* feat(mcp): admin status, deferred-consent persistence, operator docs (Phase 9)
Completes the OAuth-MCP build-out (Phases 0-8 shipped) by closing the
operator + deferred-consent gaps:
1. **Per-(user, server) deferred-consent persistence** — when a
non-interactive run (scheduled / channel) hits ``mcp_consent_required``
or ``mcp_insufficient_scope``, the sync pool dispatchers now upsert a
row into a new ``mcp_pending_consent`` table. The dashboard hydrates
the gear-icon badge from this table on load, so users who weren't
online to see the in-flight SSE prompt still surface the deferred
work on next login. Cleared automatically by the OAuth callback
handler on consent completion; manual user dismiss via new DELETE
endpoints. Composite PK ``(user_id, server_name)`` collapses repeat
occurrences for the same server — no NULLs-not-distinct trap.
2. **Admin status pill + bulk-revoke** — the MCP Servers admin row now
shows ``consented_users_count`` for ``auth_type=oauth_user`` rows
when ≥1, with a two-step-confirm ``bulk-revoke`` button that drops
every user's token for the server via the existing
``delete_mcp_oauth_rows_by_server_name`` primitive. Upstream RFC
7009 revoke is intentionally NOT attempted in bulk (avoids N
upstream HTTP calls per admin click); audit detail records
``upstream_revoke_outcome=bulk_admin_no_upstream``. A "last
refresh" pill (age + outcome) renders on each row, sourced from a
new ``_last_refresh`` dict populated by ``_refresh_server`` on every
call (both manual ``refresh_sync`` and the ``_cb_auto_reconnect``
follow-up).
3. **ClientType.SCHEDULED** added to the prompts module + scheduler
passes it through to ``create_workstream``. ``ChatSession`` now
computes ``_is_interactive_for_consent`` at construction (WEB / CLI
are interactive; CHAT / SCHEDULED are not) and plumbs the flag
through ``call_tool_sync`` / ``read_resource_sync`` /
``get_prompt_sync`` to the three sync dispatchers. The wrap at the
``_is_structured_error`` gate routes consent codes to the new
``_record_pending_consent_best_effort`` helper for non-interactive
callers only; interactive sessions stay on the in-flight SSE path
Phase 8 ships unchanged.
4. **Operator docs** — ``docs/mcp-oauth.md`` (operator guide, parallel
to ``docs/oidc.md``: ``auth_type`` choice, OAuth client setup,
encryption-key rotation, troubleshooting matrix) and
``docs/operations/mcp-oauth-headless.md`` (one-paragraph runbook
per ``feedback_runbook_trust_llm.md``: pre-consent recipe for
scheduled / channel-driven runs).
Schema
- Migration 054_mcp_pending_consent.py — composite PK
``(user_id, server_name)``, ``occurrence_count`` + ``first_seen_at`` /
``last_seen_at`` for recency metadata, ``idx_mcp_pending_consent_user``
for the badge-load query. No FKs (matches the rest of the
oauth_user schema).
- Migration 055_mcp_user_tokens_server_index.py — adds
``idx_mcp_user_tokens_server`` on ``(server_name, expires_at)`` so
the admin pill's ``count_mcp_consented_users_*`` queries don't
full-scan against the leading-``user_id`` composite PK.
- Cross-backend: works on SQLite + PostgreSQL via dialect-specific
``on_conflict_do_update`` (PG ``postgresql.insert`` / SQLite
``sqlalchemy.dialects.sqlite.insert``). No ``NULLS NOT DISTINCT``
needed — the simplified PK eliminates the cross-version trap.
Endpoints
- ``GET /v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending`` — list deferred-consent records for
the authenticated user. Install-level gate via cached
``any_oauth_user_mcp_servers`` short-circuits to ``{pending: 0}`` on
installs with no oauth_user MCP servers — local-auth deployments
exercise zero new storage queries on this path. The gate result is
cached on ``app.state`` with a 60s TTL to spare repeat dashboard
loads.
- ``DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending/{server_name}`` — single dismiss.
Returns 204 in both existed-and-deleted and never-existed cases
(no cross-tenant existence leak); audits
``mcp_server.oauth.pending_consent_dismissed`` with
``mode=single`` + ``cleared=0|1`` so a session-hijack attacker
scrubbing breadcrumbs leaves an audit trail.
- ``DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/pending`` — bulk dismiss; audits
``mode=bulk`` + ``cleared=N``.
- ``POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/{name}/bulk-revoke`` — admin
bulk-revoke for the named server's per-user tokens. Requires
``admin.mcp`` permission + 400s when the row isn't ``oauth_user``.
All four registered on both ``turnstone-server`` and
``turnstone-console`` (mirrors the Phase 8 ``/connections`` endpoint
shape).
Performance
- Admin list handler now uses a single ``GROUP BY`` bulk-count query
(``count_mcp_consented_users_grouped_by_server``) wrapped in
``asyncio.to_thread`` rather than N per-row sync DB round-trips
inside the async handler. Skipped entirely when no row is
oauth_user.
Frontend
- ``ui/static/app.js``: ``loadPendingConsents()`` hydrates the
existing ``_pendingConsentServers`` set on dashboard init + after
the user opens the settings modal. Endpoint failures stay silent
— the badge will be re-driven by the next in-flight tool error.
- ``console/static/admin.js``: ``consented_users_count`` pill +
``bulk-revoke`` button on each MCP row (only when ≥1 consented),
two-step confirm matching the existing delete pattern. ``last-
refresh`` age + outcome pill in the per-row status cell, sourced
from the freshest per-node entry in ``status[*].last_refresh_at`` /
``last_refresh_outcome``. CSS for the pills in ``style.css``.
Tests
- ``test_mcp_pending_consent_storage`` — 13 tests covering upsert
idempotency, list ordering, per-user isolation, single/bulk delete,
count-by-server + grouped variant, install-level gate.
- ``test_mcp_pending_consent_dispatch`` — 9 tests, including the
boundary-cross gate per ``feedback_tests_through_boundaries.md``:
drives the real ``call_tool_sync`` → ``_dispatch_pool_sync`` →
``_is_structured_error`` → ``_record_pending_consent_best_effort``
with a mocked classified-lookup so the structural plumb-through is
verified end-to-end. Includes a storage-failure test that pins
the docstring's "envelope unchanged on storage failure" promise.
- ``test_mcp_pending_consent_endpoints`` — 11 tests: install gate,
list-for-self, no-cross-user-leak, single/bulk delete, idempotent
not-found, audit emission on single + bulk + cross-tenant dismiss.
- ``test_chat_session_interactivity_flag`` — 7 tests pinning the
``ClientType`` → ``_is_interactive_for_consent`` mapping against
the module-level ``INTERACTIVE_CONSENT_CLIENT_TYPES`` frozenset.
- ``test_mcp_admin_bulk_revoke`` — 7 tests covering admin.mcp
permission gate, 404 on missing, 400 on non-oauth_user, 200 with
``rows_deleted`` + ``consented_users_before``, audit row with
``upstream_revoke_outcome=bulk_admin_no_upstream``, cross-server
isolation.
- ``test_mcp_oauth_handlers`` — 2 new callback tests pin the post-
callback ``delete_mcp_pending_consent`` invocation: success-clears
+ storage-failure-still-redirects.
- 636 tests pass on the impacted surface (47 new + Phase 0-8 OAuth-MCP
+ session + prompts + storage admin). ruff + mypy clean.
Hard invariants honored
- Static path byte-identical for ``auth_type ∈ {none, static}`` — the
flag flows only through the pool dispatchers, which only fire when
the row resolves to ``oauth_user``.
- ``asyncio.timeout`` (not ``asyncio.wait_for``) preserved on every
AS / SDK / pool-loop await — no new awaits added to the hot path.
- Install-level gate on the badge endpoint: cached
``any_oauth_user_mcp_servers`` returns False on a row-less
deployment → endpoint short-circuits without touching the pending-
consent table; 60s TTL bounds the staleness window after admin
flips ``auth_type``.
- Operator-actionable codes (key-unknown, url-insecure, *_forbidden)
explicitly filtered out of persistence — they're outside the
user-facing consent badge scope.
- Best-effort write: the structured-error envelope returned to the
agent is identical whether the persistence write succeeds or fails
(storage exception is logged with type name only — no chained
context that could carry an ``httpx.Request`` bearer header).
- No ``exc_info=True`` on any new path that can chain a bearer-bearing
``httpx.Request``.
- Defensive parsing: ``_parse_pending_consent_envelope`` mirrors
``_is_structured_error``'s ``isinstance(decoded, dict)`` guard plus
filters scope tokens through ``is_valid_scope_token`` capped at
``MAX_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE_REPORTED`` — defense-in-depth even though
production callers already validate upstream.
- Audit events on every dismiss endpoint so a session-control attacker
scrubbing dashboard breadcrumbs still leaves a trail.
Cross-backend
- Tested on SQLite via the conftest backend fixture.
- PostgreSQL path uses ``postgresql.insert(...).on_conflict_do_update``
parallel to the existing ``mcp_user_tokens`` upsert in Phase 3.
Deferred (not Phase 9 blockers)
- Multi-node pool eviction on bulk-revoke: only local-node sessions
would be evicted if we built it, and there's no bulk-by-server
primitive on MCPClientManager today; remote nodes will surface as
a 401 on next dispatch which refreshes through the (now empty)
token row.
- RFC 8693 / Azure OBO ``auth_type=oauth_token_exchange`` — captured
in the design doc as a future architectural direction (~600 LOC +
IdP-side admin work); requires OIDC token capture and per-MCP-server
resource-trust configuration that v1 does not ship.
* docs(mcp): address Copilot review feedback on Phase 9
- Fix misleading admin.js comment that claimed the refresh pill rendered
"<short-relative> <outcome>" — the pill actually renders only the short
age, with outcome reflected via CSS class and tooltip.
- Replace broken feedback_secrets_not_in_env.md repo-root link in
mcp-oauth.md with the inlined rationale (env-borne secrets reachable
via shell tools / os.environ; TOML secrets are not).
Turnstone
Multi-node AI orchestration platform. Deploy tool-using AI agents across a cluster of servers with direct HTTP routing, interactive interfaces, and enterprise governance.
Named after the Ruddy Turnstone (Arenaria interpres) — a shorebird that flips stones to discover what's hiding underneath.
Release Tracks
| Track | Install | Docker | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stable | pip install turnstone |
ghcr.io/turnstonelabs/turnstone:stable |
Production-grade. Bugfixes only. |
| Experimental | pip install turnstone --pre |
ghcr.io/turnstonelabs/turnstone:experimental |
New features. May have rough edges. |
See docs/releasing.md for the full release process.
What it does
Turnstone gives LLMs tools — shell, files, search, web, planning — and orchestrates multi-turn conversations where the model investigates, acts, and reports.
- Interactive sessions — terminal CLI or browser UI with parallel workstreams
- Cluster dashboard — real-time view of all nodes and workstreams with console routing proxy
- Intent validation — LLM judge evaluates every tool call with risk assessments and evidence
- Governance — RBAC, OIDC SSO, tool policies, skills, usage tracking, audit logs
- Multi-provider — OpenAI-compatible APIs (vLLM, llama.cpp, NIM), Anthropic Messages API, and Google Gemini
- MCP support — external tool servers with native deferred loading (Anthropic/OpenAI) or BM25 fallback
Quickstart
pip install turnstone
# Terminal REPL
turnstone --base-url http://localhost:8000/v1
# Browser UI
turnstone-server --port 8080 --base-url http://localhost:8000/v1
# Cluster dashboard
pip install turnstone[console]
turnstone-console --port 8090
For PostgreSQL (recommended for production):
pip install turnstone[postgres]
export TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND=postgresql
export TURNSTONE_DB_URL="postgresql+psycopg://user:pass@localhost:5432/turnstone"
turnstone-server --port 8080 --base-url http://localhost:8000/v1
Docker
cp .env.example .env # edit LLM_BASE_URL, OPENAI_API_KEY, etc.
docker compose --profile production up
See QUICKSTART.md for the bootstrap wizard and docs/docker.md for Docker configuration and profiles.
Programmatic (SDK)
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneServer
with TurnstoneServer("http://localhost:8080", token="tok_xxx") as client:
ws = client.create_workstream(name="demo")
result = client.send_and_wait("Analyze the error logs", ws.ws_id, auto_approve=True)
print(result.content)
Tools
Built-in tools for shell, files, search, web, memory, notifications, and autonomous sub-agents — plus external tools via MCP with native deferred loading. See docs/tools.md for the full reference and docs/mcp-registry.md for MCP configuration.
Architecture
Single-node: Client → Server (direct HTTP + SSE). No external dependencies beyond the database.
Multi-node: Client → Console (rendezvous routing proxy) → Server nodes. The console picks the target node for each workstream via rendezvous (HRW) hashing over the live service registry — pure function of (ws_id, live_nodes), no stored bucket state, deterministic across readers. A node join or drop only re-routes the keys that score highest on the affected node.
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
turnstone |
Terminal CLI (REPL) |
turnstone-server |
Web UI + REST API + SSE events |
turnstone-console |
Cluster dashboard + routing proxy + admin panel |
turnstone-channel |
Channel gateway (Discord and Slack adapters) |
turnstone-admin |
User/token management CLI |
turnstone-eval |
Eval harness for prompt/tool optimization |
turnstone-bootstrap |
LLM-guided setup wizard |
Diagrams
UML diagrams in docs/diagrams/:
| Diagram | Description |
|---|---|
| System Context | Components and external dependencies |
| Package Structure | Python modules and dependency graph |
| Core Engine | SessionUI, ChatSession, LLMProvider |
| Conversation Turn | Message lifecycle through the engine |
| Tool Pipeline | Prepare / approve / execute |
| Workstream States | State machine transitions |
| Console Data Flow | Dashboard data collection |
| Deployment | Docker Compose topology |
| Auth | JWT, scopes, login flows |
| Channels | Discord / Slack adapters + routing |
| Judge | Intent validation pipeline |
| OIDC | SSO authorization code flow |
Documentation
| Topic | Link |
|---|---|
| Configuration reference | docs/settings.md |
| API reference | docs/api-reference.md |
| Docker deployment | docs/docker.md |
| Intent validation (judge) | docs/judge.md |
| Governance & RBAC | docs/governance.md |
| OIDC SSO | docs/oidc.md |
| TLS / mTLS | docs/tls.md |
| Channel integrations | docs/channels.md |
| Console dashboard | docs/console.md |
| Eval harness | docs/eval.md |
| Tools reference | docs/tools.md |
| MCP integration | docs/mcp-registry.md |
Requirements
- Python 3.11+
- An OpenAI-compatible API endpoint, Anthropic API key, or Google Gemini API key
- Optional: PostgreSQL (
pip install turnstone[postgres]), Anthropic (pip install turnstone[anthropic]) - Git LFS for cloning (diagram PNGs)
License
Business Source License 1.1 — free for all use except hosting as a managed service. Converts to Apache 2.0 on 2030-03-01.
