mirror of
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d068366a61
* feat(rbac): editable builtin role permissions via overlay layer
Adds a ``role_permission_overrides`` table that stores per-(role_id,
permission) grant/revoke deltas, applied on top of the immutable
``roles.permissions`` baseline at permission-load time. Builtin roles
(``builtin-admin/operator/viewer``) become customizable through the
admin Roles UI without losing the "reset to default" guarantee — every
override is auditable and reversible.
Motivating case: ``model.skills.write`` is deliberately default-ungranted
on every role so operators must consciously opt in before a coordinator
session can mutate the skill catalog. Until now there was no UX path to
do that opt-in — the only options were dropping into SQL or running a
fresh migration. The overrides editor closes that gap.
Backend
- Migration 057 + storage methods on both sqlite + postgresql backends
- ``get_user_permissions`` merges baseline ∪ grants − revokes for builtin
rows; custom rows pass through unchanged
- ``GET /v1/api/admin/roles/{id}/effective`` for inspect
- ``PUT /v1/api/admin/roles/{id}/overrides`` for write — admin.roles gated,
audited, validates against ``_VALID_PERMISSIONS``, refuses non-builtin
targets, strips no-op grants/revokes before persisting
- Lockout guard: cannot revoke ``admin.roles`` if doing so would leave
zero users with the permission (returns 409)
- ``coordinator.trust.send`` added to ``_VALID_PERMISSIONS`` — was
seeded into builtin-admin by migration 042 but never registered with
the validator, so the very first round-trip through the editor 400'd
on it. Drift-detection test guards future migrations from recreating
the same gap
Frontend
- Roles tab redesign: chevron + permission-count chip replace the
"..." truncation; expand-on-click drawer groups perms by namespace
with baseline / grant (green +) / revoke (red −) chip variants
- Edit modal opens for builtin rows ("Customize Built-in Role" title);
toggles show baseline-default vs override state; submit diffs against
the rendered toggle universe (not raw baseline) so future taxonomy
drift can't silently strip unknown perms
- "Modified +N/-N" pill on rows with active overrides; "Reset to default"
drawer action clears the override set
- ``_PERMISSION_SECTIONS`` brought up to date with all currently-seeded
perms (admin.coordinator, admin.cluster.inspect, admin.models,
admin.nodes, admin.prompt_policies, conversation.modify,
coordinator.trust.send were missing)
Tests
- 7 storage tests covering set/list/clear/effective + overlay merge into
``get_user_permissions`` for both builtin and custom roles
- 11 endpoint tests covering effective/overrides happy paths, validation,
lockout guard, builtin-only restriction, no-op normalization, list
enrichment
* feat(rbac): enforce workstreams.{create,close} + tools.approve gates
These three permissions were declared in ``_VALID_PERMISSIONS``, seeded
into ``builtin-operator``'s baseline by migration 008/017, surfaced in
the admin Roles UI as toggles, and documented in ``bootstrap.py`` as
the operator role's capabilities — and never enforced anywhere. The
audit that ran out of the overlay PR found zero ``require_permission``
sites for any of them; any authenticated user could create workstreams,
close any workstream, or approve any pending tool regardless of role.
Behaviour change for callers without the perms:
- ``POST /v1/api/workstreams/new`` (node + console proxy variants)
now 403 without ``workstreams.create``
- ``POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/close`` (and ``/route/`` proxy)
now 403 without ``workstreams.close``
- ``POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/approve`` (and ``/route/`` proxy)
now 403 without ``tools.approve``
The OR-fallback to ``admin.coordinator`` keeps coord sessions spawning
interactive children unblocked without needing operator-style perms.
Service-scoped inter-cluster calls bypass via the existing
``allow_service_bypass`` path on the new ``require_any_permission``
helper. Builtin admin and operator both already carry these perms;
viewer correctly loses workstream create/close/approve (it already
couldn't do those in spirit).
Implementation
- ``require_any_permission`` (core/auth.py) — OR-semantics variant of
``require_permission`` with per-conditional comments documenting the
security policy at the choke point. 403 body names every accepted
perm so operators get an actionable remediation
- ``make_{create,close,approve}_handler`` (core/session_routes.py)
accept ``fallback_permissions: tuple[str, ...]`` — checked only when
``cfg.permission_gate is None`` (interactive case). Coord's
``permission_gate=_require_admin_coordinator`` continues to take
precedence on the coord-config side
- Console-side ``create_workstream`` and ``route_create`` inline the
same OR check before proxying — fail fast on a forbidden request
without burning a cluster round-trip
- ``route_proxy`` adds a verb-scoped gate on ``approve`` and ``close``
only; ``send``/``cancel``/``dequeue``/``command``/``plan`` remain
authenticated-only (pre-existing, out of scope for this audit)
Tests
- New ``TestPermissionGatesOnLifecycle`` (4 tests) in test_server_authz
pinning 403-without-perm + non-403-with-perm at the node lift sites
- New ``TestRouteProxyPermissionGates`` (5 tests) in
test_console_routing_proxy covering 403 paths, OR fallback via
``admin.coordinator``, and that ``send`` remains ungated
- ``_make_jwt`` helpers in test_server_authz, test_close_reason_
persistence, test_server_attachments_on_create updated to embed
operator-shaped perms by default so existing tests continue to
exercise the post-gate logic rather than 403'ing on the new check
Docs
- ``bootstrap.py`` operator role line corrected to list every perm
it actually carries (was missing ``tools.approve`` and
``conversation.modify``)
* fix(rbac): close lockout + escalation gaps in role-overrides editor
Three issues surfaced by /review of the overlay layer and gate uplift —
all in the RBAC/auth surface, treated as zero-days.
**F-1: lockout guard misses the grant-removal path.** PUT-replace
semantics on ``set_role_overrides`` mean an existing grant of
``admin.roles`` (added via override to e.g. builtin-operator) is
silently dropped when the new payload omits it. The previous guard
short-circuited on ``"admin.roles" not in revokes`` and never noticed.
Concrete cluster-bricking scenario: grant admin.roles to operator via
override, unassign builtin-admin, click "Reset to default" on operator
→ all users lose admin.roles, recoverable only via SQL.
The rewritten guard simulates the post-PUT effective set on the target
role directly: if ``(baseline | new_grants) - new_revokes`` lacks
admin.roles AND nobody holds it via another role, refuse the change.
The "via another role" question is answered by one bulk query rather
than the prior O(users × roles) round-trip loop.
**F-3: lockout check blocked the event loop on moderate deployments.**
The prior check called ``storage.list_user_roles`` per user and
``storage.effective_role_permissions`` per (user, role) pair —
synchronous SQL inside an async handler. 200 users × 5 roles = 1000
connection cycles long enough to trip reverse-proxy timeouts on a
permission revoke.
Replaced with ``storage.users_with_permission(perm, *,
exclude_role_id)`` — one join over ``user_roles ⋈ roles`` plus one IN
fetch on overrides for the builtin role ids in the result, folded
in-process. Two queries total, independent of cluster size. The whole
check now runs under ``asyncio.to_thread`` so even the bulk read
doesn't stall the loop.
**F-2 reframed: admin_assign_role's subset check ignored the overlay.**
The check at lines 6321-6328 reads ``target_role.get("permissions",
"")`` (baseline column) when computing the perms it requires the
caller to hold. After this branch, an admin.roles holder can grant
e.g. ``model.skills.write`` to builtin-operator via override; an
admin.users holder (who happens to NOT hold that perm) could then
assign operator to a new user, silently escalating the assignee. The
existing two-person-rule by perm split (admin.roles for catalog edits,
admin.users for assignments) only holds if the assignment-time check
considers the overlay. Switched ``target_perms`` to
``storage.effective_role_permissions(role_id)["effective"]``.
Note: this PR retains the existing model where admin.roles is the
catalog-edit superuser (admin_create_role, admin_update_role, and now
admin_role_overrides all skip the caller-holds-grants check). The
two-person rule against escalation lives at the assignment gate, which
this fix reinforces.
**F-7: delete_role left orphaned override rows.** No FK on
``role_permission_overrides.role_id`` (migration 057 omitted FKs to
match the rest of the governance schema). Added explicit cleanup in
both sqlite + postgresql ``delete_role`` implementations so a
re-seeded role_id (deterministic for builtins on schema reseed) can't
silently inherit stale overrides from the prior occupant.
Tests
- storage: ``test_users_with_permission_bulk`` exercises the new bulk
helper including ``exclude_role_id`` and overlay folding
- storage: ``test_delete_role_cleans_up_overrides`` pins the F-7 fix
- endpoint: ``test_overrides_lockout_guard_blocks_grant_removal`` is
the F-1 reproduction — operator-overlay grants admin.roles, builtin-
admin has it removed, attempting to reset operator's overrides 409s
- endpoint: ``test_assign_role_blocks_escalation_via_overlay_grant``
pins the F-2 reframed fix — overlay-poisoned operator can't be
assigned by a caller missing the overlay perms
* refactor(rbac): cleanup batch from /review (#584)
Five non-security findings folded into one commit so the security
batch stays focused. All consistent with the existing intent of
``feat/builtin-role-overrides``.
**F-4: presence check on ``_effectivePerms``.** ``governance.js`` was
guarding on ``Array.isArray(role.effective) && role.effective.length > 0``,
falling through to splitting ``role.permissions`` (the baseline) when
the array was empty. For a builtin role whose overrides legitimately
revoke every baseline perm, that path silently rendered the baseline
chips with no override indicators — the inspector lied about what the
role can do. ``_enrich_role`` always sets ``effective: []``, so
presence is the right sentinel.
**F-5: JS-side drift detector.** Commit 1 added a Python-side test
asserting ``_VALID_PERMISSIONS`` covers every baseline perm; the
mirror invariant on the frontend went uncaught. A new perm added to
``_VALID_PERMISSIONS`` without a matching entry in
``_PERMISSION_SECTIONS`` becomes silently un-customizable through the
admin UI (the only documented grant/revoke path). Test parses the
JS const out via regex and asserts set-equality both directions —
detects "missing in UI" and "extra in UI" so the toggle catalog and
validator can't fork.
**F-6: bulk enrich for ``admin_list_roles``.** Was ``1 +
2*builtin_count + 1*custom_count`` SELECTs per admin-tab open;
collapsed to one ``IN``-filtered query via new
``storage.effective_role_permissions_bulk(role_ids)``. Implemented
on both sqlite + postgresql backends following the existing
``effective_role_permissions`` shape.
**F-8: rename ``fallback_permissions`` → ``accepted_permissions``.**
The lift body uses ``if cfg.permission_gate / elif accepted_permissions``
— mutually exclusive — so when ``permission_gate`` is None this IS
the primary gate, not a fallback to anything. The "fallback" name
suggested a tier-2-after-tier-1 semantic that didn't exist. Renamed
across ``make_{approve,close,create}_handler`` factories, the three
call sites in ``turnstone/server.py``, and the docstrings.
**F-9: positive lift-level tests for ``admin.coordinator``-only.**
``TestPermissionGatesOnLifecycle`` previously had a single positive
test for ``workstreams.create`` alone, plus negative-403 tests for
each verb without perms. The OR-fallback to ``admin.coordinator``
(which keeps coord sessions spawning interactive children unblocked)
had no positive coverage at the lift code path — only at the proxy,
which exercises a different verb-dict gate. Added three tests
(create / close / approve) that pass ``admin.coordinator`` alone and
assert non-403, so a future tightening of the accepted_permissions
tuple can't silently regress coord-driven child workstreams.
Out of scope: nit perf-4 (event-delegation refactor on
``_renderGovRoles``). ``setSafeHtml`` rebuild is the existing
pattern across every admin tab; rewriting one tab's render path on
this branch would be drive-by inconsistent with the surrounding
codebase. Filed as a separate concern if the Roles tab grows past
the scale where it bites.
* fix(rbac-ui): aria-expanded + row-click on Roles drawer (#585)
Two Copilot review findings on governance.js:
- Expand button was missing aria-expanded — screen readers couldn't
announce drawer state. Now reflects the row's expanded flag.
- Comment said "row + chevron both work" but only the chevron was
wired. Added data-expand-role to the row element too so the
existing handler loop (querySelectorAll on the attribute) picks up
both — clicking anywhere in the role row toggles the drawer.
Edit/Delete handlers already stopPropagation so they aren't
triggered by the row-level click.
* fix(migrations): rebase role_permission_overrides to 058
PR #560 mitigation #1 landed 057_output_assessments_llm_judge.py on
main in parallel; my migration claimed the same number, forking
alembic's head and breaking postgres. Renumbered to 058 and
re-pointed down_revision at 057 so the chain stays linear.
No behaviour change — same DDL. Full sweep clean (6730 passed).
* fix(migrations): update 058 revision strings to match filename
Previous commit (ea86aefc) renamed 057_role_permission_overrides.py to
058_* but the in-file revision = "057" / down_revision = "056"
strings stayed — leftover from when the file shipped as 057. Tests
pass because alembic walks the chain by revision string, and the
strings now correctly read revision = "058" / down_revision = "057"
to make the chain linear with main's 057_output_assessments_llm_judge.
Caught locally before re-running CI; my prior `git mv` + content edit
landed as a staged rename + unstaged modification on the previous
push.
455 lines
17 KiB
Python
455 lines
17 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the multipart variant of POST /v1/api/workstreams/new.
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Exercises:
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- The pure helpers `_validate_and_save_uploaded_files` and
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`_reserve_and_resolve_attachments` (added alongside the multipart path).
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- The full create endpoint via TestClient with a FakeSession factory so
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the initial-message dispatch thread runs end-to-end without an LLM.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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import queue
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import threading
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import time
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import pytest
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from starlette.testclient import TestClient
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# Magic-byte-valid 1x1 PNG (matches the fixture in test_server_attachments_endpoints.py)
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PNG_1x1 = (
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b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01"
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b"\x08\x06\x00\x00\x00\x1f\x15\xc4\x89\x00\x00\x00\rIDATx\x9cc\xfc\xcf"
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b"\xc0\xc0\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x01\xa5\xf6E@\x00\x00\x00\x00IEND\xaeB`\x82"
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)
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_TEST_JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
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def _make_jwt(user_id: str) -> str:
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from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER, create_jwt
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return create_jwt(
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user_id=user_id,
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scopes=frozenset({"read", "write"}),
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source="test",
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secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
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audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
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# ``workstreams.create`` is now a real gate on POST /workstreams/new
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# — see PR adding 057_role_permission_overrides. Embed the perm so
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# the multipart-create flow under test stays exercising the create
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# path and not the new 403.
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permissions=frozenset({"workstreams.create"}),
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)
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def _auth(user: str) -> dict[str, str]:
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return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_make_jwt(user)}"}
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Pure helper tests
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestValidateAndSaveUploadedFiles:
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def test_saves_image_and_text(self, tmp_path):
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from turnstone.core.attachments import (
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validate_and_save_uploaded_files as _validate_and_save_uploaded_files,
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)
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from turnstone.core.memory import list_pending_attachments
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from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
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reset_storage()
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init_storage("sqlite", path=str(tmp_path / "t.db"), run_migrations=False)
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try:
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files = [
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("hi.png", "image/png", PNG_1x1),
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("notes.md", "text/markdown", b"# Hello\n"),
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]
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ids, err = _validate_and_save_uploaded_files(files, "ws-X", "userA")
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assert err is None
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assert len(ids) == 2
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pending = list_pending_attachments("ws-X", "userA")
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assert len(pending) == 2
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kinds = {p["kind"] for p in pending}
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assert kinds == {"image", "text"}
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finally:
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reset_storage()
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def test_rejects_oversized_image(self, tmp_path):
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from turnstone.core.attachments import IMAGE_SIZE_CAP
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from turnstone.core.attachments import (
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validate_and_save_uploaded_files as _validate_and_save_uploaded_files,
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)
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from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
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reset_storage()
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init_storage("sqlite", path=str(tmp_path / "t.db"), run_migrations=False)
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try:
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# Magic-byte-valid PNG header padded past the cap.
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oversized = PNG_1x1 + b"\x00" * (IMAGE_SIZE_CAP + 1)
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files = [("big.png", "image/png", oversized)]
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ids, err = _validate_and_save_uploaded_files(files, "ws-X", "userA")
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assert err is not None
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assert err.status_code == 413
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assert ids == []
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finally:
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reset_storage()
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def test_rejects_unsupported_text(self, tmp_path):
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from turnstone.core.attachments import (
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validate_and_save_uploaded_files as _validate_and_save_uploaded_files,
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)
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from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
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reset_storage()
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init_storage("sqlite", path=str(tmp_path / "t.db"), run_migrations=False)
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try:
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# No image magic, MIME isn't text/*, extension not allowlisted
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files = [("evil.bin", "application/octet-stream", b"\x00\x01\x02")]
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ids, err = _validate_and_save_uploaded_files(files, "ws-X", "userA")
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assert err is not None
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assert err.status_code == 400
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assert ids == []
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finally:
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reset_storage()
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def test_pending_cap_returns_409(self, tmp_path):
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from turnstone.core.attachments import MAX_PENDING_ATTACHMENTS_PER_USER_WS
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from turnstone.core.attachments import (
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validate_and_save_uploaded_files as _validate_and_save_uploaded_files,
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)
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from turnstone.core.memory import save_attachment
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from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
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reset_storage()
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init_storage("sqlite", path=str(tmp_path / "t.db"), run_migrations=False)
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try:
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# Saturate the pending cap
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for i in range(MAX_PENDING_ATTACHMENTS_PER_USER_WS):
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save_attachment(
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f"pre-{i}", "ws-X", "userA", f"f{i}.txt", "text/plain", 1, "text", b"x"
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)
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files = [("notes.md", "text/markdown", b"hello")]
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ids, err = _validate_and_save_uploaded_files(files, "ws-X", "userA")
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assert err is not None
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assert err.status_code == 409
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assert ids == []
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finally:
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reset_storage()
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class TestReserveAndResolveAttachments:
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def test_reserves_and_returns_attachments(self, tmp_path):
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from turnstone.core.attachments import Attachment
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from turnstone.core.attachments import (
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reserve_and_resolve_attachments as _reserve_and_resolve_attachments,
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)
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from turnstone.core.memory import save_attachment
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from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
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reset_storage()
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init_storage("sqlite", path=str(tmp_path / "t.db"), run_migrations=False)
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try:
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save_attachment("a1", "ws-X", "userA", "a.txt", "text/plain", 5, "text", b"hello")
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save_attachment("a2", "ws-X", "userA", "b.png", "image/png", 91, "image", PNG_1x1)
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resolved, ordered, dropped = _reserve_and_resolve_attachments(
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["a1", "a2"], "send-1", "ws-X", "userA"
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)
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assert ordered == ["a1", "a2"]
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assert dropped == []
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assert len(resolved) == 2
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assert all(isinstance(a, Attachment) for a in resolved)
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kinds = [a.kind for a in resolved]
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assert kinds == ["text", "image"]
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finally:
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reset_storage()
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def test_double_reserve_drops_second(self, tmp_path):
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from turnstone.core.attachments import (
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reserve_and_resolve_attachments as _reserve_and_resolve_attachments,
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)
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from turnstone.core.memory import save_attachment
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from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
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reset_storage()
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init_storage("sqlite", path=str(tmp_path / "t.db"), run_migrations=False)
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try:
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save_attachment("a1", "ws-X", "userA", "a.txt", "text/plain", 5, "text", b"hello")
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r1, ord1, _ = _reserve_and_resolve_attachments(["a1"], "send-A", "ws-X", "userA")
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assert len(r1) == 1
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r2, ord2, drop2 = _reserve_and_resolve_attachments(["a1"], "send-B", "ws-X", "userA")
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assert r2 == []
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assert ord2 == []
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assert drop2 == ["a1"]
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finally:
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reset_storage()
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# End-to-end create endpoint tests (multipart variant)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class _FakeSession:
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"""Minimal stand-in: records send() invocations from the dispatch thread.
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Knows its own ``ws_id`` and ``user_id`` so it can faithfully simulate the
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real ChatSession's attachment-consume step against storage. Tests then
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assert that pending attachments are gone after dispatch.
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"""
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def __init__(self, ws_id: str = "", user_id: str = ""):
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self.ws_id = ws_id
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self.user_id = user_id
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self.model = "test-model"
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self.model_alias = "test-model"
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self.messages = []
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self.sends: list[tuple[str, list, str | None]] = []
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self._lock = threading.Lock()
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self._cancel_event = threading.Event()
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self.notify_targets = ""
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self._notify_on_complete = "[]"
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def send(self, text, attachments=None, send_id=None):
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with self._lock:
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self.sends.append((text, list(attachments or []), send_id))
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# Simulate the real ChatSession's consume step against storage
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# so callers can assert the lifecycle landed.
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|
if attachments and send_id and self.ws_id and self.user_id:
|
|
import uuid as _uuid
|
|
|
|
from turnstone.core.memory import mark_attachments_consumed
|
|
|
|
ids = [a.attachment_id for a in attachments]
|
|
mark_attachments_consumed(
|
|
ids,
|
|
_uuid.uuid4().hex, # synthetic conversation message id
|
|
self.ws_id,
|
|
self.user_id,
|
|
reserved_for_msg_id=send_id,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Methods the create handler may call but we don't care about
|
|
def set_watch_runner(self, *_a, **_kw):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
def queue_message(self, *_a, **_kw):
|
|
return ("", "normal", "msg-x")
|
|
|
|
def request_title_refresh(self, *_a, **_kw):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
def resume(self, *_a, **_kw):
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
class _FakeUI:
|
|
def __init__(self, ws_id="", user_id=""):
|
|
self.ws_id = ws_id
|
|
self._user_id = user_id
|
|
self.auto_approve = False
|
|
self.auto_approve_tools: set[str] = set()
|
|
self.events: list[dict] = []
|
|
self._enqueued: list[dict] = []
|
|
|
|
def _enqueue(self, ev):
|
|
self._enqueued.append(ev)
|
|
|
|
def on_stream_end(self):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
def on_state_change(self, state):
|
|
self.events.append({"type": "state_change", "state": state})
|
|
|
|
def on_error(self, msg):
|
|
self.events.append({"type": "error", "message": msg})
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.fixture
|
|
def app_client(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
|
|
"""End-to-end app with a fake session factory + SessionManager."""
|
|
from turnstone.core.adapters.interactive_adapter import InteractiveAdapter
|
|
from turnstone.core.metrics import MetricsCollector
|
|
from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
|
|
from turnstone.core.storage import get_storage, init_storage, reset_storage
|
|
from turnstone.server import WebUI, create_app
|
|
|
|
reset_storage()
|
|
init_storage("sqlite", path=str(tmp_path / "t.db"), run_migrations=False)
|
|
|
|
metrics = MetricsCollector()
|
|
metrics.model = "test-model"
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("turnstone.server._metrics", metrics)
|
|
# Replace WebUI with our fake so the create handler's isinstance check passes.
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("turnstone.server.WebUI", _FakeUI)
|
|
|
|
fake_sessions: list[_FakeSession] = []
|
|
|
|
def _factory(ui, _model, ws_id, **_kw):
|
|
# The user_id rides on the WebUI factory closure; pull it off the
|
|
# ui instance so the FakeSession's consume step uses the right scope.
|
|
user_id = getattr(ui, "_user_id", "")
|
|
s = _FakeSession(ws_id=ws_id, user_id=user_id)
|
|
fake_sessions.append(s)
|
|
return s
|
|
|
|
gq: queue.Queue[dict] = queue.Queue(maxsize=1000)
|
|
WebUI._global_queue = gq
|
|
adapter = InteractiveAdapter(
|
|
global_queue=gq,
|
|
ui_factory=lambda ws: _FakeUI(
|
|
ws_id=ws.id,
|
|
user_id=ws.user_id,
|
|
),
|
|
session_factory=_factory,
|
|
)
|
|
mgr = SessionManager(
|
|
adapter, storage=get_storage(), max_active=10, node_id="node-test", event_emitter=adapter
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
app = create_app(
|
|
workstreams=mgr,
|
|
global_queue=gq,
|
|
global_listeners=[],
|
|
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
|
|
skip_permissions=False,
|
|
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
|
|
)
|
|
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
|
|
try:
|
|
yield client, fake_sessions, gq
|
|
finally:
|
|
client.close()
|
|
reset_storage()
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestCreateMultipart:
|
|
def test_create_with_image_and_initial_message(self, app_client):
|
|
from turnstone.core.memory import list_pending_attachments
|
|
|
|
client, sessions, _gq = app_client
|
|
meta = {"name": "demo", "initial_message": "describe this image"}
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/v1/api/workstreams/new",
|
|
data={"meta": json.dumps(meta)},
|
|
files=[("file", ("tiny.png", PNG_1x1, "image/png"))],
|
|
headers=_auth("userA"),
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
|
|
data = resp.json()
|
|
ws_id = data["ws_id"]
|
|
assert ws_id
|
|
assert len(data["attachment_ids"]) == 1
|
|
|
|
# Wait briefly for the dispatch thread
|
|
deadline = time.time() + 2.0
|
|
while time.time() < deadline and not sessions:
|
|
time.sleep(0.02)
|
|
deadline = time.time() + 2.0
|
|
while time.time() < deadline and not sessions[0].sends:
|
|
time.sleep(0.02)
|
|
assert sessions
|
|
assert sessions[0].sends, "session.send was not invoked"
|
|
text, atts, send_id = sessions[0].sends[0]
|
|
assert text == "describe this image"
|
|
assert send_id # reservation token threaded through
|
|
assert len(atts) == 1
|
|
assert atts[0].kind == "image"
|
|
|
|
# Lifecycle: the FakeSession marks them consumed via storage —
|
|
# so the pending-list for this ws should be empty after dispatch.
|
|
assert list_pending_attachments(ws_id, "userA") == []
|
|
|
|
def test_create_with_attachments_no_initial_message_keeps_pending(self, app_client):
|
|
from turnstone.core.memory import list_pending_attachments
|
|
|
|
client, _, _gq = app_client
|
|
meta = {"name": "stash"}
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/v1/api/workstreams/new",
|
|
data={"meta": json.dumps(meta)},
|
|
files=[("file", ("notes.md", b"# hello\n", "text/markdown"))],
|
|
headers=_auth("userA"),
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
|
|
data = resp.json()
|
|
ws_id = data["ws_id"]
|
|
pending = list_pending_attachments(ws_id, "userA")
|
|
assert len(pending) == 1
|
|
assert pending[0]["filename"] == "notes.md"
|
|
|
|
def test_create_rejects_oversized_image_and_rolls_back(self, app_client):
|
|
from turnstone.core.attachments import IMAGE_SIZE_CAP
|
|
|
|
client, _, gq = app_client
|
|
oversized = PNG_1x1 + b"\x00" * (IMAGE_SIZE_CAP + 1)
|
|
meta = {"name": "fails"}
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/v1/api/workstreams/new",
|
|
data={"meta": json.dumps(meta)},
|
|
files=[("file", ("big.png", oversized, "image/png"))],
|
|
headers=_auth("userA"),
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 413
|
|
# Regression: ws_created must NOT have been emitted for a request
|
|
# that's about to be rejected. Otherwise SSE consumers see a
|
|
# phantom workstream flash on dashboards.
|
|
events: list[dict] = []
|
|
while not gq.empty():
|
|
events.append(gq.get_nowait())
|
|
kinds = {e.get("type") for e in events}
|
|
assert "ws_created" not in kinds, f"phantom ws_created emitted for failed create: {events}"
|
|
|
|
def test_create_missing_meta_returns_400(self, app_client):
|
|
client, _, _gq = app_client
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/v1/api/workstreams/new",
|
|
files=[("file", ("notes.md", b"hello", "text/markdown"))],
|
|
headers=_auth("userA"),
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 400
|
|
|
|
def test_create_invalid_meta_json_returns_400(self, app_client):
|
|
client, _, _gq = app_client
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/v1/api/workstreams/new",
|
|
data={"meta": "{not json}"},
|
|
files=[],
|
|
headers=_auth("userA"),
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 400
|
|
|
|
def test_attachments_with_resume_ws_returns_400(self, app_client):
|
|
from turnstone.core.memory import register_workstream
|
|
|
|
client, _, _gq = app_client
|
|
register_workstream("ws-resume-target", name="resume target")
|
|
meta = {"name": "fork", "resume_ws": "ws-resume-target"}
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/v1/api/workstreams/new",
|
|
data={"meta": json.dumps(meta)},
|
|
files=[("file", ("notes.md", b"hello", "text/markdown"))],
|
|
headers=_auth("userA"),
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 400
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestCreateJsonStillWorks:
|
|
"""The JSON path must remain byte-for-byte identical (back-compat)."""
|
|
|
|
def test_create_json_no_attachments(self, app_client):
|
|
client, _, _gq = app_client
|
|
resp = client.post(
|
|
"/v1/api/workstreams/new",
|
|
json={"name": "json-only"},
|
|
headers=_auth("userA"),
|
|
)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
|
|
data = resp.json()
|
|
assert data["ws_id"]
|
|
# New optional field, but always emitted (empty list when absent)
|
|
assert data["attachment_ids"] == []
|