            max_tokens=4096,
+            tool_timeout=30,
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def real_mgr() -> tuple[SessionManager, _BuildRealSessionAdapter]:
+    """Real SessionManager wired to an adapter that builds real ChatSessions.
+
+    No StateWriter is wired so ``set_state`` writes directly to storage
+    on the calling thread (we want subscriber dispatch to fire in the
+    same thread the test invokes ``set_state`` on).
+    """
+    adapter = _BuildRealSessionAdapter()
+    storage = FakeStorage()
+    mgr = SessionManager(
+        adapter,
+        storage=storage,
+        max_active=5,
+        event_emitter=adapter,
+    )
+    return mgr, adapter
+
+
+def _wait_for_worker_done(ws: Workstream, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    """Poll ``ws._worker_running`` until it clears or timeout elapses."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        with ws._lock:
+            if not ws._worker_running:
+                return
+        time.sleep(0.01)
+    raise AssertionError(f"worker thread for ws={ws.id[:8]} didn't exit within {timeout}s")
+
+
+def test_idle_event_through_real_session_manager_drives_wake_send(real_mgr, tmp_db):
+    """The full wake pipeline, no direct-injection shortcuts.
+
+    Boundary path under test:
+      enqueue → mgr.set_state(IDLE)
+        → SessionManager._state_subscribers iteration (real)
+        → IdleNudgeWatcher._on_state (real)
+        → session_worker.send (real)
+        → real daemon thread
+        → ChatSession.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue (real)
+        → ChatSession.send("") (real, with patched LLM stream)
+        → _append_user_turn stamps ``_source``
+        → _attach_pending_user_reminders drains ``{"user","any"}``
+        → _apply_reminders_for_provider splices envelope onto empty content
+    """
+    mgr, _adapter = real_mgr
+    watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+    watcher.start()
+
+    try:
+        ws = mgr.create(user_id="u1", name="wake-int", skill=None)
+        assert ws.session is not None
+        # Patch the LLM-facing surface so send() runs the chat loop end-to-end
+        # without any real provider.  We patch on the just-built ChatSession;
+        # the patches are reverted by the `with` block.
+        with (
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=iter([])),
+            patch.object(
+                ws.session,
+                "_stream_response",
+                return_value={"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
+            ),
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_update_token_table"),
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_print_status_line"),
+            patch.object(ws.session, "_visible_memory_count", return_value=0),
+            patch("turnstone.core.session.save_message"),
+        ):
+            # Suppress the auto-title side-thread; orthogonal to wake.
+            ws.session._title_generated = True
+
+            # Enqueue an any-channel nudge — the future ``idle_children`` shape.
+            ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("idle_children", "your kids", "any")
+            assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 1
+
+            # Trigger IDLE.  This runs subscriber dispatch synchronously on
+            # the calling thread → IdleNudgeWatcher._on_state → session_worker.send
+            # → spawn daemon thread → deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue.
+            mgr.set_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+
+            # Wait for the daemon thread to clear ``_worker_running`` so the
+            # post-conditions are stable.
+            _wait_for_worker_done(ws)
+
+        # Queue fully drained by the wake.
+        assert len(ws.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+
+        # The synthesized empty user message landed in history with the
+        # ``_source`` audit tag and the reminder side-channel populated.
+        user_msgs = [m for m in ws.session.messages if m.get("role") == "user"]
+        assert user_msgs, "expected a synthesized user message from the wake"
+        wake_msg = user_msgs[-1]
+        assert wake_msg["content"] == ""
+        assert wake_msg.get("_source") == "system_nudge"
+        assert wake_msg.get("_reminders") == [{"type": "idle_children", "text": "your kids"}]
+
+        # The wake-source tag is reset post-send so subsequent activity
+        # behaves normally.
+        assert ws.session._wake_source_tag == ""
+    finally:
+        watcher.shutdown()
+
+
+def test_idle_event_with_empty_queue_does_not_dispatch_wake(real_mgr, tmp_db):
+    """Non-empty queue is the gate.  An IDLE event on a workstream with
+    nothing queued must NOT call ``session_worker.send``.
+
+    Patches the dispatch primitive directly rather than racing a
+    ``time.sleep`` against an erroneous spawn — the question is
+    whether the watcher's gate fired, which is a deterministic
+    decision the patch captures.
+    """
+    mgr, _adapter = real_mgr
+    watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+    watcher.start()
+
+    try:
+        ws = mgr.create(user_id="u1", name="empty-int", skill=None)
+        # No enqueue.
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.set_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0, "wake must not dispatch for an empty queue"
+    finally:
+        watcher.shutdown()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def coord_mgr() -> tuple[SessionManager, _BuildRealSessionAdapter, FakeStorage]:
+    """Real coord-side SessionManager with the adapter's kind set to
+    COORDINATOR.  Same shape as ``real_mgr`` but for the coord half of
+    the lifespan.  No StateWriter wired so subscriber dispatch fires
+    synchronously on the test thread.
+    """
+    adapter = _BuildRealSessionAdapter(kind=WorkstreamKind.COORDINATOR)
+    storage = FakeStorage()
+    mgr = SessionManager(
+        adapter,
+        storage=storage,
+        max_active=5,
+        event_emitter=adapter,
+    )
+    return mgr, adapter, storage
+
+
+def test_coord_idle_with_active_children_emits_envelope_via_real_managers(coord_mgr, tmp_db):
+    """Full coord-path integration test (matches design doc §7.4).
+
+    Drives the production install order — ``CoordinatorIdleObserver``
+    registered FIRST, then ``IdleNudgeWatcher`` — and asserts the
+    full chain: observer enqueues on IDLE → watcher peeks → wake
+    spawns a worker → ``deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue`` drains and
+    runs the synthetic empty-user turn → reminder envelope reaches
+    the synthesized user message via the side-channel.
+
+    The boundary-crossing path tested here mirrors what
+    ``console/server.py``'s lifespan does at production startup; if
+    the install order is ever reversed, this test fails.
+    """
+    from turnstone.console.coordinator_idle_observer import CoordinatorIdleObserver
+    from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamKind as _Kind
+
+    mgr, adapter, storage = coord_mgr
+    # Observer FIRST, then watcher.  Same order as
+    # ``console/server.py:4435-4443`` — production correctness depends
+    # on subscribers firing in registration order on the same IDLE.
+    observer = CoordinatorIdleObserver(mgr, storage)
+    observer.start()
+    watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+    watcher.start()
+
+    try:
+        coord = mgr.create(user_id="u1", name="parent-coord", skill=None)
+        assert coord.session is not None
+
+        # Two interactive children of the coord, both running.  Use
+        # the storage's register_workstream API so the rows match
+        # production shape (the observer queries via list_workstreams).
+        storage.register_workstream(
+            "child-a",
+            user_id="u1",
+            name="research-pricing",
+            kind=_Kind.INTERACTIVE,
+            parent_ws_id=coord.id,
+            state="running",
+        )
+        storage.register_workstream(
+            "child-b",
+            user_id="u1",
+            name="draft-rfc",
+            kind=_Kind.INTERACTIVE,
+            parent_ws_id=coord.id,
+            state="thinking",
+        )
+
+        # Pretend the coord has already had a real conversation so
+        # ``should_nudge``'s message_count > 1 gate passes.
+        coord.session.messages.append({"role": "user", "content": "spawn 2"})
+        coord.session.messages.append({"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"})
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_create_stream_with_retry", return_value=iter([])),
+            patch.object(
+                coord.session,
+                "_stream_response",
+                return_value={"role": "assistant", "content": "ack"},
+            ),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_full_messages", return_value=[]),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_update_token_table"),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_print_status_line"),
+            patch.object(coord.session, "_visible_memory_count", return_value=0),
+            patch("turnstone.core.session.save_message"),
+        ):
+            coord.session._title_generated = True
+            mgr.set_state(coord.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            _wait_for_worker_done(coord)
+
+        # Queue drained — the wake delivered the observer's enqueue.
+        assert len(coord.session._nudge_queue) == 0
+        # The synthetic empty-user turn landed with a reminder containing
+        # both children.
+        user_msgs = [m for m in coord.session.messages if m.get("role") == "user"]
+        # Two real msgs (user + assistant context above) plus the wake.
+        wake_msg = user_msgs[-1]
+        assert wake_msg["content"] == ""
+        assert wake_msg.get("_source") == "system_nudge"
+        reminders = wake_msg.get("_reminders") or []
+        assert len(reminders) == 1
+        assert reminders[0]["type"] == "idle_children"
+        text = reminders[0]["text"]
+        assert "research-pricing" in text
+        assert "draft-rfc" in text
+        assert "child-a" in text
+        assert "child-b" in text
+        assert "wait_for_workstream" in text
+    finally:
+        watcher.shutdown()
+        observer.shutdown()

tests/test_idle_nudge_watcher.py

@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`IdleNudgeWatcher`.
+
+Drives a fake :class:`SessionManager` that mimics the real one's
+``subscribe_to_state`` / ``get`` contract.  The watcher itself
+dispatches via ``turnstone.core.session_worker.send``; we patch that
+module-level function to capture calls without spawning real threads.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import contextlib
+import threading
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.idle_nudge_watcher import IdleNudgeWatcher
+from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import NudgeQueue
+from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamState
+
+
+class _FakeSession:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._nudge_queue = NudgeQueue()
+        self.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue_called = 0
+
+    def deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue(self) -> None:
+        self.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue_called += 1
+
+
+class _FakeWorkstream:
+    def __init__(self, ws_id: str = "ws-test") -> None:
+        self.id = ws_id
+        self.session: _FakeSession | None = _FakeSession()
+        self._lock = threading.Lock()
+        self._worker_running = False
+        self._closed = False
+        self.worker_thread: Any = None
+
+
+class _FakeManager:
+    """Mimics SessionManager's subscribe-to-state surface without a DB."""
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._workstreams: dict[str, _FakeWorkstream] = {}
+        self._subscribers: list[Any] = []
+        self._subscribers_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+    def add_ws(self, ws: _FakeWorkstream) -> None:
+        self._workstreams[ws.id] = ws
+
+    def get(self, ws_id: str) -> _FakeWorkstream | None:
+        return self._workstreams.get(ws_id)
+
+    def subscribe_to_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._subscribers_lock:
+            self._subscribers.append(callback)
+
+    def unsubscribe_from_state(self, callback: Any) -> None:
+        with self._subscribers_lock, contextlib.suppress(ValueError):
+            self._subscribers.remove(callback)
+
+    def fire_state(self, ws_id: str, state: WorkstreamState) -> None:
+        """Mirror SessionManager.set_state's subscriber-fan-out behaviour."""
+        with self._subscribers_lock:
+            subs = list(self._subscribers)
+        for cb in subs:
+            # Match contextlib.suppress(Exception) in real SessionManager.
+            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+                cb(ws_id, state)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fake_mgr_and_ws() -> tuple[_FakeManager, _FakeWorkstream]:
+    mgr = _FakeManager()
+    ws = _FakeWorkstream()
+    mgr.add_ws(ws)
+    return mgr, ws
+
+
+class TestIdleNudgeWatcher:
+    def test_idle_event_with_empty_queue_no_op(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_idle_event_with_pending_nudge_dispatches(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("idle_children", "your kids", "any")
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 1
+            kwargs = mock_send.call_args.kwargs
+            # `enqueue=lambda: None` — verify by calling and checking no-op.
+            assert kwargs["enqueue"]() is None
+            # `run` should call deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue when invoked.
+            kwargs["run"]()
+            assert ws.session.deliver_wake_nudge_from_queue_called == 1
+            assert kwargs["thread_name"].startswith("wake-nudge-")
+
+    def test_non_idle_state_ignored(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("foo", "bar", "any")
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            for state in (
+                WorkstreamState.RUNNING,
+                WorkstreamState.THINKING,
+                WorkstreamState.ATTENTION,
+                WorkstreamState.ERROR,
+            ):
+                mgr.fire_state(ws.id, state)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_unknown_ws_ignored(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, _ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state("ghost", WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_session_none_ignored(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session = None  # workstream loaded but session not yet built
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_start_is_idempotent(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        watcher.start()  # no-op
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("foo", "bar", "any")
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            # Only one subscriber was registered despite the double-start.
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 1
+
+    def test_shutdown_unsubscribes(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        ws.session._nudge_queue.enqueue("foo", "bar", "any")
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        watcher.shutdown()
+        with patch("turnstone.core.session_worker.send") as mock_send:
+            mgr.fire_state(ws.id, WorkstreamState.IDLE)
+            assert mock_send.call_count == 0
+
+    def test_shutdown_is_idempotent(self, fake_mgr_and_ws):
+        mgr, _ws = fake_mgr_and_ws
+        watcher = IdleNudgeWatcher(mgr)
+        watcher.start()
+        watcher.shutdown()
+        watcher.shutdown()  # no error

tests/test_judge.py

@@ -777,6 +777,58 @@ class TestModelAliasResolution:
         assert judge._client_factory_args["api_key"] == "alias-key"
         assert judge._client_factory_args["provider_name"] == "openai"
 
+    def test_unknown_alias_inherits_session_model(self):
+        """``judge.model`` is alias-only.  A value that doesn't resolve
+        through the registry inherits the session model (same path as
+        an empty config.model) rather than getting pinned onto the
+        session provider as a raw model id — that legacy behavior
+        silently broke whenever the session provider didn't speak the
+        configured model id (Anthropic session, ``judge.model =
+        "gpt-5-mini"`` → every verdict came back as ``llm_fallback``)."""
+        session_provider = _make_mock_provider()
+        session_provider.provider_name = "anthropic"
+        session_client = MagicMock()
+        session_client.base_url = "https://session.example/v1"
+        session_client.api_key = "session-key"
+
+        registry = MagicMock()
+        registry.has_alias.return_value = False  # judge.model isn't an alias
+
+        config = JudgeConfig(enabled=True, model="gpt-5-mini")
+        judge = IntentJudge(
+            config=config,
+            session_provider=session_provider,
+            session_client=session_client,
+            session_model="session-default-model",
+            context_window=100_000,
+            model_registry=registry,
+        )
+
+        assert judge._provider is session_provider
+        assert judge._model == "session-default-model"
+        # Context window mirrors the session, not the (uncalled) caps lookup.
+        assert judge._judge_context_window == 100_000
+
+    def test_empty_model_inherits_session_model(self):
+        """Empty ``config.model`` is the documented self-consistency path."""
+        session_provider = _make_mock_provider()
+        session_provider.provider_name = "openai"
+        session_client = MagicMock()
+        session_client.base_url = "https://session.example/v1"
+        session_client.api_key = "session-key"
+
+        config = JudgeConfig(enabled=True, model="")
+        judge = IntentJudge(
+            config=config,
+            session_provider=session_provider,
+            session_client=session_client,
+            session_model="session-default-model",
+            context_window=100_000,
+        )
+
+        assert judge._provider is session_provider
+        assert judge._model == "session-default-model"
+
     def test_coordinator_tool_call_returns_llm_verdict_not_fallback(self):
         """Happy-path regression for coordinator tool calls: with a properly
         resolved provider, the verdict tier must be ``llm`` — the

tests/test_judge_storage.py

@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ class TestIntentVerdictCRUD:
         assert v["tier"] == "heuristic"
         assert v["judge_model"] == ""
         assert v["latency_ms"] == 2
-        assert v["user_decision"] == ""
+        # ``user_decision`` defaults to ``"pending"`` (not the empty
+        # string) so an audit reader can distinguish in-flight rows
+        # from pre-convention legacy rows that carry the column's
+        # server_default of ``""``.
+        assert v["user_decision"] == "pending"
         assert "created" in v
 
     def test_get_nonexistent(self, db):
@@ -114,6 +118,123 @@ class TestIntentVerdictCRUD:
         assert ok is False
 
 
+class TestIntentVerdictUpsert:
+    """``upsert_intent_verdict`` — the LLM-tier-aware persistence path.
+
+    Backs the heuristic → llm_fallback "upgrade in place" pattern.
+    The async judge's fallback verdicts deliberately reuse the
+    heuristic ``verdict_id``; a plain INSERT would collide on the
+    PK and the upgrade would be lost to a silently-swallowed
+    exception (Postgres logged ``intent_verdicts_pkey`` violations
+    for every fallback delivery on stable/1.5 smoke tests).
+    """
+
+    def test_upsert_on_fresh_id_inserts(self, db):
+        """No conflict — behaves like a regular INSERT."""
+        db.upsert_intent_verdict(**_make_verdict_kwargs())
+        v = db.get_intent_verdict("v_001")
+        assert v is not None
+        assert v["tier"] == "heuristic"
+        assert v["user_decision"] == "pending"
+
+    def test_upsert_on_conflict_upgrades_tier_reasoning_judge_model(self, db):
+        """On PK conflict: tier, reasoning, judge_model update — every
+        other field is preserved.  Mirrors what the judge emits when
+        promoting heuristic → llm_fallback."""
+        db.upsert_intent_verdict(
+            **_make_verdict_kwargs(
+                tier="heuristic",
+                reasoning="initial heuristic reasoning",
+                judge_model="",
+            )
+        )
+        db.upsert_intent_verdict(
+            **_make_verdict_kwargs(
+                tier="llm_fallback",
+                reasoning="initial heuristic reasoning (LLM judge did not return a verdict)",
+                judge_model="gpt-5-judge",
+            )
+        )
+        v = db.get_intent_verdict("v_001")
+        assert v is not None
+        # The three fields that should change.
+        assert v["tier"] == "llm_fallback"
+        assert "LLM judge did not return" in v["reasoning"]
+        assert v["judge_model"] == "gpt-5-judge"
+
+    def test_upsert_on_conflict_preserves_user_decision(self, db):
+        """LOAD-BEARING: a manually-resolved approval (user_decision=
+        ``"approved"``) or auto-approve-stamped row (user_decision=
+        ``"policy"``/``"blanket"``/etc.) must NOT be clobbered back to
+        ``"pending"`` when the late LLM-fallback verdict lands.
+        ``IntentVerdict.to_dict()`` doesn't project user_decision, so
+        the upsert's defaulted ``"pending"`` would silently overwrite
+        the real value if user_decision were in the on-conflict
+        SET clause."""
+        db.upsert_intent_verdict(**_make_verdict_kwargs())
+        ok = db.update_intent_verdict("v_001", user_decision="approved")
+        assert ok is True
+        # Simulate the late LLM-fallback delivery — same verdict_id,
+        # default user_decision (the IntentVerdict.to_dict() shape).
+        db.upsert_intent_verdict(
+            **_make_verdict_kwargs(
+                tier="llm_fallback",
+                reasoning="extended (LLM judge did not return a verdict)",
+                judge_model="gpt-5-judge",
+            )
+        )
+        v = db.get_intent_verdict("v_001")
+        assert v is not None
+        assert v["user_decision"] == "approved"  # NOT clobbered to "pending"
+        assert v["tier"] == "llm_fallback"  # but the upgrade did land
+
+    def test_upsert_on_conflict_preserves_identity_and_carried_fields(self, db):
+        """Identity columns (ws_id, call_id, func_name, func_args) and
+        carried-verbatim columns (intent_summary, risk_level,
+        confidence, recommendation, evidence, latency_ms) are
+        excluded from the on-conflict SET — verify they aren't
+        changed even when the second upsert passes different values
+        (defensive against a future judge bug that ships divergent
+        carried fields)."""
+        db.upsert_intent_verdict(**_make_verdict_kwargs())
+        db.upsert_intent_verdict(
+            **_make_verdict_kwargs(
+                # Same verdict_id (conflict trigger), divergent everything else.
+                ws_id="ws-different",
+                call_id="tc_different",
+                func_name="bash_v2",
+                func_args='{"command":"rm -rf /"}',
+                intent_summary="totally different summary",
+                risk_level="critical",
+                confidence=0.0,
+                recommendation="deny",
+                evidence='["dangerous"]',
+                latency_ms=99999,
+                # The three fields that DO update.
+                tier="llm_fallback",
+                reasoning="upgraded reasoning",
+                judge_model="judge-v2",
+            )
+        )
+        v = db.get_intent_verdict("v_001")
+        assert v is not None
+        # All preserved from the first upsert (identity + carried).
+        assert v["ws_id"] == "ws-abc"
+        assert v["call_id"] == "tc_001"
+        assert v["func_name"] == "bash"
+        assert v["func_args"] == '{"command":"echo hello"}'
+        assert v["intent_summary"] == "Echo a greeting to stdout"
+        assert v["risk_level"] == "low"
+        assert v["confidence"] == 0.85
+        assert v["recommendation"] == "approve"
+        assert v["evidence"] == '["The command only prints text."]'
+        assert v["latency_ms"] == 2
+        # Only the three updated.
+        assert v["tier"] == "llm_fallback"
+        assert v["reasoning"] == "upgraded reasoning"
+        assert v["judge_model"] == "judge-v2"
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Bulk insert
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

tests/test_load_skill.py

@@ -420,8 +420,9 @@ class TestSkillCatalogDisclosure:
         session.system_messages = []
         session._agent_system_messages = []
         session.reasoning_effort = "medium"
-        session._pending_tool_advisories = []
-        session._pending_user_advisories = []
+        from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import NudgeQueue
+
+        session._nudge_queue = NudgeQueue()
         session._tool_search = None
         session._mcp_client = None
         session._notify_on_complete = "{}"

tests/test_mcp_admin_bulk_revoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+"""Integration tests for the Phase 9 admin bulk-revoke endpoint.
+
+POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/{name}/bulk-revoke clears every user's
+OAuth token for a server (admin-side counterpart to the per-user
+DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name} that shipped in
+Phase 8).
+
+Coverage:
+- requires ``admin.mcp`` permission (401/403 without).
+- 404 when the named server is missing.
+- 400 when the server's ``auth_type`` is not ``oauth_user``.
+- 200 + ``rows_deleted`` + ``consented_users_before`` on success.
+- Audit row written with
+  ``upstream_revoke_outcome="bulk_admin_no_upstream"``.
+- Token rows are gone from ``mcp_user_tokens`` post-call.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+
+import pytest
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.middleware import Middleware
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+from starlette.routing import Mount, Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from turnstone.console.server import admin_mcp_bulk_revoke
+from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+
+class _InjectAdminMcp(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
+            user_id="admin-user",
+            scopes=frozenset({"approve"}),
+            token_source="config",
+            permissions=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "admin.mcp"}),
+        )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+class _InjectNoAdminMcp(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
+            user_id="regular-user",
+            scopes=frozenset({"approve"}),
+            token_source="jwt",
+            permissions=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}),
+        )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _build_app(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, with_admin_mcp: bool = True) -> Starlette:
+    mw = _InjectAdminMcp if with_admin_mcp else _InjectNoAdminMcp
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=[
+            Mount(
+                "/v1",
+                routes=[
+                    Route(
+                        "/api/admin/mcp-servers/{name}/bulk-revoke",
+                        admin_mcp_bulk_revoke,
+                        methods=["POST"],
+                    ),
+                ],
+            ),
+        ],
+        middleware=[Middleware(mw)],
+    )
+    app.state.auth_storage = storage
+    return app
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    backend: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "srv-oauth",
+    server_id: str = "srv-oauth-id",
+) -> None:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url="https://example.com/mcp",
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_static_server(
+    backend: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "srv-static",
+    server_id: str = "srv-static-id",
+) -> None:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url="https://example.com/mcp",
+        auth_type="static",
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_tokens(backend: SQLiteBackend, server_name: str, users: int) -> None:
+    for i in range(users):
+        backend.create_mcp_user_token(
+            f"user-{i}",
+            server_name,
+            access_token_ct=b"ct",
+            refresh_token_ct=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            audience="https://example.com/mcp",
+        )
+
+
+def test_requires_admin_mcp_permission(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+    client = TestClient(_build_app(storage, with_admin_mcp=False))
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/srv-oauth/bulk-revoke")
+    assert resp.status_code == 403
+
+
+def test_404_on_missing_server(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/never-existed/bulk-revoke")
+    assert resp.status_code == 404
+    assert resp.json() == {"error": "No such server"}
+
+
+def test_400_on_static_server(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed_static_server(storage)
+    client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/srv-static/bulk-revoke")
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert "oauth_user" in body["error"]
+
+
+def test_400_on_invalid_server_name(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    # double-underscore is reserved for the prefixed-tool-name encoding.
+    client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/bad__name/bulk-revoke")
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_200_on_success_with_no_consented_users(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+    client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/srv-oauth/bulk-revoke")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert body["status"] == "ok"
+    assert body["rows_deleted"] == 0
+    assert body["consented_users_before"] == 0
+
+
+def test_200_clears_all_user_tokens(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+    _seed_user_tokens(storage, "srv-oauth", users=3)
+    # Token for another server must survive the bulk-revoke.
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="srv-other", server_id="srv-other-id")
+    _seed_user_tokens(storage, "srv-other", users=2)
+
+    client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/srv-oauth/bulk-revoke")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert body["status"] == "ok"
+    assert body["rows_deleted"] == 3
+    assert body["consented_users_before"] == 3
+
+    # Target server's tokens are gone; bystander's tokens survive.
+    assert storage.count_mcp_consented_users_by_server("srv-oauth") == 0
+    assert storage.count_mcp_consented_users_by_server("srv-other") == 2
+
+
+def test_audits_with_bulk_admin_no_upstream(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+    _seed_user_tokens(storage, "srv-oauth", users=2)
+    client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/srv-oauth/bulk-revoke")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+
+    # Pull the most-recent audit row for the bulk_revoked action and
+    # verify it carries the deferral marker.
+    events = storage.list_audit_events(limit=10)
+    bulk_rows = [e for e in events if e.get("action") == "mcp_server.oauth.bulk_revoked"]
+    assert len(bulk_rows) == 1
+    detail = bulk_rows[0].get("detail")
+    if isinstance(detail, str):
+        import json as _json
+
+        detail = _json.loads(detail)
+    assert detail.get("upstream_revoke_outcome") == "bulk_admin_no_upstream"
+    assert detail.get("rows_deleted") == 2
+    assert detail.get("consented_users_before") == 2
+    assert detail.get("name") == "srv-oauth"

tests/test_mcp_consent_url_sibling_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+"""Structural gate against the Phase 7b sibling-bug pattern.
+
+Phase 7b's bug-1 was a single ``f"MCP X error: {e}"`` site dropping a
+structured-error JSON. Phase 8 introduces the ``consent_url`` field on
+the same JSON envelope: every ``_structured_error(...)`` invocation
+that emits ``mcp_consent_required`` or ``mcp_insufficient_scope`` MUST
+also pass a ``consent_url=`` kwarg, otherwise the dashboard renderer
+can't surface a re-consent button.
+
+This test is purely structural — it scans the source of
+:mod:`turnstone.core.mcp_client` and asserts every consent-required /
+insufficient-scope ``_structured_error`` call carries
+``consent_url=``. It catches future regressions where a new exec path
+adds a fourth call site and forgets the kwarg.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import turnstone.core.mcp_client as _mcp_client_module
+
+_USER_ACTIONABLE_CODES = ("mcp_consent_required", "mcp_insufficient_scope")
+
+
+def _read_source() -> str:
+    path = Path(_mcp_client_module.__file__)
+    return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def _find_structured_error_blocks(source: str) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
+    """Return ``(line_no, block)`` pairs for every ``_structured_error(...)``.
+
+    Each block is the call's argument list expanded across however many
+    lines the formatter chose. Uses a paren-counting walk so multi-line
+    kwargs and nested expressions are captured correctly.
+    """
+    blocks: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+    needle = "_structured_error("
+    idx = 0
+    while True:
+        loc = source.find(needle, idx)
+        if loc < 0:
+            break
+        # Skip the function definition itself.
+        if source[loc - 4 : loc] == "def ":
+            idx = loc + len(needle)
+            continue
+        line_no = source.count("\n", 0, loc) + 1
+        depth = 1
+        end = loc + len(needle)
+        while end < len(source) and depth > 0:
+            ch = source[end]
+            if ch == "(":
+                depth += 1
+            elif ch == ")":
+                depth -= 1
+            end += 1
+        blocks.append((line_no, source[loc:end]))
+        idx = end
+    return blocks
+
+
+def test_every_user_actionable_structured_error_passes_consent_url() -> None:
+    source = _read_source()
+    blocks = _find_structured_error_blocks(source)
+    user_actionable_blocks = [
+        (ln, blk)
+        for ln, blk in blocks
+        if any(f'code="{code}"' in blk for code in _USER_ACTIONABLE_CODES)
+    ]
+
+    # Sanity check: ensure we actually scanned the file the audit cares
+    # about (a stale path or import would otherwise silently pass with
+    # zero matches).
+    assert user_actionable_blocks, (
+        "No mcp_consent_required / mcp_insufficient_scope _structured_error "
+        "call sites found — has the audit been pointed at the wrong file?"
+    )
+
+    missing: list[tuple[int, str]] = []
+    for ln, blk in user_actionable_blocks:
+        if "consent_url=" not in blk:
+            # Strip whitespace and truncate so the failure message is
+            # readable in CI.
+            collapsed = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", blk).strip()
+            missing.append((ln, collapsed[:200]))
+
+    assert not missing, (
+        "Sibling-bug regression: the following consent-required / "
+        "insufficient-scope _structured_error sites are missing the "
+        "consent_url= kwarg.\n" + "\n".join(f"  line {ln}: {snippet}" for ln, snippet in missing)
+    )
+
+
+def test_audit_finds_all_known_user_actionable_sites() -> None:
+    """Lock the count so accidental deletions are caught.
+
+    There are 13 user-actionable ``_structured_error`` call sites today
+    (4 each in the tool / resource / prompt token-classify branches +
+    3 in the post-retry-failed branches + 1 in ``_handle_auth_403``'s
+    insufficient-scope branch). If a new exec path is added the count
+    can rise; if a branch is removed the count can fall — both are
+    fine, but require an intentional bump of this number to confirm
+    the change went through review.
+    """
+    source = _read_source()
+    blocks = _find_structured_error_blocks(source)
+    user_actionable_count = sum(
+        1 for _, blk in blocks if any(f'code="{code}"' in blk for code in _USER_ACTIONABLE_CODES)
+    )
+    assert user_actionable_count == 13, (
+        f"Expected 13 user-actionable _structured_error sites, got "
+        f"{user_actionable_count}. If this is intentional, bump the "
+        f"expected count and document why in the commit message."
+    )

tests/test_mcp_crypto.py

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+"""Tests for ``turnstone.core.mcp_crypto`` cipher + config loading.
+
+Covers token-at-rest encryption for OAuth-MCP.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
+    MCPTokenCipher,
+    MCPTokenCipherConfig,
+    MCPTokenDecryptError,
+    MCPTokenKeyConfigError,
+    _key_fingerprint,
+    _validate_key,
+    load_mcp_token_cipher_config,
+)
+
+
+def _new_raw_key() -> bytes:
+    """Return a fresh 32-byte Fernet key as raw bytes (post-base64-decode)."""
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Cipher round-trip
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCipherRoundTrip:
+    def test_round_trip_single_key(self) -> None:
+        cipher = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        plaintext = b"access_token_12345"
+        ct = cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
+        assert ct != plaintext
+        assert cipher.decrypt(ct) == plaintext
+
+    def test_round_trip_unicode_token(self) -> None:
+        cipher = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        # Tokens may legitimately carry UTF-8 bytes (e.g. JWT with
+        # non-ASCII claim values).  Round-trip a multi-byte sequence.
+        plaintext = "tok_é中💯".encode()
+        ct = cipher.encrypt(plaintext)
+        assert cipher.decrypt(ct) == plaintext
+
+    def test_wrong_key_raises_decrypt_error(self) -> None:
+        cipher_a = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        cipher_b = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(_new_raw_key(),)))
+        ct = cipher_a.encrypt(b"secret")
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError) as exc_info:
+            cipher_b.decrypt(ct)
+        # Audit-trail correlation: error must carry the fingerprints of
+        # the keys actually attempted, not a placeholder.
+        assert exc_info.value.key_fingerprints_attempted
+        assert exc_info.value.key_fingerprints_attempted == cipher_b.key_fingerprints
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Rotation (MultiFernet behavior)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestRotation:
+    def test_rotation_forward(self) -> None:
+        """Encrypt with a new-only cipher, decrypt with a [v2, v1] cluster.
+
+        Mirrors the operational situation where a node already has the
+        rotated key list installed and a peer just wrote a row under v2.
+        """
+        v1 = _new_raw_key()
+        v2 = _new_raw_key()
+        new_only = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v2,)))
+        cluster = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v2, v1)))
+        ct = new_only.encrypt(b"hello")
+        assert cluster.decrypt(ct) == b"hello"
+
+    def test_rotation_backward_keeps_old_decryptable(self) -> None:
+        """A row written under the OLD key (v1) must still decrypt after
+        rotation places v2 first and keeps v1 as fallback."""
+        v1 = _new_raw_key()
+        v2 = _new_raw_key()
+        old_only = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v1,)))
+        rotated = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v2, v1)))
+        ct = old_only.encrypt(b"legacy")
+        assert rotated.decrypt(ct) == b"legacy"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Config loader
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _patch_load_config(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, payload: dict) -> None:
+    """Override ``turnstone.core.config.load_config`` to return ``payload``
+    when the ``"security"`` section is requested."""
+
+    def fake(section: str | None = None) -> dict:
+        if section == "security":
+            return payload
+        return {}
+
+    import turnstone.core.config as cfg_mod
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cfg_mod, "load_config", fake)
+
+
+class TestLoadConfig:
+    def test_load_singular_key(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        key = Fernet.generate_key().decode()
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_key": key})
+        cfg = load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert cfg is not None
+        assert len(cfg.keys) == 1
+
+    def test_load_plural_overrides_singular(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        plural = [Fernet.generate_key().decode(), Fernet.generate_key().decode()]
+        _patch_load_config(
+            monkeypatch,
+            {
+                "mcp_token_encryption_keys": plural,
+                "mcp_token_encryption_key": Fernet.generate_key().decode(),
+            },
+        )
+        cfg = load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert cfg is not None
+        assert len(cfg.keys) == 2  # plural wins, singular ignored
+
+    def test_load_returns_none_when_absent(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {})
+        assert load_mcp_token_cipher_config() is None
+
+    def test_load_empty_plural_falls_through_to_singular(
+        self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch
+    ) -> None:
+        """Operator wrote ``mcp_token_encryption_keys = []`` AND set a
+        singular value: empty plural is treated as absent."""
+        key = Fernet.generate_key().decode()
+        _patch_load_config(
+            monkeypatch,
+            {"mcp_token_encryption_keys": [], "mcp_token_encryption_key": key},
+        )
+        cfg = load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert cfg is not None
+        assert len(cfg.keys) == 1
+
+    def test_load_invalid_base64_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_key": "###not-base64###"})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        # Operator-facing hint is part of every error message.
+        assert "regenerate with:" in str(exc_info.value)
+
+    def test_load_wrong_length_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        # 24 raw bytes → 32 base64 chars; not 32 raw bytes after decode.
+        short_key = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b"\x00" * 24).decode()
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_key": short_key})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert "32 bytes" in str(exc_info.value)
+
+    def test_load_non_list_plural_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_keys": "single-string-not-list"})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+        assert "list" in str(exc_info.value).lower()
+
+    def test_load_non_string_in_plural_raises(self, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+        _patch_load_config(monkeypatch, {"mcp_token_encryption_keys": [12345]})
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            load_mcp_token_cipher_config()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fingerprint stability
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestFingerprint:
+    def test_key_fingerprint_stable_and_short(self) -> None:
+        key = _new_raw_key()
+        fp1 = _key_fingerprint(key)
+        fp2 = _key_fingerprint(key)
+        assert fp1 == fp2
+        # 8 bytes -> 16 hex characters.
+        assert len(fp1) == 16
+        assert all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in fp1)
+
+    def test_different_keys_have_different_fingerprints(self) -> None:
+        fp1 = _key_fingerprint(_new_raw_key())
+        fp2 = _key_fingerprint(_new_raw_key())
+        assert fp1 != fp2
+
+    def test_cipher_fingerprints_match_keys(self) -> None:
+        v1 = _new_raw_key()
+        v2 = _new_raw_key()
+        cipher = MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(v1, v2)))
+        assert cipher.key_fingerprints == (
+            _key_fingerprint(v1),
+            _key_fingerprint(v2),
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Direct ``_validate_key`` — exercises edge cases not reachable via loader
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestValidateKey:
+    def test_empty_string_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            _validate_key("", label="x")
+
+    def test_whitespace_only_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            _validate_key("   ", label="x")
+
+    def test_label_propagated_in_error(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError) as exc_info:
+            _validate_key("###", label="my_label_42")
+        assert "my_label_42" in str(exc_info.value)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# MCPTokenCipher constructor guard
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCipherConstructorGuard:
+    def test_empty_keys_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenKeyConfigError):
+            MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=()))

tests/test_mcp_hot_reload.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import Any
 
+from tests.conftest import _seed_static_state
 from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -105,14 +106,18 @@ class TestRemoveServerSync:
         """remove_server_sync cleans up all per-server state dicts."""
         mgr = MCPClientManager({"test": {"command": "echo"}})
         # Simulate state as if the server was connected
-        mgr._per_server_tools["test"] = [_fake_openai_tool()]
-        mgr._per_server_resources["test"] = [_fake_resource_dict()]
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["test"] = [_fake_prompt_dict()]
-        mgr._supports_list_changed["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_resources["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_resource_list_changed["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_prompts["test"] = True
-        mgr._supports_prompt_list_changed["test"] = True
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "test",
+            tools=[_fake_openai_tool()],
+            resources=[_fake_resource_dict()],
+            prompts=[_fake_prompt_dict()],
+            supports_list_changed=True,
+            supports_resources=True,
+            supports_resource_list_changed=True,
+            supports_prompts=True,
+            supports_prompt_list_changed=True,
+        )
         mgr._rebuild_tools()
         mgr._rebuild_resources()
         mgr._rebuild_prompts()
@@ -127,14 +132,7 @@ class TestRemoveServerSync:
         assert len(mgr.get_tools()) == 0
         assert mgr.resource_count == 0
         assert mgr.prompt_count == 0
-        assert "test" not in mgr._per_server_tools
-        assert "test" not in mgr._per_server_resources
-        assert "test" not in mgr._per_server_prompts
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_list_changed
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_resources
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_resource_list_changed
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_prompts
-        assert "test" not in mgr._supports_prompt_list_changed
+        assert "test" not in mgr._static_servers
 
     def test_removes_config_to_prevent_reconnect(self) -> None:
         """remove_server_sync removes from _server_configs to prevent reconnect."""
@@ -146,8 +144,8 @@ class TestRemoveServerSync:
     def test_preserves_other_servers(self) -> None:
         """Removing one server does not affect another server's state."""
         mgr = MCPClientManager({"srv_a": {}, "srv_b": {}})
-        mgr._per_server_tools["srv_a"] = [_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_a__foo")]
-        mgr._per_server_tools["srv_b"] = [_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_b__bar")]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "srv_a", tools=[_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_a__foo")])
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "srv_b", tools=[_fake_openai_tool("mcp__srv_b__bar")])
         mgr._rebuild_tools()
 
         assert len(mgr.get_tools()) == 2
@@ -179,13 +177,17 @@ class TestGetServerStatus:
         """Status of a connected server reports correct tool/resource/prompt counts."""
         mgr = MCPClientManager({"test": {}})
         # Simulate connected state
-        mgr._sessions["test"] = object()  # any truthy value
-        mgr._per_server_tools["test"] = [
-            _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__a"),
-            _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__b"),
-        ]
-        mgr._per_server_resources["test"] = [_fake_resource_dict()]
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["test"] = [_fake_prompt_dict()]
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "test",
+            session=object(),  # any truthy value
+            tools=[
+                _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__a"),
+                _fake_openai_tool("mcp__test__b"),
+            ],
+            resources=[_fake_resource_dict()],
+            prompts=[_fake_prompt_dict()],
+        )
 
         status = mgr.get_server_status("test")
         assert status["connected"] is True
@@ -225,8 +227,7 @@ class TestGetAllServerStatus:
     def test_mixed_connected_and_disconnected(self) -> None:
         """Status correctly reflects a mix of connected and disconnected servers."""
         mgr = MCPClientManager({"up": {}, "down": {}})
-        mgr._sessions["up"] = object()
-        mgr._per_server_tools["up"] = [_fake_openai_tool("mcp__up__x")]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "up", session=object(), tools=[_fake_openai_tool("mcp__up__x")])
 
         statuses = mgr.get_all_server_status()
         assert statuses["up"]["connected"] is True

tests/test_mcp_http_parsers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+"""Unit tests for ``turnstone.core.mcp_http_parsers``.
+
+The parser replaces the prior hand-rolled scanners that used
+``header.lower().find("scope")`` to locate parameter names — that approach
+misparsed ``scope`` embedded inside other tokens (``xscope``) or inside
+quoted-string values of preceding params. Each adversarial case below
+asserts the new tokenizer respects RFC 7235 ``challenge → auth-param``
+boundaries; the docstrings document the equivalent input that broke the
+naive parser. Negative-test verification: temporarily reverting
+``parse_www_authenticate_scope`` to delegate to ``header.lower().find("scope")``
+makes ``test_scope_inside_realm_value`` and ``test_scope_inside_xscope`` fail.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_http_parsers import (
+    parse_www_authenticate_bearer,
+    parse_www_authenticate_error,
+    parse_www_authenticate_scope,
+)
+
+
+class TestParseScope:
+    def test_basic_scope(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:read mail:send"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("files:read", "mail:send")
+
+    def test_no_scope_param(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope('Bearer error="invalid_token"') == ()
+
+    def test_unterminated_quoted_string_returns_empty(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope('Bearer scope="files:read') == ()
+
+    def test_escaped_chars_in_value_drops_invalid_scope_token(self) -> None:
+        # RFC 7230 §3.2.6 backslash escapes decode the literal scope to
+        # ``files:read "weird"``. RFC 6749 §3.3 ``scope-token`` forbids
+        # ``"``, so ``"weird"`` is dropped and only ``files:read``
+        # survives the post-split validation.
+        header = r'Bearer scope="files:read \"weird\""'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("files:read",)
+
+    def test_empty_string(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope("") == ()
+
+    def test_unquoted_scope_value(self) -> None:
+        # Unquoted single token.
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope("Bearer scope=files:read") == ("files:read",)
+
+    # --- the four headline misparse cases ---
+
+    def test_scope_inside_xscope(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer xscope="value"`` must NOT be read as ``scope``.
+
+        The naive ``find("scope")`` matched at position 7 inside
+        ``xscope`` and returned ``("value",)``.
+        """
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope('Bearer xscope="value"') == ()
+
+    def test_scope_inside_realm_value(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer realm="my scope=fake", scope="real"`` must return ``("real",)``.
+
+        The naive parser found ``scope=`` inside the quoted ``realm``
+        value first and returned ``("fake",)``.
+        """
+        header = 'Bearer realm="my scope=fake", scope="real"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("real",)
+
+    def test_scope_inside_quoted_realm_with_escaped_quotes(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer realm="foo scope=\\"admin:write\\" bar"`` returns ``()``.
+
+        The inner ``scope=`` is wholly inside the quoted-string value of
+        ``realm`` — there is no top-level ``scope`` auth-param, so the
+        result is empty.
+        """
+        header = r'Bearer realm="foo scope=\"admin:write\" bar"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ()
+
+    def test_scope_token_validation_drops_control_bytes(self) -> None:
+        """Tokens containing CR / LF / tab / DEL / quote are dropped.
+
+        RFC 6749 §3.3 restricts ``scope-token`` to visible ASCII
+        excluding ``"`` and ``\\``. The splitter applies that
+        validation so a malicious AS cannot smuggle CRLF (or the like)
+        through a future log / notification path that prints the scope
+        list verbatim. ``"a\\rb"`` and ``"\\nc"`` fail validation;
+        ``"d"`` survives. The legitimate space separator splits ``d``
+        into its own token.
+        """
+        # Build via concatenation so the assertion stays intelligible.
+        header = 'Bearer scope="a\rb \nc d"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_scope(header) == ("d",)
+
+
+class TestParseError:
+    def test_basic_quoted_error(self) -> None:
+        assert (
+            parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error="insufficient_scope"')
+            == "insufficient_scope"
+        )
+
+    def test_other_quoted_error_tokens(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error="invalid_token"') == "invalid_token"
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error="invalid_request"') == "invalid_request"
+
+    def test_no_error_param(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error("Bearer realm=foo") is None
+
+    def test_error_description_does_not_match_error(self) -> None:
+        """``error_description`` is its own auth-param key, not ``error``.
+
+        The tokenizer reads ``_`` as part of the token (RFC 7230 ``tchar``),
+        so ``error_description`` becomes one key, ``error`` another.
+        """
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error('Bearer error_description="bad"') is None
+
+    def test_unquoted_error(self) -> None:
+        # Some ASes don't quote the error token.
+        assert (
+            parse_www_authenticate_error("Bearer error=insufficient_scope") == "insufficient_scope"
+        )
+
+    def test_empty_string(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error("") is None
+
+    def test_error_inside_realm_value(self) -> None:
+        """``Bearer realm="my error=fake", error="real"`` must return ``"real"``.
+
+        Naive parser grabbed ``fake`` from inside the ``realm`` quoted
+        value.
+        """
+        header = 'Bearer realm="my error=fake", error="real"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_error(header) == "real"
+
+
+class TestBearerDict:
+    def test_returns_lowercased_keys(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer Realm="x", Error="y", Scope="a b"'
+        params = parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header)
+        assert params == {"realm": "x", "error": "y", "scope": "a b"}
+
+    def test_non_bearer_scheme_returns_empty(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer('Basic realm="x"') == {}
+
+    def test_no_scheme(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer('realm="x"') == {}
+
+    def test_bearer_only_no_params(self) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer("Bearer ") == {}
+
+    def test_bearer_with_no_space_returns_empty(self) -> None:
+        # ``BearerToken`` is not a Bearer challenge (no separator).
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer("BearerToken") == {}
+
+    def test_first_value_wins_on_duplicate(self) -> None:
+        # If a malformed AS sends two ``scope=`` params we keep the first.
+        # The earlier ``find()``-based scanner would have returned the
+        # last; either choice is legal for malformed input but we need
+        # to be consistent.
+        header = 'Bearer scope="first", scope="second"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"scope": "first"}
+
+    def test_trailing_comma(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer error="x",'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"error": "x"}
+
+    def test_multiple_commas(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer ,, error="x",,, scope="y"'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"error": "x", "scope": "y"}
+
+    def test_embedded_escaped_quote(self) -> None:
+        header = r'Bearer realm="he said \"hi\""'
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"realm": 'he said "hi"'}
+
+    def test_param_without_value_skipped(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer realm, error="x"'
+        # ``realm`` without ``=`` is dropped; ``error`` survives.
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == {"error": "x"}
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "header,expected",
+        [
+            ("", {}),
+            ("Bearer", {}),
+            ('Bearer realm=""', {"realm": ""}),
+            ('Bearer realm="", scope=""', {"realm": "", "scope": ""}),
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_edge_cases(self, header: str, expected: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+        assert parse_www_authenticate_bearer(header) == expected
+
+
+class TestPathologicalInput:
+    def test_oversized_pathological_input_rejected_under_50ms(self) -> None:
+        """Headers longer than the defensive cap return ``{}`` immediately.
+
+        The cap is set to 4096 bytes — real ASes emit a few hundred bytes
+        at most. This guards both ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer``
+        callers against pathological input from a misbehaving server.
+        The previous ``header.lower().find("scope", i)`` loop was
+        O(N**2) — a 100 KB header with no ``=`` took ~330 ms because
+        each ``find`` rescanned the entire suffix. The single-pass
+        tokenizer (capped at 4 KB) reduces this to a one-shot length
+        check that returns ``{}`` in microseconds, so the budget is
+        generous regardless of which side of the cap was hit.
+        """
+        big = "Bearer scope=" + "a" * 10_000
+        start = time.perf_counter()
+        result = parse_www_authenticate_scope(big)
+        elapsed = time.perf_counter() - start
+        assert result == ()
+        assert elapsed < 0.05, f"oversized-header reject took {elapsed * 1000:.1f}ms"
+
+    def test_within_cap_long_header_under_50ms(self) -> None:
+        """A 4 KB header with thousands of ``find`` candidates still parses fast.
+
+        Stays under the cap so the tokenizer actually runs end to end —
+        the goal is to prove the inner loop is O(N), not just that the
+        cap rejects oversized input.
+        """
+        # Pack the header right up to the cap with non-matching
+        # auth-params, then put the real ``scope`` at the end.
+        filler_parts = []
+        size = len("Bearer ")
+        i = 0
+        while size < 3900:
+            part = f'xscope{i}="ignore", '
+            if size + len(part) > 3900:
+                break
+            filler_parts.append(part)
+            size += len(part)
+            i += 1
+        header = "Bearer " + "".join(filler_parts) + 'scope="real"'
+        assert len(header) <= 4096
+        start = time.perf_counter()
+        result = parse_www_authenticate_scope(header)
+        elapsed = time.perf_counter() - start
+        assert result == ("real",)
+        assert elapsed < 0.05, f"4kb tokenize took {elapsed * 1000:.1f}ms"

tests/test_mcp_integration.py

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
 
 import pytest
 
+from tests.conftest import _seed_static_state
 from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
 from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
 
@@ -109,13 +110,15 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
 
     def test_rebuild_resources_produces_merged_state(self, mgr: MCPClientManager) -> None:
         """_rebuild_resources merges per-server resources into a unified list."""
-        mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
-            _make_resource("file:///b.txt", "b", "alpha"),
-        ]
-        mgr._per_server_resources["beta"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///c.txt", "c", "beta"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "alpha",
+            resources=[
+                _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
+                _make_resource("file:///b.txt", "b", "alpha"),
+            ],
+        )
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "beta", resources=[_make_resource("file:///c.txt", "c", "beta")])
 
         mgr._rebuild_resources()
 
@@ -130,13 +133,19 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
 
     def test_rebuild_prompts_produces_merged_state(self, mgr: MCPClientManager) -> None:
         """_rebuild_prompts merges per-server prompts into a unified list."""
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello"),
-        ]
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["beta"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__beta__summarize", "summarize", "beta", "Summarize text"),
-            _make_prompt("mcp__beta__translate", "translate", "beta", "Translate text"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "alpha",
+            prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello")],
+        )
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "beta",
+            prompts=[
+                _make_prompt("mcp__beta__summarize", "summarize", "beta", "Summarize text"),
+                _make_prompt("mcp__beta__translate", "translate", "beta", "Translate text"),
+            ],
+        )
 
         mgr._rebuild_prompts()
 
@@ -164,10 +173,12 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
         try:
             # Populate session and resource map
             session = _make_mock_session()
-            mgr._sessions["alpha"] = session
-            mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-                _make_resource("file:///readme.md", "readme", "alpha"),
-            ]
+            _seed_static_state(
+                mgr,
+                "alpha",
+                session=session,
+                resources=[_make_resource("file:///readme.md", "readme", "alpha")],
+            )
             mgr._rebuild_resources()
 
             result = mgr.read_resource_sync("file:///readme.md", timeout=5)
@@ -194,18 +205,22 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
 
         try:
             session = _make_mock_session()
-            mgr._sessions["alpha"] = session
             # Register a template resource (no concrete resources)
-            mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-                {
-                    "uri": "db://tables/{table}/rows/{id}",
-                    "name": "row",
-                    "description": "Fetch a row",
-                    "mimeType": "application/json",
-                    "server": "alpha",
-                    "template": True,
-                },
-            ]
+            _seed_static_state(
+                mgr,
+                "alpha",
+                session=session,
+                resources=[
+                    {
+                        "uri": "db://tables/{table}/rows/{id}",
+                        "name": "row",
+                        "description": "Fetch a row",
+                        "mimeType": "application/json",
+                        "server": "alpha",
+                        "template": True,
+                    },
+                ],
+            )
             mgr._rebuild_resources()
 
             # Template should not be in _resource_map
@@ -230,10 +245,12 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
 
         try:
             session = _make_mock_session()
-            mgr._sessions["alpha"] = session
-            mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-                _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello"),
-            ]
+            _seed_static_state(
+                mgr,
+                "alpha",
+                session=session,
+                prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha", "Say hello")],
+            )
             mgr._rebuild_prompts()
 
             messages = mgr.get_prompt_sync(
@@ -314,40 +331,42 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
     def test_shutdown_clears_all_state(self, mgr: MCPClientManager) -> None:
         """shutdown() clears sessions, tools, resources, prompts, and listeners."""
         # Populate state
-        mgr._sessions["alpha"] = MagicMock()
-        mgr._per_server_tools["alpha"] = [
-            {
-                "type": "function",
-                "function": {
-                    "name": "mcp__alpha__search",
-                    "description": "Search",
-                    "parameters": {},
+        _seed_static_state(
+            mgr,
+            "alpha",
+            session=MagicMock(),
+            tools=[
+                {
+                    "type": "function",
+                    "function": {
+                        "name": "mcp__alpha__search",
+                        "description": "Search",
+                        "parameters": {},
+                    },
+                }
+            ],
+            resources=[
+                _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
+                {
+                    "uri": "db://tables/{table}",
+                    "name": "table",
+                    "description": "",
+                    "mimeType": "",
+                    "server": "alpha",
+                    "template": True,
                 },
-            }
-        ]
+            ],
+            prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha")],
+        )
         mgr._rebuild_tools()
-        mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///a.txt", "a", "alpha"),
-            {
-                "uri": "db://tables/{table}",
-                "name": "table",
-                "description": "",
-                "mimeType": "",
-                "server": "alpha",
-                "template": True,
-            },
-        ]
         mgr._rebuild_resources()
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__greet", "greet", "alpha"),
-        ]
         mgr._rebuild_prompts()
         mgr._listeners.append(lambda: None)
         mgr._resource_listeners.append(lambda: None)
         mgr._prompt_listeners.append(lambda: None)
 
         # Verify populated
-        assert len(mgr._sessions) == 1
+        assert len(mgr._static_servers) == 1
         assert len(mgr._tools) == 1
         assert len(mgr._resources) == 2  # 1 concrete + 1 template
         assert len(mgr._template_prefixes) == 1
@@ -355,7 +374,7 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
 
         mgr.shutdown()
 
-        assert len(mgr._sessions) == 0
+        assert len(mgr._static_servers) == 0
         assert len(mgr._tools) == 0
         assert len(mgr._tool_map) == 0
         assert len(mgr._resources) == 0
@@ -376,19 +395,15 @@ class TestFullLifecycleResourcesPrompts:
         mgr.add_resource_listener(lambda: resource_fired.append(1))
         mgr.add_prompt_listener(lambda: prompt_fired.append(1))
 
-        mgr._per_server_tools["alpha"] = []
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "alpha", tools=[])
         mgr._rebuild_tools()
         assert len(tool_fired) == 1
 
-        mgr._per_server_resources["alpha"] = [
-            _make_resource("file:///x.txt", "x", "alpha"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "alpha", resources=[_make_resource("file:///x.txt", "x", "alpha")])
         mgr._rebuild_resources()
         assert len(resource_fired) == 1
 
-        mgr._per_server_prompts["alpha"] = [
-            _make_prompt("mcp__alpha__p1", "p1", "alpha"),
-        ]
+        _seed_static_state(mgr, "alpha", prompts=[_make_prompt("mcp__alpha__p1", "p1", "alpha")])
         mgr._rebuild_prompts()
         assert len(prompt_fired) == 1
 

tests/test_mcp_oauth_connections.py

@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+"""Integration tests for the MCP OAuth ``/connections`` endpoints.
+
+Covers the list and revoke handlers that surface user-owned MCP server
+consents to the settings UI:
+
+* ``GET /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections`` — non-secret projection only.
+* ``DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name}`` — best-effort
+  upstream revoke (RFC 7009) followed by the authoritative local
+  delete; cross-user attempts return 404 with the exact same body
+  shape as a never-existed row to avoid leaking tenant existence.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.middleware import Middleware
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+from starlette.routing import Mount, Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+    handle_mcp_oauth_list_connections,
+    handle_mcp_oauth_revoke_connection,
+)
+from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fixtures + helpers (mirror tests/test_mcp_oauth_handlers.py)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _InjectAuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Stamp a fixed authenticated user on every request."""
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, user_id: str = "user-1") -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._user_id = user_id
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
+            user_id=self._user_id,
+            scopes=frozenset({"write"}),
+            token_source="config",
+            permissions=frozenset({"read", "write"}),
+        )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+class _NoAuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Leave ``request.state.auth_result`` unset so handlers see anon."""
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+async def _list_handler(request: Request) -> Response:
+    return await handle_mcp_oauth_list_connections(request)
+
+
+async def _revoke_handler(request: Request) -> Response:
+    return await handle_mcp_oauth_revoke_connection(request)
+
+
+def _build_app(
+    *,
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    http_client: httpx.AsyncClient | MagicMock,
+    token_store: MCPTokenStore | None,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    mcp_client: Any = None,
+    authenticated: bool = True,
+) -> Starlette:
+    middleware: list[Middleware]
+    if authenticated:
+        middleware = [Middleware(_InjectAuthMiddleware, user_id=user_id)]
+    else:
+        middleware = [Middleware(_NoAuthMiddleware)]
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=[
+            Mount(
+                "/v1",
+                routes=[
+                    Route("/api/mcp/oauth/connections", _list_handler),
+                    Route(
+                        "/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name}",
+                        _revoke_handler,
+                        methods=["DELETE"],
+                    ),
+                ],
+            ),
+        ],
+        middleware=middleware,
+    )
+    app.state.auth_storage = storage
+    app.state.mcp_token_store = token_store
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_http_client = http_client
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_refresh_locks = {}
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_dcr_locks = {}
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_metadata_cache = {}
+    app.state.mcp_oauth_last_cleanup_monotonic = 0.0
+    app.state.oidc_config = OIDCConfig(enabled=False, redirect_base="https://testserver")
+    if mcp_client is not None:
+        app.state.mcp_client = mcp_client
+    return app
+
+
+def _make_token_store(backend: SQLiteBackend) -> MCPTokenStore:
+    return MCPTokenStore(backend, make_mcp_token_cipher(), node_id="test")
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_user_server(
+    backend: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "srv-oauth",
+    server_id: str = "srv-id-1",
+    cached_issuer: str | None = "https://as.example.com",
+) -> str:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid profile",
+        oauth_audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        oauth_authorization_server_url=None,
+    )
+    if cached_issuer is not None:
+        backend.update_mcp_server(server_id, oauth_as_issuer_cached=cached_issuer)
+    return server_id
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    token_store: MCPTokenStore,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "srv-oauth",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-secret",
+) -> None:
+    token_store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token="access-secret",
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at="2099-12-31T00:00:00",
+        scopes="openid profile",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _good_as_metadata_doc(
+    *, revocation_endpoint: str | None = "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    doc: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
+        "authorization_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/authorize",
+        "token_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/token",
+        "registration_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/register",
+        "jwks_uri": "https://as.example.com/jwks",
+        "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"],
+        "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["none", "client_secret_basic"],
+    }
+    if revocation_endpoint is not None:
+        doc["revocation_endpoint"] = revocation_endpoint
+    return doc
+
+
+def _mk_response(
+    status_code: int = 200,
+    json_body: Any = None,
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> MagicMock:
+    import json as _json
+
+    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    resp.status_code = status_code
+    resp.headers = headers or {}
+    body_str = _json.dumps(json_body) if json_body is not None else ""
+    resp.content = body_str.encode("utf-8")
+    if json_body is not None:
+        resp.json.return_value = json_body
+    else:
+        resp.json.side_effect = ValueError("no body")
+    resp.text = body_str
+    return resp
+
+
+def _public_addr_patch():
+    return patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))])
+
+
+def _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client: TestClient, timeout: float = 2.0) -> None:
+    """Block until all in-flight upstream-revoke tasks complete.
+
+    Phase 8 perf-1 made the RFC 7009 AS round-trip a fire-and-forget
+    task so the user-visible 204 isn't gated on the AS. The tasks were
+    scheduled on the TestClient's portal loop; we re-enter that loop
+    via :attr:`TestClient.portal` to await them. Tests that assert
+    against the upstream POST must call this helper before the
+    assertion.
+    """
+    from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import _revoke_upstream_tasks
+
+    portal = getattr(client, "portal", None)
+    if portal is None:
+        return
+
+    async def _drain() -> None:
+        pending = list(_revoke_upstream_tasks)
+        if pending:
+            async with asyncio.timeout(timeout):
+                await asyncio.gather(*pending, return_exceptions=True)
+
+    portal.call(_drain)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    backend = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+    backend.create_user("user-1", "user1", "User One", "hash")
+    backend.create_user("user-2", "user2", "User Two", "hash")
+    return backend
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def http_client_mock() -> MagicMock:
+    client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+    client.get = AsyncMock()
+    client.post = AsyncMock()
+    return client
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# GET /connections
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestListConnections:
+    def test_list_connections_unauthenticated_401(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            authenticated=False,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 401
+        assert resp.json() == {"error": "Authentication required"}
+
+    def test_list_connections_no_token_store_503(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=None)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 503
+
+    def test_list_connections_empty_user_returns_empty_list(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json() == {"connections": []}
+
+    def test_list_connections_returns_users_consents(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage, name="srv-a", server_id="srv-id-a")
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage, name="srv-b", server_id="srv-id-b")
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, server_name="srv-a")
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, server_name="srv-b")
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        body = resp.json()
+        assert "connections" in body
+        servers = sorted(row["server_name"] for row in body["connections"])
+        assert servers == ["srv-a", "srv-b"]
+
+    def test_list_connections_isolates_by_user(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, user_id="user-1", server_name="srv-oauth")
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, user_id="user-2", server_name="srv-oauth")
+
+        # User-1 sees only user-1's row.
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store, user_id="user-1"
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        rows = resp.json()["connections"]
+        assert all(row["user_id"] == "user-1" for row in rows)
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+
+        # User-2 sees only user-2's row.
+        app2 = _build_app(
+            storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store, user_id="user-2"
+        )
+        client2 = TestClient(app2, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp2 = client2.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        rows2 = resp2.json()["connections"]
+        assert all(row["user_id"] == "user-2" for row in rows2)
+        assert len(rows2) == 1
+
+    def test_list_connections_does_not_leak_secret_fields(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections")
+        rows = resp.json()["connections"]
+        assert rows
+        for row in rows:
+            for forbidden in (
+                "access_token",
+                "refresh_token",
+                "access_token_ct",
+                "refresh_token_ct",
+            ):
+                assert forbidden not in row, f"secret field {forbidden!r} leaked in {row!r}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# DELETE /connections/{server_name}
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestRevokeConnection:
+    def test_revoke_connection_unauthenticated_401(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store)
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            authenticated=False,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 401
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_missing_row_404(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-nonexistent")
+        assert resp.status_code == 404
+        assert resp.json() == {"error": "No such connection"}
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_local_delete_succeeds_204(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        # No refresh token → upstream revoke is skipped entirely.
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        # Local row is gone.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+        # Upstream not contacted.
+        http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_with_revocation_endpoint_calls_upstream(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+        http_client_mock.post.return_value = _mk_response(200)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        # ``with TestClient(...)`` keeps a persistent portal so the
+        # fire-and-forget upstream-revoke task isn't cancelled when
+        # the request handler returns. See ``_drain_revoke_upstream_tasks``.
+        # The SSRF-validator's ``socket.getaddrinfo`` patch must wrap
+        # the drain too — the discovery call now runs on the background
+        # task and resolves the AS hostname after the request returns.
+        with (
+            TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False) as client,
+            _public_addr_patch(),
+        ):
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+
+            assert resp.status_code == 204
+            # Local row is gone.
+            assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+            # The upstream RFC 7009 POST is fire-and-forget post-Phase-8 perf-1
+            # so the test must drain the in-flight task set before asserting.
+            _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client)
+            # Upstream POSTed to revocation_endpoint with refresh-token grant.
+            assert http_client_mock.post.await_count == 1
+            call = http_client_mock.post.await_args
+            assert call.args[0] == "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+            data = call.kwargs.get("data") or {}
+            assert data.get("token") == "refresh-secret"
+            assert data.get("token_type_hint") == "refresh_token"
+            assert data.get("client_id") == "client-abc"
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_without_revocation_endpoint_skips_upstream(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(
+            200, _good_as_metadata_doc(revocation_endpoint=None)
+        )
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        # ``with TestClient(...)`` keeps the portal alive for the
+        # background task drain.
+        with (
+            TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False) as client,
+            _public_addr_patch(),
+        ):
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+
+            assert resp.status_code == 204
+            # Local row gone, upstream POST never made.
+            assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+            # Drain the fire-and-forget discovery task before asserting on
+            # the AS POST — the task runs ``discover_authorization_server``
+            # but does NOT proceed to POST because revocation_endpoint is
+            # absent.
+            _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client)
+            http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_upstream_failure_still_204(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+        # AS returns 500 — local delete must still succeed.
+        http_client_mock.post.return_value = _mk_response(500)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+
+        with _public_addr_patch():
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_audit_event_emitted_with_user_revoked_reason(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+        # Audit row was written via the storage API (tests don't poke at
+        # the SQLite schema directly — the table name is an internal
+        # detail).
+        events = storage.list_audit_events(action="mcp_server.oauth.token_revoked")
+        assert len(events) == 1
+        ev = events[0]
+        assert ev["user_id"] == "user-1"
+        # resource_id is the immutable server_id PK, not the name.
+        assert ev["resource_id"] == "srv-id-1"
+        import json as _json
+
+        detail = _json.loads(ev["detail"]) if isinstance(ev["detail"], str) else ev["detail"]
+        assert detail["reason"] == "user_revoked"
+        assert detail["upstream_revoke_outcome"] == "no_refresh_token"
+        assert detail["server_name"] == "srv-oauth"
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_cross_user_attempt_404(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        # Owned by user-2, not user-1.
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, user_id="user-2", server_name="srv-oauth")
+
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store, user_id="user-1"
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        # Cross-user attempt MUST surface as a generic 404, byte-identical
+        # body to the never-existed case (no tenant existence leak).
+        assert resp.status_code == 404
+        assert resp.json() == {"error": "No such connection"}
+        # Drain pending tasks defensively, then confirm the upstream
+        # endpoint was NEVER contacted on the 404-cross-user path. A
+        # bug that scheduled the AS round-trip before the cross-user
+        # check would leak existence via the AS-side 200/4xx response.
+        _drain_revoke_upstream_tasks(client)
+        http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+        # User-2's row is untouched.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-2", "srv-oauth") is not None
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_evicts_pool_session(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        mcp_client_mock = MagicMock()
+        # ``evict_user_session`` is the public sync surface on
+        # MCPClientManager; mirror its signature here so the handler's
+        # ``hasattr`` gate triggers.
+        mcp_client_mock.evict_user_session = MagicMock(return_value=None)
+
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            mcp_client=mcp_client_mock,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+        mcp_client_mock.evict_user_session.assert_called_once_with("user-1", "srv-oauth")
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_pool_eviction_failure_does_not_block_204(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token=None)
+
+        mcp_client_mock = MagicMock()
+        mcp_client_mock.evict_user_session = MagicMock(side_effect=RuntimeError("loop closed"))
+
+        app = _build_app(
+            storage=storage,
+            http_client=http_client_mock,
+            token_store=token_store,
+            mcp_client=mcp_client_mock,
+        )
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        # Local delete still happened.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_204_not_gated_on_slow_upstream(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        """The user-visible 204 must return promptly even when the
+        upstream AS round-trip is slow / hanging. Pre-perf-1 the
+        handler awaited ``revoke_token_at_as`` synchronously, so a
+        stuck AS could block the user's revoke confirmation. The
+        fire-and-forget refactor moves the call onto a background task
+        so the 204 returns in well under 1s regardless of AS latency.
+        Bound is conservative for CI runner jitter.
+        """
+        import time
+
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        http_client_mock.get.return_value = _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+
+        async def _slow_post(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+            # Simulate a slow / unreachable AS — must NOT gate the
+            # user-visible 204 on this round-trip.
+            await asyncio.sleep(5.0)
+            return _mk_response(200)
+
+        http_client_mock.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=_slow_post)
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+
+        with _public_addr_patch():
+            start = time.monotonic()
+            resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+            elapsed = time.monotonic() - start
+
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        # 1s ceiling — the 204 must return on the local-delete path
+        # without waiting on the AS POST (which sleeps 5s above). Bound
+        # is intentionally generous for CI runner jitter; the actual
+        # path is on the order of milliseconds.
+        assert elapsed < 1.0, (
+            f"204 returned in {elapsed:.3f}s — should be <1s; the "
+            "fire-and-forget upstream revoke isn't decoupled from the "
+            "response."
+        )
+        # The local row IS gone — the authoritative delete ran before
+        # the 204 returned, even though the AS round-trip is still
+        # in flight.
+        assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+        # Cancel any in-flight tasks so the test client can exit cleanly.
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import _revoke_upstream_tasks
+
+        portal = getattr(client, "portal", None)
+        if portal is not None:
+            for task in list(_revoke_upstream_tasks):
+                portal.call(task.cancel)
+
+    def test_revoke_connection_sheds_upstream_when_task_set_full(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, http_client_mock: MagicMock
+    ) -> None:
+        """Round-2 q-2 regression: the soft cap on ``_revoke_upstream_tasks``
+        is the only protection against unbounded background-task pile-up
+        under a coordinated mass-revoke. When the set is full, the local
+        delete still runs but no upstream task is scheduled; the audit
+        detail records ``upstream_revoke_outcome="shed_by_cap"`` and
+        the AS endpoint is never contacted.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+            _REVOKE_UPSTREAM_TASKS_MAX,
+            _revoke_upstream_tasks,
+        )
+
+        _seed_oauth_user_server(storage)
+        token_store = _make_token_store(storage)
+        _seed_user_token(token_store, refresh_token="refresh-secret")
+
+        app = _build_app(storage=storage, http_client=http_client_mock, token_store=token_store)
+        sentinel_event_holder: dict[str, asyncio.Event] = {}
+
+        # Use ``with TestClient(...)`` so the portal stays alive — we
+        # need to schedule sentinel tasks on the portal's loop and the
+        # tasks must outlive the request to actually fill the set.
+        with (
+            TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False) as client,
+            _public_addr_patch(),
+        ):
+            portal = client.portal
+            assert portal is not None
+
+            async def _create_sentinel_event() -> asyncio.Event:
+                event = asyncio.Event()
+                sentinel_event_holder["event"] = event
+                return event
+
+            sentinel_event = portal.call(_create_sentinel_event)
+
+            async def _wait_on_event() -> None:
+                await sentinel_event.wait()
+
+            async def _fill_task_set() -> list[asyncio.Task[None]]:
+                tasks: list[asyncio.Task[None]] = []
+                for _ in range(_REVOKE_UPSTREAM_TASKS_MAX):
+                    t = asyncio.create_task(_wait_on_event())
+                    _revoke_upstream_tasks.add(t)
+                    tasks.append(t)
+                return tasks
+
+            sentinels = portal.call(_fill_task_set)
+            assert len(_revoke_upstream_tasks) >= _REVOKE_UPSTREAM_TASKS_MAX
+
+            try:
+                resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/srv-oauth")
+                assert resp.status_code == 204
+                # Local row is still gone — authoritative delete ran.
+                assert token_store.get_user_token("user-1", "srv-oauth") is None
+                # AS endpoint MUST NOT have been contacted.
+                http_client_mock.post.assert_not_called()
+                # Audit detail records the categorical shed outcome.
+                events = storage.list_audit_events(action="mcp_server.oauth.token_revoked")
+                assert len(events) == 1
+                detail = events[0]["detail"]
+                if isinstance(detail, str):
+                    import json as _json
+
+                    detail = _json.loads(detail)
+                assert detail["upstream_revoke_outcome"] == "shed_by_cap"
+            finally:
+                # Release sentinels so the portal can shut down cleanly.
+                async def _release() -> None:
+                    sentinel_event.set()
+                    for t in sentinels:
+                        t.cancel()
+                    await asyncio.gather(*sentinels, return_exceptions=True)
+
+                portal.call(_release)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# evict_user_session helper sanity checks
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestEvictUserSession:
+    def test_evict_user_session_no_loop_is_silent_noop(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager.__new__(MCPClientManager)
+        mgr._loop = None  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+        # Must not raise.
+        mgr.evict_user_session("user-1", "srv-oauth")
+
+    def test_evict_user_session_dispatches_to_loop(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager.__new__(MCPClientManager)
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        try:
+            mgr._loop = loop  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            mgr._user_pool_entries = {}  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            mgr._last_pool_notification_refresh = {}  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+            evicted: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+
+            def _fake_evict(key: tuple[str, str]) -> None:
+                evicted.append(key)
+
+            mgr._evict_session = _fake_evict  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+            # Run the dispatch on a separate thread so the loop can drain.
+            import threading
+
+            done = threading.Event()
+
+            def _run_loop() -> None:
+                loop.call_later(0.05, loop.stop)
+                loop.run_forever()
+                done.set()
+
+            t = threading.Thread(target=_run_loop, daemon=True)
+            t.start()
+            mgr.evict_user_session("user-1", "srv-oauth")
+            done.wait(timeout=1.0)
+
+            assert evicted == [("user-1", "srv-oauth")]
+        finally:
+            if not loop.is_closed():
+                loop.close()

tests/test_mcp_oauth_discovery.py

@@ -0,0 +1,626 @@
+"""Discovery tests for the per-(user, server) MCP OAuth flow.
+
+Covers PRM (RFC 9728) and AS metadata (RFC 8414) discovery, including:
+- override URL takes precedence
+- PRM happy path: server URL -> .well-known/oauth-protected-resource
+  -> ``authorization_servers[0]``
+- PRM 401 + ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="..."`` follows
+  the URL.
+- AS metadata without S256 -> :class:`MCPOAuthDiscoveryError`.
+- SSRF rejection on AS issuer URL.
+- In-memory cache hit/miss + persistent cache write to
+  ``mcp_servers.oauth_as_issuer_cached``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import time
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+    ASMetadata,
+    MCPOAuthDiscoveryError,
+    _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate,
+    discover_authorization_server,
+)
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _mk_response(
+    status_code: int = 200,
+    json_body: Any = None,
+    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> MagicMock:
+    """Build a MagicMock that quacks like ``httpx.Response``."""
+    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    resp.status_code = status_code
+    resp.headers = headers or {}
+    resp.content = (str(json_body) if json_body is not None else "").encode("utf-8")
+    if json_body is not None:
+        resp.json.return_value = json_body
+    else:
+        resp.json.side_effect = ValueError("no body")
+    resp.text = str(json_body) if json_body is not None else ""
+    return resp
+
+
+def _good_as_metadata_doc() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {
+        "issuer": "https://as.example.com",
+        "authorization_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/authorize",
+        "token_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/token",
+        "jwks_uri": "https://as.example.com/jwks",
+        "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"],
+        "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["none", "client_secret_basic"],
+        "registration_endpoint": "https://as.example.com/register",
+    }
+
+
+def _public_addr_patch():
+    return patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))])
+
+
+def _mk_storage_mock(server_id: str = "srv-id") -> MagicMock:
+    storage = MagicMock()
+    storage.update_mcp_server.return_value = True
+    return storage
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# PRM parser
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestParsePRMUrl:
+    def test_extracts_resource_metadata_url(self) -> None:
+        header = (
+            'Bearer error="invalid_token", '
+            'resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"'
+        )
+        url = _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header)
+        assert url == "https://srv.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
+
+    def test_returns_none_when_absent(self) -> None:
+        assert _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate('Bearer realm="x"') is None
+
+    def test_handles_empty_header(self) -> None:
+        assert _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate("") is None
+
+    def test_handles_escaped_quote_in_value(self) -> None:
+        """RFC 7230 quoted-string allows ``\\"`` — naive ``[^"]+`` truncates.
+
+        A malicious or buggy resource server could send an embedded
+        escaped quote; the parser must yield the unescaped value, not
+        the prefix up to the escaped quote.
+        """
+        header = 'Bearer resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/with\\"quote"'
+        url = _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header)
+        assert url == 'https://srv.example.com/with"quote'
+
+    def test_handles_escaped_backslash(self) -> None:
+        header = 'Bearer resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/back\\\\slash"'
+        url = _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header)
+        assert url == "https://srv.example.com/back\\slash"
+
+    def test_unterminated_quoted_string_returns_none(self) -> None:
+        # Closing quote missing — naive regex would still match, but
+        # the proper parser should reject malformed input.
+        header = 'Bearer resource_metadata="https://srv.example.com/no-close'
+        assert _parse_prm_url_from_www_authenticate(header) is None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# discover_authorization_server happy paths
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDiscoveryOverride:
+    def test_override_url_skips_prm(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert isinstance(meta, ASMetadata)
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+        # Only the AS metadata URL was hit, not PRM.
+        called_urls = [c.args[0] for c in client.get.call_args_list]
+        assert all("oauth-authorization-server" in u for u in called_urls)
+
+
+class TestDiscoveryPRM:
+    def test_prm_happy_path(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-protected-resource"):
+                return _mk_response(
+                    200,
+                    {
+                        "resource": "https://mcp.example.com",
+                        "authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"],
+                    },
+                )
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-authorization-server"):
+                return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+            raise AssertionError(f"unexpected URL: {url}")
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.issuer == "https://as.example.com"
+
+    def test_prm_401_follows_www_authenticate(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            if url == "https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource":
+                return _mk_response(
+                    401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": (
+                            'Bearer error="invalid_token", '
+                            "resource_metadata="
+                            '"https://meta.example.com/prm"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                    json_body=None,
+                )
+            if url == "https://meta.example.com/prm":
+                return _mk_response(
+                    200,
+                    {
+                        "authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"],
+                    },
+                )
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-authorization-server"):
+                return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+            raise AssertionError(f"unexpected URL: {url}")
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+
+    def test_prm_401_without_resource_metadata_raises(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            return _mk_response(401, headers={"www-authenticate": "Basic realm=x"})
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="resource_metadata"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# AS metadata validation
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestASMetadataValidation:
+    def test_no_s256_raises(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["code_challenge_methods_supported"] = ["plain"]
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="S256"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+    def test_missing_endpoints_raises(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        del doc["token_endpoint"]
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="missing required"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+    def test_third_party_endpoint_rejected(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["token_endpoint"] = "https://attacker.example.com/token"
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="token_endpoint"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+
+    def test_ssrf_on_override_rejected(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock()
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            # Resolve to private 10.x — SSRF guard fires before any HTTP call.
+            with patch(
+                "socket.getaddrinfo",
+                return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("10.0.0.1", 0))],
+            ):
+                await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://internal.corp.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError):
+            asyncio.run(_run())
+        client.get.assert_not_called()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Caching
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestMetadataCache:
+    def test_cache_miss_then_hit(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+        cache: dict[str, tuple[ASMetadata, float]] = {}
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                first = await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                    metadata_cache=cache,
+                )
+                second = await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                    metadata_cache=cache,
+                )
+                return first, second
+
+        first, second = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert first.token_endpoint == second.token_endpoint
+        # First call hit AS metadata; second call hit the cache.
+        assert client.get.call_count == 1
+
+    def test_cache_expiry_refetches(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+        # Pre-populate cache with a very stale entry.
+        stale_meta = ASMetadata(
+            issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            authorization_endpoint="https://as.example.com/authorize",
+            token_endpoint="https://as.example.com/token",
+            registration_endpoint=None,
+            revocation_endpoint=None,
+            jwks_uri=None,
+            code_challenge_methods_supported=("S256",),
+            token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported=(),
+        )
+        cache = {"https://as.example.com": (stale_meta, time.monotonic() - 10**6)}
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                    metadata_cache=cache,
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        # Stale entry was bypassed -> we hit the network.
+        assert client.get.call_count == 1
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+
+    def test_persistent_cache_write_on_first_resolution(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url, *args, **kwargs):
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-protected-resource"):
+                return _mk_response(200, {"authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"]})
+            return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        asyncio.run(_run())
+        # update_mcp_server was called once with the cached issuer.
+        storage.update_mcp_server.assert_called_once_with(
+            "srv-id", oauth_as_issuer_cached="https://as.example.com"
+        )
+
+    def test_persistent_cache_skip_when_already_cached(self) -> None:
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc()))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run():
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        asyncio.run(_run())
+        storage.update_mcp_server.assert_not_called()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# sec-3 — cached_issuer re-validated on read
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestCachedIssuerSSRFRevalidation:
+    """A cached issuer URL must still pass SSRF validation on every read.
+
+    Defense-in-depth: an admin who points ``oauth_as_issuer_cached`` at a
+    private address (or a hostname that has rebound to one) should not
+    bypass the guard just because the value was already in the row.
+    """
+
+    def test_cached_issuer_rejected_clears_row_and_falls_through_to_prm(self) -> None:
+        async def _get(url: str, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> MagicMock:
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-protected-resource"):
+                return _mk_response(200, {"authorization_servers": ["https://as.example.com"]})
+            if url.endswith("/oauth-authorization-server"):
+                return _mk_response(200, _good_as_metadata_doc())
+            raise AssertionError(f"unexpected URL: {url}")
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        # cached_issuer points at a private host. SSRF guard fires on
+        # the cached value first, the row is cleared, and PRM
+        # discovery runs as a fallback.
+        async def _run() -> Any:
+            with patch(
+                "socket.getaddrinfo",
+                # Private resolution for "internal.corp", public for everything else.
+                side_effect=lambda host, *a, **kw: [
+                    (2, 1, 6, "", ("10.0.0.1" if "internal" in host else "93.184.216.34", 0))
+                ],
+            ):
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url=None,
+                    cached_issuer="https://internal.corp.example.com",
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.token_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/token"
+        # The bad cached_issuer was cleared from the row.
+        clear_calls = [
+            c
+            for c in storage.update_mcp_server.call_args_list
+            if c.kwargs.get("oauth_as_issuer_cached") is None
+        ]
+        assert clear_calls, "cached_issuer should have been cleared"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# revocation_endpoint parsing (RFC 8414)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestASMetadataRevocationEndpoint:
+    def test_as_metadata_parses_revocation_endpoint(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["revocation_endpoint"] = "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run() -> ASMetadata:
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.revocation_endpoint == "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+
+    def test_as_metadata_revocation_endpoint_absent(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc.pop("revocation_endpoint", None)
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run() -> ASMetadata:
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        meta = asyncio.run(_run())
+        assert meta.revocation_endpoint is None
+
+    def test_as_metadata_revocation_endpoint_rejected_when_cross_origin(self) -> None:
+        doc = _good_as_metadata_doc()
+        doc["revocation_endpoint"] = "https://attacker.example.com/revoke"
+
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200, doc))
+        storage = _mk_storage_mock()
+
+        async def _run() -> ASMetadata:
+            with _public_addr_patch():
+                return await discover_authorization_server(
+                    server_name="srv-x",
+                    server_url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                    override_url="https://as.example.com",
+                    cached_issuer=None,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    storage=storage,
+                    server_id="srv-id",
+                    trusted_hosts=frozenset(),
+                )
+
+        with pytest.raises(MCPOAuthDiscoveryError, match="revocation_endpoint"):
+            asyncio.run(_run())

tests/test_mcp_oauth_pending_storage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+"""Smoke tests for the new OAuth-MCP storage tables.
+
+Phase 2 only adds the schema — token CRUD lands in Phase 3 and pending-
+state CRUD in Phase 4.  These tests verify the tables exist after
+``init_storage`` and accept the documented row shape via raw SQL.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+from turnstone.core.storage._schema import mcp_oauth_pending, mcp_user_tokens
+
+
+class TestMcpUserTokensTable:
+    def test_table_exists_and_accepts_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_user_tokens),
+                {
+                    "user_id": "u1",
+                    "server_name": "srv-a",
+                    "access_token_ct": b"\x00ciphertext-a",
+                    "refresh_token_ct": b"\x00ciphertext-r",
+                    "expires_at": "2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+                    "scopes": "openid profile",
+                    "as_issuer": "https://auth.example.com",
+                    "audience": "https://mcp.example.com",
+                    "created": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                    "last_refreshed": None,
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            row = conn.execute(
+                sa.select(mcp_user_tokens).where(
+                    (mcp_user_tokens.c.user_id == "u1") & (mcp_user_tokens.c.server_name == "srv-a")
+                )
+            ).one()
+        assert row.access_token_ct == b"\x00ciphertext-a"
+        assert row.refresh_token_ct == b"\x00ciphertext-r"
+        assert row.scopes == "openid profile"
+        assert row.audience == "https://mcp.example.com"
+
+    def test_composite_pk_distinguishes_user_server(self, backend) -> None:
+        """Same user, different server => two rows; same (user, server) => conflict."""
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_user_tokens),
+                [
+                    {
+                        "user_id": "u1",
+                        "server_name": "srv-a",
+                        "access_token_ct": b"a",
+                        "refresh_token_ct": None,
+                        "expires_at": None,
+                        "scopes": None,
+                        "as_issuer": "https://auth.example.com",
+                        "audience": "https://a.example.com",
+                        "created": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                        "last_refreshed": None,
+                    },
+                    {
+                        "user_id": "u1",
+                        "server_name": "srv-b",
+                        "access_token_ct": b"b",
+                        "refresh_token_ct": None,
+                        "expires_at": None,
+                        "scopes": None,
+                        "as_issuer": "https://auth.example.com",
+                        "audience": "https://b.example.com",
+                        "created": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                        "last_refreshed": None,
+                    },
+                ],
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            count = conn.execute(sa.select(sa.func.count()).select_from(mcp_user_tokens)).scalar()
+        assert count == 2
+
+
+class TestMcpOauthPendingTable:
+    def test_table_exists_and_accepts_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_oauth_pending),
+                {
+                    "state": "rand-state-xyz",
+                    "user_id": "u1",
+                    "server_name": "srv-a",
+                    "code_verifier": "verifier-blob",
+                    "return_url": "/admin/mcp-servers",
+                    "created_at": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+            row = conn.execute(
+                sa.select(mcp_oauth_pending).where(mcp_oauth_pending.c.state == "rand-state-xyz")
+            ).one()
+        assert row.user_id == "u1"
+        assert row.server_name == "srv-a"
+        assert row.return_url == "/admin/mcp-servers"
+
+    def test_state_pk_unique(self, backend) -> None:
+        """A second insert with the same state value raises IntegrityError."""
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_oauth_pending),
+                {
+                    "state": "dup-state",
+                    "user_id": "u1",
+                    "server_name": "srv-a",
+                    "code_verifier": "v",
+                    "return_url": "/x",
+                    "created_at": "2026-05-04T11:00:00",
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+        import pytest
+        from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
+
+        with pytest.raises(IntegrityError), backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.insert(mcp_oauth_pending),
+                {
+                    "state": "dup-state",
+                    "user_id": "u2",
+                    "server_name": "srv-b",
+                    "code_verifier": "v",
+                    "return_url": "/y",
+                    "created_at": "2026-05-04T11:01:00",
+                },
+            )
+            conn.commit()

tests/test_mcp_oauth_pkce.py

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"""PKCE pair-generation tests for the MCP OAuth flow.
+
+Verifies the contract documented in RFC 7636 §4.1 and §4.2:
+
+- ``code_verifier`` is a high-entropy 43..128 character urlsafe-base64 string.
+- ``code_challenge`` is the BASE64URL-NO-PADDING encoding of
+  ``SHA256(verifier)``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import string
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import generate_pkce_pair
+
+_URLSAFE_CHARS = set(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "-_")
+
+
+class TestGeneratePkcePair:
+    def test_returns_tuple_of_strings(self) -> None:
+        verifier, challenge = generate_pkce_pair()
+        assert isinstance(verifier, str)
+        assert isinstance(challenge, str)
+
+    def test_verifier_length_in_rfc_range(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            verifier, _ = generate_pkce_pair()
+            assert 43 <= len(verifier) <= 128
+
+    def test_verifier_is_urlsafe(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            verifier, _ = generate_pkce_pair()
+            assert all(ch in _URLSAFE_CHARS for ch in verifier)
+
+    def test_challenge_matches_sha256_of_verifier(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            verifier, challenge = generate_pkce_pair()
+            digest = hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode("ascii")).digest()
+            expected = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
+            assert challenge == expected
+
+    def test_challenge_has_no_padding(self) -> None:
+        for _ in range(20):
+            _, challenge = generate_pkce_pair()
+            assert "=" not in challenge
+
+    def test_pairs_are_unique(self) -> None:
+        pairs = {generate_pkce_pair() for _ in range(50)}
+        # 50 random draws shouldn't collide; if they do we have a much
+        # bigger problem than this assertion.
+        assert len(pairs) == 50

tests/test_mcp_oauth_revoke.py

@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+"""Tests for :func:`turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.revoke_token_at_as`.
+
+The helper is best-effort RFC 7009 token revocation. It must:
+- skip cleanly when the AS metadata doesn't advertise a revocation endpoint
+- POST the form body when one is present (with optional client_secret)
+- never raise on non-2xx, network errors, or timeouts — caller doesn't
+  want try/except in cleanup paths
+- never use ``exc_info=True`` — chained ``__context__`` may carry an
+  ``httpx.Request`` whose ``Authorization`` header holds a bearer; the
+  bearer-leak invariant requires structured fields with type names only
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+    ASMetadata,
+    MCPOAuthDiscoveryError,
+    _attempt_upstream_revoke,
+    revoke_token_at_as,
+)
+
+
+def _make_as_metadata(
+    *,
+    revocation_endpoint: str | None = "https://as.example.com/revoke",
+) -> ASMetadata:
+    return ASMetadata(
+        issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        authorization_endpoint="https://as.example.com/authorize",
+        token_endpoint="https://as.example.com/token",
+        registration_endpoint=None,
+        revocation_endpoint=revocation_endpoint,
+        jwks_uri=None,
+        code_challenge_methods_supported=("S256",),
+        token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported=("client_secret_basic",),
+    )
+
+
+def _mk_response(status_code: int) -> MagicMock:
+    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    resp.status_code = status_code
+    return resp
+
+
+class TestRevocationUnsupported:
+    def test_revoke_token_skipped_when_revocation_endpoint_none(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata(revocation_endpoint=None)
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock()
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        client.post.assert_not_called()
+        info_events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_unsupported" in info_events
+
+
+class TestRevocationSuccess:
+    def test_revoke_token_succeeds_on_200(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret="s-secret",
+                )
+            )
+
+        # POST shape — URL + form body keys.
+        client.post.assert_awaited_once()
+        call_args = client.post.call_args
+        assert call_args.args[0] == "https://as.example.com/revoke"
+        body = call_args.kwargs["data"]
+        assert body == {
+            "token": "r-secret",
+            "token_type_hint": "refresh_token",
+            "client_id": "client-1",
+            "client_secret": "s-secret",
+        }
+        info_events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_succeeded" in info_events
+
+    def test_revoke_token_omits_client_secret_when_none(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(200))
+
+        asyncio.run(
+            revoke_token_at_as(
+                as_metadata=as_meta,
+                http_client=client,
+                refresh_token="r-secret",
+                client_id="client-1",
+                client_secret=None,
+            )
+        )
+
+        body = client.post.call_args.kwargs["data"]
+        assert "client_secret" not in body
+        assert body["token"] == "r-secret"
+        assert body["token_type_hint"] == "refresh_token"
+        assert body["client_id"] == "client-1"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_succeeds_on_204(self) -> None:
+        # RFC 7009 says the AS MAY return any 2xx; treat the whole range
+        # as success.
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(204))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        info_events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_succeeded" in info_events
+
+
+class TestRevocationFailureLogged:
+    def _run_and_capture(self, status: int) -> list[Any]:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(return_value=_mk_response(status))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+        return mock_log.info.call_args_list
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_400_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(400)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        # Must include status field.
+        failed_call = next(c for c in calls if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed")
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("status") == 400
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_401_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(401)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(c for c in calls if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed")
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("status") == 401
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_403_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(403)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+
+    def test_revoke_token_logs_on_5xx_does_not_raise(self) -> None:
+        calls = self._run_and_capture(500)
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in calls]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(c for c in calls if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed")
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("status") == 500
+
+
+class TestRevocationExceptionPaths:
+    def test_revoke_token_handles_network_error(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("boom"))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(
+            c
+            for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list
+            if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed"
+        )
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("error") == "ConnectError"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_handles_httpx_timeout(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.TimeoutException("slow"))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(
+            c
+            for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list
+            if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed"
+        )
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("error") == "TimeoutException"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_handles_asyncio_timeout(self) -> None:
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+
+        async def _slow(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+            await asyncio.sleep(10.0)
+            raise AssertionError("should have timed out")
+
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=_slow)
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                    timeout_seconds=0.05,
+                )
+            )
+
+        events = [c.args[0] for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed" in events
+        failed_call = next(
+            c
+            for c in mock_log.info.call_args_list
+            if c.args[0] == "mcp_server.oauth.revocation_failed"
+        )
+        # ``asyncio.timeout`` raises ``TimeoutError`` (Python's builtin)
+        # on cancellation.
+        assert failed_call.kwargs.get("error") == "TimeoutError"
+
+    def test_revoke_token_no_exc_info_in_logs(self) -> None:
+        """Bearer-leak invariant: the revoke path must NEVER set
+        ``exc_info=True``. Chained ``__context__`` may include an
+        ``httpx.Request`` whose ``Authorization`` header holds a
+        bearer; the traceback formatter would render it.
+        """
+        as_meta = _make_as_metadata()
+        client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+        client.post = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("boom"))
+
+        with patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log:
+            asyncio.run(
+                revoke_token_at_as(
+                    as_metadata=as_meta,
+                    http_client=client,
+                    refresh_token="r-secret",
+                    client_id="client-1",
+                    client_secret=None,
+                )
+            )
+
+        # No info call may carry exc_info.
+        for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list:
+            assert "exc_info" not in call.kwargs, (
+                f"mcp_server.oauth log info({call.args[0]!r}) used exc_info — "
+                "this violates the bearer-leak invariant"
+            )
+        # Defensively: also check warning + exception levels for the
+        # same call site.
+        for call in mock_log.warning.call_args_list:
+            assert "exc_info" not in call.kwargs
+        mock_log.exception.assert_not_called()
+
+
+class TestAttemptUpstreamRevokeNeverRaises:
+    """Round-2 q-3 regression: ``_attempt_upstream_revoke``'s docstring
+    claims ``Never raises``. Background-task semantics make this load-
+    bearing — a propagated exception logs ``Task exception was never
+    retrieved`` because the ``set.discard`` done-callback doesn't read
+    ``task.exception()``.
+
+    The wrapper's narrow inner ``except`` clauses (``MCPOAuthDiscoveryError``,
+    ``MCPTokenDecryptError``) leave room for any other exception type
+    raised by ``discover_authorization_server`` /
+    ``storage.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct`` / ``token_store.cipher.decrypt``
+    to escape. The outer ``try/except Exception`` is what keeps the
+    contract honest. These tests pin that gate.
+    """
+
+    def _build_args(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        token_store = MagicMock()
+        token_store.cipher = MagicMock()
+        token_store.cipher.decrypt.return_value = b"shh"
+        storage = MagicMock()
+        storage.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct.return_value = None
+        return {
+            "http_client": MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient),
+            "metadata_cache": None,
+            "storage": storage,
+            "token_store": token_store,
+            "server_name": "srv-oauth",
+            "server_row": {
+                "url": "https://mcp.example.com",
+                "oauth_client_id": "client-1",
+                "oauth_authorization_server_url": None,
+                "oauth_as_issuer_cached": None,
+            },
+            "server_id_for_audit": "srv-id-1",
+            "refresh_token": "r-secret",
+        }
+
+    def test_attempt_upstream_revoke_swallows_unexpected_exception(self) -> None:
+        """A generic exception from a path the inner handlers don't
+        cover MUST be caught at the outer boundary and logged with type
+        name only (no exc_info=True per the bearer-leak invariant).
+        """
+        args = self._build_args()
+
+        async def _boom(*_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> Any:
+            raise RuntimeError("network blew up")
+
+        with (
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.discover_authorization_server", side_effect=_boom),
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log,
+        ):
+            # MUST NOT raise.
+            asyncio.run(_attempt_upstream_revoke(**args))
+
+        events = [call.args[0] for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_failed" in events, (
+            "outer try/except must log mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_failed "
+            "with the exception type name when an unexpected exception escapes "
+            "the narrow inner handlers"
+        )
+        for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list:
+            assert "exc_info" not in call.kwargs, (
+                "outer-block log must not use exc_info=True — chained "
+                "__context__ may carry an httpx.Request bearer"
+            )
+
+    def test_attempt_upstream_revoke_logs_discovery_failure(self) -> None:
+        """Round-2 bug-1: ``MCPOAuthDiscoveryError`` MUST emit
+        ``upstream_revoke_discovery_failed`` so operators have visibility
+        into a silent-discovery-failure path that previously logged
+        nothing while the audit row recorded ``upstream_revoke_outcome=scheduled``.
+        """
+        args = self._build_args()
+
+        async def _disc_fail(*_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> Any:
+            raise MCPOAuthDiscoveryError("PRM fetch 503")
+
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.discover_authorization_server",
+                side_effect=_disc_fail,
+            ),
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_oauth.log") as mock_log,
+        ):
+            asyncio.run(_attempt_upstream_revoke(**args))
+
+        events = [call.args[0] for call in mock_log.info.call_args_list]
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_discovery_failed" in events
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.upstream_revoke_failed" not in events

tests/test_mcp_oauth_storage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+"""Storage CRUD tests for the per-(user, server) MCP OAuth pending-state table.
+
+Validates the storage-protocol additions for the per-(user, server)
+OAuth flow:
+
+- ``create_mcp_oauth_pending_state``
+- ``pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state`` (atomic, with TTL)
+- ``cleanup_expired_mcp_oauth_pending_states``
+- ``get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct``
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+
+class TestCreateAndPop:
+    def test_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state(
+            "state-1",
+            "user-a",
+            "srv-x",
+            "verifier-blob",
+            "/admin/mcp-servers",
+        )
+        row = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("state-1", max_age_seconds=600)
+        assert row is not None
+        assert row["state"] == "state-1"
+        assert row["user_id"] == "user-a"
+        assert row["server_name"] == "srv-x"
+        assert row["code_verifier"] == "verifier-blob"
+        assert row["return_url"] == "/admin/mcp-servers"
+
+    def test_pop_consumes_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("s2", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        first = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("s2")
+        assert first is not None
+        # Second pop must miss — row was consumed.
+        second = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("s2")
+        assert second is None
+
+    def test_pop_missing_returns_none(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("never-existed") is None
+
+
+class TestTTL:
+    def test_pop_rejects_expired_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old-state", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        # Backdate it so it's older than the TTL window.
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.text(
+                    "UPDATE mcp_oauth_pending SET created_at = '2020-01-01T00:00:00' "
+                    "WHERE state = 'old-state'"
+                )
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+
+        # Default TTL is 600s — the row is decades old.
+        row = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old-state")
+        assert row is None
+
+        # Even though pop returned None, the row must have been wiped — a
+        # second pop with a giant TTL must still see nothing.
+        again = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old-state", max_age_seconds=10**9)
+        assert again is None
+
+    def test_pop_accepts_fresh_row(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("fresh", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        row = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("fresh", max_age_seconds=600)
+        assert row is not None
+        assert row["state"] == "fresh"
+
+
+class TestCleanup:
+    def test_cleanup_deletes_only_expired(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        backend.create_mcp_oauth_pending_state("new", "u", "s", "v", "/r")
+        with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+            conn.execute(
+                sa.text(
+                    "UPDATE mcp_oauth_pending SET created_at = '2020-01-01T00:00:00' "
+                    "WHERE state = 'old'"
+                )
+            )
+            conn.commit()
+
+        deleted = backend.cleanup_expired_mcp_oauth_pending_states(max_age_seconds=600)
+        assert deleted == 1
+        # Old gone, new still around.
+        assert backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("old") is None
+        survivor = backend.pop_mcp_oauth_pending_state("new")
+        assert survivor is not None
+
+    def test_cleanup_no_rows(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.cleanup_expired_mcp_oauth_pending_states() == 0
+
+
+class TestGetOAuthClientSecretCt:
+    def test_returns_none_when_unset(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-id",
+            name="srv-x",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+        )
+        assert backend.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("srv-id") is None
+
+    def test_returns_ciphertext_after_set(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-id",
+            name="srv-x",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            auth_type="oauth_user",
+        )
+        ct = b"\x00\xff\x42encrypted-blob"
+        ok = backend.set_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("srv-id", ct)
+        assert ok is True
+        out = backend.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("srv-id")
+        assert out == ct
+
+    def test_returns_none_for_missing_server(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.get_mcp_oauth_client_secret_ct("does-not-exist") is None
+
+
+def _create_user_token_row(
+    backend,
+    *,
+    user_id: str,
+    server_name: str,
+    created: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Insert a token row + backdate ``created`` so ordering is deterministic.
+
+    The storage helper stamps ``created`` from ``datetime.now(UTC)``; for
+    multi-row ordering tests we backdate via raw SQL so the inserts stay
+    independent of clock resolution.
+    """
+    backend.create_mcp_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token_ct=b"ct-access",
+        refresh_token_ct=b"ct-refresh",
+        expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+    with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+        conn.execute(
+            sa.text(
+                "UPDATE mcp_user_tokens SET created = :created "
+                "WHERE user_id = :uid AND server_name = :sn"
+            ),
+            {"created": created, "uid": user_id, "sn": server_name},
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+
+
+class TestListMCPUserTokenMetadataByUser:
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_empty(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("nobody") == []
+
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_single_server(self, backend) -> None:
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("u1")
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        assert rows[0]["user_id"] == "u1"
+        assert rows[0]["server_name"] == "srv-a"
+        assert rows[0]["as_issuer"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        assert rows[0]["audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+        assert rows[0]["scopes"] == "openid"
+        # Projection MUST omit ciphertext columns — the SQL no longer
+        # selects them, so the TypedDict has no key.
+        assert "access_token_ct" not in rows[0]
+        assert "refresh_token_ct" not in rows[0]
+
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_multiple_servers(self, backend) -> None:
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-c", created="2026-05-03T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-b", created="2026-05-02T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("u1")
+        assert [r["server_name"] for r in rows] == ["srv-a", "srv-b", "srv-c"]
+
+    def test_list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user_isolates_by_user(self, backend) -> None:
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="user-a", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="user-a", server_name="srv-b", created="2026-05-02T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _create_user_token_row(
+            backend, user_id="user-b", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-03T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows_a = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("user-a")
+        assert {r["server_name"] for r in rows_a} == {"srv-a", "srv-b"}
+        assert all(r["user_id"] == "user-a" for r in rows_a)
+
+        rows_b = backend.list_mcp_user_token_metadata_by_user("user-b")
+        assert len(rows_b) == 1
+        assert rows_b[0]["user_id"] == "user-b"
+        assert rows_b[0]["server_name"] == "srv-a"

tests/test_mcp_pending_consent_dispatch.py

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+"""Boundary tests for the Phase 9 pending-consent write path.
+
+Drives ``MCPClientManager._dispatch_pool_sync`` (and the helper it
+calls, ``_record_pending_consent_best_effort``) and asserts that
+deferred-consent records reach storage only on non-interactive callers.
+
+Per ``feedback_tests_through_boundaries.md``, at least one test must
+drive the real sync dispatcher → real ``_is_structured_error`` →
+real ``_record_pending_consent_best_effort`` plumb-through; the
+``_helpers`` unit tests below cover the classifier in isolation, but
+the end-to-end test is the structural gate that catches
+plumb-through regressions.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import threading
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import (
+    _PENDING_CONSENT_PERSIST_CODES,
+    MCPClientManager,
+    _parse_pending_consent_envelope,
+)
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import TokenLookupResult
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helper-level unit tests (cheap, no event loop)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestParseEnvelope:
+    def test_consent_required_no_scopes(self) -> None:
+        env = json.dumps({"error": {"code": "mcp_consent_required", "server": "x", "detail": "d"}})
+        assert _parse_pending_consent_envelope(env) == ("mcp_consent_required", None)
+
+    def test_insufficient_scope_with_scopes(self) -> None:
+        env = json.dumps(
+            {
+                "error": {
+                    "code": "mcp_insufficient_scope",
+                    "server": "x",
+                    "detail": "d",
+                    "scopes_required": ["read", "write"],
+                }
+            }
+        )
+        assert _parse_pending_consent_envelope(env) == (
+            "mcp_insufficient_scope",
+            ["read", "write"],
+        )
+
+    def test_operator_codes_filtered(self) -> None:
+        # Key-unknown / url-insecure / *_forbidden are operator-actionable,
+        # NOT user-consent-shaped.  They must not produce pending-consent
+        # rows, regardless of whether the caller is interactive.
+        for code in (
+            "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown",
+            "mcp_oauth_url_insecure",
+            "mcp_tool_call_forbidden",
+            "mcp_resource_read_forbidden",
+            "mcp_prompt_get_forbidden",
+        ):
+            env = json.dumps({"error": {"code": code, "server": "x", "detail": "d"}})
+            assert _parse_pending_consent_envelope(env) is None, code
+
+    def test_malformed_json_returns_none(self) -> None:
+        assert _parse_pending_consent_envelope("not json") is None
+        assert _parse_pending_consent_envelope("") is None
+
+    def test_persist_codes_set_is_expected(self) -> None:
+        # Pin the contract — adding a new persistable code here is a
+        # deliberate design decision and should require a test update.
+        assert {
+            "mcp_consent_required",
+            "mcp_insufficient_scope",
+        } == _PENDING_CONSENT_PERSIST_CODES
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# End-to-end plumb-through (drives _dispatch_pool_sync)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(backend: Any, *, name: str = "pool-srv") -> None:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id="srv-" + name,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        command="",
+        args="[]",
+        url="https://example.com/mcp",
+        headers="{}",
+        env="{}",
+        auto_approve=False,
+        enabled=True,
+        created_by="admin",
+    )
+    backend.update_mcp_server("srv-" + name, auth_type="oauth_user")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="phase9-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _wire_mgr(mgr: MCPClientManager, backend: Any) -> None:
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    from types import SimpleNamespace
+    from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+    app_state = SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=backend,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(backend, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+    mgr.set_storage(backend)
+    mgr.set_app_state(app_state)
+
+
+def test_dispatch_persists_pending_for_non_interactive_caller(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, backend: Any
+) -> None:
+    """Non-interactive caller hits ``mcp_consent_required`` → a
+    ``mcp_pending_consent`` row appears for ``(user_id, server_name)``."""
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    _seed_oauth_server(backend)
+    _wire_mgr(mgr, backend)
+
+    async def _missing_token(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="missing")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_missing_token,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo",
+            {"payload": "hi"},
+            user_id="user-a",
+            timeout=10,
+            is_interactive_for_consent=False,
+        )
+
+    # Structured error envelope surfaces as RuntimeError to the caller.
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value)).get("error", {})
+    assert payload.get("code") == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+    # Persistent row written for the dashboard badge.
+    rows = backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a")
+    assert len(rows) == 1
+    r = rows[0]
+    assert r["user_id"] == "user-a"
+    assert r["server_name"] == "pool-srv"
+    assert r["error_code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    assert r["occurrence_count"] == 1
+
+
+def test_dispatch_does_not_persist_for_interactive_caller(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, backend: Any
+) -> None:
+    """Interactive caller hits the same error path → NO row written.
+
+    Interactive (WEB / CLI) sessions surface the consent prompt in-flight
+    via the Phase 8 SSE renderer; persisting would just produce
+    immediately-stale dashboard badges.
+    """
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    _seed_oauth_server(backend)
+    _wire_mgr(mgr, backend)
+
+    async def _missing_token(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="missing")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_missing_token,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError),
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo",
+            {"payload": "hi"},
+            user_id="user-a",
+            timeout=10,
+            is_interactive_for_consent=True,
+        )
+
+    assert backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a") == []
+
+
+def test_dispatch_returns_envelope_unchanged_on_storage_failure(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, backend: Any
+) -> None:
+    """When ``upsert_mcp_pending_consent`` raises, the agent-observable
+    contract is unchanged: the structured-error ``RuntimeError`` still
+    surfaces with the original ``mcp_consent_required`` code.  The doc-
+    string promises best-effort persistence; this test pins that
+    promise so a regression that propagates the storage exception would
+    fail visibly.
+    """
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    _seed_oauth_server(backend)
+    _wire_mgr(mgr, backend)
+
+    async def _missing_token(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="missing")
+
+    original_upsert = backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent
+
+    def _raise(*_a: Any, **_kw: Any) -> None:
+        raise RuntimeError("storage offline")
+
+    backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent = _raise  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+    try:
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+                side_effect=_missing_token,
+            ),
+            pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+        ):
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__echo",
+                {"payload": "hi"},
+                user_id="user-a",
+                timeout=10,
+                is_interactive_for_consent=False,
+            )
+    finally:
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent = original_upsert  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value)).get("error", {})
+    assert payload.get("code") == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+
+def test_dispatch_does_not_persist_for_operator_actionable_code(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, backend: Any
+) -> None:
+    """Decrypt-failure → operator-actionable; even non-interactive callers
+    must NOT produce a user-facing pending-consent record (the user can't
+    resolve this by re-consenting).
+    """
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    _seed_oauth_server(backend)
+    _wire_mgr(mgr, backend)
+
+    async def _decrypt_failure(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="decrypt_failure")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_decrypt_failure,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo",
+            {"payload": "hi"},
+            user_id="user-a",
+            timeout=10,
+            is_interactive_for_consent=False,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value)).get("error", {})
+    assert payload.get("code") == "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown"
+    # The operator-actionable code does NOT produce a pending-consent row.
+    assert backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a") == []

tests/test_mcp_pending_consent_endpoints.py

@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+"""HTTP tests for the Phase 9 pending-consent endpoints.
+
+Covers:
+- ``GET /v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending`` (install gate + read path)
+- ``DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending/{server_name}`` (single clear)
+- ``DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending`` (bulk clear)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+
+import pytest
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.middleware import Middleware
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+from starlette.routing import Mount, Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import (
+    handle_mcp_oauth_clear_all_pending,
+    handle_mcp_oauth_clear_pending,
+    handle_mcp_oauth_list_pending,
+)
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+
+class _InjectAuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Stamp a fixed authenticated user on every request."""
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, user_id: str = "user-1") -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._user_id = user_id
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Any) -> Response:
+        request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
+            user_id=self._user_id,
+            scopes=frozenset({"write"}),
+            token_source="config",
+            permissions=frozenset({"read", "write"}),
+        )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _build_app(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, user_id: str = "user-1") -> Starlette:
+    class _Mw(_InjectAuthMiddleware):
+        def __init__(self, app: Any) -> None:
+            super().__init__(app, user_id=user_id)
+
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=[
+            Mount(
+                "/v1",
+                routes=[
+                    Route("/api/mcp/oauth/pending", handle_mcp_oauth_list_pending),
+                    Route(
+                        "/api/mcp/oauth/pending",
+                        handle_mcp_oauth_clear_all_pending,
+                        methods=["DELETE"],
+                    ),
+                    Route(
+                        "/api/mcp/oauth/pending/{server_name}",
+                        handle_mcp_oauth_clear_pending,
+                        methods=["DELETE"],
+                    ),
+                ],
+            ),
+        ],
+        middleware=[Middleware(_Mw)],
+    )
+    app.state.auth_storage = storage
+    return app
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    backend = SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+    backend.create_user("user-1", "user1", "User One", "hash")
+    backend.create_user("user-2", "user2", "User Two", "hash")
+    return backend
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(backend: SQLiteBackend, *, name: str = "srv-x") -> None:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id="srv-id-" + name,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url="https://example.com/mcp",
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_pending(
+    backend: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "srv-x",
+    error_code: str = "mcp_consent_required",
+    now_iso: str = "2026-05-11T12:00:00",
+) -> None:
+    backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+        user_id=user_id,
+        server_name=server_name,
+        error_code=error_code,
+        scopes_required=None,
+        last_ws_id=None,
+        last_tool_call_id=None,
+        now_iso=now_iso,
+    )
+
+
+class TestListPending:
+    def test_install_gate_short_circuits_on_no_oauth_servers(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        # Seed a pending row but NO oauth_user MCP server — the gate
+        # must short-circuit to {pending: 0} regardless.
+        _seed_pending(storage)
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json() == {"pending": 0, "servers": []}
+
+    def test_lists_pending_records_for_authenticated_user(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        _seed_pending(storage)
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        body = resp.json()
+        assert body["pending"] == 1
+        assert len(body["servers"]) == 1
+        assert body["servers"][0]["server_name"] == "srv-x"
+        assert body["servers"][0]["error_code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+    def test_does_not_leak_cross_user_records(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        _seed_pending(storage, user_id="user-2")
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage, user_id="user-1"))
+        resp = client.get("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json() == {"pending": 0, "servers": []}
+
+
+class TestClearPending:
+    def test_delete_single(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        _seed_pending(storage)
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending/srv-x")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        assert storage.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-1") == []
+
+    def test_delete_missing_still_returns_204(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        # Idempotent — must not leak cross-user existence info via 404.
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending/never-existed")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+    def test_delete_does_not_touch_cross_user_rows(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        _seed_pending(storage, user_id="user-1")
+        _seed_pending(storage, user_id="user-2")
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage, user_id="user-1"))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending/srv-x")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+        # User-2's row survives.
+        assert len(storage.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-2")) == 1
+
+
+class TestAuditTrail:
+    def test_single_dismiss_audits(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        _seed_pending(storage)
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending/srv-x")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+        events = storage.list_audit_events(limit=10)
+        rows = [
+            e for e in events if e.get("action") == "mcp_server.oauth.pending_consent_dismissed"
+        ]
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        detail = rows[0].get("detail")
+        if isinstance(detail, str):
+            import json as _json
+
+            detail = _json.loads(detail)
+        assert detail.get("mode") == "single"
+        assert detail.get("cleared") == 1
+
+    def test_single_dismiss_audits_even_when_no_row_existed(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        # Cross-tenant non-observability requires a 204 in the never-existed
+        # case — the audit row distinguishes a real dismiss from a stuffed
+        # attempt by recording ``cleared=0``.
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending/never-existed")
+        assert resp.status_code == 204
+
+        events = storage.list_audit_events(limit=10)
+        rows = [
+            e for e in events if e.get("action") == "mcp_server.oauth.pending_consent_dismissed"
+        ]
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        detail = rows[0].get("detail")
+        if isinstance(detail, str):
+            import json as _json
+
+            detail = _json.loads(detail)
+        assert detail.get("mode") == "single"
+        assert detail.get("cleared") == 0
+
+    def test_bulk_dismiss_audits(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="srv-y")
+        _seed_pending(storage, server_name="srv-x")
+        _seed_pending(storage, server_name="srv-y")
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json() == {"cleared": 2}
+
+        events = storage.list_audit_events(limit=10)
+        rows = [
+            e for e in events if e.get("action") == "mcp_server.oauth.pending_consent_dismissed"
+        ]
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        detail = rows[0].get("detail")
+        if isinstance(detail, str):
+            import json as _json
+
+            detail = _json.loads(detail)
+        assert detail.get("mode") == "bulk"
+        assert detail.get("cleared") == 2
+
+
+class TestClearAllPending:
+    def test_bulk_clear(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="srv-y")
+        _seed_pending(storage, server_name="srv-x")
+        _seed_pending(storage, server_name="srv-y")
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json() == {"cleared": 2}
+        assert storage.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-1") == []
+
+    def test_bulk_clear_zero_when_empty(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage)
+        client = TestClient(_build_app(storage))
+        resp = client.delete("/v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert resp.json() == {"cleared": 0}

tests/test_mcp_pending_consent_storage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+"""Storage CRUD tests for the Phase 9 ``mcp_pending_consent`` table.
+
+Validates protocol additions backing the dashboard pending-consent badge:
+
+- ``upsert_mcp_pending_consent`` — insert + on-conflict refresh
+- ``list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user`` — read path
+- ``delete_mcp_pending_consent`` — single-row clear
+- ``delete_all_mcp_pending_consent_by_user`` — bulk clear
+- ``count_mcp_consented_users_by_server`` — admin status pill
+- ``any_oauth_user_mcp_servers`` — install-level gate
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+
+def _iso(ts: str = "2026-05-11T12:00:00") -> str:
+    return ts
+
+
+class TestUpsertAndList:
+    def test_insert_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-a",
+            server_name="srv-x",
+            error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+            scopes_required="read write",
+            last_ws_id="ws-1",
+            last_tool_call_id="tool-1",
+            now_iso=_iso(),
+        )
+        rows = backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a")
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        r = rows[0]
+        assert r["user_id"] == "user-a"
+        assert r["server_name"] == "srv-x"
+        assert r["error_code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+        assert r["scopes_required"] == "read write"
+        assert r["last_ws_id"] == "ws-1"
+        assert r["last_tool_call_id"] == "tool-1"
+        assert r["occurrence_count"] == 1
+        assert r["first_seen_at"] == r["last_seen_at"]
+
+    def test_upsert_bumps_count_and_refreshes_recency(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-a",
+            server_name="srv-x",
+            error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+            scopes_required=None,
+            last_ws_id=None,
+            last_tool_call_id=None,
+            now_iso="2026-05-11T12:00:00",
+        )
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-a",
+            server_name="srv-x",
+            error_code="mcp_insufficient_scope",
+            scopes_required="read",
+            last_ws_id="ws-2",
+            last_tool_call_id="tool-2",
+            now_iso="2026-05-11T13:00:00",
+        )
+        rows = backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a")
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        r = rows[0]
+        # Recency fields refreshed to the second call's values; count bumped.
+        assert r["occurrence_count"] == 2
+        assert r["error_code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope"
+        assert r["scopes_required"] == "read"
+        assert r["last_ws_id"] == "ws-2"
+        assert r["last_tool_call_id"] == "tool-2"
+        assert r["last_seen_at"] == "2026-05-11T13:00:00"
+        # first_seen_at preserved — that's the load-bearing audit value.
+        assert r["first_seen_at"] == "2026-05-11T12:00:00"
+
+    def test_list_orders_by_last_seen_desc(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-a",
+            server_name="srv-old",
+            error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+            scopes_required=None,
+            last_ws_id=None,
+            last_tool_call_id=None,
+            now_iso="2026-05-11T10:00:00",
+        )
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-a",
+            server_name="srv-new",
+            error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+            scopes_required=None,
+            last_ws_id=None,
+            last_tool_call_id=None,
+            now_iso="2026-05-11T11:00:00",
+        )
+        rows = backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a")
+        assert [r["server_name"] for r in rows] == ["srv-new", "srv-old"]
+
+    def test_per_user_isolation(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-a",
+            server_name="srv",
+            error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+            scopes_required=None,
+            last_ws_id=None,
+            last_tool_call_id=None,
+            now_iso=_iso(),
+        )
+        assert backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-b") == []
+
+
+class TestDelete:
+    def test_delete_single(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-a",
+            server_name="srv-x",
+            error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+            scopes_required=None,
+            last_ws_id=None,
+            last_tool_call_id=None,
+            now_iso=_iso(),
+        )
+        assert backend.delete_mcp_pending_consent("user-a", "srv-x") is True
+        assert backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a") == []
+        # Second delete returns False (no row).
+        assert backend.delete_mcp_pending_consent("user-a", "srv-x") is False
+
+    def test_delete_missing_returns_false(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.delete_mcp_pending_consent("never", "missing") is False
+
+    def test_delete_all_by_user(self, backend) -> None:
+        for name in ("srv-a", "srv-b", "srv-c"):
+            backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+                user_id="user-a",
+                server_name=name,
+                error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+                scopes_required=None,
+                last_ws_id=None,
+                last_tool_call_id=None,
+                now_iso=_iso(),
+            )
+        # Cross-user row that must NOT be touched.
+        backend.upsert_mcp_pending_consent(
+            user_id="user-b",
+            server_name="srv-z",
+            error_code="mcp_consent_required",
+            scopes_required=None,
+            last_ws_id=None,
+            last_tool_call_id=None,
+            now_iso=_iso(),
+        )
+        assert backend.delete_all_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a") == 3
+        assert backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-a") == []
+        assert len(backend.list_mcp_pending_consent_by_user("user-b")) == 1
+
+
+class TestCountConsentedUsersByServer:
+    def _seed_server(self, backend, name: str = "srv-x") -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-id-" + name,
+            name=name,
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            command="",
+            args="[]",
+            url="https://example.com/mcp",
+            headers="{}",
+            env="{}",
+            auto_approve=False,
+            enabled=True,
+            created_by="admin",
+        )
+        backend.update_mcp_server("srv-id-" + name, auth_type="oauth_user")
+
+    def test_counts_distinct_non_expired_users(self, backend) -> None:
+        self._seed_server(backend)
+        future = "2099-01-01T00:00:00"
+        backend.create_mcp_user_token(
+            "alice",
+            "srv-x",
+            access_token_ct=b"ct",
+            refresh_token_ct=None,
+            expires_at=future,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            audience="https://example.com/mcp",
+        )
+        backend.create_mcp_user_token(
+            "bob",
+            "srv-x",
+            access_token_ct=b"ct",
+            refresh_token_ct=None,
+            expires_at=None,  # null treated as non-expired
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            audience="https://example.com/mcp",
+        )
+        # Different server — must not count.
+        self._seed_server(backend, name="srv-y")
+        backend.create_mcp_user_token(
+            "carol",
+            "srv-y",
+            access_token_ct=b"ct",
+            refresh_token_ct=None,
+            expires_at=future,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            audience="https://example.com/mcp",
+        )
+        assert backend.count_mcp_consented_users_by_server("srv-x") == 2
+        assert backend.count_mcp_consented_users_by_server("srv-y") == 1
+
+    def test_excludes_expired(self, backend) -> None:
+        self._seed_server(backend)
+        backend.create_mcp_user_token(
+            "alice",
+            "srv-x",
+            access_token_ct=b"ct",
+            refresh_token_ct=None,
+            expires_at="2020-01-01T00:00:00",  # well in the past
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            audience="https://example.com/mcp",
+        )
+        assert backend.count_mcp_consented_users_by_server("srv-x") == 0
+
+    def test_zero_when_no_rows(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.count_mcp_consented_users_by_server("missing") == 0
+
+
+class TestInstallGate:
+    def test_any_oauth_user_returns_false_on_empty(self, backend) -> None:
+        assert backend.any_oauth_user_mcp_servers() is False
+
+    def test_any_oauth_user_ignores_static_rows(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-1",
+            name="static-only",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            command="",
+            args="[]",
+            url="https://example.com",
+            headers='{"Authorization": "Bearer x"}',
+            env="{}",
+            auto_approve=False,
+            enabled=True,
+            created_by="admin",
+        )
+        assert backend.any_oauth_user_mcp_servers() is False
+
+    def test_any_oauth_user_returns_true_when_one_exists(self, backend) -> None:
+        backend.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-2",
+            name="oauth-srv",
+            transport="streamable-http",
+            command="",
+            args="[]",
+            url="https://example.com",
+            headers="{}",
+            env="{}",
+            auto_approve=False,
+            enabled=True,
+            created_by="admin",
+        )
+        backend.update_mcp_server("srv-2", auth_type="oauth_user")
+        assert backend.any_oauth_user_mcp_servers() is True

tests/test_mcp_pool_auth_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
+"""Phase 6 integration tests — real-transport drives 401/403 through the SDK.
+
+These are the structural exit criterion for Phase 6. They MUST drive
+through the real ``streamablehttp_client``, the real httpx response-hook
+path, and a REAL upstream MCP server (a ``FastMCP`` in-process subprocess
+with a starlette middleware that programmatically returns 401/403 with
+crafted ``WWW-Authenticate`` headers).
+
+Direct ``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection is FORBIDDEN here — Phase 5
+bug-1 was masked precisely by that pattern (the production code path
+was structurally unreachable, but the unit-test injection bypassed the
+SDK's swallow). The integration tests gate that the production path
+actually receives the carrier signal end-to-end.
+
+The fixture upstream is built in-thread (uvicorn on its own asyncio
+loop in a background thread) — same pattern as
+``tests/spike_sdk_concurrency.py``. Per the orchestrator's startup-cost
+note, measured at ~0.05s per fixture spin-up locally; well under the
+2s threshold for default-collection inclusion.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import logging
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+import uvicorn
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import TokenLookupResult
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+# Quiet noisy logs during tests.
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fixture upstream — programmable BehaviorMiddleware
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class BehaviorMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Inspects per-request behaviour state and returns 401/403 on demand.
+
+    The behaviour is steered by a mutable ``behaviour`` dict on the
+    middleware instance; tests mutate it via the fixture handle.
+    Records every request's Authorization header for assertion.
+
+    Behaviour semantics:
+      * ``"once_401"``: return 401 once, then 200 thereafter.
+      * ``"always_401"``: always return 401.
+      * ``"once_403_insufficient"``: return 403 with insufficient_scope once.
+      * ``"once_403_generic"``: return 403 without error param once.
+      * ``"once_multi_www_auth_403"``: return 403 with TWO
+        ``WWW-Authenticate`` headers — first ``Bearer`` challenge
+        carries the SAFE scopes, second carries INJECTED scopes. The
+        dispatcher must report only the first.
+      * ``"never"`` (default): pass through to the real handler.
+
+    ``www_authenticate`` overrides the default header crafted per shape.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._behaviour = behaviour
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable[..., Any]) -> Response:
+        from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
+
+        # Record the Authorization header for assertion. POST is the
+        # tools/call request the dispatcher sends.
+        if request.method == "POST" and "/mcp" in str(request.url):
+            self._behaviour.setdefault("post_auth_headers", []).append(
+                request.headers.get("authorization")
+            )
+
+        mode = self._behaviour.get("mode", "never")
+        if mode == "once_401":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "unauthorized",
+                    status_code=401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "always_401":
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "unauthorized",
+                status_code=401,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                        "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                    )
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_403_insufficient":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "forbidden",
+                    status_code=403,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate",
+                            'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:write mail:send"',
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "once_403_generic" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "forbidden",
+                status_code=403,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get("www_authenticate", "Bearer realm=mcp")
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_multi_www_auth_403" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            # Two ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...`` challenges. The
+            # first carries ``error=insufficient_scope`` but NO
+            # ``scope=`` parameter; the second carries the INJECTED
+            # scopes the dispatcher must NOT report. The first
+            # challenge intentionally lacks ``scope`` because
+            # ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer`` uses ``setdefault`` —
+            # if the first challenge HAD a scope, ``setdefault`` would
+            # already win on first-occurrence. The vector this test
+            # guards is the case where a defended absence becomes a
+            # silent presence: a hook regression to ``get(...)`` joins
+            # repeated headers with ``, `` and the parser then folds
+            # the second challenge's scope into the first challenge's
+            # params dict because there is no first-occurrence to
+            # protect.
+            response = StarletteResponse("forbidden", status_code=403)
+            response.headers.append(
+                "www-authenticate",
+                'Bearer realm="legit", error="insufficient_scope"',
+            )
+            response.headers.append(
+                "www-authenticate",
+                'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="org:admin db:write"',
+            )
+            return response
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _find_free_port() -> int:
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def _build_server(port: int, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="phase6-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.tool()
+    async def echo(payload: str = "default") -> str:
+        return f"echoed:{payload}"
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(BehaviorMiddleware, behaviour=behaviour)
+    config = uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=port, log_level="warning", access_log=False)
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def _wait_ready(port: int, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.5):
+                return
+        except OSError:
+            time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"upstream at 127.0.0.1:{port} not ready after {timeout}s")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def upstream():
+    """Boot a FastMCP fixture upstream in a background thread.
+
+    Yields ``(url, behaviour)`` where ``behaviour`` is a mutable dict
+    the test mutates to steer the middleware (set ``mode`` to one of
+    the BehaviorMiddleware shapes).
+    """
+    port = _find_free_port()
+    behaviour: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    server = _build_server(port, behaviour)
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="phase6-upstream")
+    t.start()
+    try:
+        _wait_ready(port)
+        yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp", behaviour
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        t.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-rrr",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 21: 401 → refresh-and-retry → success
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Real upstream returns 401 once with ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer
+    error="invalid_token"``, then 200. Dispatcher carrier captures the
+    401, ``force_refresh=True`` mints a new bearer (stubbed), retry
+    succeeds. Hard invariant 3: breaker counter remains 0.
+
+    Drives through the REAL ``streamablehttp_client`` and a REAL
+    upstream subprocess (no ``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection). This
+    is the structural exit gate for Phase 6 — the equivalent unit
+    tests CANNOT prove the production wiring works because the SDK
+    swallows the underlying exception.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    # Override URL to point at the local upstream (loopback http:// is
+    # exempt from the URL-validator).
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "hi"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+
+    assert "echoed:hi" in result
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+    # Server saw at least 2 POSTs to /mcp (initial + retry).
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, f"expected >=2 POSTs; got {len(post_headers)}"
+    # Retry carries a different bearer than the initial.
+    initial = post_headers[0]
+    retry = post_headers[1]
+    assert initial != retry, (
+        "retry attached the same bearer as the initial; the dispatcher "
+        "did not pick up the refreshed token."
+    )
+    # Pool entry has a session after the successful retry.
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 22: 401 + refresh failure → mcp_consent_required
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_401_with_refresh_failure_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    # Structured-error envelopes flow back via ``RuntimeError(json_str)``
+    # so the session-layer ``except Exception`` handler routes the
+    # consent card uniformly across tool / resource / prompt dispatchers.
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+    # Phase 8 — consent_url surfaces a /start URL the dashboard can open
+    # in a popup. URL-encoded server name; no scopes baked in (the AS
+    # picks up the configured scopes server-side at /start).
+    assert payload["error"]["consent_url"] == "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=pool-srv"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 23: 403 + insufficient_scope → mcp_insufficient_scope with parsed scopes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_403_insufficient_scope_emits_structured_error(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_insufficient"
+    behaviour["www_authenticate"] = (
+        'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:write mail:send"'
+    )
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope"
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == ["files:write", "mail:send"]
+    # Phase 8 — consent_url carries the step-up scopes URL-encoded so the
+    # dashboard can union them with the configured set at /start.
+    assert payload["error"]["consent_url"] == (
+        "/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=pool-srv&scopes=files%3Awrite%20mail%3Asend"
+    )
+    # No retry — exactly ONE POST attempted before the structured error.
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 24: 403 without insufficient_scope → generic forbidden
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_403_no_insufficient_scope_emits_generic_forbidden(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_generic"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_tool_call_forbidden"
+    assert "scopes_required" not in payload["error"]
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# sec-1: multi-WWW-Authenticate header injection — only the FIRST
+# Bearer challenge feeds the structured-error / audit emission.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_403_multi_www_authenticate_drops_injected_scopes(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Upstream returns a 403 with TWO ``WWW-Authenticate: Bearer ...``
+    challenges. The first carries ``error=insufficient_scope`` but NO
+    ``scope=`` parameter; the second carries INJECTED scopes
+    (``["org:admin", "db:write"]``). The dispatcher must report
+    ``scopes_required == []`` — derived from the first challenge alone
+    — never the second challenge's injected scopes.
+
+    Two layers of defence cooperate (either alone neutralises the
+    vector; both run together so a regression in one cannot silently
+    re-open it):
+
+    1. ``_make_capturing_http_factory._hook`` reads
+       ``response.headers.get_list("www-authenticate")[0]`` rather than
+       ``response.headers.get(...)`` — the latter joins repeated
+       headers with ``", "`` which the RFC 7235 tokenizer would
+       otherwise consume as a continuation of the first challenge.
+    2. ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer`` stops at the first ``Bearer``
+       challenge boundary even if the input was already joined, so a
+       hook regression to ``get(...)`` would NOT re-open the vector.
+
+    The first challenge intentionally lacks ``scope=`` — the parser
+    uses ``setdefault`` so a first-occurrence ``scope`` would already
+    win and mask a single-layer regression. The undefended-absence
+    case is what proves both layers actually do their job.
+
+    Negative-test (CRITICAL — Phase 5 lesson): verified by reverting
+    the hook to ``response.headers.get("www-authenticate")`` AND
+    removing the ``_looks_like_bearer_challenge_start`` guard in
+    ``parse_www_authenticate_bearer``. The test then fails because
+    ``scopes_required`` becomes ``["org:admin", "db:write"]`` — the
+    injected scopes from the second challenge silently fold into the
+    first challenge's params dict via httpx's comma-joined header
+    value (the absence of a first-occurrence scope means nothing
+    blocks the fold).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_multi_www_auth_403"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope", (
+        f"expected mcp_insufficient_scope; got {payload!r}"
+    )
+    # ``scopes_required`` derives from the FIRST challenge alone, which
+    # carries no ``scope=`` parameter. The injected second challenge
+    # MUST NOT appear here.
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == [], (
+        "Multi-header injection slipped through: dispatcher reported "
+        "scopes from the SECOND Bearer challenge. Got "
+        f"{payload['error']['scopes_required']!r}; expected []."
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 25: 401 retry ceiling — never recurse
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_401_retry_ceiling(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Upstream always returns 401; refresh stub keeps minting tokens.
+    After exactly ONE retry, dispatcher emits ``mcp_consent_required``.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    refresh_count = 0
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        nonlocal refresh_count
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            refresh_count += 1
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token=f"refreshed-{refresh_count}")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    # Exactly ONE refresh round-trip.
+    assert refresh_count == 1, f"expected exactly 1 refresh round-trip; got {refresh_count}"
+    # Server saw EXACTLY 2 POSTs (initial + 1 retry).
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 2, (
+        f"expected exactly 2 POSTs (initial + 1 retry); got {len(post_headers)}"
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 26: breaker unaffected by repeated auth failures (slow — 50 cycles)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_breaker_unaffected_by_auth_failures(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """50 sequential dispatches all hit 401 with refresh-failed → 50
+    cycles of ``mcp_consent_required``. ``_consecutive_failures`` MUST
+    stay at 0 throughout (hard invariant 3 verified end-to-end).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        for _ in range(50):
+            with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+                mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                    "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "x"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+                )
+            payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+            assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+            assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 27: static path unaffected by Phase 6 changes
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_static_path_unaffected(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Static-path connect against an unauthed upstream succeeds without
+    going through the capturing factory. This is the integration-level
+    mirror of ``test_reconnect_preserves_static_state_identity``.
+
+    Drives the static path against the same fixture upstream (with
+    ``behaviour={}`` so middleware passes through) — confirms the
+    static path's session lifecycle is byte-identical even when the
+    pool path's auth introspection is wired up.
+    """
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    # No mode → middleware passes through to FastMCP.
+
+    mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+
+    # Manually configure mgr with a static-path server pointing at the
+    # fixture upstream. Use _connect_one (not the pool path).
+    cfg = {"type": "streamable-http", "url": url}
+
+    async def _connect_static() -> None:
+        await mgr._connect_one("static-srv", cfg)
+
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_connect_static(), loop)
+    fut.result(timeout=15)
+
+    state_before = mgr._static_servers.get("static-srv")
+    assert state_before is not None
+    assert state_before.session is not None
+    # Snapshot identity.
+    state_id_before = id(state_before)
+    session_before = state_before.session
+
+    # Reconnect — the canonical regression check is that the
+    # StaticServerState object identity is preserved.
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_connect_static(), loop)
+    fut.result(timeout=15)
+
+    state_after = mgr._static_servers.get("static-srv")
+    assert state_after is not None
+    assert id(state_after) == state_id_before, (
+        "Static path StaticServerState identity changed across reconnect; "
+        "hard invariant 1 violated."
+    )
+    assert state_after.session is not None
+    assert state_after.session is not session_before, (
+        "Reconnect did not actually replace the session"
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 27b: static dispatch unaffected by Phase 8 consent_url kwarg
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_static_dispatch_unaffected_by_consent_url_kwarg(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Static-auth tool dispatch must be byte-identical post-Phase 8.
+
+    The Phase 8 changes only ADD a ``consent_url`` kwarg to
+    ``_structured_error`` invocations on the pool path. Static dispatch
+    must not pick up the field — there's no consent flow for
+    ``auth_type='none'`` / ``'static'`` servers, and exposing one would
+    confuse the dashboard renderer. Asserts a successful tool result is
+    a plain string with no JSON envelope and no ``consent_url`` substring.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — succeeds
+
+    mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cfg = {"type": "streamable-http", "url": url}
+
+    async def _connect_static() -> None:
+        await mgr._connect_one("static-srv", cfg)
+
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_connect_static(), loop)
+    fut.result(timeout=15)
+
+    # Drive call_tool_sync without a user_id — the static path is taken.
+    result = mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__static-srv__echo", {"payload": "static-x"}, timeout=15)
+
+    # Static path returns the FastMCP fixture's echo string.
+    assert "echoed:static-x" in result
+    # No JSON envelope leaked through; specifically no consent_url field.
+    assert "consent_url" not in result, (
+        f"Static-auth tool dispatch surfaced a consent_url; result: {result!r}"
+    )
+    # Defensive: result is not a JSON-encoded structured error.
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(result)
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError):
+        parsed = None
+    if isinstance(parsed, dict):
+        assert "error" not in parsed, (
+            f"Static-auth dispatch returned a structured-error envelope; got {parsed!r}"
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Test 28: pool reuse — 401 on a SECOND dispatch (carrier owned by entry)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_integration_pool_reuse_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Reused pool sessions still capture 401 correctly.
+
+    Dispatch 1 hits a passthrough upstream (200) and populates
+    ``entry.session``. Dispatch 2 reuses that session — no fresh
+    connect, so a per-dispatch ``_AuthCapture`` would never reach
+    the httpx response hook (the hook closes over the carrier passed
+    at first connect, which lives on the entry). A correctly-wired
+    entry-owned carrier is the only shape that lets dispatch 2's 401
+    surface to the dispatcher.
+
+    Two independent production bugs gate this test passing; both must
+    hold for reused-session 401 recovery to work end-to-end:
+
+    1. The carrier must live on the pool entry (not per-dispatch) so
+       the response hook bound at first connect writes to the same
+       object the dispatcher reads across reuse. Verified by reverting
+       ``PoolEntryState.auth_capture`` to a per-dispatch
+       ``_AuthCapture()`` allocation: the carrier-fired event never
+       reaches the dispatcher and the test times out.
+
+    2. The dispatcher must race ``call_tool`` against the carrier's
+       fired event. The SDK's ``_receive_loop`` runs in BaseSession's
+       TaskGroup nested inside ``streamablehttp_client``'s TaskGroup;
+       when an upstream 4xx fires, the outer TaskGroup cancels
+       ``_receive_loop`` mid-finally before it can deliver
+       ``CONNECTION_CLOSED`` to the response stream's waiting
+       receiver. anyio's ``send_nowait`` skips waiters with pending
+       cancellation — but our dispatch task (created via
+       ``run_coroutine_threadsafe`` for the reused-session case) has
+       NO pending cancellation, so the send delivers but the receiver
+       never wakes (the waiter's Event is set on stale state). Result:
+       a forever-hung ``response_stream_reader.receive()``. Verified
+       by reverting the ``asyncio.wait({call_task, fired_task})``
+       race in ``_dispatch_pool_with_entry`` to a bare ``await
+       session.call_tool(...)``: the test times out.
+
+    This test is the structural gate against the per-dispatch carrier
+    pattern: it looks right in code review and passes single-dispatch
+    integration tests, but breaks silently on session reuse — and the
+    SDK-level hang the carrier fix exposes silently strands the
+    dispatcher even when the carrier is correct.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — dispatch 1 succeeds
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        # Dispatch 1: passthrough success. Establishes the pooled session.
+        result1 = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "first"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+        assert "echoed:first" in result1
+
+        entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+        session_after_first = entry.session
+        assert session_after_first is not None, (
+            "test setup: dispatch 1 did not populate entry.session; "
+            "subsequent dispatch will not exercise the reuse path"
+        )
+
+        # Reconfigure upstream to 401 once on the next call. Reset the
+        # auth-headers log so we can count dispatch-2's POSTs cleanly.
+        behaviour["post_auth_headers"] = []
+        behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+        behaviour["_fired"] = False
+
+        # Dispatch 2: same (user, server). The hook from dispatch 1's
+        # connect is still bound to entry.auth_capture. The 401 fires;
+        # the dispatcher's auth_401 path triggers refresh-and-retry.
+        result2 = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "second"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+
+    assert "echoed:second" in result2, (
+        f"reused-session 401 retry did not succeed. result: {result2!r}. "
+        "If this is JSON with mcp_consent_required, the dispatcher "
+        "fell through to consent_required emission; if a generic "
+        "tool error, the carrier was empty (auth branch unreachable)."
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0, (
+        "auth failures must not trip the per-server breaker"
+    )
+
+    # Dispatch 2 produces multiple POSTs: the original 401 with the
+    # rejected bearer, then the retry's full connect handshake
+    # (initialize + notifications/initialized + tools/list) followed by
+    # the actual tools/call — all under the refreshed bearer. The retry
+    # reconnects because the auth_401 handler evicted the broken session.
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, (
+        f"expected >=2 POSTs after dispatch 2 (401 + retry); "
+        f"got {len(post_headers)}: {post_headers}"
+    )
+    # First POST is the original bearer that got 401'd.
+    assert post_headers[0] == "Bearer access-aaa", (
+        f"first POST was {post_headers[0]!r}; expected the original bearer"
+    )
+    # Every subsequent POST carries the refreshed bearer (the retry
+    # ran with force_refresh=True and reconnected with the new token).
+    refreshed = post_headers[1:]
+    assert all(h == "Bearer refreshed-bearer" for h in refreshed), (
+        f"retry POSTs carried unexpected bearer(s); observed: {post_headers}"
+    )

tests/test_mcp_pool_auth_prompt_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,720 @@
+"""Phase 7b integration tests — real-transport prompt get 401/403/etc.
+
+Mirror of :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_resource_integration` for the
+prompt path (RFC §3.3). Drives through the real ``streamablehttp_client``,
+real httpx response-hook plumbing, and a real upstream subprocess
+(``FastMCP`` with a programmable ``BehaviorMiddleware``). Direct
+``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection is forbidden (invariant 14).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import logging
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+import uvicorn
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import TokenLookupResult
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+
+class BehaviorMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Programmable upstream behaviour — see
+    :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_integration` for the semantics. This
+    copy serves the prompt integration tests.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._behaviour = behaviour
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable[..., Any]) -> Response:
+        from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
+
+        if request.method == "POST" and "/mcp" in str(request.url):
+            self._behaviour.setdefault("post_auth_headers", []).append(
+                request.headers.get("authorization")
+            )
+
+        mode = self._behaviour.get("mode", "never")
+        if mode == "once_401":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "unauthorized",
+                    status_code=401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "always_401":
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "unauthorized",
+                status_code=401,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                        "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                    )
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_403_insufficient":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "forbidden",
+                    status_code=403,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate",
+                            'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="prompts:read"',
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "once_403_generic" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "forbidden",
+                status_code=403,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get("www_authenticate", "Bearer realm=mcp")
+                },
+            )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _find_free_port() -> int:
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def _build_server(port: int, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="phase7b-prompt-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.prompt()
+    def greet(who: str = "world") -> str:
+        return f"Hello, {who}!"
+
+    @mcp.prompt()
+    def summarize(topic: str = "today") -> str:
+        return f"Please summarize {topic}."
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(BehaviorMiddleware, behaviour=behaviour)
+    config = uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=port, log_level="warning", access_log=False)
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def _wait_ready(port: int, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.5):
+                return
+        except OSError:
+            time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"upstream at 127.0.0.1:{port} not ready after {timeout}s")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def upstream():
+    port = _find_free_port()
+    behaviour: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    server = _build_server(port, behaviour)
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="phase7b-prompt-upstream")
+    t.start()
+    try:
+        _wait_ready(port)
+        yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp", behaviour
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        t.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-rrr",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _seed_pool_prompt_map(
+    mgr: MCPClientManager,
+    user_id: str,
+    server_name: str,
+    prefixed_name: str,
+    original_name: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Pre-seed ``_user_prompt_map`` so ``_resolve_pool_target_prompt``
+    finds the prefixed name. Production wires this through
+    ``_connect_one_pool``; the integration tests seed it directly so the
+    test focuses on the dispatch behaviour after resolution succeeds.
+    """
+
+    async def _seed() -> None:
+        entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((user_id, server_name))
+        entry.prompts = [
+            {
+                "name": prefixed_name,
+                "original_name": original_name,
+                "server": server_name,
+                "description": "",
+                "arguments": [],
+            }
+        ]
+        mgr._rebuild_user_prompt_map(user_id)
+
+    assert mgr._loop is not None
+    asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_seed(), mgr._loop).result(timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-1: 401 → refresh → retry → success (prompt path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Real upstream returns 401 once, then 200. Carrier captures 401,
+    force_refresh=True mints a new bearer, retry returns the prompt
+    messages. Hard invariant 3: breaker counter remains 0.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        messages = mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "everyone"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    assert isinstance(messages, list)
+    assert len(messages) == 1
+    assert messages[0]["role"] == "user"
+    assert "everyone" in messages[0]["content"]
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, f"expected >=2 POSTs; got {len(post_headers)}"
+    assert post_headers[0] != post_headers[1], (
+        "retry attached the same bearer as the initial; the dispatcher "
+        "did not pick up the refreshed token."
+    )
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-2: persistent 401 → mcp_consent_required (prompt path) → RuntimeError
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_persistent_401_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-3: 403 + insufficient_scope → mcp_insufficient_scope (prompt path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_403_insufficient_scope_emits_structured_error(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_insufficient"
+    behaviour["www_authenticate"] = 'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="prompts:read"'
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope"
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == ["prompts:read"]
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-3b: 403 generic → mcp_prompt_get_forbidden
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_403_generic_forbidden(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_generic"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    # Per the kind="prompt" wiring of `_handle_auth_403`, the
+    # operation-specific code surfaces here rather than the tool path's
+    # generic mcp_tool_call_forbidden.
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_prompt_get_forbidden"
+    assert "scopes_required" not in payload["error"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-6: breaker isolation — auth failures NEVER trip the breaker
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_breaker_unaffected_by_auth_failures(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Repeated 401 + refresh-failed cycles leave breaker at 0
+    (hard invariant 3 verified end-to-end for the prompt path)."""
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    # Re-seed each iteration: symmetric eviction (Phase 7b) clears
+    # ``_user_prompt_map`` on auth failure so the next dispatch's
+    # resolver would miss without a fresh seed. Production reconnect
+    # repopulates this; the test simulates that out-of-band.
+    for _ in range(10):
+        _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+                side_effect=_fake_classified,
+            ),
+            pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+        ):
+            mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+                {"who": "world"},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=15,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+        assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Negative tests — token lookup edge cases (prompt path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_missing_token_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="missing")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_decrypt_failure_emits_token_undecryptable(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="decrypt_failure")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown"
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_http_url_emits_url_insecure(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """An ``http://`` (non-loopback) oauth_user URL must surface
+    ``mcp_oauth_url_insecure`` BEFORE the bearer is attached.
+    """
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://example.com/mcp")
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_prompt_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "mcp__pool-srv__greet", "greet")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as excinfo,
+    ):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(excinfo.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_oauth_url_insecure"
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_unknown_name_raises_value_error(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any,
+) -> None:
+    """When the prefixed name doesn't resolve to either pool or static,
+    the static-path code raises ``ValueError``. Per-user-first
+    resolution (scope decision 0.1) means user_id-bearing callers still
+    hit this path when their pool catalog doesn't carry the name."""
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unknown MCP prompt"):
+        mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__nonexistent__missing",
+            None,
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-PR-E2E: real discovery + dispatch in same connect (no _seed_pool_prompt_map)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_prompt_get_e2e_discovery_then_dispatch_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Drive REAL discovery + dispatch end-to-end through the pool path.
+
+    Mirror of the tool path's
+    ``test_integration_pool_reuse_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds``: skips
+    the ``_seed_pool_prompt_map`` shortcut and lets ``_connect_one_pool``
+    populate ``_user_prompt_map`` from the real ``prompts/list``
+    upstream response. Verifies that the entry's discovered prompts
+    match what the FastMCP fixture advertises AND that
+    ``_user_prompt_map[user_id]`` is populated with the prefixed name
+    after dispatch — proving the discovery path actually fired.
+
+    This is the structural gate against a regression where prompt
+    dispatch silently bypasses discovery (e.g., a mis-wired resolver
+    that finds the (server, original) via prefix-parsing alone never
+    populates the per-user catalog).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — discovery + dispatch both succeed
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    # NB: no `_seed_pool_prompt_map` — the resolver finds (server, original)
+    # via the `mcp__{server}__{prompt}` prefix and hands off to
+    # ``_dispatch_pool_prompt_sync``, which lazy-connects via
+    # ``_connect_one_pool``. The connect runs the real ``prompts/list``
+    # against the FastMCP fixture and populates the per-user catalog.
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        messages = mgr.get_prompt_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__greet",
+            {"who": "world"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=15,
+        )
+
+    assert isinstance(messages, list)
+    assert len(messages) == 1
+    assert messages[0]["role"] == "user"
+    assert "world" in messages[0]["content"]
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+    # Discovery populated the entry's prompts with both fixtures
+    # (``greet`` and ``summarize``) — proves real ``prompts/list``
+    # ran during the connect, not just the targeted ``prompts/get``.
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+    assert entry.prompts is not None
+    discovered_names = {p["name"] for p in entry.prompts}
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__greet" in discovered_names
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__summarize" in discovered_names
+
+    # ``_rebuild_user_prompt_map`` ran during the connect, populating the
+    # per-user catalog. This is the signal that discovery wired into the
+    # routing tables — without it, a follow-up ``get_prompt_sync`` would
+    # need to re-resolve via prefix parsing every time.
+    user_prompt_map = mgr._user_prompt_map.get("user-1") or {}
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__greet" in user_prompt_map
+    assert "mcp__pool-srv__summarize" in user_prompt_map

tests/test_mcp_pool_auth_resource_integration.py

@@ -0,0 +1,690 @@
+"""Phase 7b integration tests — real-transport resource read 401/403/etc.
+
+Mirror of :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_integration` for the resource
+path (RFC §3.2). Drives through the real ``streamablehttp_client``,
+real httpx response-hook plumbing, and a real upstream subprocess
+(``FastMCP`` with a programmable ``BehaviorMiddleware``). Direct
+``httpx.HTTPStatusError`` injection is forbidden (invariant 14).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import logging
+import socket
+import threading
+import time
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+import pytest
+import uvicorn
+from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP
+from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import TokenLookupResult
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Callable
+
+    from starlette.requests import Request
+    from starlette.responses import Response
+
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.error").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+logging.getLogger("mcp").setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+
+class BehaviorMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
+    """Programmable upstream behaviour — see
+    :mod:`tests.test_mcp_pool_auth_integration` for the semantics. This
+    copy serves the resource integration tests.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, app: Any, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
+        super().__init__(app)
+        self._behaviour = behaviour
+
+    async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next: Callable[..., Any]) -> Response:
+        from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
+
+        if request.method == "POST" and "/mcp" in str(request.url):
+            self._behaviour.setdefault("post_auth_headers", []).append(
+                request.headers.get("authorization")
+            )
+
+        mode = self._behaviour.get("mode", "never")
+        if mode == "once_401":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "unauthorized",
+                    status_code=401,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "always_401":
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "unauthorized",
+                status_code=401,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                        "www_authenticate", 'Bearer error="invalid_token"'
+                    )
+                },
+            )
+        elif mode == "once_403_insufficient":
+            if not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+                self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+                return StarletteResponse(
+                    "forbidden",
+                    status_code=403,
+                    headers={
+                        "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get(
+                            "www_authenticate",
+                            'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:read"',
+                        )
+                    },
+                )
+        elif mode == "once_403_generic" and not self._behaviour.get("_fired"):
+            self._behaviour["_fired"] = True
+            return StarletteResponse(
+                "forbidden",
+                status_code=403,
+                headers={
+                    "www-authenticate": self._behaviour.get("www_authenticate", "Bearer realm=mcp")
+                },
+            )
+        return await call_next(request)
+
+
+def _find_free_port() -> int:
+    s = socket.socket()
+    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    port = s.getsockname()[1]
+    s.close()
+    return port
+
+
+def _build_server(port: int, behaviour: dict[str, Any]) -> uvicorn.Server:
+    mcp = FastMCP(name="phase7b-resource-target", streamable_http_path="/mcp")
+
+    @mcp.resource("res://hello")
+    def hello() -> str:
+        return "world"
+
+    @mcp.resource("res://json/data")
+    def jdata() -> str:
+        return '{"k": 1}'
+
+    # Echo tool exists so the e2e test can trigger ``_connect_one_pool``
+    # (and the full tool + resource + prompt discovery) via prefix-parsed
+    # ``call_tool_sync`` BEFORE the resource read. The other tests in this
+    # module use ``_seed_pool_resource_map`` and never invoke tools, so
+    # adding the tool is invisible to them.
+    @mcp.tool()
+    async def echo(payload: str = "default") -> str:
+        return f"echoed:{payload}"
+
+    app = mcp.streamable_http_app()
+    app.add_middleware(BehaviorMiddleware, behaviour=behaviour)
+    config = uvicorn.Config(app, host="127.0.0.1", port=port, log_level="warning", access_log=False)
+    return uvicorn.Server(config)
+
+
+def _wait_ready(port: int, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        try:
+            with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.5):
+                return
+        except OSError:
+            time.sleep(0.05)
+    raise TimeoutError(f"upstream at 127.0.0.1:{port} not ready after {timeout}s")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def upstream():
+    port = _find_free_port()
+    behaviour: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    server = _build_server(port, behaviour)
+
+    def _run() -> None:
+        loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+        asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
+        loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())
+
+    t = threading.Thread(target=_run, daemon=True, name="phase7b-resource-upstream")
+    t.start()
+    try:
+        _wait_ready(port)
+        yield f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/mcp", behaviour
+    finally:
+        server.should_exit = True
+        t.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+    refresh_token: str | None = "refresh-rrr",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token=refresh_token,
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _seed_pool_resource_map(
+    mgr: MCPClientManager, user_id: str, server_name: str, uri: str
+) -> None:
+    """Pre-seed ``_user_resource_map`` so ``_resolve_pool_target_resource``
+    finds the URI. Production wires this through ``_connect_one_pool``;
+    the integration tests seed it directly so the test focuses on the
+    dispatch behaviour after resolution succeeds.
+    """
+
+    async def _seed() -> None:
+        entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((user_id, server_name))
+        entry.resources = [
+            {
+                "uri": uri,
+                "name": "",
+                "description": "",
+                "mimeType": "",
+                "server": server_name,
+            }
+        ]
+        mgr._rebuild_user_resource_map(user_id)
+
+    assert mgr._loop is not None
+    asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_seed(), mgr._loop).result(timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-1: 401 → refresh → retry → success (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Real upstream returns 401 once, then 200. Carrier captures 401,
+    force_refresh=True mints a new bearer, retry returns the resource.
+    Hard invariant 3: breaker counter remains 0.
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        result = mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    assert result == "world"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) >= 2, f"expected >=2 POSTs; got {len(post_headers)}"
+    assert post_headers[0] != post_headers[1], (
+        "retry attached the same bearer as the initial; the dispatcher "
+        "did not pick up the refreshed token."
+    )
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-2: persistent 401 → mcp_consent_required (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_persistent_401_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="refreshed-bearer")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+    assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-3: 403 + insufficient_scope → mcp_insufficient_scope (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_403_insufficient_scope_emits_structured_error(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_insufficient"
+    behaviour["www_authenticate"] = 'Bearer error="insufficient_scope", scope="files:read"'
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_insufficient_scope"
+    assert payload["error"]["scopes_required"] == ["files:read"]
+    post_headers = behaviour.get("post_auth_headers", [])
+    assert len(post_headers) == 1, (
+        f"403 must NOT trigger a retry; observed {len(post_headers)} POSTs"
+    )
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-3b: 403 generic → mcp_resource_read_forbidden
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_403_generic_forbidden(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "once_403_generic"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    # Per the kind="resource" wiring of `_handle_auth_403`, the
+    # operation-specific code surfaces here rather than the tool path's
+    # generic mcp_tool_call_forbidden.
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_resource_read_forbidden"
+    assert "scopes_required" not in payload["error"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-6: breaker isolation — auth failures NEVER trip the breaker
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_breaker_unaffected_by_auth_failures(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Repeated 401 + refresh-failed cycles leave breaker at 0
+    (hard invariant 3 verified end-to-end for the resource path)."""
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "always_401"
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        if kwargs.get("force_refresh"):
+            return TokenLookupResult(kind="refresh_failed")
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    # Re-seed each iteration: symmetric eviction (Phase 7b) clears
+    # ``_user_resource_map`` on auth failure so the next dispatch's
+    # resolver would miss without a fresh seed. Production reconnect
+    # repopulates this; the test simulates that out-of-band.
+    for _ in range(10):
+        _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+                side_effect=_fake_classified,
+            ),
+            pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+        ):
+            mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+        assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Negative tests — token lookup edge cases (resource path)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_missing_token_emits_consent_required(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="missing")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=10)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+
+def test_resource_read_decrypt_failure_emits_token_undecryptable(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    url, _behaviour = upstream
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="decrypt_failure")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=10)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown"
+
+
+def test_resource_read_http_url_emits_url_insecure(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """An ``http://`` (non-loopback) oauth_user URL must surface
+    ``mcp_oauth_url_insecure`` BEFORE the bearer is attached.
+    """
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://example.com/mcp")
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    _seed_pool_resource_map(mgr, "user-1", "pool-srv", "res://hello")
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with (
+        patch(
+            "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+            side_effect=_fake_classified,
+        ),
+        pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info,
+    ):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=5)
+
+    payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+    assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_oauth_url_insecure"
+
+
+def test_resource_read_unknown_uri_raises_value_error(
+    running_loop_mgr: Any,
+) -> None:
+    """When the URI doesn't resolve to either pool or static, the
+    static-path code raises ``ValueError``. Per-user-first resolution
+    (scope decision 0.1) means user_id-bearing callers still hit this
+    path when their pool catalog doesn't carry the URI."""
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unknown MCP resource"):
+        mgr.read_resource_sync("res://nonexistent", user_id="user-1", timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# I-RP-E2E: real discovery + dispatch in same connect (no _seed_pool_resource_map)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_resource_read_e2e_discovery_then_dispatch_succeeds(
+    upstream: Any, running_loop_mgr: Any, storage: SQLiteBackend
+) -> None:
+    """Drive REAL discovery + dispatch end-to-end through the pool path.
+
+    Mirror of the tool path's
+    ``test_integration_pool_reuse_401_refresh_and_retry_succeeds``: skips
+    the ``_seed_pool_resource_map`` shortcut and lets ``_connect_one_pool``
+    populate ``_user_resource_map`` from the real ``resources/list``
+    upstream response. Verifies that the entry's discovered resources
+    match what the FastMCP fixture advertises AND that
+    ``_user_resource_map[user_id]`` is populated with the URI(s) after
+    discovery — proving the discovery path actually fired.
+
+    Resource URIs do NOT carry a server-name prefix (unlike tools and
+    prompts), so the resource resolver cannot derive (server, uri) by
+    parsing alone. The test triggers the connect via a prefix-parsed
+    ``call_tool_sync`` first (which runs the full
+    tools+resources+prompts discovery against the FastMCP fixture),
+    then drives ``read_resource_sync`` against a URI that the
+    upstream advertised — proving that real discovery wired the URI
+    into the per-user catalog.
+
+    Structural gate against a regression where resource discovery is
+    silently skipped (e.g., a capability-gating bug that drops the
+    ``resources/list`` call but keeps the connect succeeding).
+    """
+    url, behaviour = upstream
+    behaviour["mode"] = "never"  # passthrough — discovery + dispatch both succeed
+
+    mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+    cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+    _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url=url)
+    _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+    mgr.set_storage(storage)
+    mgr.set_app_state(_make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher))
+    # NB: no `_seed_pool_resource_map` — the connect runs the real
+    # ``resources/list`` against the FastMCP fixture and populates the
+    # per-user catalog. The tool call below triggers that connect because
+    # ``_resolve_pool_target`` derives (server, original) from the
+    # ``mcp__pool-srv__echo`` prefix and lazy-connects via
+    # ``_connect_one_pool``.
+
+    async def _fake_classified(**_kwargs: Any) -> TokenLookupResult:
+        return TokenLookupResult(kind="token", token="access-aaa")
+
+    with patch(
+        "turnstone.core.mcp_client.get_user_access_token_classified",
+        side_effect=_fake_classified,
+    ):
+        # Step 1: trigger the connect via prefix-parsed tool dispatch.
+        # Discovery (tools + resources + prompts) populates the per-user
+        # catalogs.
+        tool_result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__echo", {"payload": "ignite"}, user_id="user-1", timeout=15
+        )
+        assert "echoed:ignite" in tool_result
+
+        # Step 2: now that discovery has populated ``_user_resource_map``,
+        # the resource resolver finds ``res://hello`` and dispatches the
+        # read on the SAME pool entry / session.
+        result = mgr.read_resource_sync("res://hello", user_id="user-1", timeout=15)
+
+    assert result == "world"
+    assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 0
+
+    # Discovery populated the entry's resources with both fixtures
+    # (``res://hello`` and ``res://json/data``) — proves real
+    # ``resources/list`` ran during the connect, not just the targeted
+    # ``resources/read``.
+    entry = mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")]
+    assert entry.session is not None
+    assert entry.resources is not None
+    discovered_uris = {r["uri"] for r in entry.resources if not r.get("template")}
+    assert "res://hello" in discovered_uris
+    assert "res://json/data" in discovered_uris
+
+    # ``_rebuild_user_resource_map`` ran during the connect, populating
+    # the per-user catalog. This is the signal that discovery wired into
+    # the routing tables — without it, ``read_resource_sync`` would have
+    # raised ValueError because the resolver had no entry for the URI.
+    user_resource_map = mgr._user_resource_map.get("user-1") or {}
+    assert "res://hello" in user_resource_map
+    assert "res://json/data" in user_resource_map

tests/test_mcp_token_store.py

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+"""Tests for ``MCPTokenStore`` ciphertext-aware CRUD.
+
+Phase 3 of the OAuth-MCP RFC: validates the encrypt/decrypt boundary
+between :class:`MCPTokenStore` and the storage protocol's ciphertext-only
+columns.  Exercises the row-not-deleted-on-decrypt-failure invariant.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+
+import pytest
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
+    MCPTokenCipher,
+    MCPTokenCipherConfig,
+    MCPTokenDecryptError,
+    MCPTokenStore,
+)
+
+
+def _make_cipher() -> MCPTokenCipher:
+    raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+    return MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,)))
+
+
+def _make_store(backend, *, audit: bool = False) -> tuple[MCPTokenStore, MCPTokenCipher]:
+    cipher = _make_cipher()
+    store = MCPTokenStore(
+        backend,
+        cipher,
+        node_id="test-node",
+        audit_storage=backend if audit else None,
+    )
+    return store, cipher
+
+
+def _seed_server(backend, *, server_id: str = "srv-id-1", name: str = "srv-a") -> str:
+    backend.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url="https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+    )
+    return server_id
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# User-token CRUD
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestUserTokenCRUD:
+    def test_create_and_get_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="access-aaa",
+            refresh_token="refresh-bbb",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+            scopes="openid profile",
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        plain = store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert plain is not None
+        assert plain["user_id"] == "u1"
+        assert plain["server_name"] == "srv-a"
+        assert plain["access_token"] == "access-aaa"
+        assert plain["refresh_token"] == "refresh-bbb"
+        assert plain["scopes"] == "openid profile"
+        assert plain["audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+
+    def test_create_with_no_refresh_token(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="access-only",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        plain = store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert plain is not None
+        assert plain["access_token"] == "access-only"
+        assert plain["refresh_token"] is None
+
+    def test_get_missing_returns_none(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        assert store.get_user_token("nobody", "srv-a") is None
+
+    def test_update_after_refresh(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="old-access",
+            refresh_token="old-refresh",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+            scopes="openid",
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        ok = store.update_user_token_after_refresh(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="new-access",
+            refresh_token="new-refresh",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T13:00:00",
+        )
+        assert ok is True
+        plain = store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert plain is not None
+        assert plain["access_token"] == "new-access"
+        assert plain["refresh_token"] == "new-refresh"
+        assert plain["expires_at"] == "2026-05-04T13:00:00"
+        # Preserved columns:
+        assert plain["scopes"] == "openid"
+        assert plain["as_issuer"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        # last_refreshed got stamped:
+        assert plain["last_refreshed"] is not None
+
+    def test_update_after_refresh_missing_row_returns_false(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        ok = store.update_user_token_after_refresh(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="x",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+        )
+        assert ok is False
+
+    def test_delete(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="a",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        assert store.delete_user_token("u1", "srv-a") is True
+        assert store.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a") is None
+        # Idempotent: deleting again returns False.
+        assert store.delete_user_token("u1", "srv-a") is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Client-secret writer
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestClientSecretWriter:
+    def test_set_oauth_client_secret_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, cipher = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        ok = store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "plaintext-secret")
+        assert ok is True
+        # Read raw via get_mcp_server: ciphertext != plaintext, decrypts back.
+        raw = backend.get_mcp_server(server_id)
+        assert raw is not None
+        ct = raw["oauth_client_secret_ct"]
+        assert isinstance(ct, (bytes, bytearray, memoryview))
+        ct_bytes = bytes(ct)
+        assert ct_bytes != b"plaintext-secret"
+        assert cipher.decrypt(ct_bytes) == b"plaintext-secret"
+
+    def test_set_oauth_client_secret_clear_with_none(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "x")
+        assert store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, None) is True
+        raw = backend.get_mcp_server(server_id)
+        assert raw is not None
+        assert raw["oauth_client_secret_ct"] is None
+
+    def test_set_oauth_client_secret_missing_server_returns_false(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        ok = store.set_oauth_client_secret("does-not-exist", "x")
+        assert ok is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Decrypt failure: row preservation invariant
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDecryptFailureInvariant:
+    def test_get_user_token_with_wrong_key_raises_decrypt_error(self, backend) -> None:
+        """CRITICAL: when no installed key can decrypt a stored row,
+        ``get_user_token`` MUST NOT auto-delete the row.  The row is
+        still valid; this node just doesn't have the right key.
+        """
+        # Write under cipher A.
+        store_a, _cipher_a = _make_store(backend)
+        store_a.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="secret-access",
+            refresh_token="secret-refresh",
+            expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+            scopes="openid",
+            as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+        raw_before = backend.get_mcp_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert raw_before is not None
+        ct_before = bytes(raw_before["access_token_ct"])
+
+        # Read under cipher B (different key).
+        store_b, cipher_b = _make_store(backend)
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError) as exc_info:
+            store_b.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        # The exception carries the keys we tried — useful for audit.
+        assert exc_info.value.key_fingerprints_attempted == cipher_b.key_fingerprints
+
+        # Row MUST still exist with ciphertext intact.
+        raw_after = backend.get_mcp_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+        assert raw_after is not None
+        assert bytes(raw_after["access_token_ct"]) == ct_before
+
+    def test_decrypt_failure_emits_audit_when_configured(self, backend) -> None:
+        """When ``audit_storage`` is set, decrypt failures emit a
+        ``mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure`` audit event."""
+        store_a, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        store_a.create_user_token(
+            "u1",
+            "srv-a",
+            access_token="x",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=None,
+            scopes=None,
+            as_issuer="https://a",
+            audience="https://m",
+        )
+
+        store_b, cipher_b = _make_store(backend, audit=True)
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError):
+            store_b.get_user_token("u1", "srv-a")
+
+        events = backend.list_audit_events(limit=10)
+        actions = {ev.get("action") for ev in events}
+        assert "mcp_server.oauth.token_decrypt_failure" in actions
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Client-secret reader — q-9
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestClientSecretReader:
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_returns_none_when_row_absent(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        assert store.get_oauth_client_secret("does-not-exist") is None
+
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_returns_none_when_column_null(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        # No set_oauth_client_secret call — column stays NULL.
+        assert store.get_oauth_client_secret(server_id) is None
+
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_round_trip(self, backend) -> None:
+        store, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        store.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "shhh-its-secret")
+        assert store.get_oauth_client_secret(server_id) == "shhh-its-secret"
+
+    def test_get_oauth_client_secret_raises_on_key_mismatch(self, backend) -> None:
+        store_a, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        server_id = _seed_server(backend)
+        store_a.set_oauth_client_secret(server_id, "secret-under-key-a")
+
+        # Cipher B has a different key — decrypt fails loudly.
+        store_b, _ = _make_store(backend)
+        with pytest.raises(MCPTokenDecryptError):
+            store_b.get_oauth_client_secret(server_id)

tests/test_mcp_token_store_metadata.py

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+"""Tests for ``MCPTokenStore.list_user_token_metadata``.
+
+Validates the non-secret projection used by the settings UI: ciphertext
+columns are stripped, ordering is preserved, and the empty case returns
+``[]``. Decrypt is intentionally skipped — the list view must never need
+the access/refresh secrets.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
+    MCPTokenCipher,
+    MCPTokenCipherConfig,
+    MCPTokenStore,
+)
+
+
+def _make_cipher() -> MCPTokenCipher:
+    raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
+    return MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,)))
+
+
+def _make_store(backend) -> MCPTokenStore:
+    return MCPTokenStore(backend, _make_cipher(), node_id="test-node")
+
+
+def _seed_token(
+    store: MCPTokenStore,
+    backend,
+    *,
+    user_id: str,
+    server_name: str,
+    created: str,
+) -> None:
+    """Create a token via the store and backdate ``created`` for ordering."""
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token="access-secret",
+        refresh_token="refresh-secret",
+        expires_at="2026-05-04T12:00:00",
+        scopes="openid profile",
+        as_issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+    with backend._engine.connect() as conn:
+        conn.execute(
+            sa.text(
+                "UPDATE mcp_user_tokens SET created = :created "
+                "WHERE user_id = :uid AND server_name = :sn"
+            ),
+            {"created": created, "uid": user_id, "sn": server_name},
+        )
+        conn.commit()
+
+
+class TestListUserTokenMetadata:
+    def test_list_user_token_metadata_returns_non_secret_fields_only(self, backend) -> None:
+        store = _make_store(backend)
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = store.list_user_token_metadata("u1")
+        assert len(rows) == 1
+        meta = rows[0]
+        # Secrets MUST be absent.
+        assert "access_token" not in meta
+        assert "refresh_token" not in meta
+        assert "access_token_ct" not in meta
+        assert "refresh_token_ct" not in meta
+        # Non-secret columns surface verbatim.
+        assert meta["user_id"] == "u1"
+        assert meta["server_name"] == "srv-a"
+        assert meta["scopes"] == "openid profile"
+        assert meta["as_issuer"] == "https://auth.example.com"
+        assert meta["audience"] == "https://mcp.example.com"
+        assert meta["expires_at"] == "2026-05-04T12:00:00"
+        assert meta["created"] == "2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        assert meta["last_refreshed"] is None
+
+    def test_list_user_token_metadata_empty(self, backend) -> None:
+        store = _make_store(backend)
+        assert store.list_user_token_metadata("nobody") == []
+
+    def test_list_user_token_metadata_preserves_creation_order(self, backend) -> None:
+        store = _make_store(backend)
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-c", created="2026-05-03T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-a", created="2026-05-01T00:00:00"
+        )
+        _seed_token(
+            store, backend, user_id="u1", server_name="srv-b", created="2026-05-02T00:00:00"
+        )
+        rows = store.list_user_token_metadata("u1")
+        assert [r["server_name"] for r in rows] == ["srv-a", "srv-b", "srv-c"]
+        assert [r["created"] for r in rows] == [
+            "2026-05-01T00:00:00",
+            "2026-05-02T00:00:00",
+            "2026-05-03T00:00:00",
+        ]

tests/test_mcp_user_pool.py

@@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
+"""Tests for the per-(user, server) MCP session pool.
+
+Covers Phase 5 of the OAuth-MCP rollout: pool data structures,
+``_ensure_pool_entry`` lazy allocation, ``_connect_one_pool`` plumbing,
+the dispatch state machine in ``_dispatch_pool``, idle / LRU eviction,
+failure classification, and ``user_id`` thread-through.
+
+The static path (``auth_type ∈ {none, static}``) MUST stay
+byte-identical — see ``test_mcp_client.py``'s
+``test_reconnect_preserves_static_state_identity``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import json
+import threading
+import time
+from contextlib import AsyncExitStack
+from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.conftest import make_mcp_token_cipher
+from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager, PoolEntryState
+from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenStore
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fixtures and helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    """A fresh SQLite backend per test (not the shared singleton)."""
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "test.db"))
+
+
+def _seed_oauth_server(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    *,
+    name: str = "pool-srv",
+    server_id: str = "srv-pool",
+    url: str = "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+) -> None:
+    storage.create_mcp_server(
+        server_id=server_id,
+        name=name,
+        transport="streamable-http",
+        url=url,
+        auth_type="oauth_user",
+        oauth_client_id="client-abc",
+        oauth_scopes="openid",
+        oauth_audience=url,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_user_token(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+    cipher: Any,
+    *,
+    user_id: str = "user-1",
+    server_name: str = "pool-srv",
+    expires_in_seconds: int = 3600,
+    access_token: str = "access-aaa",
+) -> None:
+    expires_at = (datetime.now(UTC) + timedelta(seconds=expires_in_seconds)).strftime(
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"
+    )
+    store = MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test")
+    store.create_user_token(
+        user_id,
+        server_name,
+        access_token=access_token,
+        refresh_token="refresh-rrr",
+        expires_at=expires_at,
+        scopes="openid",
+        as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+        audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_app_state(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, cipher: Any) -> SimpleNamespace:
+    return SimpleNamespace(
+        auth_storage=storage,
+        mcp_token_store=MCPTokenStore(storage, cipher, node_id="test"),
+        mcp_oauth_http_client=MagicMock(),
+        mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
+        mcp_oauth_metadata_cache={},
+    )
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def running_loop_mgr():
+    """Background-loop fixture matching the static-path test convention.
+
+    Tests that need a wired-up app_state assign it via ``mgr.set_app_state``.
+    """
+    cfg: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    mgr = MCPClientManager(cfg)
+    loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
+    thread = threading.Thread(target=loop.run_forever, daemon=True, name="mcp-pool-test-loop")
+    thread.start()
+    mgr._loop = loop
+    try:
+        yield mgr, loop, thread
+    finally:
+        # Drain the eviction task before stopping the loop so its log/stream
+        # handlers don't fire after pytest has torn its handlers down. Mirrors
+        # the production ``shutdown()`` shape.
+        async def _drain(m: MCPClientManager) -> None:
+            task = m._user_pool_eviction_task
+            if task is not None:
+                task.cancel()
+                with contextlib.suppress(BaseException):
+                    await task
+                m._user_pool_eviction_task = None
+
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(_drain(mgr), loop).result(timeout=2)
+        loop.call_soon_threadsafe(loop.stop)
+        thread.join(timeout=2)
+
+
+def _run_on_loop(loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop, coro: Any) -> Any:
+    """Submit *coro* to *loop*, wait for the result with a 5s timeout."""
+    fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(coro, loop)
+    return fut.result(timeout=5)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Pool data structures
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestPoolDataStructures:
+    """``_user_pool_entries``, ``_user_pool_locks``, eviction-task state."""
+
+    def test_pool_state_starts_empty(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}
+        assert mgr._user_pool_last_used == {}
+        assert mgr._user_pool_locks == {}
+        assert mgr._user_pool_eviction_task is None
+
+    def test_set_app_state_persists(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        sentinel = SimpleNamespace(token_store=object())
+        mgr.set_app_state(sentinel)
+        assert mgr._app_state is sentinel
+
+    def test_ensure_pool_entry_allocates_lock_on_loop(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        """``asyncio.Lock`` MUST be created on the mcp-loop (RFC §2.0 #2)."""
+        mgr, loop, _thread = running_loop_mgr
+        key = ("user-A", "pool-srv")
+        entry = _run_on_loop(loop, mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key))
+        assert isinstance(entry, PoolEntryState)
+        assert entry.key == key
+        assert isinstance(entry.open_lock, asyncio.Lock)
+        # Calling again returns the same entry / lock object.
+        entry2 = _run_on_loop(loop, mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key))
+        assert entry2 is entry
+        assert entry2.open_lock is entry.open_lock
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Lazy connect (`_connect_one_pool`)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class _AsyncCM:
+    """Awaitable async context manager that returns ``value`` from __aenter__."""
+
+    def __init__(self, value: Any) -> None:
+        self._value = value
+
+    async def __aenter__(self) -> Any:
+        return self._value
+
+    async def __aexit__(self, *exc: Any) -> bool:
+        return False
+
+
+class TestLazyConnect:
+    def test_connect_pool_injects_authorization_header(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        from unittest.mock import patch
+
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+
+        observed_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+        async def _probe(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> None:
+            return None
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+        fake_session.initialize = AsyncMock(return_value=None)
+        # Phase 7b: ``_connect_one_pool`` discovers tools, resources,
+        # and prompts after ``initialize()`` returns (resources/prompts
+        # capability-gated). The capability stub returns a tools-only
+        # advertisement so the test can keep its narrow focus on the
+        # bearer-injection contract; resources/prompts paths are
+        # exercised by the real-transport tests in
+        # ``tests/test_mcp_user_catalog.py``.
+        fake_caps = MagicMock()
+        fake_caps.resources = None
+        fake_caps.prompts = None
+        fake_session.get_server_capabilities = MagicMock(return_value=fake_caps)
+        fake_session.list_tools = AsyncMock(return_value=MagicMock(tools=[]))
+
+        def _stream_factory(*, url: str, headers: dict[str, str]) -> _AsyncCM:
+            observed_kwargs["url"] = url
+            observed_kwargs["headers"] = dict(headers)
+            return _AsyncCM((AsyncMock(), AsyncMock(), lambda: None))
+
+        with (
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_client.streamablehttp_client", side_effect=_stream_factory),
+            patch.object(mgr, "_tcp_probe", side_effect=_probe),
+            patch("turnstone.core.mcp_client.ClientSession", return_value=_AsyncCM(fake_session)),
+        ):
+            cfg = {
+                "type": "streamable-http",
+                "url": "https://mcp.example.com/sse",
+                "headers": {},
+            }
+            entry = _run_on_loop(
+                loop,
+                mgr._connect_one_pool(("user-1", "pool-srv"), cfg, "access-aaa"),
+            )
+
+        assert entry.session is fake_session
+        assert observed_kwargs["headers"]["Authorization"] == "Bearer access-aaa"
+
+    def test_connect_pool_rejects_non_http_transport(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cfg = {"type": "stdio", "command": "echo"}
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="streamable-http"):
+            _run_on_loop(
+                loop,
+                mgr._connect_one_pool(("user-1", "pool-srv"), cfg, "access-aaa"),
+            )
+
+    def test_pool_path_does_not_touch_static_servers(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        # Pre-seed a static-path entry so accidental writes are observable.
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+        sentinel = StaticServerState(name="static-srv", session=MagicMock())
+        mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] = sentinel
+
+        async def _seed_pool() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = MagicMock()
+            entry.last_used = time.monotonic()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_pool())
+        # Pool side has its own state; the static dict is untouched.
+        assert mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] is sentinel
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries[("user-1", "pool-srv")].session is not None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Eviction
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestEviction:
+    def test_idle_eviction_closes_stale_entries(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 0.0  # everything is stale
+
+        async def _seed() -> list[PoolEntryState]:
+            entries = []
+            for i in range(3):
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((f"u{i}", "pool-srv"))
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                entries.append(entry)
+            return entries
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}
+
+    def test_eviction_skips_locked_entries(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 0.0
+
+        async def _seed_and_lock() -> tuple[asyncio.Lock, asyncio.Event]:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("u-busy", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = MagicMock()
+            held = asyncio.Event()
+
+            async def _hold() -> None:
+                async with entry.open_lock:
+                    held.set()
+                    await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+
+            asyncio.create_task(_hold())
+            await held.wait()
+            return entry.open_lock, held
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_and_lock())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        # Entry survives because eviction skipped the locked key.
+        assert ("u-busy", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+
+    def test_lru_cap_evicts_oldest(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 999_999.0  # TTL effectively disabled
+        mgr._user_pool_lru_max = 2
+
+        async def _seed() -> None:
+            base = time.monotonic()
+            for i in range(5):
+                key = (f"u{i}", "pool-srv")
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key)
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                # Recent timestamps so TTL doesn't fire — only LRU should.
+                entry.last_used = base + i
+                mgr._user_pool_last_used[key] = base + i
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        assert len(mgr._user_pool_entries) <= 2
+        # The two newest survive (u3, u4).
+        assert ("u4", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+        assert ("u3", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+
+    def test_eviction_resilient_to_close_errors(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 0.0
+
+        broken_stack = MagicMock(spec=AsyncExitStack)
+        broken_stack.aclose = AsyncMock(side_effect=RuntimeError("close failed"))
+
+        async def _seed() -> None:
+            for i in range(2):
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry((f"u{i}", "pool-srv"))
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                entry.stack = broken_stack
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        # Eviction must not raise even if close fails.
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        # All entries removed from the dict regardless.
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Dispatch state machine
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDispatchStateMachine:
+    """One row per state in the §1.5 / RFC §6 state machine."""
+
+    def _wire_pool(
+        self, mgr: MCPClientManager, storage: SQLiteBackend, cipher: Any
+    ) -> SimpleNamespace:
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+        return state
+
+    def test_no_token_emits_consent_required(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+        assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+
+    def test_decrypt_failure_does_not_emit_consent(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenDecryptError
+
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        state = self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        def _raise(*args, **kwargs):
+            raise MCPTokenDecryptError(
+                "no installed key can decrypt",
+                key_fingerprints_attempted=("aabbccdd",),
+            )
+
+        state.mcp_token_store.get_user_token = _raise
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_token_undecryptable_key_unknown"
+        # Operator fingerprints stay server-side (audit log + structured log);
+        # the agent-facing payload must NOT carry them onward to the LLM
+        # provider.
+        assert "key_fingerprints_attempted" not in payload["error"]
+
+    def test_refresh_failure_emits_consent(self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        # Seed an expired token with no refresh — the classified getter
+        # treats this as "refresh_failed" (deletes the row, returns the
+        # tagged result).
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher, expires_in_seconds=-1000)
+        state = self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+        # Drop the refresh token to force the no-refresh-token branch.
+        state.mcp_token_store.delete_user_token("user-1", "pool-srv")
+        state.mcp_token_store.create_user_token(
+            "user-1",
+            "pool-srv",
+            access_token="access-aaa",
+            refresh_token=None,
+            expires_at=(datetime.now(UTC) - timedelta(seconds=1000)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"),
+            scopes="openid",
+            as_issuer="https://as.example.com",
+            audience="https://mcp.example.com",
+        )
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_consent_required"
+
+    def test_token_present_dispatches_to_session(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher, expires_in_seconds=3600)
+        self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        # Pre-seed a connected pool entry so dispatch never touches the
+        # SDK or the network.
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "tool-result"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+
+        async def _seed_entry() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = fake_session
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_entry())
+
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+            {"q": "hi"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+        assert result == "tool-result"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Failure classification
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestClassifyFailure:
+    def test_transport_failure_classified_as_transport(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        for exc in (
+            BrokenPipeError(),
+            ConnectionResetError(),
+            EOFError(),
+            TimeoutError("net"),
+        ):
+            assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "transport"
+
+    def test_protocol_error_classified_as_protocol(self) -> None:
+        from mcp import McpError
+        from mcp.types import ErrorData
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        err = McpError(ErrorData(code=-32600, message="bad request"))
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(err) == "protocol"
+
+    def test_other_classified_as_other(self) -> None:
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(ValueError("nope")) == "other"
+
+    def test_http_401_classified_as_auth_401(self) -> None:
+        """Defense-in-depth: ``HTTPStatusError`` classification still works
+        even though Phase 6 normally consults the carrier instead.
+
+        Phase 6 split ``"auth"`` into ``"auth_401"`` / ``"auth_403"``
+        so the dispatcher can refresh-and-retry only on 401.
+        """
+        import httpx
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        req = httpx.Request("POST", "https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        resp = httpx.Response(401, request=req)
+        exc = httpx.HTTPStatusError("unauthorized", request=req, response=resp)
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "auth_401"
+
+    def test_http_403_classified_as_auth_403(self) -> None:
+        import httpx
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        req = httpx.Request("POST", "https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        resp = httpx.Response(403, request=req)
+        exc = httpx.HTTPStatusError("forbidden", request=req, response=resp)
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "auth_403"
+
+    def test_http_500_not_classified_as_auth(self) -> None:
+        import httpx
+
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        req = httpx.Request("POST", "https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        resp = httpx.Response(500, request=req)
+        exc = httpx.HTTPStatusError("server", request=req, response=resp)
+        # 5xx is not auth — falls through to "other".
+        assert mgr._classify_failure(exc) == "other"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Wired-failure paths in _dispatch_pool
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestDispatchFailureWiring:
+    """``_classify_failure`` is consulted in production, not just tests."""
+
+    def _wire_pool(
+        self, mgr: MCPClientManager, storage: SQLiteBackend, cipher: Any
+    ) -> SimpleNamespace:
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+        return state
+
+    def _seed_connected_session(
+        self, mgr: MCPClientManager, loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop, exc: BaseException
+    ) -> None:
+        async def _seed() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            sess = MagicMock()
+
+            async def _raise(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+                raise exc
+
+            sess.call_tool = _raise
+            entry.session = sess
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed())
+
+    def test_dispatch_pool_transport_failure_trips_breaker(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        self._wire_pool(mgr, storage, cipher)
+
+        self._seed_connected_session(mgr, loop, BrokenPipeError("dead"))
+
+        with pytest.raises(BrokenPipeError):
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        # Transport failure ticks the breaker.
+        assert mgr._consecutive_failures.get("pool-srv", 0) == 1
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# HTTPS enforcement (sec-1)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestHttpsEnforcement:
+    def test_pool_rejects_http_url_for_oauth_user(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://insecure.example.com/sse")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+
+        with pytest.raises(RuntimeError) as exc_info:
+            mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                {},
+                user_id="user-1",
+                timeout=5,
+            )
+        payload = json.loads(str(exc_info.value))
+        assert payload["error"]["code"] == "mcp_oauth_url_insecure"
+        assert payload["error"]["server"] == "pool-srv"
+
+    def test_pool_accepts_loopback_http(self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        """``http://127.0.0.1`` and ``http://localhost`` should not be blocked."""
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv", url="http://127.0.0.1:8000/sse")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+
+        # Pre-seed a connected pool entry so dispatch succeeds without
+        # touching the network.
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "ok"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+
+        async def _seed_entry() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = fake_session
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_entry())
+
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+            {},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+        # Loopback URL not rejected — dispatch reaches the (fake) session.
+        assert result == "ok"
+
+    def test_validate_oauth_user_url_helper(self) -> None:
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import _validate_oauth_user_url
+
+        # Acceptable: https + the exact loopback hostnames.
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("https://mcp.example.com/sse")
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("http://localhost/sse")
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("http://127.0.0.1:9000/sse")
+        _validate_oauth_user_url("http://[::1]/sse")
+
+        # Rejected: non-https + non-loopback. The ``*.localhost`` suffix
+        # bypass is intentionally NOT honored (RFC 6761 localhost-zone
+        # resolution is configuration-dependent — custom resolvers,
+        # /etc/hosts, Docker overlays may map ``foo.localhost`` to
+        # non-loopback IPs).
+        for bad in (
+            "http://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            "http://app.localhost/sse",
+            "ws://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            "ftp://mcp.example.com/sse",
+            "//mcp.example.com/sse",
+        ):
+            with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="https://"):
+                _validate_oauth_user_url(bad)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _resolve_pool_target parser (q-9)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestResolvePoolTarget:
+    def _make_mgr_with_oauth_server(
+        self, storage: SQLiteBackend, *, name: str = "pool-srv"
+    ) -> MCPClientManager:
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name=name)
+        mgr = MCPClientManager({})
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        return mgr
+
+    def test_malformed_prefix(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        # Wrong prefix.
+        assert mgr._resolve_pool_target("xyz__pool-srv__t", None, None) is None
+
+    def test_too_few_separators(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        # mcp__server with no original_name segment.
+        assert mgr._resolve_pool_target("mcp__pool-srv", None, None) is None
+
+    def test_empty_server_segment(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        # mcp____tool — server segment is empty.
+        assert mgr._resolve_pool_target("mcp____tool", None, None) is None
+
+    def test_original_with_double_underscore_round_trips(self, storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        mgr = self._make_mgr_with_oauth_server(storage)
+        target = mgr._resolve_pool_target("mcp__pool-srv__do__thing", None, None)
+        assert target is not None
+        assert target[0] == "pool-srv"
+        # Original-name keeps its embedded ``__``.
+        assert target[1] == "do__thing"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# LRU + lock interlock (q-7)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestLruInterlock:
+    def test_lru_cap_skips_locked_oldest(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        """LRU eviction must skip a locked entry the same way TTL does."""
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        mgr._user_pool_idle_ttl_s = 999_999.0  # disable TTL
+        mgr._user_pool_lru_max = 2
+
+        async def _seed_and_lock_oldest() -> tuple[asyncio.Lock, asyncio.Event]:
+            base = time.monotonic()
+            for i in range(3):
+                key = (f"u{i}", "pool-srv")
+                entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(key)
+                entry.session = MagicMock()
+                # Older index ⇒ older timestamp.
+                entry.last_used = base + i
+                mgr._user_pool_last_used[key] = base + i
+            # Lock the oldest (u0) so eviction must skip it and pick a younger one.
+            oldest = mgr._user_pool_entries[("u0", "pool-srv")]
+            held = asyncio.Event()
+
+            async def _hold() -> None:
+                async with oldest.open_lock:
+                    held.set()
+                    await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+
+            asyncio.create_task(_hold())
+            await held.wait()
+            return oldest.open_lock, held
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_and_lock_oldest())
+
+        async def _evict() -> None:
+            await mgr._evict_idle_pool_entries()
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _evict())
+        # Locked u0 must survive.
+        assert ("u0", "pool-srv") in mgr._user_pool_entries
+        # The oldest unlocked entry (u1) was evicted to bring count down to cap.
+        assert ("u1", "pool-srv") not in mgr._user_pool_entries
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Concurrent dispatch on shared session (M4 / perf-1)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestConcurrentDispatch:
+    def test_pool_concurrent_dispatch_to_same_user_server_is_serialized(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        """Phase 6: two tool calls on the SAME (user, server) MUST serialize
+        on ``open_lock`` so the auth-introspection carrier never crosses
+        between concurrent dispatches.
+
+        Phase 5 perf-1 released ``open_lock`` before ``call_tool`` so two
+        concurrent same-key calls multiplexed on a shared
+        ``ClientSession``. Phase 6 reverts that for the auth-aware path
+        because the per-dispatch ``_AuthCapture`` is keyed off the
+        ``httpx.AsyncClient`` event hook — releasing the lock would let
+        a concurrent dispatch overwrite the carrier mid-flight,
+        attributing one caller's 401 to another (a security bug).
+
+        Verified by reverting ``_dispatch_pool_with_entry`` to the
+        Phase 5 shape (release ``open_lock`` before ``call_tool`` —
+        i.e. move the ``in_flight += 1`` / ``call_tool`` / decrement
+        block out of the ``async with`` body) and confirming this test
+        observes ``max_concurrency == 2``.
+        """
+        mgr, loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        cipher = make_mcp_token_cipher()
+        _seed_oauth_server(storage, name="pool-srv")
+        _seed_user_token(storage, cipher)
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        state = _make_app_state(storage, cipher=cipher)
+        mgr.set_app_state(state)
+
+        observed_max_concurrency = 0
+        in_flight = 0
+        in_flight_lock = threading.Lock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            nonlocal observed_max_concurrency, in_flight
+            with in_flight_lock:
+                in_flight += 1
+                observed_max_concurrency = max(observed_max_concurrency, in_flight)
+            try:
+                # Hold a moment so concurrent calls would overlap if
+                # they weren't serialized on ``open_lock``.
+                await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
+                content = MagicMock()
+                content.text = "ok"
+                res = MagicMock()
+                res.content = [content]
+                res.isError = False
+                return res
+            finally:
+                with in_flight_lock:
+                    in_flight -= 1
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+
+        async def _seed_entry() -> None:
+            entry = await mgr._ensure_pool_entry(("user-1", "pool-srv"))
+            entry.session = fake_session
+
+        _run_on_loop(loop, _seed_entry())
+
+        results: list[str] = []
+        errors: list[Exception] = []
+
+        def _dispatch() -> None:
+            try:
+                results.append(
+                    mgr.call_tool_sync(
+                        "mcp__pool-srv__do_thing",
+                        {},
+                        user_id="user-1",
+                        timeout=5,
+                    )
+                )
+            except Exception as exc:  # pragma: no cover — diagnostic only
+                errors.append(exc)
+
+        t1 = threading.Thread(target=_dispatch)
+        t2 = threading.Thread(target=_dispatch)
+        t1.start()
+        t2.start()
+        t1.join(timeout=5)
+        t2.join(timeout=5)
+
+        assert errors == []
+        assert results == ["ok", "ok"]
+        # ``open_lock`` held across ``call_tool`` — the second dispatch
+        # waits for the first to release before entering call_tool.
+        assert observed_max_concurrency == 1
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# user_id thread-through (signature)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestUserIdThreadThrough:
+    def test_default_user_id_takes_static_path(self, running_loop_mgr) -> None:
+        """``user_id=None`` must leave the static-path call byte-identical."""
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        # Static-path tool registered the standard way.
+        mgr._tool_map["mcp__static__t"] = ("static-srv", "t")
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "static-output"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+        mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] = StaticServerState(
+            name="static-srv", session=fake_session
+        )
+
+        # No user_id, no app_state — pool branch is skipped entirely.
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync("mcp__static__t", {"q": "hi"}, user_id=None, timeout=5)
+        assert result == "static-output"
+
+    def test_user_id_with_static_path_does_not_use_pool(
+        self, running_loop_mgr, storage: SQLiteBackend
+    ) -> None:
+        """Caller passes user_id but the resolved server is static — pool
+        branch must not run because ``_lookup_server_row`` reports
+        ``auth_type != 'oauth_user'``."""
+        mgr, _loop, _ = running_loop_mgr
+        storage.create_mcp_server(
+            server_id="srv-static",
+            name="static-srv",
+            transport="stdio",
+            url="",
+            command="echo",
+            auth_type="static",
+        )
+        mgr.set_storage(storage)
+        mgr.set_app_state(SimpleNamespace())
+
+        mgr._tool_map["mcp__static-srv__t"] = ("static-srv", "t")
+        from turnstone.core.mcp_client import StaticServerState
+
+        fake_session = MagicMock()
+
+        async def _call_tool(name, args):
+            content = MagicMock()
+            content.text = "static-output"
+            res = MagicMock()
+            res.content = [content]
+            res.isError = False
+            return res
+
+        fake_session.call_tool = _call_tool
+        mgr._static_servers["static-srv"] = StaticServerState(
+            name="static-srv", session=fake_session
+        )
+
+        result = mgr.call_tool_sync(
+            "mcp__static-srv__t",
+            {"q": "hi"},
+            user_id="user-1",
+            timeout=5,
+        )
+        assert result == "static-output"
+        # No pool entries were created.
+        assert mgr._user_pool_entries == {}

tests/test_memory_relevance.py

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 """Tests for turnstone.core.memory_relevance — scoring, formatting, context extraction."""
 
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
 from turnstone.core.memory_relevance import (
+    MemoryConfig,
     build_memory_context,
     extract_recent_context,
     score_memories,
@@ -192,3 +195,265 @@ class TestExtractRecentContext:
 
     def test_empty_messages(self):
         assert extract_recent_context([]) == ""
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Composition candidate-selection (_init_system_messages)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _make_mem(name: str, content: str = "", memory_id: str | None = None) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {
+        "name": name,
+        "memory_id": memory_id or f"mid_{name}",
+        "type": "project",
+        "scope": "global",
+        "scope_id": "",
+        "description": "",
+        "content": content or name,
+        "updated": "2024-01-01T00:00:00",
+    }
+
+
+def _make_session(fetch_limit: int = 5, relevance_k: int = 3, **kwargs: object):
+    """Composition tests need a real ChatSession (constructor calls
+    ``_init_system_messages`` once, unpatched, before the test gets a chance
+    to install patches).  ``tmp_db`` initializes the storage singleton that
+    constructor needs; tests then patch the visibility helpers and call
+    ``_init_system_messages`` a second time to exercise the new logic.
+    """
+    from tests._helpers import make_chat_session
+
+    return make_chat_session(
+        memory_config=MemoryConfig(fetch_limit=fetch_limit, relevance_k=relevance_k),
+        **kwargs,
+    )
+
+
+class TestCompositionCandidateSelection:
+    """Verify the query-aware candidate set in _init_system_messages."""
+
+    def test_recency_ceiling_regression(self, tmp_db):
+        """Old relevant memory not in recency top-N still injected via search path."""
+        session = _make_session(fetch_limit=5, relevance_k=3)
+        session.messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "postgres database configuration"}]
+
+        old_mem = _make_mem(
+            "ancient_db_config",
+            content="postgres database configuration connection host port",
+            memory_id="m_old",
+        )
+        # Recency top-5 do not include old_mem
+        recent = [_make_mem(f"recent_{i}", memory_id=f"mr{i}") for i in range(5)]
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(session, "_search_visible_memories", return_value=[old_mem]),
+            patch.object(session, "_list_visible_memories", return_value=recent),
+        ):
+            session._init_system_messages()
+
+        joined = "\n".join(m["content"] for m in session.system_messages if m["role"] == "system")
+        # With the fix, old_mem enters the candidate pool via search and wins BM25
+        assert "ancient_db_config" in joined
+
+    def test_empty_query_falls_back_to_recency(self, tmp_db):
+        """No user messages → empty context → recency path, search never called."""
+        session = _make_session()
+        session.messages = []  # extract_recent_context returns ""
+
+        recency = [_make_mem("note_alpha"), _make_mem("note_beta")]
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(session, "_list_visible_memories", return_value=recency),
+            patch.object(session, "_search_visible_memories") as search_mock,
+        ):
+            session._init_system_messages()
+
+        search_mock.assert_not_called()
+        joined = "\n".join(m["content"] for m in session.system_messages if m["role"] == "system")
+        assert "note_alpha" in joined
+
+    def test_sparse_match_union_fills_candidate_pool(self, tmp_db):
+        """Search returning < fetch_limit results unions with recency fillers."""
+        session = _make_session(fetch_limit=5, relevance_k=4)
+        session.messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "unique_term xyzzy"}]
+
+        hit_a = _make_mem("hit_alpha", content="unique_term xyzzy alpha", memory_id="m_ha")
+        hit_b = _make_mem("hit_beta", content="unique_term xyzzy beta", memory_id="m_hb")
+        search_hits = [hit_a, hit_b]  # 2 < fetch_limit=5 → triggers union
+
+        # Recency overlaps on hit_a/hit_b and adds 3 fillers
+        filler = [_make_mem(f"filler_{i}", memory_id=f"mf{i}") for i in range(3)]
+        recency = [hit_a, hit_b] + filler
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(session, "_search_visible_memories", return_value=search_hits),
+            patch.object(session, "_list_visible_memories", return_value=recency),
+        ):
+            session._init_system_messages()
+
+        joined = "\n".join(m["content"] for m in session.system_messages if m["role"] == "system")
+        # Both hits match "unique_term xyzzy" well → appear after BM25 ranking
+        assert "hit_alpha" in joined
+        assert "hit_beta" in joined
+
+    def test_recency_preserved_when_search_returns_noise_above_relevance_k(self, tmp_db):
+        """Pool guarantee: recency-50 always reaches BM25, even when search
+        returns enough noise hits to clear ``relevance_k``.
+
+        Closes the narrow regression vs. the original bug — without the
+        ``fetch_limit`` threshold, a stopword-dominated cap-search that
+        returned >= relevance_k irrelevant hits would short-circuit and
+        evict the recency-only memory the bug had been surfacing.
+        """
+        session = _make_session(fetch_limit=10, relevance_k=3)
+        session.messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "configure host"}]
+
+        # Search returns relevance_k=3 noise hits — enough to skip recency
+        # under the OLD threshold, not enough to fill fetch_limit=10.
+        noise = [
+            _make_mem(f"noise_{i}", content="generic content", memory_id=f"mn{i}") for i in range(3)
+        ]
+        # The memory the user actually wants — distinctive, in recency,
+        # but its content doesn't share any token with the noise hits.
+        wanted = _make_mem(
+            "host_config_v2",
+            content="host=localhost port=5432 db=production",
+            memory_id="m_wanted",
+        )
+        recency = [wanted] + [_make_mem(f"recent_{i}", memory_id=f"mr{i}") for i in range(5)]
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(session, "_search_visible_memories", return_value=noise),
+            patch.object(session, "_list_visible_memories", return_value=recency),
+        ):
+            session._init_system_messages()
+
+        joined = "\n".join(m["content"] for m in session.system_messages if m["role"] == "system")
+        # ``wanted`` reached BM25 via the union and matched "host" → injected.
+        assert "host_config_v2" in joined
+
+    def test_recency_tail_preserved_when_search_adds_distinct_hits(self, tmp_db):
+        """SUPERSET invariant: every recency item is in the candidate pool
+        when search adds hits, even if the resulting union exceeds
+        fetch_limit.  Truncating the union at fetch_limit (the prior
+        behavior) evicted the recency tail — which is exactly where
+        ancient-but-recently-touched memories live, the recall this PR
+        sets out to improve.
+        """
+        session = _make_session(fetch_limit=10, relevance_k=3)
+        session.messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "alpha"}]
+
+        # 5 search hits, none of which appear in recency.
+        search_hits = [
+            _make_mem(f"search_{i}", content="alpha", memory_id=f"ms{i}") for i in range(5)
+        ]
+        # 10 recency items; without the union uncap, the 5 oldest of these
+        # would be displaced by the 5 search hits.
+        recency = [_make_mem(f"recency_{i}", memory_id=f"mr{i}") for i in range(10)]
+
+        with (
+            patch.object(session, "_search_visible_memories", return_value=search_hits),
+            patch.object(session, "_list_visible_memories", return_value=recency),
+        ):
+            candidates, source = session._select_memory_candidates("alpha")
+
+        candidate_ids = {c["memory_id"] for c in candidates}
+        # Pool is search_hits ∪ recency — 15 items, no truncation.
+        assert len(candidates) == 15
+        assert source == "union"
+        # Every recency item present (no tail eviction).
+        for i in range(10):
+            assert f"mr{i}" in candidate_ids, f"recency item {i} evicted"
+        # And every search hit is also in the pool.
+        for i in range(5):
+            assert f"ms{i}" in candidate_ids, f"search hit {i} missing"
+
+    def test_coord_scope_isolated_visibility(self, tmp_db):
+        """Coord composition queries the coord scope alone, never the
+        global/workstream/user union."""
+        from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamKind
+
+        coord = _make_session(
+            fetch_limit=5,
+            relevance_k=3,
+            ws_id="coord-1",
+            user_id="user-1",
+            kind=WorkstreamKind.COORDINATOR,
+        )
+        scopes = coord._visible_scopes()
+        assert scopes == [("coordinator", "coord-1")]
+        # And: search uses those same scopes (no global/user fan-in)
+        coord.messages = [{"role": "user", "content": "anything"}]
+        with patch(
+            "turnstone.core.session.search_visible_structured_memories",
+            return_value=[],
+        ) as search_mock:
+            coord._search_visible_memories("anything", limit=5)
+        search_mock.assert_called_once()
+        # Second positional arg is the scopes list
+        assert search_mock.call_args.args[1] == [("coordinator", "coord-1")]
+
+
+class TestMemorySearchToolExecution:
+    """End-to-end test of ``memory(action='search')`` through _exec_memory.
+
+    Drives the actual tool dispatch (not just the storage facade) so the
+    OR-of-terms fix and the coalesced ``memory.search`` log get exercised
+    together.
+    """
+
+    def test_search_action_returns_or_of_terms_results(self, tmp_db):
+        """Multi-word query returns rows where ANY term matches — not all."""
+        from turnstone.core.memory import save_structured_memory
+
+        save_structured_memory("postgres_notes", "host=localhost port=5432")
+        save_structured_memory("redis_notes", "host=redis port=6379")
+        save_structured_memory("unrelated", "completely different")
+
+        session = _make_session()
+        item = session._prepare_memory(
+            "call-1",
+            {"action": "search", "query": "postgres no_such_word_a no_such_word_b"},
+        )
+        # Sanity: prepare returned a search-ready dispatch (not an error item)
+        assert item.get("action") == "search"
+
+        call_id, msg = session._exec_memory(item)
+        assert call_id == "call-1"
+        assert "postgres_notes" in msg
+        # Other memories don't match any query term
+        assert "unrelated" not in msg
+
+
+class TestPerTurnSearchCache:
+    """The per-turn cache spares redundant SQL across mid-turn rebuilds."""
+
+    def test_repeated_search_in_same_turn_hits_cache(self, tmp_db):
+        from turnstone.core.memory import save_structured_memory
+
+        save_structured_memory("hello_mem", "alpha beta gamma")
+        session = _make_session()
+        with patch(
+            "turnstone.core.session.search_visible_structured_memories",
+            return_value=[],
+        ) as backend_mock:
+            session._search_visible_memories("alpha beta", limit=5)
+            session._search_visible_memories("alpha beta", limit=5)
+            session._search_visible_memories("alpha beta", limit=5)
+        # 3 calls but only 1 backend hit — cache absorbed the rest
+        assert backend_mock.call_count == 1
+
+    def test_user_turn_invalidates_cache(self, tmp_db):
+        from turnstone.core.memory import save_structured_memory
+
+        save_structured_memory("hello_mem", "alpha")
+        session = _make_session()
+        with patch(
+            "turnstone.core.session.search_visible_structured_memories",
+            return_value=[],
+        ) as backend_mock:
+            session._search_visible_memories("alpha", limit=5)
+            session._invalidate_memory_cache()  # simulates new user turn
+            session._search_visible_memories("alpha", limit=5)
+        assert backend_mock.call_count == 2

tests/test_metacognition.py

@@ -4,12 +4,16 @@ from turnstone.core.metacognition import (
     NUDGE_COMPLETION,
     NUDGE_CORRECTION,
     NUDGE_DENIAL,
+    NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP,
+    NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP,
     NUDGE_REPEAT,
     NUDGE_RESUME,
     NUDGE_START,
     NUDGE_TOOL_ERROR,
+    RepeatDetector,
     detect_completion,
     detect_correction,
+    format_idle_children_nudge,
     format_nudge,
     should_nudge,
 )
@@ -308,3 +312,276 @@ class TestRepeatNudge:
         """Repeat nudge should fire even with zero memories."""
         state: dict[str, float] = {}
         assert should_nudge("repeat", state, message_count=5, memory_count=0) is True
+
+
+class TestRepeatDetector:
+    """Repeat-detection streak machine — fires only when the same signature
+    is recorded ``threshold`` times *consecutively* (default 3).  Recording
+    any different signature resets the streak, so an interrupted repeat
+    isn't flagged as a stuck loop."""
+
+    def test_below_threshold_does_not_fire(self):
+        det = RepeatDetector()
+        assert det.record("a") is False
+        assert det.record("a") is False  # second call still under threshold
+
+    def test_at_threshold_fires(self):
+        det = RepeatDetector()
+        det.record("a")
+        det.record("a")
+        assert det.record("a") is True
+
+    def test_continues_to_fire_past_threshold(self):
+        # Caller is responsible for clearing after a fire — until they do,
+        # subsequent identical calls keep returning True.
+        det = RepeatDetector()
+        det.record("a")
+        det.record("a")
+        assert det.record("a") is True
+        assert det.record("a") is True
+
+    def test_clear_resets_count(self):
+        det = RepeatDetector()
+        det.record("a")
+        det.record("a")
+        det.clear()
+        assert det.record("a") is False  # back to 1 after clear
+
+    def test_intervening_sig_resets_streak(self):
+        # The streak is consecutive: recording any other sig mid-streak
+        # discards the in-progress count.  An alternating pattern like
+        # [A, A, B, A, A] is two short streaks of 2, not a streak of 4.
+        det = RepeatDetector()
+        det.record("a")
+        det.record("a")
+        assert det.record("b") is False  # b at count 1; a's streak is gone
+        assert det.record("a") is False  # a starts fresh at 1
+        assert det.record("a") is False  # a at 2
+        assert det.record("a") is True  # a hits 3 — fresh streak completes
+
+    def test_errored_signature_counts_toward_repeat(self):
+        # Regression: when metacog was split out of the system message,
+        # the error-output skip got reintroduced and stuck-loop detection
+        # silently broke for tools that kept failing.  Detector itself is
+        # signature-only — error vs. success is the caller's policy.
+        det = RepeatDetector()
+        # Caller records an errored call's sig the same as a successful one;
+        # the streak is what matters.
+        for _ in range(3):
+            last = det.record("bash:ls /nonexistent")
+        assert last is True
+
+    def test_custom_threshold(self):
+        det = RepeatDetector(threshold=2)
+        assert det.record("a") is False
+        assert det.record("a") is True
+
+    def test_threshold_one_fires_immediately(self):
+        det = RepeatDetector(threshold=1)
+        assert det.record("a") is True
+
+
+class TestFormatIdleChildrenNudge:
+    """``format_idle_children_nudge`` renders the wake-driven idle_children
+    body — no ``<system-reminder>`` envelope (the side-channel splice
+    wraps it at the wire boundary).
+    """
+
+    def test_empty_list_returns_empty_string(self):
+        # Caller short-circuits on `if not text: return` — so empty
+        # input MUST produce empty output, not a header-only stub.
+        assert format_idle_children_nudge([]) == ""
+
+    def test_single_child_renders(self):
+        children = [{"ws_id": "ws-abc12345", "name": "research-task", "state": "running"}]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert "ws-abc12" in text  # short-id form (8 chars)
+        assert "research-task" in text
+        assert "running" in text
+        assert "wait_for_workstream" in text
+        assert "ws-abc12345" in text  # full id appears in the suggestion's ws_ids list
+
+    def test_under_display_cap_no_overflow_line(self):
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": f"ws-{i:08d}", "name": f"task-{i}", "state": "running"} for i in range(3)
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert "...and" not in text
+        for i in range(3):
+            assert f"task-{i}" in text
+
+    def test_over_display_cap_renders_overflow_line(self):
+        n = NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP + 4
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": f"ws-{i:08d}", "name": f"task-{i}", "state": "thinking"} for i in range(n)
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert f"...and {n - NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP} more" in text
+        # First N children are inline; later ones are folded into "...and N more".
+        for i in range(NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP):
+            assert f"task-{i}" in text
+        for i in range(NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_DISPLAY_CAP, n):
+            # Names beyond the display cap aren't visible; only counted.
+            assert f"task-{i}" not in text
+
+    def test_over_wait_cap_truncates_suggestion_ws_ids(self):
+        n = NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP + 5
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": f"ws-{i:08d}", "name": f"task-{i}", "state": "running"} for i in range(n)
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        # The first WAIT_CAP ids appear in the suggestion; later ones don't.
+        first_in_suggestion = f"ws-{NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP - 1:08d}"
+        first_excluded = f"ws-{NUDGE_IDLE_CHILDREN_WAIT_CAP:08d}"
+        assert first_in_suggestion in text
+        assert first_excluded not in text
+
+    def test_unnamed_child_falls_back(self):
+        children = [{"ws_id": "ws-deadbeef", "name": "", "state": "attention"}]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        assert "(unnamed)" in text
+        assert "attention" in text
+
+    def test_newline_in_name_does_not_forge_extra_bullet(self):
+        """A workstream name with embedded ``\\n`` / ``\\t`` / ``\\r`` MUST
+        NOT break the bullet structure — :func:`sanitize_name`'s strict
+        regex strips control chars (incl. TAB/LF/CR) so the name stays
+        on a single line under its own bullet.  Without this, a
+        malicious child name like ``"foo\\n  - ws-fake (running): bar"``
+        would forge a fake sibling row in the rendered list.
+        """
+        children = [
+            {"ws_id": "ws-real0001", "name": "real", "state": "running"},
+            {
+                "ws_id": "ws-evil0002",
+                "name": "evil\n  - ws-fake (running): forged",
+                "state": "thinking",
+            },
+            {"ws_id": "ws-real0003", "name": "tail", "state": "running"},
+        ]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        bullet_rows = [ln for ln in text.splitlines() if ln.startswith("  - ")]
+        assert len(bullet_rows) == 3, (
+            f"expected 3 bullet rows; got {len(bullet_rows)}: {bullet_rows!r}"
+        )
+        evil_row = next(row for row in bullet_rows if "ws-evil" in row)
+        assert "\n" not in evil_row
+        assert "\t" not in evil_row
+        assert "\r" not in evil_row
+        assert "evil" in evil_row
+        assert "ws-real" in bullet_rows[2]
+        assert "tail" in bullet_rows[2]
+
+    def test_missing_state_renders_question_mark(self):
+        children = [{"ws_id": "ws-12345678", "name": "x"}]
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge(children)
+        # Defensive default — exotic state keys / partial dicts shouldn't crash.
+        assert "?" in text
+
+    def test_no_system_reminder_envelope(self):
+        # The side-channel ``_apply_reminders_for_provider`` splice
+        # adds ``<system-reminder>`` at the wire boundary; the formatter
+        # MUST NOT wrap, or the model would see a doubled envelope.
+        text = format_idle_children_nudge([{"ws_id": "ws-x", "name": "y", "state": "running"}])
+        assert "<system-reminder>" not in text
+        assert "</system-reminder>" not in text
+
+    def test_format_nudge_returns_empty_for_idle_children(self):
+        # The static map's idle_children entry is the empty string by
+        # design — format_idle_children_nudge produces the real body.
+        assert format_nudge("idle_children") == ""
+
+    def test_should_nudge_recognises_idle_children_type(self, monkeypatch):
+        # Type registration in ``_NUDGE_MAP`` makes ``should_nudge``
+        # recognise it for cooldown gating; without the entry it would
+        # silently return False on every call.
+        state: dict[str, float] = {}
+        # message_count > 1 to clear the first-message gate.
+        assert should_nudge("idle_children", state, message_count=4, memory_count=0) is True
+        # Cooldown set on success → second immediate call returns False.
+        assert should_nudge("idle_children", state, message_count=5, memory_count=0) is False
+
+
+class TestSanitizeName:
+    """Strict sanitiser for single-line user-controlled name fields
+    (used by :func:`format_idle_children_nudge` for the workstream
+    ``name``).  Strips ASCII control chars **including** TAB/LF/CR
+    plus Unicode steering vectors and angle-bracket tag breakers.
+    """
+
+    def test_empty_input_returns_empty(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        assert sanitize_name("") == ""
+
+    def test_strips_tab_lf_cr(self):
+        """Strict variant: TAB/LF/CR are stripped so a hostile name with
+        an embedded newline can't break a bullet's one-line structure.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        # All three become spaces (then collapsed to one inline space
+        # by the trailing ``strip()``-on-leading/trailing-only step
+        # — interior runs stay as multiple spaces, that's fine for a
+        # one-line name).
+        assert sanitize_name("a\tb") == "a b"
+        assert sanitize_name("a\nb") == "a b"
+        assert sanitize_name("a\rb") == "a b"
+
+    def test_strips_other_ascii_control_chars(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        assert sanitize_name("a\x07b\x0bc\x0cd") == "a b c d"
+        assert sanitize_name("a\x7fb") == "a b"
+
+    def test_strips_angle_bracket_tag_breakers(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_name
+
+        assert sanitize_name("a</thinking>b") == "a/thinkingb"
+
+
+class TestSanitizePayload:
+    """Permissive sanitiser used by the ``watch_triggered`` producer.
+    Strips ASCII control chars (except TAB/LF/CR), Unicode steering
+    vectors (bidi, zero-width, BOM, tag chars), and angle-bracket
+    tag breakers — keeps everything else intact, so multi-line shell
+    output retains its line structure.
+    """
+
+    def test_empty_input_returns_empty(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        assert sanitize_payload("") == ""
+
+    def test_strips_ascii_control_chars(self):
+        """``\\x00``-``\\x1f`` minus TAB/LF/CR plus ``\\x7f`` (DEL) become spaces."""
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # BEL (0x07), VT (0x0b), FF (0x0c) — all in strip set.
+        assert sanitize_payload("a\x07b\x0bc\x0cd") == "a b c d"
+        # DEL (0x7f).
+        assert sanitize_payload("a\x7fb") == "a b"
+
+    def test_preserves_tab_lf_cr(self):
+        """TAB / LF / CR are intentionally preserved so multi-line shell
+        output keeps its line structure when sanitised as a watch payload.
+        """
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # Newlines kept; only the leading + trailing strip happens.
+        out = sanitize_payload("line1\nline2\n\tindented\rline3")
+        assert out == "line1\nline2\n\tindented\rline3"
+
+    def test_strips_bidi_and_zero_width(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # U+202E RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE; U+200B ZERO WIDTH SPACE.
+        assert sanitize_payload("a‮b​c") == "a b c"
+
+    def test_strips_angle_bracket_tag_breakers(self):
+        from turnstone.core.metacognition import sanitize_payload
+
+        # "<" / ">" go away entirely (not replaced with space) so a name
+        # like "</thinking>" doesn't leave a hole the model can read as
+        # a structural marker.
+        assert sanitize_payload("a</thinking>b") == "a/thinkingb"

tests/test_migration_049.py

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+"""Tests for alembic migration 049 (OAuth-MCP schema).
+
+Drives ``command.upgrade`` from a programmatic Alembic config against
+an isolated SQLite database per test, then asserts:
+
+* the two new tables (``mcp_user_tokens``, ``mcp_oauth_pending``) exist,
+* the eight new ``mcp_servers`` columns exist,
+* the post-upgrade ``UPDATE mcp_servers`` normalization rewrites rows
+  with empty / missing headers to ``auth_type='none'`` while leaving
+  rows with non-empty headers at ``auth_type='static'``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import command
+from alembic.config import Config
+
+_MIGRATIONS_DIR = str(
+    Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "turnstone" / "core" / "storage" / "migrations"
+)
+
+
+def _alembic_cfg(db_path: Path) -> Config:
+    cfg = Config()
+    cfg.set_main_option("script_location", _MIGRATIONS_DIR)
+    cfg.set_main_option("sqlalchemy.url", f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+    return cfg
+
+
+class TestMigration049:
+    def test_creates_new_tables_and_columns(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+        db_path = tmp_path / "049.db"
+        cfg = _alembic_cfg(db_path)
+
+        # Walk forward through 048 first, then explicitly to 049 so we
+        # exercise the *upgrade* function (not just the schema's `head`).
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "048")
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "049")
+
+        engine = sa.create_engine(f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+        try:
+            inspector = sa.inspect(engine)
+            tables = set(inspector.get_table_names())
+            assert "mcp_user_tokens" in tables
+            assert "mcp_oauth_pending" in tables
+
+            mcp_cols = {c["name"] for c in inspector.get_columns("mcp_servers")}
+            new_cols = {
+                "auth_type",
+                "oauth_client_id",
+                "oauth_client_secret_ct",
+                "oauth_scopes",
+                "oauth_audience",
+                "oauth_registration_mode",
+                "oauth_authorization_server_url",
+                "oauth_as_issuer_cached",
+            }
+            assert new_cols.issubset(mcp_cols), new_cols - mcp_cols
+
+            # Index check on mcp_oauth_pending.
+            indexes = {ix["name"] for ix in inspector.get_indexes("mcp_oauth_pending")}
+            assert "idx_mcp_pending_created" in indexes
+        finally:
+            engine.dispose()
+
+    def test_normalizes_empty_headers_to_none(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+        """Streamable-http rows with NULL / '' / '{}' headers become
+        auth_type='none'; rows with non-empty headers stay 'static'.
+        Stdio rows always stay 'static' regardless of headers — the
+        column value is opaque when there is no HTTP transport."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "049-norm.db"
+        cfg = _alembic_cfg(db_path)
+
+        # Apply everything up to 048, seed rows, then apply 049.
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "048")
+
+        engine = sa.create_engine(f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+        try:
+            with engine.begin() as conn:
+                conn.execute(
+                    sa.text(
+                        """
+                        INSERT INTO mcp_servers (
+                            server_id, name, transport, command, args, url,
+                            headers, env, auto_approve, enabled, created_by,
+                            registry_name, registry_version, registry_meta,
+                            created, updated
+                        ) VALUES (
+                            :sid, :name, :transport, '', '[]',
+                            'https://x', :headers, '{}', 0, 1, '', NULL, '',
+                            '{}', '2026-05-04T11:00:00', '2026-05-04T11:00:00'
+                        )
+                        """
+                    ),
+                    [
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-empty-str",
+                            "name": "empty-str",
+                            "transport": "streamable-http",
+                            "headers": "",
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-empty-obj",
+                            "name": "empty-obj",
+                            "transport": "streamable-http",
+                            "headers": "{}",
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-with-headers",
+                            "name": "with-headers",
+                            "transport": "streamable-http",
+                            "headers": '{"Authorization":"Bearer x"}',
+                        },
+                        # Stdio rows must keep the 'static' default, even
+                        # though their headers are empty — auth_type is
+                        # opaque for stdio.
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-stdio-empty",
+                            "name": "stdio-empty",
+                            "transport": "stdio",
+                            "headers": "{}",
+                        },
+                        {
+                            "sid": "s-stdio-null",
+                            "name": "stdio-null",
+                            "transport": "stdio",
+                            "headers": "",
+                        },
+                    ],
+                )
+
+            command.upgrade(cfg, "049")
+
+            with engine.connect() as conn:
+                rows = dict(conn.execute(sa.text("SELECT name, auth_type FROM mcp_servers")).all())
+            assert rows["empty-str"] == "none"
+            assert rows["empty-obj"] == "none"
+            assert rows["with-headers"] == "static"
+            # Stdio rows must remain at the 'static' column default even
+            # when headers are empty — the migration only touches HTTP
+            # rows where auth_type is semantically meaningful.
+            assert rows["stdio-empty"] == "static"
+            assert rows["stdio-null"] == "static"
+        finally:
+            engine.dispose()
+
+    def test_full_chain_to_head(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
+        """Sanity: running ``upgrade head`` on a fresh DB yields the
+        same end-state column set as ``_schema.metadata``."""
+        db_path = tmp_path / "049-head.db"
+        cfg = _alembic_cfg(db_path)
+        command.upgrade(cfg, "head")
+
+        engine = sa.create_engine(f"sqlite:///{db_path}")
+        try:
+            from turnstone.core.storage._schema import mcp_servers
+
+            inspector = sa.inspect(engine)
+            actual = {c["name"] for c in inspector.get_columns("mcp_servers")}
+            expected = {c.name for c in mcp_servers.columns}
+            assert expected.issubset(actual), expected - actual
+        finally:
+            engine.dispose()

tests/test_model_definition_storage.py

@@ -212,3 +212,73 @@ class TestModelDefinitionStorage:
         m = db.get_model_definition(did)
         assert m is not None
         assert m["temperature"] is None
+
+    def test_reasoning_flags_default(self, db: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        """surface_persisted_reasoning defaults True; replay_reasoning_to_model defaults False."""
+        did = _make_id()
+        db.create_model_definition(definition_id=did, alias="reason-default", model="gpt-5")
+        m = db.get_model_definition(did)
+        assert m is not None
+        assert m["surface_persisted_reasoning"] is True
+        assert m["replay_reasoning_to_model"] is False
+
+    def test_create_with_explicit_reasoning_flags(self, db: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        did = _make_id()
+        db.create_model_definition(
+            definition_id=did,
+            alias="reason-explicit",
+            model="claude-opus-4-7",
+            surface_persisted_reasoning=False,
+            replay_reasoning_to_model=True,
+        )
+        m = db.get_model_definition(did)
+        assert m is not None
+        assert m["surface_persisted_reasoning"] is False
+        assert m["replay_reasoning_to_model"] is True
+        # Same values must round-trip via the alias lookup too.
+        m_alias = db.get_model_definition_by_alias("reason-explicit")
+        assert m_alias is not None
+        assert m_alias["surface_persisted_reasoning"] is False
+        assert m_alias["replay_reasoning_to_model"] is True
+
+    def test_update_surface_persisted_reasoning(self, db: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        did = _make_id()
+        db.create_model_definition(definition_id=did, alias="upd-persist", model="gpt-5")
+        ok = db.update_model_definition(did, surface_persisted_reasoning=False)
+        assert ok is True
+        m = db.get_model_definition(did)
+        assert m is not None
+        assert m["surface_persisted_reasoning"] is False
+        assert m["replay_reasoning_to_model"] is False  # untouched
+
+    def test_update_replay_reasoning_to_model(self, db: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        did = _make_id()
+        db.create_model_definition(definition_id=did, alias="upd-replay", model="gpt-5")
+        ok = db.update_model_definition(did, replay_reasoning_to_model=True)
+        assert ok is True
+        m = db.get_model_definition(did)
+        assert m is not None
+        assert m["surface_persisted_reasoning"] is True  # untouched
+        assert m["replay_reasoning_to_model"] is True
+
+    def test_list_returns_reasoning_flags(self, db: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+        db.create_model_definition(
+            definition_id=_make_id(),
+            alias="list-a",
+            model="gpt-5",
+            surface_persisted_reasoning=True,
+            replay_reasoning_to_model=False,
+        )
+        db.create_model_definition(
+            definition_id=_make_id(),
+            alias="list-b",
+            model="claude-opus-4-7",
+            surface_persisted_reasoning=False,
+            replay_reasoning_to_model=True,
+        )
+        models = db.list_model_definitions()
+        by_alias = {m["alias"]: m for m in models}
+        assert by_alias["list-a"]["surface_persisted_reasoning"] is True
+        assert by_alias["list-a"]["replay_reasoning_to_model"] is False
+        assert by_alias["list-b"]["surface_persisted_reasoning"] is False
+        assert by_alias["list-b"]["replay_reasoning_to_model"] is True

tests/test_model_registry.py

@@ -76,6 +76,23 @@ class TestModelConfig:
         assert cfg.temperature == 0.0
         assert cfg.temperature is not None
 
+    def test_reasoning_flags_default(self) -> None:
+        cfg = ModelConfig(alias="x", base_url="x", api_key="x", model="x")
+        assert cfg.surface_persisted_reasoning is True
+        assert cfg.replay_reasoning_to_model is False
+
+    def test_reasoning_flags_set(self) -> None:
+        cfg = ModelConfig(
+            alias="x",
+            base_url="x",
+            api_key="x",
+            model="x",
+            surface_persisted_reasoning=False,
+            replay_reasoning_to_model=True,
+        )
+        assert cfg.surface_persisted_reasoning is False
+        assert cfg.replay_reasoning_to_model is True
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # ModelRegistry
@@ -314,7 +331,11 @@ class TestLoadModelRegistry:
                 api_key="dummy",
                 model="local-model",
             )
-        assert reg.count == 2  # "openai" + "default"
+        # The CLI ``"default"`` shim is suppressed once ``[models.*]``
+        # populates configs — only the explicit alias survives.
+        assert reg.count == 1
+        assert reg.has_alias("openai")
+        assert not reg.has_alias("default")
         assert reg.default == "openai"
         _, model, _ = reg.resolve()
         assert model == "gpt-4o"
@@ -545,7 +566,12 @@ class TestLoadModelRegistryWithDB:
         assert cfg.source == "config"
 
     def test_db_only_models_coexist(self) -> None:
-        """DB models coexist alongside config.toml models."""
+        """DB models coexist alongside config.toml models.
+
+        The CLI ``"default"`` shim is suppressed when DB / config models
+        already populate the registry — see
+        ``test_cli_default_shim_skipped_when_db_models_present``.
+        """
         storage = _MockStorage(
             [
                 {
@@ -569,7 +595,7 @@ class TestLoadModelRegistryWithDB:
             reg = load_model_registry("http://x/v1", "x", "x", storage=storage)
         assert reg.has_alias("db-only")
         assert reg.has_alias("config-only")
-        assert reg.has_alias("default")
+        assert not reg.has_alias("default")
         assert reg.get_config("db-only").source == "db"
         assert reg.get_config("config-only").source == "config"
 
@@ -589,10 +615,12 @@ class TestLoadModelRegistryWithDB:
                 }
             ]
         )
+        # The CLI default shim is suppressed when the DB row populates
+        # configs, so only the DB-sourced alias exists here.
         with patch("turnstone.core.model_registry.load_config", return_value={}):
             reg = load_model_registry("http://x/v1", "x", "x", storage=storage)
         assert reg.get_config("from-db").source == "db"
-        assert reg.get_config("default").source == ""
+        assert not reg.has_alias("default")
 
     def test_disabled_db_models_excluded(self) -> None:
         """Disabled DB models are not loaded."""
@@ -686,6 +714,53 @@ class TestLoadModelRegistryWithDB:
         assert cfg.max_tokens is None
         assert cfg.reasoning_effort is None
 
+    def test_db_reasoning_flags_loaded(self) -> None:
+        """Per-model reasoning flags from DB are carried in ModelConfig."""
+        storage = _MockStorage(
+            [
+                {
+                    "alias": "anth-thinking",
+                    "model": "claude-opus-4-7",
+                    "provider": "anthropic",
+                    "base_url": "",
+                    "api_key": "sk-anth",
+                    "context_window": 200000,
+                    "capabilities": "{}",
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    "surface_persisted_reasoning": False,
+                    "replay_reasoning_to_model": True,
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+        with patch("turnstone.core.model_registry.load_config", return_value={}):
+            reg = load_model_registry("http://x/v1", "x", "x", storage=storage)
+        cfg = reg.get_config("anth-thinking")
+        assert cfg.surface_persisted_reasoning is False
+        assert cfg.replay_reasoning_to_model is True
+
+    def test_db_reasoning_flags_default_when_absent(self) -> None:
+        """Pre-052 rows without the columns degrade to dataclass defaults."""
+        storage = _MockStorage(
+            [
+                {
+                    "alias": "legacy-row",
+                    "model": "gpt-5",
+                    "provider": "openai",
+                    "base_url": "",
+                    "api_key": "",
+                    "context_window": 32768,
+                    "capabilities": "{}",
+                    "enabled": True,
+                    # surface_persisted_reasoning + replay_reasoning_to_model intentionally absent
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+        with patch("turnstone.core.model_registry.load_config", return_value={}):
+            reg = load_model_registry("http://x/v1", "x", "x", storage=storage)
+        cfg = reg.get_config("legacy-row")
+        assert cfg.surface_persisted_reasoning is True
+        assert cfg.replay_reasoning_to_model is False
+
     def test_db_default_alias_not_clobbered(self) -> None:
         """DB model with alias='default' is not overwritten by CLI args."""
         storage = _MockStorage(
@@ -770,16 +845,76 @@ class TestRegistryReload:
         assert reg.has_alias("b")
         assert reg.default == "b"
 
-    def test_reload_clears_clients(self) -> None:
-        models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m")}
+    def test_reload_keeps_clients_when_connection_target_unchanged(self) -> None:
+        """Selective teardown: a model edit that leaves base_url / api_key /
+        provider intact (e.g. admin tweaks the underlying ``model`` name or
+        ``temperature``) keeps the cached HTTP client warm — no need to
+        re-establish TLS+pool when the endpoint is the same."""
+        models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m1", provider="openai")}
         reg = ModelRegistry(models=models, default="a")
-        # Force client creation
         reg.get_client("a")
-        assert "a" in reg._clients
+        client_before = reg._clients["a"]
+        provider_before = reg.get_provider("a")
+
+        # Same endpoint (base_url, api_key, provider), only ``model`` changed.
+        new_models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m2", provider="openai")}
+        reg.reload(new_models, "a")
+
+        assert "a" in reg._clients
+        assert reg._clients["a"] is client_before
+        assert "a" in reg._providers
+        assert reg._providers["a"] is provider_before
+
+    def test_reload_drops_client_when_base_url_changes(self) -> None:
+        """A ``base_url`` change drops the cached client (different
+        endpoint = new connection) but keeps the cached provider —
+        ``LLMProvider`` is keyed only on the provider string, which
+        didn't change."""
+        models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m", provider="openai")}
+        reg = ModelRegistry(models=models, default="a")
+        reg.get_client("a")
+        provider_before = reg.get_provider("a")
+
+        new_models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://y/v1", "key", "m", provider="openai")}
+        reg.reload(new_models, "a")
 
-        # Reload with same models — clients should be cleared
-        reg.reload(dict(models), "a")
         assert "a" not in reg._clients
+        assert "a" in reg._providers
+        assert reg._providers["a"] is provider_before
+
+    def test_reload_drops_provider_when_provider_string_changes(self) -> None:
+        """A provider-type swap (e.g. openai → anthropic) drops both the
+        client AND the provider so the next resolve picks up the right
+        ``LLMProvider`` implementation against the new SDK."""
+        models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m", provider="openai")}
+        reg = ModelRegistry(models=models, default="a")
+        reg.get_client("a")
+        reg.get_provider("a")
+
+        new_models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m", provider="anthropic")}
+        reg.reload(new_models, "a")
+
+        assert "a" not in reg._clients
+        assert "a" not in reg._providers
+
+    def test_reload_drops_clients_for_removed_aliases(self) -> None:
+        """Aliases removed from the registry must release their cached
+        clients — otherwise a deleted endpoint's connection pool would
+        outlive the alias indefinitely."""
+        models = {
+            "a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m"),
+            "b": ModelConfig("b", "http://y/v1", "key", "m"),
+        }
+        reg = ModelRegistry(models=models, default="a")
+        reg.get_client("a")
+        reg.get_client("b")
+
+        # Drop "b" entirely.
+        new_models = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "http://x/v1", "key", "m")}
+        reg.reload(new_models, "a")
+
+        assert "a" in reg._clients  # unchanged endpoint, kept warm
+        assert "b" not in reg._clients
 
     def test_reload_validates_default(self) -> None:
         models_a = {"a": ModelConfig("a", "x", "x", "m")}
@@ -809,6 +944,8 @@ class _FakeUI:
         self.infos: list[str] = []
         self.errors: list[str] = []
 
+    def on_turn_start(self) -> None: ...
+    def on_turn_committed(self) -> None: ...
     def on_thinking_start(self) -> None: ...
     def on_thinking_stop(self) -> None: ...
     def on_reasoning_token(self, text: str) -> None: ...
@@ -1066,24 +1203,57 @@ class TestSessionAgentModel:
     def _captured_effort(captured: dict[str, Any]) -> str | None:
         """Pull reasoning_effort out of provider-specific shapes.
 
-        openai-compatible servers receive it via extra_body.chat_template_kwargs;
-        commercial providers receive it as a top-level kwarg.
+        Chat Completions delivers it as a top-level ``reasoning_effort`` kwarg
+        (when the model's caps permit it).  Operators who route reasoning_effort
+        through ``chat_template_kwargs`` (gpt-oss-style local templates) get
+        it inside ``extra_body.chat_template_kwargs``.
         """
+        if "reasoning_effort" in captured:
+            return captured["reasoning_effort"]
         eb = captured.get("extra_body") or {}
         ctk = eb.get("chat_template_kwargs") or {}
-        return ctk.get("reasoning_effort") or captured.get("reasoning_effort")
+        return ctk.get("reasoning_effort")
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _effort_caps() -> dict[str, Any]:
+        """Capabilities that allow Chat-Completions reasoning_effort to flow."""
+        return {
+            "reasoning_effort_values": [
+                "minimal",
+                "low",
+                "medium",
+                "high",
+                "max",
+            ],
+        }
 
     def _three_model_registry(self, **kwargs: Any) -> ModelRegistry:
+        caps = self._effort_caps()
         return ModelRegistry(
             models={
                 "main": ModelConfig(
-                    "main", "http://m/v1", "k", "main-model", provider="openai-compatible"
+                    "main",
+                    "http://m/v1",
+                    "k",
+                    "main-model",
+                    provider="openai-compatible",
+                    capabilities=dict(caps),
                 ),
                 "smart": ModelConfig(
-                    "smart", "http://s/v1", "k", "smart-model", provider="openai-compatible"
+                    "smart",
+                    "http://s/v1",
+                    "k",
+                    "smart-model",
+                    provider="openai-compatible",
+                    capabilities=dict(caps),
                 ),
                 "fast": ModelConfig(
-                    "fast", "http://f/v1", "k", "fast-model", provider="openai-compatible"
+                    "fast",
+                    "http://f/v1",
+                    "k",
+                    "fast-model",
+                    provider="openai-compatible",
+                    capabilities=dict(caps),
                 ),
             },
             default="main",
@@ -1189,6 +1359,45 @@ class TestSessionAgentModel:
         session._run_agent([{"role": "user", "content": "x"}], label="plan", agent_alias="fast")
         assert captured["model"] == "fast-model"
 
+    def test_session_fallback_inherits_primary_alias_for_caps(self) -> None:
+        """When _run_agent has no registry agent route, it must fall back to
+        the session's primary alias for capability and server_compat lookup —
+        otherwise per-model caps (reasoning_effort_values, server_compat) get
+        silently dropped on the agent path."""
+        reg = self._three_model_registry()  # no agent_model / plan_model set
+        session = _make_session(registry=reg, model_alias="main")
+        # Probe what _run_agent passes to _provider_extra_params and
+        # _resolve_capabilities by recording the model_alias on each call.
+        captured_extra_alias: list[str | None] = []
+        captured_resolve_alias: list[str | None] = []
+        original_extra = session._provider_extra_params
+        original_resolve = session._resolve_capabilities
+
+        def spy_extra(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+            captured_extra_alias.append(kwargs.get("model_alias"))
+            return original_extra(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        def spy_resolve(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+            # _resolve_capabilities(provider, model, alias)
+            alias = args[2] if len(args) >= 3 else kwargs.get("alias")
+            captured_resolve_alias.append(alias)
+            return original_resolve(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        session._provider_extra_params = spy_extra  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+        session._resolve_capabilities = spy_resolve  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+        self._capture_on(session.client)  # patch client.chat.completions.create
+        session._run_agent([{"role": "user", "content": "x"}], label="plan")
+
+        assert captured_extra_alias and captured_extra_alias[-1] == "main", (
+            f"agent fallback path did not inherit primary alias for extra_params: "
+            f"{captured_extra_alias!r}"
+        )
+        assert captured_resolve_alias and captured_resolve_alias[-1] == "main", (
+            f"agent fallback path did not inherit primary alias for caps: "
+            f"{captured_resolve_alias!r}"
+        )
+
     def test_invalid_alias_raises_in_run_agent(self) -> None:
         """Defence-in-depth: _prepare_* validates first, but _run_agent
         rejects unknown aliases too rather than silently falling back."""
@@ -1477,6 +1686,58 @@ class TestLoadModelRegistryDBOnly:
             reg = load_model_registry(model="", storage=storage)
         assert not reg.has_alias("default")
 
+    def test_cli_default_shim_skipped_when_db_models_present(self) -> None:
+        """An auto-detected ``--model`` does NOT synthesise a ``default``
+        alias when the DB already contributes models.
+
+        Regression for the silent bypass of ``model.task_alias`` /
+        ``model.plan_alias``: a synthesised ``default`` aliased to whatever
+        ``--base-url`` was at boot leaks into the LLM-visible alias list,
+        and the LLM picks it for ``task_agent(model="default")`` — which
+        then routes around the operator-configured per-role default.
+        """
+        storage = _MockStorage(
+            [
+                {
+                    "alias": "gh200",
+                    "model": "deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Flash",
+                    "provider": "openai",
+                    "base_url": "http://gh200:8000/v1",
+                    "api_key": "sk-gh200",
+                    "context_window": 1048576,
+                    "capabilities": "{}",
+                    "enabled": True,
+                }
+            ]
+        )
+        with patch("turnstone.core.model_registry.load_config", return_value={}):
+            reg = load_model_registry(
+                base_url="http://flatspark:8000/v1",
+                api_key="sk-flatspark",
+                model="qwen3.6-35B-A3B",  # populated by ``detect_model``
+                storage=storage,
+            )
+        assert reg.has_alias("gh200")
+        assert not reg.has_alias("default")
+
+    def test_cli_default_shim_skipped_when_config_models_present(self) -> None:
+        """Same shim suppression when only ``[models.*]`` populates configs."""
+        fake_cfg: dict[str, Any] = {
+            "models": {"local": {"model": "qwen3-32b"}},
+        }
+        with patch("turnstone.core.model_registry.load_config", return_value=fake_cfg):
+            reg = load_model_registry("http://x/v1", "x", "fallback-model")
+        assert reg.has_alias("local")
+        assert not reg.has_alias("default")
+
+    def test_cli_default_shim_still_fires_when_registry_empty(self) -> None:
+        """Single-model CLI mode (no DB, no config.toml [models.*]) keeps
+        the back-compat ``default`` alias."""
+        with patch("turnstone.core.model_registry.load_config", return_value={}):
+            reg = load_model_registry("http://x/v1", "x", "lone-model")
+        assert reg.has_alias("default")
+        assert reg.get_config("default").model == "lone-model"
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # server._effective_routing / _apply_routing_overrides

tests/test_models_changed_event.py

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+"""``models_changed`` SSE fanout coverage.
+
+The console pushes a ``models_changed`` cluster event whenever a model
+definition is created / updated / deleted / reloaded, or whenever a
+setting in :data:`turnstone.console.server._MODEL_AFFECTING_SETTING_KEYS`
+is updated or reset.  Connected browsers refetch ``/v1/api/models`` on
+receipt so the home composer dropdown + admin Models → Roles sub-tab
+reflect alias edits without a manual reload.
+
+These tests pin two contracts:
+
+- every model-definition CRUD path emits exactly one ``models_changed``
+  fanout (so the browser stays in sync with the DB);
+- settings PUT / DELETE only emit the fanout when the key is
+  model-affecting — unrelated keys (e.g. ``session.retention_days``)
+  must not trigger spurious dropdown re-renders across the cluster.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+import pytest
+from starlette.applications import Starlette
+from starlette.middleware import Middleware
+from starlette.routing import Route
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from tests._coord_test_helpers import _AuthMiddleware
+from turnstone.console.server import (
+    _MODEL_AFFECTING_SETTING_KEYS,
+    admin_create_model_definition,
+    admin_delete_model_definition,
+    admin_delete_setting,
+    admin_model_reload,
+    admin_update_model_definition,
+    admin_update_setting,
+)
+from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def storage(tmp_path: Any) -> SQLiteBackend:
+    return SQLiteBackend(str(tmp_path / "models_changed.db"))
+
+
+def _seed(storage: SQLiteBackend, *, definition_id: str, alias: str) -> None:
+    storage.create_model_definition(
+        definition_id=definition_id,
+        alias=alias,
+        model="model-x",
+        provider="openai-compatible",
+        base_url="http://localhost:8000/v1",
+        api_key="sk-test",
+        context_window=8192,
+        capabilities="{}",
+        enabled=True,
+        created_by="admin",
+    )
+
+
+def _make_client(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> tuple[TestClient, MagicMock]:
+    """Build a TestClient + return the stub collector for assertion.
+
+    Wires the four model-definition CRUD/reload routes plus the two
+    settings mutation routes.  Collector is a MagicMock so each
+    ``emit_models_changed`` call lands as a recorded call without
+    spinning up the full SSE listener queue.
+    """
+    app = Starlette(
+        routes=[
+            Route(
+                "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions",
+                admin_create_model_definition,
+                methods=["POST"],
+            ),
+            Route(
+                "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions/reload",
+                admin_model_reload,
+                methods=["POST"],
+            ),
+            Route(
+                "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions/{definition_id}",
+                admin_update_model_definition,
+                methods=["PUT"],
+            ),
+            Route(
+                "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions/{definition_id}",
+                admin_delete_model_definition,
+                methods=["DELETE"],
+            ),
+            Route(
+                "/v1/api/admin/settings/{key:path}",
+                admin_update_setting,
+                methods=["PUT"],
+            ),
+            Route(
+                "/v1/api/admin/settings/{key:path}",
+                admin_delete_setting,
+                methods=["DELETE"],
+            ),
+        ],
+        middleware=[Middleware(_AuthMiddleware)],
+    )
+    app.state.auth_storage = storage
+    app.state.coord_registry = None  # CRUD endpoints handle this gracefully
+    collector = MagicMock()
+    collector.get_all_nodes.return_value = []
+    app.state.collector = collector
+    app.state.proxy_client = MagicMock()
+    app.state.config_store = MagicMock()
+    client = TestClient(app)
+    client.headers.update(
+        {
+            "X-Test-User": "admin",
+            "X-Test-Perms": "admin.models,admin.settings",
+        }
+    )
+    return client, collector
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Model-definition CRUD endpoints fan out ``models_changed``
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_create_emits_models_changed(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    resp = client.post(
+        "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions",
+        json={
+            "alias": "fast",
+            "model": "fast-model",
+            "provider": "openai-compatible",
+            "base_url": "http://localhost:9000/v1",
+            "api_key": "sk-x",
+            "context_window": 4096,
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 1
+
+
+def test_update_emits_models_changed(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local")
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    resp = client.put(
+        "/v1/api/admin/model-definitions/m1",
+        json={"model": "swapped-model"},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 1
+
+
+def test_update_with_empty_body_does_not_emit(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    """Empty-body PUT writes no rows + skips the registry refresh — no
+    SSE fanout either, since nothing actually changed."""
+    _seed(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local")
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    resp = client.put("/v1/api/admin/model-definitions/m1", json={})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 0
+
+
+def test_delete_emits_models_changed(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local")
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    resp = client.delete("/v1/api/admin/model-definitions/m1")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 1
+
+
+def test_reload_emits_models_changed(storage: SQLiteBackend) -> None:
+    _seed(storage, definition_id="m1", alias="local")
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    resp = client.post("/v1/api/admin/model-definitions/reload")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 1
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Settings PUT / DELETE only emit for model-affecting keys
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+# Pinned snapshot of the role-related keys we expect the allowlist to
+# cover today.  The frozenset itself is asserted further down so a
+# stray addition doesn't silently bypass coverage.
+_EXPECTED_AFFECTING_KEYS = frozenset(
+    {
+        "model.default_alias",
+        "model.plan_alias",
+        "model.plan_effort",
+        "model.task_alias",
+        "model.task_effort",
+        "coordinator.model_alias",
+        "coordinator.reasoning_effort",
+        "judge.model",
+        "channels.default_model_alias",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def _value_for_key(key: str) -> str:
+    """Return a registry-valid value for ``key``.
+
+    ``reasoning_effort`` keys have a fixed choice list; alias-shaped
+    keys accept arbitrary strings.  Avoids per-key custom payloads.
+    """
+    if (
+        key.endswith("reasoning_effort")
+        or key.endswith("plan_effort")
+        or key.endswith("task_effort")
+    ):
+        return "low"
+    return "anything"
+
+
+def test_affecting_keys_set_matches_expected() -> None:
+    """Lock in the allowlist so an unintentional removal is caught."""
+    assert _MODEL_AFFECTING_SETTING_KEYS == _EXPECTED_AFFECTING_KEYS
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("key", sorted(_EXPECTED_AFFECTING_KEYS))
+def test_settings_put_emits_for_model_affecting_key(storage: SQLiteBackend, key: str) -> None:
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    resp = client.put(
+        f"/v1/api/admin/settings/{key}",
+        json={"value": _value_for_key(key)},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("key", sorted(_EXPECTED_AFFECTING_KEYS))
+def test_settings_delete_emits_for_model_affecting_key(storage: SQLiteBackend, key: str) -> None:
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    # Seed a row so DELETE has something to remove (otherwise 404).
+    client.put(
+        f"/v1/api/admin/settings/{key}",
+        json={"value": _value_for_key(key)},
+    )
+    collector.emit_models_changed.reset_mock()
+    resp = client.delete(f"/v1/api/admin/settings/{key}")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 1
+
+
+def test_settings_put_does_not_emit_for_unrelated_key(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    """Updating a non-model setting (here: a session retention knob)
+    must not trigger a cluster-wide dropdown refresh."""
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    resp = client.put(
+        "/v1/api/admin/settings/session.retention_days",
+        json={"value": 30},
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 0
+
+
+def test_settings_delete_does_not_emit_for_unrelated_key(
+    storage: SQLiteBackend,
+) -> None:
+    client, collector = _make_client(storage)
+    client.put(
+        "/v1/api/admin/settings/session.retention_days",
+        json={"value": 30},
+    )
+    collector.emit_models_changed.reset_mock()
+    resp = client.delete("/v1/api/admin/settings/session.retention_days")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert collector.emit_models_changed.call_count == 0

tests/test_notify_dispatcher.py

@@ -0,0 +1,400 @@
+"""Tests for the console-side ``NotifyDispatcher``.
+
+Exercises the dispatcher against the SQLite synthetic-sweep path so the
+suite runs without a Postgres dependency.  The PG path is shaped the
+same way (same handler invocation semantics) — the only difference is
+the underlying stream's wake-up source, which is covered separately in
+``test_storage_notify.py::TestPostgresNotify``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import threading
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def dispatcher_factory(storage):
+    """Yield a factory that constructs + tracks dispatchers for teardown."""
+    from turnstone.console.notify_dispatcher import NotifyDispatcher
+
+    created: list[NotifyDispatcher] = []
+
+    def _make(*, channels: list[str]) -> NotifyDispatcher:
+        d = NotifyDispatcher(storage, channels=channels)
+        created.append(d)
+        return d
+
+    yield _make
+
+    for d in created:
+        d.stop(timeout=2.0)
+
+
+def _wait_for(predicate, deadline_sec: float = 3.0) -> bool:
+    """Poll ``predicate`` until True or timeout.  Returns bool."""
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + deadline_sec
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if predicate():
+            return True
+        time.sleep(0.02)
+    return False
+
+
+def _start_ready(d, *, timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
+    """``d.start()`` + assert the listener is actually listening.
+
+    Closes the start-vs-notify race for backends where ``storage.listen``
+    blocks on the network (Postgres ``LISTEN`` over a fresh psycopg
+    connection): without the sync, a same-thread ``storage.notify`` can
+    fire before the LISTEN registers and the notification is lost.
+    """
+    d.start()
+    if not d.wait_until_ready(timeout=timeout):
+        msg = f"dispatcher listener did not open within {timeout}s"
+        raise AssertionError(msg)
+
+
+class TestSubscribe:
+    def test_subscribe_registers_handler(self, dispatcher_factory, storage):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        seen: list = []
+        d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: seen.append(n))
+        _start_ready(d)
+        # Fire a notify via the storage layer — dispatcher delivers to handler.
+        storage.notify("alpha", "hello")
+        assert _wait_for(lambda: any(n.payload == "hello" for n in seen))
+
+    def test_subscribe_undeclared_channel_raises(self, dispatcher_factory):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not declared"):
+            d.subscribe("beta", lambda n: None)
+
+    def test_subscribe_returns_unsubscribe_callable(self, dispatcher_factory, storage):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        seen: list = []
+        unsub = d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: seen.append(n))
+        _start_ready(d)
+        storage.notify("alpha", "first")
+        assert _wait_for(lambda: any(n.payload == "first" for n in seen))
+        unsub()
+        # After unsubscribe, the handler no longer fires.  Drain old hits
+        # so the next notify-vs-handler-count check is unambiguous.
+        seen.clear()
+        storage.notify("alpha", "second")
+        # Give the dispatcher a beat to deliver if it were going to.
+        time.sleep(0.2)
+        assert not any(n.payload == "second" for n in seen)
+
+    def test_construction_requires_at_least_one_channel(self, storage):
+        from turnstone.console.notify_dispatcher import NotifyDispatcher
+
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="at least one"):
+            NotifyDispatcher(storage, channels=[])
+
+    def test_duplicate_channels_deduplicated(self, dispatcher_factory):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha", "alpha", "beta"])
+        assert d.channels == ["alpha", "beta"]
+
+
+class TestDispatch:
+    def test_multiple_handlers_each_invoked(self, dispatcher_factory, storage):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        seen_a: list = []
+        seen_b: list = []
+        d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: seen_a.append(n))
+        d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: seen_b.append(n))
+        _start_ready(d)
+        storage.notify("alpha", "shared")
+        assert _wait_for(lambda: seen_a and seen_b)
+        assert seen_a[0].payload == "shared"
+        assert seen_b[0].payload == "shared"
+
+    def test_handler_exception_does_not_break_dispatch(self, dispatcher_factory, storage):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        survived: list = []
+
+        def _broken(_n):
+            msg = "boom"
+            raise RuntimeError(msg)
+
+        d.subscribe("alpha", _broken)
+        d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: survived.append(n))
+        _start_ready(d)
+        storage.notify("alpha", "after_broken")
+        # The second handler runs even though the first raised.
+        assert _wait_for(lambda: any(n.payload == "after_broken" for n in survived))
+
+    def test_dispatch_filters_by_channel(self, dispatcher_factory, storage):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha", "beta"])
+        seen_a: list = []
+        seen_b: list = []
+        d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: seen_a.append(n))
+        d.subscribe("beta", lambda n: seen_b.append(n))
+        _start_ready(d)
+        storage.notify("alpha", "for_a")
+        storage.notify("beta", "for_b")
+        assert _wait_for(lambda: seen_a and seen_b)
+        assert all(n.payload == "for_a" for n in seen_a)
+        assert all(n.payload == "for_b" for n in seen_b)
+
+
+class TestReconnect:
+    """Reconnect + synthetic ``reconcile`` notify on stream-open success.
+
+    Uses a stub storage that owns its own listen stream so the test can
+    drive a controlled stream-error sequence — the SQLite path can't
+    raise :class:`NotifyConnectionError`, and the PG path requires a
+    real database outage to exercise this code, neither of which fits a
+    unit test.  The dispatcher's threading and reconcile-pending logic
+    are storage-agnostic — the dispatcher sees the same
+    :class:`NotifyStream` Protocol regardless of backend.
+    """
+
+    def test_reconcile_fires_after_reopen_not_before(self):
+        from turnstone.console.notify_dispatcher import NotifyDispatcher
+        from turnstone.core.storage._notify import Notify, NotifyConnectionError
+
+        # State machine: open -> first poll raises NotifyConnectionError
+        # -> dispatcher waits backoff then reopens -> second open's first
+        # poll blocks forever (test stops the dispatcher before then).
+        # The fix: synthetic reconcile fires AFTER the second open
+        # succeeds, not after the first open fails.
+        sequence: list[str] = []
+        reopen_event = threading.Event()
+
+        class _StubStream:
+            def __init__(self, fail_first_poll: bool):
+                self._fail = fail_first_poll
+                self._closed = False
+
+            def poll(self, _timeout):
+                if self._closed:
+                    return []
+                if self._fail:
+                    self._fail = False
+                    sequence.append("poll_raises")
+                    msg = "fake-disconnect"
+                    raise NotifyConnectionError(msg)
+                sequence.append("poll_returns")
+                # Block until close to simulate a quiet steady-state.
+                time.sleep(0.5)
+                return []
+
+            def close(self):
+                self._closed = True
+
+        class _StubStorage:
+            def __init__(self):
+                self._open_count = 0
+
+            def listen(self, _channels):
+                import contextlib as _contextlib
+
+                @_contextlib.contextmanager
+                def _cm():
+                    self._open_count += 1
+                    sequence.append(f"open_{self._open_count}")
+                    if self._open_count == 2:
+                        reopen_event.set()
+                    stream = _StubStream(fail_first_poll=(self._open_count == 1))
+                    try:
+                        yield stream
+                    finally:
+                        stream.close()
+
+                return _cm()
+
+        # Speed up backoff so the reopen happens promptly in the test.
+        import turnstone.console.notify_dispatcher as nd_mod
+
+        original_backoff = nd_mod._RECONNECT_BACKOFF_INITIAL
+        nd_mod._RECONNECT_BACKOFF_INITIAL = 0.05
+        try:
+            d = NotifyDispatcher(_StubStorage(), channels=["alpha"])
+            got: list[Notify] = []
+            d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: got.append(n))
+            d.start()
+            try:
+                # Wait for the second open (post-reconnect).
+                assert reopen_event.wait(3.0), "dispatcher did not reopen after disconnect"
+                # Reconcile should be delivered shortly after the reopen.
+                deadline = time.monotonic() + 2.0
+                while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+                    if any(n.payload == "reconcile" for n in got):
+                        break
+                    time.sleep(0.02)
+                assert any(n.payload == "reconcile" for n in got), (
+                    f"no reconcile delivered; sequence={sequence}, got={got}"
+                )
+                # The reconcile must NOT fire before the second open —
+                # if it did, the index of 'open_2' in sequence would
+                # come after any reconcile-emitting work.  Check ordering:
+                # 'open_1' < 'poll_raises' < 'open_2' (synthesize happens
+                # inside the with-block of the SECOND open).
+                ix_open_1 = sequence.index("open_1")
+                ix_raises = sequence.index("poll_raises")
+                ix_open_2 = sequence.index("open_2")
+                assert ix_open_1 < ix_raises < ix_open_2
+            finally:
+                d.stop(timeout=2.0)
+        finally:
+            nd_mod._RECONNECT_BACKOFF_INITIAL = original_backoff
+
+    def test_generic_exception_path_also_synthesizes_reconcile(self):
+        """Exceptions thrown during ``listen()`` (not via stream.poll) still trigger reconcile.
+
+        Models the ``psycopg.connect()`` / initial ``LISTEN`` failure
+        shape, which doesn't go through the stream's exception
+        translator and would hit the generic ``except Exception``
+        branch.  Pre-fix, that branch emitted no reconcile.
+        """
+        from turnstone.console.notify_dispatcher import NotifyDispatcher
+
+        reopen_event = threading.Event()
+
+        class _StubStream:
+            def __init__(self):
+                self._closed = False
+
+            def poll(self, _timeout):
+                if self._closed:
+                    return []
+                time.sleep(0.5)
+                return []
+
+            def close(self):
+                self._closed = True
+
+        class _StubStorage:
+            def __init__(self):
+                self._open_count = 0
+
+            def listen(self, _channels):
+                import contextlib as _contextlib
+
+                self._open_count += 1
+                if self._open_count == 1:
+                    # First open raises a generic exception (e.g.
+                    # ``psycopg.OperationalError`` from a failed connect)
+                    # — landing in the dispatcher's generic except branch.
+                    msg = "fake-connect-failure"
+                    raise RuntimeError(msg)
+
+                @_contextlib.contextmanager
+                def _cm():
+                    reopen_event.set()
+                    stream = _StubStream()
+                    try:
+                        yield stream
+                    finally:
+                        stream.close()
+
+                return _cm()
+
+        import turnstone.console.notify_dispatcher as nd_mod
+
+        original_backoff = nd_mod._RECONNECT_BACKOFF_INITIAL
+        nd_mod._RECONNECT_BACKOFF_INITIAL = 0.05
+        try:
+            d = NotifyDispatcher(_StubStorage(), channels=["alpha"])
+            got: list = []
+            d.subscribe("alpha", lambda n: got.append(n))
+            d.start()
+            try:
+                assert reopen_event.wait(3.0), "dispatcher did not reopen after generic exception"
+                deadline = time.monotonic() + 2.0
+                while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+                    if any(n.payload == "reconcile" for n in got):
+                        break
+                    time.sleep(0.02)
+                assert any(n.payload == "reconcile" for n in got), (
+                    "no reconcile delivered after generic-exception recovery"
+                )
+            finally:
+                d.stop(timeout=2.0)
+        finally:
+            nd_mod._RECONNECT_BACKOFF_INITIAL = original_backoff
+
+
+class TestCoalescing:
+    """Same-channel burst collapses to one handler invocation per batch."""
+
+    def test_burst_coalesces_to_one_handler_call_per_channel(self, dispatcher_factory, storage):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        invocations: list = []
+        # Slow handler to ensure all bursts queue up before the first
+        # call returns — gives the dispatch loop time to coalesce.
+        coalesce_gate = threading.Event()
+
+        def _slow_handler(n):
+            invocations.append(n)
+            coalesce_gate.wait(0.05)
+
+        d.subscribe("alpha", _slow_handler)
+        _start_ready(d)
+        # Burst of 10 notifies on the same channel — should coalesce
+        # down to many fewer handler invocations.
+        for i in range(10):
+            storage.notify("alpha", str(i))
+        # Wait until the dispatch settles (handler is called at least once
+        # and the queue empties).
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + 2.0
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            if invocations and d._dispatch_queue.empty():
+                time.sleep(0.1)  # allow any final coalesced call to land
+                break
+            time.sleep(0.02)
+        coalesce_gate.set()
+        # At least one handler call; well fewer than 10 (coalescing
+        # collapsed the burst).  Exact count depends on timing — typical
+        # is 1-2 invocations per burst on a fast machine.
+        assert invocations, "handler never fired"
+        assert len(invocations) < 10, (
+            f"expected coalescing to collapse burst of 10; got {len(invocations)} invocations"
+        )
+
+
+class TestLifecycle:
+    def test_start_is_idempotent(self, dispatcher_factory):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        d.start()
+        d.start()  # No-op, no thread doubling
+        # Single listener + single dispatch thread are spawned regardless.
+        # Inspect by name so we don't depend on the exact thread count of
+        # the test runner.
+        listener_threads = [
+            t for t in threading.enumerate() if t.name == "notify-dispatcher-listener"
+        ]
+        dispatch_threads = [
+            t for t in threading.enumerate() if t.name == "notify-dispatcher-dispatch"
+        ]
+        assert len(listener_threads) == 1
+        assert len(dispatch_threads) == 1
+
+    def test_stop_is_idempotent(self, dispatcher_factory):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        d.start()
+        d.stop(timeout=2.0)
+        d.stop(timeout=2.0)  # No-op, no error
+
+    def test_stop_without_start_is_noop(self, dispatcher_factory):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        d.stop(timeout=1.0)  # No-op, no thread to join
+
+    def test_stop_joins_threads(self, dispatcher_factory):
+        d = dispatcher_factory(channels=["alpha"])
+        d.start()
+        # Capture thread references then stop and assert they exited.
+        threads_before = [
+            t
+            for t in threading.enumerate()
+            if t.name in {"notify-dispatcher-listener", "notify-dispatcher-dispatch"}
+        ]
+        assert threads_before
+        d.stop(timeout=3.0)
+        time.sleep(0.05)
+        for t in threads_before:
+            assert not t.is_alive(), f"{t.name} still alive after stop"

tests/test_nudge_queue.py

@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+"""Unit tests for :class:`NudgeQueue`."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.nudge_queue import TOOL_DRAIN, USER_DRAIN, NudgeQueue
+
+
+class TestEnqueueDrain:
+    def test_enqueue_drain_fifo_order(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "any")
+        # Drain everything regardless of channel — preserves insertion order.
+        out = q.drain({"user", "tool", "any"})
+        # Drain returns ``(nudge_type, text, metadata)``; producers
+        # without ``metadata`` see ``None`` in the third slot.
+        assert out == [("a", "1", None), ("b", "2", None), ("c", "3", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_drain_filter_keeps_non_matching(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "x", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "y", "tool")
+        # Drain only user → tool entry stays.
+        out = q.drain(USER_DRAIN)
+        assert out == [("a", "x", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 1
+        # Now drain tool — gets the remaining entry.
+        out = q.drain(TOOL_DRAIN)
+        assert out == [("b", "y", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_any_channel_drains_on_either_seam(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("c", "z", "any")
+        # User-seam drain pulls "any".
+        assert q.drain(USER_DRAIN) == [("c", "z", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+        # Re-enqueue and prove tool-seam also drains "any".
+        q.enqueue("d", "w", "any")
+        assert q.drain(TOOL_DRAIN) == [("d", "w", None)]
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_drain_empty_filter_no_op(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        # Empty filter drains nothing.
+        assert q.drain(set()) == []
+        assert len(q) == 1
+
+    def test_drain_empty_queue_returns_empty_list(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        # Fast-path: no items → no kept-deque allocation, just `[]`.
+        assert q.drain(USER_DRAIN) == []
+        assert q.drain({"user", "tool", "any"}) == []
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_drain_preserves_order_across_partial_drain(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "user")
+        q.enqueue("d", "4", "tool")
+        # Drain user — should get "a" then "c" in order; "b","d" stay.
+        assert q.drain({"user"}) == [("a", "1", None), ("c", "3", None)]
+        # Tool drain follows insertion order on remaining.
+        assert q.drain({"tool"}) == [("b", "2", None), ("d", "4", None)]
+
+
+class TestLenAndClear:
+    def test_len_does_not_mutate(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        assert len(q) == 1
+        assert len(q) == 1  # second call still 1; not consumed
+        assert q.pending() == [("a", "1")]
+
+    def test_len_empty_is_zero(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_clear_returns_count(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.clear() == 0
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "any")
+        assert q.clear() == 3
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_clear_empty_returns_zero(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.clear() == 0
+
+
+class TestDropOldestByType:
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_removes_earliest_match(self):
+        """Drop the FIRST entry of the matching type; later matches stay."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("other", "first", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "older", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "newer", "any")
+        # "older" is the earliest target — drop it.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is True
+        assert q.pending() == [("other", "first"), ("target", "newer")]
+
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_no_match_returns_false(self):
+        """Empty queue and unmatched-type cases both return False."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        # Empty.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is False
+        # Non-matching items only.
+        q.enqueue("other", "1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("other", "2", "tool")
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is False
+        # Queue is unaffected.
+        assert q.pending() == [("other", "1"), ("other", "2")]
+
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_only_drops_one(self):
+        """Multiple matching entries → only the first is removed."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "2", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "3", "any")
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target") is True
+        assert q.pending() == [("target", "2"), ("target", "3")]
+
+    def test_drop_oldest_by_type_channel_filter(self):
+        """With ``channel`` set, drop walks only that channel.  Pairs with
+        :meth:`count_by_type(..., channel=...)` so producer-side soft caps
+        operate on a consistent entry set.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "user-1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("target", "any-1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "any-2", "any")
+        # Drop the oldest "any"-channel target — leaves the user one
+        # untouched even though it's earlier in insertion order.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target", channel="any") is True
+        assert q.pending() == [
+            ("target", "user-1"),
+            ("target", "any-2"),
+        ]
+        # And a channel with no matches returns False without touching
+        # the queue.
+        assert q.drop_oldest_by_type("target", channel="tool") is False
+        assert q.pending() == [
+            ("target", "user-1"),
+            ("target", "any-2"),
+        ]
+
+
+class TestCapAtOrDropOldest:
+    def test_below_cap_no_drop(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(3):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"t-{i}", "any")
+        # 3 entries, cap=5 → no drop.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 5, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 3
+
+    def test_at_cap_drops_oldest(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(5):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"t-{i}", "any")
+        # 5 entries, cap=5 → drop the oldest ("t-0"), leaving 4.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 5, channel="any") is True
+        remaining = q.pending()
+        assert ("target", "t-0") not in remaining
+        assert len(remaining) == 4
+        assert remaining[0] == ("target", "t-1")  # FIFO drop-oldest preserved
+
+    def test_above_cap_drops_only_one(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(7):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"t-{i}", "any")
+        # 7 entries, cap=5 → drop only ONE per call (soft-cap regulates over time).
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 5, channel="any") is True
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 6
+
+    def test_channel_filter_respected(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(3):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"any-{i}", "any")
+        for i in range(3):
+            q.enqueue("target", f"user-{i}", "user")
+        # 3 "any"-channel entries; cap=3 on channel="any" → drop oldest "any" only.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 3, channel="any") is True
+        # User-channel entries untouched.
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="user") == 3
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="any") == 2
+
+    def test_other_types_ignored(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        for i in range(5):
+            q.enqueue("other", f"o-{i}", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "t-0", "any")
+        # Only one "target" entry; cap=1 on "target" → drop it.  "other"
+        # entries are untouched even though queue holds 6 total.
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 1, channel="any") is True
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 0
+        assert q.count_by_type("other") == 5
+
+    def test_zero_or_negative_cap_no_op(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "t-0", "any")
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 0, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", -1, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 1
+
+    def test_no_match_returns_false(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("other", "o-0", "any")
+        assert q.cap_at_or_drop_oldest("target", 1, channel="any") is False
+        assert q.count_by_type("other") == 1
+
+
+class TestCountByType:
+    def test_count_by_type_no_channel(self):
+        """Count across all channels with ``channel=None``."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("other", "x", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "2", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "3", "tool")
+        assert q.count_by_type("target") == 3
+        assert q.count_by_type("other") == 1
+        assert q.count_by_type("missing") == 0
+
+    def test_count_by_type_with_channel_filter(self):
+        """Filter narrows the count to one channel — used by producer-side
+        soft caps that pair with ``drop_oldest_by_type(..., channel=...)``.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("target", "u-1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("target", "a-1", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "a-2", "any")
+        q.enqueue("target", "t-1", "tool")
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="any") == 2
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="user") == 1
+        assert q.count_by_type("target", channel="tool") == 1
+
+    def test_count_by_type_empty_queue(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.count_by_type("anything") == 0
+        assert q.count_by_type("anything", channel="any") == 0
+
+
+class TestPending:
+    def test_pending_no_filter_returns_all_in_order(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "any")
+        # All three, in insertion order, as (nudge_type, text) tuples.
+        assert q.pending() == [("a", "1"), ("b", "2"), ("c", "3")]
+
+    def test_pending_channel_filter(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("c", "3", "user")
+        q.enqueue("d", "4", "any")
+        assert q.pending("user") == [("a", "1"), ("c", "3")]
+        assert q.pending("tool") == [("b", "2")]
+        assert q.pending("any") == [("d", "4")]
+
+    def test_pending_does_not_mutate(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        # Two pending calls return same content; nothing consumed.
+        first = q.pending()
+        second = q.pending()
+        assert first == second
+        assert len(q) == 2
+
+
+class TestMetadata:
+    """Producer-supplied ``metadata`` rides alongside ``(type, text)`` on
+    drain.  Today only ``watch_triggered`` populates it; the wire shape
+    accommodates future producers (e.g. structured tool_error context)
+    without another schema bump.
+    """
+
+    def test_drain_returns_metadata_when_set(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        meta = {"watch_name": "w1", "command": "ls", "poll_count": 2}
+        q.enqueue("watch_triggered", "$ ls\nfile.txt", "any", metadata=meta)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [("watch_triggered", "$ ls\nfile.txt", meta)]
+
+    def test_drain_returns_none_when_metadata_unset(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("idle_children", "kids", "any")  # no metadata kwarg
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [("idle_children", "kids", None)]
+
+    def test_pending_with_metadata_projects_third_field(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("watch_triggered", "out", "any", metadata={"watch_name": "w"})
+        snapshot = q.pending_with_metadata()
+        assert snapshot == [
+            ("a", "1", None),
+            ("watch_triggered", "out", {"watch_name": "w"}),
+        ]
+        # ``pending`` (without metadata) keeps the legacy 2-tuple shape.
+        assert q.pending() == [("a", "1"), ("watch_triggered", "out")]
+
+    def test_metadata_survives_partial_drain(self):
+        """A ``user``-channel drain leaves an unaffected ``tool``-channel
+        entry — its metadata must still be present on the next drain."""
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("user_thing", "u", "user")
+        q.enqueue("watch_triggered", "w-out", "tool", metadata={"watch_name": "w1"})
+        # User drain doesn't touch the tool entry.
+        assert q.drain({"user"}) == [("user_thing", "u", None)]
+        # Tool drain still has the metadata.
+        assert q.drain({"tool"}) == [
+            ("watch_triggered", "w-out", {"watch_name": "w1"}),
+        ]
+
+    def test_metadata_with_valid_until_predicate(self):
+        """Metadata + ``valid_until`` co-exist on the same entry; the
+        predicate gate runs as before, and on a True result the metadata
+        rides the drained tuple.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue(
+            "watch_triggered",
+            "w-out",
+            "any",
+            valid_until=lambda: True,
+            metadata={"watch_name": "w1", "is_final": True},
+        )
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [
+            ("watch_triggered", "w-out", {"watch_name": "w1", "is_final": True}),
+        ]
+
+
+class TestHasPending:
+    def test_has_pending_returns_false_on_empty_queue(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        assert q.has_pending({"user", "any"}) is False
+        assert q.has_pending({"tool"}) is False
+
+    def test_has_pending_short_circuits_on_first_match(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "user")
+        # First entry doesn't match, second does — true after walking 2.
+        assert q.has_pending({"user"}) is True
+
+    def test_has_pending_returns_false_when_no_match(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "tool")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        assert q.has_pending({"user", "any"}) is False
+
+    def test_has_pending_matches_any_channel(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any")
+        # USER_DRAIN-shaped filter pulls "any" entries.
+        assert q.has_pending(USER_DRAIN) is True
+        # TOOL_DRAIN-shaped filter also pulls "any" entries.
+        assert q.has_pending(TOOL_DRAIN) is True
+
+    def test_has_pending_does_not_mutate(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "user")
+        q.enqueue("b", "2", "tool")
+        before = q.pending()
+        q.has_pending({"user"})
+        q.has_pending({"tool"})
+        q.has_pending(set())
+        assert q.pending() == before
+
+
+class TestValidation:
+    def test_invalid_channel_raises(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="channel"):
+            q.enqueue("a", "1", "wake")  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+            q.enqueue("b", "2", "")  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        # Queue is unaffected by the failed enqueues.
+        assert len(q) == 0
+
+    def test_channel_is_required(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        # No default — caller MUST pick a seam consciously.
+        with pytest.raises(TypeError):
+            q.enqueue("a", "1")  # type: ignore[call-arg]
+
+
+class TestValidUntil:
+    """``valid_until`` predicate: drain re-checks freshness.  Falsy
+    predicates drop the entry without delivery and log at ``info``
+    (normal lifecycle outcome); raising predicates drop the entry and
+    log at ``warning`` with ``exc_info`` (misbehaving predicate).
+    """
+
+    def test_valid_until_true_delivers(self):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any", valid_until=lambda: True)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == [("a", "1", None)]
+
+    def test_valid_until_false_drops_with_info_log(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any", valid_until=lambda: False)
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.INFO, logger="turnstone.core.nudge_queue"):
+            out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == []
+        # Already removed from queue (drain partition removes BEFORE
+        # predicate check — falsy doesn't return to queue).
+        assert len(q) == 0
+        # The drop emits a structured info record so a wiring
+        # regression (a predicate that always returns False) is still
+        # observable, without spamming ``warning`` for the routine
+        # lifecycle case where ``valid_until`` is doing its job.
+        # structlog renders the event name + extras into ``msg`` as a
+        # single rendered string, so substring-match like the
+        # ``watch_dispatch.queue_full`` assertion in
+        # tests/test_watch_dispatch.py.
+        drops = [r for r in caplog.records if "nudge_queue.predicate_dropped" in r.getMessage()]
+        assert len(drops) == 1
+        assert drops[0].levelno == logging.INFO
+        assert "predicate_false" in drops[0].getMessage()
+        assert "'nudge_type': 'a'" in drops[0].getMessage()
+        assert "'channel': 'any'" in drops[0].getMessage()
+        assert "'text_len': 1" in drops[0].getMessage()
+
+    def test_valid_until_exception_drops_with_warning(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture):
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+
+        def boom() -> bool:
+            raise RuntimeError("predicate crash")
+
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any", valid_until=boom)
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="turnstone.core.nudge_queue"):
+            out = q.drain({"any"})
+        assert out == []
+        # Crash-on-predicate is treated as "no longer valid" — drop, not propagate.
+        assert len(q) == 0
+        # Stays at ``warning`` (with ``exc_info``) because a raising
+        # predicate is a bug, not a normal lifecycle outcome.
+        drops = [r for r in caplog.records if "nudge_queue.predicate_dropped" in r.getMessage()]
+        assert len(drops) == 1
+        assert drops[0].levelno == logging.WARNING
+        rendered = drops[0].getMessage()
+        assert "predicate_raised" in rendered
+        assert "RuntimeError" in rendered
+        assert "predicate crash" in rendered
+
+    def test_valid_until_evaluated_outside_lock(self):
+        """The predicate may do non-trivial work (e.g. storage I/O)
+        without blocking other producers.  Verify the predicate runs
+        outside the queue's internal lock by enqueueing from inside
+        the predicate — would deadlock if the lock was still held.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+
+        def reentrant() -> bool:
+            # If the lock is held during predicate eval, this enqueue
+            # would block forever (RLock would let it through, but the
+            # queue uses a plain Lock).
+            q.enqueue("inner", "from-predicate", "any", valid_until=lambda: True)
+            return True
+
+        q.enqueue("outer", "1", "any", valid_until=reentrant)
+        out = q.drain({"any"})
+        # Outer's predicate ran outside the lock, enqueued "inner";
+        # outer's True return delivered "outer".  "inner" was enqueued
+        # AFTER the partition snapshot, so it stays in the queue.
+        assert out == [("outer", "1", None)]
+        assert q.pending() == [("inner", "from-predicate")]
+
+    def test_valid_until_only_evaluated_for_matching_channel(self):
+        """A non-matching entry's predicate must NOT fire — that would
+        be wasted work (or worse, a side-effecting predicate would run
+        when the entry is supposed to stay queued).
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        calls = []
+
+        def track() -> bool:
+            calls.append(1)
+            return True
+
+        # Tool-channel entry; we drain user-channel.  Predicate must not run.
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "tool", valid_until=track)
+        q.drain({"user", "any"})
+        assert calls == []
+        # Entry stays queued.
+        assert q.pending("tool") == [("a", "1")]
+
+    def test_valid_until_default_none_always_delivers(self):
+        # No predicate → entry behaves identically to pre-PR-3 entries.
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        q.enqueue("a", "1", "any")  # no valid_until kwarg
+        assert q.drain({"any"}) == [("a", "1", None)]
+
+
+class TestConcurrency:
+    def test_concurrent_enqueue_drain_no_loss(self):
+        """16 producer threads × 64 nudges = 1024 total; one consumer
+        drains in a loop until producers finish + queue empty.  Verify
+        every produced item is observed exactly once.
+        """
+        q = NudgeQueue()
+        producers = 16
+        per_producer = 64
+        total = producers * per_producer
+
+        produced: set[tuple[str, str]] = set()
+        produced_lock = threading.Lock()
+        observed: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+        observed_lock = threading.Lock()
+        done_event = threading.Event()
+
+        def produce(pid: int) -> None:
+            for i in range(per_producer):
+                key = (f"p{pid}", f"i{i}")
+                with produced_lock:
+                    produced.add(key)
+                q.enqueue(key[0], key[1], "user")
+
+        def consume() -> None:
+            while not done_event.is_set() or len(q) > 0:
+                drained = q.drain({"user"})
+                if drained:
+                    with observed_lock:
+                        # Drop the trailing ``metadata`` slot — every
+                        # entry here was enqueued without metadata, so
+                        # the comparison set / count matches the produced
+                        # ``(type, text)`` shape.
+                        observed.extend((nt, txt) for nt, txt, _meta in drained)
+
+        consumer = threading.Thread(target=consume, daemon=True)
+        consumer.start()
+        threads = [threading.Thread(target=produce, args=(i,)) for i in range(producers)]
+        for t in threads:
+            t.start()
+        for t in threads:
+            t.join()
+        done_event.set()
+        consumer.join(timeout=5.0)
+        assert not consumer.is_alive(), "consumer didn't finish in time"
+
+        # Every produced key observed; no duplicates.
+        assert set(observed) == produced
+        assert len(observed) == total
+        assert len(q) == 0

tests/test_oauth_ssrf.py

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+"""Direct tests for the shared SSRF helpers in :mod:`turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf`.
+
+The OIDC test suite already exercises these via the OIDC adapter
+(``OIDCError`` re-raises). This file pins the canonical
+:class:`OAuthSSRFError` exception so callers that don't go through OIDC
+(notably ``mcp_oauth``) can rely on a stable contract.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import urllib.parse
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from turnstone.core.oauth_ssrf import (
+    OAuthSSRFError,
+    effective_port,
+    is_localhost,
+    validate_discovered_endpoint,
+    validate_url_no_ssrf,
+)
+
+
+class TestIsLocalhost:
+    def test_loopback_names(self) -> None:
+        assert is_localhost("localhost")
+        assert is_localhost("127.0.0.1")
+        assert is_localhost("::1")
+        assert is_localhost("foo.localhost")
+
+    def test_non_loopback(self) -> None:
+        assert not is_localhost("example.com")
+        assert not is_localhost("internal.corp")
+
+
+class TestEffectivePort:
+    def test_explicit_port(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com:9443/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) == 9443
+
+    def test_default_https(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) == 443
+
+    def test_default_http(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("http://idp.example.com/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) == 80
+
+    def test_unknown_scheme(self) -> None:
+        p = urllib.parse.urlparse("ftp://idp.example.com/foo")
+        assert effective_port(p) is None
+
+
+class TestValidateUrlNoSSRF:
+    _PUBLIC_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))]
+    _PRIVATE_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("10.0.0.1", 0))]
+    _LOOPBACK_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0))]
+
+    def test_valid_https(self) -> None:
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            parsed = validate_url_no_ssrf("https://idp.example.com/foo", allow_http=False)
+        assert parsed.scheme == "https"
+        assert parsed.hostname == "idp.example.com"
+
+    def test_rejects_http_when_not_allowed(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="must use HTTPS"):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("http://idp.example.com", allow_http=False)
+
+    def test_allows_http_localhost_with_flag(self) -> None:
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._LOOPBACK_ADDR):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("http://localhost:8080", allow_http=True)
+
+    def test_rejects_http_non_localhost_even_with_flag(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="must use HTTPS"):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("http://idp.example.com", allow_http=True)
+
+    def test_rejects_userinfo(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="embedded credentials"):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("https://user:pass@idp.example.com", allow_http=False)
+
+    def test_rejects_private_address(self) -> None:
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PRIVATE_ADDR),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="non-public address"),
+        ):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("https://corp.example.com", allow_http=False)
+
+    def test_rejects_unresolvable(self) -> None:
+        import socket
+
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", side_effect=socket.gaierror("fail")),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="cannot be resolved"),
+        ):
+            validate_url_no_ssrf("https://no.such.host.invalid", allow_http=False)
+
+
+class TestValidateDiscoveredEndpoint:
+    _PUBLIC_ADDR = [(2, 1, 6, "", ("93.184.216.34", 0))]
+
+    def test_same_origin_passes(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://idp.example.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_third_party_host_rejected(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="not trusted"),
+        ):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://attacker.example.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_trusted_endpoint_host_passes(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://shard.example.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset({"shard.example.com"}),
+            )
+
+    def test_known_google_alias_passes(self) -> None:
+        """The hard-coded Google alias map covers oauth2.googleapis.com."""
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://accounts.google.com")
+        with patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_scheme_mismatch_rejected(self) -> None:
+        # When the issuer is http://localhost (allow_http=True), an
+        # https:// endpoint must still be rejected as a scheme mismatch.
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("http://localhost:8080")
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=[(2, 1, 6, "", ("127.0.0.1", 0))]),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="scheme"),
+        ):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://localhost:8080/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=True,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )
+
+    def test_port_mismatch_rejected(self) -> None:
+        issuer = urllib.parse.urlparse("https://idp.example.com")
+        with (
+            patch("socket.getaddrinfo", return_value=self._PUBLIC_ADDR),
+            pytest.raises(OAuthSSRFError, match="port"),
+        ):
+            validate_discovered_endpoint(
+                "https://idp.example.com:9443/token",
+                issuer,
+                allow_http=False,
+                trusted_endpoint_hosts=frozenset(),
+            )