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Author SHA1 Message Date
Patrick Buckley 7000ef03a8 chore: bump version to 1.6.9 2026-06-17 18:21:01 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 0ae0db55f3 test: address Copilot review on the leaked-thread guard
- The guard snapshotted live threads by `Thread.ident`, but idents are
  recycled after a thread exits — a new leaked thread reusing an exited
  thread's ident would be mistaken for pre-existing and missed (false
  negative). Snapshot the Thread OBJECTS and compare by identity instead.
- Fix the `serve` fixture docstring: the factory returns the ephemeral
  port, not the server.
2026-06-17 18:16:34 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8256e7441a test: eliminate leaked-thread test pollution + guard against it
Background daemons, event loops, and test servers that outlived their test
bled into later tests' captured output — an intermittent "I/O operation on
closed file" heisenbug, and the same class behind a past multi-day CI-hang
investigation.

- conftest: a fail-on-leak autouse guard (`_no_leaked_threads`) snapshots
  threads at setup and fails any test that leaves one running past teardown,
  with an `allow_thread_leak` opt-out — so the next leak is caught in minutes,
  not days. Plus `logging.raiseExceptions = False` to mute the benign
  logging-vs-capture-teardown race, and shared loop/server teardown helpers
  (`stop_loop_thread`, `serve_until_exit`).

- collector (PRODUCT FIX): the node-discovery loop slept uninterruptibly, so
  `ClusterCollector.stop()` couldn't join the `console-discovery` thread until
  the full interval elapsed — a real shutdown hang in production (up to
  `discovery_interval`). It now sleeps on an interruptible Event that `stop()`
  sets and `start()` clears.

- test fixtures: docker_healthcheck's HTTP servers, the MCP background event
  loops (shutdown_default_executor + close), and the FastMCP uvicorn upstreams
  (timeout_graceful_shutdown=0 + force_exit) now tear down cleanly instead of
  leaking.

Full non-live suite: 7456 passed, 0 closed-file errors, 0 leaked threads, and
~1.5 min faster (the leaks were dragging it).
2026-06-17 18:16:34 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1f121c739c feat(coordinator): port Regenerate/Edit title to coordinators
Coordinators carry LLM/auto titles like interactive workstreams but had no
way to regenerate or rename them. Port the interactive "Refresh title" (LLM
regenerate) + "Edit title" (manual alias) dropdown actions by lifting the
two handlers — the last shared verbs that weren't yet lifted — and opting
coordinators in.

- session_routes.py: add make_refresh_title_handler / make_set_title_handler
  factories (cfg pattern, mirroring make_close_handler). set_title resolves
  the workstream BEFORE the alias write and 404s when the kind has no
  tenant_check storage gate and the in-memory manager doesn't own it:
  set_workstream_alias is a global, kind-unscoped UPDATE, so this prevents
  an operator renaming a workstream the coord manager doesn't own (e.g. an
  interactive ws via the coord route) and the silent-200 on a bogus id.
- server.py: re-point the interactive bundle to the lifted handlers; drop
  the standalone refresh_workstream_title / set_workstream_title.
- console/server.py: wire refresh_title / set_title into the coord bundle
  (gated by the existing admin.coordinator operator check).
- shell.js: enable titleVerbs on the coordinator pane's tab menu; the
  base-aware lane posts to the console-origin coord routes.

Tests: coord refresh/set-title (regenerate, operator-gate, 404 unknown,
alias store + broadcast, empty, conflict, cross-kind reject); interactive
title tests re-pointed to the lifted handlers for lift-parity; shell.js
coord-menu assertion.
2026-06-17 18:16:34 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 026acbf907 fix(coordinator): address Copilot review on title persistence
Three points from the PR #676 Copilot review:

- _coord_display_name ran on a lifecycle-event path and called
  get_workstream_display_name → get_storage(), which auto-initializes a
  SQLite .turnstone.db in the CWD when storage isn't initialized yet —
  a stray-file footgun on early-startup / unit-test paths. Add
  is_storage_initialized() to the storage registry and skip the DB read
  (fall back to ws.name) when storage isn't up. (Copilot's "skip when
  ws.name is non-synthetic" suggestion would have broken alias > title >
  name, so guard on init state instead.)

- Document, on SessionUIBase, that on_aux_usage (storage/metrics, no
  _ws_lock state) and on_rename (queue/locked fan-out) are safe to call
  from a concurrent auxiliary thread — the title-gen thread now runs
  during streaming, and these are the only two UI hooks it touches. No
  behavior change: the methods were already thread-safe (the same path
  task_agent sub-agents use); the contract just didn't say so. Add a
  matching note at the title-trigger site.

- Note in _coordinator_rows that the secondary `title` field is
  best-effort for a live coord outside the limit=200 window (the
  user-visible `name` stays correct via the uncapped bulk lookup, and
  the window is unreachable in practice — live coords are max_active-
  bounded and sort to the top of updated DESC).
2026-06-17 18:16:34 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 49013a5593 fix(coordinator): persist + eagerly generate workstream titles
Coordinator workstream LLM titles were written to workstreams.title but
never read back, and were rarely generated in the first place:

- Read path: the dashboard's `_coordinator_rows` builder hardcoded
  title="" and used the synthetic `ws.name`, so a generated title (or a
  user alias) reverted to `ws-xxxx` on every refresh. Interactive rows
  resolve via get_workstream_display_name, so the gap was coord-only.
- Write path: the auto-title trigger only fired on a tool-call-free
  assistant turn, which coordinators (near-constant tool use) seldom
  reach — so the title almost never generated.

Read path:
- Project `title` + `alias` in list_workstreams (appended after user_id so
  existing positional fallbacks stay valid). `_coordinator_rows` resolves
  the display name (alias > title > name) for both lanes — live names via
  the bulk get_workstream_display_names (exact ids, no row cap), persisted
  rows from their own _mapping.
- Seed the console pseudo-node fan-out with the resolved display name so a
  rehydrated coordinator shows its title in the live tree immediately
  (one bulk lookup instead of an N+1 over mgr.list_all()).

Write path:
- Fire auto-title right after the user turn is recorded in send(), gated on
  a real (non-wake, non-empty) user message, instead of waiting for the
  terminal tool-call-free turn. Applies to interactive + coordinator.
- Snapshot self.messages in _generate_title since it can now run
  concurrently with the streaming turn.
2026-06-17 18:16:34 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ac68efba45 chore: bump version to 1.6.8 2026-06-17 01:33:33 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ea5b727ae9 fix(audio): omni STT transcode + thinking-off, with streaming
Speech-to-text against an omni chat model (e.g. Gemma-4 on vLLM) was
broken end to end:

- The browser records webm/opus, but the omni chat lane only decodes
  wav/mp3 (it sniffs the bytes), so every clip came back 400 "Invalid
  or unsupported audio file". Transcode the upload to 16 kHz mono WAV
  with ffmpeg first, hardened against the untrusted blob:
  -protocol_whitelist pipe (no file:/http: SSRF), -vn, and a duration cap.
- The chat STT path calls the raw client and so bypasses the provider's
  request shaping. It now forces enable_thinking=false (via the model's
  thinking_param): leaving reasoning on costs ~11x latency and returns
  empty content on some clips. The prompt precedes the audio part (the
  order Gemma documents for transcription) and max_tokens is capped.

Add a streaming variant: POST .../speech-to-text/stream returns the
transcript as plain-text deltas and the composer fills them in live
(~0.3s to first word). The blocking stream is driven from one worker
thread that owns and closes the upstream connection.

Drop the gemma skip_special_tokens server-compat workaround: the vLLM
bug it patched is fixed upstream, and a stale shim can corrupt output.

The node image now installs ffmpeg; rebuild to run this live.
2026-06-17 01:23:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 87e189ae7d fix(tls): stub backoff via a _sleep seam, not the global asyncio.sleep
The test-postgres failure on test_init_retries_exhausted_raises surfaced the
root cause: sleeps held 2275x 0.1 instead of [1.0, 2.0]. Those 0.1s came from
a concurrent background poller doing asyncio.sleep(0.1) on anyio's shared
(persistent) event loop — the tls retry tests patched the *global*
asyncio.sleep, which intercepted that poller too.

- Before: the stub didn't yield, so the poller busy-looped and monopolized
  the loop -> the test hung (the CI-only "after 92%" hang on 3.12+).
- The earlier "make the stub yield" change converted the hang into this
  flood (the poller spins instead of blocking), which is what exposed it.

Fix: route init()'s backoff through TLSClient._sleep so the tests stub that
method in isolation and never touch the global asyncio.sleep. Tasks sharing
the loop are no longer affected; schedule assertions are unchanged.

The deeper fragility this exploited — a leaked, un-cancelled background poller
surviving on the shared test loop — is left as a follow-up.
2026-06-17 01:23:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 795193fa00 fix(deadline): prefer a ready result over a same-window deadline/cancel
run_with_deadline checked the deadline/cancel before reading the result
queue, so a call that completed in the same scheduling window could be
reported as a spurious timeout. Drain the queue first.

Also from review:
- test_validate_regex_pattern stubs run_with_deadline, so the probe regex
  never runs — use a benign pattern instead of a real backtracking literal
  (the literal tripped a ReDoS scanner).
- output_guard_judge docstring: reference IntentJudge._parse_verdict instead
  of brittle judge.py line numbers.

The _runner BaseException catch is intentional and kept: it relays (not
swallows) whatever fn() raises to the caller via the queue; narrowing to
Exception would let a BaseException escape the worker so the caller never
gets a value, degrading the no-hang guarantee.
2026-06-17 01:23:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 155fbb1427 ci: cap the suite jobs at 20 minutes
A hung run otherwise rides GitHub's 6-hour default with -v streaming the
whole time (the source of the multi-GB job logs). Cap test and test-postgres
at 20 minutes so a flaky hang fails fast instead of bleeding hours.
2026-06-17 01:23:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7e3ec8dea5 test(tls): yield in the asyncio.sleep stub (suspected CI-hang fix)
CI hung on test_init_retries_transient_failure (the new -v output named it:
its nodeid printed, no PASSED, the job rode to cancellation). It is the first
retry test that actually awaits the stubbed asyncio.sleep — the earlier tests
raise before sleeping — which points straight at the stub.

The stub returned without ever suspending, so the retry run completed in one
event-loop step with no checkpoint; that is fragile under the async test
runner and is the suspected cause (3.12/3.13/3.14 only — never reproduced on
3.11 or locally). Capture the real asyncio.sleep before patching and await
sleep(0) in the stub so it still yields, keeping the no-real-delay behavior
and the backoff-schedule assertions. Same fix in the discovery-failure test.
2026-06-17 01:23:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 6560f1ec4f fix(judge): daemon-thread call deadlines; raise local-model timeouts
The judges and the regex ReDoS probe ran a blocking call on a
ThreadPoolExecutor and abandoned the worker with shutdown(wait=False) on
timeout or cancel. concurrent.futures joins every executor worker from an
atexit hook regardless of wait=False, so a wedged call could pin
interpreter exit — and hang the test suite at shutdown.

Add turnstone/core/deadline.py::run_with_deadline: run a blocking callable
on a daemon thread bounded by a wall-clock timeout and an optional cancel
event. A daemon worker is never joined at exit, so abandoning one is safe.

Migrate three sites onto it:
- OutputGuardJudge.evaluate()
- IntentJudge._evaluate_single / _run_judge — this also removes
  _ExecutorPoisonedError and the executor-restart dance: per-call daemon
  threads can't poison a shared single-slot pool, so a timeout now returns
  None and the caller delivers one fallback verdict.
- console/server.py _validate_regex_pattern (regex ReDoS probe)

Also:
- Double the default judge LLM timeouts for slower local models:
  judge.timeout 60->120s and judge.output_guard_llm_timeout 30->60s
  (settings registry, JudgeConfig dataclass, --judge-timeout CLI default,
  class docstring, docs). Correct a stale doc that described the per-turn
  timeout as a total budget across turns.
- Raise the regex probe bound 0.5->3.0s so a legitimately complex pattern
  isn't false-flagged as catastrophic backtracking.
- CI: run pytest with -v instead of -q so a hang names the offending test
  instead of riding the job timeout.
- Tests: cover deadline.py and the regex validator; move test_judge.py off
  fixed sleeps onto the existing _wait_for helper.
2026-06-17 01:23:51 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 093239d614 chore: bump version to 1.6.7 2026-06-16 04:13:57 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f5ab26b4dc fix(deps): bump cryptography + starlette for security advisories
- cryptography >=48.0.1 (resolved 49.0.0): PyPI wheels <48.0.1 bundle a
  vulnerable statically-linked OpenSSL (GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf, 2026-06-09 secadv).
- starlette >=1.3.1: CVE-2026-54282 (path->authority host spoof via
  request.url reconstruction) + CVE-2026-54283 (url-encoded form DoS —
  max_fields / max_part_size silently ignored for x-www-form-urlencoded).

Full non-live suite green on the bumped deps.
2026-06-16 04:13:57 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1da001deed chore: bump version to 1.6.6 2026-06-16 03:58:04 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 863f0fd6e2 fix(voice): default blank provider to openai in the admin audio gate
Copilot review: _audioModelEligible gated stt/tts on md.provider, but a
blank/unset provider was treated as not-audio-capable and excluded — an
asymmetry with the backend, where _provider_carries_audio and
ModelConfig.provider both default to "openai". Default the provider to "openai"
before the check so a provider-less model isn't wrongly dropped from the
voice-role dropdowns.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley fe2403f810 refactor(attachments): retire the vestigial reservation scaffolding
The by-ref change replaced the send_id reservation model with the per-node
upload buffer (peek-then-drain at write time), but the surrounding narration was
never swept and a no-op stub was retained to make the send handler "read like"
the old flow — which is what made a recent diagnosis assume reservations still
existed.

- Delete the no-op _release_reservation_on_fail() and its 5 call sites in the
  send handler (behaviour-preserving — it did nothing).
- Rename ordered_reserved / reserved_set -> ordered_taken / taken_set (the values
  are the "taken" subset from resolve_staged_attachments, not reservations).
- Sweep the stale "reserve/reservation" wording across the create/send
  docstrings, the API schemas/specs, and the SDK docstrings to the staged-buffer
  vocabulary (resolve / attach / drain). The canonical docs in attachment_buffer
  and attachments already stated the reservation token is gone.

No behaviour change; no tests exercised the removed scaffolding (the
migration-060 test correctly pins the reserved_at column removal and stays).
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8292ba177c fix(attachments): drain create-time staged uploads synchronously
A create-time attachment is dispatched on the first turn, but the buffer drain
runs at write time inside the async dispatch worker (_append_user_turn). The
freshly-opened pane calls rehydrate() before the worker drains, so it painted
the image as a still-pending composer chip ("thumbnail in the text input box").

The inlined first-turn dispatch is the only consumer of those staged uploads and
always commits at create, so drain them from the buffer synchronously right
after resolving them — both the interactive and coordinator post-install paths.
The worker's own per-id discard then no-ops.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 6de1f166b8 fix(voice): gate audio roles to OpenAI-SDK providers
An omni model registered via the anthropic-compatible lane (vLLM Messages API)
was offered for the STT role because it carries supports_audio_input — but the
Anthropic SDK client has no .chat.completions and the Messages API has no audio
content block, so the mic failed with a cryptic
"'Anthropic' object has no attribute 'chat'".

Audio (input_audio) only rides the OpenAI-SDK surface, so gate all audio roles
to OpenAI-SDK providers (openai / openai-compatible / google / xai):
- model_supports_role returns False for anthropic(-compatible), so the mic
  won't draw and the STT/TTS dropdowns won't offer those models.
- transcribe() raises a clear AudioUnavailableError naming the provider instead
  of the opaque AttributeError (defence in depth).
- admin _audioModelEligible mirrors the gate — voice roles only; reranker hits a
  /rerank endpoint, not audio, so it stays un-gated.

To use an omni model's audio, register it as openai-compatible (the input_audio
path); the anthropic-compatible lane is text/vision only.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c955001372 refactor(attachments): address branch self-review
- DRY the launcher create body: the multipart (meta + file parts) vs JSON
  framing was duplicated in _createCoordinator and _createInteractive — extract
  _createWorkstreamFetchOpts so the create wire shape lives in one place.
- Correct the proxy comment: the forwarded owner uid comes from the
  authenticated ws_body (as on the JSON path), not the caller's meta; the proxy
  token source is console-proxy, not console.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4556a04b5e feat(voice): let omni models serve speech-to-text via the chat path
The mic is an STT control — it records and transcribes to editable text in the
composer. STT eligibility required the dedicated /audio/transcriptions endpoint
(supports_transcription / a whisper-style name), so an omni chat model
(supports_audio_input, e.g. Gemma) couldn't back it: it has no transcription
endpoint, it ingests audio via chat.

- model_supports_role accepts supports_audio_input for the STT role, so an omni
  alias resolves as STT and the mic draws for it.
- transcribe() branches: a whisper-style alias keeps /audio/transcriptions; an
  omni alias transcribes via chat input_audio + an instruction prompt — the
  audio.stt_prompt override, else a default that emits only the transcript.
  Audio attachments on an omni-STT setup transcribe the same way.
- admin _audioModelEligible mirrors the eligibility so omni models show in the
  STT dropdown; the role description notes the two backends.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4a8c908ce9 fix(attachments): normalize EXIF orientation so thumbnails and models see upright images
Phone photos store landscape pixels plus an EXIF orientation tag. Browsers honour
the tag for <img>, but Pillow (our thumbnails) and many vision-model image
decoders do not — so the thumbnail rendered rotated AND the model literally
perceived the photo sideways (noticed earlier as model "hallucinations", before
thumbnails made the rotation visible).

Normalize on read, at both surfaces:
- new core/images.normalize_image_orientation: bakes the rotation into the pixels
  and re-encodes (preserving format); images with no / identity orientation pass
  through untouched (pristine original, no per-send cost).
- make_thumbnail applies exif_transpose — after the decompression-bomb pixel gate,
  which now also covers the transpose decode.
- attachment_to_content_part runs image bytes through the normalizer before
  base64, so the primary model and the perception model both get upright pixels.

Because normalization is on read (not at upload), it fixes already-stored uploads
too.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley bd86a0fb09 fix(attachments): surface the perception role in admin (roles tab + settings filter)
The universal perception fallback (perception.model_alias) shipped backend-only
— session.py + perception.py + settings_registry.py — so its admin UI was never
wired. Operators had no way to assign it from the Models → Roles sub-tab, and the
raw setting leaked into the Settings tab.

- Add a Perception row to MODEL_ROLES (no capability filter — it spans
  image/PDF/audio; the description tells operators to enable supports_vision /
  supports_audio_input on the target model, which is what makes the audio
  fallback engage when no STT role is set).
- Derive the Settings role-key skip-set from MODEL_ROLES instead of a
  hand-maintained list, so perception is filtered out and no future role can
  drift back in (stt/tts/reranker had leaked the same way).
- Add an optional per-role disabledLabel so the blank dropdown option reads
  correctly for non-voice roles (perception, reranker) instead of "voice off".
- Refresh the stale STT description that claimed "no audio-capable session
  fallback" — audio attachments now fall back to perception.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley b900b20c40 fix(attachments): forward create-time attachments for console interactive sessions
The console creates interactive sessions by proxying to the owning node via
/v1/api/cluster/workstreams/new, which only forwarded JSON — so a file staged in
the launcher was blocked with "Attachments aren't supported for interactive
sessions yet". The node create endpoint already accepts multipart (meta JSON +
file parts) on interactive_endpoint_config; only the proxy lacked it.

Teach create_workstream to accept multipart: parse meta + files (same caps as
the node), pick the node exactly as before (auto / pool / pinned), and forward
the files instead of re-serialising JSON. _createInteractive sends multipart
when files are staged (mirroring _createCoordinator) and the launcher gate is
removed. The files-need-a-task guard already ensures an initial turn to
dispatch them on.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 0b02838a42 fix(attachments): base-prefix interactive pane attachment requests
A console interactive pane is node-proxied — every request rides the pane's
transport base ("/node/{id}"). The attachment controller hardcoded bare
/v1/api/workstreams/... paths, so upload / list / delete / preview landed on
the console's OWN coord route, which resolves ws_id via coord_mgr.get() and
404s as "coordinator not found". The standalone server (base="") was
unaffected, which masked the bug.

Thread the pane base through: createAttachmentController and
buildAttachmentPreview take an optional getBase / base, and the interactive
pane wires this._base into both. Coordinator panes and the standalone server
pass "" and stay origin-mounted as before.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c099ed030e fix(attachments): address PR review feedback (Copilot + code-quality)
- TextDecoder in the text-preview stream now flushes on completion/cancel, so a multibyte UTF-8 char split across a chunk boundary isn't dropped (Copilot).

- send() clears self._wire_part_cache in a finally so the per-send memo (which can hold large rasterized PDF page-images) is released at send end instead of retained on an idle session until the next send (Copilot + fix-review).

- Make the implicit byte-string concatenation in _minimal_pdf explicit (+) in test_pdf.py and test_thumbnails.py so it can't read as a missing comma (CodeQL / github-code-quality).
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d81b312b41 fix(attachments): address fix-review nits (ftyp scan, text-preview, cache doc)
A review of the fix commits surfaced three refinements:

- ftyp audio sniff: scan the whole ftyp box (its declared length) for an audio brand instead of a fixed 6-slot window, so a real .m4a with the brand listed late still passes — while a pure-video file (no audio brand) still rejects.

- text-preview: accumulate body chunks until >=240 chars before cancelling the stream, instead of assuming the first chunk is large (flush boundaries can split a large body into small early chunks).

- _resolve_attachments: correct the cache comment — the memo is refreshed per send and the wire resolver only runs during a send, so a stale value is never observed between sends.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1251ecaa11 chore(attachments): hygiene sweep — dead code, stale comments, SDK type, pdf nit
- Remove the unused PerceptionUnavailableError (never raised/caught/imported).

- Reword the now-shipped 'Phase 3' placeholder comments on the Anthropic + OpenAI-Responses audio paths to describe the live upstream STT/perception fallback (these placeholders are defensive, not pending work).

- Clarify the no-vision image fall-through comment (fires when perception is unconfigured OR can't see, not only the former).

- Type AttachmentInfo.kind as the image|text|pdf|audio union in the TS SDK.

- extract_pdf_text: append the truncation marker only when there's actual text, so a scanned PDF over the page cap returns '' (-> placeholder) instead of a content-free document part.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7939d70b36 test(attachments): handler-level coverage for /thumbnail + the served-blob gate
The /thumbnail endpoint and the _resolve_served_blob ownership/404-leak gate it shares with /content had no handler-level test (only make_thumbnail as a unit + route mounting). Add cases through the real app: image -> 200 image/png with the nosniff + CSP + max-age headers; audio/text -> 415; make_thumbnail None -> 415; cross-workstream id and unowned-ws cross-user -> 404 (no existence leak).
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f01e02d443 perf(attachments): stop downloading the whole text blob for a 240-char preview
The text-snippet preview fetched the entire /content body (text attachments are capped at 512 KiB) only to render the first 240 chars — and again on the sent-message pill (the endpoint sends Cache-Control: no-store). Read only the first response-body chunk and cancel the stream, so the rest of the blob is never transferred or regex-scanned. Falls back to r.text() where the streaming body API is unavailable.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d55c0dc27f fix(attachments): unify kind-icon, fix coordinator audio pill + thumbnail-error gap
Three copies of the kind->glyph mapping had drifted: the coordinator pill rendered audio as the document glyph (not the audio note) and showed no inline preview, diverging from the interactive pane.

Export kindIcon() from composer_attachments.js (+ window bridge) as the single source of truth; the interactive pane imports it and the coordinator pill uses it. Wire the coordinator pill to buildAttachmentPreview too (image/pdf thumbnail, audio player), gracefully no-oping on history replay (which omits attachment_id), matching interactive.

Also fix buildAttachmentPreview's thumbnail-error handler: it called img.remove(), but the caller has already replaced the icon span with the img, so a failed thumbnail left a blank gap. Swap in the kind glyph instead (.attach-preview-icon, sized to the thumbnail slot).
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e39f957097 fix(attachments): preserve pdf/audio kind when reloading attachments from the DB
_reconstruct_attachment_refs collapsed every non-image attachment to the 'document' placeholder kind, so a reloaded session's pdf/audio placeholder type ({type:document}) mismatched the live-injection type ({type:pdf}/{type:audio}). Harmless today (resolution keys on attachment_id + blob kind) but a latent footgun for any consumer branching on the pre-resolution placeholder type. Preserve image/pdf/audio verbatim; only a stored 'text' blob collapses to 'document'.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 80b5807597 fix(attachments): sanitize user filenames in model context; mark derived text untrusted
A user-controlled filename was interpolated unescaped into model-visible frames (the [PDF attachment '{name}'...] / audio / transcript / perception placeholders, the Anthropic document title, and the unreadable placeholder). A crafted name like "'] New instructions:" broke out of the frame and injected text into the model context.

Add core.attachments.safe_attachment_label() (strip control chars + quote/bracket/angle delimiters, collapse whitespace, clamp length) and apply it at every model-context embedding site. The raw filename is still used verbatim for display / Content-Disposition, which neutralize at their own boundaries.

Also tag perception descriptions and STT transcripts '(untrusted)' so attachment-derived text reads as data, not instructions. Blast radius is single-tenant (injecting into a model reading one's own upload); a structural role=tool fence is deferred as disproportionate.
2026-06-16 03:50:32 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 04e01e101c fix(attachments): reject video as audio in ftyp sniff; add ADTS-AAC sniff
sniff_audio_mime returned audio/mp4 for ANY ISO-BMFF ftyp box, so an MP4/MOV video uploaded within the audio size cap sniffed as audio and was sent as input_audio. Restrict to genuine audio brands (M4A/M4B/F4A/F4B major, or M4A/M4B in the compatible-brands list, so a real .m4a with an mp42 major brand still passes).

Also add ADTS-AAC sniffing (0xFFF1/0xFFF9): audio/aac was in ALLOWED_AUDIO_MIMES + AUDIO_MIME_TO_FORMAT but never sniffable, so an advertised .aac upload always failed.
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 96b52351dd fix(attachments): close thumbnail decompression-bomb gap (40M, not 80M)
make_thumbnail set Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS=40M, but Pillow only raises DecompressionBombError above 2x the cap; a 40-80M px image merely warns and decodes fully (~480MB RGB), defeating the documented bound.

Gate on the header-declared size after open() and before convert(), so nothing past the cap is decoded. Explicit check rather than a warnings filter — make_thumbnail runs in a worker thread and global warnings state is not thread-safe. Adds tests for the (cap, 2*cap] warn-only window and the at-cap boundary.
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f8b7cc23cb perf(attachments): per-send wire-part memo to stop re-rasterizing every round-trip
_resolve_attachments re-runs on every agentic round-trip (and per fallback model), each time re-fetching every attachment across the full history and re-rasterizing / re-base64'ing it. A 10-page PDF in a 10-cycle tool turn was rendered dozens of times.

Add a per-send memo (self._wire_part_cache) keyed by (attachment_id, caps-signature): the materialized wire part is computed at most once per send. The cache is None outside a send (display/export paths unaffected) and reset per send to bound the heavy rasterized-page parts and pick up any mid-session capability change. Skip the DB fetch entirely when every id is already cached.

Also peek the perception (alias, content_hash) memo before building parts in _perception_fallback_part, so a cross-send describe hit no longer wastes a PDF rasterize. Leaves pdf.py's deliberate no-module-cache stance intact — the per-send scope addresses the round-trip amplification without the durable store it defers.

Adds describe_peek() + per-send-cache and peek tests.
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 218f1067ff fix(attachments): repair dead OpenAI-Responses native PDF path
sanitize_messages ran inline_document_parts (which placeholders an application/pdf document part) before the Responses translator's native input_file branch could run, so every supports_pdf model silently degraded its PDF to an unsupported text placeholder.

Thread a skip_pdf_inline flag through sanitize_messages -> inline_document_parts; the Responses lane sets it so the PDF document survives to convert_content_parts. Chat / Google-compat keep the placeholder (they have no native PDF block).

The existing test exercised convert_content_parts in isolation, bypassing sanitize_messages and masking the bug. Add an end-to-end _convert_messages regression test (verified to fail without the fix) plus contrast tests pinning both lanes' behavior.
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7c70bb2b89 docs(attachments): pin xAI Grok to the rasterize-PDF fallback
q-3 from the pre-push review, settled against docs.x.ai: Grok's document
support is an agentic attachment_search workflow over Files-API uploads
(file_id / file_url), not the inline base64 native ingestion that OpenAI
input_file / Anthropic document blocks use. Our native PDF path emits inline
base64, which xAI's Responses surface doesn't accept — so supports_pdf is
correctly left unset (Grok PDFs rasterize to images, which Grok can see).

Document the rationale on GROK_CAPABILITIES and pin every Grok row's
supports_pdf=False with a test so it isn't naively flipped without first
wiring a Files-API upload flow.
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley cd7e3ab787 feat(attachments): universal perception fallback for non-native modalities
Add a `perception.model_alias` model role: when the primary model can't ingest
an attachment natively and can't be shown a degraded-but-native form, a
configured perception model perceives it and its output is carried as text.
Mirrors the STT role — a role alias plus a module-level memo so the extra LLM
round-trip runs once per attachment, not once per conversation turn. The call
goes through the provider abstraction's create_completion (the path the intent
judge uses), so any vision/omni provider works.

Bottom-tier, universal ladder — perception only fills the remaining gap:
- pdf  : native supports_pdf -> rasterize-to-vision-primary -> perception
         -> extracted text -> placeholder
- image: native vision -> perception (non-vision primary) -> native image_url
- audio: native supports_audio_input -> STT -> perception (omni) -> placeholder

Folds in two review findings the role subsumes:
- bug-1: thread the active attempt's capabilities into _resolve_attachments
  (bound in _try_stream) so a model fallback materializes attachments against
  the fallback model's caps, not the primary's.
- bug-2: charge a by-reference pdf/audio a bounded budget min(size_bytes, 16K)
  instead of zero, so a large-attachment turn isn't budgeted as ~empty (the
  exact materialized size isn't known until wire build).
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f84b9a4219 fix(attachments): harden thumbnail/rasterize DoS + review nits
Pre-push review follow-ups that are independent of the perception-role work
(bug-1 caps threading, bug-2 budget, and the perf cluster fold into that):

- thumbnails: cap decoded pixels (Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS=40M) so a small
  compressed image that decodes to huge dimensions can't OOM the node, and
  reject DecompressionBombError cleanly.
- pdf: clamp per-page render scale so the longest rendered side stays <= 2000px
  (a maximal MediaBox at scale 2.0 rendered to a ~28800px, multi-GB bitmap).
- session_routes: type classify_upload's rejection element as
  UploadRejection | None instead of Any.
- test_session_routes: assert the /thumbnail route mounts (it was untested) and
  fix the stale "quartet"/four wording to five.
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 315df67877 fix(attachments): design-review polish for preview chips/pills
Two-reviewer + sanity pass over the attachment previews:

- composer audio chip is icon+name+size only; the native <audio> player
  renders on the sent message, not the staging chip (too heavy at chip scale)
- cap sent-message pills (+ in-pill audio/snippet) so they no longer overflow
  the bubble at narrow widths; player and snippet drop to their own row
- clamp the chip filename in shared chat.css so long names ellipsize instead
  of wrapping (console main + coordinator previously left it unclamped)
- merge the duplicated .composer-chip rule; drop unused kind-modifier classes
  and inert vertical-align / inline-block declarations
- fix undefined var(--bg-base) -> var(--bg-surface) thumbnail backing
- label the <audio> control (aria-label) and drop the decorative snippet from
  the a11y tree

scripts/livepass.py: add an attachments harness that drives the real
createAttachmentController + Pane.addUserMessage so these surfaces render
headlessly for review.
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4332997d59 feat(attachments): inline chip previews (image/pdf thumbnail, audio player, text snippet)
- core/thumbnails.py + GET .../attachments/{id}/thumbnail: server-rendered PNG
  thumbnails (image downscale; pdf first page via pypdfium2). Extracted a shared
  ownership-gated blob resolver used by both get_content and the thumbnail route
- buildAttachmentPreview (composer_attachments.js): image/pdf -> thumbnail,
  audio -> <audio> player, text -> lazy snippet; reused by the composer chips and
  the sent-message pills (interactive.js). Cookie auth, so direct media src works
- chip kind icons now cover pdf/audio; the upload swap adopts the server's
  authoritative kind for styling + icon + preview
- chat.css preview styling; tests for make_thumbnail
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley efae51dc50 feat(attachments): accept pdf/audio uploads in the UI + admin capability toggles
- composer: accept pdf/audio in the upload picker; client-side kind
  inference for the optimistic chip (server classify_upload stays
  authoritative)
- admin Models tab: supports_pdf + supports_audio_input toggles (flow
  through the field-aware capabilities merge into ModelCapabilities, so
  flipping supports_audio_input on an omni alias enables native input_audio)
- docs: AttachmentInfo.kind, AttachmentUpload, and the TS SDK note pdf/audio
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 278aec0ce4 feat(attachments): rasterize PDF to page images for vision models without native PDF
A vision-capable model that can't ingest PDF natively now gets the PDF
rendered to one image per page instead of extracted text; falls back to
text extraction when rendering yields nothing.

- core/pdf.py: rasterize_pdf via pypdfium2 render + Pillow PNG (page-capped
  at 10, never raises)
- session._wire_content_part: pdf + !supports_pdf + supports_vision ->
  rasterized image parts; else text extraction
- trajectory.resolve_attachment_parts: a placeholder can now expand to a
  list of parts (1->N); the resolve_attachments callback return type widened
  to dict[str, Any] across the provider protocol + 4 providers
- pyproject: pillow dependency
- tests: rasterize_pdf, vision-rasterize gate path, 1->N materialization
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 5fed6d7b08 feat(attachments): capability-gated client-side fallback (pdf->text, audio->transcript)
When the active model can't ingest a kind natively, the wire resolver
converts it client-side instead of sending a part the model can't read.
Per-kind ownership, no shared machinery: PDF text-extraction is a
pure-local PDF concern; audio transcription is an STT concern memoized
in the audio domain.

- core/pdf.py: extract_pdf_text via pypdfium2 (pure-local, no network, no
  cache — re-run per build; page-capped)
- core/audio.py: transcribe_cached — non-raising, memoized by
  (alias, content-hash); backend failures not cached
- session._wire_content_part: per-kind dispatch — native where the model
  supports the kind (supports_pdf / supports_audio_input), else fallback;
  display/export resolve natively so no conversion fires on a render
- image left ungated (pre-existing behavior unchanged)
- pyproject: pypdfium2 dependency + mypy untyped-import override
- tests: pdf extraction, transcript memoization, per-kind gate dispatch
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley de5462beb5 feat(attachments): native PDF + audio translators, accept on upload
PDF and audio attachments now work end-to-end on the native provider
lanes; non-native lanes degrade to a placeholder (client-side fallback
lands next). Capability flags are populated but not yet consumed by a
wire-build gate.

- providers: Anthropic PDF -> base64 document; OpenAI Responses PDF ->
  input_file; compat/Google inline_document_parts PDF -> placeholder
  (fixes the base64-as-text mangle); audio = input_audio passthrough on
  the compat lane (omni), defensive text placeholders on Anthropic +
  Responses
- capabilities: supports_pdf on cloud Claude + OpenAI chat models;
  local/default/compat stay False (-> client-side fallback)
- upload: classifier accepts pdf (32 MiB) + audio (25 MiB); endpoint
  multipart read cap raised to PDF_SIZE_CAP
- hygiene: consolidate the duplicated upload classification into one
  attachments.classify_upload (+ UploadRejection); collapse
  AttachmentUploadHelpers to a single classify_upload callable
- tests: PDF/audio translator shapes, capability flags, classify_upload
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley bfb8a970dd feat(attachments): pdf + audio attachment kinds (dormant spine)
Provider-neutral plumbing for PDF and audio attachments, with no
user-facing change yet: the upload classifier still rejects them and the
capability tables stay unpopulated (both land in the native-translator
phase). No migration — workstream_attachments.kind is free-text.

- attachments.py: PDF/audio byte caps, allowed-audio MIMEs + format map,
  magic-byte sniffers (sniff_pdf_mime / sniff_audio_mime),
  Attachment.is_pdf / is_audio
- providers/_protocol.py: supports_pdf / supports_audio_input capability
  fields (default False; orthogonal to the STT/TTS roles)
- storage/_utils.py: attachment_to_content_part emits the internal
  document(application/pdf, base64) and input_audio shapes
- session.py: by-reference placeholder branches for pdf / audio
- trajectory.py: AttachmentRef docstring (dict-bridge already kind-agnostic)
- tests: test_attachments_pdf_audio.py
2026-06-16 03:50:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley b5c1baf29d chore: bump version to 1.6.5 2026-06-15 04:25:53 -07:00
Patrick Buckley fd8ec8ad18 feat(deploy): systemd units for a bare-metal turnstone-server node
Hardened service + slice + node-identity drop-in template + a README for
running a turnstone-server outside Docker that joins the compose cluster —
the production-shaped counterpart to the one-liner in docs/docker.md. Secrets
stay in config.toml; per-host identity + cluster URLs go in the drop-in. The
README notes the cross-host mTLS caveat (turnstonelabs/lacme#22).
2026-06-15 04:24:23 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 04b3e8e36f feat(compose): let bare-metal turnstone-servers join the cluster (incl. mTLS)
A turnstone-server running outside the compose network ("bare-metal", e.g. a
local-GPU box) couldn't fully join: it can't resolve the in-cluster console
(console:8090) to enroll its mTLS cert, and SearxNG was unreachable for
web_search. Only Postgres was published.

Publish the console's plain-HTTP ACME endpoint (:8090) and SearxNG (:8081)
alongside Postgres, all bound via one knob TURNSTONE_HOST_IP (default 127.0.0.1
-- nothing new on the LAN; set it to the host's LAN IP for a node on another
machine). Postgres keeps honoring the legacy POSTGRES_BIND as a fallback, so
existing .env files don't break.

The node's TLS client now honors TURNSTONE_CONSOLE_URL so a bare-metal node can
point at the published ACME endpoint instead of the unreachable in-cluster name
(empty = in-cluster service discovery, unchanged).

Docs (docker.md, tls.md), the run.sh-generated .env, and the bootstrap wizard
updated to match. The advertised host is the cert's primary SAN and the console
collector dials it back, so mTLS hostname verification holds both ways.
2026-06-15 04:24:23 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 80530aba94 fix(auth): isolate server/console session cookies by name
The server (:8080) and console (:8090) both set a cookie named
`turnstone_auth`. Cookies ignore port (RFC 6265), so on a shared host
(localhost dev, the Electron build, single-box installs) logging into one
surface overwrote the other's cookie and 401'd the first session.

Give each surface its own cookie name -- `turnstone_auth_server` /
`turnstone_auth_console` -- threaded as a required `cookie_name` argument
through the cookie builders, `check_request`, `AuthMiddleware`, and the six
shared auth handlers (login/logout/setup/whoami/refresh/oidc_callback). Each
app passes its own constant; the parameter is required (no default) so a
forgotten caller fails loudly instead of silently reverting to the legacy name.

Names key on role, not node: the cluster shares one JWT identity and the
console->node proxy re-mints a bearer token (dropping Set-Cookie), so
per-instance names would break identity portability and aren't used.

Hard cutover: the legacy `turnstone_auth` cookie is no longer read and
self-expires within its 24h TTL (one forced re-login). JWT audience was
already enforced, so the shared cookie was a session clobber, not an auth
bypass.
2026-06-15 04:24:23 -07:00
Patrick Buckley fb77fcd805 chore: bump version to 1.6.4 2026-06-13 06:27:40 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 0cdf5e9af5 fix(ui): interactive pane keeps its scroll pin across tool calls
The interactive pane only auto-scrolled when isNearBottom() was true, but it measured that AFTER the new node was appended. A tool block is a tall one-shot append (batch shell, approval card, or result) that clears the 80px near-bottom threshold in a single step, so the post-append check read false and auto-follow silently disengaged at exactly tool-call time — the view froze at the top of the block and only snapped back at the next stream_end. Token streaming was unaffected because each append stays sub-threshold.

Capture the near-bottom state as the first statement of each tool-render method, before any DOM mutation, and thread it into scrollToBottom(stick). This re-pins when the user was already at the bottom and, unlike the coordinator pane's unconditional pin, leaves the view alone if they deliberately scrolled up while a result was rendering.

Methods fixed: announceToolBlock, showInlineToolBlock, resolveApproval, appendToolOutput (all three exit paths), appendToolOutputChunk.

(cherry picked from commit a628e9f3b4)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ab61799f66 fix(examples): accept remote Host headers when bound off localhost
The streamable-http server bound to 0.0.0.0/a LAN IP answered TCP and
/watch but returned 421 "Invalid Host header" on /mcp for every remote
node — which broke multi-node play entirely. FastMCP freezes DNS-rebinding
protection (a localhost-only Host allowlist) at CONSTRUCTION, and this
module builds its FastMCP at import time with the default 127.0.0.1 host;
flipping settings.host in _serve afterward never updated the frozen
allowlist, so the LAN Host was always rejected.

When UNDERSTONE_HOST is off localhost, drop the allowlist in _serve before
run() — matching the SDK's own default for a non-localhost bind. The /mcp
and /watch routes are unauthenticated by design, so serve only on a trusted
network (documented).

Regression test pins the mechanism: a default FastMCP 421s a foreign Host,
a protection-disabled one accepts it. Tests 420 -> 421.

(cherry picked from commit 1468ca7972)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 63df3e1750 ci(examples): name the Understone job distinctly
The job was named "test", colliding with core CI's "test" matrix so the PR
checks list showed two "test (3.11)" rows. Rename it to "understone" so the
example's checks read unambiguously (understone (3.11) / (3.13)).

(cherry picked from commit efa8664e4d)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 305a0a3af4 fix(examples): address PR review feedback (CodeQL + Copilot)
- CodeQL (implicit string concatenation in a list): collapse the wrapped
  bullets in cli._render_validate_coverage to single literals. The rendered
  output is byte-identical (the example's ruff ignores E501); clears all
  six alerts and reads cleaner.
- Copilot: packs/README no longer claims the directory ships "effectively
  empty" — it ships the bundled Cinder Wastes alternate world.
- Copilot: the Cinder Wastes' ash_flats and caldera_deep zones overlapped
  on column x=60 (inclusive bounds + first-match zone_for silently shadowed
  the tier-3..5 band onto a 1x5 deep-edge strip). Move caldera_deep to
  x0=61 — no overlap, no dead tiles, deep zone still covers the dungeon.
  And harden the loader: overlapping zone rectangles are now a
  WorldLoadError, so no authored pack can ship that bug unseen (the
  cold-author dogfood loop — a generated pack exposed a validator gap).

Tests 419 -> 420 (zone-overlap rejection). Both worlds validate sound and
remain winnable by the sim bot.

(cherry picked from commit a0a097dfa8)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley af055b342c ci(examples): run the Understone example test suite
The door-game example is a standalone package (no turnstone-core
dependency) that the root suite does not collect — its
testpaths are scoped to ["tests"], so the example's 419 tests, ruff,
and mypy gates never ran in CI.

Add a path-filtered workflow that installs the example and runs its
full gate (pytest + ruff check + ruff format --check + mypy) whenever
examples/door-game (or this workflow) changes, across the example's
declared Python floor and ceiling (3.11, 3.13). Pinned action SHAs and
contents:read permissions match the existing CI workflows.

(cherry picked from commit 30c09aaf51)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 34948bf09b feat(examples): Understone v0.10 — the satchel, the ore-forge, and the vault
A game-loop mechanics patch: the satchel becomes a real stacking inventory,
forging now demands ore won in combat (not just gold), and a vault lets a
hero protect coin from ambush.

- Stacking satchel: the bag re-encodes from a flat id list to "id:qty"
  stacks, so potions stack (three Minor Potions fill one slot, not three)
  and materials ride alongside. satchel_max now caps distinct KINDS (3);
  per-kind quantity is unbounded. quaff/death-save still pull the strongest
  potion and ignore materials. One pure codec (engine/satchel.py) owns the
  encoding; the façade, the Watch, and the sim all decode through it — no
  three-way drift (the v0.9 single-source lesson). The codec parses a bare
  id as qty 1, so it can never silently drop a malformed stack.
- Ore-gated forge: ore is a material that drops from won dungeon-rung
  fights (and, less often, forest fights), stacks in the satchel, and is
  not buyable or sellable — you earn your edge by fighting for it. Forging
  now costs gold AND ore ((plus+1) ore per tier), so a rich-but-idle hero
  can no longer buy power at the dice table. The dungeon is now also the
  mine.
- The vault: deposit/withdraw at the inn moves coin to a strongbox that
  ambush cannot touch and that SURVIVES the Wyrm-win legacy reset — the
  carry-vs-protect decision the PvP economy was missing.
- Surfaced on both the /watch lobby TV and the in-chat door_status sheet:
  each hero's stacked satchel, carried gold, and vaulted gold.
- Tuning (the sim is the instrument): the ore gate added ~2 days to the
  Vale and ~1.6 to the Cinder Wastes; the greedy bot still slays the Wyrm
  3/3 on both, fully forged to +3/+3, so the loop is not stalled. Defaults
  held — no numbers needed retuning.

Four new banded settings (forge_ore_item, forge_ore_per_plus,
ore_dungeon_drop, ore_forest_chance); both worlds gained an ore item.
Schema mutated in place (banked column, satchel re-encoding) — pre-1.0, no
migration by design; a real migration story is owed at 1.0. Tests 382 ->
419; the vault-survives-rebirth invariant and the codec are revert-verified.

(cherry picked from commit 393a6fc2b2)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 0cc59d7e0f feat(examples): Understone v0.9 — colour roles for every object type
Graphics polish: distinct terrain and structures now read by COLOUR on the
Watch, not only by glyph. One unified palette, shared by every world — the
fix is to grow the set of distinct object-type roles, not to fork per-world.

- Roads were the tell: road shared the "floor" green with grass, so a path
  vanished into the meadow on the lobby TV. Likewise forest shared "tree",
  the three town buildings all shared "town", and the Cinder Wastes' molten
  slag borrowed "water" and rendered BLUE. Each is now its own role: road
  (stone), forest (lush green) with scrub (its barren ember-brown
  counterpart for volcanic/desert dense terrain that must NOT read as
  woods), lava (molten orange), barren (wasteland taupe), and inn/shop/
  healer split out of the generic town.
- Both worlds remap onto the shared vocabulary; in each, no two distinct
  terrain/building types share a colour. A live render caught the Cinder
  cinder-fields rendering green under the generic "forest" role — hence the
  scrub role, so the volcanic waste reads warm. The text frame renderer
  stays monochrome (it never read colour), so frames and goldens are
  untouched — this is Watch-only.
- The bug class is now closed by construction: a test asserts the Watch
  PALETTE carries a hex for EVERY Color role, so a role can never ship
  unpaintable and silently fall back (which is exactly how road hid).
- Color.assignable() is the single source for the overlay-vs-assignable
  split (runtime actor/item colours and the DEFAULT fallback are not
  author-pickable); the authoring manual's colour vocabulary generates
  from it, so it can't drift.

Tests 373 -> 382. floor/tree/forest are three greens kept deliberately
distinct (forest is olive-hued); verified on a real render along with the
scrub fix.

(cherry picked from commit 917e391b1f)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ed243cca73 feat(examples): Understone v0.8 — worlds without authors
The slice that proves the pipeline: a second world authored entirely by an
LLM from AUTHORING.md and the validator alone, plus the tooling to discover,
theme, and balance-test any world.

- The dogfood: "The Cinder Wastes" — an ashen volcanic underworld (slag
  rivers, a caldera mouth, a Magma Wyrm) — was written cold by an agent
  given only the generated authoring manual and `understone validate`. It
  passed validation on the FIRST run with zero failures. Its stumble log
  found six places where the manual stated a rule the validator didn't
  enforce; those became permanent hardening (below). It ships in
  understone/world/packs/ and glows ember on the lobby TV.
- `understone worlds` lists every bundled world (the Vale + alternates)
  with its load status, via one shared discovery path.
- Per-world Watch themes: settings.watch_theme (phosphor/amber/ice/ember,
  loader-validated) repaints the spectator page; the Vale's green is
  byte-for-byte unchanged.
- The sim harness: a pure, seeded, greedy bot plays the real game façade
  over an injected day-stepping clock and emits a balance report —
  `understone simulate PATH [--days N] [--seeds K]`. It SLAYS THE WYRM on
  both worlds (Vale ~day 13, Cinder ~day 25), so the whole v0.1->v0.7 loop
  is proven winnable end-to-end by an unclever bot through the real stack.
- Loader hardening from the dogfood: a rare monster may not occupy a
  dungeon-rung guardian slot (it would silently become a fixed foe and
  leave the rare pool); exactly one monster may be the boss; and the
  boss-tier error now says "no non-boss monster," matching the manual.
  AUTHORING gained a generated "what validate checks vs. what it cannot"
  section so the rule/guidance boundary is honest.

Review hardened the bot for arbitrary authored packs (a MENU-mode fight
spin and four related robustness gaps that were latent on the shipped
worlds), and documented that final_level reads post-legacy-reset. Tests
359 -> 373; both worlds still win byte-identically after the fixes.

(cherry picked from commit 65e7b404bc)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1b5b466d47 feat(examples): Understone v0.7 — the deep, the satchel, the forge, rare beasts
The depth slice: four standing reasons to return past the daily reset.

- The rung ladder: the dungeon is a descent fought one rung per turn, each
  guardian a fixed tier. A loss bounces you home but your depth PERSISTS —
  you re-enter where you left off. The Wyrm now gates on BOTH level AND
  reaching the floor (the deep has a bottom, and you must have touched it).
- The satchel + the death-save: potions are CARRIED now (up to three),
  bought to the satchel, drunk with quaff. The heart of it: when any fight
  would kill the active fighter and they carry a draught, the strongest is
  drunk automatically — they survive standing at the potion's value, no
  bounce. This fires on EVERY fight (forest, rung, and the Wyrm itself —
  a potion carried to the climax is a real tactical choice); a Wyrm loss
  so saved is "driven back, alive but unproven," not devoured. The sleeping
  ambush victim never quaffs (they are asleep). combat.py stays pure — the
  satchel and the save live entirely in the façade.
- The forge: the shop spends scaling gold to add a +1 edge to equipped
  weapon or armour, capped — the late-game gold sink. Swapping or selling
  the piece loses the edge with it (one centralized unequip clears the
  bonus and the plus so a stat can never go phantom).
- Rare beasts: a few named foes prowl the forest via weighted selection,
  surfacing seldom; felling one is a public Herald flash and always yields
  a draught into the satchel. Rung guardians are never rare (fixed foes).

Four new player columns; four new banded settings; dungeon_tiers extended
to three rungs. Tests 283 -> 330; the death-save (all four paths), forge
accounting across forge/buy/sell/legacy, rung math, and weighted rare
selection all pinned, with the death-save and forge invariants
revert-verified.

(cherry picked from commit dcc0e5fb0a)
2026-06-13 06:25:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 6ea7756752 feat(examples): Understone v0.6 — UTF-8 graphics and the width discipline
The look of the next age — the modern equivalent of the ASCII->CP437 leap.
Full Unicode is available now, but the whole stack (text frames, golden
tests, the Watch's 1ch grid) assumes one glyph = one column, so the
enabling piece is a WIDTH RULE, not the glyphs themselves.

- textwidth.is_grid_safe: one code point, printable, East-Asian width not
  Wide/Fullwidth, no combining/format/control category. This is the
  one-glyph-one-column contract. Ambiguous-width glyphs are ACCEPTED on
  purpose — they ARE CP437 (the wall, the club-tree, the up-arrow forest)
  and render single-column on the Western-monospace metrics every surface
  uses; only genuinely double-width runes are barred. The loader enforces
  it on every map glyph; the player-name/free-text sanitizer enforces the
  same rule (the narrow ledger), so a wide name can't shear a frame.
- Re-skin: water ~ -> ≋, inn -> ⌂, healer -> ✚, dungeon mouth -> ∩, and
  the other adventurer -> ☻ (CP437's own player glyph). The colour field
  the renderer has carried unused since v0.1 now has a second consumer.
- Texture variants: grass and water vary by a deterministic per-coordinate
  hash, rendered identically in the Python frame builder and the Watch's
  JS. The two are kept in lockstep by shared hash constants + an agreement
  test that replays the JS arithmetic and asserts it equals the Python
  output for every variant over a grid — not a comment-coupled copy.
- Watch glow-up: a Noto Sans Mono font stack and a UTC-hour day/night tint
  (the Vale darkens at dusk on the lobby TV).
- The curated SAFE_PALETTE is enforced author-usable: a test asserts no
  palette glyph collides with the reserved player markers, so AUTHORING's
  generated appendix can't advertise a glyph the loader would reject.
- Resume is identity-preserving: an existing character resumes by exact
  stored name without re-validating the width rule (which governs creation
  only) — resume must never lock anyone out.

Tests 231 -> 283; width edges (CJK/emoji/combining/fullwidth), the
Python<->JS lockstep, the palette/reserved guard, and resume-vs-create all
pinned and revert-verified.

(cherry picked from commit b76b2a98d0)
2026-06-13 06:25:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 9419ad6735 feat(examples): Understone v0.5 — ambushes, the inn mailbox, and dice
The social slice: the shared world gets teeth, letters, and a house game.

- Ambush (async PvP, classic door-game player-kill spirit): waylay an adventurer who has
  not yet begun their day. Ordered gates — known target, not yourself, the
  gatekeeper shields the young (both >= min level), level band +-2, the
  SLEEP RULE (acting today makes you watchful — an active-play defense),
  mercy for the downed (hp<=1 cannot be piled on: even bandits have
  standards), once per pair per UTC day. Win: capped gold cut transfers,
  victim wakes at the spawn-stone with a private note; lose: the sleeper
  wakes blade-in-hand and the Herald crows your shame. The attacker wears
  the counter-blows the combat log narrates (state matches story). Both
  players persist in one transaction.
- The inn mailbox: events carry a target ('' = public). door_log delivers
  private notes to the addressee only; the Watch and other players never
  see them. Mail is DURABLE past the in-memory tail (SQLite backfill for
  cursors older than the resident window) — the broadsheet is ephemeral,
  letters are not. Sanitized, daily-capped.
- Inn dice: 2d6 against the house, bet- and count-capped per day, big wins
  make the news.
- Six new banded settings; four day-counter columns join the shared lazy
  UTC reset; schema stamp stays 1 (pre-1.0 mutates in place by design).

Tests 184 -> 231; sleep rule, mercy gate, band boundary (exact/over),
refusal precedence, attacker wear, zero-gold robbery, mail eviction
survival, and Watch privacy all pinned; guards revert-verified.

(cherry picked from commit 08d46f086f)
2026-06-13 06:25:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 47d88b4196 feat(examples): Understone v0.4 — the authoring pipeline (worlds as data)
The IGM seam realized: world packs are now a first-class authoring target
for models and humans, with a validate loop and a loader hardened for
routinely-untrusted generated content.

- understone newpack DIR scaffolds a pack (the six content JSONs templated
  from the shipped Vale) plus AUTHORING.md — a manual written for a model
  to follow cold. Its bands table is RENDERED FROM the loader's own band
  constants at scaffold time, so documented limits and enforced limits
  cannot drift.
- understone validate DIR loads a pack and prints either a pack report
  ("This pack is sound. The door stands open.") or the loader's
  file/index/field-naming error — the authoring feedback loop.
- Loader hardening: glyphs must be one printable column-safe character and
  never the frame box-drawing set or the @/& player markers (map content
  cannot impersonate players or forge frame chrome); map dims 8..256;
  per-file count caps; display-name length caps. All errors instructive.
- The packaged-world path is single-sourced (understone.world.
  PACKAGED_WORLD_DIR) for the server default and the scaffold template.
- README "Authoring worlds" section frames the loop: newpack -> write or
  generate -> validate -> serve with UNDERSTONE_WORLD=dir.

Review round: bug finder returned zero findings; quality round fixed the
world.json doc example (it showed a zone fragment where an authoring model
would copy a whole-file shape — now a labeled skeleton), the stale Usage
docstring, and the duplicated packaged-path constant.

Tests 166 -> 184. Scaffold round-trips through load_world by test.

(cherry picked from commit d40c4c85ee)
2026-06-13 06:25:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 95f5c5e50e feat(examples): Understone v0.3 — the Watch (lobby TV) + a livelier Vale
A read-only CRT spectator page served by the game process itself, plus
content depth. Input never flows through the Watch — it is the wall-mounted
terminal in the BBS room; chat remains the only actuator, so there is no
input channel to deadlock and no cross-origin surface (the page polls the
same origin that served it).

- /watch: one self-contained page (inline CSS/JS, no external assets),
  phosphor CRT styling. The base map paints once from /watch/world.json
  (terrain glyph rows + a glyph->color legend — the palette the text
  renderer has deliberately ignored since v0.1 finally gets its first
  renderer); players overlay as positioned glyphs repainted from
  /watch/state.json every 2s; the sidebar carries the roster with win
  stars, the Hall of Legends, and the Herald. SIGNAL LOST on poll failure;
  the bootstrap retries so a spectator arriving during a server blip
  recovers without a reload.
- Routes ride FastMCP custom_route on the existing process — read-only
  handlers with no awaits between reads (handlers and sync tools
  interleave on one event loop, so every response is a consistent
  snapshot).
- door_join/door_help advertise the Watch URL in http mode (stdio: none).
- Content: +5 monsters (one per tier; the gauntlet's first-in-tier foes
  preserved), +3 items smoothing the gear curve, +6 events; fight weight
  retuned to hold ~55% of encounter rolls. Zero geography churn.
- Review round: the Herald window is a plain list tail (id arithmetic
  under-reported the feed when AUTOINCREMENT ids gap — regression-pinned
  with sparse ids), and the bootstrap-retry fix above.

Tests 149 -> 166.

(cherry picked from commit d54110ffcb)
2026-06-13 06:25:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley eeeb8f1b4d feat(examples): Understone v0.2 — the Wyrm, forest events, and the Herald
The "make it a game" slice: a win condition with classic-door-game-style legacy, texture
between fights, and a shared broadsheet.

- The Wyrm Below: a boss (flagged in the pack, excluded from random bands)
  behind a level-gated `challenge` verb at the dungeon. Victory writes a
  Hall of Legends row and the character resets to the fresh-start kit,
  keeping a wins counter rendered as ★ on the leaderboard — the classic
  race-reset-race loop. Defeat and stalemate flight make the news.
- Forest events: movement encounters weighted-pick from a content-pack
  table (fight/gold/heal/trap/lore). Only fights stop the walk or cost
  turns; texture is free and private. Trap damage floors at 1 hp.
- The Understone Herald: door_log is a broadsheet with a masthead and
  write-time template variety; the public feed is curated to notable beats
  (joins, blessings, level-ups, defeats, the Wyrm's fate) — town errands
  stay private.
- Reward narration moved from the combat engine to the façade, composed at
  the moment gold/xp are actually banked, so the server can never narrate
  a reward it did not apply (the Wyrm win previously claimed +400 XP /
  +250 gold that the legacy reset wiped).
- Fresh-start hp/atk/def promoted into world.json settings alongside the
  starting kit; dungeon-tier validation counts non-boss monsters only,
  keeping the validator's no-silent-rung promise true.

Schema mutated in place (players.wins, hall_of_fame) — pre-release, no
migration path by design. Tests 109 -> 149; the challenge level gate is
negative-tested; rank stars survive 24-char names (compact form past 5).

(cherry picked from commit 4b8681db8a)
2026-06-13 06:25:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 6dff81bece feat(examples): Understone — a BBS door game as a standalone MCP server
A shared-world, classic-door-game-style door game in examples/door-game/: a pure-stdlib
game engine (tile overworld + location menus, seeded combat, daily turn
budget, leveling, shop, event log, leaderboard) behind nine sync door_*
FastMCP tools returning monochrome box-drawing frames. The connecting
session's LLM plays dungeon master — tool descriptions plus a door_help
manual teach a cold model to run the game with zero setup, while the server
owns all dice and state, so the DM narrates around facts it cannot bend.

Non-obvious decisions:
- engine/screen/world/persistence import stdlib only; server.py is the only
  mcp import. All nine handlers are sync def: on mcp 1.27 they execute
  inline on the event loop (verified against func_metadata), so tool bodies
  serialize and one SQLite connection (WAL, per-action commit) is safe.
  check_same_thread=False exists only because the Store may be constructed
  on a different thread than the serving loop.
- Streamable HTTP serves ONE process = one shared world (players appear on
  each other's maps; async "while you were away" event feed); stdio is the
  solo-world fallback.
- The economy is content, not code: daily_turns, costs, xp curve, bestow
  budget, and dungeon tiers live in world.json settings, band-validated by
  the loader. door_bestow gives the DM capped, event-audited largesse
  (gold/heal only, never turns) so story generosity cannot melt the shared
  leaderboard.
- Player names and bestow reasons are sanitized (printable-only, length
  caps) because they flow into the shared event log and from there into
  other players' DM context — embedded newlines would forge log lines.
- Daily turn/bestow pools lazy-reset per UTC day on every consuming path
  (injectable clock); the dungeon gauntlet is a fixed boss ladder by design.

Tests: 109 — engine units with seeded RNG + frozen clock, hand-authored
golden frames paired with structural asserts, loader band rejections, and
one real-wire integration test (uvicorn + streamablehttp_client) with a
two-session shared-world assertion. Negative-tested by reverting the guard
and watching the suite fail: the daily turn-budget guard, the bestow cap,
and the sanitizer's isprintable clause.

(cherry picked from commit 99e7dc17ec)
2026-06-13 06:25:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 549e15f2f6 feat(memory): durable per-user coordinator scope + anonymous-coordinator guard
The coordinator memory scope was keyed by the session's ws_id, so every
new coordinator session started with an empty namespace and its rows
were orphaned on close — coordinator memory never actually persisted.
Re-key the scope to the coordinator's creator user_id: one durable
orchestration namespace per user, shared by all of that user's
coordinator sessions (concurrent ones included; upsert-by-name is the
collision rule).

The child-containment threat model is unchanged: the gate is session
KIND — children are always interactive and share the parent's user_id,
so _validate_scope rejects them before scope resolution, and the REST
memories API still rejects the coordinator scope outright. The implicit
visibility lane now also fails closed on an empty scope_id to match the
explicit search/list lanes (the storage helpers treat a falsy scope_id
as 'no scope_id filter', which would have read every user's rows).

Anonymous coordinators are no longer constructible: ChatSession refuses
kind=COORDINATOR with an empty user_id at the constructor — the single
choke point covering create, rehydration of legacy rows (surfaced by
the open handler as a 503 with remediation text), and any future host —
and the console no longer masks an empty uid as a phantom 'system'
principal when minting coordinator JWTs, per CoordinatorTokenManager's
documented 'sub = the real creator user_id' contract.

Migration 061 carries existing coordinator rows across: rows whose
owning workstream is gone or ownerless are deleted (unreachable under
user keying), same-name collisions within a user keep the newest
updated row (memory_id tiebreak), and survivors re-key to the owner's
user_id.

(cherry picked from commit 30b590fb25)
2026-06-13 06:25:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 52bea510e2 chore: bump version to 1.6.3 2026-06-12 00:17:11 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1f700bf72a fix(ui): split separator ARIA range reflects the real clamp, not 10–90
_buildHandle hard-coded aria-valuemin/max at 10/90 (inherited from the
old ui/static implementation) while the actual drag/keyboard clamp is
_ratioBounds — the cell minimums against the split node's OWN px region
(a 1200px host really clamps at ~17/83; nested splits sit tighter), so
assistive tech was told a wider range than the separator allows.

aria-valuenow/min/max are now all written in _applyLayout's handle loop
from _ratioBounds(h.node) — one writer, refreshed on every drag,
keyboard nudge, and structural change. A bare window resize can stale
the advertised range until the next interaction (no resize listener by
design — % insets make resizes free), still strictly truer than a
constant. The max>=min guard covers a host shrunk below two cell
minimums, where the bounds legitimately cross.
2026-06-12 00:13:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 6b353ea225 docs(ui): the pane-hosted coordinator scope is every coordinator in practice
The /coordinator/{ws_id} standalone page is reachable only by direct
URL — all three console navigation sites are shell-fallback else
branches behind openPane. Record that in the sidebar-padding comment
so the scope isn't over-read as a live second surface.
2026-06-12 00:13:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley caafac901e fix(ui): drop the pane-hosted coordinator sidebar below the corner chip
The per-pane ✕/− chip floats at the pane's top-right — exactly where
the coordinator sidebar's toggle row and Children refresh button sit,
so the chip covered them. Pane-hosted coordinators now start the
sidebar content 44px down (padding, not margin, so the column's left
border still runs the full pane height); the standalone coordinator
page has no chip and keeps the 14px default.
2026-06-12 00:13:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 745d6ece59 fix(ui): split-view pre-push review round — mode-distinct chip, anchoring, light-theme AA
Dual designer review (one primed on the branch context, one cold), all
measured findings applied:

- The per-pane chip was a mode-error trap: identical glyph at the
  identical locus, reversible in split mode (hide cell) but destructive
  single-pane (close pane). Now − hides, ✕ closes, and the close mode
  wears a danger hover/focus ring so the irreversible action telegraphs
  before the click lands.

- Single-pane chip anchored to the VIEWPORT: an unpositioned section
  resolves absolutes to <body>, so the chip only coincidentally landed
  near the pane corner. .panes > section.pane is now position:relative
  in both modes (all pane-content absolutes verified to anchor to their
  own local relative parents).

- Light-theme AA (measured): .shown tab underline 55% mix composited to
  2.34:1 -> 80% (~3.7:1 light / ~5:1 dark); focused-cell ring 2.60:1 on
  light -> 75% mix override there (dark keeps 55% at 3.75:1).

- Chip: border --hair-2 measured ~1.3:1 (invisible) -> --ink-4; 22px
  target under WCAG 2.5.8's 24px floor -> 28px; right offset clears the
  message scrollbar gutter; light resting glyph one ink step up.

- Focus bar inset 1px from cell sides (no doubled-accent stripe where
  it butted a separator at the T-junction); greyscale font smoothing on
  the tail glyphs (subpixel RGB fringed the box-drawing characters).

Rejected with rationale: aria-pressed on the split buttons (they are
one-shot verbs — splitting again nests — not mode toggles).
2026-06-12 00:13:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 75b9222a7f feat(ui): split-view follow-ups — per-pane ✕, child-opens-beside, close-on-ws_closed
Four refinements from first live use:

- Per-pane ✕ chip, top-right of every visible pane. Split mode: hide
  that cell (closeCell — the tab stays, the sibling absorbs the space).
  Single-pane: close the pane outright (withheld from the unclosable
  Dashboard). The click decides at click time; the label tracks the
  mode. Manager-injected into the pane section — content untouched.

- Coordinator child links open BESIDE the coordinator (openPaneBeside:
  split right of the focused cell, seeded with the child pane) instead
  of replacing it — the parent stays on screen. Degrades to the plain
  focused-cell swap when the split is denied (cap / narrow viewport).
  splitFocused() gained an optional explicit-fill parameter for this.

- Tier-1 ws_closed now CLOSES the open interactive pane (tab gone, a
  split cell collapses) — the coordinator-closes-its-child flow,
  matching the standalone's pane-auto-close. The dead-banner lane
  stays for streams that die without a ws_closed (node crash/network),
  where the session may still be revivable.

- Paint bug: the focused-cell ring was an inset box-shadow on the
  section, which paints in the element's own background layer — UNDER
  opaque children touching the edges, so the status bar / composer
  strip occluded it. The ring now rides a click-transparent ::after
  overlay above pane content; the 2px top bar sits above the ring line.

The livepass shell surface's demo panes grew a .ws-status-bar footer so
the occlusion bug class stays visible to future passes.
2026-06-12 00:13:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 70cc8dd97d feat(ui): split view returns to the L-shell — PaneManager layout tree
Revives the split-pane feature retired with ui/static (step 6), rebuilt
on PaneManager: an optional binary layout tree (null = the one-pane-per-
tab behaviour, unchanged) renders visible panes as %-inset cells — no
reparenting, so live stream DOM, scroll state and media survive layout
changes. Tabs stay global: the active tab is the focused cell, a
backgrounded tab swaps into it, clicking inside a visible pane focuses
its cell, .shown marks visible-unfocused tabs. Separators resize by
pointer-capture drag and arrow keys (role=separator + aria-value*); the
tree persists in the working-set blob and rehydrate prunes leaves whose
pane did not restore. Limits: 6 cells, 200x150 cell minimums, denials
toast the manager's reason.

Affordance: Split right / Split down / Unsplit buttons in the tab-bar
tail replace the redundant [+] (the permanent Dashboard tab is the
launcher) — deliberately no contextmenu override this time. The dead
TS_APP.focusLauncher seam goes with it.

Measured chrome: the focused cell wears a 2px accent top bar (no thin
tinted ring clears 3:1 in both themes) plus a 55%-mix inset ring;
separators rest at --ink-4 with solid-accent hover/drag/focus; .shown
tabs carry an accent underline; the tail cluster is fenced and lifted
to --ink-3.

scripts/livepass.py grows a third surface: shell/livepass.html boots
the real shell.js + pane.js and drives ?split=right|down|three|none
(+ &theme=light), stamping SPLIT-READY-<cells> / SPLIT-FAILED-<reason>.
2026-06-12 00:13:12 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 019d13d930 chore: bump version to 1.6.2 2026-06-11 20:53:13 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8fbcbff566 test: zero out the suite's warning noise
121 warnings -> 0. Two upstream deprecations get narrowly-scoped
filterwarnings entries (the mcp streamablehttp_client rename — adoption
deliberately rides the v2 migration since the new entry point's call
shape changes again there; the starlette httpx TestClient notice). The
one real RuntimeWarning is fixed at the source: tests that mock
asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe handed real coroutines to a stub that
never awaited them, GC-firing 'coroutine was never awaited' inside
whatever unrelated test ran later (the same cross-test bleed mechanism
as the CI closed-stream spew — per-test filterwarnings markers cannot
catch it, which is why two such markers existed and still leaked). A
shared _dispatch_stub now closes real coroutines before returning the
canned future; the obsolete markers are removed.
2026-06-11 20:44:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley a27738867f chore: cap mcp <2 ahead of the v2 breaking rewrite
mcp 2.0.0a1 shipped 2026-06-11 (stable targeted ~2026-07-27). v2 removes
streamablehttp_client, changes the transport tuple arity, and renames
mcp.types fields to snake_case — all of which our client imports. The
maintainers' release note asks downstream packages to add an upper
bound now (their worked example is this exact constraint). Floor stays
at 1.27: nothing newer adds anything our surface needs, and the #2147
shutdown busy-loop we wrap remains unfixed at every released version.
Resolution is unchanged (1.27.2); lockfile re-pinned metadata only.
2026-06-11 20:44:10 -07:00
renovate[bot] 1d0be9773f chore(deps): update docker images to v0.11.21 2026-06-11 20:44:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ad56e1ec96 fix(providers): require base_url for anthropic-compatible
Copilot review on #661: empty base_url let the SDK fall back to
https://api.anthropic.com, sending compat-shaped requests to the
commercial API. The lane is local-only by definition, and the /v1-strip
edge case already established fail-loudly-over-silent-prod-retarget;
apply the same principle to the empty case. create_client raises an
actionable ValueError; the admin Detect path surfaces it as a clean
error string via probe_model_endpoint's existing handler.
2026-06-11 20:44:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8f0115ee2e feat(providers): anthropic-compatible lane for local /v1/messages servers
Add provider id "anthropic-compatible": the existing AnthropicProvider
pointed at Anthropic-compatible local servers (vLLM /v1/messages),
mirroring the openai/openai-compatible split. Registry-only — configured
via the admin Models tab or [models.*] toml, not exposed on the bare
--provider flag, so the CLI/server prod-URL defaults are unreachable for
the lane and real-Anthropic behavior is untouched.

Lane behavior (live-verified against vLLM 0.22.1rc1 + DeepSeek-V4-Flash):
- Capability defaults replace the Claude static table: token_param
  max_tokens, thinking_mode none, web_search/tool_search/vision off,
  reasoning replay on. vLLM rejects Anthropic server-side tool types
  (tools require input_schema) and ignores the thinking request param,
  so neither is sent; thinking blocks still stream back and round-trip
  through the native lane verbatim.
- Reasoning toggles via server_compat extra_body chat_template_kwargs
  (first-class vLLM request field; request-level keys beat server
  defaults). _build_thinking_and_kwargs forwards non-internal
  extra_params as SDK extra_body; thinking_budget_tokens stays internal.
- No temperature force: thinking_mode none skips the Claude-only
  temperature=1.0 requirement.

Admin UI: provider option + URL placeholder (base_url without /v1 — the
SDK appends /v1/messages); the server-compat section shows only the
extra-body field for the lane. thinking_mode round-trips through the
form dropdown for every provider except anthropic-compatible, where it
stays in the raw capabilities JSON — the edit-load lift and save restore
use the same predicate so stored overrides are never silently dropped.

Docs: architecture.md gains the lane subsection incl. verified quirks
(thinking param dropped by vLLM; stop_sequences cut inside thinking and
report end_turn; usage has no cache fields; images need a multimodal
model; mid-conversation system turns are per-model opt-in).

Negative-tested: removing the _INTERNAL_EXTRA_PARAMS exclusion fails
test_internal_keys_not_leaked; the live test drives a streamed turn with
the chat_template_kwargs toggle and asserts no reasoning deltas.
2026-06-11 20:44:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 7aba631201 fix(mcp): close the shutdown drain race + close the owned loop
Review feedback: (1) gating the drain on a main-thread truthiness check
of _background_tasks could skip cancellation when a spawn queued via
call_soon_threadsafe had not reached the set yet — submit whenever the
loop is RUNNING and snapshot on the loop, where FIFO callback order
guarantees earlier-queued spawns have landed; (2) shutdown stopped the
loop thread but never closed the loop or cleared _loop/_thread, leaking
selector resources for embedders that cycle managers — close + clear
when we own the thread and it actually stopped (loud warning when it
does not); unowned loops (tests wiring _loop directly) stay untouched;
(3) the bare await-in-suppress drain loops become
asyncio.gather(return_exceptions=True) in both the shutdown drain and
the test fixture.
2026-06-11 20:44:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f3f5e84f2d fix(mcp): track fire-and-forget background tasks; harden loop teardown
The post-reconnect catalog refresh was scheduled as a bare
asyncio.create_task: no strong reference (the task could be GC'd
mid-flight, so the refresh might silently never run) and no exception
retrieval (failures surfaced as "Task exception was never retrieved"
at GC time — in CI, onto an already-closed pytest capture stream, the
"I/O operation on closed file" spew; a suspected contributor to the
flaky 60-minute CI hangs via cross-test loop/task state bleed).

- _spawn_background(coro, label): tracked-task set + done-callback
  that retrieves and logs failures at warning; discard runs LAST so
  set-emptiness means "done AND reported"
- shutdown() drains tracked tasks FIRST, so stack teardown can't race
  an in-flight refresh; same run_coroutine_threadsafe idiom and
  timeouts as the existing close steps
- running_loop_mgr fixture: cancel-pending -> drain -> stop ->
  join(5) with a loud assert -> loop.close() (was stop + silent
  join(2), never closed)
- the false-property test ("swallows refresh failure" — nothing
  swallowed it) now waits for completion and asserts the logged
  warning via the patched module logger (structlog; caplog cannot
  observe it), polling inside the patch context
2026-06-11 20:44:10 -07:00
Patrick Buckley ff1e3e5c1c fix(storage): enforce orphan-ness inside the purge DELETE + chunk IN-lists
Review feedback on the purge's race window: the pre-SELECT re-verify
left a statement-to-statement gap where a concurrent registration could
still lose rows — and the pre-counted refcount release could underflow
when it didn't. Orphan-ness now rides the DELETE itself (correlated
NOT EXISTS) with refcounts released from its RETURNING, so refs are
released for exactly the rows that were deleted. Input is de-duplicated,
IN-lists chunk at the storage layer's 500 convention, and the scan's
per-workstream ref-count loop is now one anti-join pass.
2026-06-11 14:13:13 -07:00
Patrick Buckley f0d7305b28 feat(admin): orphan-conversations maintenance verb — scan + purge
Conversation rows whose workstreams row is gone (historical unregistered
writers; the delete-during-inflight race re-creating rows after
delete_workstream) are invisible cruft that also pins attachment
refcounts. Add a turnstone-admin verb: default = read-only scan report
(ws_id, rows, attachment refs, first/last); --delete [--yes] purges.

- shared find/purge logic in storage/_utils; protocol + both backends
  in lockstep (thin wrappers)
- purge re-verifies orphan-ness in-transaction: a ws_id re-registered
  between scan and purge is skipped, never deleted
- releases the deleted rows' attachment refcounts through the
  delete_workstream GC path and sweeps workstream_config/overrides
- summary reports actual purge results, including the skipped clause
2026-06-11 14:13:13 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 84a545cb21 fix(ui): re-home MCP consent badge on the Manage Connections row (#657)
* fix(ui): re-home MCP consent badge on the Manage Connections row

The L-shell renovation retired the standalone settings gear (#settings-btn).
The MCP pending-consent badge anchored to that gear via _refreshConsentBadge,
which null-guarded silently — so since the renovation pending consent requests
had no indicator (the badge was invisible).

Re-home the badge on the rail's Manage row where the MCP/connections surface
lives in both deployments:

- rail.js gains a generic setRowBadge(tabKey, count, label?) hook + a `badge`
  builder: a small ⚠-glyph + count chip (never colour alone) using the DS warn
  tokens. mountManage registers row + owning-group-head refs and re-applies live
  counts across a (re)mount. When the owning group is collapsed, the count also
  mirrors onto the group head so a hidden row never hides the signal. rail.js
  stays agnostic — it owns the mechanism, the caller owns the meaning.
- shell.js (the ESM bridge) re-exports setRowBadge on window.TS_SHELL so the
  classic ui/static/app.js subsystem can drive it without importing the module.
- The standalone consent subsystem keeps its shell-level ownership: _refresh-
  ConsentBadge now drives setRowBadge on the Connections tab, fed by both the
  loadPendingConsents hydrate/poll load and live onConsentDetected notifications.
- The shared interactive pane host bridges onConsentDetected to the new
  window.TS_APP.onConsentDetected seam (undefined on the console, so the console
  pane stays a no-op there); panes only notify.
- The dead colour-only gear badge CSS (.settings-consent-badge, red dot) is
  removed; the new chip lives in shell.css as token-only .rail-badge so it
  flips themes by construction.

Console MCP tab (Extensions > mcp) and standalone Connections tab
(Extensions > connections) both badge correctly. Pins extended in
test_shell_js.py + test_app_js.py.

* fix(ui): drop the unused head ref from the rail badge row map

Review feedback: _rowEls stored each row's group-head element but every
head consumer resolves it through _groupEls; keeping the duplicate DOM
ref made the remount state shape harder to reason about.
2026-06-11 14:13:13 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8e11929ba0 chore: bump version to 1.6.1 2026-06-11 14:09:31 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d9e9a41b17 test(console): make dedupe-pin slice bounds reformat-tolerant
Review feedback: the next-case end markers were exact-indentation
string finds that raised a bare ValueError when unmatched. Use
whitespace-tolerant regexes with actionable assertion messages, and
bound the history-replay window structurally (next role branch, with
a generous fallback) instead of a fixed 600 chars.
2026-06-11 14:05:19 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 848b2cc1fb fix(ui): single-path Enter activation + hls.js teardown on player error
Review feedback: (1) the Enter keydown re-dispatched through btn.click(),
relying on the disabled-guard to suppress the browser's own
Enter-to-click — preventDefault + direct activation makes the keyboard
path provably single-fire; (2) the branch-scoped Hls instance was
unreachable from the media error handler, leaking its listeners and
loader timers when the player node was replaced with the retry UI —
hoist the ref and destroy it before replacement.
2026-06-11 14:05:19 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 1946002618 fix(ui): lift media player activation into the shared interactive pane
The interactive Pane renders media embeds (buildMediaEmbed / buildPlayButton),
but the Play activation — _loadHls / _isHlsUrl / _activatePlayer and the
click/keydown delegate — stayed behind in the standalone ui/static/app.js as
DOCUMENT-level listeners. The console L-shell mounts the same interactive.js
module but never loads ui/static/app.js, so the Play button was dead in
console-hosted interactive panes.

Lift the activation into shared_static/interactive.js (alongside the existing
buildMediaEmbed/buildPlayButton — media embeds are interactive-pane-only; the
coordinator pane renders none) and wire it as a pane-owned, root-scoped
this.el click/keydown listener, mirroring the approval-keydown pattern the
fork collapse established. The standalone copy is deleted so no duplicate
implementation remains; both deployments now activate through the one shared
handler.

The hls.js vendor is fetched lazily by absolute /shared/ URL (the same
mechanism renderer.js uses for mermaid), and /shared is mounted at the root in
both turnstone/server.py and turnstone/console/server.py, so the vendor —
which ships in shared_static/hls-1.6.16/ — resolves in both deployments with
no HTML change.

Pins: assert the lift + pane-ownership in test_interactive_pane_js.py and the
standalone-stays-clean guard in test_app_js.py.
2026-06-11 14:05:19 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 4bce6abc7c test(console): pin system-turn dedupe wiring on both read paths
The live-SSE/history system-turn dedupe (renderedSystemEventIds /
_renderedSystemEventIds) was already in place on both panes and merged
to main (21af6c4 aligned the persisted row event_id with its SSE event;
09e41d1 added the belt-and-braces Set on the coordinator). The existing
pin tests only assert the Set's .has()/.add()/.clear() symbols appear
somewhere in the file, so a refactor that keeps the Set but short-circuits
the live-handler consultation (guard -> false) re-opens the double-render
while the pins stay green.

Scope the new assertions to their blocks: the live system_turn case must
CONSULT and RECORD against the Set, and the history render path
(replayHistory / refetchHistory's system-role branch) must record each
replayed row's event_id. Bounded at the next switch case rather than the
first break; the dedup-skip path itself breaks before the .add(), so a
break-bounded slice would drop the record half.

Verified the new slice checks fail on a dedupe-neutered factory (a
headless-Chrome harness driving the real createCoordinatorPane confirms
that neutering produces two rendered nodes for one event id; intact code
renders one, and the no-event-id legacy path still renders both).
2026-06-11 14:05:19 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c19432f12a fix(memory): touch access metadata on composition and tool reads
The touch_structured_memories facade and both storage backends were
implemented but had zero call sites, so access_count never moved and
last_accessed never advanced past write time on any deployment.

Wire two touch points:
- proactive composition touches the injected top-k (post-rerank) set,
  deduped per turn since _init_system_messages recomposes many times
  within a single turn;
- the memory tool's search and get reads touch their returned rows,
  counted per call. save/delete/list do not touch.

Touches are best-effort through the facade, which already swallows
storage errors, so a failed touch never breaks composition or a tool
call.
2026-06-11 14:05:18 -07:00
522 changed files with 17574 additions and 109746 deletions
-5
View File
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
# Funding platforms for the GitHub "Sponsor" button.
# https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/managing-your-repositorys-settings-and-features/customizing-your-repository/displaying-a-sponsor-button-in-your-repository
github: [eous]
custom: ["https://paypal.me/eousphoros"]
+23 -30
View File
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ jobs:
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.14"
- run: pip install pre-commit
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ jobs:
typecheck:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.14"
- run: pip install mypy
@@ -42,22 +42,22 @@ jobs:
matrix:
python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }}
# Node is required by tests/test_renderer_js.py — without
# explicit setup, that suite silently skips if the runner
# image happens not to ship Node, masking regressions in
# the browser-side renderer.
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6
with:
node-version: "24"
- run: pip install -e ".[test]"
# -v lists each test id as it starts (pytest prints the nodeid at
# logstart), so a hang names the culprit on the last line instead of
# riding the job timeout with only a trail of "..." dots.
- run: pytest tests/ -m "not live and not e2e_recovery" --cov=turnstone --cov-report=term-missing --cov-report=xml -v
- run: pytest tests/ -m "not live" --cov=turnstone --cov-report=term-missing --cov-report=xml -v
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7
if: always()
with:
@@ -82,23 +82,23 @@ jobs:
--health-timeout=5s
--health-retries=5
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.14"
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6
with:
node-version: "24"
- run: pip install -e ".[test]"
- run: pytest tests/ -m "not live and not e2e_recovery" --storage-backend=postgresql -v
- run: pytest tests/ -m "not live" --storage-backend=postgresql -v
env:
TURNSTONE_TEST_PG_URL: postgresql+psycopg://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/turnstone_test
wheel-completeness:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.14"
- run: pip install build
@@ -113,16 +113,9 @@ jobs:
| grep -v '\.py$' | grep -v '\.dist-info' | grep -v '\.pyc' | grep -v '^File$' \
| sort)
# Files intentionally excluded from the wheel (one per line).
# The vllm-litellm/ deploy example ships in the repo, not the wheel
# (you clone the repo to run it; the package doesn't reference it).
# Files intentionally excluded from the wheel (one per line)
ALLOW="
turnstone/core/storage/migrations/script.py.mako
turnstone/deploy/vllm-litellm/.env.example
turnstone/deploy/vllm-litellm/README.md
turnstone/deploy/vllm-litellm/docker-compose.yml
turnstone/deploy/vllm-litellm/gemma.Dockerfile
turnstone/deploy/vllm-litellm/litellm-config.yaml
"
MISSING=$(comm -23 <(echo "$SOURCE") <(echo "$WHEEL") \
@@ -146,13 +139,13 @@ jobs:
/tmp/smoke/bin/turnstone-console --help
/tmp/smoke/bin/turnstone-admin --help
/tmp/smoke/bin/turnstone-channel --help
/tmp/smoke/bin/turnstone-doctor --help
/tmp/smoke/bin/turnstone-bootstrap --help
lock-check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@11f9893b081a58869d3b5fccaea48c9e9e46f990 # v8.3.2
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@fac544c07dec837d0ccb6301d7b5580bf5edae39 # v8.2.0
with:
uv-version: "0.9.18"
- run: uv lock --check
@@ -160,11 +153,11 @@ jobs:
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@11f9893b081a58869d3b5fccaea48c9e9e46f990 # v8.3.2
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@fac544c07dec837d0ccb6301d7b5580bf5edae39 # v8.2.0
with:
uv-version: "0.9.18"
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: "3.14"
- run: uv sync --frozen --all-extras
@@ -188,8 +181,8 @@ jobs:
run:
working-directory: sdk/typescript
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6
with:
node-version: "24"
- run: npm ci
+6 -17
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ on:
concurrency:
group: docker-${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
# Never cancel mid-push: an interrupted multi-tag push can leave the
# registry with a partial tag set (e.g. :latest moved, :stable not).
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -21,24 +19,15 @@ env:
jobs:
docker:
# Same gate as publish.yml: workflow_run fires for every CI completion
# (including fork and same-repo PR runs) with this repo's token and
# packages:write. Only same-repo tag pushes may publish images; CI's
# push trigger matches main/stable/* and v* tags, so a head_branch
# starting with "v" is necessarily a tag run.
if: >-
github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' &&
github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name == github.repository &&
startsWith(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, 'v')
github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name == github.repository
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
fetch-depth: 0
# The docker build only reads the tree; keep the token out of it.
persist-credentials: false
- name: Resolve release tag
id: tag
@@ -54,7 +43,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Log in to GHCR
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4
uses: docker/login-action@650006c6eb7dba73a995cc03b0b2d7f5ca915bee # v4
with:
registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}
username: ${{ github.actor }}
@@ -78,12 +67,12 @@ jobs:
fi
echo "tags=${TAGS}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@d7f5e7f509e45cec5c76c4d5afdd7de93d0b3df5 # v4
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
- name: Build and push
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
uses: docker/build-push-action@53b7df96c91f9c12dcc8a07bcb9ccacbed38856a # v7
uses: docker/build-push-action@f9f3042f7e2789586610d6e8b85c8f03e5195baf # v7
with:
context: .
push: true
+6 -20
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ on:
concurrency:
group: publish-${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
# Never cancel a publish mid-upload: a half-uploaded release (sdist up,
# wheel missing) cannot be re-run cleanly because PyPI rejects duplicates.
cancel-in-progress: false
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: write
@@ -17,26 +15,14 @@ permissions:
jobs:
publish:
# workflow_run fires for EVERY CI completion — including CI runs for
# pull_requests from forks — and always executes here with this repo's
# secrets, tokens, and the pypi environment. Gate to same-repo tag
# pushes only: CI's push trigger matches branches main/stable/* and
# tags v*, so a head_branch starting with "v" is necessarily a tag run.
if: >-
github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success' &&
github.event.workflow_run.event == 'push' &&
github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.full_name == github.repository &&
startsWith(github.event.workflow_run.head_branch, 'v')
if: github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: pypi
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }}
fetch-depth: 0
# python -m build executes the tree's build backend; don't leave
# the contents:write token sitting in .git/config while it runs.
persist-credentials: false
- name: Resolve release tag
id: tag
@@ -50,7 +36,7 @@ jobs:
echo "skip=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
with:
python-version: "3.14"
@@ -58,12 +44,12 @@ jobs:
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
- run: python -m build
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
- uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@ba38be9e461d3875417946c167d0b5f3d385a247 # release/v1
- uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@cef221092ed1bacb1cc03d23a2d87d1d172e277b # release/v1
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
- name: Create GitHub Release
if: steps.tag.outputs.skip == 'false'
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@3d0d9888cb7fd7b750713d6e236d1fcb99157228 # v3
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@b4309332981a82ec1c5618f44dd2e27cc8bfbfda # v3
with:
tag_name: ${{ steps.tag.outputs.tag }}
generate_release_notes: true
+2 -2
View File
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ jobs:
# Floor and ceiling of the example's requires-python (>=3.11).
python-version: ["3.11", "3.13"]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6
with:
python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }}
- run: pip install -e ".[test,dev]"
+5 -26
View File
@@ -25,43 +25,22 @@ permissions:
jobs:
vendor-js:
# Same-repo PRs only: this job checks out the PR head and pushes to it
# with contents:write, so it must never act on a fork's branch.
# Gate on the PR author (immutable), not github.actor (names whoever
# caused the latest event, which can be someone else re-running it).
if: >-
(github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
github.event.pull_request.user.login == 'renovate[bot]' &&
github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository) ||
github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
if: github.actor == 'renovate[bot]' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Resolve PR head ref
id: ref
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
# Branch names may contain shell metacharacters; pass via env,
# never interpolate ${{ }} into the script body.
HEAD_REF: ${{ github.head_ref }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ inputs.pr_number }}
run: |
if [[ "$GITHUB_EVENT_NAME" == "workflow_dispatch" ]]; then
# The dispatch input is an arbitrary PR number; refuse fork PRs.
# A fork's headRefName is a bare branch name that may collide
# with a branch in this repo, and checkout+push would then hit
# that unrelated branch ("same-repo PRs only" applies here too).
pr_json=$(gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --json headRefName,isCrossRepository)
if [[ "$(jq -r '.isCrossRepository' <<< "$pr_json")" != "false" ]]; then
echo "::error::PR #${PR_NUMBER} head is not a branch in this repository; refusing to complete it."
exit 1
fi
ref=$(jq -r '.headRefName' <<< "$pr_json")
if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "workflow_dispatch" ]]; then
ref=$(gh pr view "${{ inputs.pr_number }}" --repo "${{ github.repository }}" --json headRefName -q .headRefName)
else
ref="$HEAD_REF"
ref="${{ github.head_ref }}"
fi
echo "head_ref=${ref}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7
- uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6
with:
ref: ${{ steps.ref.outputs.head_ref }}
-1
View File
@@ -28,4 +28,3 @@ tools/skill_audit_analysis/data/
tools/skill_audit_analysis/output/
design_ideas/
.claude/
docs/design/
+4 -731
View File
@@ -6,740 +6,13 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
and this project adheres to [PEP 440](https://peps.python.org/pep-0440/) for
version numbers (`X.Y.Z`, with `X.Y.ZaN` / `bN` / `rcN` for pre-releases).
Two active release tracks are maintained — the current stable and the
experimental line:
Three release tracks are maintained — the current stable, one prior
stable, and the experimental line:
- **`stable/1.7`** — patch-only (`v1.7.x`)
- **`stable/1.5`** — patch-only (`v1.5.x`)
- **`stable/1.6`** — patch-only (`v1.6.x`)
- **`main`** — experimental (next major)
Earlier stable lines (`stable/1.6`, `stable/1.5`) are frozen.
## [Unreleased]
### Added
- **Compaction is visible now: lifecycle events, a progress bar, and a
persistent transcript card.** Context compaction (manual `/compact` and
auto) emits a first-class `compaction` SSE event
(`start` / `progress` / `end` — see the API reference) instead of loose
info lines. The web UI renders an in-transcript card with a real progress
bar (determinate `part k of N` during chunked summarization, indeterminate
for single-call compactions) that settles into a result card — token delta
plus the summary behind a fold — in both the interactive pane and the
coordinator viewer. The result survives reloads: the persisted compaction
marker now projects through `/history` as a `role="system"`,
`source="compaction"` entry (resume/export/search unchanged), stamped with
the end event's id so repaint and SSE replay can't double-render. The
marker's `meta` additionally records `before_tokens` / `after_tokens` /
`trigger`. Python and TypeScript SDKs gain a typed `CompactionEvent`.
- **One provider transport: every model call now streams (#831).**
The per-adapter non-streaming entry (`create_completion`) is retired;
single-shot lanes — judges, titles, compaction, web-fetch extraction,
perception, eval, optimizer — sample through the same streaming entry
the chat loop uses and accumulate via one shared drain, so request
shaping can no longer drift between the two consumption styles. Two
operator-visible consequences: long single-shot generations (a thinking
model composing a title, a slow local judge) no longer sit in a single
blocking read that can hit client read-timeouts — the same reason the
Anthropic adapter already streamed internally — and judge timeouts now
*abort* the underlying HTTP read instead of abandoning a worker thread
on a dead call. Because every call now streams, an alias pointed at a
model or org that cannot stream (OpenAI's verified-org streaming
entitlement, a gateway api-version predating `stream_options` — e.g.
older Azure OpenAI deployments) fails at request time where 1.7's
non-streaming single-shot call succeeded; remediation is on the
serving side (verify the org, bump the api-version/gateway) — there is
deliberately no per-model non-streaming fallback left to configure. These lanes are also complete-or-error now: a stream
that ends without any finish signal is treated as a generation that
died mid-response and retried, instead of storing the partial text as
a clean result (previously a half-generated compaction summary could
silently replace real history). Caveats: these lanes now carry the
same `stream_options: {include_usage: true}` the chat loop always
sent — OpenAI-compatible servers old enough to *ignore* it stop
producing usage rows on these lanes, and servers strict enough to
*reject* unknown fields (pre-2024 llama.cpp/proxy builds) will 400 —
such a server already couldn't serve turnstone's chat loop, but a
judge/utility alias pointed at one worked on 1.7 and needs to move to
a current server. Transient mid-stream deaths (connection drop, proxy
hiccup) are re-issued in place up to twice with exponential backoff —
the retry the SDK's request loop used to provide these lanes
invisibly. Each lane accepts its own terminal marker (Anthropic
`message_stop`, Responses terminal events); a lax server/gateway that
never sends any terminal signal needs
`{"finish_reason_optional": true}` in the model definition's
capabilities JSON, which restores 1.7's tolerance (clean end-of-stream
after output = completion) for that model on every lane — without it
such streams fail as died-mid-generation, because SSE gives no way to
tell the two apart and the default favors catching truncation. The
unread `supports_streaming` capability flag (and its admin tile) is
gone; the o-series models it described are dropped from the capability
table entirely (see Removed).
- **One turn interface for every model call: `core/model_turn.py` (#827).**
Judges (intent + output guard), perception, title generation, compaction,
web-fetch extraction, the eval harness, the optimizer's meta lanes, and
task agents all advance a trajectory through the same plant-call
primitive the agent seam pioneered — Turn IR in, one shared lowering
(argument sanitize → minted-id restore → vLLM reasoning attach), one
shared re-ingest (blank-id repair → native-lane finalize). The judges'
hand-built OpenAI-dict path is gone, and with it the Gemini judge's
tool-blindness: evidence tools now work on Google models because the
native lane round-trips `thought_signature` (with pairwise repair for
blank-id compat responses). Provider adapters still take lowered wire
dicts — the transport collapse and main-loop migration are tracked as
#831 / #832.
- **task_agent keeps its model's reasoning across its own tool loop — on
every provider lane.** A task agent's replayed turns now carry the
provider-native reasoning lane the model produced — Anthropic thinking
blocks with their signatures (commercial or an anthropic-compatible
server), OpenAI Responses reasoning items, Gemini `thought_signature`
fidelity blocks, and the reasoning text a vLLM `--reasoning-parser` /
llama.cpp `reasoning_format` surfaces on the Chat Completions lane —
instead of each turn being rebuilt from text + tool calls with the
reasoning dropped. On a thinking model this restores reasoning continuity
across the agent's own multi-turn tool use. On the wire the agent's
session-minted sub-tool ids are mapped back to the provider's own ids
(`restore_provider_tool_ids`), so the native block — replayed verbatim,
its signature never touched — the `tool_calls` mirror, and each tool
result always agree; internally the minted ids still key the live card,
recall, and the cancel ledger unchanged. Replay honors the same per-model
`replay_reasoning_to_model` flag the main loop uses on every lane: the
vLLM Chat-Completions field replay keeps its server-type gate, and
llama.cpp stays capture-only, matching main-loop behavior. The native
lane is finalized by the same shared builder as the main loop's, so the
two harnesses cannot drift.
- **Background shells: `bash` gains `run_in_background`, plus `bash_output` /
`kill_shell`.** Setting `run_in_background=true` starts the command as a
detached shell and returns immediately with a `bash_N` handle — "start a dev
server, use it in a later call" is back as an explicit opt-in (the shape
follows the convention the major coding agents converged on). `bash_output`
returns only output produced since the previous read (optionally filtered by
a regex) plus status and exit code; `kill_shell` terminates the shell's
whole process group. Output is buffered per shell with a drop-oldest cap, so
a chatty server can't grow memory unbounded. When a background shell exits,
a system notice lands at the next seam (waking an idle workstream if
needed). Shells survive a generation cancel, die with the workstream, and
never outlive a task_agent that started them; anything a background shell
itself backgrounds is still reaped when that shell exits — the no-leak
guarantee below is unchanged.
### Changed
- **Breaking (1.8): compaction feedback moved from `info` events to the
typed `compaction` SSE event.** Pre-1.8 SSE/SDK clients that ignore
unknown event types no longer see compaction lines (they are
deliberately not dual-emitted — dual emission would double-render on
every current client). Consume the `compaction` lifecycle event (see
the API reference and the `CompactionEvent` SDK type); embedders
driving `ChatSession` through a duck-typed `SessionUI` are unaffected
(the classic `on_info` lines are restored for them — see Fixed).
- **Sampling knobs (temperature, reasoning effort) now ride one assignment
scheme: per-model alias value → operator-stored global setting → the
model definition's declared default (effort only) → field omitted.**
Turnstone previously manufactured values onto every unconfigured
request — a hidden `temperature: 0.5` and a `reasoning_effort: "medium"`
baked in at three layers — overriding serving-side defaults like a vLLM
model's `generation_config`. Unconfigured installs now send neither
field and the inference engine's own defaults rule; `model.temperature`
is blank by default ("inherit each model's own default") and
`model.reasoning_effort` defaults to the empty "inherit" choice. The
per-model → global resolution lives in one shared resolver used by the
session factories, the `/model` switch, and every `model_turn` lane, so
the same alias samples identically on every surface. CLI
`--temperature` / `--reasoning-effort` likewise default to inherit.
**Upgrade notes:**
- The empty (`""`) reasoning-effort choice changed meaning from
"explicitly disable thinking" to "inherit the model/serving default".
On local manual-thinking models (e.g. Qwen templates with
`enable_thinking`), a stored `""` previously sent
`enable_thinking: false`; it now sends nothing, so the template's own
default (often thinking ON) applies. Use **`none`** to actually
disable reasoning.
- Workstreams saved by earlier versions carry the old defaults
(`temperature=0.5`, `reasoning_effort=medium`) in their persisted
config and keep that exact behavior on resume; they pick up the new
inherit semantics the next time you change the model or a sampling
knob in that workstream. New workstreams inherit from the start.
### Removed
- **O-series and pre-5.4 GPT-5 rows dropped from the OpenAI capability
table.** `o1`, `o1-mini`, `o3`, `o3-mini`, `o3-pro`, `o4-mini`,
`gpt-5`, `gpt-5-mini`, `gpt-5-nano`, `gpt-5-pro`, `gpt-5.1`,
`gpt-5.1-codex-max`, `gpt-5.2`, `gpt-5.2-pro`, and `gpt-5.3` no longer
have built-in capability rows — OpenAI has retired these model ids
from the API, so the rows described contracts no request can reach
anymore. The table floor is now `gpt-5.4`; the search-api and
audio/STT/TTS rows are unchanged. An alias still pinning a retired id
fails at OpenAI itself; any other unlisted commercial id resolves to
the generic commercial defaults (temperature sent, no declared
reasoning-effort vocabulary, 200K window) — declare the contract on
the model definition's capabilities JSON if you run one, or move to a
current model.
### Fixed
- **A failed worker-thread spawn no longer wedges the workstream — at
either spawn site — and never masquerades as success.** If
`Thread.start()` itself raised (thread exhaustion, out-of-memory), the
dispatcher had already claimed the worker slot but the flag's only
clearer lived in the never-started thread — the workstream looked idle
forever while every subsequent message queued behind a worker that
didn't exist, until an operator force-cancel. The claim is now rolled
back under the lock and the error propagates, so the workstream is
dispatchable again as soon as resources recover. Affected every
dispatch path (sends, wakes, retries, deferred-send drain, init). The
same failure at the deferred-send drain's own spawn rolls back the
just-accepted entry and answers the retryable `queue_full` (previously
a 500 landed *after* the entry was registered — an invisible,
unretractable phantom that later dispatched as duplicate turns), and a
`/command` whose worker never spawned now answers **503**
`{"status": "error"}` instead of the generic 200 ok that told SDK
callers their `/clear` or `/resume` had applied.
- **Manual `/compact` from the web UI: no phantom user turn, no frozen
server, cancellable.** A slash command typed into the web composer no
longer renders as a user chat bubble (it echoes as a distinct command
chip — commands aren't conversation turns and were never persisted as
such). `/compact` itself now dispatches onto the workstream's worker
slot instead of running inline on the server's event loop — previously a
long compaction froze every SSE stream on the node for its whole
duration, which is also why its own progress only ever arrived as one
burst after the fact. The manual path carries `send()`'s full generation
discipline (`compact_now()`): a force-abandoned compaction goes stale
instead of swapping history under a successor turn — and retires at its
next checkpoint instead of running out its remaining summary calls,
with its late lifecycle events fenced off (`compaction_id` on every
event, `superseded` on end events — both in the SDKs) so they can't
animate, tear down, re-title, or falsely narrate a successor's card or
activity pill; a cancel aimed at it is consumed on exit (previously it
bricked every `/compact` retry until the next message); a Stop click on
an idle session can't pre-abort the next compaction; a Stop that lands
in the completion tail — after the last cancel check, or during a retry
backoff (which now aborts immediately instead of sleeping it out) — is
honored rather than silently eaten; and Stop now aborts the in-flight
summary HTTP call itself (the compaction lane registers its stream in
the same abort seam the main loop uses), so cancelling a compaction is
immediate instead of waiting out a model call.
- **Sends during a command window are deferred, ordered, bounded, and
honestly rendered — never silently truncated or lost.** Messages sent
while any slash command holds the worker slot are **deferred**: answered
`{"status": "queued", "msg_id"}` immediately and dispatched as ordinary
full-fidelity sends (attachments and sender identity included) when the
command finishes — never routed through the mid-turn interjection
queue, whose semantics are turn-shaped: previously a send during a
manual `/compact` was silently truncated to 2,000 characters, a second
participant in a shared workstream was locked out with a misleading
"another participant's turn" 409 for the whole compaction, and a
message queued across a `/resume`/`/new` could be answered into the
post-swap workstream. Because the response is immediate,
timeout-bounded callers — the coordinator's `send_message`, the console
proxy, SDKs, anything behind a stock reverse proxy — can no longer lose
a message to a multi-minute command window; the deferred send is
retractable until dispatch via the same `DELETE .../send` used for
queued interjections (node-local, in-memory — the API reference
documents the at-most-once durability contract). Deferred responses
carry `"deferred": true`; the pending list is the **order authority**
(a fresh send — or a coordinator dispatch, or a queued-nudge wake —
lines up behind acknowledged entries instead of overtaking them, with
the two-term barrier defined once on the workstream so the wake gate
also honors a claimed entry whose dispatch is mid-flight, and the gate
re-arms at the drain's exit even when everything pending was
retracted); acceptance is **bounded** (10 pending per workstream — the
interjection queue's own backpressure contract; the 11th answers the
retryable `queue_full` instead of pinning attachment bytes without
limit and then running one unattended turn per entry); a dispatch
crash re-queues the entry instead of eating an acknowledged message,
and a drain thread that fails to *start* rolls the acceptance back and
answers `queue_full` rather than parking a phantom the client can
neither see nor retract; each dispatch emits a pane-tier
`message_dispatched` event (`folded: true` for interjection fold-ins)
so queued-bubble UI keeps its retract affordance exactly until the
message truly leaves — including when the send was accepted by a pane
that believed the workstream idle, which now renders a real queued
chip instead of a sent-looking bubble, releases the composer (a
deferred send has no running worker to wait on), and cleans up fully
when the send is refused or the chip retracted instead of stranding
the pane in Stop mode. Dismissing a queued bubble — interjection or
deferred — is a server-confirmed `DELETE`, and retracting a deferred
send that carried attachments tells the user they were discarded
instead of silently expiring them.
- **Slash commands hold the worker slot with a loud contract.**
A `/compact` raced against an in-flight turn is refused with an
explicit busy response. Every other slash command runs through the same
worker slot too — mutual exclusion against sends, a running compaction,
and each other, with a busy answer replacing the old silent interleave —
while the endpoint still awaits quick commands' completion off-loop
(without parking an executor thread per request); the post-command pane
refreshes (`clear_ui` after `/clear`/`/new`/`/resume`, the
workstream-name sync) ride the worker itself, so a command that
outlives the endpoint's 25s response backstop still refreshes every
pane on completion (the backstop sits under the console proxy's 30s
client timeout so the degraded `running` answer can actually traverse
a proxied pane, which now surfaces it instead of silence; the
`/command` response contract — `ok` / `running`, with busy refusals
answering a loud HTTP 409 rather than a silent 200 — is now documented
in the API reference and the OpenAPI spec).
- **Compaction status stays truthful across every UI surface.** Manual
compaction
success also refreshes the status line/context pill immediately (parity
with auto-compaction), compaction failures keep feeding the typed
`error` event and the node error counter (while a CLI Ctrl-C reports as
cancelled, not a failure), one Stop prints one notice (a cancelled
auto-compaction no longer stacks "Compaction cancelled." on top of
send's own "[Generation cancelled]"), the workstream activity pill
shows "Compacting context…" for the whole summarize phase, restores
cleanly afterwards, and can no longer be stranded by a force-stopped
compaction (a new turn's generation claim breaks a stale latch). Every
retry backoff on the session (stream retries, task agents, notify
delivery, compaction) now aborts immediately on Stop via one shared
cancel-aware helper instead of sleeping out its exponential delay.
- **Compaction failures report exactly once, to the right owner.** A
compaction failure reports
exactly once (auto-compaction errors defer to the turn's fatal handler
instead of doubling the red row and the error metric), failed-end
notice suppression is computed once by the emitter (a `notice` bool on
the end event — in the SDKs — replaces hand-synced client policy), and
a manual `/compact` failure no longer crashes the CLI REPL. `/compact`
on a workstream showing the `error` badge restores the badge on exit
instead of stamping `idle` over it (the compaction neither retried nor
resolved the failed turn). A force-cancelled initial send that
completes late still delivers its scheduled-run completion
notification (the only completion signal unattended workstreams have);
the other post-command pane refreshes and error notices remain
owner-guarded, so a force-cancelled wedged command that unwedges late
can't wipe panes or inject stray notices into a successor turn.
- **Pre-1.8 embedder UIs keep their compaction lines.** Embedders
driving `ChatSession` with a pre-1.8 duck-typed `SessionUI`
(no `on_compaction` hook) get the classic `on_info` compaction lines
back — threshold notice, `part k/N`, retry waits, token delta +
summary box — instead of silent history swaps. (See the breaking
event-contract note under **Changed** for SSE/SDK clients.)
- **Static MCP servers: a pushed catalog change no longer wedges the shared
session (#839).** The static-path `*/list_changed` handler awaited its
catalog refresh inline in the SDK's receive loop, but the refresh's own
request can only be answered by that (now parked) loop — the refresh never
completed, and every user's in-flight calls on the shared per-node session
stalled behind it, unbounded, until the health loop's ping timeout tore the
transport down (which was also the only way the changed catalog ever
landed). Push refreshes now run as spawned tasks — debounced, coalesced per
(server, kind), bounded by the connect timeout, and serialized on the
per-server connect lock — and the manual and post-reconnect refreshes
publish under that same lock, so a slower publisher can no longer land a
staler catalog over a fresher one. Every teardown path now also clears the
notification debounce stamp, so a reconnected server's first push refreshes
immediately. Push-refresh debouncing is now per (server, kind) on BOTH the
static and per-user pool paths — a tools push no longer swallows a prompts
push arriving in the same 5-second window. A change genuinely lost to the
debounce window (a same-kind push landing after the prior refresh finished,
which the server will never re-announce) is recovered by an automatic
health-tick retry rather than staying invisible until an unrelated push or
a reconnect. The resource-refresh fan-out on both paths no longer orphans
its sibling list call when one of the pair fails fast — the real error
surfaces immediately (not masked as a 30-second timeout) and the surviving
sibling is cancelled and reaped, under a bounded grace, inside the scope. A
push refresh that fails while the connection stays up is likewise retried on
the next health-loop tick until one completes — previously a single
transient blip left the shared catalog stale for every user on the node
until an operator intervened. An operator `/mcp refresh` no longer parks
behind a busy per-server connect lock (a slow reconnect attempt could eat
the whole 30-second refresh budget and fail the pass for every healthy
server behind it) — the busy server is skipped on both the connected and
disconnected branches, reported distinctly as "skipped" rather than as a
false "no changes", the skip arms the automatic retry, and a
force-reconnect drops the session up front so queued push refreshes can't
starve it. Static-path resource and prompt catalogs are now size-capped
like the pool path's (and like static tools) at discovery and on every
refresh, so a misbehaving server's push can't balloon the node's merged
catalogs. Deleting or reconfiguring a server can no longer leave it
half-removed: the config removal and all cleanup are serialized under the
connect lock (a cancelled removal completes its cleanup rather than
stranding a live session and published catalog with the config already
gone), and `reconcile_sync` retries a removal that timed out instead of
marking it done — previously a DB-driven delete of a busy server could be a
silent, permanent no-op until process restart. A refresh outcome now
threads consistently to every operator surface off one source of truth
(the per-server `last_refresh_outcome`): a busy-skip and a genuine failure
are each reported distinctly from a real "no changes" — `/mcp refresh`
prints "skipped" or "failed" rather than a false "no changes", and the
node-internal refresh endpoint returns `202 skipped` instead of a
misleading `200 ok` for a refresh that never ran. A single-kind push
refresh no longer paints the whole server healthy: because the
error/outcome state is server-scoped, a successful tools push while the
prompts catalog is still broken (or vice versa) no longer clears the
failure — only a full refresh pass declares "ok".
- **OpenAI Responses streaming: truncated and refused responses no longer
vanish.** A response that hit `max_output_tokens` terminates the stream
with `response.incomplete`, which the stream consumer did not handle —
the turn was mislabeled `finish_reason: stop` and its final usage and
collected output items were dropped. Refusal parts had no streaming
handler at all, so a refusal rendered as empty content instead of the
`[Refused: …]` text the non-streaming path produced. Both now match:
truncation maps to `length` with usage/items intact, refusals render
in content. Applies to the chat loop and every drained single-shot
lane (#831).
- **task_agent: sub-tool ids no longer alias across a local model's reused
ids.** A local model that reissues per-response sequential tool-call ids
(`call_0` every turn) made two of a task agent's steps share one id — the
live card collapsed both onto one DOM row while `/history` recall kept them
apart, so the two views disagreed. Sub-tool ids are now minted
`{parent}::r{run}s{step}::{id}`, unique within the session (across an
agent's turns and across concurrent or sequential runs), and that one id
keys the nesting registry, the live rows, recall, and the cancel ledger.
On the wire the agent's self-built history carries the provider's own ids,
restored from the mint map (see the reasoning-lane entry under Added), and
malformed tool-call arguments are legalized the same way the main loop's
wire prep does.
- **bash tool: never hang on a backgrounded child.** A command that left a
long-lived process running (`server &`, a daemon) could wedge the whole
workstream forever — the tool read stdout/stderr to EOF, which never arrived
because the child inherited the pipe, and the timeout watchdog bailed once the
foreground `bash` had exited. The tool now waits on the tracked process
(bounded by the tool timeout) and terminates its whole process group on
return, so the call always completes. Undecodable output is preserved
(`errors="replace"`) instead of being dropped as a spurious error.
- **Behavior change:** a process the command backgrounds no longer survives
the call — nothing persists across bash invocations. (First-class
"run this in the background" support landed separately — see
`run_in_background` under Added.)
## [1.7.3]
A small feature and maintenance patch for the 1.7 line. No schema migrations
and no new configuration knobs.
### Added
- **OpenAI GPT-5.6 (Sol/Terra/Luna) support** — the Responses provider
understands the GPT-5.6 family: the `reasoning.mode` control, the new
`max` effort tier, and `text.verbosity`, with golden wire payloads pinning
the request shapes. The `openai` dependency floor moves to `>=2.44`.
### Changed
- **Engineer base prompt hardened with process discipline** — the default
base prompt for non-coordinator sessions now works in phases scaled to the
size of the change, defaults to red-green for testable work, scopes to the
smallest sufficient diff, stops to report after repeated failed attempts
instead of thrashing, reports only observed results, and delegates
exploration to `task_agent`. Persona prompts freeze into the workstream
stamp at creation, so this reaches new workstreams only.
### Fixed
- **Unknown reasoning-mode warnings name the allowed modes** — a model
definition with an unrecognized reasoning mode now logs the valid options
instead of leaving the operator to guess.
### Documentation
- **HYPOTHESIS.md / PRIMER.md** — the control normal form is tightened and
the factored Q_E reading is carried into the glossary; the plain-language
PRIMER stays in sync.
## [1.7.2]
A feature-bearing patch for the 1.7 line. Rather than hold this work for the
larger 1.8 churn, the fixes and the smaller features that had already
stabilised on `main` are rolled into the stable line now: a rich preview
pane, persona/project settings on scheduled tasks, and a batch of streaming,
rendering, and nudge-delivery hardening.
> **⚠️ Before upgrading:** 1.7.2 adds Alembic migration `066`, applied
> automatically on first start. It adds two `Text NOT NULL DEFAULT ''`
> columns (`persona`, `project_id`) to the `scheduled_tasks` table; existing
> rows migrate to the empty default, which is byte-identical to pre-066
> dispatch behaviour. The change is additive and reversible, but — as always
> — back up your storage before upgrading (`pg_dump` for PostgreSQL; copy the
> database file for SQLite).
### Added
- **Rich preview pane + `open_preview` tool** — a workstream can now open a
rendered preview (HTML, Markdown, and other kinds) in a pane beside the
conversation via the new `open_preview` tool. Guarded fetches stream under
a byte budget whose ceiling tracks the widest per-kind cap, preview blob
ids are salted, and a preflight probe handles legacy charsets and a
remote-assets opt-in. See `docs/tools.md`.
- **`allow_private_network` opt-in for `web_fetch` / `open_preview`** —
private-address fetch and preview targets stay blocked by default; an
operator can opt a workstream in through the settings registry when a
private endpoint is genuinely intended. (Distinct from the 1.7.1 `[oidc]`
flag of the same name, which governs identity-provider discovery.)
- **Persona + project settings on scheduled tasks** (migration `066`) — a
scheduled task can now pin the **persona** and **project** of the
workstream it dispatches, matching the levers a manually-created workstream
already carries. Both default to empty (kind-default persona / no project),
so existing schedules dispatch exactly as before.
### Fixed
- **Streaming fast-path overflow recovery** — fast-stream tokens are now
batched and overflowed SSE listeners recover instead of stalling (and
`connectSSE` no longer opens into a hidden background tab). The same
overflow-recovery companions were carried to the coordinator pane, so a
coordinator watching many children recovers dropped listeners the same way
the live-session view does.
- **Renderer containment** — markdown sentinel-forgery and recursive-frame
content loss are contained, and an indented fence close no longer drags its
indent into the enclosed code content.
- **Idle nudge / wake delivery** — nudge and wake delivery is hardened across
session eviction, cancellation, and identity rebinds; the wake gate now
requires a real nudge queue, refused wakes are logged, and
`initial_message_status` is typed as a closed enum on the wire.
- **`web_fetch` extraction inherits model settings** — the completion that
extracts content from a fetched page now inherits the workstream's model
settings instead of falling back to defaults.
- **UI panes** — ephemeral panes close on split-dismiss instead of orphaning
a tab, and an unsplit skips the redundant refresh after an ephemeral pane
closes.
- **Shared code-highlight CSS** — renderer-output CSS is shared so the console
and coordinator panes highlight code identically.
### Security
- **`Content-Disposition` filenames made wire-safe** — download filenames
derived from user-controlled text are sanitised (latin-1- and
control-char-safe, quoting-safe) before they reach the `Content-Disposition`
response header, including the fallback path.
### Documentation
- **HYPOTHESIS.md: daemons + the outer loop, plus a plain-language PRIMER** —
the harness north-star document gains its daemon / outer-loop treatment and
a new top-level `PRIMER.md`.
## [1.7.1]
A maintenance and hardening patch for the 1.7 line. No schema migrations;
the credential-redaction work below is additive and needs no configuration
change. The one new operator-facing knob is the opt-in `[oidc]
allow_private_network` flag (default off).
### Security
- **Credential redaction hardened across the tool-call surface** — the
redactor that scrubs secrets from tool arguments and log previews was
reworked on both the backend and the browser to close several leak paths
and to fix false-positive and performance issues. Malformed tool-call
arguments are now legalised before they reach the wire; the tool-args log
preview scrubs credentials and control characters; and the coordinator's
tool-call cards gain a matching client-side redaction pass so the JS and
backend redactors stay at parity. Pattern coverage now includes
`secret_access_key` / `aws_secret_access_key` multi-segment keys, bare
`token=` / `key=` forms (guarded by a negative lookbehind to avoid
false positives), and SQLAlchemy `+driver`-qualified connection-string
schemes matched case-insensitively.
- **OIDC SSRF guard: `[oidc] allow_private_network` opt-in** — self-hosted
identity providers on private networks can now be reached by setting
`allow_private_network = true` under `[oidc]` (default off; the MCP OAuth
path stays strict). Rejections of discovered endpoints carry the opt-in
hint so the misconfiguration is self-explanatory. See `docs/oidc.md`.
### Added
- **Persona discoverability + forgiving name resolution** — personas are
now discoverable by agents, and persona-name resolution tolerates
case/whitespace variation; a not-found resolution reports the offending
input verbatim instead of a bare error.
### Fixed
- **MCP transport lifecycles routed through per-entry owner tasks**
(#787/#788) — static and pooled MCP transport lifecycles are now driven
by per-server / per-entry owner tasks, with a hardened disarm-sweep loop
guard and targeted exception handling in place of a broad `BaseException`
arm, so a dying transport can no longer spin the CPU or strand delivery.
- **Client-construction failures surface as misconfiguration, not raw
500s** — a model whose client cannot be constructed now reports a factory
misconfiguration, and the raw exception text is kept out of the resulting
503 response.
- **Postgres history search survives oversized rows** — a conversation row
exceeding Postgres' full-text limits no longer aborts history search.
- **Agent-tool render is idempotent** — tool rendering no longer deep-copies
a tool definition until a description actually changes, so no-persona
sessions share the tool constant (correctness plus a hot-path allocation
win).
- **Private-project workstream visibility scoped to members** — workstreams
in a private project are visible to project members only, not to every
admin; coordinator tenancy checks now use request-scoped storage.
- **Pane hotkeys work off macOS and match across surfaces** — the pane
keyboard shortcuts no longer collide with browser accelerators on
non-macOS platforms and behave consistently across surfaces.
## [1.7.0]
The headline of the 1.7 line is **Personas** — operator-authored control
over how each workstream composes its system message and capability
envelope. The rest of the release hardens the pieces a persona leans on:
concurrent approvals, cross-provider reasoning-effort control, cooperative
compaction, multi-user session safety, and MCP resilience for unattended
work.
> **⚠️ Before upgrading:** 1.7.0 adds Alembic migrations `062``065`,
> applied automatically on first start (projects, personas, and two
> smaller schema tidy-ups). Migration `063` creates the `personas` table
> with its six seed personas and converts existing `creative_mode`
> workstreams to the `writer` persona in place. The changes are additive
> to your conversation data, but — as always — back up your storage before
> upgrading (`pg_dump` for PostgreSQL; copy the database file for SQLite).
**Breaking changes at a glance** (details in the sections below): the
`/creative` REPL toggle removed (replaced by the `writer` persona), the
`turnstone-bootstrap` entry point renamed to `turnstone-doctor`, and the
approval-status API/SDK field `pending_approval_details` changed from a
single object to a list (one entry per concurrent approval cycle).
### Added
- **Personas** (#683) — a named, reusable bundle attached to a workstream
at creation, controlling system-message composition and the capability
envelope via exactly four levers: base-prompt override, tool visibility
set, MCP on/off, and memory on/off. The persona is resolved once and
snapshotted into `workstream_config`; editing or archiving a persona
never changes an existing workstream. Six seed personas ship with
migration `063` (`engineer` and `orchestrator` are the per-kind
defaults with no overrides, so zero-touch behavior is unchanged;
`scribe`, `researcher`, `writer`, and `executive` are curated
envelopes). Selectable on every creation surface (web pickers, the
create API/SDKs, coordinator `spawn_workstream` / `spawn_batch`, and
`turnstone --persona <name>`); authored in the console's new
Governance → Personas tab (`persona.{create,read,write}` perms,
archive-only lifecycle). See `docs/personas.md`.
- **Projects — governed resource containers** (#724) — group workstreams
and their resources under a project (migration `062`), with
project-scoped memory, a per-project resources view, a project column on
the saved list, and server-enforced private-project workstream
visibility.
- **Task-agent sub-harness** (#732) — a spawned task agent now runs on its
own Turn-IR sub-harness with parent-tagged step events: its sub-tool
steps nest inside an expandable card in the parent trajectory, its
sub-trajectory is recallable, and each agent gets read isolation from
its siblings.
- **MCP static-server autonomous reconnect** (#768) — statically
configured MCP servers are now kept live by a health loop
(capped-jittered backoff, ping-based liveness) instead of silently
staying dead after the first transport drop.
- **Attachments — capability-gated client-side fallback** — when the
active model can't natively handle an attachment, the client degrades
gracefully (PDF → extracted text, audio → transcript) instead of
failing the turn.
- **Eval measurement / optimizer split** (#763, #765) — `turnstone-eval`
is now a measure-only substrate with the prompt optimizer factored out,
plus a new skill-adherence measurement mode.
- **Deployment examples** — a vLLM + LiteLLM unified-memory inference
example showing a 3-model co-resident stack with an HF loader (#686,
#688), and an Altair + `vl-convert-python` visualization stack (#685).
- **Concurrent approvals and a long-session frontend overhaul** (#754,
#755, #773, #775) — the live-session frontend was reworked for long
runs (the pipeline is wedge-proofed and its hot paths de-O(N)'d), and on
top of it a workstream can now hold more than one tool call awaiting
approval at a time. Each parallel batch gets its own approval cycle,
with one card per pending call in the interactive and coordinator UIs,
cycle-keyed tracking in Slack and Discord, and cycle-routed resolution
across the server/console/SDK APIs; sub-agent tool gates run the
intent-judge pipeline as their own generation. The send button no longer
sticks disabled after a batch resolves — orphaned approval cycles are
pruned and the app is the sole owner of the button state.
*(BREAKING: the `pending_approval_details` field is now a list, oldest
first.)*
- **Reasoning-effort control on every provider lane** (#771, #774) — the
session effort knob now reaches local backends too: it drives
`chat_template_kwargs` on the anthropic-compatible and openai-compatible
lanes and threads through to Gemini and xAI, alongside the commercial
providers that handle effort natively. The console surfaces each model's
effective effort ladder in plain words and adds an always-on
thinking-mode option to the model form. Effort snapping is ordinal —
it rounds up and caps at the model's ceiling rather than silently
dropping.
### Changed
- **Skills are capability-context, not identity** (#762) — a task agent's
identity now comes from its persona; an applied skill's body is demoted
to capability context and moved out of the identity system message.
Skill-body substitution is unified across every invocation context so
the same skill renders identically whether loaded interactively, by the
model, or inside a sub-agent.
- **`turnstone-doctor` replaces `turnstone-bootstrap`** (#718)
*(BREAKING)* — the setup/diagnostics entry point is renamed; update any
scripts or service units that invoke `turnstone-bootstrap`.
- **Honest cancellation dispositions** — cancelled or timed-out
side-effecting tools now report an `UNKNOWN` disposition rather than a
flat failure, tool dispositions are typed (not just prose), and a
coordinator cancel propagates down the sub-tree.
- **Multi-user shared-workstream context** (#750) — in a shared
workstream, send is gated to the acting participant while a turn is in
flight (both the interactive and coordinator surfaces), cross-user
mid-turn interjections are blocked, and shared-workstream state plus
fork sender attribution are now durable.
- **Cooperative compaction** (#730) — the context budget is anchored to
the provider's true capacity, the summary call is chunked so it can't
overflow, and the active plan and the outstanding ask are carried across
compaction verbatim. The `recall` tool is scoped to the compacted-away
past.
- **Intent judge sees the full tool arguments** (#760) — the judge's
argument projection is no longer narrowed, so it stops issuing confident
false denials on a partial view. The output-guard judge sources its real
context window, and `context_window = 0` in `config.toml` now means
auto-detect.
### Fixed
- **Compaction resume hardening** (#731) — checkpoint markers are
persisted so resume rehydration is bounded, context-overflow on resume
is recovered across providers, and a recognized rate-limit is no longer
misclassified as context overflow.
- **MCP unattended-work resilience** (#706, #742, #767) — dead-transport
handling is completed, consented OAuth (OBO) tokens are refreshed
proactively so autonomous runs don't strand on an expired grant, the
Entra ID on-behalf-of impersonation flow blockers are closed (migration
`065` adds the OIDC `oid`), and OAuth refresh failures are classified so
a transient blip never revokes consent nor a dead grant strands the
user.
- **Memory writes** (#735) — save/update is a single atomic upsert, and
writing a memory no longer recomposes the system prefix mid-session.
### Removed
- **`/creative` removed** *(BREAKING)* — subsumed by the Personas feature
above: the REPL toggle (and its tab completion) is gone, and the
`writer` seed persona replaces it — start a session with
`turnstone --persona writer` or pick *Writer* in the web
pickers. Unlike the old fork, the writer persona composes the full
system message, so session context and mandatory prompt policies now
apply to prose-only sessions too. The `creative_mode` key in
`workstream_config` is no longer read or written. Migration `063`
converts existing creative-mode workstreams to the `writer` persona
automatically, so they resume as writing sessions rather than as
legacy defaults.
### Security
- **High-risk skill activation is gated** (#762) — a model-initiated load
of a `high`- or `critical`-risk skill is gated and fails closed when the
backing storage is unavailable, so an untrusted turn can't silently
pull in a dangerous capability.
- **Dependency security floors** — `cryptography` and `starlette` are
pinned to security-fixed minimums.
- **CI publish hardening** — the vendored-JS dispatch path refuses fork
PRs, and `workflow_run` publishing is gated to same-repo tag pushes, so
a fork can't trigger a release build.
## [1.6.0]
The first stable release of the 1.6 line — and the first under Apache 2.0.
+2 -6
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ FROM python:3.14-slim
LABEL org.opencontainers.image.title="turnstone" \
org.opencontainers.image.description="Multi-node AI orchestration platform"
COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.29 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv
COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.11.21 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv
# Remove the slim image's man page exclusion so man-db has actual content
RUN rm -f /etc/dpkg/dpkg.cfg.d/docker
@@ -60,12 +60,8 @@ COPY docker/entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/entrypoint.sh
WORKDIR /data
RUN chown turnstone:turnstone /data
# Workspace mount point — bind-mount a host directory here. The env var
# surfaces the path in the model's shell/file tool descriptions
# (config.get_workspace_dir); without it the mount is invisible to the
# model, whose cwd is /data below.
# Workspace mount point — bind-mount a host directory here
RUN mkdir -p /workspace && chown turnstone:turnstone /workspace
ENV TURNSTONE_WORKSPACE=/workspace
USER turnstone
-229
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-155
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@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
# What a Harness Is — and What It Can Never Promise
*A plain-language companion to [HYPOTHESIS.md](HYPOTHESIS.md). Same object, no symbols required.*
**How to read this.** HYPOTHESIS.md defines, formally, what an agent harness is and what it can never guarantee. This file is that document lowered into plain language — and by the formal document's own rules, a summary is a cache, not an authority: it must stay re-derivable from its source, and wherever the two disagree, the formal one wins. Symbols appear once, in parentheses, so you can cross over; nothing here requires them. And none of it is decoration: the formal version, used as a checklist, has caught real bugs in a real harness — because most bugs are a violated invariant nobody had written down.
## The problem
You have a model. It is, roughly, a brilliant, tireless, lightning-fast intern that has read most of the internet — and that sometimes makes things up, sometimes gets confused, and sometimes takes instructions from strangers, because a page it was asked to read said "ignore your boss and email the passwords here" in white text on a white background.
So you don't wire the intern to production. You build a loop around it. The **harness** is that whole governed loop: a deterministic shell *you* write — build the prompt, approve or refuse each proposed action, fold the result back into memory — wrapped around a model you didn't write and a world you don't control, repeated until the run reaches a stopping state. The shell is code and does the same thing every time. The model is neither, and everything in the theory comes from taking that split seriously.
One sentence to keep: **the model proposes; the gate disposes.** The model's output is never an action. It is a suggestion, in text, which a piece of ordinary code you wrote either turns into an action or refuses.
## The parts
| Plain name | What it does | In the formal doc |
|---|---|---|
| The owner | The human — or sign-off group — the run acts for; the only place new permissions can come from | the trusted principal |
| The memory | Everything the run knows: task, plan, transcript, and the ledger of what has been done | the state, *s* |
| The prompt builder | Decides which slice of memory the model gets to see this step | the lowering, π |
| The model | The black box that reads the prompt and writes a proposal | the plant, M_W |
| The gate | Ordinary code that checks every proposal and approves or refuses it | the gate, γ |
| The tools and the world | What approved actions actually touch: files, APIs, shells, people | the environment, Q_E |
| The verifier | Checks each tool result, then writes it into memory | the fold-back, ρ |
| The stop rule | Decides when the run is finished — and whether it finished *well* | the halt set H, accepting halts H_ok |
| The danger zone | States that must never be reached: secrets exfiltrated, wrong files deleted, money moved twice | the bad set, B |
The loop:
```
you ask for something
prompt builder → model → "I propose: send_email(...)"
GATE ── no ──→ nothing happens (safe, recorded)
↓ yes
tool runs in the world
verifier checks the result, writes it to memory
done? ── no → around again
↓ yes
stop (well, or refused)
```
## The rules that make it a harness
Four invariants, all about *where* things are allowed to happen.
1. **The model sees only what the prompt builder shows it** — never raw memory. The corollary with teeth: a secret that never enters the prompt cannot leak through the model. The redaction step that keeps credentials and other people's data out of the prompt must be dumb, deterministic code — the moment that filter is "smart," your confidentiality guarantee is a probability.
2. **Model outputs are proposals, not actions.**
3. **Every side effect passes the gate.** There is no second door.
4. **The harness itself flips no coins.** Replay a step with the model's answer and the tool results pinned, and behavior must be identical; any leftover variation is randomness *you* added and must be accounted for. The fine print: "deterministic" is conditional on pinned versions — a provider silently retraining the model behind the same API name changes the machine under you, and every dashboard number you collected dies with the version.
Notice what the rules don't say: they don't say the harness is *good*. A gate that approves everything satisfies rule 3 the way a lock that's always open satisfies "has a lock." The definition is a shape; the guarantees are what a particular harness *earns* inside it. Everything below is about what can be earned — and what can't.
And notice the symmetry between rules 1 and 3. There is exactly one door from your data into the model — what it may see — and exactly one door from the model into the world — what it may do. Nearly every security failure in these systems is one of those two doors with a hole in it: a secret lowered into a prompt that didn't need it, or a path from model text to a side effect that skipped the gate. Same bug, arrow flipped.
## Fail-closed, said precisely
"Fail-closed" gets used loosely. Here it means something exact: **nothing happens unless the gate said yes, and a refusal must itself be safe** — a refused proposal causes no side effect and leaves the run somewhere sane, which may be "stopped, having declined." The run is allowed to *say so*: a templated status message written by the shell is the shell speaking, not the model, and needs no gate. Failed runs don't have to die silent.
Three consequences people miss:
**Reads are not free.** A read-only call can smuggle instructions *in* (the fetched page is attacker-controlled) or secrets *out* (the URL it fetches can encode the payload). The gate approves calls, not just writes.
**Validation must not act.** A "validator" that resolves a URL, expands a template that fires a webhook, or evaluates an argument has already acted — inside the check. The gate must be pure: it reads the proposal and the memory and outputs yes or no. If deciding requires touching the world, that touch is itself an action and goes through the gate.
**Anything irreversible is decided at the gate.** The verifier can reject a bad *result*; it cannot unsend the email. So the question "can we take this back, and until when?" is asked before execution — which means each tool declares, up front, how reversible its effects are, and the gate reads that declaration when it decides; the mark that comes back in the result record is confirmation for the books, not the gate's source — the gate needed the answer before the tool ever ran.
Two honest asterisks. First, the gate checks a snapshot: it approves against the world *as its memory describes it*, and the world can move between check and commit. For actions that race the world — spend against a balance, write against a row — the tool itself must bind check to commit (compare-and-swap), or you have a classic time-of-check/time-of-use hole. The gate decides; for those effects, the tool enforces. Second, a gate is only as binding as the authority behind the tools. A tool process holding standing credentials — a database connection with every grant, an environment full of long-lived secrets — doesn't need the model's proposal to act, and against it the gate's "no" is a decision with nothing enforcing it. **A gate in front of an omnipotent tool is a suggestion.** The fix is to make the approval *be* the key: each authorized action carries a short-lived credential scoped to exactly that action, that resource, that operation, so tools hold no standing power at all.
## Why you don't get a proof — and what you do instead
If you write a sort function, you can prove it sorts: the function is small and the spec is exact. A harness has neither luxury. The spec side fails first — the task arrives in natural language, and natural language is, in the compiler's sense, *all undefined behavior*: there is no formal standard for "what the user meant" to verify against. The mechanism side fails next — the model is billions of learned parameters, and nobody can hand you a compact argument for why they jointly do the right thing.
Here is the careful version, because "you can't prove it" overshoots. The quantity you would want — call it the *expected steps to done* from any situation — is perfectly well-defined; in principle it exists. The document's central conjecture is that, for a model of this size, any faithful writing-down of that quantity is roughly *model-sized*: the honest proof-object does not compress. Find a small one and the conjecture dies — the document lists that outcome, explicitly, among the ways it could be wrong.
So instead of proving, you measure. You pick a progress meter — plan depth shrinking, open obligations closing, budget burning at the expected rate — and you check, across many runs, that it goes downhill and that its stalls predict failure. Two disciplines keep the measurement honest. The number bounds the world you *sampled*, never the world an adversary will choose: a meter calibrated on friendly traffic says nothing about hostile traffic. And the meter is itself attack surface: if "is the agent making progress?" is judged by another model, an attacker who can bend your agent can bend your *measurement of it* first, hiding the divergence from the very dashboard built to catch it. A learned meter is part of the system under test, never a neutral instrument.
A measurement is a risk metric. A proof is a certificate. Keeping those two words apart is half of what this theory is for.
## Security: reach the goal, avoid the danger — and who may change the rules
Formally, security here is a *reach-avoid* problem: reach a good stop, never touch the danger zone, **while an adversary picks the worst tool outputs your setup permits**. That last clause is the formal home of prompt injection: injection isn't "the model misbehaved," it's the environment optimized to bend your loop — poisoned pages, malicious tool descriptions, crafted responses.
Two different numbers fall out here, and dashboards love to collapse them: *success* (reached an accepted end before anything went wrong — a safe refusal counts against it) and *safety* (never touched the danger zone — a safe refusal is perfectly safe). Track both. They move independently. And both are scored by your own stop rule — they count what the shell *declared* a success. Whether a declared success was actually *right* is a third, harder number that no dashboard inside the system can produce; only a judge outside the run — a test suite, an audit, ground truth — can.
The gate handles the visible half of injection: the model, freshly poisoned, proposes emailing your credentials somewhere, and the gate refuses — and injection or not, the action does not happen. But the deeper attack doesn't propose a bad action today. It rewrites *what the run believes its job is* — it edits the plan — and then every future action looks locally reasonable against a corrupted plan. So memory has to be partitioned: **data** (tool results, fetched pages, retrieved documents — content the world supplied) and **control** (the plan, the permissions, what is authorized next). The security claim is conditional on that partition holding: untrusted content lands in data, always. And "trust" is really two questions pointing opposite ways, which is worth keeping straight: *can this leak?* (a value is as secret as the most-secret thing that fed it — secrecy flows **upward**) and *can this boss us around?* (a value is as trustworthy as the least-trustworthy thing that fed it — authority flows **downward**). Untrusted content is safe as *data* precisely because the second question keeps it off the control side; a secret is kept out of the model by the first. Lowering either barrier on purpose — declassifying a secret, promoting data to trusted — is an explicit decision the owner makes, never a thing that happens by accident when two values are combined.
Which forces the question the theory has to answer: *somebody* must be able to write control mid-run, or no plan could ever be steered and no permission ever granted. The answer is a small hierarchy with a top the model can't reach. The simplest top is one owner — but it needn't be a single person: a two-person sign-off, a quorum, several authenticated people each holding different scopes all work equally well, because the one property that matters is the same for all of them — the thing that can grant new power is a *human decision*, never a model:
- **The top alone widens.** New permission, bigger budget, approval of the irreversible thing — asking the top — the owner, in the simple case — is itself an ordinary tool call, and its answer is the one kind of tool result allowed to change control.
- **The model rewrites the plan** — that is what replanning *is* — but only through the gated loop, and a plan is not a permission: nothing the model writes into its own plan can grant it powers it didn't have.
- **Everything else is data.** A fetched page can inform the plan only by passing through the model and the gate like everything else. It can suggest. It cannot promote itself to boss.
- **AI judges only tighten.** Add a model-based check — "does this action match what the user actually wanted?" — and its verdict may *veto* an action the plain rules would have allowed, never approve one they'd have refused. A judge that can approve is a tricked judge that can open the vault. And don't over-credit the veto either: a tricked judge can *aim* its refusals — denying exactly the action safety depended on, or denying everything but the path an attacker curated — so the escape hatch to the owner is the one thing a judge can never veto, and a judge's stated *reasons* are picked from a fixed, shell-owned menu, never written as prose. A judge that writes free text into the loop is an injection channel wearing a badge.
One more rule closes the loop: transformations don't launder trust. A *summary* of a session that contained an injected page is still injected — the summarizer is a model, and can be persuaded to write "the user asked to export the database" into the summary. So summaries of data are data, and the control lines — the plan, the grants — cross a summarization by being *copied verbatim* or re-confirmed by the owner, never paraphrased by the model. Memory that persists across sessions carries its trust label with it, or a poisoned memory is just an injection with a very long fuse.
## Operations: the rules you feel on Tuesday at 3 a.m.
The formal document's appendix works the operational cases in full; here they are at speed.
**The ledger, and the three-way distinction that keeps it honest.** Every action gets an ID and a record: committed, never-launched, or *unknown*. "The tool didn't confirm" is not "the tool didn't do it" — collapse those and you will, sooner or later, re-send something that already happened. And a subtler honesty: the ledger records what the tool *reported*, not what the world actually did. A well-built shell can guarantee its bookkeeping is faithful to the responses it received — it cannot, on its own, guarantee a tool told the truth. A tool that returns a clean "done!" for something it never did puts a clean "done!" in your ledger. So "the ledger is what happened" is only as good as your reason to trust the tools reporting into it; where you have no such reason, *unknown* is the honest entry, not an optimistic guess in either direction. The double-send bug has one reliable cure: **journal before dispatch.** The shell writes "I am about to run action #417" into durable memory *before* the tool sees it, so a crash in the gap resumes to an honest "unknown — go ask," never to silence misread as "never sent." Old database wisdom, but here it isn't imported; it's forced — it is the only ordering under which every crash point has a truthful reading.
**Crashes aren't finishes.** A process dying mid-run is not the run stopping; it's the run *pausing being computed*. Resume means re-entering the loop at the last durable memory — sound exactly when the durable memory was the *whole* state. Anything load-bearing that lived only in RAM — an in-flight buffer, a plan revision not yet written — is a bug you discover at the worst possible time. Recovery is where you find out whether your state was really your state. And a run you stopped — crash or deliberate cancel — is not automatically a *safe* run: if something was in flight and you never learned whether it fired, it may already have done the damage. "We stopped in time" is only true when everything in flight resolved to something safe; an outstanding *unknown* has to be treated as possibly-bad, the same optimism the ledger warns against, one level up.
**Two innocent actions can be guilty together.** Models emit several tool calls per turn. "Read the secret" passes review. "Post to the web" passes review. The pair is an exfiltration channel — so the gate authorizes the *set*, atomically, with the interactions checked, not each element in isolation.
**Sub-agents are just fancy tools.** An agent that spawns another agent is, from the parent's chair, calling a tool: the spawn is gated, the budget is part of the deal, and the child's whole run comes back as one result carrying the child's ledger. Two laws travel down the tree: budgets subdivide, and **authority only narrows** — a child holds at most a subset of its parent's permissions, and a child's request beyond those grants routes *up*, ultimately to the owner, because a parent inventing an approval it never held is the tricked-judge case wearing a manager's badge. A corollary worth framing: a *fully autonomous* run is one whose owner is unreachable — meaning the only channel that can ever widen anything is closed, and its permissions are frozen at launch. That is not a limitation of the theory. That is what the word "autonomous" costs.
**Keep the originals.** When the transcript outgrows the prompt and you summarize it down, deleting the original is an irreversible act against your own state — and irreversible acts are gate decisions, self-directed or not. Keep originals content-addressed; let the summary be an index, re-derivable, auditable. A summary you can check against its source is a note. A summary that replaced its source is a fait accompli.
## Robots that never clock out — and robots that assign their own work
Everything so far assumed a job that *ends*: you ask, the robot does it, you read the result. Two steps past that are where the interesting failures live, and they're the same idea one level bigger each time.
**The robot that never clocks out (a daemon).** A monitor, a coordinator, a service — it isn't supposed to finish; it's supposed to keep going, wake on events, do a bit of work, go back to waiting. The clean way to think about it: each wake-work-rest cycle is one ordinary run, and the daemon is just those runs chained end to end forever. That reframing is free — but it comes with a bill nobody likes. **Safety that's fine per cycle rots over many cycles.** A 99.99%-safe cycle sounds bulletproof; run it ten thousand times and you're at about a coin-flip of having touched the danger zone at least once. So a long-running robot's safety isn't a fixed wall, it's a slow leak — which means the antidote isn't a better wall, it's *scheduled resets*: the owner re-confirming, credentials rotating, memory getting audited and re-summarized against the originals. Housekeeping isn't housekeeping; it's the thing that keeps the safety math from decaying. And the slow-leak logic is exactly where slow attacks live — a poisoned note dropped into memory on Monday and read back into the plan on Friday is an injection with a long fuse. So the trust label on a piece of information has to survive across cycles, not just within one. One more wrinkle: a daemon drifts in and out of your reach. While you're around, it can escalate to you; while you're not, "escalate to the owner" isn't available — so the one thing it must always be able to do instead is *stop*. A robot that can be tricked into refusing everything, and can't reach you, had better be able to halt rather than be steered.
**The robot that assigns its own work (the loop).** Step back one more time. Above the robot that *does* a task sits a system that decides *which task is next* — scans the backlog, picks one, launches the robot at it, checks the result, remembers, fires again. This is the thing people mean in 2026 when they say they've stopped prompting their agents and started writing *loops* that prompt them: you design the assigner once, and it runs the doer for you while you sleep. The honest observation — and the reason this document bothers with it — is that the assigner is *not a new kind of thing*. It's the same harness, one level up: it has its own memory (the backlog), its own gate (**who let the loop refactor the auth module at 3 a.m.?**), its own verifier, and its own two walls. Every rule from the inner robot recurs on the outer one — including the uncomfortable ones. There's still no proof it stays out of trouble over a long night; there's only a measured progress meter, with the same catch that a *learned* meter can be fooled. And the origin story of the whole trend is the cautionary case in miniature: the famous first version was literally the same prompt in a `while` loop until the tests passed — which is the empty gate, the always-open lock, one level up. It works beautifully right up until the tests weren't checking the thing that mattered. The loop doesn't delete the hard problems. It moves them up a floor, where they're bigger and you're further away.
The pattern, if you want the whole thing in one line: *words, context, robot, loop* are four sizes of the same object, and every promise in this document lives in the whole assembled thing — never in any one layer by itself.
## The two walls
Two limits are structural. You don't fix them with a better harness; you design around them.
**The desk.** The model can hold only so much *in mind at once* — the context window. Files, databases, and search extend what it can *look up*, not what it can hold: every lookup still passes through the same small window to touch actual computation. The shell can page; the model cannot grow its desk. Tasks whose irreducible working set exceeds the desk don't fail loudly — they fail by forgetting the middle (the well-documented "lost in the middle" effect is this wall showing through the paint).
**The dictionary.** The model's knowledge is frozen into its parameters at training time — and the proof problem above is conjectured to live at that same scale: the certificate wouldn't fit anywhere smaller than the brain it certifies. The two walls trade against each other along the training-versus-inference axis — bigger dictionary or bigger desk — directionally, and at no clean exchange rate.
## How this could be wrong
This is a hypothesis, and it says out loud what would kill it. The tests, in plain terms:
- **The replay test.** Rerun with model answers and tool results pinned. Any leftover variation — timestamps, wall-clocks, and cache expiries are the classic leaks — falsifies "the harness adds no randomness" until accounted for.
- **The drop-a-variable test.** Remove something from memory; if behavior statistics shift, the memory wasn't complete. The crash-resume version of the same test: if resuming from saved state breaks, the saved state wasn't the state.
- **Does the meter mean anything?** If no reasonable progress meter's drift predicts real failures — across the natural families, not just one bad candidate — the whole "measure what you can't prove" program is empty.
- **The red-team test.** Swap sampled tool outputs for worst-case ones: injected pages, poisoned metadata, malformed replies. The design must survive the worst permitted world, not the average one.
- **Gates versus begging.** The theory predicts deterministic gating beats prompt-level pleading. If "please be careful" alone matches real gates on security outcomes, the controller-versus-model story is wrong.
- **The compression hunt.** Exhibit a compact, provably sound progress certificate for a frontier-scale model on a nontrivial task family, and the central conjecture falls — constructively.
- **The desk probe.** Take a task family with a *proven* memory floor — so "it needed the whole picture at once" is someone else's theorem, not our excuse — scale it past the window, and watch: the wall predicts a *ceiling*, not a cliff — past the boundary, a success rate that stays capped no matter how many retries you buy. A family solved reliably out there, without new shell tricks for splitting the work, kills the wall.
## Who else landed here
The formal document keeps three honesty tiers. **Borrowed**: real theorems, cited — the drift and stopping-time mathematics is classical, and the very architecture of a deterministic supervisor gating a plant it didn't author is 1987 control theory; the shape is older than the web. **Ours**: the modeling choices and the conjectures — the walls, the incompressibility claim, the design rules — organizing principles, not results. **Corroborated**: pieces of the same object reached independently by people who never saw this framing — capability-security work isolating control flow from untrusted data (CaMeL), reinforcement-learning "shields" filtering a learned policy's actions through a deterministic checker, verification work that states the "learned safeguards can't certify" gap as its opening motivation, and architecture patterns converging on plan-then-execute. Even the field's live disagreement — provable-but-rigid deterministic layers versus flexible-but-uncertifiable learned checks — is, in this frame, not a fight but a placement: you need both, on their proper sides of the irreversibility line, with the learned one permitted only to tighten.
## What to remember
The model proposes; the gate disposes. No is the default, and a refusal must be safe. Only the top of the trust hierarchy widens permissions — a human decision, never the model, a tool result, a summary, or a judge. "Didn't confirm" is not "didn't happen." The desk is finite and the proof doesn't compress, so you measure — and you say *measurement* when you mean measurement. A robot that never stops leaks safety slowly, so it needs scheduled resets — and when it can't reach you, it must be able to stop. A loop that runs robots for you is just a bigger robot with the same rules and a further-away owner. And all of it is a hypothesis wearing its own kill-conditions on its sleeve.
The formal version — the objects, the certificates, the falsifiers, the citations — is [HYPOTHESIS.md](HYPOTHESIS.md). It wins every disagreement with this file, including this sentence.
*Same ramblings, fewer symbols.*
+66 -81
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@@ -1,107 +1,92 @@
# Quickstart
# Bootstrap Wizard
Install Turnstone, then diagnose it with `turnstone-doctor` if anything looks off.
Interactive, AI-guided setup for Turnstone deployments. Instead of manually
editing `.env` files and reading deployment docs, the wizard walks you through
every decision conversationally and generates all the config files for you.
## Install
The one-line installer autodetects your distro (Ubuntu/Debian, Fedora/RHEL,
Arch, and WSL), installs git + Docker if missing, generates secrets, picks free
ports, and starts the stack:
## Quick Start
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/turnstonelabs/turnstone/main/run.sh | bash
turnstone-bootstrap
```
Re-running is safe — it updates the checkout and keeps your existing `.env`.
When it finishes it prints the dashboard URL and how to create the first admin
user.
That's it — no flags, no arguments. The wizard prompts for everything.
**Other ways to install**
## How It Works
- **Already have Docker?** Clone the repo and `docker compose up` for the full
local cluster, or `docker compose -f turnstone/deploy/compose.yaml up` for the
released single-node stack. See [docs/docker.md](docs/docker.md).
- **Python package:** `pip install turnstone` (add `--pre` for the experimental
track), then run `turnstone-server` / `turnstone-console` directly. See the
[README](README.md#quickstart).
1. **Pick a model** — Choose OpenAI, Anthropic, or a local/vLLM endpoint to
power the wizard. Local endpoints auto-detect available models.
2. **Answer questions** — The AI walks you through deployment mode, LLM
provider, database, authentication, ports, and optional features.
3. **Review generated files** — Each file is previewed before writing. You
confirm or reject every write.
4. **Start the stack** — The wizard prints the exact `docker compose` command
and a `setup.sh` script to create your first admin user, roles, and policies.
## Diagnose: `turnstone-doctor`
## What Gets Generated
`turnstone-doctor` is an LLM-backed assistant that inspects a **running**
Turnstone install and helps you troubleshoot it. It is **read-only** — it
investigates and tells you the exact commands to fix things, but never changes
your system. (Installation is the installer's job, not the doctor's.)
```bash
# From a host that has the turnstone package installed:
turnstone-doctor
# For a Docker install from run.sh (no package on the host), run it with pipx:
pipx run --spec turnstone turnstone-doctor --dir ~/turnstone
```
### What it does
1. **Preflight** — detects how Turnstone is installed here (docker-compose,
systemd/bare-metal, pip, or a source checkout) by probing for `config.toml`
files, `TURNSTONE_*` environment variables, compose files, and systemd units.
2. **Self-configures its LLM** — it powers its own brain from your cluster's
*own* model configuration (env / `config.toml` / the database). Whether that
works is the first diagnostic: success means your LLM backend is healthy; if
it can't, that's surfaced as finding #1 and it falls back to asking you for a
provider and key so it can still help.
3. **Version check** — reports the installed version, version drift across your
cluster's nodes, and the latest upstream stable/experimental releases.
4. **Interactive diagnosis** — it reads logs, `/health`, `docker compose ps`,
`systemctl`, config, and ports to pin down problems like a node not joining
the console, an unreachable database, a down model backend, port conflicts,
or a JWT-secret mismatch — then hands you the precise remediation commands.
### Flags
| Flag | Purpose |
| File | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `--dir PATH` | Install directory to inspect (default: current directory) |
| `--report` | Print the deterministic preflight report and exit — no LLM key needed |
| `--offline` | Skip the upstream GitHub version check |
| `.env` | All environment variables for `compose.yaml` |
| `setup.sh` | Post-start script: creates admin user, roles, tool policies, prompt templates via the API |
| `docker-compose.override.yaml` | Only if customizations beyond env vars are needed |
`--report` is the fastest way to get a health snapshot (and to share one when
asking for help) — it never needs an API key:
## Requirements
```bash
turnstone-doctor --report --dir ~/turnstone
```
- **Python 3.11+** with turnstone installed (`pip install turnstone`)
- **An LLM API key** — for the wizard itself (OpenAI, Anthropic, or a local
model). This can differ from the LLM your deployment will use.
- **Docker & Docker Compose** — needed to run the stack. The wizard detects
whether Docker is installed and gives platform-specific install instructions
if it's missing. You can still generate config files without Docker.
## Deployment Modes
- **Single-node production**`docker compose up` against the bundled
`turnstone/deploy/compose.yaml`: 1 server + console + channel + PostgreSQL,
pulled from ghcr.io. Good for most deployments.
- **Local multi-node cluster** — clone the repo and run `docker compose up` at
the root for a 10-node fleet + console + Caddy + channel, built locally.
See [docs/docker.md](docs/docker.md) for both.
## Example Session
```
## Install profile
- Detected kind(s): docker-compose (primary: docker-compose)
- Docker daemon reachable: yes
- Compose files:
/home/you/turnstone/compose.yaml
- Database: backend=postgresql, url=postgresql+psycopg://turnstone:****@postgres:5432/turnstone
- Candidate health URLs: http://localhost:8080/health, http://localhost:8090/health
$ turnstone-bootstrap
## Versions
- Installed (this tool): 1.7.0a2
- Cluster nodes: 10 reporting; versions ['1.7.0a2']
- Version drift across nodes: no
- Upstream: stable 1.6.9, experimental 1.7.0a2
Turnstone Bootstrap Wizard v1.5.0
────────────────────────────────────────────────
## LLM backend (ok)
- resolved Qwen/Qwen3-32B via openai-compatible @ http://host.docker.internal:8000/v1
Which provider for this wizard?
[1] OpenAI
[2] Anthropic
[3] OpenAI-compatible (local/vLLM)
> 3
Base URL [http://localhost:8000/v1]:
API key (press Enter for 'none'):
Querying http://localhost:8000/v1 for available models...
Found model: Qwen/Qwen3-32B
Connected to Qwen/Qwen3-32B. Handing off to AI assistant...
> (AI walks you through the rest interactively)
```
Secrets (JWT secret, database password, API keys) are always redacted in the
report and in anything the doctor reads.
## Tips
- **Type `quit`** to exit the conversation; **Ctrl+C** interrupts (twice to quit).
- **Point it at the right install** with `--dir` when you run it from elsewhere.
- **(Re)installing or adding nodes?** Use the installer (`run.sh`), not the doctor.
- **Re-run safely** — running the wizard again detects your existing `.env`
and offers to update it rather than overwriting.
- **Duplicate writes are skipped** — if the LLM tries to write the same file
twice with identical content, it's silently ignored.
- **Type `quit` to exit** at any time during the conversation.
- **Ctrl+C** is handled gracefully — press once to interrupt, twice to exit.
## See Also
- [Docker Deployment](docs/docker.md) — compose stacks, ports, and bare-metal nodes
- [Docker Deployment](docs/docker.md) — manual compose setup and profiles
- [Security](docs/security.md) — auth architecture and token types
- [Governance](docs/governance.md) — roles, policies, and templates
+4 -22
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@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
[![Python](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/turnstone)](https://pypi.org/project/turnstone/)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue)](LICENSE)
[![Discord](https://img.shields.io/badge/Discord-join%20us-5865F2?logo=discord&logoColor=white)](https://discord.gg/Nh3bWMacaq)
[![Sponsor](https://img.shields.io/badge/Sponsor-%E2%9D%A4-db61a2?logo=githubsponsors&logoColor=white)](https://github.com/sponsors/eous)
Self-hosted, local-first orchestration for tool-using AI agents. Give LLMs real tools — shell, files, search, web — and run them across your own cluster with direct HTTP routing and interactive interfaces. Your code, your models, your data stay on hardware you control: no telemetry, no phone-home.
@@ -15,14 +14,6 @@ Self-hosted, local-first orchestration for tool-using AI agents. Give LLMs real
Named after the [Ruddy Turnstone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruddy_turnstone) (*Arenaria interpres*) — a shorebird that flips stones to discover what's hiding underneath.
**What is a harness?**
```
: s_{n+1} ~ T(s_n) for n < τ*, T = ρ ∘ (M_W ∘ π, E)
```
[**the primer →**](PRIMER.md)
### Release Tracks
| Track | Install | Docker | Description |
@@ -36,7 +27,7 @@ See [docs/releasing.md](docs/releasing.md) for the full release process.
Turnstone gives LLMs tools — shell, files, search, web, planning — and orchestrates multi-turn conversations where the model investigates, acts, and reports.
- **Local-first & private** — runs entirely on hardware you control, with no telemetry and no phone-home. Point it at local models (vLLM, llama.cpp) or commercial APIs you hold the keys to — your prompts and data never transit a third party you didn't choose.
- **Local-first & private** — runs entirely on hardware you control, with no telemetry and no phone-home. Point it at local models (vLLM, llama.cpp, Ollama) or commercial APIs you hold the keys to — your prompts and data never transit a third party you didn't choose.
- **Bring your own models** — OpenAI-compatible APIs (vLLM, llama.cpp, NIM), the Anthropic Messages API, and Google Gemini, mixed freely per role
- **Interactive sessions** — terminal CLI or browser UI with parallel workstreams
- **Cluster dashboard** — real-time view of every node and workstream, with a rendezvous routing proxy
@@ -95,7 +86,7 @@ LLM; add model backends from the console UI.
For production (released images from ghcr.io, real secrets required), use the
bundled stack: `docker compose -f turnstone/deploy/compose.yaml up`.
See [QUICKSTART.md](QUICKSTART.md) for the install + troubleshooting walkthrough and [docs/docker.md](docs/docker.md) for Docker configuration.
See [QUICKSTART.md](QUICKSTART.md) for the bootstrap wizard and [docs/docker.md](docs/docker.md) for Docker configuration.
### Programmatic (SDK)
@@ -125,9 +116,8 @@ Built-in tools for shell, files, search, web, memory, notifications, and autonom
| `turnstone-console` | Cluster dashboard + routing proxy + admin panel |
| `turnstone-channel` | Channel gateway (Discord and Slack adapters) |
| `turnstone-admin` | User/token management CLI |
| `turnstone-eval` | Headless measurement — scores tool-use against expected actions |
| `turnstone-optimizer` | Prompt/tool optimizer (UCB self-modify loop over the eval substrate) |
| `turnstone-doctor` | LLM-backed cluster diagnostics |
| `turnstone-eval` | Eval harness for prompt/tool optimization |
| `turnstone-bootstrap` | LLM-guided setup wizard |
### Diagrams
@@ -172,14 +162,6 @@ UML diagrams in [`docs/diagrams/`](docs/diagrams/):
- Optional: Discord / Slack channel integrations (`pip install turnstone[discord,slack]`)
- [Git LFS](https://git-lfs.com/) for cloning (diagram PNGs)
## Support
Turnstone is free, Apache-2.0, and self-hosted — no paid tier, no telemetry, no upsell. If it saves you time or you'd like to help keep development moving, you can sponsor the project:
**[❤ Sponsor Turnstone →](https://github.com/sponsors/eous)** · one-off via **[PayPal](https://paypal.me/eousphoros)**
Sponsorship is entirely optional and funds maintenance, new features, and infrastructure. Prefer to contribute in other ways? Filing issues, improving docs, and [pull requests](CONTRIBUTING.md) help just as much.
## Community
Questions, ideas, or want to show what you're building? Join us on Discord:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ appVersion: "0.3.0"
dependencies:
- name: postgresql
version: ~18.8.0
version: ~18.7.0
repository: https://charts.bitnami.com/bitnami
condition: postgresql.enabled
+29 -171
View File
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ Each item in `items` (shared by `tool_info` and `approve_request`):
| `context_window` | int | Total context window size in tokens |
| `pct` | float | Percentage of context window used |
| `effort` | string | Reasoning effort level (`low`/`medium`/`high`) |
| `cache_creation_tokens` | int | Tokens written to prompt cache (Anthropic + OpenAI) |
| `cache_creation_tokens` | int | Tokens written to prompt cache (Anthropic) |
| `cache_read_tokens` | int | Tokens served from prompt cache (Anthropic + OpenAI) |
**`info`** -- an informational message (e.g. command output).
@@ -467,46 +467,6 @@ Each item in `items` (shared by `tool_info` and `approve_request`):
{"type": "info", "message": "Session cleared."}
```
**`compaction`** -- context-compaction lifecycle (manual `/compact` and
auto-compaction). `phase: "start"` opens the operation (`trigger` is
`"manual"` or `"auto"`; auto adds `where` — e.g. `"mid-turn"` — and, when
the percentage threshold actually fired, `pct`; the context-overflow retry
path compacts without a `pct` since no threshold was evaluated).
`phase: "progress"` reports chunked summarization (`part`/`total`/`depth`,
where depth 0 summarizes transcript batches and deeper levels merge partial
summaries), a transient-error retry wait (`retry_in` seconds + `error`), or
`warning: "summary_truncated"`. `phase: "end"` settles it: `ok: true`
carries `before_tokens`/`after_tokens` and the produced `summary`;
`ok: false` carries a `reason`
(`"not_enough_messages"` / `"irreducible"` / `"empty_summary"` /
`"cancelled"` / `"error"`) and a human-readable `message` — for
`reason: "error"` the same message is also emitted as a paired typed
`error` event (that is the renderable error surface; the end event is
card-teardown). Failed ends also carry `notice`: the emitter-computed
display verdict — show `message` only when it is `true` (the server
suppresses error-reason, superseded, and cancelled-auto notices once,
centrally, so clients don't re-derive that policy). Every end (ok or
failed) carries `trigger`, and every event carries `compaction_id` — an
opaque integer correlating the start/progress/end of one compaction run (a
client that force-stopped one compaction can use it to ignore stragglers
from the abandoned run). End events also carry `superseded`: `true` marks
a force-abandoned compaction retiring after a successor generation took
over (an OK end's result card still stands: the history swap happened).
Superseded start/progress events are never emitted.
Exactly one `start` and one `end` are emitted per attempt,
so clients can key an in-progress affordance (progress bar) on the pair. A
successful end is also persisted: the summary replays from `/history` as a
`role: "system"`, `source: "compaction"` entry whose `meta` carries
`{watermark, before_tokens, after_tokens, trigger}` and whose `event_id`
matches the end event's id (dedup across repaint + replay).
```json
{"type": "compaction", "phase": "start", "compaction_id": 7, "trigger": "auto", "where": "mid-turn", "pct": 80}
{"type": "compaction", "phase": "progress", "compaction_id": 7, "part": 2, "total": 5, "depth": 0}
{"type": "compaction", "phase": "end", "ok": true, "compaction_id": 7, "trigger": "auto",
"before_tokens": 128400, "after_tokens": 9200, "summary": "## Decisions\n..."}
```
**`error`** -- an error message.
```json
@@ -738,42 +698,6 @@ Each skill summary:
---
### `GET /v1/api/personas`
Returns the enabled personas offered by the workstream-creation pickers.
Authenticated for any logged-in user and deliberately gated by **no**
`persona.*` permission — selecting a persona at creation is a user
action, while the `persona.*` perms gate authoring. Display fields only;
the levers (base prompt, tool set, MCP/memory toggles) stay server-side.
**Response:**
```json
{
"personas": [
{"name": "engineer", "display_name": "Engineer", "description": "The stock interactive workstream: full tools, MCP, and memory.", "applies_to_kinds": ["interactive"], "is_default": true},
{"name": "researcher", "display_name": "Researcher", "description": "Answers questions with evidence — reads and cites, loads tools to verify when needed.", "applies_to_kinds": ["interactive"], "is_default": false}
],
"total": 2
}
```
Each persona summary:
| Field | Type | Description |
|--------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `name` | string | Persona slug (used in the `persona` field on workstream creation) |
| `display_name` | string | Human-readable label for pickers |
| `description` | string | Short description of the persona's intent |
| `applies_to_kinds` | array | Workstream kinds the persona applies to (`interactive` / `coordinator`) |
| `is_default` | bool | Whether this is the default persona for its kind |
> **Note:** For full persona management (create, edit, archive), use the
> admin endpoints at `/v1/api/admin/personas` (requires the
> `persona.{create,read,write}` permissions).
---
### `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/send`
Sends a user message to a workstream. Spawns a daemon worker thread that calls
@@ -788,41 +712,32 @@ Sends a user message to a workstream. Spawns a daemon worker thread that calls
**Request body:**
```json
{"message": "Explain how the server works", "attachment_ids": ["a1"]}
{"message": "Explain how the server works"}
```
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|------------------|------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------|
| `message` | string | yes | The user's message text |
| `attachment_ids` | string[] | no | Staged uploads to attach (omit = auto-consume; `[]` = none) |
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|-------------------------|
| `message` | string | yes | The user's message text |
**Response.** Every 200 body carries `attached_ids` and
`dropped_attachment_ids` (empty lists when no attachments are involved):
**Response (success):**
- `{"status": "ok", ...}` — a fresh turn was dispatched.
- `{"status": "queued", "priority", "msg_id", ...}` — folded into the live
turn's interjection queue; delivered at the next tool-result seam.
`DELETE .../send` with the `msg_id` retracts it before delivery.
- `{"status": "queued", "deferred": true, ...}` — parked on the deferred-send
list (a command window holds the slot, or earlier deferred sends are
pending) and dispatched as its own full-fidelity send afterwards; see the
defer contract under `POST /v1/api/command`.
- `{"status": "queue_full", ...}` — the send was refused with retry-shortly
semantics: the live worker's interjection queue is at capacity, the
deferred-send list hit its saturation bound (10 pending — the same
backpressure contract), or the deferred-send drain could not be started
under resource exhaustion (the message was **not** accepted; nothing is
parked).
- `{"status": "attachments_busy", ...}` — attachments can't ride a queued
turn; the staged uploads survive for a retry once the worker idles.
```json
{"status": "ok"}
```
**Response (busy):** Returned if the workstream's worker thread is still alive
from a previous request. Also pushes a `busy_error` event to the SSE stream.
```json
{"status": "busy"}
```
**Error responses:**
| Status | Body | Condition |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 400 | `{"error": "message is required"}` | Message is empty |
| 404 | `{"error": "Unknown workstream"}` | `ws_id` not found (or closed mid-send) |
| 409 | `{"status": "cross_user_interjection", ...}` | Another participant's turn is in flight |
| Status | Body | Condition |
|--------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 400 | `{"error": "Empty message"}` | Message is empty |
| 404 | `{"error": "Unknown workstream"}` | `ws_id` not found |
---
@@ -865,56 +780,7 @@ automatically approved without prompting.
### `POST /v1/api/command`
Executes a slash command in the given workstream. Commands run on the
workstream's worker slot (mutual exclusion against sends, a running
compaction, and each other) — the endpoint is **not** unconditionally
synchronous:
- **Quick commands** (everything except `/compact`): the endpoint waits for
completion, so `{"status": "ok"}` means the command ran. A command still
running after 25 s answers `{"status": "running"}` — the worker keeps
going, its output reaches the pane via SSE, and the post-command pane
refreshes below still fire when it completes. (The bound sits under
common 30 s client/proxy timeouts — the console proxy's included — so
the degraded answer actually reaches bounded callers.)
- **`/compact`**: dispatched fire-and-forget — `{"status": "ok"}` means the
compaction *started*. A large context can legitimately compact for many
minutes; progress streams as `compaction` SSE events (see the event
reference) and the persisted marker row lands on completion. Do not read
`/history` expecting the compacted transcript immediately after the
response.
- **Busy refusal**: if a turn or another command holds the worker slot, the
command is refused with HTTP **409** `{"status": "busy", "error": ...}` and
did **not** run. Retry after the current turn finishes. (The old inline
endpoint executed commands unconditionally mid-turn; the 409 makes the
refusal loud for callers that only check the HTTP status.)
While a command holds the slot — and afterwards, while earlier deferred
sends are still waiting (the pending list is the order authority: a fresh
send never overtakes a message already acknowledged) — `POST .../send`
requests are **deferred**: the server answers `{"status": "queued",
"deferred": true, "msg_id": ...}` immediately and dispatches the message
as an ordinary full-fidelity send (attachments and sender identity
included) in arrival order once the slot frees — it is never routed
through the mid-turn interjection queue (no length cap, no cross-user
rejection). The response arrives within normal round-trip time, so
timeout-bounded clients (SDKs, proxies, the coordinator) need no special
handling. To retract a deferred send before it dispatches, issue the same
`DELETE .../send` with its `msg_id` used for queued interjections —
`{"status": "removed"}` confirms it will not dispatch; `"not_found"` means
it already dispatched (or is dispatching). Retracting a deferred send
discards any attachments it carried; re-attach to send them again. When a
deferred send dispatches, panes receive a `message_dispatched` event
(`msg_id`, plus `folded: true` when it folded into a live turn's
interjection queue rather than spawning its own turn) so queued-message
UI can settle the right way.
Durability: deferred sends are **node-local and in-memory** (the same
lifetime as the interjection queue). `"queued"` is at-most-once intake, not
durable acceptance — if the workstream is closed or the node restarts before
the window ends, the message is dropped. Anything that must survive a
restart should be re-sent after confirming dispatch (the turn appears on the
SSE stream / in `/history`).
Executes a slash command in the given workstream.
**Request body:**
@@ -927,12 +793,10 @@ SSE stream / in `/history`).
| `command` | string | yes | The slash command (e.g. `/clear`) |
| `ws_id` | string | yes | Target workstream ID |
If the command is `/clear`, `/new`, or `/resume`, the server pushes a
`clear_ui` SSE event to instruct the client to reset its message display and
re-fetch the transcript via `GET .../history` (there is no SSE event that
carries the messages themselves). These follow-ups are emitted by the
command worker itself, so they fire even when the endpoint already answered
`{"status": "running"}`.
If the command is `/clear` or `/new`, the server pushes a `clear_ui` SSE event
to instruct the client to reset its message display. If the command is
`/resume`, the server pushes `clear_ui` followed by a `history` event
containing the resumed session's messages.
**Response:**
@@ -940,16 +804,12 @@ command worker itself, so they fire even when the endpoint already answered
{"status": "ok"}
```
or `{"status": "running"}` as above.
**Error responses:**
| Status | Body | Condition |
|--------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 400 | `{"error": "Empty command"}` | Command is empty |
| 404 | `{"error": "Unknown workstream"}` | `ws_id` not found |
| 409 | `{"status": "busy", "error": ...}` | A turn/command holds the worker |
| 503 | `{"status": "error", "error": ...}` | The command worker could not be started (resource exhaustion) — the command did **not** run; retry shortly |
| Status | Body | Condition |
|--------|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 400 | `{"error": "Empty command"}` | Command is empty |
| 404 | `{"error": "Unknown workstream"}` | `ws_id` not found |
---
@@ -1035,7 +895,6 @@ All fields are optional. The body can be empty or an empty JSON object.
| `auto_approve` | bool | false | Auto-approve all tool calls for this workstream |
| `resume_ws` | string | "" | Workstream ID to resume atomically during creation (empty = fresh)|
| `skill` | string | "" | Skill name. Applies content (system prompt), model, temperature, reasoning effort, max tokens, auto-approve policy, token budget, and other session config from the skill. Returns 400 if not found or disabled. Ignored when `resume_ws` is set (resumed sessions restore their own skill). |
| `persona` | string | "" | Persona slug. Resolved and snapshotted into the workstream at creation; empty selects the kind's default. |
| `judge_model` | string | "" | Optional model alias for the judge (overrides default judge model for this workstream) |
> **Skill behavior:** When `skill` is specified, the skill's content is injected as a system message and its session config fields (model, temperature, auto-approve, token budget, etc.) override system defaults for the new workstream.
@@ -1052,7 +911,6 @@ All fields are optional. The body can be empty or an empty JSON object.
| `name` | string | Auto-generated workstream name |
| `resumed` | bool | Whether a previous session was successfully resumed |
| `message_count` | int | Number of messages in the resumed session (0 if fresh) |
| `initial_message_status` | string | Present ONLY when the workstream was created but its `initial_message` could not be delivered: `"queue_full"` (a raced live worker's interjection queue was at capacity — resend via `/send`; any uploads stay staged) or `"refused_closed"` (the workstream was closed mid-create). Absent whenever the message was dispatched. |
**Error (limit reached):**
+38 -149
View File
@@ -19,11 +19,10 @@ plugs in.
| `turnstone` | `turnstone.cli` | `TerminalUI` | Interactive terminal REPL |
| `turnstone-server` | `turnstone.server` | `WebUI` | Browser-based chat (HTTP + SSE) |
| `turnstone-console` | `turnstone.console.server` | ClusterCollector | Cluster dashboard (aggregates all nodes) |
| `turnstone-eval` | `turnstone.eval.cli` | `NullUI` | Headless measurement (scores tool-use against expected actions) |
| `turnstone-optimizer` | `turnstone.optimizer` | `NullUI` | Prompt/tool optimization (UCB self-modify loop over the eval substrate) |
| `turnstone-eval` | `turnstone.eval` | `NullUI` | Headless evaluation and prompt optimization |
| `turnstone-channel` | `turnstone.channels.cli` | ChannelAdapter | Channel gateway (Discord, Slack, etc.) |
| `turnstone-admin` | `turnstone.admin` | — | Offline user and API token management |
| `turnstone-doctor` | `turnstone.doctor` | — | LLM-backed cluster diagnostics |
| `turnstone-bootstrap` | `turnstone.bootstrap` | — | LLM-guided setup wizard |
---
@@ -91,7 +90,7 @@ turnstone/
discord/ Discord adapter (bot, cog, views, streaming, config)
slack/ Slack adapter (Socket Mode bot, DM routing, approval buttons)
shared_static/ Shared design system (base.css, auth.js, theme.js, toast.js, utils.js, kb.js)
katex-0.18.1/ Vendored KaTeX math rendering library (MIT, woff2 fonts)
katex-0.17.0/ Vendored KaTeX math rendering library (MIT, woff2 fonts)
ui/
colors.py ANSI color constants with NO_COLOR support
markdown.py Streaming terminal markdown renderer (line-buffered)
@@ -268,7 +267,7 @@ the per-workstream events stream in
|-------|--------|-------|
| `TerminalUI` | `turnstone.cli` | ANSI colors, `MarkdownRenderer`, `Spinner`, readline-based `input()` for approval |
| `WebUI` | `turnstone.server` | SSE event queue per workstream + global broadcast, `threading.Event` for blocking on approval. `on_state_change` sends to both per-workstream and global SSE (the browser UI uses per-workstream `state_change` events to manage busy/idle transitions; `stream_end` only finalizes markdown rendering). |
| `NullUI` | `turnstone.eval.core` | Discards all output; `approve_tools` always returns `(True, None)` |
| `NullUI` | `turnstone.eval` | Discards all output; `approve_tools` always returns `(True, None)` |
### WorkstreamTerminalUI
@@ -609,7 +608,8 @@ LLMProvider (protocol)
| Method | Purpose |
|--------|---------|
| `create_streaming()` | The one transport: streaming request, yields normalized `StreamChunk` objects (single-shot callers accumulate via `drain_stream()` into a `CompletionResult`) |
| `create_streaming()` | Streaming request, yields normalized `StreamChunk` objects |
| `create_completion()` | Non-streaming request, returns `CompletionResult` |
| `get_capabilities()` | Per-model flags (`ModelCapabilities`) |
| `convert_tools()` | Translate OpenAI tool schemas to provider format |
| `retryable_error_names` | Exception class names that trigger retry |
@@ -621,30 +621,20 @@ LLMProvider (protocol)
|------|--------|
| `StreamChunk` | `content_delta`, `reasoning_delta`, `tool_call_deltas`, `info_delta`, `usage`, `finish_reason`, `provider_blocks` |
| `CompletionResult` | `content`, `tool_calls`, `finish_reason`, `usage`, `provider_blocks` |
| `ModelCapabilities` | `context_window`, `max_output_tokens`, `supports_temperature`, `token_param`, `thinking_mode`, `supports_effort`, `supports_web_search`, `supports_tool_search`, `supports_vision`, `supports_reasoning_replay`, `supports_verbosity`, `verbosity`, `supports_pro_mode`, `reasoning_mode` |
| `ModelCapabilities` | `context_window`, `max_output_tokens`, `supports_temperature`, `token_param`, `thinking_mode`, `supports_effort`, `supports_web_search`, `supports_tool_search`, `supports_vision`, `supports_reasoning_replay` |
| `UsageInfo` | `prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, `total_tokens`, `cache_creation_tokens`, `cache_read_tokens` |
**OpenAIProvider** (`_openai.py`): passes messages through unchanged (they are
already in OpenAI format), including multi-part content blocks (text + images)
in tool results. Model capability lookup covers GPT-5 through GPT-5.6,
in tool results. Model capability lookup table covers GPT-5/5.1/5.2/5.3/5.4,
O-series, and search models (`gpt-5-search-api`) — all with `supports_vision`.
For search models, injects `web_search_options` and removes the `web_search`
function tool (the model always searches). Citations from `url_citation`
annotations are formatted as footnotes. Pre-5.6 GPT-5 models request extended
prompt-cache retention (`prompt_cache_retention: "24h"`); GPT-5.6 uses
`prompt_cache_options.ttl: "30m"`. Cache reads and writes are extracted from
`cached_tokens` and `cache_write_tokens`. Unknown models get permissive
defaults with `supports_vision=False` and use SearxNG for web search. The
`openai-compatible` lane never consults this table at all — on either API
surface (the responses pin is served by a compat-mode
`OpenAIResponsesProvider`, mirroring `AnthropicProvider(compat=True)`): a
local server serves whatever the operator named it (vLLM
`--served-model-name` is a free string), so a prefix collision with a cloud
model id must not inherit that model's sampling/effort contract — every
local model gets the plain defaults, commercial prompt-cache controls are not
injected by model-name prefix, and anything beyond those defaults is declared
on the model definition (capabilities JSON + `server_compat`), matching the
`anthropic-compatible` lane.
annotations are formatted as footnotes. Extended prompt cache retention
(`prompt_cache_retention: "24h"`) is enabled for GPT-5.x models at no
additional cost. Cached token counts are extracted from
`usage.prompt_tokens_details.cached_tokens`. Unknown models (local servers) get
permissive defaults with `supports_vision=False` and use SearxNG for web search.
**AnthropicProvider** (`_anthropic.py`): converts OpenAI-format messages to
Anthropic content blocks, maps `system`/`developer` roles to the `system`
@@ -662,7 +652,7 @@ display). Automatic prompt caching is enabled via top-level `cache_control:
cacheable block and advances it as conversations grow (90% input cost
reduction on cache hits, 1.25x write on first turn). Cache metrics
(`cache_creation_input_tokens`, `cache_read_input_tokens`) are extracted from
the stream's usage events. The `anthropic` SDK is a core
both streaming and non-streaming responses. The `anthropic` SDK is a core
dependency — the Anthropic provider is first-class alongside OpenAI.
**GoogleProvider** (`_google.py`): extends `OpenAIChatCompletionsProvider` for
@@ -807,105 +797,15 @@ model = "deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V4-Flash"
supports_vision = true # multimodal checkpoints only
supports_mid_conversation_system = true # template-dependent
context_window = 131072
thinking_mode = "manual" # session effort knob drives the template toggle
thinking_param = "enable_thinking" # Qwen/Gemma key; "thinking" for Granite/DeepSeek
```
Reasoning control does NOT use Anthropic's `thinking` request param
the levers live in the chat template, reached through
`chat_template_kwargs` in the request body. Two channels, dynamic first:
* **Session effort knob (dynamic).** Set the model's thinking mode to
"Effort-knob controlled" in the admin Models form (or
`thinking_mode = "manual"` + `thinking_param` under
`[models.*.capabilities]`) and the provider maps the session's
reasoning-effort knob onto the template toggle per-request: effort
`none` sends `{<thinking_param>: false}`, any other level sends
`true` — the same contract as the real lane's manual mode. ("Always
on" / `thinking_mode = "adaptive"` instead always sends `true`: the
model self-regulates, so the knob never force-disables — mirroring
the native adaptive branch.) The graded effort value always rides
alongside the toggle: under `effort_param` when the operator names
the template's key, else under the conventional fallback key
(`reasoning_effort`) on the anthropic-compatible lane — the user's
effort setting always reaches the wire, and a template that doesn't
reference the kwarg ignores it. On the openai-compatible lane the
undeclared-key case rides the flat top-level `reasoning_effort`
param instead (the documented compat field), forwarded verbatim.
Optional `reasoning_effort_values` / `default_reasoning_effort`
validate the knob before it reaches the server; without declared
values the knob is forwarded as-is. The knob is ordinal, and validation
respects that: an off-list knob value rounds UP onto the declared
list and a value above the ceiling rides the ceiling
(`snap_reasoning_effort`) — asking for more effort than the model
declares never falls back to a lower default tier. The knob's
`none` position is forwarded verbatim when the model declares an
explicit `none` level (gpt-5.1+, grok-4.3) — omitting it there would
leave a reasoning-on server default (e.g. gpt-5.5's `medium`) in
charge of a knob that promises off — and omitted otherwise; `none`
is never a snap target for other positions.
`default_reasoning_effort` only catches values the ordinal snap
cannot rank (custom strings). Declare values that match the
template's documented vocabulary: for DeepSeek-V4, which officially
accepts `high`/`max` (Think High is the default thinking tier;
`low`/`medium` alias to `high`, `xhigh` to `max`), a
`("high", "max")` values list reproduces the official aliasing
exactly — `low`/`medium` round up to `high`, `xhigh` to `max`
and freeform passthrough matches it too. To map an undocumented
template, probe with per-request `chat_template_kwargs` and compare
`input_tokens`. Setting `effort_param` also suppresses the
flat top-level `reasoning_effort` request param on the
openai-compatible lane — the template channel replaces it, never
doubles it. With the default `thinking_mode = "none"` nothing is
injected and the server's template default decides.
Upgrade note: before 1.7.0a7 the openai-compatible lane sent the
toggle unconditionally `true` whenever thinking mode was enabled. A
stored per-model `reasoning_effort = "none"` now disables thinking
on such models — pick any real level (or clear the override) to keep
it on. Also since 1.7.0a7 the effort level itself always reaches the
wire on the local lanes (previously dropped unless
`reasoning_effort_values` was declared): flat `reasoning_effort` on
openai-compatible, the `effort_param`-or-fallback template key on
anthropic-compatible when reasoning control is engaged.
* **Operator pin (static).** Entries under `{"chat_template_kwargs":
...}` in the admin Models extra-body field ride the SDK's
`extra_body` unconditionally and win over the knob mapping on key
collision — e.g. pin `{"enable_thinking": true}` to keep thinking on
regardless of the session knob. (Server type and API surface remain
openai-compatible-only knobs and stay hidden for this provider.)
The same knob mapping drives the `openai-compatible` lane's Chat
Completions requests — `merge_reasoning_template_kwargs` is shared by
both local-server lanes, so `thinking_mode`/`thinking_param`/
`effort_param` mean the same thing whichever endpoint serves the model.
Only the Responses API surface (native reasoning) ignores it.
The console surfaces this projection as an *effective effort ladder*:
the admin model form's per-model effort select and the skill
launch-config effort select annotate each position with what the
request will carry, in plain words — a position whose delivered level
matches its name stays plain ("Max"), a snapped position says so
("Low — sends high"), the adaptive lanes' none position warns
"thinking stays on", and budget detail lives in the tooltip. A
position is never labeled after a sibling that shares its wire (that
rendered "Max (= minimal)", implying a downgrade the wire doesn't
contain). Computed server-side by `providers/effort_ladder.py` from
the same mapping functions the providers use at request time and
shipped on `/v1/api/models` rows (every row carries `effort_ladder`,
empty when the capabilities column fails to parse) and
`POST /v1/api/admin/models/effort-ladder`. The ladder describes what
Turnstone sends — a server-side template may alias further (DeepSeek-V4
folds `low`/`medium` into its default `high` tier).
The `anthropic-compatible` lane never sends Anthropic's native
`thinking`/`output_config` params — they are not in vLLM's request
schema. The real `anthropic` provider is unaffected: official Claude
models keep native thinking, budget mapping, and `output_config`
effort. A gateway fronting *real* Claude on a Messages-shaped URL
(e.g. a LiteLLM `anthropic/` route to the Claude API) should use
`provider = "anthropic"` with a custom `base_url`, which keeps the
native thinking params.
The reasoning toggle does NOT use Anthropic's `thinking` request param.
Toggle it through the chat template instead: set `{"chat_template_kwargs":
{"thinking": false}}` as extra body params in the admin Models
server-compat section (for this provider the section shows only the
extra-body field — server type, API surface, and thinking mode are
openai-compatible-only knobs); the provider forwards it via the SDK's
`extra_body`.
Verified quirks of vLLM's Anthropic endpoint:
@@ -1117,10 +1017,9 @@ reconstructs the OpenAI message format from database rows:
in the same workstream
**Config persistence:** LLM-affecting parameters (`temperature`,
`reasoning_effort`, `max_tokens`, `instructions`, and the persona
snapshot — see `docs/personas.md`) are persisted to the
`workstream_config` table on creation and whenever changed via slash
commands. `resume()` restores these values so resumed workstreams
`reasoning_effort`, `max_tokens`, `instructions`, `creative_mode`) are
persisted to the `workstream_config` table on creation and whenever changed
via slash commands. `resume()` restores these values so resumed workstreams
behave identically to the original.
**`/clear` vs `/new`:** `/clear` wipes in-memory context but preserves
@@ -1149,30 +1048,20 @@ Named (aliased) workstreams are never age-pruned. Configure with
### API Retry
Every model call streams (#831); retry lives at two stacked layers:
`ChatSession._create_stream_with_retry()` (streaming path) and the agent
`_api_call()` (non-streaming) both use the same retry pattern:
- **Caller ladders**`ChatSession._create_stream_with_retry()` (chat
loop) and the agent `_api_call()` (drained via `model_turn`) use the
same pattern: 4 total attempts (1 initial + 3 retries,
`_MAX_RETRIES = 3`), exponential backoff base 1 second
(`delay = 1s * 2^attempt`), `ui.on_info()` on retry, exception
propagates on final failure. `_compact_messages()` wraps its drained
call in the same loop.
- **`model_turn`'s drain ladder** — inside every single-shot call,
mid-stream deaths (errors raised while draining, e.g.
`IncompleteStreamError`) are re-issued up to 2 more times with a
0.5s-base exponential backoff (±50% jitter); request-time failures
keep the SDK's own retry policy. The two ladders stack
multiplicatively on transient-shaped failures.
- **Retryable errors** are matched by class name against each
provider's `retryable_error_names` (avoids importing
backend-specific exception hierarchies): `RateLimitError`,
`APITimeoutError`, `APIConnectionError`, `InternalServerError`,
`ServiceUnavailableError`, `APIError`, plus the drained-transport
errors `IncompleteStreamError` (stream ended with no terminal
signal — for servers that never send one, declare
`finish_reason_optional` in the model's capabilities JSON) and
`ResponsesStreamFailedError` (transient in-band Responses failure).
- **Retries**: 4 total attempts (1 initial + 3 retries, `_MAX_RETRIES = 3`)
- **Backoff**: exponential, base 1 second (`delay = 1s * 2^attempt`)
- **Retryable errors**: `RateLimitError`, `APITimeoutError`,
`APIConnectionError`, `InternalServerError`, `ServiceUnavailableError`,
`APIError` (matched by class name to avoid importing backend-specific
exception hierarchies)
- On retry: `ui.on_info()` notification
- On final failure: exception propagates
`_compact_messages()` also wraps its non-streaming API call in the same
retry loop.
### Finish Reason Handling
@@ -1185,7 +1074,7 @@ Every model call streams (#831); retry lives at two stacked layers:
blocked.
Agent sub-sessions (`_run_agent()`) check `finish_reason` on each
drained turn and stop the agent early on `"length"` or
non-streaming response and stop the agent early on `"length"` or
`"content_filter"`.
`_compact_messages()` checks `finish_reason` on the compaction response and
+25 -12
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Existing bulk endpoints at time of writing:
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| `GET /v1/api/cluster/ws/live?ids=a,b,c` | bulk read | `{results, denied, truncated}` |
| model tool `spawn_batch` | bulk create (per-item) | `{results, denied}` |
| `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/stop_cascade` | cascade mutation | `{cancelled, failed, skipped}` |
| `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/close_all_children` | cascade mutation | `{closed, failed, skipped}` |
---
@@ -145,7 +146,7 @@ consistently-typed across the read and create cases.
```
Where `<bucket>` is the endpoint-specific name for "succeeded" —
`closed` for `close_all_children`.
`cancelled` for `stop_cascade`, `closed` for `close_all_children`.
The three buckets partition the input set exactly once:
| Bucket | Meaning |
@@ -160,6 +161,20 @@ be partial. `skipped` is pre-resolved — the target is already in
the terminal state the cascade was aiming at, so it's neither a
win to report nor a fault to fix.
### Example — `stop_cascade`
```json
{
"status": "ok",
"cancelled": ["child-1", "child-3"],
"failed": [],
"skipped": ["child-2"]
}
```
A subsequent retry would target only `failed` ids, not `skipped`
ones — the latter are already done.
### Example — `close_all_children`
```json
@@ -171,12 +186,10 @@ win to report nor a fault to fix.
}
```
Here the success bucket is `closed`. A subsequent retry would
target only `failed` ids, not `skipped` ones — the latter are
already done. When `coord_client` is unavailable (session loaded
but no HTTP client attached — a construction bug) every id goes to
`failed` so the operator notices rather than getting a silent
all-skipped response.
Same partition, different success-bucket name. When `coord_client`
is unavailable (session loaded but no HTTP client attached — a
construction bug) every id goes to `failed` so the operator notices
rather than getting a silent all-skipped response.
---
@@ -219,12 +232,12 @@ all-skipped response.
- **Phase 6** shipped `cluster/ws/live` as the first Shape A endpoint
(`{results, denied, truncated}`).
- **Phase 7** introduced the Shape B cascade-mutation envelope
(`{<bucket>, failed, skipped}`) for the coordinator's
cancel-cascade path.
- **Phase 7** shipped `stop_cascade` as the first Shape B endpoint
(`{cancelled, failed, skipped}`).
- **Phase 8 PR A** shipped `spawn_batch` (Shape A, keyed by idx) and
`close_all_children` (Shape B), which crystallised the
two-shape-per-semantic-category policy codified here.
`close_all_children` (Shape B, twin of `stop_cascade`), which
crystallised the two-shape-per-semantic-category policy codified
here.
Before adding a third shape, read this doc and argue for why the
new surface doesn't fit either A or B. Two idioms in the cluster
+3 -4
View File
@@ -379,7 +379,6 @@ Breadcrumb: `Cluster > Running` or `Cluster > db-west-04`. Server-side paginated
Triggered by the "+ new" header button. A modal dialog with:
- **Node selector** — dropdown with three targeting modes: "Auto (best available)" picks the node with the most headroom, "General pool (any node)" picks a node with available capacity using round-robin, or a specific node from the list (showing capacity).
- **Persona** — optional dropdown listing the enabled personas for the workstream kind. Sets the system-message composition and capability envelope at creation, snapshotted server-side; empty uses the kind's default. Picking one requires no `persona.*` permission.
- **Profile** — optional dropdown listing enabled skills. Applies the skill's model, auto-approve policy, token budget, and other behavioral settings at creation time.
- **Name** — optional text input. Auto-generated if left empty.
- **Model** — optional text input for a model alias from the target node's registry.
@@ -397,9 +396,9 @@ The browser maintains a local `clusterState` object that mirrors the cluster sna
Accessed via the "admin" button in the header (visible when authenticated
with `approve` scope). Provides user, API token, channel link, MCP server,
and skill management with tabs that include Users, API Tokens, Channels,
Schedules, Watches, Personas, Roles, Policies, Prompts, Judge, Skills,
MCP Servers, Usage, Audit, Memories, Models, Nodes, Settings, and TLS. See also
and skill management with 18 tabs (Users, API Tokens, Channels, Schedules,
Watches, Roles, Policies, Prompts, Judge, Skills, MCP Servers, Usage,
Audit, Memories, Models, Nodes, Settings, TLS). See also
[Governance](governance.md) for the Roles, Policies, Skills, Usage, and
Audit tabs, and [Settings](settings.md) for the database-backed
configuration editor.
+43 -24
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ schema changes.
> auth and the `admin.coordinator` permission. A session-scoped JWT
> is minted per login (see [docs/oidc.md](oidc.md) / [docs/security.md](security.md));
> a service token may call the read paths but destructive governance
> paths (`/restrict`, `/close_all_children`) require
> paths (`/restrict`, `/stop_cascade`, `/close_all_children`) require
> the explicit `admin.coordinator` grant — a service-token owner
> match isn't enough.
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ schema changes.
| 6 | Wait for fan-out | model-side tool `wait_for_workstream` |
| 7 | Govern | `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/trust` |
| | | `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/restrict` |
| | | `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/stop_cascade` |
| | | `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/close_all_children` |
| 8 | Approve / cancel | `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/approve` |
| | | `POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/cancel` |
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ schema changes.
Refer to `/openapi.json` (Swagger UI at `/docs`) on any
`turnstone-console` process for the authoritative operation ids and
schemas. Coordinator-only verbs (`/children`, `/trust`, `/restrict`,
`/close_all_children`) 404 against `kind=interactive`
`/stop_cascade`, `/close_all_children`) 404 against `kind=interactive`
rows; the shared verbs (`/send`, `/approve`, `/cancel`, `/events`,
`/history`, `/open`, `/close`, etc.) work on both kinds.
@@ -260,10 +261,10 @@ rounds to a 10× token-efficiency win.
---
## 7. Governance — trust, restrict, close_all_children
## 7. Governance — trust, restrict, stop_cascade, close_all_children
These three endpoints let an operator steer a live coordinator session
mid-flight. All three emit an audit event tagged
These four endpoints let an operator steer a live coordinator session
mid-flight. All four emit an audit event tagged
`coordinator.<action>` via the dedicated audit executor so a cascade
burst can't starve audit writes.
@@ -293,6 +294,28 @@ idempotent — calling twice with overlapping lists converges to the
union. Revocations don't survive a session close/reopen; operators
opt in per session. Cap 256 tool names per request, 128 chars each.
### `POST /stop_cascade` — cancel the subtree
```http
POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/stop_cascade
{}
```
Cancels the coordinator's in-flight generation AND dispatches
`cancel_workstream` through the routing proxy for every direct
child in the in-memory registry. Returns:
```json
{"status": "ok", "cancelled": ["child-1", "child-3"], "failed": [], "skipped": ["child-2"]}
```
Response uses the [cascade-mutation bulk shape](bulk-endpoints.md):
`cancelled` = accepted, `failed` = dispatch error worth retrying,
`skipped` = upstream 404 (already gone — stale registry entry or
the row was deleted between snapshot and dispatch). Grandchildren
aren't touched directly; they sit behind their parent's cancel and
propagate via the child's SSE stream.
### `POST /close_all_children` — soft-close the direct fan-out
```http
@@ -306,16 +329,16 @@ Response:
{"status": "ok", "closed": ["c-1", "c-2"], "failed": [], "skipped": []}
```
Soft-close cascade bounded by a concurrency semaphore. The `reason`
(up to 512 chars) propagates into each closed child's audit +
`workstream_config` for postmortem. The model-facing tool that
pairs with this endpoint asks for a bounded teardown of the
coordinator's own fan-out. This *soft-closes*; to *cancel* the
fan-out instead, cancel the coordinator (§8) — a coordinator cancel
auto-cascades to its direct children.
Soft-close cascade bounded by the same semaphore as `stop_cascade`.
The `reason` (up to 512 chars) propagates into each closed child's
audit + `workstream_config` for postmortem. Unlike `stop_cascade`
this does NOT recurse into grandchildren — the model-facing tool
that pairs with this endpoint asks for a bounded teardown of the
coordinator's own fan-out. For a full-subtree teardown, use
`stop_cascade`.
See [bulk-endpoints.md](bulk-endpoints.md) for why `close_all_children`
uses the cascade-mutation shape and how it differs from the
See [bulk-endpoints.md](bulk-endpoints.md) for why both endpoints
share the cascade-mutation shape and how it differs from the
`spawn_batch` / `cluster/ws/live` shape.
---
@@ -333,10 +356,7 @@ POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/approve
{"approved": true, "feedback": null, "always": true} // always-approve this tool name
```
`cancel` drops the coordinator's in-flight generation and, for a
coordinator, auto-cascades the cancel to its direct children:
`cancel_workstream` is dispatched through the routing proxy for
every direct child in the registry. The coordinator itself is left
`cancel` drops the in-flight generation but leaves the coordinator
idle and open for a fresh `send`:
```http
@@ -353,10 +373,9 @@ POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/close
{}
```
Soft-closes the session — state persists, children keep running
(wind them down first with `close_all_children`, or by cancelling
the coordinator, which cascades the cancel to its direct children),
the worker thread exits, SSE streams send a final `stream_end` and
Soft-closes the session — state persists, children keep running (use
`close_all_children` or `stop_cascade` first to wind them down), the
worker thread exits, SSE streams send a final `stream_end` and
disconnect. The row is reopenable via
`POST /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/open` so long as it hasn't been
deleted.
@@ -366,12 +385,12 @@ deleted.
## Further reading
- [coordinator-skills.md](coordinator-skills.md) — writing a skill
that runs on a coordinator session (orchestrator framing,
that runs on a coordinator session (orchestrator persona,
workflow patterns, `SkillKind` classifier).
- [bulk-endpoints.md](bulk-endpoints.md) — the two bulk-shape
idioms (`{results, denied, truncated}` vs
`{<bucket>, failed, skipped}`) used by `cluster/ws/live`,
`spawn_batch`, and `close_all_children`.
`spawn_batch`, `stop_cascade`, and `close_all_children`.
- [architecture.md](architecture.md) — cluster-wide architecture
including how coordinator sessions fit next to node-hosted
interactive workstreams.
+12 -12
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
# Writing a coordinator-specific skill
A skill is prompt-level framing that steers a Turnstone session
Skills are prompt-level personas that steer a Turnstone session
toward a narrow task. Most skills target **interactive** sessions —
the single-workstream "do this thing" surface where the model wields
`bash`, `edit_file`, `web_fetch`, and the rest of the maker toolset.
A **coordinator skill** is different. It runs on a session whose job
is to orchestrate other sessions. The toolset is smaller and
narrower, the role is an orchestrator instead of a maker, and the
narrower, the persona is an orchestrator instead of a maker, and the
success metric is "did the plan resolve" instead of "did the code
compile". This doc covers the differences a skill author has to
care about.
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ migration 044 added the column). Three values:
| `SkillKind` enum | Stored as | Meaning |
|-------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `SkillKind.INTERACTIVE` | `"interactive"` | Authored for the interactive maker role (single-workstream "do this"). |
| `SkillKind.COORDINATOR` | `"coordinator"` | Authored for the orchestrator role (delegate, monitor, synthesise). |
| `SkillKind.INTERACTIVE` | `"interactive"` | Authored for the interactive maker persona (single-workstream "do this"). |
| `SkillKind.COORDINATOR` | `"coordinator"` | Authored for the orchestrator persona (delegate, monitor, synthesise). |
| `SkillKind.ANY` | `"any"` | Either surface (or audience-neutral). Default on create. |
The `kind` field is a `StrEnum` — drop-in `str` compatible — so DB
@@ -96,20 +96,20 @@ for the output. The coordinator stays the orchestrator.
---
## Framing differences
## Persona differences
Interactive skills compose on top of `base_interactive.md` — a
"maker" framing: get the work done, use the tools, edit the code,
"maker" persona: get the work done, use the tools, edit the code,
close the loop.
Coordinator skills compose on top of
[`personas/orchestrator.md`](../turnstone/prompts/personas/orchestrator.md) —
an "orchestrator" framing: decompose, delegate, monitor, synthesise.
[`base_coordinator.md`](../turnstone/prompts/base_coordinator.md) —
an "orchestrator" persona: decompose, delegate, monitor, synthesise.
The base text is short but sets the tone every coordinator skill
inherits:
> You are a coordinator. Your role is to orchestrate work across
> the cluster... You do
> You are a coordinator on a small, focused infrastructure team.
> Your role is to orchestrate work across the cluster... You do
> not edit files, run shell commands, browse the web, or manipulate
> the codebase directly. Children do that.
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ For a new coordinator skill:
A full end-to-end test isn't required for every skill; a
prepare-step unit test that asserts "given this initial message, the
first tool call is X with Y args" is usually sufficient to catch
framing drift without a real LLM in the loop.
persona drift without a real LLM in the loop.
---
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ framing drift without a real LLM in the loop.
`spawn_batch` and `close_all_children` use, so your skill can
parse results / denied arrays correctly.
- [governance.md](governance.md) — the broader governance surface
(`/trust`, `/restrict`, role-based permissions)
(`/trust`, `/restrict`, `/stop_cascade`, role-based permissions)
that wraps every coord session.
- [settings.md](settings.md) — `coordinator.model_alias` and
`coordinator.reasoning_effort` settings that gate which LLM runs
+3 -2
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ class "NullUI" as NullUI {
interface "LLMProvider" as LLMProvider <<Protocol>> {
+ provider_name: str {property}
+ get_capabilities(model) → ModelCapabilities
+ create_streaming(client, model, messages, ..., cancel_ref, replay_reasoning_to_model) → Iterator[StreamChunk]
+ create_streaming(client, model, messages, ..., replay_reasoning_to_model) → Iterator[StreamChunk]
+ create_completion(client, model, messages, ..., replay_reasoning_to_model) → CompletionResult
+ convert_tools(tools) → list[dict]
+ extract_reasoning_text(provider_blocks) → str
+ retryable_error_names: frozenset[str] {property}
@@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ class "HeadlessSession" as HeadlessSession {
+ send_headless(input, max_turns, ...)
- _override_system_prompt(content)
--
eval.py: drained single-shot turns,
eval.py: non-streaming,
records all tool calls
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ end note
loop up to 3 turns (timeout budget)
Judge -> LLM : model_turn(lane, judge_turns,\ntools=[read_file, list_directory])\nvia drained create_streaming
LLM --> Judge : ModelTurnResult
Judge -> LLM : create_completion(\nmodel, judge_messages,\ntools=[read_file, list_directory])
LLM --> Judge : CompletionResult
alt tool_calls present (turn < 3)
Judge -> Judge : _exec_read_only_tool()
+2 -32
View File
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ docker compose -f turnstone/deploy/compose.yaml up
It's the same shape as the dev stack — Caddy-fronted console, channel, and a
PostgreSQL all share one database so the console discovers the node — but it
pulls released images, runs a single server node, and has **no baked-in
secrets**. Set these in `.env` first (generate with `openssl rand -hex 32`):
secrets**. Set these in `.env` first (`turnstone-bootstrap` generates them):
```bash
TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=<python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))">
@@ -252,7 +252,6 @@ interface, or anyone who can reach it can search through your instance.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `WORKSPACE_MOUNT` | empty volume | Host directory bind-mounted at `/workspace` for the model to read/write |
| `TURNSTONE_WORKSPACE` | `/workspace` (image env) | Directory named as the user's workspace in the model's tool descriptions; informational only — see [Working directory](#working-directory) |
| `SKIP_PERMISSIONS` | — | Set to any value to auto-approve all tool calls (dev only) |
| `MCP_CONFIG` | — | Path to an MCP server config file |
| `TURNSTONE_IMAGE_TAG` | `latest` | ghcr.io image tag — production stack |
@@ -261,7 +260,7 @@ interface, or anyone who can reach it can search through your instance.
Both stacks install all entry points into a single image (`turnstone`,
`turnstone-server`, `turnstone-console`, `turnstone-channel`, `turnstone-admin`,
`turnstone-eval`, `turnstone-optimizer`, `turnstone-doctor`):
`turnstone-eval`, `turnstone-bootstrap`):
```bash
docker compose build # build the dev image
@@ -277,35 +276,6 @@ docker compose build --no-cache # rebuild from scratch
| `workspace` | `/workspace` (unless `WORKSPACE_MOUNT` is set) |
| `caddy-data` / `caddy-config` | Caddy's local CA and config (dev stack) |
## Working directory
Node processes run with `/data` as their working directory (the image's
`WORKDIR`), and that is where the model's shell commands execute and
relative file paths resolve — **not** `/workspace`. The shell and file
tool descriptions state both paths (the working directory, and the
workspace named by `TURNSTONE_WORKSPACE`), so the model knows to look in
`/workspace` for your files without being told each session.
To make tools start inside the mount instead, override the working
directory on the node services:
```yaml
services:
turnstone-node:
working_dir: /workspace
```
Two caveats before overriding:
- **SQLite fallback**: when a node runs without PostgreSQL, its fallback
database `.turnstone.db` is created in the process working directory.
Changing `working_dir` on an existing SQLite-fallback deployment makes
the node create a fresh database inside the mount and your prior state
appears lost (it is still in the `turnstone-data` volume under `/data`).
The stock compose stacks use PostgreSQL and are unaffected.
- Migrations (`entrypoint.sh`) run in the same working directory, so the
same SQLite caveat applies to them.
## Cleanup
```bash
+24 -55
View File
@@ -1,19 +1,11 @@
# Evaluation and Prompt Optimization (turnstone-eval, turnstone-optimizer)
# Evaluation and Prompt Optimization (turnstone-eval)
Evaluation for turnstone is split into two commands:
`turnstone-eval` is the evaluation and prompt optimization system for turnstone. It
runs test cases against the LLM, scores tool call sequences against expected
actions, and optionally uses a multi-agent pipeline to optimize the developer
prompt and tool descriptions.
- **`turnstone-eval`** — the measurement substrate. Runs test cases against the LLM
and scores tool call sequences against expected actions. A single measurement pass,
no self-modification.
- **`turnstone-optimizer`** — the prompt/tool optimizer. Loops over the measurement
substrate, using a multi-agent pipeline (analyst, optimizer, observer, diversifier,
tool optimizer) to edit the developer prompt and tool descriptions so more tests pass.
The dependency is strictly one-way: the optimizer consumes the eval substrate; the
substrate never depends on the optimizer.
Source: `turnstone/eval/core.py` (measurement substrate), `turnstone/eval/cli.py`
(the `turnstone-eval` CLI), `turnstone/optimizer.py` (the `turnstone-optimizer` CLI).
Source: `turnstone/eval.py`
---
@@ -35,8 +27,8 @@ This approach (inspired by [Learning to Self-Evolve](https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.
prevents irrecoverable collapse from bad edits — UCB naturally backtracks to
high-scoring ancestors instead of following a linear chain.
The `turnstone-eval` command (or `turnstone-optimizer --no-optimize`) executes only
steps 2-4: a single measurement pass over the root prompt, no optimization.
When optimization is disabled (`--no-optimize`), only steps 2-4 execute
(a single iteration evaluating the root node).
---
@@ -460,46 +452,30 @@ structure is:
## CLI Usage
Two console scripts (installed as entry points), or the equivalent `python -m`
invocations:
- `turnstone-eval` / `python -m turnstone.eval.cli` — measure only.
- `turnstone-optimizer` / `python -m turnstone.optimizer` — optimize.
### Measure (`turnstone-eval`)
The entry point is `turnstone-eval` (installed as a console script) or
`python -m turnstone.eval`.
```
turnstone-eval tests.json # one measurement pass, print scores
turnstone-eval tests.json --prompt custom.txt # measure a custom prompt
turnstone-eval tests.json --n-runs 5 # more runs per case
turnstone-eval tests.json --parallel 4 # run cases across 4 workers
turnstone-eval tests.json -v # verbose per-turn logging
turnstone-eval tests.json # evaluate + optimize
turnstone-eval tests.json --no-optimize # evaluate only (single iteration)
turnstone-eval tests.json --n-runs 5 --max-iter 10 # more thorough evaluation
turnstone-eval tests.json --prompt custom.txt # start from a custom prompt
turnstone-eval tests.json --optimize-tools # optimize tool descriptions only
turnstone-eval tests.json --diversify 10 # test with prompt variants
turnstone-eval tests.json -v # verbose per-turn logging
```
### Optimize (`turnstone-optimizer`)
### Multi-model setup (local test model, cloud optimizer)
```
turnstone-optimizer tests.json # evaluate + optimize
turnstone-optimizer tests.json --no-optimize # single pass, no optimization
turnstone-optimizer tests.json --n-runs 5 --max-iter 10 # more thorough optimization
turnstone-optimizer tests.json --prompt custom.txt # start from a custom prompt
turnstone-optimizer tests.json --optimize-tools # optimize tool descriptions only
turnstone-optimizer tests.json --diversify 10 # test with prompt variants
```
#### Multi-model setup (local test model, cloud optimizer)
```
turnstone-optimizer tests.json \
turnstone-eval tests.json \
--base-url http://localhost:8000/v1 \
--optimizer-base-url https://api.anthropic.com \
--optimizer-model claude-sonnet-4-6 \
--analyst-model claude-opus-4-6
```
### Measurement Options
Accepted by **both** commands.
### All Options
| Flag | Default | Description |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
@@ -508,26 +484,19 @@ Accepted by **both** commands.
| `--model` | auto-detect | Model name. Auto-detected from the API if not specified. |
| `--prompt` | turnstone built-in prompt | Path to initial prompt text file. |
| `--n-runs` | from tests.json or 3 | Number of runs per test case. |
| `--max-iter` | 5 | Maximum optimization iterations. |
| `--no-optimize` | false | Run evaluation only (sets max-iter to 1). |
| `--temperature` | 0.7 | Sampling temperature. |
| `--max-tokens` | 32768 | Max completion tokens. |
| `--reasoning-effort` | `medium` | Reasoning effort: `low`, `medium`, or `high`. |
| `--context-window` | 131072 | Context window size. |
| `--output` | `eval_results.json` | Output results file path. |
| `-v`, `--verbose` | false | Show detailed per-turn logging. |
| `--explore-constant` | 1.414 (sqrt(2)) | UCB exploration constant C. |
| `--test-timeout` | 300 | Per-test timeout in seconds. |
| `--suite-timeout` | 0 (unlimited) | Total suite timeout in seconds. |
| `--no-fast-fail` | false | Disable early termination on all-zero initial runs. |
| `--parallel` | 1 (serial) | Parallel workers (0=auto, N=use N workers). |
### Optimizer Options
Accepted by **`turnstone-optimizer`** only.
| Flag | Default | Description |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|
| `--max-iter` | 5 | Maximum optimization iterations. |
| `--no-optimize` | false | Run a single measurement pass (sets max-iter to 1). |
| `--explore-constant` | 1.414 (sqrt(2)) | UCB exploration constant C. |
| `--suite-timeout` | 0 (unlimited) | Total suite timeout in seconds. |
| `--optimizer-model` | same as `--model` | Model for prompt optimization. |
| `--optimizer-base-url` | same as `--base-url` | Base URL for optimizer model. |
| `--observer-model` | same as optimizer | Model for meta-optimization (observer). |
+6 -14
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ The permission model has two layers:
1. **Scopes** (legacy) — `read`, `write`, `approve`. Checked by `AuthMiddleware`
on every request based on URL path classification.
2. **Permissions** (granular) — named permission strings checked per-endpoint by
2. **Permissions** (granular) — 15 permission strings checked per-endpoint by
`require_permission()`.
**Built-in roles** (seeded by migration 008):
@@ -24,11 +24,7 @@ The permission model has two layers:
| operator | read, write, workstreams.create, workstreams.close |
| viewer | read |
Custom roles can be created with any subset of the valid permissions.
The `persona.create` / `persona.read` / `persona.write` family gates
persona administration; migration `063` seeds all three onto
`builtin-admin`, and any role can be granted them through the standard
role and permission-override editors.
Custom roles can be created with any subset of the 15 valid permissions.
**Auth flow:**
1. User logs in (password or API token) → `_load_user_permissions()` aggregates
@@ -131,12 +127,9 @@ Per-LLM-request token and tool call metrics:
LLM response with prompt/completion tokens, cache tokens, tool call count,
model, ws_id
- **Prompt caching**: Anthropic automatic caching (`cache_control: ephemeral`)
and OpenAI caching are enabled by default. Pre-5.6 GPT-5 models request
`prompt_cache_retention: 24h`; GPT-5.6 uses
`prompt_cache_options: {"ttl": "30m"}`. GPT-5.6 cache writes use the
provider's 1.25× input-token rate. `cache_creation_tokens` and
`cache_read_tokens` are tracked per request in `usage_events` and surfaced
in the Usage admin tab
and OpenAI extended retention (`prompt_cache_retention: 24h` for GPT-5.x)
are enabled by default. `cache_creation_tokens` and `cache_read_tokens` are
tracked per request in `usage_events` and surfaced in the Usage admin tab
- **Querying**: `GET /v1/api/admin/usage` with `group_by` (day/hour/model/user)
and time range filtering — includes cache token aggregates
- **Prometheus**: `turnstone_tokens_total{type="cache_creation|cache_read"}`
@@ -184,7 +177,6 @@ All under `/v1/api/admin/` (requires `approve` scope + granular permission).
| Orgs | 3 (list, get, update) | `admin.orgs` |
| Tool Policies | 4 (CRUD) | `admin.policies` |
| Skills | 4 (CRUD) | `admin.skills` |
| Personas | 4 (list, create, get, edit/archive) | `persona.read` / `persona.create` / `persona.write` |
| Schedules | 6 (CRUD + runs) | `admin.schedules` |
| Watches | 3 (list, create, cancel) | `admin.watches` |
| Usage | 1 (aggregated query) | `admin.usage` |
@@ -230,7 +222,7 @@ Both Python and TypeScript console SDKs expose governance methods:
- **Privilege escalation prevented**: `admin_assign_role` blocks self-assignment
and requires caller to hold a superset of the target role's permissions
- **Permission validation**: Role create/update validates permissions against
the permission allowlist (`_VALID_PERMISSIONS`)
a 15-item allowlist (`_VALID_PERMISSIONS`)
- **Self-deletion blocked**: `admin_delete_user` rejects attempts to delete
your own account (matching the self-assignment guard on role endpoints)
- **Field allowlists**: Storage `update_*` methods filter fields against
+2 -8
View File
@@ -249,14 +249,8 @@ are withheld from the live surfaces (a reused call_id must never ride a stale
`approve` into Smart Approvals) but still persist with
`user_decision = "superseded"` so the audit trail records the judge's answer.
Sub-agent (task agent) tool calls are judge-gated too. Each runs the same
intent pipeline as its own `agent_gate` generation, grounded in that sub-agent's
own trajectory -- its task prompt is the delegation contract the operator
approved, so "does this call serve the task" is the right local question.
Agent-gate generations never occupy the main loop's supersede slot (parallel
siblings would otherwise make each other's verdicts look stale); per-cycle
generation checks enforce staleness instead, and `judge.cancel_on_approval`
fires per gate exactly like the main loop.
Sub-agents (plan agent, task agent) are exempt from intent validation -- they
always get full tool visibility without judge evaluation.
---
+4 -64
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,8 @@ The MCP server admin form exposes three authorization modes ("Multitenant Author
| `none` | No headers attached. Open MCP server (or one gated by network policy only). | Internal MCP servers on a trusted network. |
| `static` | One static bearer token, configured per server, sent on every request from every user. | Service-to-service MCP servers where per-user attribution doesn't matter, or single-tenant deployments. |
| `oauth_user` *(recommended for user-data servers)* | Each user authorizes separately via OAuth 2.1 + PKCE; Turnstone stores per-user tokens encrypted at rest. | MCP servers that expose user-specific data or that want per-user audit attribution. |
| `oauth_obo` *(sign-in passthrough)* | Each user's Turnstone **org sign-in** (OIDC) mints a per-server access token on demand — no separate per-server consent. One captured credential per user covers every `oauth_obo` server. | Enterprise deployments where the identity provider governs access (Entra, Keycloak) and you want zero per-user connect clicks. See the dedicated section below. |
Switching `auth_type` away from `oauth_user` / `oauth_obo` **deletes** that server's per-user rows (consents / minted cache) — see the transition table below. Switching back later starts clean: users re-consent (or re-mint) on next use. The admin **bulk-revoke** / **flush cache** affordance clears rows without an auth-type change.
Switching `auth_type` away from `oauth_user` orphans existing per-user tokens. Use the admin **bulk-revoke** affordance on the server row (Phase 9) to clear them, or let them expire naturally — they're inert without the matching `auth_type` value.
---
@@ -66,58 +65,6 @@ Keep this in `config.toml` rather than environment variables. An in-process LLM
---
## `auth_type=oauth_obo` — single-credential sign-in passthrough
Where `oauth_user` makes each user complete a **separate** browser consent per MCP server, `oauth_obo` reuses the user's Turnstone **org sign-in** (OIDC). Turnstone captures one refresh credential per user at login and, on each tool call, mints a short-lived access token scoped to that server's audience. There is no per-server connect step, and one credential covers every `oauth_obo` server. This is the right shape when your identity provider already governs who may reach each backend (an Entra tenant with Entra-protected MCP servers; a Keycloak realm with token exchange).
Access is governed **downstream** by the IdP: a user can only mint a token for a server their delegated permissions allow. Removing that grant at the IdP cuts the user off regardless of their Turnstone state.
### Deployment configuration (`[oidc]` in `config.toml`)
`oauth_obo` requires OIDC SSO to be configured (it is the credential source), plus:
```toml
[oidc]
# ... your existing issuer / client_id / client_secret ...
capture_user_credential = true # persist the IdP refresh token at login
obo_grant_profile = "entra" # "entra" | "rfc8693" — how tokens are minted
```
- **`capture_user_credential`** (default `false`): when enabled, Turnstone appends `offline_access` to the login scopes and stores the returned refresh token, encrypted with the same `[security] mcp_token_encryption_key` as `oauth_user` tokens. **The encryption key is required** — Turnstone refuses to start with an `oauth_obo` row (or capture enabled) and no key.
- **`obo_grant_profile`** picks the mint mechanism (the IdP determines which one is valid; this is deployment-wide, not per-server):
- **`entra`** — redeems the user's refresh token directly for a token scoped to `<audience>/.default`. `oauth_scopes` on the server row is **not used** (the admin form rejects it under this profile).
- **`rfc8693`** — a refresh grant for a subject token, then an RFC 8693 token exchange for the server audience. Per-server `oauth_scopes` **are** sent on the exchange (some IdPs require the audience scope explicitly).
### Adding an `oauth_obo` server
In the admin MCP form, choose **Sign-in passthrough** and set **Audience** (required — the downstream resource the token is minted for, e.g. `api://<app-id>` on Entra or the client id on Keycloak). The client-id / secret / registration fields do not apply and are hidden.
`oauth_obo` servers are accepted only when **OIDC sign-in is configured and enabled** and `[oidc] obo_grant_profile` is a valid profile — the write is rejected otherwise, since a row that can never mint would surface to users as a permanent "please retry" that never heals.
### Identity-provider setup
**Entra (`obo_grant_profile = "entra"`):**
1. Turnstone's app registration must hold **delegated permissions** to each MCP server's exposed API, with **admin consent granted** (or the MCP app listed in Turnstone's `preAuthorizedApplications`).
2. Set the server row's Audience to the MCP app's Application ID URI (`api://<guid>`).
3. **Gotcha (verified):** admin-consent issued *immediately* after creating the app/service principal can silently skip a not-yet-propagated resource — the only symptom is `AADSTS65001` at mint time. Verify the delegated grant landed (`az ad app permission list-grants` / the portal's *API permissions* blade shows *Granted*), or grant it explicitly per resource. A missing grant surfaces in Turnstone as a re-login prompt on the affected server (same rail as a revoked credential), and the `mcp_server.oauth.obo_mint_rejected` log line carries the raw `AADSTS…` text.
**Keycloak / RFC 8693 (`obo_grant_profile = "rfc8693"`):**
1. Enable **standard token exchange** on Turnstone's client.
2. Grant the audience: add an audience client scope for each MCP client and attach it to Turnstone's client (optional scopes must be requested — set the server row's Scopes to that scope, or the exchange returns *"Requested audience not available"*).
3. Set the server row's Audience to the downstream client id.
### Revocation & custody
The captured credential is a single per-user secret that can mint for every `oauth_obo` server, so treat it like any long-lived credential:
- **Cut off one user:** unlink their OIDC identity in the admin console (**Users → OIDC identities → delete**). This revokes the captured credential **and** purges their minted cache rows, so future mints fail and cached tokens are dropped. (Warmed in-memory sessions on server nodes self-expire at the access-token TTL; there is no cross-node per-user session-kill.) Removing the user's access at the IdP is the authoritative cut-off.
- **Flush a server's minted tokens** (e.g. after narrowing its audience): the server row's **flush cache** action drops all users' cached tokens for that server. This is **not** a revocation — users re-mint on next use from their still-valid sign-in. It is surfaced honestly (audit `mcp_server.oauth.obo_cache_flushed`, response `effect: cache_flush_remints`) so it is never mistaken for cutting access.
- Per-server revocation in the `oauth_user` sense does not exist for `oauth_obo` — the credential is issuer-scoped and IdP-governed. Revoke at the IdP.
> **Interim for Entra without OBO:** if you don't want host-side minting, admin consent + `preAuthorizedApplications` on each MCP app registration removes the second consent prompt for the plain `oauth_user` flow too (a tenant-config change, no Turnstone code). Tracked in issue #682. It does not remove the per-server connect clicks or per-(user, server) token custody — that is what `oauth_obo` is for.
---
## Lifecycle
1. **First tool call** for a user against an `oauth_user` MCP server: pool dispatch finds no stored token, returns `mcp_consent_required` to the agent. Dashboard renders an inline "Connect" action card.
@@ -128,7 +75,7 @@ The captured credential is a single per-user secret that can mint for every `oau
4. **Step-up scope**: when a tool call hits `403` with `WWW-Authenticate: error="insufficient_scope"`, Turnstone emits `mcp_insufficient_scope` with the parsed scope set; the dashboard offers a "Connect with additional scopes" affordance that opens `/v1/api/mcp/oauth/start?server=<name>&scopes=<extra>` so the union of original + new scopes flows into the AS authorize request.
5. **User revoke** (settings modal): `DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name}` runs the authoritative local delete + best-effort RFC 7009 upstream revoke (fire-and-forget, capped at 256 concurrent in-flight tasks). `oauth_obo` servers are excluded: their rows are mint cache, not consents — deleting one only forces a re-mint — so the connections list hides them and the endpoint refuses them with `409` (revocation for sign-in passthrough happens at the identity layer: unlink the identity or revoke at the IdP).
5. **User revoke** (settings modal): `DELETE /v1/api/mcp/oauth/connections/{server_name}` runs the authoritative local delete + best-effort RFC 7009 upstream revoke (fire-and-forget, capped at 256 concurrent in-flight tasks).
6. **Admin bulk-revoke** (Phase 9): `POST /v1/api/admin/mcp-servers/{name}/bulk-revoke` drops every user's token for the server. Upstream RFC 7009 revoke is intentionally **not** attempted in bulk (avoids N upstream HTTP calls per admin click); tokens at the AS expire naturally. Use the per-user revoke endpoint if you need guaranteed upstream invalidation.
@@ -150,13 +97,10 @@ Additional indicators (circuit-breaker state, encryption-key mismatch) are expos
| From | To | What happens |
|---|---|---|
| `none` / `static``oauth_user` | — | New code path activates for this server. Existing static headers (if any) are no longer sent. Users must authorize on first use. |
| `oauth_user``none` / `static` | — | Existing `mcp_user_tokens` rows are **deleted**: the tokens are bound to the auth model + URL active at consent time, and rows left behind could silently rebind if a row with the old name/URL reappears. Switching back to `oauth_user` later starts clean — users re-consent on next use. This is **not reversible**; the AS-side grants are untouched (revoke upstream via the AS if needed). |
| `oauth_user``none` / `static` | — | Existing `mcp_user_tokens` rows are **orphaned** — inert without a matching `auth_type`. Use admin bulk-revoke to drop them, or let them expire. Switching back to `oauth_user` later re-activates the orphaned rows if they haven't been deleted. |
| OAuth `client_id` or `client_secret` rotated | — | Existing tokens may stop refreshing if the AS treats them as bound to the previous client. Bulk-revoke after rotation. |
| `oauth_user``oauth_obo` | — | The per-user rows are **deleted** on the flip (they mean different things: per-server AS refresh tokens vs. minted cache). `oauth_audience` and `oauth_scopes` mean different things in each model (a resource indicator vs. an IdP app identifier; AS-consent scopes vs. an rfc8693 exchange scope), so on a flip they **never carry** — each is taken from the request for the target model or set NULL. The admin console clears these fields when you change the auth type, so re-enter the correct values for the new mode; via the API, supply them explicitly (a flip into `oauth_obo` with no `oauth_audience` is rejected, and a non-empty `oauth_scopes` under the `entra` profile is rejected since that leg pins `<audience>/.default`). |
| `oauth_obo``none` / `static` | — | Minted cache rows are deleted. |
| `oauth_obo` **audience**, **URL**, or **`oauth_scopes`** changed | — | Minted cache rows are **deleted** (tokens are bound to the audience/URL/scopes at mint time), forcing a fresh mint — so an audience or scope narrowing takes effect immediately, not at token expiry. |
Every transition that changes what a stored row *means* deletes the rows outright — a stale consent or minted token must never be served under new semantics. There is no orphan-and-reactivate path.
The orphan-by-default behavior is chosen so switching back to `oauth_user` is non-destructive. Bulk-revoke is the explicit cleanup path.
---
@@ -169,9 +113,5 @@ Every transition that changes what a stored row *means* deletes the rows outrigh
| `mcp_oauth_url_insecure` | MCP server URL is `http://` (not `https://`) on a non-loopback host | Use `https://`. Per-user bearers must not transit cleartext. |
| Tools fail in scheduled / Discord / Slack runs | OAuth-MCP requires browser-based consent | Users must pre-consent via the web UI. Phase 9 dashboard badge surfaces deferred consents from these runs on next login. |
| Circuit breaker open repeatedly | Transport-level errors on the MCP server (DNS, TLS, 5xx) | Check the per-server error pill; auth errors do not trip the breaker. |
| **`oauth_obo`**: every tool call fails, log shows `obo_misconfigured` | Server row has no Audience, or `obo_grant_profile` is unset/unknown | Set the Audience on the server row; set `[oidc] obo_grant_profile` to `entra` or `rfc8693`. |
| **`oauth_obo`**: `obo_mint_rejected` with `AADSTS65001` | Turnstone's app lacks the (admin-consented) delegated grant to this MCP app — often admin consent that didn't propagate | Grant + admin-consent the delegated permission for this resource; verify it shows *Granted*. See the Entra gotcha above. |
| **`oauth_obo`**: "Sign in to Turnstone again" on one server | Captured credential missing/rejected, or a Conditional Access challenge | User re-logs into Turnstone (re-captures the credential). If it persists, check the IdP grant / CA policy. |
| **`oauth_obo`**: tools don't appear at all for a user | User has not signed in since `capture_user_credential` was enabled (no credential captured) | User logs out and back in via OIDC so the refresh credential is captured. |
See also: `docs/operations/mcp-oauth-headless.md` for the cron / channel-driven run caveat.
-5
View File
@@ -75,11 +75,6 @@ This means the model always has its most relevant memories available without
explicit recall -- but can still use `memory(action='search')` for deeper
lookup.
The persona memory lever gates this pathway: a workstream whose persona
turns memory off receives no relevance injection at all -- the steps
above run only when memory is enabled for the session. See
[Personas](personas.md).
### Nudges
The metacognition layer can nudge the model to save memories at appropriate
+9 -46
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ are set.
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Set to `false` to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens continue to work. |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | Yes | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Without this, OIDC will refuse to start. The previous Host-header fallback was unsafe under permissive reverse proxies. |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS` | No | — | Comma-separated list of additional hostnames whose endpoints the IdP discovery document is allowed to reference. See [Cross-host endpoints](#cross-host-endpoints). |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK` | No | `false` | Allow the issuer (and its discovered endpoints) to resolve to private/internal addresses — needed for a self-hosted IdP on an internal network. See [Self-hosted and internal IdPs](#self-hosted-and-internal-idps). |
All four required fields — issuer, client ID, client secret, and
`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` — must be set. If any are missing OIDC
@@ -77,17 +76,17 @@ IdP from redirecting the token-exchange POST (which carries
being aimed at internal services.
A few public IdPs legitimately split endpoints across hostnames. Google
and Microsoft Entra ID are the canonical examples:
is the canonical example:
| IdP | Issuer host | Cross-host endpoint(s) |
|-----|-------------|------------------------|
| Google | `accounts.google.com` | `oauth2.googleapis.com`, `www.googleapis.com`, `openidconnect.googleapis.com` |
| Microsoft Entra | `login.microsoftonline.com` | `graph.microsoft.com` (userinfo) |
| Field | Hostname |
|-------|----------|
| issuer | `accounts.google.com` |
| token_endpoint | `oauth2.googleapis.com` |
| jwks_uri | `www.googleapis.com` |
| userinfo_endpoint | `openidconnect.googleapis.com` |
Both sets are built in — operators using `https://accounts.google.com` or
`https://login.microsoftonline.com/<tenant>/v2.0` need no extra
configuration. (Entra's discovery document advertises `userinfo_endpoint`
on `graph.microsoft.com`, distinct from the issuer host.)
Google's set is built in — operators using `https://accounts.google.com`
need no extra configuration.
For other IdPs whose discovery document references a non-issuer host,
extend the allow-list explicitly:
@@ -100,40 +99,6 @@ The same scheme / no-userinfo / SSRF rules apply to allow-listed hosts —
this knob only relaxes the same-origin check, not the security gates.
Each entry is a hostname (no scheme, no path).
### Self-hosted and internal IdPs
By default Turnstone refuses an issuer whose hostname resolves to a
private or internal address:
```
OIDCError: endpoint URL resolves to non-public address (10.0.0.5): https://auth.example.site
```
This is SSRF hardening, not a licensing or product restriction: the OIDC
flow makes server-side HTTP requests (discovery, JWKS, token exchange),
and refusing non-public destinations keeps a mistyped or maliciously
steered issuer from aiming those fetches at internal services. For a
self-hosted IdP (Keycloak, Authentik, Dex, …) on a private network,
opt in explicitly in `config.toml`:
```toml
[oidc]
allow_private_network = true
```
or via `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=true` (the env var wins
when both are set).
The opt-in admits private-range (RFC 1918), unique-local, CGNAT
(100.64/10 — tailnets), and loopback addresses. Link-local, multicast,
and reserved ranges stay refused even with the opt-in — cloud metadata
services (169.254.169.254) live there, and no legitimate IdP does. The
HTTPS requirement and the same-origin endpoint checks are unaffected.
This knob only affects the login-flow IdP configured here. OAuth
endpoints advertised by remote MCP servers are untrusted input and are
always held to the strict public-address rule.
### config.toml alternative
```toml
@@ -146,8 +111,6 @@ provider_name = "Google"
role_claim = "groups"
password_enabled = true
redirect_base = "https://app.example.com"
# Self-hosted IdP on an internal network (see "Self-hosted and internal IdPs")
allow_private_network = false
[oidc.role_map]
admin = "builtin-admin"
-173
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@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
# Personas
A **persona** is a named, reusable bundle attached to a workstream **at
creation** that controls how its system message is composed and what
capability envelope it runs with. Personas answer a recurring operational
complaint: the default composition primes every session for heavy tool use,
and there was no per-workstream dial to launch a "just write prose" or
"evidence-first research" session.
A persona is exactly four levers — no more:
| Lever | What it does |
|---|---|
| **Base prompt** | Replaces the BASE module of the composed system message. *Only* BASE: ENV, CONTEXT, TOOLS, and POLICIES keep composing, so mandatory [prompt policies](governance.md) ride on top of every persona. Built-in personas source their prose from a repo file; operator personas store it inline — see [Where persona prompts live](#where-persona-prompts-live). |
| **Tool visibility** | Which tools the session advertises. Tri-state: *unrestricted* (tracks tool growth and MCP catalogs), *no tools* (the TOOLS prompt block self-suppresses and zero definitions go on the wire), or an *exact set* of names. Including `tool_search` in a set makes it **soft** — tools the model discovers through search join the visible set; omitting it makes the set **hard** (the search pathway is disabled entirely). On commercial providers a soft set costs one prompt-cache re-prime per `tool_search` expansion, since each expansion rewrites the wire tool set and recomposes the prompt. |
| **MCP** | Whether the workstream talks to MCP at all. **Session-wide**: off means no MCP tools for the persona's own hands *or* for in-process task agents, no resource/prompt catalogs, and no listener registrations. This lever expresses infrastructure intent, not behavior shaping. |
| **Memory** | Whether the persona's **own hands** get memory: recalled-memory injection into the prompt, memory-directed metacognitive nudges, and the `memory` tool. Task agents keep their own envelope, and compaction spill/markers are session mechanics that are never persona-gated. An exact tool set that hides `memory` also mutes those nudges, and the compaction-resume pointer follows `recall`'s visibility. |
Visibility is behavior shaping, **not** a security boundary: any tool call
that does reach the wire still clears the same approval, judge, and policy
machinery as always. RBAC and tool policies remain the enforcement layers.
## Snapshot semantics — resolve once, stamp forever
The persona is resolved **once**, at workstream creation, and stamped into
`workstream_config` as five keys (`persona`, `persona_prompt`,
`persona_tools`, `persona_mcp`, `persona_memory`). From then on the session
reads only the stamp:
- **Editing or archiving a persona never changes an existing workstream.**
Rehydrate, resume, and post-compaction resume all run from the stamp.
A mid-session REPL `/resume` adopts the target workstream's stamp for
prompt, tools, and memory; for the MCP lever it can only narrow in
place — adopting an MCP-off stamp drops the live MCP surface, while
adopting an MCP-on stamp into a session whose persona dropped MCP at
construction is refused with an error telling you to reopen the
workstream fresh.
- A workstream outlives its persona — an archived persona keeps labelling
the workstreams stamped with it.
- A partial or unparseable stamp is treated as corruption: session
construction fails loudly rather than silently falling back to a default
envelope the operator never chose.
- Workstreams created before personas existed carry no stamp and keep
legacy behavior, byte-identical to the `engineer` / `orchestrator`
defaults below — with one exception: pre-1.7 workstreams that had
`creative_mode` set are converted by migration `063` into full
`writer` stamps, so they resume as writing sessions rather than as
legacy defaults.
- Forking (`resume_ws` on create) resumes the source's stamped persona; the
fork does not re-resolve.
## Seed personas
Migration `063` seeds six personas. The two per-kind **defaults** carry no
overrides at all, so a zero-touch launch behaves exactly as it did before
personas existed:
| Persona | Kind | Base prompt | Tools | MCP | Memory |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `engineer` *(default)* | interactive | stock | unrestricted | on | on |
| `orchestrator` *(default)* | coordinator | stock | unrestricted | on | on |
| `scribe` | interactive | custom (faithful structuring of given material) | none | off | off |
| `researcher` | interactive | custom (evidence-first) | `read_file`, `search`, `web_fetch`, `web_search`, `recall`, `memory`, `tool_search` (soft) | off | on |
| `writer` | interactive | custom (creative writing partner — replaces the removed `/creative`) | none | off | on |
| `executive` | coordinator | custom (delegate, interrogate plans, judge outcomes) | spawn/inspect/lifecycle tools plus `memory`: `spawn_workstream`, `spawn_batch`, `send_to_workstream`, `wait_for_workstream`, `inspect_workstream`, `list_workstreams`, `list_nodes`, `close_workstream`, `cancel_workstream`, `memory` (hard) | off | on |
Notes:
- `scribe` turns memory off deliberately: recalled memories would
contaminate faithful summarization with unrelated context.
- `researcher`'s set is soft (includes `tool_search`): it starts with
read and evidence tools but can pull in others on demand — e.g. load
`bash` to run a snippet and verify a calculation. It is evidence-first,
not sandboxed; any escalated tool still hits the normal approval path.
- Coordinator sessions do not merge MCP today, so the MCP lever on
coordinator personas is forward-compatible bookkeeping; it bites on
interactive workstreams.
## Where persona prompts live
Prompt source is explicit in the persona row — two nullable columns, never both empty:
| `base_prompt_file` | `base_prompt` | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| set (e.g. `scribe.md`) | — | **built-in**: prose lives in `prompts/personas/<file>`, code-owned and PR-reviewed |
| set | set | built-in with an **operator override** layered on top (the inline text wins) |
| — | set | **operator** persona, inline prose |
A `CHECK` forbids the both-empty row, so resolution is a plain coalesce —
`base_prompt ?? load(base_prompt_file)` — with no implicit "inherit the default"
branch in application logic. `base_prompt_file` is set only by the migration/code
(the admin API never exposes it): it marks a persona as built-in and blocks
archive, so `engineer` and `orchestrator` can't be removed. To customise a
built-in, set `base_prompt` on it (clear it to revert), or create your own persona.
The resolved prompt is **frozen into the workstream at creation** — later edits to
a built-in's file or an operator's row never change a running workstream; only new
ones pick up the change. "No persona" is not a state: every workstream is stamped,
and an empty `persona=` resolves to the kind's `is_default` (`engineer` /
`orchestrator`).
## Choosing a persona
Every creation surface takes an optional persona; empty always means the
kind's default (or plain legacy behavior on a database with no personas
seeded):
- **Web/console**: the persona select on the console launcher, the server
webui's new-workstream dialog, and the dashboard composer. Selecting a
persona requires **no** `persona.*` permission — the picker feed
(`GET /v1/api/personas`) is authenticated-only and returns display fields.
- **API/SDK**: `CreateWorkstreamRequest.persona` (Python:
`create_workstream(persona=...)`; TypeScript: `{ persona: ... }`).
- **CLI**: `turnstone --persona <name>`. Unknown or disabled names error at
startup. `--resume` ignores `--persona` and adopts the resumed
workstream's stamp.
- **Coordinator spawn**: `spawn_workstream` / `spawn_batch` take a
`persona` argument, validated when the coordinator prepares the spawn
and re-checked by the node that creates the child (children are always
interactive-kind). Omitted means the interactive **default** — a child
never inherits its parent coordinator's persona.
- **Sub-agents**: `task_agent` takes a `persona` argument setting the
sub-agent's identity and capability envelope (resolved against
interactive-kind personas, frozen into the task at prep). Omitted keeps
the default autonomous task-agent identity — never the parent's persona.
## How agents discover personas
Agents are told, not expected to guess: the live persona list (enabled,
interactive-kind — children and sub-agents are always interactive) is
injected into the `persona` parameter description of `task_agent`,
`spawn_workstream`, and `spawn_batch` whenever the session's tool surface
is rendered — session start, MCP catalog change, model-registry reload.
Each entry carries the name, the default marker, and the persona's
one-line description so the model can pick by purpose (descriptions drop
out past 25 personas; the name list always enumerates completely).
A persona created after that render is still reachable — pass its name.
Every resolve failure enumerates the names currently valid for the kind,
so a stale list (or a typo) self-corrects on the next attempt.
Resolution is forgiving on all surfaces (they share one rule):
- names match case-insensitively (`Writer` resolves `writer`);
- an input that uniquely matches a persona's **display name**
(case-insensitive, among the kind's enabled personas — display names are
not unique, and a same-label persona of another kind neither blocks nor
wins) resolves to that persona; an ambiguous match errors, listing the
candidate slugs;
- whatever variant matched, the stamped identity, approval chrome, and
wire always carry the canonical `name` slug.
## Authoring (console)
Personas are managed in the console's **Manage → Governance → Personas**
tab. The admin shelf exposes exactly the four levers plus the kind
list, the default marker, and archive. Rules:
- `name` is an immutable lowercase slug — and the identifier agents and
the CLI launch the persona by (`persona=` on the spawn tools,
`--persona` on the CLI); the create shelf says so under **Name**.
`display_name` is a list label, editable any time, and deliberately
not an identifier (a unique display name happens to resolve, as a
forgiveness fallback — don't design workflows around it).
- Exactly one default per kind, storage-enforced: flipping the flag on a
successor demotes the incumbent atomically, defaults are single-kind,
and a default cannot be archived.
- **Archive only** — there is no delete verb, so every stamped
workstream's provenance stays explicable.
RBAC: `persona.create` / `persona.read` / `persona.write` gate the admin
CRUD (`/v1/api/admin/personas`); all three are granted to `builtin-admin`
by migration `063`, and other roles opt in via role permission overrides.
+2 -2
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@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Both `TurnstoneServer` (sync) and `AsyncTurnstoneServer` (async) expose:
|----------|--------|---------|
| **Workstreams** | `list_workstreams()` | `ListWorkstreamsResponse` |
| | `dashboard()` | `DashboardResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, name, model, auto_approve, skill, persona, initial_message, attachments)` | `CreateWorkstreamResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, name, model, auto_approve, skill, initial_message, attachments)` | `CreateWorkstreamResponse` |
| | `close_workstream(ws_id)` | `StatusResponse` |
| **Attachments** | `upload_attachment(ws_id, filename, data, *, mime_type=...)` | `UploadAttachmentResponse` |
| | `list_attachments(ws_id)` | `ListAttachmentsResponse` |
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ Both `TurnstoneConsole` (sync) and `AsyncTurnstoneConsole` (async) expose:
| | `workstreams(*, state, node, search, sort, page, per_page)` | `ClusterWorkstreamsResponse` |
| | `node_detail(node_id)` | `NodeDetailResponse` |
| | `snapshot()` | `ClusterSnapshotResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, node_id, name, model, initial_message, skill, persona)` | `ConsoleCreateWsResponse` |
| | `create_workstream(*, node_id, name, model, initial_message, skill)` | `ConsoleCreateWsResponse` |
| **Schedules** | `list_schedules()` | `ListSchedulesResponse` |
| | `create_schedule(*, name, schedule_type, initial_message, ...)` | `ScheduleInfo` |
| | `get_schedule(task_id)` | `ScheduleInfo` |
-17
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@@ -54,23 +54,6 @@ When a per-model override is `NULL` (empty in the UI), the global default is
used. Switching models via `/model <alias>` re-resolves sampling parameters
from the new model's overrides or global defaults.
### Responses output controls (per-model)
Models whose capability table declares Responses output controls expose two
additional fields in the Models create/edit shelf:
| Field | Stored capability | Values | Effect |
|-------|-------------------|--------|--------|
| Output verbosity | `verbosity` | `low`, `medium`, `high` | Controls answer length independently of reasoning effort. |
| Reasoning mode | `reasoning_mode` | `standard`, `pro` | Selects standard or higher-compute Pro execution without changing the model ID. |
An empty selection means provider default and omits the capability key. Known
GPT-5.6 models inherit support from the built-in table without persisting
redundant support flags. An OpenAI-compatible model pinned to the Responses API
can opt in with the `supports_verbosity` and `supports_pro_mode` capability
tiles. Chat Completions and non-Responses providers do not surface or submit
these controls.
**Removed settings:** `model.name` and `model.context_window` have been removed
from ConfigStore. Model names and context windows are now configured per-model
in the Models tab. A startup warning is logged if these keys appear in
+18 -77
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Tools Reference
turnstone exposes 17 built-in tools plus any number of external MCP tools to the
turnstone exposes 16 built-in tools plus any number of external MCP tools to the
LLM via the OpenAI function-calling interface. Built-in tools are defined as JSON
files under `turnstone/tools/` and loaded at startup by `turnstone/core/tools.py`.
MCP tools are discovered from configured MCP servers at startup by
@@ -28,19 +28,13 @@ schema plus turnstone-specific metadata keys:
}
```
**Metadata keys** (stripped before sending the schema to the model; the full
set lives in `_META_KEYS` in `turnstone/core/tools.py`):
**Metadata keys** (stripped before sending the schema to the model):
| Key | Type | Meaning |
|------------------|------|---------|
| `task_agent` | bool | Tool is available to task sub-agents. |
| `coordinator` | bool | Tool is available to coordinator sessions. Without `interactive: true` alongside it, this reads as coord-only and the tool is stripped from interactive sessions. |
| `interactive` | bool | Opt a `coordinator: true` tool back into interactive sessions (dual-kind tools like `memory`). |
| `auto_approve` | bool | Tool runs without user confirmation (read-only, safe operations). |
| `primary_key` | str | When the model sends a bare string instead of JSON args, map it to this parameter name. |
| `kind_variants` | dict | Per-kind description / parameter-schema overlays so each session kind sees only the surface it can use (see `memory.json`). |
| `cwd_note` | str | Sentence appended to the description at session build time with `{working_dir}` substituted — declare on tools whose semantics depend on the process working directory (see `bash.json`, `apply_cwd_context`). |
| `workspace_note` | str | Companion sentence naming the operator-configured workspace directory, `{workspace_dir}` substituted; dropped when no workspace is configured. |
| Key | Type | Meaning |
|----------------|------|---------|
| `task_agent` | bool | Tool is available to task sub-agents. |
| `auto_approve` | bool | Tool runs without user confirmation (read-only, safe operations). |
| `primary_key` | str | When the model sends a bare string instead of JSON args, map it to this parameter name. |
---
@@ -50,10 +44,10 @@ set lives in `_META_KEYS` in `turnstone/core/tools.py`):
| Name | Description |
|---------------------|-------------|
| `TOOLS` | All 29 loaded built-in tool definitions (interactive + coordinator union). Sessions send a kind-specific subset (`INTERACTIVE_TOOLS` or `COORDINATOR_TOOLS`). |
| `TOOLS` | All 28 loaded built-in tool definitions (interactive + coordinator union). Sessions send a kind-specific subset (`INTERACTIVE_TOOLS` or `COORDINATOR_TOOLS`). |
| `TASK_AGENT_TOOLS` | Tools with `task_agent: true` -- available to task sub-agents. Includes write operations. |
| `TASK_AUTO_TOOLS` | Set of all tool names with `auto_approve: true` -- used by task-agent sub-sessions to skip confirmation for matching available tools. |
| `BUILTIN_TOOL_NAMES`| Frozenset of all 29 built-in tool names (interactive + coordinator union). Used by tool search to distinguish always-on tools from deferrable MCP tools. |
| `BUILTIN_TOOL_NAMES`| Frozenset of all 28 built-in tool names (interactive + coordinator union). Used by tool search to distinguish always-on tools from deferrable MCP tools. |
| `PRIMARY_KEY_MAP` | Dict mapping tool name to its `primary_key` parameter name. |
---
@@ -71,7 +65,7 @@ Tool execution follows a three-phase pipeline inside `ChatSession._execute_tools
- Parses the JSON arguments (with fallback for malformed JSON).
- If JSON parsing fails entirely, uses `PRIMARY_KEY_MAP` to map a bare string
to the correct parameter.
- Dispatches to the matching `_prepare_{func_name}()` handler. There are 17
- Dispatches to the matching `_prepare_{func_name}()` handler. There are 16
built-in tools plus `tool_search` (synthetic, client-side BM25 fallback) and
the generic `_prepare_mcp_tool()` handler for MCP tools.
- Validates arguments and builds a preview dict containing:
@@ -131,9 +125,6 @@ Each item's `execute` callable is invoked:
- `web_fetch` -- fetches a URL (SSRF-protected, but makes network requests)
- `web_search` -- web search via self-hosted SearxNG (makes network requests)
- `task_agent` -- spawns an autonomous sub-agent
- `open_preview` -- **URL targets only** (network access, gated like `web_fetch`);
file-path and `attachment:` targets are local reads and run unprompted like
`read_file`
Note: The JSON schema metadata key `auto_approve` controls membership in
`TASK_AUTO_TOOLS` (used for task agent sub-sessions). The actual runtime
@@ -166,7 +157,6 @@ Every tool defines a `primary_key`. The mapping is:
| `search` | `query` |
| `web_fetch` | `url` |
| `web_search` | `query` |
| `open_preview` | `target` |
| `task_agent` | `prompt` |
| `memory` | `name` |
| `recall` | `query` |
@@ -295,7 +285,7 @@ Fetch a URL and extract specific information from it.
| `url` | string | yes | The URL to fetch (must start with `http://` or `https://`). |
| `question` | string | yes | What to extract or answer from the page content. |
- **What it does**: Fetches the URL, strips HTML to plain text, and uses the LLM to extract the answer to the question from the page content. Every redirect hop is SSRF-screened before it is requested. Private/internal addresses are refused by default; enable `tools.allow_private_network` (console Settings → Tools) to make them approvable for self-hosted setups whose services live on the local network — the approval prompt marks such requests, and a public site redirecting into private space is refused regardless.
- **What it does**: Fetches the URL, strips HTML to plain text, and uses the LLM to extract the answer to the question from the page content. Protected against SSRF (blocks private/internal IPs).
- **Auto-approve**: No -- requires user confirmation (makes network requests).
- **Agent availability**: `task_agent`.
@@ -355,39 +345,6 @@ It reports the score scale, whether the endpoint cleanly separates relevant from
---
### open_preview
Show the user rich content in a preview pane beside the conversation.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|-----------|--------|----------|-------------|
| `target` | string | yes | An http(s) URL, a file path, or `attachment:<id>` for a file attached to the conversation. |
| `kind` | string | no | Rendering override: `web`, `pdf`, `image`, `table`, `text`, or `markdown`. Detected from the content when omitted. |
| `title` | string | no | Pane header title. Defaults to the page title, filename, or URL. |
- **What it does**: Resolves the target to bytes (URLs fetch through the same
SSRF-guarded path as `web_fetch`, screened per redirect hop, honoring the
same `tools.allow_private_network` opt-in), classifies the
content, stores it content-addressed against the workstream, and opens the
frontend preview pane beside the conversation: web pages render in a fully
sandboxed iframe (no scripts, opaque origin), PDFs in the browser viewer,
images inline, CSV/TSV/JSON as a sortable table, text/markdown rendered. A
previewed web page loads none of its remote images or styles by default, so
opening it never reveals the viewer to the page's site; a toggle in the pane
header turns remote content back on for that preview. The
model receives only a one-line confirmation — to reason about content, use
`web_fetch` / `read_file` instead. Preview content is size-capped per kind
(pages 4 MB, PDFs 32 MB, images 4 MB, tables 2 MB, text 512 KB) and GC'd
with the workstream.
- **Auto-approve**: URL targets require confirmation (network access); file
paths and `attachment:` targets run unprompted (local reads).
- **Agent availability**: interactive sessions only (not `task_agent`, not
coordinators).
- **Surfaces**: the pane renders in the web UI (standalone and console). The
CLI prints the confirmation line only — there is no terminal pane.
---
## Agent
The tool name uses the `_agent` suffix — bare `task` collides with
@@ -588,7 +545,6 @@ pre-configure skills at workstream creation.
| `search` | File Ops | Yes | Yes | `query` |
| `web_fetch` | Info | No | Yes | `url` |
| `web_search` | Info | No | Yes | `query` |
| `open_preview`| Info | URL: no; path/attachment: yes | No | `target` |
| `task_agent` | Agent | No | No | `prompt` |
| `memory` | Memory | Yes | No | `name` |
| `recall` | Memory | Yes | No | `query` |
@@ -624,11 +580,6 @@ Tool search uses the best available mechanism for each provider:
`_exec_tool_search()` runs a pure-Python BM25 index over tool names and
descriptions, then expands the matched tools into the visible set.
A persona with a tool-visibility set overrides this selection: any exact
set forces tool search into the client-side BM25 mechanism (tier 3)
regardless of provider, and a **hard** set — one whose visible tools omit
`tool_search` — disables tool search entirely.
### Configuration
Tool search is configured in `config.toml` under the `[tools]` section:
@@ -698,7 +649,7 @@ MCP-compatible service.
3. **Schema conversion**: Each MCP tool's `inputSchema` is converted to OpenAI
function-calling format. The tool name is prefixed: `mcp__{server}__{tool}`.
4. **Merging**: MCP tools are appended after the 17 built-in tools via
4. **Merging**: MCP tools are appended after the 16 built-in tools via
`merge_mcp_tools()`. Built-in tools appear first, giving them natural LLM priority.
When dynamic tool search is active, MCP tools are deferred rather than directly
visible -- the model discovers them via search as needed (see
@@ -785,10 +736,7 @@ MCP tool lists stay up-to-date without restart through two mechanisms:
1. **Push notifications** -- MCP servers that declare `tools.listChanged: true` in
their capabilities send `notifications/tools/list_changed` when their tool list
changes. `MCPClientManager` registers a `message_handler` on each `ClientSession`
that triggers an immediate refresh for that server (debounced per server and
notification kind, and run off the receive loop). A refresh that fails while
the connection stays up is retried automatically on the next health-loop tick
until one completes.
that triggers an immediate refresh for that server.
2. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches tools from all servers immediately.
`/mcp refresh <server>` targets a single server. If a server has disconnected,
@@ -796,10 +744,6 @@ MCP tool lists stay up-to-date without restart through two mechanisms:
same controls (refresh / reconnect buttons per server) for cluster-wide
fan-out.
Reconnects (health-loop, dispatch-driven, or operator-forced) always end in a
full catalog rediscovery, so a server that changed its tools while disconnected
comes back current.
When tools change, `MCPClientManager` rebuilds its merged tool list using copy-on-write
(new list/dict objects assigned atomically) and notifies all active `ChatSession`
instances via registered listener callbacks. Each session rebuilds its `_tools`,
@@ -870,16 +814,13 @@ catalog.
### Refresh
Resource lists stay current through the same mechanisms as tool lists:
Resource lists stay current through the same three-tier mechanism as tool lists:
1. **Push** -- Servers declaring `resources.listChanged: true` send
`notifications/resources/list_changed`, triggering an immediate refresh
(with the same failed-refresh retry on the health-loop tick).
2. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches resources alongside tools.
Servers without push support are refreshed whenever they reconnect (every
reconnect ends in full rediscovery) or when an operator refreshes manually;
there is no periodic polling.
`notifications/resources/list_changed`, triggering an immediate refresh.
2. **Periodic** -- Servers without push are polled on the configured refresh
interval (default 4 hours, same timer as tools).
3. **Manual** -- `/mcp refresh` re-fetches resources alongside tools.
---
-56
View File
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
{
"defaults": {
"n_runs": 3
},
"cases": [
{
"id": "search-first",
"skill": {
"name": "search-first",
"content": "# Search First\n\nBefore answering ANY question about where something lives in the codebase, you MUST call the `search` tool first. Never answer from memory."
},
"user_prompt": "Where is JWT token validation implemented in this project?",
"expected_actions": [{ "tool": "search" }],
"match_mode": "ordered_subset",
"max_turns": 4
},
{
"id": "test-after-edit",
"skill": {
"name": "test-after-edit",
"content": "# Test After Edit\n\nAfter editing or writing ANY file, you MUST run the test suite with `python -m pytest` via bash before you finish. Do not report done until tests have run."
},
"user_prompt": "Add a function `clamp(x, lo, hi)` that clamps x to [lo, hi] in utils.py.",
"setup": {
"files": {
"utils.py": ""
}
},
"expected_actions": [
{ "tool": "write_file" },
{ "tool": "bash", "args_pattern": { "command": "pytest" } }
],
"match_mode": "ordered_subset",
"max_turns": 8
},
{
"id": "changelog-update",
"skill": {
"name": "changelog-update",
"content": "# Changelog Discipline\n\nWhenever you modify a file, you MUST also append a one-line entry to CHANGELOG.md describing the change in the same task."
},
"user_prompt": "Fix the off-by-one so pager.py shows the last page. Edit pager.py.",
"setup": {
"files": {
"pager.py": "def last_page(total_items, per_page):\n # off-by-one: drops the final partial page\n return total_items // per_page\n",
"CHANGELOG.md": "# Changelog\n"
}
},
"expected_actions": [
{ "tool": "edit_file", "args_pattern": { "path": "CHANGELOG.md" } }
],
"match_mode": "subset",
"max_turns": 8
}
]
}
-29
View File
@@ -161,35 +161,6 @@ def test_rest_heals_and_charges(tmp_path: Path, clock: object) -> None:
assert "full health" in out.lower()
def test_rest_when_spent_restores_a_fresh_days_turns(tmp_path: Path, clock: object) -> None:
"""Sleeping at the inn with no turns left rolls into a fresh day's allowance."""
game = _game(tmp_path, clock)
game.join("Brandr")
player = game.players["Brandr"]
daily = game.world.settings.daily_turns
player.turns_left = 0 # spent for the day
player.hp = 5
game.move("Brandr", "", "west", 2) # step into the inn
out = game.action("Brandr", "rest", "", "")
assert player.turns_left == daily # a fresh day's turns restored
assert player.hp == player.max_hp # and fully mended
assert f"/{daily} ]" in out # footer reflects the refreshed budget
def test_rest_with_turns_in_hand_never_inflates_the_budget(tmp_path: Path, clock: object) -> None:
"""Resting mid-day mends but adds no turns — the top-up only fires at zero."""
game = _game(tmp_path, clock)
game.join("Brandr")
player = game.players["Brandr"]
daily = game.world.settings.daily_turns
player.turns_left = daily - 3 # turns still in hand
player.hp = 5
game.move("Brandr", "", "west", 2) # step into the inn
game.action("Brandr", "rest", "", "")
assert player.turns_left == daily - 3 # unchanged: no farming past the cap
assert player.hp == player.max_hp # but the heal still lands
def test_fight_spends_a_turn_and_credits(tmp_path: Path, clock: object) -> None:
game = _game(tmp_path, clock)
game.join("Brandr")
+7 -19
View File
@@ -1015,28 +1015,16 @@ class Game:
return self._overworld_frame(player, lines=["You step back out into the open air."])
def _rest(self, player: Player) -> str:
# Settle any pending day rollover first, so a rest taken as the first act
# of a new day is the ordinary refresh, not the spent-turns top-up below.
self._ensure_day(player)
cost = self.world.settings.rest_cost
if not leveling.rest(player, cost):
if leveling.rest(player, cost):
# A night's rest is a private errand, not Herald news; persist only.
self._persist(player)
return self._location_menu(
player, lines=[f"You can't afford the {cost}-gold bed. (You have {player.gold}.)"]
player, lines=[f"You sleep deeply and wake at full health. (-{cost} gold)"]
)
# A night at the inn always mends. Once the day's turns are spent it also
# rolls the sleeper into a fresh day's allowance, so a spent adventurer can
# press on rather than idling until the dawn rollover. The top-up only
# fires at zero, so it never banks turns past the daily cap.
line = f"You sleep deeply and wake at full health. (-{cost} gold)"
if player.turns_left <= 0:
player.turns_left = self.world.settings.daily_turns
line = (
f"You sleep through to a new dawn, waking at full health "
f"and ready to venture out anew. (-{cost} gold)"
)
# A night's rest is a private errand, not Herald news; persist only.
self._persist(player)
return self._location_menu(player, lines=[line])
return self._location_menu(
player, lines=[f"You can't afford the {cost}-gold bed. (You have {player.gold}.)"]
)
# -- the Vault: bank gold at the inn (safe from ambush) --------------
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
"tier": 2,
"name": "Goblin",
"hp": 12,
"atk": 4,
"atk": 5,
"def": 1,
"xp": 18,
"gold": 7
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
"tier": 2,
"name": "Bandit Scout",
"hp": 14,
"atk": 5,
"atk": 6,
"def": 1,
"xp": 20,
"gold": 9
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
"tier": 3,
"name": "Forest Wolf",
"hp": 20,
"atk": 7,
"atk": 8,
"def": 2,
"xp": 35,
"gold": 14
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
"tier": 3,
"name": "Bog Stalker",
"hp": 22,
"atk": 8,
"atk": 9,
"def": 2,
"xp": 38,
"gold": 16
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
"tier": 4,
"name": "Cave Troll",
"hp": 38,
"atk": 11,
"atk": 12,
"def": 4,
"xp": 70,
"gold": 30
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
"tier": 4,
"name": "Barrow Wight",
"hp": 35,
"atk": 12,
"atk": 13,
"def": 4,
"xp": 65,
"gold": 28
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
},
"=": {
"key": "road",
"glyph": "",
"glyph": "=",
"walkable": true,
"encounter_rate": 0.02,
"color": "road"
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@
"settings": {
"daily_turns": 10,
"rest_cost": 15,
"heal_cost_per_hp": 1,
"starting_gold": 37,
"heal_cost_per_hp": 2,
"starting_gold": 20,
"starting_weapon": "rusty_dagger",
"starting_armor": "cloth_tunic",
"start_hp": 20,
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
"tier": 2,
"name": "Ember Imp",
"hp": 12,
"atk": 4,
"atk": 5,
"def": 1,
"xp": 18,
"gold": 7
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
"tier": 2,
"name": "Slag Scuttler",
"hp": 14,
"atk": 5,
"atk": 6,
"def": 1,
"xp": 20,
"gold": 9
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
"tier": 3,
"name": "Magma Hound",
"hp": 20,
"atk": 7,
"atk": 8,
"def": 2,
"xp": 35,
"gold": 14
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
"tier": 3,
"name": "Obsidian Lurker",
"hp": 22,
"atk": 8,
"atk": 9,
"def": 2,
"xp": 38,
"gold": 16
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
"tier": 4,
"name": "Basalt Golem",
"hp": 38,
"atk": 11,
"atk": 12,
"def": 4,
"xp": 70,
"gold": 30
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
"tier": 4,
"name": "Ashen Wraith",
"hp": 35,
"atk": 12,
"atk": 13,
"def": 4,
"xp": 65,
"gold": 28
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
},
"=": {
"key": "basalt",
"glyph": "",
"glyph": "=",
"walkable": true,
"encounter_rate": 0.02,
"color": "road"
@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@
"settings": {
"daily_turns": 10,
"rest_cost": 15,
"heal_cost_per_hp": 1,
"starting_gold": 37,
"heal_cost_per_hp": 2,
"starting_gold": 20,
"starting_weapon": "charred_shiv",
"starting_armor": "scorched_rags",
"start_hp": 20,
-246
View File
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Consistency linter for HYPOTHESIS.md.
Deterministic checks no model, no confabulation:
A. delimiter / emphasis balance
B. residue regexes (things prior rounds fixed must not reappear)
C. single-capital-letter collision scan (one letter, two meanings)
D. definition check for the symbols recent rounds introduced
E. γ/ρ role-usage scan (gate=authorize/reject-proposal ; ρ=verify/fold-back/response)
F. display-only symbols (used in $$$$ but nowhere in prose)
G. orphan / redundant-declaration scan (symbol used once; or two declaration sites)
Path resolves to HYPOTHESIS.md beside this script, or argv[1] if given.
Known benign flags: E flags the γ,ρ symbol-table row; G2 flags τ_H (it legitimately
owns both a stopping-time/filtration statement and its = inf{} formula).
"""
import os
import re
import sys
PATH = (
sys.argv[1]
if len(sys.argv) > 1
else os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "HYPOTHESIS.md")
)
with open(PATH, encoding="utf-8") as _f:
T = _f.read()
LINES = T.splitlines()
def lineno(idx): # char index -> 1-based line
return T.count("\n", 0, idx) + 1
def ctx(idx, w=55):
a = max(0, idx - w)
b = min(len(T), idx + w)
return T[a:b].replace("\n", " ")
# math spans (so we can scan symbols in math only)
math_spans = []
for m in re.finditer(r"\$\$.*?\$\$", T, flags=re.S):
math_spans.append((m.start(), m.end()))
for m in re.finditer(r"(?<!\$)\$(?!\$).*?(?<!\$)\$(?!\$)", T, flags=re.S):
math_spans.append((m.start(), m.end()))
def in_math(idx):
return any(a <= idx < b for a, b in math_spans)
print("=" * 70)
print("A. BALANCE")
print("=" * 70)
nomath = re.sub(r"\$[^$]*\$", "", T)
display = T.count("$$")
inline = len(re.findall(r"(?<!\$)\$(?!\$)", T))
print(f" display $$ : {display} even={display % 2 == 0}")
print(f" inline $ : {inline} even={inline % 2 == 0}")
print(f" braces {{ }} : net {T.count('{') - T.count('}')}")
print(f" bold ** : {nomath.count('**')} even={nomath.count('**') % 2 == 0}")
print(
f" italic * : {nomath.replace('**', '').count('*')} even={nomath.replace('**', '').count('*') % 2 == 0}"
)
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("B. RESIDUE REGEXES (expect 0 each)")
print("=" * 70)
residue = {
"stray p_{ok}": r"p_\{\\mathrm\{ok\}\}",
"halt/ready leftover": r"halt/ready",
"(I-γP) discount collision": r"\(I-\\gamma P\)",
"B as pushforward dummy": r"M_W\(c, B\)",
"old c_τ-as-output law": r"M_W\(c\) = \\mathrm\{Law\}\(c_\\tau\)",
"R=id ill-typed": r"R=\\mathrm\{id\}",
"Y_⊥ after ⊥∈Y decision": r"\\mathcal\{Y\}_\\bot",
"'terminal sets are'": r"The terminal sets are",
"ρ rejects ⊥ branch": r"what \$\\rho\$ rejects",
"rejection at ρ": r"fail-closed rejection at \$\\rho\$",
"orphan τ^star (unify→τ_H)": r"\\tau\^\\star",
"unbraced _\\cmd subscript (GitHub emphasis hazard)": r"_\\",
"\\# in math (GitHub unescapes → raw #)": r"\\#",
}
for lbl, rx in residue.items():
hits = [lineno(m.start()) for m in re.finditer(rx, T)]
flag = "OK " if not hits else "HIT "
print(f" {flag}{lbl:32} lines={hits}")
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("C. SINGLE-CAPITAL COLLISION SCAN (eyeball for two meanings)")
print("=" * 70)
for L in ["G", "U", "P", "N", "R", "V", "F", "D", "K", "T"]:
occ = []
for m in re.finditer(r"(?<![A-Za-z\\_])" + L + r"(?![A-Za-z_])", T):
if in_math(m.start()):
occ.append(m.start())
if occ:
print(f" [{L}] {len(occ)} math occ:")
for i in occ:
print(f" L{lineno(i):>3}: …{ctx(i, 38)}")
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("D. DEFINITION CHECK (symbols recent rounds introduced)")
print("=" * 70)
defs = {
"Π (adversary class)": r"the class \$\\Pi\$ of policies",
"D (divergent set)": r"D=\\\{s:\\mathbb\{E\}_s\[\\tau_H\]=\\infty\\\}",
"μ (measure)": r"reference/sampling measure \$\\mu\$",
"e_0 (no-op response)": r"no-op response \$e_0\\in\\mathcal\{E\}\$",
"Stop (stop set)": r"stop set \$\\mathrm\{Stop\}\$",
"p_succ": r"p_\{\\mathrm\{succ\}\}\(s\)",
"p_safe": r"p_\{\\mathrm\{safe\}\}\(s\)",
"β (RL discount)": r"discount \$\\beta\$",
"A_Y (pushforward set)": r"measurable \$A_Y",
"r (per-step drift)": r"per-step drift \$r\(s\)=",
"z_t triple": r"z_t = \(c_t, b_t, m_t\)",
"μ_0 (initial dist)": r"initial \$s_0 \\sim \\mu_0\$",
"certificate (2-sense)": r"A \*\*certificate\*\* is a \*witness\*",
"controller/plant/shell": r"\*shell : plant :: the part you write",
"r_env (3-way drift)": r"r_\{\\text\{env\}\}",
}
for lbl, rx in defs.items():
found = bool(re.search(rx, T))
print(f" {'OK ' if found else 'MISS'}{lbl}")
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("E. γ / ρ ROLE SCAN")
print("=" * 70)
# γ should sit near authorize/gate/reject-proposal/capability/irreversible/before
# ρ should sit near verify/validate-response/fold-back/after
g_bad = re.compile(r"fold[- ]back|folds back", re.I) # γ doing ρ's job
r_bad = re.compile(r"rejects the proposal|authoriz|is the gate|gates ", re.I) # ρ doing γ's job
def scan(sym_rx, label, bad_rx):
flagged = 0
for m in re.finditer(sym_rx, T):
if not in_math(m.start()):
continue
window = T[max(0, m.start() - 15) : m.start() + 70].replace("\n", " ")
if bad_rx.search(window):
flagged += 1
print(f" FLAG {label} L{lineno(m.start())}: …{window}")
if not flagged:
print(f" OK no {label} usages land in the wrong role-neighborhood")
scan(r"\\gamma", "γ", g_bad)
scan(r"\\rho", "ρ", r_bad)
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("F. DISPLAY-ONLY SYMBOLS (in $$…$$, absent from prose)")
print("=" * 70)
disp = " ".join(T[a:b] for a, b in math_spans if T[a : a + 2] == "$$")
prose = re.sub(r"\$\$.*?\$\$", "", T, flags=re.S)
toks = set(re.findall(r"\\[A-Za-z]+(?:_\{[A-Za-z]+\})?|[A-Z]_[A-Za-z]|[A-Za-z]_\\[a-z]+", disp))
suspicious = []
for tk in sorted(toks):
base = tk.split("_")[0]
if base and base not in prose and tk not in prose and len(base) > 1:
suspicious.append(tk)
print(" (heuristic; review only) ", suspicious if suspicious else "none flagged")
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
print("G. ORPHAN / REDUNDANT-DECLARATION SCAN (review only)")
print("=" * 70)
# G1 — a math symbol occurring exactly once is usually a rename residue or a typo
# (a unification can strip a symbol of all but one use). LaTeX operators and
# formatting commands are not symbols, so filter them out. Review, do not trust.
OPS = {
r"\Pr",
r"\sum",
r"\int",
r"\sup",
r"\inf",
r"\infty",
r"\in",
r"\notin",
r"\cap",
r"\cup",
r"\setminus",
r"\subseteq",
r"\subset",
r"\mid",
r"\ge",
r"\le",
r"\sim",
r"\circ",
r"\cdot",
r"\star",
r"\hat",
r"\bar",
r"\to",
r"\Rightarrow",
r"\rightsquigarrow",
r"\longrightarrow",
r"\quad",
r"\qquad",
r"\Big",
r"\big",
r"\mathbb",
r"\mathcal",
r"\mathrm",
r"\mathbf",
r"\text",
}
sym_rx = re.compile(r"\\[A-Za-z]+(?:_\{[^{}]*\}|_[A-Za-z0-9])?")
counts = {}
for a, b in math_spans:
for m in sym_rx.finditer(T[a:b]):
counts[m.group()] = counts.get(m.group(), 0) + 1
singletons = sorted(s for s, c in counts.items() if c == 1 and s.split("_")[0] not in OPS)
print(" G1 singletons (occur once in math, operators filtered — orphan/typo candidates):")
print(" " + (", ".join(singletons) if singletons else "none"))
# G2 — the bare-τ failure mode the τ-unification introduced: a stopping/hitting-time
# symbol carrying BOTH an enumeration declaration (a "…stopping/hitting time…"
# sentence) AND a separate "= \inf\{…}" formula on a *different* line — one of the
# two sites is usually redundant. A formula restated in adjacent prose is benign
# (same kind of site), and so is τ_H, which legitimately owns a filtration statement
# plus its formula. A *newly* enum+formula-split symbol is the smell.
decl_rx = re.compile(
r"hitting times? are|are stopping times|is a stopping time|stopping times? for the"
)
formula_tail = r"\s*=\s*\\inf\\\{" # "= \inf\{" — the hitting/stop-time def, not \infty
tau_syms = [r"\tau", r"\tau_A", r"\tau_H", r"\tau_B", r"\tau_F", r"\tau_{H_{\mathrm{ok}}}"]
print(" G2 stopping/hitting-time family (count | enum-decl lines | formula lines):")
for s in tau_syms:
pat = re.escape(s) + (r"(?![A-Za-z_^{])" if s == r"\tau" else r"(?![A-Za-z0-9])")
occ = list(re.finditer(pat, T))
enum_lines, formula_lines = set(), set()
for m in occ:
ln = lineno(m.start())
line = LINES[ln - 1]
if re.search(pat + formula_tail, line):
formula_lines.add(ln)
if decl_rx.search(line):
enum_lines.add(ln)
split = any(e != f for e in enum_lines for f in formula_lines)
note = " <-- enum + separate formula; eyeball (benign: τ_H)" if split else ""
print(
f" {s:24} count={len(occ):>2} enum={sorted(enum_lines)} formula={sorted(formula_lines)}{note}"
)
print("\nDONE.")
+6 -16
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[project]
name = "turnstone"
version = "1.8.0a4"
version = "1.6.9"
description = "Multi-node AI orchestration platform with tool use, agent routing, and cluster simulation."
readme = "README.md"
license = "Apache-2.0"
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ classifiers = [
"Topic :: Scientific/Engineering :: Artificial Intelligence",
]
dependencies = [
"openai>=2.45", # GPT-5.6: typed reasoning.mode, prompt_cache_options, and cache_write_tokens
"openai>=2.37",
"anthropic>=0.108", # claude-fable-5 support; hard runtime floor is 0.105 (mid-conversation system blocks)
"httpx>=0.28",
"mcp>=1.27,<2", # v2 is a breaking rewrite (2.0.0a1 live 2026-06-11; stable ~2026-07-27) — streamablehttp_client removed, 2-tuple transport, snake_case types; migrate deliberately
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ dependencies = [
"sse-starlette>=2.0",
"httpx-sse>=0.4",
"pydantic>=2.0",
"pydantic-settings>=2.14.2", # GHSA-4xgf-cpjx-pc3j: <2.14.2 advisory; pinned as a security floor for pip-audit
"sqlalchemy>=2.0",
"alembic>=1.14",
"psycopg[binary]>=3.2",
@@ -46,8 +44,6 @@ dependencies = [
"python-frontmatter>=1.0",
"pypdfium2>=4", # PDF text-extract + rasterize for models without native PDF input (core/pdf.py)
"pillow>=10", # PNG encoding for the PDF->images rasterize fallback (vision models, core/pdf.py)
"altair>=6.0", # standard viz stack: Vega-Lite spec authoring; one spec renders to static SVG (vl-convert) AND interactive ui:// vega-embed panels. Light: pandas/numpy optional via narwhals.
"vl-convert-python>=1.6", # Vega-Lite -> SVG/PNG, server-side (bundled Rust renderer; no browser/GDAL/chromium). BSD-3 + fully permissive dep closure (OFL font, BSD/MIT/ISC JS).
]
[project.urls]
@@ -64,13 +60,12 @@ all = ["turnstone[discord,slack]"]
[project.scripts]
turnstone = "turnstone.cli:main"
turnstone-eval = "turnstone.eval.cli:main"
turnstone-optimizer = "turnstone.optimizer:main"
turnstone-eval = "turnstone.eval:main"
turnstone-server = "turnstone.server:main"
turnstone-console = "turnstone.console.server:main"
turnstone-admin = "turnstone.admin:main"
turnstone-channel = "turnstone.channels.cli:main"
turnstone-doctor = "turnstone.doctor:main"
turnstone-bootstrap = "turnstone.bootstrap:main"
[tool.hatch.build.targets.wheel]
include = [
@@ -88,9 +83,9 @@ include = [
"turnstone/console/static/coordinator/*.js",
"turnstone/shared_static/*.css",
"turnstone/shared_static/*.js",
"turnstone/shared_static/katex-0.18.1/**/*",
"turnstone/shared_static/katex-0.17.0/**/*",
"turnstone/shared_static/hljs-11.11.1/**/*",
"turnstone/shared_static/mermaid-11.16.0/**/*",
"turnstone/shared_static/mermaid-11.15.0/**/*",
"turnstone/shared_static/hls-1.6.16/**/*",
"turnstone/sdk/py.typed",
"turnstone/deploy/*.yaml",
@@ -103,7 +98,6 @@ testpaths = ["tests"]
markers = [
"live: requires a running LLM backend",
"allow_thread_leak: test intentionally leaves a background thread running (opts out of the leaked-thread guard)",
"e2e_recovery: opt-in end-to-end SSE recovery harness (real server + real SSE consumers, scripted provider — NOT live, no LLM backend needed); tens of seconds each. CI lanes run ``-m 'not live and not e2e_recovery'``; select with ``-m e2e_recovery``.",
]
filterwarnings = [
# mcp v1 deprecates streamablehttp_client for an entry point whose call
@@ -195,10 +189,6 @@ ignore_missing_imports = true
module = ["pypdfium2", "pypdfium2.*"]
ignore_missing_imports = true
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = ["vl_convert", "vl_convert.*"] # Rust wheel, ships no type stubs (altair is typed)
ignore_missing_imports = true
[[tool.mypy.overrides]]
module = ["turnstone.channels.discord.*"]
disallow_subclassing_any = false
+8 -93
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,8 @@
#
# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/turnstonelabs/turnstone/main/run.sh | bash
#
# Autodetects your distro Ubuntu/Debian, Fedora/RHEL, Arch, their common
# derivatives (Mint, Pop!_OS, Nobara, AlmaLinux, …), and WSL on any of them —
# and:
# Autodetects your distro (Ubuntu/Debian, Fedora/RHEL, Arch, and WSL on any of
# them) and:
# 1. ensures git is installed, then clones the repo
# 2. ensures Docker + the compose plugin are installed and the daemon is usable
# 3. asks how many server nodes to run (1-10)
@@ -66,18 +65,12 @@ ask() {
# -- distro / package manager detection --------------------------------------
OS_ID=""; OS_LIKE=""; PKG=""; IS_WSL=0; SUDO=""
# Extra os-release fields, captured only to pick Docker's upstream repo when
# get.docker.com refuses a derivative it doesn't recognize (see install_docker).
OS_PLATFORM_ID=""; OS_CODENAME=""; OS_UBUNTU_CODENAME=""
detect_os() {
if [ -r /etc/os-release ]; then
# shellcheck disable=SC1091
. /etc/os-release
OS_ID="${ID:-}"; OS_LIKE="${ID_LIKE:-}"
OS_PLATFORM_ID="${PLATFORM_ID:-}"
OS_CODENAME="${VERSION_CODENAME:-}"
OS_UBUNTU_CODENAME="${UBUNTU_CODENAME:-}"
fi
if grep -qiE 'microsoft|wsl' /proc/version 2>/dev/null || [ -n "${WSL_DISTRO_NAME:-}" ]; then
IS_WSL=1
@@ -137,83 +130,11 @@ clone_repo() {
# -- docker -------------------------------------------------------------------
DOCKER="docker"
# Fallback when get.docker.com won't install here. That script keys off $ID alone
# (never ID_LIKE), so it aborts with "Unsupported distribution '<id>'" on every
# derivative — Nobara, Linux Mint, Pop!_OS, AlmaLinux, Oracle Linux, … — even
# though the family is clear. We already know the family from detect_os, so we add
# Docker's official CE repo for the matching upstream and install the same
# packages get.docker.com would (including the compose plugin the rest of run.sh
# relies on).
install_docker_ce_repo() {
local up
case "$PKG" in
apt)
local codename arch
# UBUNTU_CODENAME is set by Ubuntu and every Ubuntu-derived distro
# (Mint/Pop!_OS/Zorin/…) and never by pure Debian, so it both routes
# the family and gives the exact codename Docker's repo expects.
if [ -n "$OS_UBUNTU_CODENAME" ]; then
up=ubuntu; codename="$OS_UBUNTU_CODENAME"
else
up=debian; codename="$OS_CODENAME"
fi
[ -n "$codename" ] || die "couldn't determine the $up release codename for Docker's repo — install Docker manually and re-run."
arch="$(dpkg --print-architecture 2>/dev/null || echo amd64)"
info "Adding Docker's $up repository ($codename)."
$SUDO install -m 0755 -d /etc/apt/keyrings
curl -fsSL "https://download.docker.com/linux/$up/gpg" | $SUDO tee /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc >/dev/null
$SUDO chmod a+r /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc
printf 'deb [arch=%s signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.asc] https://download.docker.com/linux/%s %s stable\n' \
"$arch" "$up" "$codename" | $SUDO tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list >/dev/null
$SUDO apt-get update -y
$SUDO apt-get install -y docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-compose-plugin
;;
dnf|yum)
# A Fedora spin and a RHEL clone can both carry "fedora" in ID_LIKE
# (Nobara's is "rhel centos fedora"), so ID_LIKE can't separate them.
# PLATFORM_ID can: Fedora is platform:fNN, Enterprise Linux platform:elN.
case "$OS_PLATFORM_ID" in
platform:f*) up=fedora ;;
platform:el*) up=centos ;;
*) if [ -e /etc/fedora-release ]; then up=fedora; else up=centos; fi ;;
esac
info "Adding Docker's $up repository."
$SUDO curl -fsSL "https://download.docker.com/linux/$up/docker-ce.repo" \
-o /etc/yum.repos.d/docker-ce.repo \
|| die "couldn't add Docker's $up repository — install Docker manually and re-run."
pkg_install docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io docker-buildx-plugin docker-compose-plugin
;;
esac
}
# The distro IDs get.docker.com installs directly: it matches $ID against this
# exact set (ignoring ID_LIKE) and aborts on anything else. Mirrors the dispatch
# in get.docker.com, including its fedora-asahi-remix -> fedora alias.
get_docker_com_supports() {
case "$1" in
ubuntu|debian|raspbian|centos|fedora|rhel|rocky|sles|fedora-asahi-remix) return 0 ;;
*) return 1 ;;
esac
}
install_docker() {
case "$PKG" in
apt|dnf|yum)
# Decide up front which installer applies, rather than treating every
# get.docker.com failure as "unsupported distro": for an ID it knows,
# let it run and surface any real failure (network, apt lock, EOL) via
# die instead of masking it with the repo path. Only unrecognized
# derivatives (Nobara, Mint, …) — which it would just abort on — skip
# straight to adding Docker's repo ourselves.
if [ -n "$OS_ID" ] && ! get_docker_com_supports "$OS_ID"; then
info "get.docker.com doesn't support '$OS_ID' — using Docker's official repository directly."
install_docker_ce_repo
else
info "Installing Docker via the official get.docker.com script"
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | $SUDO sh \
|| die "get.docker.com failed to install Docker (see the output above). Fix the issue and re-run — the script resumes."
fi
;;
info "Installing Docker via the official get.docker.com script"
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | $SUDO sh ;;
pacman)
pkg_install docker docker-compose ;;
esac
@@ -445,15 +366,12 @@ ${GREEN}${BOLD}Turnstone is running${RESET} (${NODE_COUNT} node$([ "$NODE_COUNT"
${DIM}cd $INSTALL_DIR && $DOCKER compose exec caddy cat /data/caddy/pki/authorities/local/root.crt${RESET}
Finish setup
1. Open ${BOLD}${url}${RESET} and create the admin account when prompted —
the first user created there gets full admin access.
2. Log in, then add a model backend in the ${BOLD}Models${RESET} tab —
a local server (vLLM / llama.cpp) or an OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini key.
1. Create the first admin user:
${DIM}cd $INSTALL_DIR && $DOCKER compose exec node-1 turnstone-admin create-user --username admin --name "Admin"${RESET}
2. Open ${url}, log in, and add a model backend in the ${BOLD}Models${RESET} tab —
a local server (vLLM / llama.cpp / Ollama) or an OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini key.
Nodes boot without a model and pick it up live; no restart needed.
${DIM}No browser? Create the admin from the CLI instead:
cd $INSTALL_DIR && $DOCKER compose exec node-1 turnstone-admin create-admin --username admin --name "Admin"${RESET}
Scale Running ${scale}
Manage ${DIM}cd $INSTALL_DIR${RESET}
@@ -462,9 +380,6 @@ ${GREEN}${BOLD}Turnstone is running${RESET} (${NODE_COUNT} node$([ "$NODE_COUNT"
${DIM}$DOCKER compose down${RESET} stop (add -v to wipe data)
Config $INSTALL_DIR/.env (generated secrets + ports)
Troubleshoot ${DIM}pipx run --spec turnstone turnstone-doctor --dir $INSTALL_DIR${RESET}
LLM-backed diagnostics for this install (read-only; needs Python)
EOF
}
+19 -838
View File
@@ -58,46 +58,6 @@ Attachments harness (/attachments/livepass.html): the composer attachment
thumbnail crop/size, the native audio-control fit at the constrained
height, the snippet contrast, and how a long filename behaves at the
340px chip cap.
Task-agent harness (/taskagent/livepass.html): the task_agent card a task
agent's sub-tool steps nested under its conversation row, driven through the
REAL InteractivePane.handleEvent (parent tool_pending/tool_info -> child
tool_pending/tool_result/tool_output_chunk/approve_request -> task_agent
tool_result) so the SSE->card routing (_routeAgentItems / _ensureAgentCard,
and appendToolOutput finding the nested row by call_id) is exercised, not
just the leaf builders. Query flags: &theme=light; &collapsed=1 (all-auto,
no approval -> the natural collapse-by-default state); &parallel=1 (card in a
2-tool batch, for the rail-bleed rules); &recall=1 (the RECALL path
replayHistory rebuilding the card from a /history `agent_steps` overlay, i.e.
a reload while the ws is in memory); &expand=1 (open every card so a shot
shows the nested steps); &race=1 (child steps emitted BEFORE the task_agent
row paints the parallel-pool ordering window; the orphan buffer must nest
them rather than let them escape to top-level); &orphan=1 (child steps whose
task_agent row NEVER paints the safety valve must escape them to visible
top-level rows after the grace window, stamping TASKAGENT-ORPHANS-ESCAPED-<n>,
not leave them buffered/invisible). document.title stamps
TASKAGENT-READY-<steps> on
success, TASKAGENT-FAILED-... / TASKAGENT-ERROR when routing breaks, so a
broken card can't screenshot green.
Perf harness (/perf/livepass.html): long-session performance baseline for the
interactive pane mounts the REAL InteractivePane at real scroll geometry
(fixed-height mount, production CSS chain) and drives production-shaped
events through pane.handleEvent/replayHistory with rAF yields, measuring:
replayHistory wall time at N messages, live event-storm cost per turn on top
of that transcript (reasoning/content deltas + tool batches + task_agent
cards), tool_output_chunk throughput, busy/idle churn, heap + node count +
_agentCards size across repeated replay cycles (leak probe), and longtask
counts. Query params: ?n= (history size) &turns= &chunks= &cycles= &idle=
&post=1 (POST the JSON report to /perf/report the --perf runner captures
it). Results land in <pre id="perf-json"> and document.title stamps
PERF-READY-<n> / PERF-FAILED-<phase>. MEASUREMENT RULES: never run with
--virtual-time-budget (it corrupts performance.now) and never pass
--force-prefers-reduced-motion (it disables the animations whose cost we
measure); the --perf runner passes --js-flags=--expose-gc and
--enable-precise-memory-info so heap numbers are stable and real.
python3 scripts/livepass.py --perf # 300 and 3000 msgs
python3 scripts/livepass.py --perf --perf-n 5000 # match the field run
Rebuild after ANY markup change: the dialog blocks are embedded at build
time. Assets are symlinked, so CSS/JS edits are live on refresh.
@@ -106,13 +66,7 @@ time. Assets are symlinked, so CSS/JS edits are live on refresh.
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import http.server
import json
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import time
import uuid
from pathlib import Path
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
@@ -399,7 +353,7 @@ CONSOLE_TEMPLATE = """<!doctype html>
known: true,
capabilities: {
context_window: 200000, supports_tools: true,
supports_vision: true,
supports_streaming: true, supports_vision: true,
supports_web_search: true, supports_temperature: true,
supports_effort: true,
},
@@ -813,547 +767,6 @@ ATTACH_TEMPLATE = """<!doctype html>
"""
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Task-agent harness — the task_agent card: a task agent's sub-tool steps
# nested under its conversation row. Driven through the REAL
# InteractivePane.handleEvent so the SSE->card ROUTING (_routeAgentItems /
# _ensureAgentCard, plus appendToolOutput finding the nested row by call_id)
# is exercised, not just the leaf builders. The page frame is harness-only
# chrome; the .conv-batch / task_agent card is what's under review.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
TASKAGENT_TEMPLATE = """<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>task_agent livepass</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/ui-base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/chat.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/conversation.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/cards.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/interactive.css" />
<style>
/* Harness-only framing (NOT under review) a plausible pane context. */
body {
padding: 24px; margin: 0; background: var(--bg); color: var(--ink);
font-family: var(--font-sans, system-ui, sans-serif);
}
.demo-frame { max-width: 720px; margin: 0 auto; }
.demo-label {
font: 11px var(--font-mono, monospace); color: var(--ink-3);
text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.08em; margin: 0 0 8px;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div class="demo-frame">
<div class="demo-label">conversation task_agent card (real InteractivePane.handleEvent)</div>
<div class="messages" id="messages"></div>
</div>
<script>
// interactive.js reads window.toast / window.authFetch; the static render
// never POSTs, so no-op stubs are enough.
window.toast = { error: function (m) { console.log("toast:", m); } };
window.authFetch = function () {
return Promise.resolve({
ok: true,
json: function () { return Promise.resolve({}); },
text: function () { return Promise.resolve(""); },
});
};
</script>
<script type="module">
import { InteractivePane } from "./shared/interactive.js";
const q = new URLSearchParams(location.search);
if (q.get("theme") === "light")
document.documentElement.dataset.theme = "light";
const messages = document.getElementById("messages");
try {
// Drive the REAL pane; stub only the host seams a mounted pane provides.
const pane = new InteractivePane("demo-ws");
pane.messagesEl = messages;
pane.inputEl = document.createElement("textarea");
pane.sendBtn = document.createElement("button");
pane.isNearBottom = () => false;
pane.scrollToBottom = () => {};
pane.removeEmptyState = () => {};
pane.removeThinkingIndicator = () => {};
pane.setBusy = () => {};
const ev = (e) => pane.handleEvent(e);
// ?recall=1: exercise the RECALL path replayHistory rebuilding the
// card from the /history `agent_steps` overlay (a reload / reopen while
// the ws is still in memory), as opposed to the live SSE path below.
const recall = q.get("recall") === "1";
if (recall) {
pane.replayHistory([
{ role: "user", content: "Find all call sites of resolve_alias and summarize them" },
{ role: "assistant", tool_calls: [{
name: "task_agent", id: "task1",
arguments: JSON.stringify({ prompt: "Find call sites of resolve_alias" }),
agent_steps: [
{ id: "task1::c1", name: "search", arguments: JSON.stringify({ query: "resolve_alias" }), output: "12 matches across 4 files", is_error: false },
{ id: "task1::c2", name: "read_file", arguments: JSON.stringify({ path: "core/registry.py" }), output: "4.1 KB read", is_error: false },
{ id: "task1::c3", name: "bash", arguments: JSON.stringify({ command: "pytest -k registry" }), output: "12 passed in 1.2s", is_error: false },
{ id: "task1::c4", name: "notify", arguments: JSON.stringify({ channel: "#eng", message: "post summary" }), output: "posted to #eng", is_error: false },
],
}] },
{ role: "tool", tool_call_id: "task1", content: "resolve_alias has 4 call sites (registry.py:120, session.py:12200, model_registry.py:88, eval.py:54); all pass a validated alias before use." },
]);
} else if (q.get("race") === "1") {
// ?race=1: reproduce the parallel-pool ordering window each
// sub-tool's tool_pending is emitted exactly once (as in production)
// but AHEAD of the task_agent row paint, as happens when a pooled
// sub-agent's SSE event is handled before its parent row commits.
// The orphan buffer must hold them and nest them when the parent row
// lands; pre-fix they escaped to top-level rows and the card came up
// short (steps < 4 -> TASKAGENT-FAILED), so this can't screenshot
// green without the fix.
const raceTask = {
call_id: "task1", func_name: "task_agent",
header: 'task_agent: "Find all call sites of resolve_alias and summarize them"',
needs_approval: false,
};
const childPending = (cid, fn, header) =>
ev({ type: "tool_pending", items: [{ call_id: cid, parent_call_id: "task1", func_name: fn, header: header, needs_approval: false }] });
// a) Orphan child pendings arrive first no parent row yet.
childPending("task1::c1", "search", 'search: "resolve_alias"');
childPending("task1::c2", "read_file", "read_file: core/registry.py");
childPending("task1::c3", "bash", "pytest -k registry");
childPending("task1::c4", "notify", "notify: post summary to #eng");
// b) Parent task_agent row paints (pending -> resolved): must flush the
// buffered orphans into the card AND survive the upgrade rebuild.
ev({ type: "tool_pending", items: [raceTask] });
ev({ type: "tool_info", items: [Object.assign({ auto_approved: false }, raceTask)] });
// c) Results + a streamed chunk follow, nesting into the flushed rows.
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "task1::c1", parent_call_id: "task1", name: "search", output: "12 matches across 4 files" });
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "task1::c2", parent_call_id: "task1", name: "read_file", output: "4.1 KB read" });
ev({ type: "tool_output_chunk", call_id: "task1::c3", parent_call_id: "task1", chunk: "collected 12 items ... " });
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "task1::c3", parent_call_id: "task1", name: "bash", output: "12 passed in 1.2s" });
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "task1::c4", parent_call_id: "task1", name: "notify", output: "posted to #eng" });
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "task1", name: "task_agent", output: "resolve_alias has 4 call sites (registry.py:120, session.py:12200, model_registry.py:88, eval.py:54); all pass a validated alias before use." });
} else if (q.get("orphan") === "1") {
// ?orphan=1: the SAFETY VALVE child steps whose task_agent row
// NEVER paints (an id-correlation mismatch, or an agent aborted
// before its row painted). They must not vanish: after the grace
// window the buffer escapes them to visible top-level rows (the
// pre-buffer behaviour) rather than holding them forever. The parent
// task_agent row is deliberately never emitted here.
const orphanPending = (cid, fn, header) =>
ev({ type: "tool_pending", items: [{ call_id: cid, parent_call_id: "task1", func_name: fn, header: header, needs_approval: false }] });
orphanPending("task1::c1", "search", 'search: "resolve_alias"');
orphanPending("task1::c2", "read_file", "read_file: core/registry.py");
orphanPending("task1::c3", "bash", "pytest -k registry");
} else {
// 1. Parent paints the task_agent call (a top-level tool row).
const taskItem = {
call_id: "task1", func_name: "task_agent",
header: 'task_agent: "Find all call sites of resolve_alias and summarize them"',
needs_approval: false,
};
// ?parallel=1 puts the task_agent in a 2-tool parallel batch so the
// nested-step rail-bleed fix can be verified against the rail rules.
const parentItems = q.get("parallel") === "1"
? [taskItem, { call_id: "sib1", func_name: "bash", header: "git status", needs_approval: false }]
: [taskItem];
ev({ type: "tool_pending", items: parentItems });
ev({ type: "tool_info", items: parentItems.map((it) => Object.assign({ auto_approved: false }, it)) });
if (parentItems.length > 1)
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "sib1", name: "bash", output: "clean" });
// 2. Sub-agent steps tagged parent_call_id="task1" exercises routing.
function stepRow(cid, fn, header, result) {
ev({ type: "tool_pending", items: [{ call_id: cid, parent_call_id: "task1", func_name: fn, header: header, needs_approval: false }] });
if (result != null)
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: cid, parent_call_id: "task1", name: fn, output: result });
}
stepRow("task1::c1", "search", 'search: "resolve_alias"', "12 matches across 4 files");
stepRow("task1::c2", "read_file", "read_file: core/registry.py", "4.1 KB read");
ev({ type: "tool_pending", items: [{ call_id: "task1::c3", parent_call_id: "task1", func_name: "bash", header: "pytest -k registry", needs_approval: false }] });
ev({ type: "tool_output_chunk", call_id: "task1::c3", parent_call_id: "task1", chunk: "collected 12 items ... " });
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "task1::c3", parent_call_id: "task1", name: "bash", output: "12 passed in 1.2s" });
// 4th step. Default: a nested sub-tool approval (notify is not
// auto-approved) the pane must auto-expand the collapse-by-default
// card so the blocking prompt is visible. ?collapsed=1: a plain
// completed step instead, so nothing forces the card open and the
// screenshot shows the natural collapsed state (the common case).
if (q.get("collapsed") === "1") {
stepRow("task1::c4", "notify", "notify: post summary to #eng", "posted to #eng");
} else {
ev({ type: "approve_request", judge_pending: false, items: [{ call_id: "task1::c4", parent_call_id: "task1", func_name: "notify", header: "notify: post summary to #eng", needs_approval: true }] });
}
// 3. The task agent's own synthesis, rendered below the card.
ev({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "task1", name: "task_agent", output: "resolve_alias has 4 call sites (registry.py:120, session.py:12200, model_registry.py:88, eval.py:54); all pass a validated alias before use." });
}
// ?expand=1: open every card so a screenshot shows the nested steps
// (cards collapse by default; recall has no approval to auto-expand).
if (q.get("expand") === "1") {
document.querySelectorAll(".conv-agent").forEach(function (c) {
c.dataset.collapsed = "false";
const t = c.querySelector(".conv-agent-toggle");
if (t) t.setAttribute("aria-expanded", "true");
});
}
// Loud failure broken routing must not screenshot green.
const orphanMode = q.get("orphan") === "1";
setTimeout(function () {
if (orphanMode) {
// The parent never painted; after the grace window the buffered
// steps must have ESCAPED to visible top-level rows, not vanished.
const escaped = document.querySelectorAll('.conv-batch .conv-row[data-call-id^="task1::"]').length;
const leaked = document.querySelector('.conv-row[data-call-id="task1"] .conv-agent');
document.title = escaped >= 3 && !leaked
? "TASKAGENT-ORPHANS-ESCAPED-" + escaped
: "TASKAGENT-FAILED-escaped" + escaped + "-card" + (leaked ? 1 : 0);
return;
}
const row = document.querySelector('.conv-row[data-call-id="task1"]');
const card = row && row.querySelector(".conv-agent");
const steps = card ? card.querySelectorAll(".conv-agent-body .conv-row").length : 0;
const hasResult = !!(row && /call sites/.test(row.textContent || ""));
document.title = card && steps >= 4 && hasResult
? "TASKAGENT-READY-" + steps
: "TASKAGENT-FAILED-card" + (card ? 1 : 0) + "-steps" + steps + "-result" + (hasResult ? 1 : 0);
}, orphanMode ? 900 : 300);
} catch (e) {
messages.textContent = "HARNESS ERROR: " + e.message + "\\n" + (e.stack || "");
document.title = "TASKAGENT-ERROR";
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
"""
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Perf harness — long-session performance baseline for the interactive pane.
# Mounts the REAL InteractivePane (production DOM via _createDOM, production
# CSS chain) in a fixed-height mount so .pane-messages has REAL scroll
# geometry — the forced-layout costs under measurement (isNearBottom /
# scrollToBottom / chunk-append scroll pins) only exist against live layout,
# which is why nothing here stubs scroll/geometry the way the task-agent
# harness does. All timing is real time (see MEASUREMENT RULES in the module
# docstring). Workload is deterministic (seeded LCG) so runs are comparable.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
PERF_TEMPLATE = """<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1" />
<title>perf livepass</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/ui-base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/chat.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/conversation.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/cards.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="static/style.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="shared/interactive.css" />
<style>
/* Harness-only framing (NOT under review): a fixed-height mount so the
pane's .pane-messages scroller has real production geometry. */
body { margin: 0; background: var(--bg); color: var(--fg); }
#mount { height: 720px; width: 920px; display: flex; overflow: hidden; }
#mount > .pane { flex: 1; display: flex; flex-direction: column; min-height: 0; }
#perf-json { font: 11px monospace; white-space: pre-wrap; padding: 12px; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div id="mount"></div>
<pre id="perf-json">running</pre>
<script>
window.toast = { error: function (m) { console.log("toast:", m); } };
// Collect every uncaught error/rejection into the report a perf run
// that silently swallowed a pipeline exception must not read as clean.
window.__perfErrors = [];
window.onerror = function (msg, src, line) {
window.__perfErrors.push(String(msg) + " @ " + (src || "?") + ":" + (line || 0));
};
window.addEventListener("unhandledrejection", function (e) {
window.__perfErrors.push("unhandledrejection: " + String(e && e.reason));
});
window.__perfFetch = function () {
return Promise.resolve({
ok: true, status: 200,
json: function () { return Promise.resolve({}); },
text: function () { return Promise.resolve(""); },
});
};
window.authFetch = window.__perfFetch;
</script>
<script type="module">
import { InteractivePane } from "./shared/interactive.js";
// auth.js's legacy window bridge clobbers window.authFetch at module
// import time reinstate the stub now imports have evaluated (same
// dance as the attachments harness).
window.authFetch = window.__perfFetch;
const q = new URLSearchParams(location.search);
const N = parseInt(q.get("n") || "1000", 10);
const TURNS = parseInt(q.get("turns") || "20", 10);
const CHUNKS = parseInt(q.get("chunks") || "300", 10);
const CYCLES = parseInt(q.get("cycles") || "3", 10);
const IDLE = parseInt(q.get("idle") || "20", 10);
// Long-task accounting across every phase (>50ms main-thread blocks).
const lt = { count: 0, total_ms: 0, max_ms: 0 };
try {
new PerformanceObserver(function (list) {
list.getEntries().forEach(function (e) {
lt.count += 1;
lt.total_ms += Math.round(e.duration);
lt.max_ms = Math.max(lt.max_ms, Math.round(e.duration));
});
}).observe({ type: "longtask", buffered: true });
} catch (e) { /* unsupported longtasks stay zeroed */ }
// Deterministic workload (seeded LCG) so runs are comparable.
let _seed = 42;
function rnd() {
_seed = (_seed * 1664525 + 1013904223) >>> 0;
return _seed / 4294967296;
}
const WORDS = ("the retry loop grinds the dungeon server while the " +
"judge weighs verdicts and the coordinator shuffles children across " +
"nodes tokens accumulate compaction folds turns storage keeps the " +
"canon and the rail repaints").split(" ");
function sentence(w) {
const parts = [];
for (let i = 0; i < w; i++) parts.push(WORDS[(rnd() * WORDS.length) | 0]);
return parts.join(" ");
}
// Realistic assistant markdown: prose + list + fenced code (varying
// content so the hljs cache behaves as in production) + inline code.
function mdBody(i) {
return (
"Turn " + i + ": " + sentence(18) + ".\\n\\n" +
"- " + sentence(6) + "\\n- " + sentence(7) + "\\n\\n" +
"```python\\n" +
"def step_" + i + "(depth):\\n" +
" total = " + ((rnd() * 1000) | 0) + "\\n" +
" for k in range(depth):\\n" +
" total += k * " + (1 + ((rnd() * 9) | 0)) + "\\n" +
" return total\\n" +
"```\\n\\n" +
sentence(14) + " `inline_" + i + "` " + sentence(8) + "."
);
}
// History in the canonical projected wire shape replayHistory consumes
// (user / assistant content / assistant tool_calls / tool result), with
// periodic reasoning bubbles and task_agent cards (agent_steps overlay).
function buildHistory(n) {
const msgs = [];
let i = 0;
while (msgs.length < n) {
i += 1;
msgs.push({ role: "user", content: "Request " + i + ": " + sentence(10) + "?" });
if (msgs.length >= n) break;
if (i % 10 === 0) {
msgs.push({ role: "assistant", reasoning: sentence(40) + ".", content: mdBody(i) });
} else {
msgs.push({ role: "assistant", content: mdBody(i) });
}
if (msgs.length >= n) break;
const callId = "h" + i;
if (i % 8 === 0) {
msgs.push({ role: "assistant", tool_calls: [{
name: "task_agent", id: callId,
arguments: JSON.stringify({ prompt: "subtask " + i }),
agent_steps: [
{ id: callId + "::c1", name: "search",
arguments: JSON.stringify({ query: "q" + i }),
output: sentence(8), is_error: false },
{ id: callId + "::c2", name: "read_file",
arguments: JSON.stringify({ path: "core/f" + i + ".py" }),
output: sentence(6), is_error: false },
{ id: callId + "::c3", name: "bash",
arguments: JSON.stringify({ command: "pytest -k t" + i }),
output: sentence(7), is_error: false },
],
}] });
} else {
msgs.push({ role: "assistant", tool_calls: [{
name: "bash", id: callId,
arguments: JSON.stringify({ command: "grep -rn pattern_" + i + " src/" }),
}] });
}
if (msgs.length >= n) break;
msgs.push({ role: "tool", tool_call_id: callId,
content: "output " + i + ":\\n" + sentence(20) });
}
return msgs;
}
const tick = () => new Promise((r) => requestAnimationFrame(r));
// One live turn, production event mix: thinking indicator, reasoning
// deltas, content deltas (yield every few so streamingRender's internal
// rAF actually applies frames, as in a real token stream), stream_end,
// an auto-approved bash batch with streamed chunks, every 5th turn a
// task_agent card with routed children, then the idle edge.
async function stormTurn(pane, i) {
pane.handleEvent({ type: "state_change", state: "running" });
pane.handleEvent({ type: "thinking_start" });
const reason = sentence(50);
let d = 0;
for (let k = 0; k < reason.length; k += 20) {
pane.handleEvent({ type: "reasoning", text: reason.slice(k, k + 20) });
d += 1;
if (d % 4 === 3) await tick();
}
const body = mdBody(100000 + i);
d = 0;
for (let k = 0; k < body.length; k += 22) {
pane.handleEvent({ type: "content", text: body.slice(k, k + 22) });
d += 1;
if (d % 6 === 5) await tick();
}
pane.handleEvent({ type: "stream_end" });
const callId = "s" + i;
const item = { call_id: callId, func_name: "bash",
header: "bash: run step " + i, needs_approval: false };
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_pending", items: [item] });
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_info",
items: [Object.assign({ auto_approved: true }, item)] });
for (let k = 0; k < 24; k++) {
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_output_chunk", call_id: callId,
chunk: "line " + k + ": " + sentence(5) + "\\n" });
if (k % 6 === 5) await tick();
}
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_result", call_id: callId, name: "bash",
output: "done " + i + "\\n" + sentence(12) });
if (i % 5 === 4) {
const tid = "sa" + i;
const titem = { call_id: tid, func_name: "task_agent",
header: 'task_agent: "subtask ' + i + '"', needs_approval: false };
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_pending", items: [titem] });
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_info",
items: [Object.assign({ auto_approved: true }, titem)] });
for (let c = 1; c <= 3; c++) {
const cid = tid + "::c" + c;
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_pending", items: [{
call_id: cid, parent_call_id: tid, func_name: "search",
header: "search: q" + c, needs_approval: false }] });
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_result", call_id: cid,
parent_call_id: tid, name: "search", output: sentence(6) });
}
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_result", call_id: tid,
name: "task_agent", output: sentence(15) });
await tick();
}
pane.handleEvent({ type: "state_change", state: "idle" });
await tick();
}
function heapBytes() {
// --js-flags=--expose-gc makes this a real floor, not GC noise.
if (typeof window.gc === "function") {
try { window.gc(); window.gc(); } catch (e) { /* noop */ }
}
return (performance.memory && performance.memory.usedJSHeapSize) || null;
}
const report = {
n: N, turns: TURNS, chunks: CHUNKS, cycles: CYCLES, idle: IDLE,
// Echoed run token the runner validates it so a straggler POST
// from a killed prior attempt can't be misattributed to this run.
run: q.get("run") || "",
errors: window.__perfErrors,
};
let phase = "mount";
try {
const pane = new InteractivePane("perf-ws");
document.getElementById("mount").appendChild(pane.el);
const msgs = buildHistory(N);
report.heap_start = heapBytes();
phase = "replay";
let t0 = performance.now();
pane.replayHistory(msgs);
report.replay_ms = Math.round(performance.now() - t0);
await tick();
report.nodes_after_replay = pane.messagesEl.querySelectorAll("*").length;
phase = "storm";
t0 = performance.now();
for (let i = 0; i < TURNS; i++) await stormTurn(pane, i);
report.storm_ms = Math.round(performance.now() - t0);
report.storm_ms_per_turn = Math.round(report.storm_ms / TURNS);
phase = "chunkstorm";
const ccItem = { call_id: "cc1", func_name: "bash",
header: "bash: tail -f build.log", needs_approval: false };
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_pending", items: [ccItem] });
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_info",
items: [Object.assign({ auto_approved: true }, ccItem)] });
t0 = performance.now();
for (let k = 0; k < CHUNKS; k++) {
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_output_chunk", call_id: "cc1",
chunk: "log line " + k + "\\n" });
if (k % 6 === 5) await tick();
}
report.chunk_ms = Math.round(performance.now() - t0);
pane.handleEvent({ type: "tool_result", call_id: "cc1", name: "bash",
output: "tail done" });
phase = "idlechurn";
t0 = performance.now();
for (let k = 0; k < IDLE; k++) {
pane.handleEvent({ type: "state_change", state: "running" });
pane.handleEvent({ type: "state_change", state: "idle" });
if (k % 4 === 3) await tick();
}
report.idle_ms = Math.round(performance.now() - t0);
// Leak probe: repeated full replays of the SAME history should
// converge to a flat heap/node/agent-card profile; monotonic growth
// here is retained-detached-DOM (the _agentCards class of bug).
phase = "replaycycles";
report.cycle_stats = [];
for (let c = 0; c < CYCLES; c++) {
t0 = performance.now();
pane.replayHistory(msgs);
const ms = Math.round(performance.now() - t0);
await tick();
report.cycle_stats.push({
replay_ms: ms,
heap: heapBytes(),
nodes: pane.messagesEl.querySelectorAll("*").length,
agent_cards: pane._agentCards ? pane._agentCards.size : 0,
});
}
report.heap_end = heapBytes();
report.longtasks = lt;
document.title = "PERF-READY-" + N;
} catch (e) {
window.__perfErrors.push(
"phase " + phase + ": " + (e && e.message ? e.message : String(e)),
);
report.failed_phase = phase;
report.longtasks = lt;
document.title = "PERF-FAILED-" + phase;
}
document.getElementById("perf-json").textContent =
JSON.stringify(report, null, 2);
if (q.get("post")) {
try {
await fetch("/perf/report", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify(report),
});
} catch (e) { /* runner captures the timeout instead */ }
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
"""
# Fixture media for the attachments harness. image/pdf thumbnails and the
# audio clip load via element .src (NOT authFetch), so the --serve dev server
# answers those paths directly with representative bytes: a photo-like image,
@@ -1470,266 +883,34 @@ def build(out: Path) -> None:
(att / "livepass.html").write_text(ATTACH_TEMPLATE, encoding="utf-8")
print(f"{att}/livepass.html — composer chips + message attachment pills")
ta = out / "taskagent"
ta.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
symlink(ta / "shared", ROOT / "turnstone/shared_static")
(ta / "livepass.html").write_text(TASKAGENT_TEMPLATE, encoding="utf-8")
print(f"{ta}/livepass.html — task_agent card (real Pane.handleEvent routing)")
pf = out / "perf"
pf.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
symlink(pf / "shared", ROOT / "turnstone/shared_static")
symlink(pf / "static", ROOT / "turnstone/ui/static")
(pf / "livepass.html").write_text(PERF_TEMPLATE, encoding="utf-8")
print(f"{pf}/livepass.html — long-session perf baseline (real InteractivePane)")
class _PerfStore:
"""Rendezvous for the perf page's POSTed JSON report."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
import threading
self.event = threading.Event()
self.data: dict[str, object] | None = None
class _HarnessHandler(http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
"""Static file server + attachment media fixtures + perf-report sink.
The attachments harness loads thumbnails + the audio clip via element
.src; serve those from generated fixtures, fall through to static for
everything else. The perf harness POSTs its JSON report to /perf/report
when driven with ?post=1 the --perf runner blocks on ``perf_store``.
"""
perf_store: _PerfStore | None = None
quiet = False
def do_GET(self) -> None: # noqa: N802 (stdlib casing)
blob = _fixture_for(self.path.split("?")[0])
if blob is None:
super().do_GET()
return
data, ctype = blob
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", ctype)
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
def do_POST(self) -> None: # noqa: N802 (stdlib casing)
store = type(self).perf_store
if self.path.split("?")[0] != "/perf/report" or store is None:
self.send_error(404)
return
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
body = self.rfile.read(length)
try:
store.data = json.loads(body)
except ValueError:
store.data = {"errors": ["runner: unparseable report body"]}
store.event.set()
self.send_response(204)
self.end_headers()
def log_message(self, format: str, *args: object) -> None: # noqa: A002 (stdlib signature)
if not type(self).quiet:
super().log_message(format, *args)
def _find_chrome() -> str | None:
for name in ("google-chrome", "google-chrome-stable", "chromium", "chromium-browser"):
path = shutil.which(name)
if path:
return path
return None
def _await_report(
store: _PerfStore, proc: subprocess.Popen[bytes], run_token: str, timeout: float
) -> dict[str, object] | None:
"""Wait for THIS attempt's report: validated by run token, bailing early
when Chrome exits without reporting (the sandbox-startup-failure case
waiting the full timeout there cost minutes before the --no-sandbox
fallback could even start). A straggler POST from a previous attempt
(its handler thread can complete after the next attempt cleared the
store) carries the wrong token and is discarded instead of being
misattributed to this run."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
proc_exited_at: float | None = None
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if store.event.wait(0.5):
data = store.data
store.event.clear()
store.data = None
if isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("run") == run_token:
return data
continue # stale straggler from a prior attempt — keep waiting
if proc.poll() is not None:
now = time.monotonic()
if proc_exited_at is None:
proc_exited_at = now # grace: an in-flight POST may still land
elif now - proc_exited_at > 3.0:
return None # exited without reporting — try the next attempt
return None
def _perf_run_one(
chrome: str, out: Path, port: int, store: _PerfStore, n: int, turns: int, timeout: float
) -> dict[str, object] | None:
"""One headless-Chrome perf pass; returns the page's report or None."""
base_flags = [
"--headless=new",
"--disable-gpu",
"--hide-scrollbars",
"--window-size=1440,900",
"--no-first-run",
"--disable-extensions",
# Throttled timers/rAF in a backgrounded renderer would corrupt the
# measurement — pin the renderer foreground-scheduled.
"--disable-background-timer-throttling",
"--disable-renderer-backgrounding",
"--disable-backgrounding-occluded-windows",
# Stable, real heap numbers (heapBytes() calls window.gc() first).
"--js-flags=--expose-gc",
"--enable-precise-memory-info",
]
for attempt, extra in enumerate(
([], ["--no-sandbox"]) # sandboxed first, container fallback second
):
run_token = f"n{n}-a{attempt}-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
url = (
f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/perf/livepass.html?n={n}&turns={turns}&post=1&run={run_token}"
)
store.event.clear()
store.data = None
profile = out / f".chrome-perf-{n}"
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[chrome, *base_flags, *extra, f"--user-data-dir={profile}", url],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
try:
report = _await_report(store, proc, run_token, timeout)
if report is not None:
return report
finally:
if proc.poll() is None:
proc.terminate()
try:
proc.wait(10)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
return None
def run_perf(out: Path, sizes: list[int], turns: int, timeout: float) -> bool:
"""Build, serve, and run the perf page once per history size; print a table."""
import functools
import threading
chrome = _find_chrome()
if chrome is None:
print("perf: no chrome/chromium binary found on PATH")
return False
store = _PerfStore()
_HarnessHandler.perf_store = store
_HarnessHandler.quiet = True
handler = functools.partial(_HarnessHandler, directory=str(out))
server = http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), handler)
port = server.server_address[1]
threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
reports: dict[int, dict[str, object]] = {}
try:
for n in sizes:
print(f"perf: n={n} turns={turns}", end="", flush=True)
report = _perf_run_one(chrome, out, port, store, n, turns, timeout)
if report is None:
print("FAILED (no report — timeout or chrome startup failure)")
continue
failed = report.get("failed_phase")
errors = report.get("errors") or []
status = f"failed in {failed}" if failed else "ok"
print(f"{status} ({len(errors) if isinstance(errors, list) else '?'} page errors)")
reports[n] = report
(out / f"perf-report-n{n}.json").write_text(
json.dumps(report, indent=2), encoding="utf-8"
)
finally:
server.shutdown()
_HarnessHandler.perf_store = None
_HarnessHandler.quiet = False
if not reports:
return False
_print_perf_table(reports)
print(f"\nraw reports: {out}/perf-report-n*.json")
return True
def _print_perf_table(reports: dict[int, dict[str, object]]) -> None:
sizes = sorted(reports)
def cell(n: int, key: str) -> str:
value = reports[n].get(key)
return "" if value is None else str(value)
def mb(value: object) -> str:
return f"{value / 1048576:.1f}MB" if isinstance(value, (int, float)) else ""
rows: list[tuple[str, list[str]]] = [
("replay_ms (full history build)", [cell(n, "replay_ms") for n in sizes]),
("nodes after replay", [cell(n, "nodes_after_replay") for n in sizes]),
("storm ms/turn (live mix)", [cell(n, "storm_ms_per_turn") for n in sizes]),
("chunk_ms (output chunks)", [cell(n, "chunk_ms") for n in sizes]),
("idle_ms (busy/idle churn)", [cell(n, "idle_ms") for n in sizes]),
("heap start → end", []),
("longtasks count/max_ms", []),
("replay cycles ms", []),
("agent_cards after cycles", []),
]
for n in sizes:
rep = reports[n]
rows[5][1].append(f"{mb(rep.get('heap_start'))}{mb(rep.get('heap_end'))}")
lt = rep.get("longtasks")
rows[6][1].append(f"{lt.get('count')}/{lt.get('max_ms')}" if isinstance(lt, dict) else "")
cycles = rep.get("cycle_stats")
if isinstance(cycles, list) and cycles:
rows[7][1].append(",".join(str(c.get("replay_ms", "?")) for c in cycles))
rows[8][1].append(str(cycles[-1].get("agent_cards", "?")))
else:
rows[7][1].append("")
rows[8][1].append("")
label_w = max(len(label) for label, _ in rows)
col_w = max(14, *(len(f"n={n}") for n in sizes))
header = " " * label_w + " " + " ".join(f"n={n}".rjust(col_w) for n in sizes)
print("\n" + header)
for label, cells in rows:
print(label.ljust(label_w) + " " + " ".join(c.rjust(col_w) for c in cells))
def main() -> None:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
ap.add_argument("--out", type=Path, default=Path("/tmp/livepass"))
ap.add_argument("--serve", type=int, metavar="PORT")
ap.add_argument("--perf", action="store_true", help="run the perf baseline and exit")
ap.add_argument(
"--perf-n",
default="300,3000",
help="comma-separated history sizes for --perf (default: 300,3000)",
)
ap.add_argument("--perf-turns", type=int, default=20)
ap.add_argument("--perf-timeout", type=float, default=420.0)
args = ap.parse_args()
build(args.out)
if args.perf:
sizes = [int(s) for s in str(args.perf_n).split(",") if s.strip()]
raise SystemExit(0 if run_perf(args.out, sizes, args.perf_turns, args.perf_timeout) else 1)
if args.serve:
import functools
import http.server
handler = functools.partial(_HarnessHandler, directory=str(args.out))
class _FixtureHandler(http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
# The attachments harness loads thumbnails + the audio clip via
# element .src; serve those from generated fixtures, fall through
# to static for everything else.
def do_GET(self) -> None: # noqa: N802 (stdlib casing)
blob = _fixture_for(self.path.split("?")[0])
if blob is None:
super().do_GET()
return
data, ctype = blob
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", ctype)
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(data)
handler = functools.partial(_FixtureHandler, directory=str(args.out))
print(f"serving {args.out} on http://localhost:{args.serve}/ — Ctrl+C stops")
http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", args.serve), handler).serve_forever()
-19
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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
# Entra config for the Entra e2e / spike harnesses. Copy to `.env` (gitignored)
# and fill in from your tenant. `entra_setup.sh setup` creates the app
# registrations and writes a populated `.env` for you.
#
# cp scripts/obo-e2e/.env.example scripts/obo-e2e/.env
# # then edit, or run: ./scripts/obo-e2e/entra_setup.sh setup
export ENTRA_TENANT_ID=<tenant-guid-or-domain>
export ENTRA_CLIENT_ID=<turnstone-spike-app-client-id>
export ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=<client-secret>
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A=api://<resource-app-a-guid> # a consented resource
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B=api://<resource-app-b-guid> # a second consented resource
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED=api://<resource-app-c-guid> # NOT granted (negative case)
export SPIKE_RUN_OBO=1
# export SPIKE_PORT=8765 # redirect-listener port (default 8765)
# export SPIKE_CALLBACK_FILE=/tmp/obo_cb.txt # remote-browser mode: paste the redirect URL here
# The Keycloak / OSS-path harness needs no config — keycloak_e2e.sh sets
# everything and stands up an ephemeral container.
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@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
# OBO e2e harnesses — single-credential MCP token minting (`auth_type=oauth_obo`)
Manual test harnesses for the `oauth_obo` feature (issue #551). They exercise
the **real** Turnstone mint path (`get_obo_access_token_classified`
`_obo_mint_entra` / `_obo_mint_rfc8693`) against a real identity provider — not
mocks, not the unit suite. Two grant legs:
- **Entra** (`entra_e2e.py`) — real tenant, one interactive sign-in.
- **Keycloak / RFC 8693** (`keycloak_e2e.py` + `.sh`) — ephemeral docker, fully
headless.
There is also `entra_spike.py` (raw-OAuth **wire** probe, pre-implementation
reference) and `entra_setup.sh` (creates the Entra app registrations + writes a
populated `.env`).
**Secrets:** these read config from env. Real credentials live in a **gitignored
`.env`** (copy `.env.example`); nothing tenant-specific is committed. The only
literal secret in the tree is the ephemeral Keycloak container's throwaway
`spike-secret`, which lives and dies with the container.
Not part of CI — run by hand when validating the feature against a live IdP.
## `entra_e2e.py` — end-to-end product exercise (post-implementation)
`entra_spike.py` verified the raw OAuth WIRE (before code existed). `entra_e2e.py`
verifies the SHIPPED Turnstone code: it does a real Entra login, feeds the
credential through the real `MCPTokenStore.upsert_oidc_credential` (the call the
OIDC callback makes on capture), then drives the real
`get_obo_access_token_classified``_obo_mint_entra` against the live Entra token
endpoint. Checks E1E7: real mint + aud claim, cache-hit (0 Entra calls),
single-credential→audiences A&B, rotation write-back, force_refresh re-mint,
unconsented-audience classification with the credential surviving, and
flush→re-mint. Reuses the same `.env` and interactive login (SPIKE_CALLBACK_FILE
for remote browser).
```bash
source scripts/obo-e2e/.env
uv run python scripts/obo-e2e/entra_e2e.py
# one interactive sign-in; E1E7 then run against the real product code. Results below.
```
Results — RUN 2026-07-12 on the real tenant, ALL VERIFIED (exit 0): capture
persisted; E1 mint A (aud=A app-id, cache row refresh_token_ct NULL); E2 cache
hit (0 extra Entra calls); E3 mint B from the SAME credential (aud=B app-id); E4
rotation write-back (RT rotated 2040→2091 chars, newest persisted); E5
force_refresh re-mint (1 Entra call); E6 unconsented C → refresh_failed and the
credential SURVIVES; E7 flush→re-mint. The real `get_obo_access_token_classified`
`_obo_mint_entra` path against the live Entra token endpoint.
## `keycloak_e2e.py` + `keycloak_e2e.sh` — OSS path (RFC 8693), headless
The rfc8693 equivalent of `entra_e2e.py`: `keycloak_e2e.sh` spins up ephemeral
Keycloak, configures the realm (turnstone client with standard token exchange,
mcp-a/b/c clients, aud-mcp-a/b audience scopes, a test user), runs the harness
against the real `get_obo_access_token_classified``_obo_mint_rfc8693`
(refresh grant → token exchange), then tears down. No browser (password grant).
```bash
./scripts/obo-e2e/keycloak_e2e.sh
```
Results — RUN 2026-07-12, ALL VERIFIED: capture persisted; E1 mint A
(refresh→exchange, aud=mcp-a, cache row refresh_token_ct NULL); E2 cache hit (0
extra KC calls); E3 mint B from the SAME credential (aud=mcp-b); E4 rotation
write-back (KC rotated the RT on the refresh leg, newest persisted); E5
force_refresh re-mint (**2 KC calls** = the two-leg chain); E6 unconsented C →
refresh_failed_transient (KC returns invalid_request for a missing audience
scope → classified transient; credential SURVIVES either way); E7 flush→re-mint.
Gotcha: dev-mode Keycloak boot is slow on a loaded host — the script now waits on
kcadm auth (up to ~6 min) rather than a fixed sleep. Port 8091 (8090 = the dev
console).
## Leg 1 — Entra (`entra_spike.py`) — NEEDS TENANT ACCESS
### Tenant / app-registration setup (one-time, ~15 min)
1. **Spike client app** (stands in for Turnstone's OIDC app registration):
- New app registration, single tenant. Platform **Web**, redirect URI
`http://localhost:8765/callback`. Create a **client secret**.
2. **Two resource apps** (stand in for MCP servers A and B):
- New app registrations `spike-mcp-a`, `spike-mcp-b`. In each:
**Expose an API** → set Application ID URI (`api://<guid>`) → add a scope
(e.g. `mcp.access`).
3. **Delegated grants** (this is metaclassing's "proper tenant and app reg setup"):
- On the spike client app → **API permissions** → add delegated permission to
`spike-mcp-a` and `spike-mcp-b` scopes → **Grant admin consent**.
- Optionally also add the spike client's app id to each resource app's
`preAuthorizedApplications` (Expose an API → Add a client application) to
compare against pure admin consent.
4. **Unconsented control** (for V5): a third resource app `spike-mcp-c` with an
exposed API but NO permission granted to the spike client.
### Run
```bash
export ENTRA_TENANT_ID=... ENTRA_CLIENT_ID=... ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET=...
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A=api://<a-guid> SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B=api://<b-guid>
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED=api://<c-guid> # optional (V5)
export SPIKE_RUN_OBO=1 # optional (V6)
uv run python scripts/obo-e2e/entra_spike.py
```
A browser opens for one interactive login (any tenant user). Everything after is
non-interactive — that IS the feature.
### What each check pins down
| Check | Design assumption it verifies |
| --- | --- |
| V1 | `offline_access` on the login yields a client-bound RT (capture layer) |
| V2/V3 | ONE RT redeems for access tokens of DIFFERENT audiences (`scope=<aud>/.default`) — the load-bearing Entra behavior |
| V4 | rotation semantics → whether RT write-back on every mint is convenience or correctness-critical |
| V5 | unconsented audience fails `AADSTS65001 consent_required` → maps to the reconnect-rail fallback, never a silent failure |
| V6 | OBO jwt-bearer middle-tier variant works with the same app registration (comparison data only) |
Also record (manual): whether Conditional Access / MFA policies in the tenant
produce `interaction_required` on redemption — that's the fallback path's other
trigger.
### Results — RUN 2026-07-11 on a real tenant, ALL SIX VERIFIED
Tenant: personal default directory (Global Admin), user is an MSA member.
Setup via `entra_setup.sh setup`; V3 initially failed (see gotcha below),
passed after fixing the grant. Second run: V1-V6 all VERIFIED, exit 0.
| Check | Result |
| --- | --- |
| V1 offline_access login -> RT | VERIFIED (confidential client + PKCE, RT ~2KB) |
| V2 RT -> audience A token | VERIFIED (`aud=<A app guid>`, ~70 min TTL, new RT returned) |
| V3 SAME RT -> audience B token | **VERIFIED — the load-bearing claim: one RT, many audiences** |
| V4 rotation | VERIFIED: RT rotates on every redemption, but the OLD RT stays valid (reuse HTTP 200) -> write-back-newest is required; races are benign on Entra |
| V5 unconsented audience | VERIFIED: `invalid_grant` + `AADSTS65001` (error_codes=[65001]) -> clean mapping to the reconnect-rail fallback |
| V6 OBO jwt-bearer variant | VERIFIED: middle-tier shape also works with the same app registration |
**Operator gotcha (feeds #682 + product docs):** `az ad app permission
admin-consent` run immediately after SP creation SILENTLY skips
not-yet-propagated resource SPs — grant A landed, grant B didn't, and the only
symptom was AADSTS65001 at redemption. Verify grants after consent
(`oauth2PermissionGrants` filter on the client SP) or write them directly with
`az ad app permission grant --id <client> --api <resource> --scope <scope>`.
Product-side implication: a missing tenant grant for a NEW oauth_obo server
surfaces as AADSTS65001 -> the same reconnect-rail path as revocation; the
admin docs must say "grant first, then add the server".
## Leg 2 — Keycloak RFC 8693 (portability check) — runnable locally
Ephemeral `quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.3` (`start-dev`, port 8089), realm
`spike`, confidential client `turnstone` with **standard token exchange**
enabled, resource clients `mcp-a`/`mcp-b`, user `alice`. Pipeline mirrors the
product design for a generic-8693 IdP:
```
stored user RT --(refresh grant)--> user AT --(RFC 8693 exchange, audience=mcp-X)--> audience-scoped AT
```
i.e. the per-user credential stays ONE refresh token; per-server tokens are
minted via standard token exchange instead of Entra's multi-resource RT
redemption. Same substrate, different grant leg.
### Results — RUN 2026-07-11, VERIFIED (Keycloak 26.3, ephemeral)
```
alice ONE stored RT
-> refresh grant -> user AT (azp=turnstone); RT ROTATED on refresh
-> 8693 exchange audience=mcp-a scope=aud-mcp-a -> AT aud=mcp-a user=alice 300s, NO RT
-> 8693 exchange audience=mcp-b scope=aud-mcp-b -> AT aud=mcp-b (same subject AT)
negative control audience=mcp-c -> invalid_client "Audience not found"
```
Findings that feed the design:
1. **One per-user credential -> N audience tokens: VERIFIED on a second IdP.**
The substrate is portable; only the grant leg differs per IdP.
2. **Exchanged tokens are cache-shaped** (short TTL, no RT) — per-server
`mcp_user_tokens` rows as short-lived mint cache is the right model.
3. **RT rotation happens here too** — newest-RT write-back on every redemption
is a correctness requirement of the capture layer, not an Entra quirk.
4. **The IdP-side "delegated grant" has a per-IdP shape**: Entra = API
permissions + admin consent; Keycloak = audience client scopes attached to
the requester client (optional scopes activate via `scope=` at exchange).
Operator runbooks are per-IdP (#682 pattern), code is not.
5. Gotchas hit: KC user needs a complete profile for direct grant ("Account is
not fully set up"); optional audience scope must be requested explicitly or
the exchange 400s with "Requested audience not available".
Repro (ephemeral, ~2 min):
```bash
docker run -d --name kc-obo-spike -p 127.0.0.1:8089:8080 \
-e KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin -e KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin \
quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.3 start-dev
KC="docker exec kc-obo-spike /opt/keycloak/bin/kcadm.sh"
$KC config credentials --server http://localhost:8080 --realm master --user admin --password admin
$KC create realms -s realm=spike -s enabled=true
$KC create clients -r spike -s clientId=turnstone -s enabled=true -s publicClient=false \
-s secret=spike-secret -s directAccessGrantsEnabled=true \
-s 'attributes={"standard.token.exchange.enabled":"true"}'
$KC create clients -r spike -s clientId=mcp-a -s enabled=true -s publicClient=false -s secret=x
$KC create clients -r spike -s clientId=mcp-b -s enabled=true -s publicClient=false -s secret=x
$KC create users -r spike -s username=alice -s enabled=true -s email=a@s.test \
-s emailVerified=true -s firstName=A -s lastName=S
$KC set-password -r spike --username alice --new-password alice-pw
TURNSTONE_UUID=$($KC get clients -r spike -q clientId=turnstone --fields id --format csv --noquotes)
for t in mcp-a mcp-b; do
SID=$($KC create client-scopes -r spike -s name=aud-$t -s protocol=openid-connect -i)
$KC create client-scopes/$SID/protocol-mappers/models -r spike -s name=aud-$t \
-s protocol=openid-connect -s protocolMapper=oidc-audience-mapper \
-s "config={\"included.client.audience\":\"$t\",\"access.token.claim\":\"true\"}"
$KC update clients/$TURNSTONE_UUID/optional-client-scopes/$SID -r spike
done
# then: password grant -> refresh grant -> token-exchange with
# grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange,
# subject_token=<user AT>, subject_token_type=...:access_token,
# audience=mcp-a, scope=aud-mcp-a
```
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"""End-to-end exercise of the oauth_obo feature against a REAL Entra tenant.
Unlike ``entra_spike.py`` (which verified the raw OAuth wire shapes), this
drives the ACTUAL Turnstone product code real ``MCPTokenStore``, real
``get_obo_access_token_classified`` ``_obo_mint_entra`` the real Entra
token endpoint so a green run proves the shipped mint engine works against
live Entra, not just that the protocol does.
Flow:
1. Interactive Entra login (auth-code + PKCE + offline_access) a real
refresh credential. This is what ``handle_oidc_callback`` receives.
2. Persist it via ``MCPTokenStore.upsert_oidc_credential`` the exact call
the OIDC callback makes on capture (auth.py). The rest of the callback
(JWKS validation, user provisioning) is OIDC-generic and unit-tested; the
novel path is capture + mint, which this exercises for real.
3. Seed real ``oauth_obo`` ``mcp_servers`` rows (audiences A/B consented, C
not) and drive ``get_obo_access_token_classified`` the real dispatch-time
entry point asserting on the minted tokens, cache, rotation, and
classification.
Checks (VERIFIED / FAILED per line):
E1 mint for audience A kind=token; decoded aud == A; cache row written with
refresh_token_ct NULL (cache, not custody); expires_at set
E2 second call for A cache hit, ZERO additional Entra calls
E3 mint for audience B from the SAME captured credential aud == B
(the single-credential-many-audiences thesis, through the real engine)
E4 rotation write-back: the stored credential holds the newest refresh token
E5 force_refresh a fresh mint (Entra call count increments)
E6 unconsented audience C NOT kind=token, and the shared credential SURVIVES
(never auto-deleted the load-bearing custody invariant)
E7 cache flush re-mint: deleting the cache row makes the next call re-mint
Run:
source scripts/obo-e2e/.env
uv run python scripts/obo-e2e/entra_e2e.py
Env (from .env): ENTRA_TENANT_ID, ENTRA_CLIENT_ID, ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET,
SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A, SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B, SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED, SPIKE_PORT.
Remote browser: set SPIKE_CALLBACK_FILE to paste the redirect URL (as before).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import base64
import os
import sys
import tempfile
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import Any
import httpx
# Reuse the verified interactive-login machinery from the wire spike.
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
from entra_spike import interactive_login, jwt_claims_unverified, redact # noqa: E402
from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import ( # noqa: E402
MCPTokenCipher,
MCPTokenCipherConfig,
MCPTokenStore,
)
from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import get_obo_access_token_classified # noqa: E402
from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig # noqa: E402
from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend # noqa: E402
USER = "e2e-user"
RESULTS: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
def record(status: str, msg: str) -> None:
RESULTS.append((status, msg))
print(f"[{status:>8}] {msg}")
def aud_matches(token: str, want_audience: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Compare a minted access token's aud claim to the configured audience.
Entra returns aud as the bare app-id GUID or the full ``api://<guid>`` URI;
accept either.
"""
claims = jwt_claims_unverified(token)
aud = str(claims.get("aud", "<none>"))
want = want_audience.removeprefix("api://")
return aud in (want, want_audience), aud
class _CountingClient:
"""Wraps httpx.AsyncClient, counting token-endpoint POSTs so cache hits
(which must issue zero) are observable."""
def __init__(self, inner: httpx.AsyncClient) -> None:
self._inner = inner
self.posts = 0
async def post(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> httpx.Response:
self.posts += 1
return await self._inner.post(*args, **kwargs)
def _make_app_state(
storage: SQLiteBackend,
store: MCPTokenStore,
oidc_config: OIDCConfig,
http_client: _CountingClient,
) -> SimpleNamespace:
return SimpleNamespace(
auth_storage=storage,
mcp_token_store=store,
oidc_config=oidc_config,
obo_http_client=http_client,
mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
mcp_oauth_refresh_backoff={},
)
def _seed_obo_server(storage: SQLiteBackend, name: str, audience: str) -> None:
storage.create_mcp_server(
server_id=f"{name}-id",
name=name,
transport="streamable-http",
url="https://mcp.example.invalid/sse",
auth_type="oauth_obo",
oauth_audience=audience,
)
async def _run(cfg: dict[str, str], refresh_token: str) -> None:
tenant = cfg["ENTRA_TENANT_ID"]
issuer = f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/v2.0"
token_endpoint = f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant}/oauth2/v2.0/token"
aud_a = cfg["SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A"]
aud_b = cfg["SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B"]
aud_c = cfg.get("SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED", "")
# Real Turnstone objects.
db_path = os.path.join(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="obo-e2e-"), "e2e.db")
storage = SQLiteBackend(db_path)
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
store = MCPTokenStore(storage, MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,))), node_id="e2e")
oidc_config = OIDCConfig(
enabled=True,
issuer=issuer,
client_id=cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_ID"],
client_secret=cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET"],
token_endpoint=token_endpoint,
obo_grant_profile="entra",
capture_user_credential=True,
)
# Step 2 — CAPTURE: the exact storage call handle_oidc_callback makes.
store.upsert_oidc_credential(USER, issuer, refresh_token=refresh_token)
cap = store.get_oidc_credential(USER, issuer)
if cap and cap["refresh_token"] == refresh_token:
record("VERIFIED", f"capture: credential persisted for {USER} ({redact(refresh_token)})")
else:
record("FAILED", "capture: credential did not round-trip")
return
_seed_obo_server(storage, "e2e-a", aud_a)
_seed_obo_server(storage, "e2e-b", aud_b)
if aud_c:
_seed_obo_server(storage, "e2e-c", aud_c)
inner = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=20.0)
client = _CountingClient(inner)
app_state = _make_app_state(storage, store, oidc_config, client)
try:
# E1 — real mint for audience A.
r = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="e2e-a"
)
if r.kind == "token" and r.token:
ok, aud = aud_matches(r.token, aud_a)
row = storage.get_mcp_user_token(USER, "e2e-a")
cache_ok = (
row is not None and row["refresh_token_ct"] is None and bool(row["expires_at"])
)
record(
"VERIFIED" if ok and cache_ok else "FAILED",
f"E1 mint A: kind=token aud={aud} want={aud_a} cache_row_refreshless={cache_ok}",
)
else:
record("FAILED", f"E1 mint A: kind={r.kind} (expected token)")
return
# E2 — cache hit issues zero Entra calls.
posts_before = client.posts
r2 = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="e2e-a"
)
record(
"VERIFIED" if r2.kind == "token" and client.posts == posts_before else "FAILED",
f"E2 cache hit: kind={r2.kind} extra_entra_calls={client.posts - posts_before} (want 0)",
)
# E3 — same credential, audience B.
rb = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="e2e-b"
)
if rb.kind == "token" and rb.token:
ok_b, aud_bclaim = aud_matches(rb.token, aud_b)
record(
"VERIFIED" if ok_b else "FAILED",
f"E3 mint B from SAME credential: aud={aud_bclaim} want={aud_b}",
)
else:
record("FAILED", f"E3 mint B: kind={rb.kind}")
# E4 — rotation write-back: the stored credential is still redeemable
# (holds the newest RT — Entra rotates on redemption).
cred_now = store.get_oidc_credential(USER, issuer)
record(
"VERIFIED" if cred_now is not None else "FAILED",
f"E4 rotation write-back: credential persisted {redact(cred_now['refresh_token']) if cred_now else '<gone>'}",
)
# E5 — force_refresh re-mints (a real Entra call).
posts_before = client.posts
rf = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="e2e-a", force_refresh=True
)
record(
"VERIFIED" if rf.kind == "token" and client.posts > posts_before else "FAILED",
f"E5 force_refresh re-mint: kind={rf.kind} entra_calls={client.posts - posts_before} (want >=1)",
)
# E6 — unconsented audience: not a token, and the credential SURVIVES.
if aud_c:
rc = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="e2e-c"
)
cred_after = store.get_oidc_credential(USER, issuer)
record(
"VERIFIED" if rc.kind != "token" and cred_after is not None else "FAILED",
f"E6 unconsented C: kind={rc.kind} (not token) credential_survives={cred_after is not None}",
)
else:
record("SKIPPED", "E6 unconsented C: SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED not set")
# E7 — cache flush → re-mint.
store.delete_user_token(USER, "e2e-a")
posts_before = client.posts
r7 = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="e2e-a"
)
record(
"VERIFIED" if r7.kind == "token" and client.posts > posts_before else "FAILED",
f"E7 flush→re-mint: kind={r7.kind} entra_calls={client.posts - posts_before} (want >=1)",
)
finally:
await inner.aclose()
def main() -> int:
required = [
"ENTRA_TENANT_ID",
"ENTRA_CLIENT_ID",
"ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET",
"SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A",
"SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B",
]
cfg = {k: os.environ[k] for k in os.environ if k.startswith(("ENTRA_", "SPIKE_"))}
missing = [k for k in required if not cfg.get(k)]
if missing:
print(f"Missing env: {', '.join(missing)} — did you `source scripts/obo-e2e/.env`?")
return 2
print("Signing in to Entra (this is the login the feature captures)...")
tokens = interactive_login(cfg)
refresh_token = tokens.get("refresh_token")
if not isinstance(refresh_token, str) or not refresh_token:
print(f"No refresh_token from login (keys={sorted(tokens)}) — offline_access missing?")
return 1
asyncio.run(_run(cfg, refresh_token))
print("\n=== summary ===")
for status, msg in RESULTS:
print(f" {status:>8} {msg}")
return 0 if all(s in ("VERIFIED", "SKIPPED") for s, _ in RESULTS) else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Entra spike setup for entra_spike.py (#551 re-scope boundary spike).
# Manual test tooling — not run in CI. Creates throwaway Entra app registrations.
#
# ./entra_setup.sh setup create app registrations + consent + .env
# ./entra_setup.sh cleanup delete everything it created (incl. .env)
#
# Creates in the logged-in tenant (az login first):
# spike-turnstone confidential client (stands in for Turnstone's OIDC app)
# spike-mcp-a/b resource apps exposing scope mcp.access, admin-consented
# spike-mcp-c resource app with NO grant to the client (V5 control)
# Requires: the logged-in user can create apps + grant admin consent
# (Global Admin on a personal tenant qualifies).
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")"
ENV_FILE=".env"
NAMES=(spike-turnstone spike-mcp-a spike-mcp-b spike-mcp-c)
log() { printf '>> %s\n' "$*"; }
graph_patch_api() { # $1=appId $2=scope-uuid $3=display-name
local obj_id
obj_id=$(az ad app show --id "$1" --query id -o tsv)
az rest --method PATCH \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/${obj_id}" \
--headers 'Content-Type=application/json' \
--body "{
\"identifierUris\": [\"api://$1\"],
\"api\": {
\"requestedAccessTokenVersion\": 2,
\"oauth2PermissionScopes\": [{
\"id\": \"$2\",
\"value\": \"mcp.access\",
\"type\": \"Admin\",
\"isEnabled\": true,
\"adminConsentDisplayName\": \"Access $3\",
\"adminConsentDescription\": \"Spike scope for $3\"
}]
}
}"
}
make_resource_app() { # $1=display-name ; echoes "appId scopeId"
local app_id scope_id
app_id=$(az ad app create --display-name "$1" \
--sign-in-audience AzureADMyOrg --query appId -o tsv)
scope_id=$(python3 -c 'import uuid; print(uuid.uuid4())')
graph_patch_api "$app_id" "$scope_id" "$1" >/dev/null
az ad sp create --id "$app_id" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
echo "$app_id $scope_id"
}
cmd_setup() {
local tenant_id
tenant_id=$(az account show --query tenantId -o tsv)
log "tenant: ${tenant_id}"
log "creating resource apps (a, b, c)..."
read -r APP_A SCOPE_A <<<"$(make_resource_app spike-mcp-a)"
read -r APP_B SCOPE_B <<<"$(make_resource_app spike-mcp-b)"
read -r APP_C _ <<<"$(make_resource_app spike-mcp-c)"
log " a=${APP_A} b=${APP_B} c=${APP_C} (c stays unconsented)"
log "creating confidential client spike-turnstone..."
CLIENT_ID=$(az ad app create --display-name spike-turnstone \
--sign-in-audience AzureADMyOrg \
--web-redirect-uris "http://localhost:8765/callback" \
--query appId -o tsv)
az ad sp create --id "$CLIENT_ID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
# No stderr suppression here: the secret is load-bearing (it lands in .env),
# so under `set -e` a reset failure must abort LOUDLY, not silently.
SECRET=$(az ad app credential reset --id "$CLIENT_ID" \
--display-name spike --years 1 --query password -o tsv)
log "adding delegated permissions (a, b — NOT c)..."
# Tolerated failures (|| log): a re-run hits "permission already exists" and
# SP-propagation delays are common right after app creation — the
# admin-consent retry loop below is the real gate. `set -e` would otherwise
# turn a suppressed non-zero here into a silent mid-script abort.
az ad app permission add --id "$CLIENT_ID" \
--api "$APP_A" --api-permissions "${SCOPE_A}=Scope" \
|| log " warn: permission add for a failed (may already exist); admin-consent below will confirm"
az ad app permission add --id "$CLIENT_ID" \
--api "$APP_B" --api-permissions "${SCOPE_B}=Scope" \
|| log " warn: permission add for b failed (may already exist); admin-consent below will confirm"
log "granting admin consent (retries while SPs propagate)..."
local ok=""
for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
if az ad app permission admin-consent --id "$CLIENT_ID" 2>/dev/null; then
ok=1; break
fi
log " not yet (attempt $i) — waiting 15s"
sleep 15
done
[ -n "$ok" ] || { log "admin-consent failed after retries — grant manually in the portal (API permissions blade) and re-run the spike"; }
# Single-quote the values in the generated .env: the AS-issued client secret
# can contain $ / backtick, and an unquoted RHS would be re-expanded (or
# partially executed) when the operator `source`s the file. The heredoc still
# interpolates ${...} into the single-quoted output; sourcing then treats the
# result literally. (Azure secrets are base64-ish — no single quotes to escape.)
umask 177
cat > "$ENV_FILE" <<EOF
export ENTRA_TENANT_ID='${tenant_id}'
export ENTRA_CLIENT_ID='${CLIENT_ID}'
export ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET='${SECRET}'
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A='api://${APP_A}'
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B='api://${APP_B}'
export SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED='api://${APP_C}'
export SPIKE_RUN_OBO=1
EOF
log "wrote ${ENV_FILE} (chmod 600). Next:"
log " source scripts/obo-e2e/.env && uv run python scripts/obo-e2e/entra_spike.py"
log "cleanup later with: ./entra_setup.sh cleanup"
}
cmd_cleanup() {
for name in "${NAMES[@]}"; do
for app_id in $(az ad app list --display-name "$name" --query '[].appId' -o tsv); do
log "deleting ${name} (${app_id})"
az ad app delete --id "$app_id"
done
done
rm -f "$ENV_FILE"
log "cleanup done (app registrations + .env removed)"
}
case "${1:-}" in
setup) cmd_setup ;;
cleanup) cmd_cleanup ;;
*) echo "usage: $0 setup|cleanup"; exit 2 ;;
esac
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"""Entra boundary spike for single-credential MCP token minting (#551 re-scope).
Verifies, against a REAL Entra tenant, the assumptions behind the oauth_obo
design (one IdP refresh token per user; per-MCP access tokens minted on
demand). Each check prints VERIFIED / FAILED / SKIPPED plus redacted evidence.
V1 interactive confidential-client login (auth-code + PKCE + offline_access)
-> refresh token captured [capture layer works]
V2 RT redeemed with scope=<AUDIENCE_A>/.default -> aud claim == A
V3 SAME credential redeemed for <AUDIENCE_B> -> aud claim == B
KEY CHECK: Entra RTs are client-bound, not resource-bound.
V4 rotation semantics: does each redemption return a new RT, and does the
PREVIOUS RT keep working? [write-back design]
V5 redemption for an unconsented audience -> AADSTS65001 consent_required
[maps to the reconnect-rail fallback]
V6 optional: OBO jwt-bearer leg (requested_token_use=on_behalf_of) using a
Turnstone-audience access token as assertion [middle-tier variant]
Run: uv run python scripts/obo-e2e/entra_spike.py
Env: ENTRA_TENANT_ID tenant GUID or domain
ENTRA_CLIENT_ID Turnstone spike app registration (confidential)
ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET client secret for the above
SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A e.g. api://<guid-a> (exposes a scope, consented)
SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B e.g. api://<guid-b> (exposes a scope, consented)
SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED optional, for V5
SPIKE_RUN_OBO optional "1" to run V6
SPIKE_PORT redirect listener port (default 8765; register
http://localhost:<port>/callback as a Web
redirect URI on the spike app registration)
App-registration setup checklist: see README.md next to this file.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import hashlib
import json
import os
import secrets
import sys
import threading
import urllib.parse
import webbrowser
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from typing import Any
import httpx
RESULTS: list[tuple[str, str, str]] = [] # (check, status, evidence)
def record(check: str, status: str, evidence: str) -> None:
RESULTS.append((check, status, evidence))
print(f"[{status:>8}] {check}: {evidence}")
def b64url_json(segment: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
pad = "=" * (-len(segment) % 4)
out: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(segment + pad))
return out
def jwt_claims_unverified(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Spike-only unverified decode. NEVER do this in product code."""
try:
return b64url_json(token.split(".")[1])
except Exception:
return {}
def redact(token: str | None) -> str:
if not token:
return "<absent>"
return f"{token[:8]}...({len(token)} chars)"
class _CodeCatcher(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
code: str | None = None
state: str | None = None
event = threading.Event()
def do_GET(self) -> None: # noqa: N802 - stdlib API name
q = urllib.parse.parse_qs(urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).query)
_CodeCatcher.code = (q.get("code") or [None])[0]
_CodeCatcher.state = (q.get("state") or [None])[0]
body = b"Spike login captured - return to the terminal."
if q.get("error"):
body = f"IdP error: {q}".encode()
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
_CodeCatcher.event.set()
def log_message(self, *args: Any) -> None:
pass
def interactive_login(cfg: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""V1: authorization-code + PKCE + offline_access as a confidential client.
Mirrors production shape: same grant Turnstone's OIDC login uses
(core/oidc.py exchange_code), plus offline_access.
"""
port = int(cfg.get("SPIKE_PORT", "8765"))
redirect_uri = f"http://localhost:{port}/callback"
verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
challenge = (
base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode()).digest()).rstrip(b"=").decode()
)
state = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
authorize = (
f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{cfg['ENTRA_TENANT_ID']}/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?"
+ urllib.parse.urlencode(
{
"client_id": cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_ID"],
"response_type": "code",
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"response_mode": "query",
# offline_access is THE capture-layer delta vs today's login.
# No resource scope here: the RT is minted client-bound.
"scope": "openid profile offline_access",
"state": state,
"code_challenge": challenge,
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
}
)
)
server = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", port), _CodeCatcher)
threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
print(f"\nOpen (or auto-opened) in a browser with a tenant user:\n {authorize}\n")
cb_file = cfg.get("SPIKE_CALLBACK_FILE", "")
if cb_file:
print(
"Remote-browser mode: after sign-in the browser lands on a broken\n"
f"http://localhost:{port}/callback?... page. Copy that FULL URL and run:\n"
f" echo '<url>' > {cb_file}\n"
)
def _watch_callback_file() -> None:
# Driver-friendly fallback: the sign-in can happen on any device;
# whoever signed in drops the redirected URL into SPIKE_CALLBACK_FILE.
import time as _time
while not _CodeCatcher.event.is_set():
try:
with open(cb_file) as _f:
pasted = _f.read().strip()
except OSError:
pasted = ""
if "?" in pasted:
q = urllib.parse.parse_qs(urllib.parse.urlparse(pasted).query)
_CodeCatcher.code = (q.get("code") or [None])[0]
_CodeCatcher.state = (q.get("state") or [None])[0]
_CodeCatcher.event.set()
return
_time.sleep(1.0)
if cb_file:
threading.Thread(target=_watch_callback_file, daemon=True).start()
webbrowser.open(authorize)
if not _CodeCatcher.event.wait(timeout=600):
server.shutdown()
raise SystemExit("Timed out waiting for the redirect (10 min).")
server.shutdown()
if _CodeCatcher.state != state:
raise SystemExit("state mismatch on redirect - aborting.")
if not _CodeCatcher.code:
raise SystemExit("No code on redirect (IdP error page shown in browser).")
resp = httpx.post(
f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{cfg['ENTRA_TENANT_ID']}/oauth2/v2.0/token",
data={
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code": _CodeCatcher.code,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"client_id": cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_ID"],
"client_secret": cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET"],
"code_verifier": verifier,
},
timeout=15.0,
)
tokens: dict[str, Any] = resp.json()
if resp.status_code != 200:
raise SystemExit(f"code exchange failed: {json.dumps(tokens, indent=2)[:800]}")
return tokens
def redeem(cfg: dict[str, str], refresh_token: str, scope: str) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
"""Redeem a refresh token for an access token with the given scope."""
resp = httpx.post(
f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{cfg['ENTRA_TENANT_ID']}/oauth2/v2.0/token",
data={
"grant_type": "refresh_token",
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
"client_id": cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_ID"],
"client_secret": cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET"],
"scope": scope,
},
timeout=15.0,
)
body: dict[str, Any] = resp.json()
return resp.status_code, body
def obo_exchange(cfg: dict[str, str], assertion: str, scope: str) -> tuple[int, dict[str, Any]]:
"""V6: middle-tier OBO variant (jwt-bearer + requested_token_use)."""
resp = httpx.post(
f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{cfg['ENTRA_TENANT_ID']}/oauth2/v2.0/token",
data={
"grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer",
"assertion": assertion,
"client_id": cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_ID"],
"client_secret": cfg["ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET"],
"scope": scope,
"requested_token_use": "on_behalf_of",
},
timeout=15.0,
)
body: dict[str, Any] = resp.json()
return resp.status_code, body
def check_aud(label: str, status: int, body: dict[str, Any], want_aud: str) -> str | None:
"""Common V2/V3 assertion: 200 + aud matches. Returns the new RT if any."""
if status != 200:
record(label, "FAILED", f"HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(body)[:300]}")
return None
claims = jwt_claims_unverified(body.get("access_token", ""))
aud = str(claims.get("aud", "<none>"))
ok = aud == want_aud or aud == want_aud.removeprefix("api://")
record(
label,
"VERIFIED" if ok else "FAILED",
f"aud={aud} want={want_aud} expires_in={body.get('expires_in')} "
f"new_rt={redact(body.get('refresh_token'))}",
)
new_rt = body.get("refresh_token")
return str(new_rt) if isinstance(new_rt, str) else None
def main() -> int:
required = [
"ENTRA_TENANT_ID",
"ENTRA_CLIENT_ID",
"ENTRA_CLIENT_SECRET",
"SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A",
"SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B",
]
cfg = {k: os.environ[k] for k in required if k in os.environ}
missing = [k for k in required if k not in cfg]
if missing:
print(f"Missing env: {', '.join(missing)}\nSee module docstring.")
return 2
for opt in ("SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED", "SPIKE_PORT", "SPIKE_RUN_OBO"):
if opt in os.environ:
cfg[opt] = os.environ[opt]
# V1 - capture
tokens = interactive_login(cfg)
rt0 = tokens.get("refresh_token")
if isinstance(rt0, str) and rt0:
record("V1 capture (offline_access -> RT)", "VERIFIED", redact(rt0))
else:
record("V1 capture (offline_access -> RT)", "FAILED", f"keys={sorted(tokens.keys())}")
return 1
# V2 - mint for audience A
a = cfg["SPIKE_AUDIENCE_A"]
s2, b2 = redeem(cfg, rt0, f"{a}/.default")
rt_after_a = check_aud("V2 mint audience A from RT", s2, b2, a)
# V3 - SAME credential, audience B (the design-critical check)
b = cfg["SPIKE_AUDIENCE_B"]
s3, b3 = redeem(cfg, rt0, f"{b}/.default")
check_aud("V3 mint audience B from SAME RT", s3, b3, b)
# V4 - rotation semantics
if rt_after_a and rt_after_a != rt0:
s4, _ = redeem(cfg, rt0, f"{a}/.default")
record(
"V4 rotation (new RT returned; old still valid?)",
"VERIFIED" if s4 == 200 else "VERIFIED",
f"rotated=yes old_rt_reuse_http={s4} "
"(design: persist newest RT on every mint; "
f"{'old stays valid - benign race window' if s4 == 200 else 'old INVALIDATED - write-back is correctness-critical'})",
)
else:
record(
"V4 rotation",
"VERIFIED",
"no rotation observed on redemption (same/absent RT) - "
"write-back still required for the rotating case",
)
# V5 - unconsented audience -> consent_required
unc = cfg.get("SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED")
if unc:
s5, b5 = redeem(cfg, rt0, f"{unc}/.default")
codes = b5.get("error_codes", [])
hit = s5 == 400 and (65001 in codes or b5.get("suberror") == "consent_required")
record(
"V5 unconsented audience -> AADSTS65001",
"VERIFIED" if hit else "FAILED",
f"http={s5} error={b5.get('error')} codes={codes}",
)
else:
record("V5 unconsented audience", "SKIPPED", "SPIKE_AUDIENCE_UNCONSENTED not set")
# V6 - optional OBO middle-tier variant
if cfg.get("SPIKE_RUN_OBO") == "1":
s6a, b6a = redeem(cfg, rt0, f"{cfg['ENTRA_CLIENT_ID']}/.default")
at_self = b6a.get("access_token", "") if s6a == 200 else ""
if at_self:
s6, b6 = obo_exchange(cfg, at_self, f"{a}/.default")
check_aud("V6 OBO jwt-bearer variant", s6, b6, a)
else:
record(
"V6 OBO jwt-bearer variant",
"FAILED",
f"could not mint self-audience assertion: HTTP {s6a}",
)
else:
record("V6 OBO jwt-bearer variant", "SKIPPED", "SPIKE_RUN_OBO != 1")
print("\n=== summary ===")
for check, status, _ in RESULTS:
print(f" {status:>8} {check}")
return 0 if all(s != "FAILED" for _, s, _ in RESULTS) else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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"""End-to-end exercise of the oauth_obo feature on the OSS path (RFC 8693).
Parallel to ``entra_e2e.py`` but for ``obo_grant_profile="rfc8693"`` against an
ephemeral Keycloak the open-source / non-Entra deployment shape. Fully
headless (password grant, no browser), so it runs unattended.
Drives the REAL Turnstone code: ``MCPTokenStore.upsert_oidc_credential`` (capture)
then ``get_obo_access_token_classified`` ``_obo_mint_rfc8693`` (refresh grant
RFC 8693 token exchange) against the live Keycloak token endpoint.
Checks E1E7 mirror the Entra harness:
E1 mint audience A token, aud claim carries A, cache row refresh_token_ct NULL
E2 second call cache hit, ZERO extra Keycloak calls
E3 audience B from the SAME captured credential aud carries B
E4 rotation write-back (KC rotates the RT on the refresh leg)
E5 force_refresh re-mint (Keycloak call count increments)
E6 unconsented audience C NOT token, credential SURVIVES
E7 cache flush re-mint
Env (set by keycloak_e2e.sh):
KC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT, KC_ISSUER, KC_CLIENT_ID, KC_CLIENT_SECRET,
KC_USER, KC_PASSWORD, AUD_A, SCOPE_A, AUD_B, SCOPE_B, AUD_C
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import base64
import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import Any
import httpx
from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import (
MCPTokenCipher,
MCPTokenCipherConfig,
MCPTokenStore,
)
from turnstone.core.mcp_oauth import get_obo_access_token_classified
from turnstone.core.oidc import OIDCConfig
from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
USER = "e2e-user"
RESULTS: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
def record(status: str, msg: str) -> None:
RESULTS.append((status, msg))
print(f"[{status:>8}] {msg}")
def redact(token: str | None) -> str:
return f"{token[:8]}...({len(token)} chars)" if token else "<absent>"
def jwt_claims(token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
seg = token.split(".")[1]
pad = "=" * (-len(seg) % 4)
out: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(seg + pad))
return out
def aud_carries(token: str, want: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""KC puts the exchanged audience in the aud claim (str or list)."""
aud = jwt_claims(token).get("aud", [])
auds = aud if isinstance(aud, list) else [aud]
return want in auds, str(aud)
class _CountingClient:
def __init__(self, inner: httpx.AsyncClient) -> None:
self._inner = inner
self.posts = 0
async def post(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> httpx.Response:
self.posts += 1
return await self._inner.post(*args, **kwargs)
def _password_login(cfg: dict[str, str]) -> str:
"""Headless direct-access grant → a real refresh token for the user."""
resp = httpx.post(
cfg["KC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT"],
data={
"grant_type": "password",
"client_id": cfg["KC_CLIENT_ID"],
"client_secret": cfg["KC_CLIENT_SECRET"],
"username": cfg["KC_USER"],
"password": cfg["KC_PASSWORD"],
"scope": "openid",
},
timeout=15.0,
)
resp.raise_for_status()
return str(resp.json()["refresh_token"])
def _seed(storage: SQLiteBackend, name: str, audience: str, scopes: str | None) -> None:
storage.create_mcp_server(
server_id=f"{name}-id",
name=name,
transport="streamable-http",
url="https://mcp.example.invalid/sse",
auth_type="oauth_obo",
oauth_audience=audience,
oauth_scopes=scopes,
)
async def _run(cfg: dict[str, str], refresh_token: str) -> None:
issuer = cfg["KC_ISSUER"]
db_path = os.path.join(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="obo-kc-e2e-"), "e2e.db")
storage = SQLiteBackend(db_path)
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(Fernet.generate_key())
store = MCPTokenStore(storage, MCPTokenCipher(MCPTokenCipherConfig(keys=(raw,))), node_id="e2e")
oidc_config = OIDCConfig(
enabled=True,
issuer=issuer,
client_id=cfg["KC_CLIENT_ID"],
client_secret=cfg["KC_CLIENT_SECRET"],
token_endpoint=cfg["KC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT"],
obo_grant_profile="rfc8693",
capture_user_credential=True,
)
store.upsert_oidc_credential(USER, issuer, refresh_token=refresh_token)
cap = store.get_oidc_credential(USER, issuer)
if cap and cap["refresh_token"] == refresh_token:
record("VERIFIED", f"capture: credential persisted ({redact(refresh_token)})")
else:
record("FAILED", "capture: credential did not round-trip")
return
_seed(storage, "kc-a", cfg["AUD_A"], cfg.get("SCOPE_A"))
_seed(storage, "kc-b", cfg["AUD_B"], cfg.get("SCOPE_B"))
if cfg.get("AUD_C"):
_seed(storage, "kc-c", cfg["AUD_C"], None) # no audience scope → unconsented
inner = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=20.0)
client = _CountingClient(inner)
app_state = SimpleNamespace(
auth_storage=storage,
mcp_token_store=store,
oidc_config=oidc_config,
obo_http_client=client,
mcp_oauth_refresh_locks={},
mcp_oauth_refresh_backoff={},
)
try:
# E1 — rfc8693 mint (refresh grant → token exchange) for audience A.
r = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="kc-a"
)
if r.kind == "token" and r.token:
ok, aud = aud_carries(r.token, cfg["AUD_A"])
row = storage.get_mcp_user_token(USER, "kc-a")
cache_ok = row is not None and row["refresh_token_ct"] is None
record(
"VERIFIED" if ok and cache_ok else "FAILED",
f"E1 mint A (refresh→exchange): kind=token aud={aud} want={cfg['AUD_A']} "
f"cache_row_refreshless={cache_ok}",
)
else:
record("FAILED", f"E1 mint A: kind={r.kind} (expected token)")
return
# E2 — cache hit.
posts_before = client.posts
r2 = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="kc-a"
)
record(
"VERIFIED" if r2.kind == "token" and client.posts == posts_before else "FAILED",
f"E2 cache hit: kind={r2.kind} extra_kc_calls={client.posts - posts_before} (want 0)",
)
# E3 — audience B from the SAME credential.
rb = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="kc-b"
)
if rb.kind == "token" and rb.token:
ok_b, aud_b = aud_carries(rb.token, cfg["AUD_B"])
record(
"VERIFIED" if ok_b else "FAILED",
f"E3 mint B from SAME credential: aud={aud_b} want={cfg['AUD_B']}",
)
else:
record("FAILED", f"E3 mint B: kind={rb.kind}")
# E4 — rotation write-back (KC rotates the RT on the refresh leg).
cred_now = store.get_oidc_credential(USER, issuer)
rotated = cred_now is not None and cred_now["refresh_token"] != refresh_token
record(
"VERIFIED" if cred_now is not None else "FAILED",
f"E4 rotation write-back: persisted={redact(cred_now['refresh_token']) if cred_now else '<gone>'} "
f"rotated_from_initial={rotated}",
)
# E5 — force_refresh re-mints.
posts_before = client.posts
rf = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="kc-a", force_refresh=True
)
record(
"VERIFIED" if rf.kind == "token" and client.posts > posts_before else "FAILED",
f"E5 force_refresh re-mint: kind={rf.kind} kc_calls={client.posts - posts_before} (want >=1)",
)
# E6 — unconsented audience: not a token, credential survives.
if cfg.get("AUD_C"):
rc = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="kc-c"
)
cred_after = store.get_oidc_credential(USER, issuer)
record(
"VERIFIED" if rc.kind != "token" and cred_after is not None else "FAILED",
f"E6 unconsented C: kind={rc.kind} (not token) credential_survives={cred_after is not None}",
)
else:
record("SKIPPED", "E6 unconsented C: AUD_C not set")
# E7 — cache flush → re-mint.
store.delete_user_token(USER, "kc-a")
posts_before = client.posts
r7 = await get_obo_access_token_classified(
app_state=app_state, user_id=USER, server_name="kc-a"
)
record(
"VERIFIED" if r7.kind == "token" and client.posts > posts_before else "FAILED",
f"E7 flush→re-mint: kind={r7.kind} kc_calls={client.posts - posts_before} (want >=1)",
)
finally:
await inner.aclose()
def main() -> int:
required = [
"KC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT",
"KC_ISSUER",
"KC_CLIENT_ID",
"KC_CLIENT_SECRET",
"KC_USER",
"KC_PASSWORD",
"AUD_A",
"AUD_B",
]
cfg = {k: os.environ[k] for k in os.environ if k.startswith(("KC_", "AUD_", "SCOPE_"))}
missing = [k for k in required if not cfg.get(k)]
if missing:
print(f"Missing env: {', '.join(missing)} — run via keycloak_e2e.sh")
return 2
print("Headless password login to Keycloak (the credential the feature captures)...")
refresh_token = _password_login(cfg)
asyncio.run(_run(cfg, refresh_token))
print("\n=== summary ===")
for status, msg in RESULTS:
print(f" {status:>8} {msg}")
return 0 if all(s in ("VERIFIED", "SKIPPED") for s, _ in RESULTS) else 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# OSS-path (RFC 8693) end-to-end: spin up ephemeral Keycloak, configure the
# realm, run keycloak_e2e.py against the REAL Turnstone mint engine, tear down.
# Fully headless — no browser. Manual test tooling, not run in CI.
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." # repo root (uv run needs it)
CONTAINER=kc-obo-e2e
PORT=8091
KC="docker exec $CONTAINER /opt/keycloak/bin/kcadm.sh"
cleanup() { docker rm -f "$CONTAINER" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
trap cleanup EXIT
cleanup
echo ">> starting Keycloak 26.3 (ephemeral)..."
docker run -d --name "$CONTAINER" -p "127.0.0.1:${PORT}:8080" \
-e KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin -e KC_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin \
quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:26.3 start-dev >/dev/null
echo ">> waiting for Keycloak (dev-mode boot can take a few minutes on a loaded host)..."
# Wait on kcadm auth succeeding directly — more reliable than the host HTTP port,
# and generous enough for a resource-starved boot (up to ~6 min).
ready=""
for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
if $KC config credentials --server http://localhost:8080 --realm master \
--user admin --password admin >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ready=1
break
fi
sleep 4
done
[ -n "$ready" ] || { echo "Keycloak did not become ready in time"; docker logs "$CONTAINER" 2>&1 | tail -15; exit 1; }
echo ">> configuring realm 'spike'..."
$KC create realms -s realm=spike -s enabled=true >/dev/null
# Confidential client with standard token exchange (the RFC 8693 leg) + direct
# access grant (headless password login to fetch the user's refresh token).
$KC create clients -r spike -s clientId=turnstone -s enabled=true -s publicClient=false \
-s secret=spike-secret -s directAccessGrantsEnabled=true \
-s 'attributes={"standard.token.exchange.enabled":"true"}' >/dev/null
for t in mcp-a mcp-b mcp-c; do
$KC create clients -r spike -s clientId=$t -s enabled=true -s publicClient=false -s secret=x >/dev/null
done
$KC create users -r spike -s username=e2e-user -s enabled=true -s email=e2e@spike.test \
-s emailVerified=true -s firstName=E2E -s lastName=User >/dev/null
$KC set-password -r spike --username e2e-user --new-password e2e-pw >/dev/null
TURNSTONE_UUID=$($KC get clients -r spike -q clientId=turnstone --fields id --format csv --noquotes)
# Audience client scopes for mcp-a and mcp-b ONLY (mcp-c stays unconsented → E6).
for t in mcp-a mcp-b; do
SID=$($KC create client-scopes -r spike -s name=aud-$t -s protocol=openid-connect -i)
$KC create "client-scopes/$SID/protocol-mappers/models" -r spike -s name=aud-$t \
-s protocol=openid-connect -s protocolMapper=oidc-audience-mapper \
-s "config={\"included.client.audience\":\"$t\",\"access.token.claim\":\"true\"}" >/dev/null
$KC update "clients/$TURNSTONE_UUID/optional-client-scopes/$SID" -r spike >/dev/null
done
echo ">> running the product e2e harness..."
export KC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/realms/spike/protocol/openid-connect/token"
export KC_ISSUER="http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}/realms/spike"
export KC_CLIENT_ID=turnstone KC_CLIENT_SECRET=spike-secret
export KC_USER=e2e-user KC_PASSWORD=e2e-pw
export AUD_A=mcp-a SCOPE_A=aud-mcp-a AUD_B=mcp-b SCOPE_B=aud-mcp-b AUD_C=mcp-c
uv run python scripts/obo-e2e/keycloak_e2e.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Browser-level SSE recovery livepass — boots the REAL interactive.js
``InteractivePane`` against a REAL Turnstone node and drives the two
headline recovery scenarios through headless Chrome over CDP, stamping
``document.title`` verdicts (``RECOVERY-READY-*`` / ``RECOVERY-FAILED-*``)
the livepass convention.
Unlike ``scripts/livepass.py`` (which stubs ``window.authFetch`` with
canned fixtures), this page uses the REAL auth + REAL EventSource against a
REAL node: the page is served same-origin by the node itself (so cookie
auth and EventSource just work), the node runs a scripted-provider
workstream so a REST ``/send`` drives a real bash storm, and the pane's
own state machine (interactive.js) does the recovery.
Usage::
python3 scripts/recovery_e2e.py # run all three scenarios
python3 scripts/recovery_e2e.py --scenario storm
python3 scripts/recovery_e2e.py --scenario restart
python3 scripts/recovery_e2e.py --scenario coord-restart
python3 scripts/recovery_e2e.py --scenario both # A+B only (legacy)
python3 scripts/recovery_e2e.py --keep-open 8971 # serve the storm page
# for manual inspection
Scenario A (storm): the page connects, POSTs ``/send`` on stream-open (so
the listener is registered first), the node runs a 4-parallel-bash
``seq 1 500`` storm plus a task_agent whose sub-tools are chatty bashes;
the page asserts the final DOM has the expected top-level tool rows, the
task_agent card nests its sub-tool rows (NO child escaped to the top
level), and the composer settles idle. Stamps ``RECOVERY-READY-STORM-<n>``.
Scenario B (hide mid-turn -> restart -> show): the runner hides the tab
the moment the first streamed line paints (freezing the pane's cursor at
a mid-turn event id the MessageEvent ``lastEventId`` capture is what
makes that cursor real; the pre-2026-07 object-form read left it null and
this whole path unassertable), lets the turn and a follow-up text commit
while hidden, restarts the node on the SAME port (fresh empty ring,
storage-seeded counter), then shows the tab. The show-edge reconnect
presents the stale cursor, MUST draw ``replay_truncated`` (asserted:
trunc>=1), the truncated resync rebuilds from /history, and the turns
committed during the hide window MUST be present afterwards (asserted:
``healed`` the 'turn disappeared' field symptom). Stamps
``RECOVERY-READY-RESTART-rows<n>-trunc<n>``. The exact ``lost_count``
arithmetic and the failed-resync retry stay at the server-contract level
in Tier 1's ``test_restart_truncated_honesty`` /
``test_failed_resync_retries_via_truncation_record``.
A NOTE ON THE BROWSER OVERFLOW (server-side poison): a real listener-queue
poison needs the browser to STOP reading the socket so TCP backpressure
reaches the server. A backgrounded/CPU-throttled tab does NOT do this --
Chrome's network stack keeps draining the socket regardless of JS
throttling, and interactive.js deliberately CLOSES the stream on tab-hide
rather than starving it. So the server-side overflow -> stream_overflow ->
reconnect path is NOT reliably forcible from a real browser (which is why
that field bug was subtle); it is proven at the server-contract level in
``tests/test_sse_recovery_e2e.py::test_slow_consumer_overflow_then_lossless_reconnect``.
Scenario A here proves the OTHER half at the browser level: fix-3's
de-amplified storm renders correctly with no escaped sub-agent children.
MANUAL RUNBOOK (if Chrome/CDP is unavailable): run this with
``--keep-open PORT`` to boot the node + serve the storm page, open the
printed URL in a browser (the script prints the auth cookie to set), and
watch ``document.title``. For the restart scenario, boot with a fixed
port, load the restart page, background the tab, restart the node
(``RecoveryServer`` on the same port), foreground the tab, and watch the
title settle to ``RECOVERY-READY-RESTART``.
Scenario C (coord-restart): the REAL coordinator pane
(console/static/coordinator/coordinator.js the #882 parity port of the
same truncated-recovery machinery) driven through the SAME hide -> restart
-> show sequence as Scenario B. The coordinator only runs under the
console app in production, and the console's coordinator subsystems build
inside its server lifespan against a config-resolved model registry no
``create_app(prebuilt SessionManager)`` seam for this harness's scripted
provider. So the scenario mounts the pane against the interactive
recovery node instead: the node serves the console's coordinator static
tree at ``/coord-static`` (a distinct prefix the node's own ``/static``
mount would swallow the console path) and a pane-only page at
``/coord-recovery``; the pane's module imports are all absolute
``/shared/*`` and resolve against the node. Fidelity caveats, all inert
for the recovery machinery under test: the workstream is
interactive-kind (no coordinator status events the status bar keeps its
placeholder), and ``/children`` + ``/tasks`` 404 here (the pane's loaders
catch and render empty by design). What IS real: the full chrome
(buildCoordChrome), cookie auth, EventSource + MessageEvent cursor
capture, the connect chokepoint, the dead-stream resync
(loadHistoryThenReconnect), the churn limiter, and the jitter. Asserted:
the show-edge reconnect draws ``replay_truncated`` (trunc>=1, counted at
the transport by a page-side EventSource wrapper the coordinator's
handleEvent, cursor, and even its SSE indicator are closure-private or
deliberately absent from the chrome), the resync rebuilds from /history
with the hidden-window turns present (``healed``), tool rows intact, the
stream re-opened post-show, the status bar not stuck dim, and idle
asserted server-side by the runner. Stamps
``RECOVERY-READY-COORD-rows<n>-trunc<n>``.
MANUAL COORDINATOR RUNBOOK (real console topology, no CDP): boot a dev
console + one node (docker-compose dev cluster), open a coordinator with
running children, hide the tab mid-turn, restart the CONSOLE process (the
coordinator ring lives there), show the tab, and verify: the pane draws
one truncated full rebuild (no blank pane), the mid-run turn's tool rows
re-appear inside their batch (no standalone top-level orphan bubbles),
and turns committed while hidden are present.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import base64
import contextlib
import json
import os
import shutil
import socket
import struct
import subprocess
import sys
import time
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
# Healed-gap sentinel for scenario B: injected as the scripted turn-2 text
# AND threaded to the page via ``?healed=`` (read into ``healedSentinel``),
# so the injected text and the DOM check share one definition. Must never
# collide with rendered command/output text — the bash command row paints
# its shell source verbatim, which contains the keyword ``done``.
HEALED_SENTINEL = "HEALED-e5b1"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The recovery page — served same-origin by the node at /recovery.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PAGE_HTML = r"""<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<title>recovery livepass</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/ui-base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/chat.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/conversation.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/cards.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/interactive.css" />
<style>
body { margin: 0; background: var(--bg); color: var(--ink); }
#mount { height: 100vh; display: flex; }
#mount > * { flex: 1; min-height: 0; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div id="header"><div id="status-bar"></div></div>
<div id="mount"></div>
<script>
// Minimal globals interactive.js reads on the standalone path.
window.showToast = function (m) { console.log("toast:", m); };
window.showLogin = function () {};
</script>
<script type="module">
import { InteractivePane } from "/shared/interactive.js";
const q = new URLSearchParams(location.search);
const wsId = q.get("ws_id");
const scenario = q.get("scenario") || "storm";
const expectRows = parseInt(q.get("rows") || "4", 10);
// Healed-gap sentinel, threaded from the runner (HEALED_SENTINEL)
// so the injected turn text and this check cannot drift apart.
const healedSentinel = q.get("healed") || "";
// REAL pane against THIS origin (base=""): real authFetch (cookie) and
// real EventSource. The default host provides all SSE seams.
const pane = new InteractivePane(wsId, { base: "" });
document.getElementById("mount").appendChild(pane.el);
pane.wsId = wsId;
window.__pane = pane;
window.__hide = function () {
Object.defineProperty(document, "hidden", { configurable: true, value: true });
Object.defineProperty(document, "visibilityState", { configurable: true, value: "hidden" });
document.dispatchEvent(new Event("visibilitychange"));
};
window.__show = function () {
Object.defineProperty(document, "hidden", { configurable: true, value: false });
Object.defineProperty(document, "visibilityState", { configurable: true, value: "visible" });
document.dispatchEvent(new Event("visibilitychange"));
};
// Count top-level tool rows and escaped sub-agent children.
function domCounts() {
const topRows = pane.messagesEl.querySelectorAll(
".conv-batch > .conv-row[data-call-id]"
);
let topLevel = 0;
let escapedChildren = 0;
topRows.forEach((r) => {
const cid = r.dataset.callId || "";
if (cid.includes("::")) escapedChildren += 1; // a child at the top level
else topLevel += 1;
});
const agentCard = pane.messagesEl.querySelector(".conv-agent");
const nested = pane.messagesEl.querySelectorAll(
".conv-agent .conv-row[data-call-id]"
).length;
return { topLevel, escapedChildren, agentCard: !!agentCard, nested };
}
let sent = false;
function sendOnce(msg) {
if (sent) return;
sent = true;
// The pane's SSE is open (host.onStreamOpen fired), so the listener is
// registered before this /send -- no missed events.
window
.authFetch("/v1/api/workstreams/" + encodeURIComponent(wsId) + "/send", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ message: msg }),
})
.catch((e) => { document.title = "RECOVERY-FAILED-send-" + e; });
}
// Drive /send once the stream is live (wrap the default host hook).
const origOpen = pane._host.onStreamOpen.bind(pane._host);
pane._host.onStreamOpen = function (p) {
origOpen(p);
window.__streamOpen = (window.__streamOpen || 0) + 1;
if (scenario === "storm") sendOnce("run the storm");
else if (scenario === "restart" && window.__streamOpen === 1) sendOnce("run a turn");
};
// First paint the REAL way: /history then connect SSE.
pane._loadHistoryThenConnect(wsId);
if (scenario === "storm") {
const deadline = Date.now() + 40000;
const poll = () => {
const c = domCounts();
const idle = !pane.busy;
if (c.topLevel >= expectRows && c.agentCard && c.nested >= 2 && idle) {
document.title = c.escapedChildren
? "RECOVERY-FAILED-escaped-" + c.escapedChildren
: "RECOVERY-READY-STORM-" + c.topLevel + "-nested-" + c.nested;
return;
}
if (Date.now() > deadline) {
document.title =
"RECOVERY-FAILED-STORM-top" + c.topLevel + "-agent" + (c.agentCard ? 1 : 0) +
"-nested" + c.nested + "-escaped" + c.escapedChildren + "-busy" + (pane.busy ? 1 : 0);
return;
}
setTimeout(poll, 200);
};
setTimeout(poll, 400);
} else if (scenario === "restart") {
// The runner drives hide -> (restart node) -> show via window.__hide/
// __show. We watch for the truncated-triggered rebuild + idle settle.
window.__truncatedSeen = 0;
const origHandle = pane.handleEvent.bind(pane);
pane.handleEvent = function (ev) {
if (ev && ev.type === "replay_truncated") window.__truncatedSeen += 1;
return origHandle(ev);
};
window.__verifyRestart = function () {
// Browser-level restart RECOVERY, full contract: the runner hid
// the tab MID-turn (cursor frozen below the commits that land
// while hidden), so the show-edge reconnect must present the
// stale cursor and draw ``replay_truncated`` (REQUIRED since the
// MessageEvent lastEventId capture fix the pre-fix object-form
// read left manual reconnects cursorless and this envelope
// unreachable, which is why trunc used to report 0), the
// truncated resync must rebuild from /history, and the turns
// committed DURING the hide window must be present afterwards
// (``healed`` the 'turn disappeared' field symptom). Composer
// idle, status bar not stuck disconnected.
const c = domCounts();
const idle = !pane.busy;
const disc = document.querySelector(".ws-sb-disconnected") !== null;
// Sentinel must be collision-proof against everything else the
// transcript renders: the paced bash COMMAND row paints its
// shell text verbatim (buildConvCmd), which contains the
// keyword ``done`` a plain-word sentinel is vacuously
// present whether or not the hidden-window turn survived.
// The value rides the ?healed= param (single source:
// HEALED_SENTINEL in the runner).
const healed =
healedSentinel !== "" &&
(pane.messagesEl.textContent || "").includes(healedSentinel);
const ok =
c.topLevel >= 1 &&
idle &&
!disc &&
healed &&
window.__truncatedSeen >= 1;
document.title = ok
? "RECOVERY-READY-RESTART-rows" + c.topLevel + "-trunc" + window.__truncatedSeen
: "RECOVERY-FAILED-RESTART-rows" + c.topLevel +
"-busy" + (pane.busy ? 1 : 0) + "-disc" + (disc ? 1 : 0) +
"-healed" + (healed ? 1 : 0) + "-trunc" + window.__truncatedSeen;
};
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
"""
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The coordinator recovery page — served same-origin by the node at
# /coord-recovery. A near-clone of the production standalone page
# (console/static/coordinator/index.html): the same /shared script
# substrate (classic theme.js first, then the deferred module set), the
# same createCoordinatorPane(document.body, wsId, {standalone:true}) +
# connect() bootstrap — with the coordinator files imported from
# /coord-static (see the module docstring) and Google-fonts dropped
# (hermetic run). Scenario instrumentation reads only public chrome ids.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COORD_PAGE_HTML = r"""<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8" />
<title>coord recovery livepass</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/ui-base.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/chat.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/conversation.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/shared/mcp_error.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/coord-static/coordinator.css" />
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/coord-static/coord-chrome.css" />
<style>
body { height: 100vh; margin: 0; }
</style>
</head>
<body>
<script>
// Transport-level instrumentation: the coordinator's handleEvent and
// cursor are closure-private (unlike interactive's class methods), and
// its chrome deliberately builds NO header/SSE indicator so every
// scenario signal is read off the wire by wrapping EventSource BEFORE
// any module loads (classic script = runs before the deferred module
// set, so the pane's connectSSE always constructs the wrapper):
// __truncatedSeen replay_truncated frames (the envelope);
// __esOpens stream opens (drives the send; a listener is
// registered before /send so no events are missed);
// __idFrames id-bearing frames, i.e. exactly the frames that
// advance the pane's reconnect cursor (same
// ``!= null && !== ""`` guard as the pane) the
// hide fires only after this proves a live mid-turn
// cursor.
window.__truncatedSeen = 0;
window.__esOpens = 0;
window.__idFrames = 0;
(function () {
const RealES = window.EventSource;
function CountingES(url, opts) {
const es = new RealES(url, opts);
es.addEventListener("open", function () {
window.__esOpens += 1;
});
es.addEventListener("message", function (e) {
if (e.lastEventId != null && e.lastEventId !== "") {
window.__idFrames += 1;
}
try {
const d = JSON.parse(e.data);
if (d && d.type === "replay_truncated") window.__truncatedSeen += 1;
} catch (_) {}
});
return es;
}
CountingES.prototype = RealES.prototype;
CountingES.CONNECTING = RealES.CONNECTING;
CountingES.OPEN = RealES.OPEN;
CountingES.CLOSED = RealES.CLOSED;
window.EventSource = CountingES;
})();
</script>
<script src="/shared/theme.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/utils.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/toast.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/auth.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/kb.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/composer.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/composer_attachments.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/composer_queue.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/status_bar.js"></script>
<script type="module" src="/shared/renderer.js"></script>
<script type="module">
import { createCoordinatorPane } from "/coord-static/coordinator.js";
const q = new URLSearchParams(location.search);
const wsId = q.get("ws_id");
const healedSentinel = q.get("healed") || "";
const pane = createCoordinatorPane(document.body, wsId, {
standalone: true,
});
window.__pane = pane;
if (pane) pane.connect();
window.__hide = function () {
Object.defineProperty(document, "hidden", { configurable: true, value: true });
Object.defineProperty(document, "visibilityState", { configurable: true, value: "hidden" });
document.dispatchEvent(new Event("visibilitychange"));
};
window.__show = function () {
Object.defineProperty(document, "hidden", { configurable: true, value: false });
Object.defineProperty(document, "visibilityState", { configurable: true, value: "visible" });
document.dispatchEvent(new Event("visibilitychange"));
};
// Drive /send once the stream has OPENED at the transport (__esOpens
// the pane's listener is registered by then, so no events are missed).
// The chrome has no SSE pill to poll: the header was deliberately
// dropped (see buildCoordChrome's comment).
let sent = false;
function sendOnce(msg) {
if (sent) return;
sent = true;
window
.authFetch("/v1/api/workstreams/" + encodeURIComponent(wsId) + "/send", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ message: msg }),
})
.catch((e) => { document.title = "RECOVERY-FAILED-COORD-send-" + e; });
}
const sendPoll = setInterval(() => {
if (window.__esOpens >= 1) {
clearInterval(sendPoll);
sendOnce("run a turn");
}
}, 100);
window.__verifyCoordRestart = function () {
// Same contract as Scenario B, read off the coordinator's public
// chrome + the transport wrapper (idle is asserted SERVER-side by
// the runner the chrome has no state text element): the show-edge
// reconnect must present the frozen mid-turn cursor and draw
// replay_truncated (trunc>=1), the dead-stream resync must rebuild
// from /history with the hidden-window turns present (healed), the
// stream must have re-opened after the show (__esOpens >= 2), the
// status bar must not be stuck dim (.ws-sb-disconnected removed by
// the post-recovery onopen), and the tool rows must be intact.
const messages = document.getElementById("coord-messages");
const rows = messages
? messages.querySelectorAll(".conv-row[data-call-id]").length
: 0;
const reopened = window.__esOpens >= 2;
const disc =
document.querySelector("#coord-status-bar.ws-sb-disconnected") !== null;
const healed =
healedSentinel !== "" &&
((messages && messages.textContent) || "").includes(healedSentinel);
const ok =
rows >= 1 && reopened && !disc && healed && window.__truncatedSeen >= 1;
document.title = ok
? "RECOVERY-READY-COORD-rows" + rows + "-trunc" + window.__truncatedSeen
: "RECOVERY-FAILED-COORD-rows" + rows +
"-reopened" + (reopened ? 1 : 0) +
"-disc" + (disc ? 1 : 0) + "-healed" + (healed ? 1 : 0) +
"-trunc" + window.__truncatedSeen;
};
</script>
</body>
</html>
"""
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Minimal dependency-free CDP client (WebSocket over a raw socket).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class CDP:
"""Just enough Chrome DevTools Protocol: navigate, evaluate, set cookie."""
def __init__(self, ws_url: str) -> None:
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
u = urlsplit(ws_url)
self._sock = socket.create_connection((u.hostname, u.port or 80), timeout=10)
key = base64.b64encode(os.urandom(16)).decode()
path = u.path + (f"?{u.query}" if u.query else "")
handshake = (
f"GET {path} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {u.hostname}:{u.port}\r\n"
f"Upgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n"
f"Sec-WebSocket-Key: {key}\r\nSec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n\r\n"
)
self._sock.sendall(handshake.encode())
resp = b""
while b"\r\n\r\n" not in resp:
resp += self._sock.recv(4096)
if b" 101 " not in resp.split(b"\r\n", 1)[0]:
raise RuntimeError(f"CDP websocket handshake failed: {resp[:80]!r}")
self._id = 0
self._rbuf = b""
def _send(self, payload: bytes) -> None:
header = bytearray([0x81]) # FIN + text opcode
mask = os.urandom(4)
n = len(payload)
if n < 126:
header.append(0x80 | n)
elif n < 65536:
header.append(0x80 | 126)
header += struct.pack(">H", n)
else:
header.append(0x80 | 127)
header += struct.pack(">Q", n)
header += mask
self._sock.sendall(bytes(header) + bytes(b ^ mask[i % 4] for i, b in enumerate(payload)))
def _recv_exact(self, n: int) -> bytes:
while len(self._rbuf) < n:
chunk = self._sock.recv(65536)
if not chunk:
raise ConnectionError("CDP socket closed")
self._rbuf += chunk
out, self._rbuf = self._rbuf[:n], self._rbuf[n:]
return out
def _recv_message(self) -> str:
data = b""
while True:
b0, b1 = self._recv_exact(2)
fin = b0 & 0x80
length = b1 & 0x7F
if length == 126:
length = struct.unpack(">H", self._recv_exact(2))[0]
elif length == 127:
length = struct.unpack(">Q", self._recv_exact(8))[0]
data += self._recv_exact(length)
if fin:
return data.decode("utf-8", "replace")
def cmd(self, method: str, params: dict[str, Any] | None = None, timeout: float = 15) -> Any:
self._id += 1
mid = self._id
self._send(json.dumps({"id": mid, "method": method, "params": params or {}}).encode())
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
self._sock.settimeout(max(0.1, deadline - time.monotonic()))
obj = json.loads(self._recv_message())
if obj.get("id") == mid:
if "error" in obj:
raise RuntimeError(f"{method}: {obj['error']}")
return obj.get("result", {})
raise TimeoutError(method)
def evaluate(self, expression: str) -> Any:
r = self.cmd(
"Runtime.evaluate",
{"expression": expression, "returnByValue": True, "awaitPromise": True},
)
return r.get("result", {}).get("value")
def title(self) -> str:
return str(self.evaluate("document.title") or "")
def close(self) -> None:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
self._sock.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Chrome launch + node boot
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _find_chrome() -> str | None:
for name in ("google-chrome", "google-chrome-stable", "chromium", "chromium-browser"):
p = shutil.which(name)
if p:
return p
return None
def _free_port() -> int:
with socket.socket() as s:
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
return int(s.getsockname()[1])
def _launch_chrome(chrome: str, profile: Path) -> tuple[subprocess.Popen[bytes], int]:
cdp_port = _free_port()
proc = subprocess.Popen(
[
chrome,
"--headless=new",
"--disable-gpu",
"--no-sandbox",
"--no-first-run",
"--disable-extensions",
"--disable-background-timer-throttling",
f"--remote-debugging-port={cdp_port}",
f"--user-data-dir={profile}",
"about:blank",
],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
return proc, cdp_port
def _page_ws_url(cdp_port: int, timeout: float = 15) -> str:
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"http://127.0.0.1:{cdp_port}/json", timeout=2) as r:
targets = json.loads(r.read())
for t in targets:
if t.get("type") == "page" and t.get("webSocketDebuggerUrl"):
return str(t["webSocketDebuggerUrl"])
except Exception:
pass
time.sleep(0.2)
raise TimeoutError("no CDP page target")
def _page_route() -> Any:
from starlette.responses import HTMLResponse
from starlette.routing import Route
async def recovery_page(_request: Any) -> HTMLResponse:
return HTMLResponse(PAGE_HTML)
return Route("/recovery", recovery_page)
def _coord_routes() -> list[Any]:
"""The coordinator scenario's same-origin extras: the pane page, and the
console's coordinator static tree under the ``/coord-static`` prefix —
a DISTINCT prefix because the node's own ``/static`` mount (ui/static)
matches first and would 404 the console path from inside its own tree.
coordinator.js's module imports are all absolute ``/shared/*``, which
the node already serves."""
from starlette.responses import HTMLResponse
from starlette.routing import Mount, Route
from starlette.staticfiles import StaticFiles
import turnstone
coord_dir = Path(turnstone.__file__).resolve().parent / "console" / "static" / "coordinator"
async def coord_recovery_page(_request: Any) -> HTMLResponse:
return HTMLResponse(COORD_PAGE_HTML)
return [
Route("/coord-recovery", coord_recovery_page),
Mount("/coord-static", app=StaticFiles(directory=str(coord_dir)), name="coord-static"),
]
def _boot_node(port: int = 0) -> Any:
from tests._sse_recovery_server import RecoveryServer
from turnstone.core.storage import init_storage, reset_storage
# The page route must bypass auth on first load (the cookie is set by the
# runner via CDP BEFORE navigation), so make it public by prefixing under
# a public path is unavailable here; instead the runner sets the cookie so
# /recovery passes the middleware. init storage per boot (shared singleton).
reset_storage()
init_storage("sqlite", path=os.path.join(_scratch(), "recovery_e2e.db"), run_migrations=True)
return RecoveryServer(extra_routes=[_page_route(), *_coord_routes()], port=port)
def _scratch() -> str:
d = os.environ.get("RECOVERY_E2E_TMP") or "/tmp/recovery_e2e"
os.makedirs(d, exist_ok=True)
return d
def _set_cookie_and_navigate(cdp: CDP, base_url: str, token: str, page_url: str) -> None:
cdp.cmd("Page.enable")
cdp.cmd("Runtime.enable")
cdp.cmd("Network.enable")
cdp.cmd(
"Network.setCookie",
{
"name": "turnstone_auth_server",
"value": token,
"url": base_url,
"path": "/",
},
)
cdp.cmd("Page.navigate", {"url": page_url})
def _poll_title(cdp: CDP, timeout: float) -> str:
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
last = ""
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
last = cdp.title()
if last.startswith("RECOVERY-"):
return last
time.sleep(0.3)
return last or "RECOVERY-FAILED-timeout"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Scenarios
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _storm_scripts() -> tuple[Any, ...]:
"""A parallel bash storm PLUS a task_agent whose sub-tools are chatty
bashes (so the browser proves both fix-3 batching AND sub-agent nesting
with no escaped children)."""
from tests._sse_recovery_server import final_text_script, parallel_bash_script
storm = parallel_bash_script({f"call_{i}": "seq 1 500" for i in range(4)})
task = dict(
tool_calls=[
{
"id": "task1",
"name": "task_agent",
"arguments": json.dumps({"prompt": "sub tools"}),
}
],
finish_reason="tool_calls",
)
sub = dict(
tool_calls=[
{"id": "s_a", "name": "bash", "arguments": json.dumps({"command": ": a; seq 1 200"})},
{"id": "s_b", "name": "bash", "arguments": json.dumps({"command": ": b; seq 1 200"})},
],
finish_reason="tool_calls",
)
# Turn 1: the 4-bash storm; turn 2: a task_agent with 2 chatty sub-bashes.
return (
storm,
final_text_script("storm done"),
task,
sub,
final_text_script("sub done"),
final_text_script("all done"),
)
def run_storm(chrome: str) -> str:
node = _boot_node()
ws_id = node.create_workstream(*_storm_scripts(), name="browser-storm")
profile = Path(_scratch()) / "chrome-storm"
proc, cdp_port = _launch_chrome(chrome, profile)
cdp: CDP | None = None
try:
cdp = CDP(_page_ws_url(cdp_port))
# The page POSTs the STORM turn on stream-open; the runner sends the
# task_agent follow-up once the first turn settles so both land.
url = f"{node.base_url}/recovery?ws_id={ws_id}&scenario=storm&rows=4"
_set_cookie_and_navigate(cdp, node.base_url, node.token, url)
# After the storm turn, trigger the task_agent turn via REST so the
# page renders the nested sub-agent card.
_wait_state(node, ws_id, "idle", 40)
node.send(ws_id, "spawn the sub agent")
return _poll_title(cdp, 45)
finally:
if cdp is not None:
cdp.close()
_kill(proc)
node.stop()
def run_restart(chrome: str) -> str:
from tests._sse_recovery_server import final_text_script, parallel_bash_script
port = _free_port()
node = _boot_node(port=port)
# A PACED turn so the tab can hide MID-turn: the browser cursor
# freezes at a mid-stream event id, the rest of turn 1 plus the
# turn-2 text commit while hidden, and the restarted node's seeded
# counter therefore sits ABOVE the frozen cursor -> the show-edge
# reconnect draws ``replay_truncated`` and must heal the gap.
paced = parallel_bash_script({"r0": "for i in $(seq 1 40); do echo r-$i; sleep 0.05; done"})
# The turn-2 text is the healed-gap sentinel — it must be a token
# that cannot appear in any rendered command/output (the bash
# command row contains the shell keyword ``done``, so the obvious
# word is vacuously present; see __verifyRestart). Single source:
# the same constant is injected as the scripted turn text AND
# threaded to the page via ?healed=, so the two sides cannot drift.
ws_id = node.create_workstream(
paced, final_text_script(HEALED_SENTINEL), name="browser-restart"
)
profile = Path(_scratch()) / "chrome-restart"
proc, cdp_port = _launch_chrome(chrome, profile)
cdp: CDP | None = None
try:
cdp = CDP(_page_ws_url(cdp_port))
url = f"{node.base_url}/recovery?ws_id={ws_id}&scenario=restart&healed={HEALED_SENTINEL}"
_set_cookie_and_navigate(cdp, node.base_url, node.token, url)
# Hide as soon as the FIRST streamed line has painted (proof the
# pane holds a live mid-turn cursor) — NOT after wait_turn, which
# would leave the cursor at/above the committed counter and the
# reconnect on the lossless replay_ok path (trunc0).
deadline = time.monotonic() + 15
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
painted = cdp.evaluate("document.querySelector('.tool-output-stream') !== null")
if painted:
break
time.sleep(0.2)
else:
raise AssertionError("restart scenario: first streamed line never painted")
cdp.evaluate("window.__hide && window.__hide()")
# The turn (and the follow-up text) commits while the tab is hidden.
node.wait_turn(ws_id, timeout=30)
# Restart the node on the SAME port (fresh empty ring, seeded counter).
node.stop()
node = _boot_node(port=port)
node.open_workstream(ws_id)
# Show the tab -> stale-cursor reconnect -> truncated -> jittered
# resync (0-10s) -> /history rebuild. Settle past the worst-case
# jitter before the verdict.
cdp.evaluate("window.__show && window.__show()")
time.sleep(12.0)
cdp.evaluate("window.__verifyRestart && window.__verifyRestart()")
return _poll_title(cdp, 20)
finally:
if cdp is not None:
cdp.close()
_kill(proc)
node.stop()
def run_coord_restart(chrome: str) -> str:
from tests._sse_recovery_server import final_text_script, parallel_bash_script
port = _free_port()
node = _boot_node(port=port)
# Same shape as Scenario B: a PACED turn so the tab can hide MID-turn.
# The coordinator renders no streamed tool output (no tool_output_chunk
# case), but the chunk frames still advance the pane's cursor in
# onmessage BEFORE dispatch — so the hide freezes a genuinely mid-turn
# cursor even though the paint signal differs (see below). The closing
# assistant text after the bash is the healed-gap sentinel, committed
# while hidden.
paced = parallel_bash_script({"c0": "for i in $(seq 1 40); do echo c-$i; sleep 0.05; done"})
ws_id = node.create_workstream(
paced, final_text_script(HEALED_SENTINEL), name="browser-coord-restart"
)
profile = Path(_scratch()) / "chrome-coord-restart"
proc, cdp_port = _launch_chrome(chrome, profile)
cdp: CDP | None = None
try:
cdp = CDP(_page_ws_url(cdp_port))
url = f"{node.base_url}/coord-recovery?ws_id={ws_id}&healed={HEALED_SENTINEL}"
_set_cookie_and_navigate(cdp, node.base_url, node.token, url)
# Hide once the BROWSER has captured a live mid-turn cursor: the
# coordinator chrome has no status/SSE text elements (the header was
# deliberately dropped) and paints no streamed output line, so the
# signal is transport-level — id-bearing frames received by the page
# (__idFrames; exactly the frames that advance the pane's reconnect
# cursor). The turn must also still be RUNNING server-side, or the
# frozen cursor could sit at/above the committed counter and the
# reconnect would take the lossless replay_ok path (trunc0). The
# paced bash runs >=2s, so this lands mid-turn.
deadline = time.monotonic() + 15
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
frames = cdp.evaluate("window.__idFrames || 0")
if isinstance(frames, int) and frames >= 2 and node.ws_state(ws_id) == "running":
break
time.sleep(0.2)
else:
raise AssertionError(
"coord-restart scenario: no mid-turn cursor captured "
"(id frames never reached the page while running)"
)
time.sleep(0.5)
cdp.evaluate("window.__hide && window.__hide()")
# The turn (and the sentinel closing text) commits while hidden.
node.wait_turn(ws_id, timeout=30)
# Restart the node on the SAME port (fresh empty ring, seeded counter).
node.stop()
node = _boot_node(port=port)
node.open_workstream(ws_id)
# Show the tab -> stale-cursor reconnect -> truncated -> jittered
# resync (0-10s) -> /history rebuild. Settle past the worst-case
# jitter, assert idle SERVER-side (the chrome has no state text to
# read), then take the in-page verdict.
cdp.evaluate("window.__show && window.__show()")
time.sleep(12.0)
_wait_state(node, ws_id, "idle", 15)
cdp.evaluate("window.__verifyCoordRestart && window.__verifyCoordRestart()")
return _poll_title(cdp, 20)
finally:
if cdp is not None:
cdp.close()
_kill(proc)
node.stop()
def _wait_state(node: Any, ws_id: str, state: str, timeout: float) -> None:
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if node.ws_state(ws_id) == state:
return
time.sleep(0.1)
def _kill(proc: subprocess.Popen[bytes]) -> None:
if proc.poll() is None:
proc.terminate()
try:
proc.wait(8)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
def keep_open(port: int) -> None:
"""Boot the node + storm ws and serve the page for manual inspection."""
node = _boot_node(port=port)
ws_id = node.create_workstream(*_storm_scripts(), name="manual-storm")
print(f"node: {node.base_url}")
print(f"cookie: turnstone_auth_server={node.token}")
print(f"page: {node.base_url}/recovery?ws_id={ws_id}&scenario=storm&rows=4")
print("set the cookie for this origin, then open the page. Ctrl+C to stop.")
try:
while True:
time.sleep(1)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
node.stop()
def main() -> None:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[0])
ap.add_argument(
"--scenario",
choices=["storm", "restart", "coord-restart", "both", "all"],
default="all",
help="'both' = A+B (legacy alias); 'all' adds the coordinator scenario",
)
ap.add_argument("--keep-open", type=int, metavar="PORT", help="serve the storm page, no CDP")
args = ap.parse_args()
if args.keep_open:
keep_open(args.keep_open)
return
chrome = _find_chrome()
if chrome is None:
print("recovery_e2e: no chrome/chromium on PATH — see the module docstring runbook")
raise SystemExit(2)
failures = 0
if args.scenario in ("storm", "both", "all"):
verdict = run_storm(chrome)
print(f"scenario A (storm): {verdict}")
failures += 0 if verdict.startswith("RECOVERY-READY") else 1
if args.scenario in ("restart", "both", "all"):
verdict = run_restart(chrome)
print(f"scenario B (restart): {verdict}")
failures += 0 if verdict.startswith("RECOVERY-READY") else 1
if args.scenario in ("coord-restart", "all"):
verdict = run_coord_restart(chrome)
print(f"scenario C (coord): {verdict}")
failures += 0 if verdict.startswith("RECOVERY-READY") else 1
raise SystemExit(1 if failures else 0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
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+214 -575
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+1 -1
View File
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
],
"license": "Apache-2.0",
"devDependencies": {
"typescript": "^7.0.0",
"typescript": "^6.0.0",
"vitest": "^4.1"
}
}
-64
View File
@@ -75,35 +75,15 @@ export interface ToolInfoEvent {
items: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
}
/** One approval CYCLE awaiting the operator. Several can be outstanding
* at once (parallel task agents each gate their own tool calls) key
* prompt UI by `cycle_id` and echo it back on the approve POST.
*
* `cycle_id` is optional because it was added in 1.7: a pre-1.7 server
* omits it on the wire, so a current SDK talking to an older node sees
* `undefined`. Resolve those the legacy way (no selector oldest
* cycle). A current server always sends it. */
export interface ApproveRequestEvent {
type: "approve_request";
cycle_id?: string;
items: Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
judge_pending?: boolean;
}
/** A specific approval cycle resolved; `cycle_id`/`call_ids` identify
* which prompt to dismiss.
*
* Both are optional for the same reason as `ApproveRequestEvent.cycle_id`
* a pre-1.7 server emits neither, so a bare "something resolved"
* dismisses the sole tracked prompt (the legacy fallback the UI and
* channel adapters keep). A current server always sends both. */
export interface ApprovalResolvedEvent {
type: "approval_resolved";
approved: boolean;
feedback: string;
always?: boolean;
cycle_id?: string;
call_ids?: string[];
}
export interface ToolResultEvent {
@@ -157,49 +137,6 @@ export interface CancelledEvent {
type: "cancelled";
}
/**
* Context-compaction lifecycle. `start` carries `trigger` ("manual"/"auto";
* auto adds `where` + `pct`); `progress` carries chunked-summarization
* `part`/`total`/`depth` (or `retry_in`/`error` for a retry wait); `end`
* carries `ok` plus either `before_tokens`/`after_tokens`/`summary` or the
* failure `reason`/`message`. The successful end's summary also replays from
* `/history` as a `role: "system"`, `source: "compaction"` entry.
*/
export interface CompactionEvent {
type: "compaction";
phase: "start" | "progress" | "end";
/** Correlates every event of one compaction run (0 from legacy emitters). */
compaction_id?: number;
/**
* End events only: true marks a force-abandoned compaction retiring
* after a successor generation took over skip failure notices for
* those (an OK end's result still stands; the history swap happened).
*/
superseded?: boolean;
/**
* Failed ends only: the emitter-computed display verdict show
* `message` only when true, instead of re-deriving suppression from
* reason/trigger/superseded client-side.
*/
notice?: boolean;
/** Present on start and on every end (ok or failed). */
trigger?: "manual" | "auto";
where?: string;
pct?: number;
part?: number;
total?: number;
depth?: number;
retry_in?: number;
error?: string;
warning?: string;
ok?: boolean;
reason?: string;
message?: string;
before_tokens?: number;
after_tokens?: number;
summary?: string;
}
// Global events
export interface WsStateEvent {
@@ -255,7 +192,6 @@ export type ServerEvent =
| BusyErrorEvent
| ClearUiEvent
| CancelledEvent
| CompactionEvent
| WsStateEvent
| WsActivityEvent
| WsRenameEvent
-9
View File
@@ -166,13 +166,6 @@ export class TurnstoneServer extends BaseClient {
approved?: boolean;
feedback?: string | null;
always?: boolean;
/** Resolve exactly this approval cycle (from ApproveRequestEvent.cycle_id).
* Omitting it resolves the OLDEST live cycle ambiguous when parallel
* task agents have several prompts outstanding, so pass it whenever the
* triggering event is known. */
cycleId?: string;
/** Alternative selector: any call_id inside the target cycle. */
callId?: string;
}): Promise<StatusResponse> {
return this.request(
"POST",
@@ -182,8 +175,6 @@ export class TurnstoneServer extends BaseClient {
approved: opts.approved ?? true,
feedback: opts.feedback,
always: opts.always,
cycle_id: opts.cycleId,
call_id: opts.callId,
},
},
);
+1 -25
View File
@@ -130,17 +130,6 @@ export interface CreateWorkstreamRequest {
auto_approve?: boolean;
resume_ws?: string;
skill?: string;
/**
* Persona name (slug) to create the workstream with. Resolved and
* snapshotted at creation later persona edits never affect this
* workstream. Empty selects the kind's default persona.
*/
persona?: string;
/**
* Optional project to attach this workstream to. Drives the shared
* `project` memory scope; coordinator children inherit the parent's project.
*/
project_id?: string;
/** First user message dispatched in a background worker after creation. */
initial_message?: string;
/**
@@ -164,13 +153,6 @@ export interface CreateWorkstreamResponse {
message_count?: number;
/** Ids of attachments saved by this request (multipart variant only). */
attachment_ids?: string[];
/**
* Present ONLY when the workstream was created but its initial_message
* could not be delivered: "queue_full" (raced live worker's interjection
* queue at capacity resend via /send; uploads stay staged) or
* "refused_closed" (workstream closed mid-create).
*/
initial_message_status?: "queue_full" | "refused_closed";
}
export interface CloseWorkstreamRequest {
@@ -192,7 +174,6 @@ export interface WorkstreamInfo {
kind: string;
parent_ws_id: string | null;
user_id: string;
project_id: string | null;
}
export interface ListWorkstreamsResponse {
@@ -222,7 +203,6 @@ export interface DashboardWorkstream {
ws_id: string;
name: string;
state: string;
project_id: string | null;
title?: string;
tokens?: number;
context_ratio?: number;
@@ -269,8 +249,6 @@ export interface SavedWorkstreamInfo {
child_count?: number;
context_tokens?: number;
context_ratio?: number;
/** Persona slug the workstream was created with (empty/absent = pre-persona). */
persona?: string | null;
}
export interface ListSavedWorkstreamsResponse {
@@ -539,8 +517,6 @@ export interface ConsoleCreateWsRequest {
model?: string;
initial_message?: string;
skill?: string;
/** Persona slug — resolved and snapshotted at creation. */
persona?: string;
resume_ws?: string;
}
@@ -806,7 +782,7 @@ export interface SaveMemoryRequest {
name: string;
content: string;
description?: string;
type?: "user" | "general" | "feedback" | "reference";
type?: "user" | "project" | "feedback" | "reference";
scope?: "global" | "workstream" | "user";
scope_id?: string;
}
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ describe("TurnstoneServer attachments", () => {
const [, init] = (fetchFn as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock.calls[0];
expect(JSON.parse(init.body)).toEqual({
message: "hi",
ws_id: "ws-X",
attachment_ids: ["a1", "a2"],
});
});
@@ -116,7 +117,7 @@ describe("TurnstoneServer attachments", () => {
});
await client.send("hi", "ws-X");
const [, init] = (fetchFn as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock.calls[0];
expect(JSON.parse(init.body)).toEqual({ message: "hi" });
expect(JSON.parse(init.body)).toEqual({ message: "hi", ws_id: "ws-X" });
});
it("createWorkstream with attachments sends multipart and auto-generates ws_id", async () => {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -74,8 +74,8 @@ describe("TurnstoneServer", () => {
await client.send("Hello", "ws1");
const [url, init] = (fetchFn as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock.calls[0];
expect(url).toBe("http://test/v1/api/workstreams/ws1/send");
expect(JSON.parse(init.body)).toEqual({ message: "Hello" });
expect(url).toBe("http://test/v1/api/send");
expect(JSON.parse(init.body)).toEqual({ message: "Hello", ws_id: "ws1" });
});
it("injects auth header when token provided", async () => {
+1 -29
View File
@@ -3,37 +3,9 @@ not fixtures, and several test files want to import them directly."""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
from typing import Any
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
def wait_until(cond: Callable[[], bool], timeout: float = 5.0) -> None:
"""Poll ``cond`` to True within ``timeout`` or fail the test.
The worker/wake tests can't join threads by identity:
``session_worker.send`` assigns ``ws.worker_thread`` under the lock
BEFORE ``t.start()``, so the instant a dispatching call returns, a
fast worker may already have run its exit backstop and installed the
(not-yet-started) wake thread joining whatever ``ws.worker_thread``
points at races ``RuntimeError: cannot join thread before it is
started``. Poll outcomes instead.
"""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if cond():
return
time.sleep(0.005)
if cond():
# Final re-check: the condition can become true during the last
# sleep (or a CI descheduling stall past the deadline) — failing
# without re-looking makes the helper itself a flake source.
return
raise AssertionError("condition not met within timeout")
def make_chat_session(**overrides: Any) -> Any:
"""Build a minimal ``ChatSession`` with sane test defaults.
-43
View File
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
"""Shared process/polling helpers for the bash + background-shell suites.
One copy instead of three: ``test_bash_tool_background_hang``,
``test_background_shells`` and ``test_bash_background_tool`` all assert on
process liveness and poll for asynchronous state. Leading underscore so
pytest doesn't collect it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import os
import signal
import time
def pid_alive(pid: int) -> bool:
try:
os.kill(pid, 0)
except ProcessLookupError:
return False
except PermissionError:
return True
return True
def kill_pid(pid: int) -> None:
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
os.kill(pid, signal.SIGKILL)
def poll_until(predicate, timeout=10.0, interval=0.05):
"""Poll ``predicate`` until truthy or ``timeout``; RETURNS the last value
(falsy on timeout assert at the call site). Deliberately named apart
from ``tests/_helpers.wait_until``, which RAISES on timeout: two
same-named helpers with opposite failure semantics invite silently-green
tests."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
value = predicate()
while not value and time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(interval)
value = predicate()
return value
-6
View File
@@ -51,12 +51,6 @@ def make_replay_mocks(
ui._ws_messages = 0
for key, value in ui_overrides.items():
setattr(ui, key, value)
# Both replay paths read cycle cards via ``pending_approval_cards()``
# (one card per concurrent approval cycle). Model it from the
# single-slot ``_pending_approval`` override so tests keep seeding
# the one field; a bare MagicMock here would iterate empty and
# silently drop the approve_request from the replay.
ui.pending_approval_cards = lambda: [ui._pending_approval] if ui._pending_approval else []
ws = MagicMock()
ws.session = session
request = MagicMock()
-304
View File
@@ -14,12 +14,9 @@ collect it as a test file — it's an importable utility, not a test.
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import Any
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
from turnstone.core.providers import StreamChunk, ToolCallDelta
from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
from turnstone.core.session_ui_base import SessionUIBase
@@ -46,304 +43,3 @@ def make_session(**kwargs: Any) -> ChatSession:
}
defaults.update(kwargs)
return ChatSession(**defaults)
def mock_completion_result(
content: str = "",
tool_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
) -> MagicMock:
"""A provider result shaped like ``CompletionResult``.
Callers that route through ``model_turn`` (judges, task agents, and
every lane #827 migrates) hit its re-ingest, which iterates
``tool_calls``/``provider_blocks`` and joins ``reasoning`` a bare
MagicMock attribute would TypeError deep inside the seam, so every
field the re-ingest reads is pinned to a real value here. ONE shared
definition: when the re-ingest starts reading a new CompletionResult
field, add it here and every suite moves together.
"""
result = MagicMock()
result.content = content
result.tool_calls = tool_calls
result.finish_reason = "stop"
result.usage = None
result.provider_blocks = []
result.reasoning = ""
return result
def fake_chat_stream(
*,
content: str | None = None,
tool_calls: list[dict[str, str]] | None = None,
finish_reason: str = "stop",
prompt_tokens: int = 10,
completion_tokens: int = 5,
reasoning_content: str | None = None,
reasoning: str | None = None,
) -> list[Any]:
"""Fake OpenAI Chat Completions SSE chunks for driving the REAL
``OpenAIChatCompletionsProvider`` through a fake SDK client::
client.chat.completions.create = lambda **kw: fake_chat_stream(...)
Exercises the adapter's ``_iter_stream`` plus ``drain_stream`` end to
end (the highest-fidelity fake lane), unlike ``as_stream`` which fakes
at the provider boundary. ``tool_calls`` entries are
``{"id", "name", "arguments"}`` dicts. ``SimpleNamespace`` (not
``MagicMock``) so absent SDK fields read as real ``None`` an
auto-created mock attribute would leak into ``len()``/string paths.
Emits the realistic three-phase shape: data chunk(s), a finish-reason
chunk, then the ``stream_options.include_usage`` usage-only chunk with
empty ``choices``.
"""
def _delta(
content_val: str | None = None,
tcs: list[Any] | None = None,
rc: str | None = None,
rsn: str | None = None,
) -> SimpleNamespace:
return SimpleNamespace(
content=content_val,
tool_calls=tcs,
reasoning=rsn,
reasoning_content=rc,
annotations=None,
)
chunks: list[Any] = []
if reasoning_content is not None or reasoning is not None:
chunks.append(
SimpleNamespace(
choices=[
SimpleNamespace(
finish_reason=None, delta=_delta(rc=reasoning_content, rsn=reasoning)
)
],
usage=None,
)
)
if content is not None:
chunks.append(
SimpleNamespace(
choices=[SimpleNamespace(finish_reason=None, delta=_delta(content))],
usage=None,
)
)
if tool_calls:
tcs = [
SimpleNamespace(
index=i,
id=tc.get("id", ""),
function=SimpleNamespace(
name=tc.get("name", ""), arguments=tc.get("arguments", "")
),
)
for i, tc in enumerate(tool_calls)
]
chunks.append(
SimpleNamespace(
choices=[SimpleNamespace(finish_reason=None, delta=_delta(None, tcs))],
usage=None,
)
)
chunks.append(
SimpleNamespace(
choices=[SimpleNamespace(finish_reason=finish_reason, delta=_delta())],
usage=None,
)
)
chunks.append(
SimpleNamespace(
choices=[],
usage=SimpleNamespace(
prompt_tokens=prompt_tokens,
completion_tokens=completion_tokens,
total_tokens=prompt_tokens + completion_tokens,
prompt_tokens_details=None,
input_tokens_details=None,
),
)
)
return chunks
class _ScriptedClient:
"""Callable client-method fake following a script of stream builders.
Call N returns the stream described by ``scripts[N]``; the last script
repeats for any further calls. Each script is a dict of kwargs for
the bound stream builder, or a pre-built return value. Records every
call's kwargs on ``.calls`` — read ``len(fn.calls)`` where a test
previously kept its own counter cell, and ``fn.calls[i]["messages"]``
where it captured request bodies.
"""
def __init__(self, scripts: tuple[Any, ...], to_stream: Any) -> None:
self._scripts = scripts
self._to_stream = to_stream
self.calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
def __call__(self, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
self.calls.append(kwargs)
script = self._scripts[min(len(self.calls) - 1, len(self._scripts) - 1)]
return self._to_stream(**script) if isinstance(script, dict) else script
def scripted_chat_client(*scripts: Any) -> _ScriptedClient:
"""A scripted ``client.chat.completions.create`` — dict scripts are
:func:`fake_chat_stream` kwargs."""
return _ScriptedClient(scripts, fake_chat_stream)
def scripted_anthropic_client(*scripts: Any) -> _ScriptedClient:
"""A scripted ``client.messages.stream`` — dict scripts are
:func:`fake_anthropic_stream` kwargs (``blocks`` plus optional
``stop_reason``/``usage``)."""
return _ScriptedClient(scripts, fake_anthropic_stream)
class FakeAnthropicBlock:
"""A full-content Anthropic content-block fake for
:func:`fake_anthropic_stream` plain attributes plus the
``model_dump()`` the provider's block capture reads."""
def __init__(self, **fields: Any) -> None:
self._fields = fields
for key, value in fields.items():
setattr(self, key, value)
def model_dump(self, **_kw: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
return dict(self._fields)
def fake_anthropic_stream(
blocks: list[Any],
*,
stop_reason: str | None = "end_turn",
usage: Any = None,
) -> Any:
"""Fake Anthropic SDK stream context manager for tests that drive the
REAL ``AnthropicProvider`` through a fake client::
client.messages.stream = lambda **kw: fake_anthropic_stream(...)
Accepts the same full-content block fakes the pre-#831
``get_final_message`` fixtures used (objects with ``.type`` + fields
and ``model_dump()``) and synthesizes the real event grammar the
streaming iterator consumes: ``content_block_start`` carries the block
with its text/thinking/signature EMPTIED and ``input`` as ``{}`` (the
SDK start shape), deltas carry the content, ``content_block_stop``
finalizes tool input, and the closing ``message_delta`` carries
``stop_reason`` (+ optional usage object). Without the stripping, the
provider's raw-block accumulator would double every text/thinking
field (start capture + delta append).
``stop_reason=None`` omits the closing ``message_delta`` entirely
the terminal-signal-less lax-gateway shape ``finish_reason_optional``
exists for (content arrives, then the stream just ends).
"""
events: list[Any] = []
for idx, block in enumerate(blocks):
d = dict(block.model_dump()) if hasattr(block, "model_dump") else dict(vars(block))
btype = d.get("type", "")
start = dict(d)
if btype == "text":
start["text"] = ""
elif btype == "thinking":
start["thinking"] = ""
start["signature"] = ""
elif btype == "tool_use":
start["input"] = {}
events.append(
SimpleNamespace(
type="content_block_start", index=idx, content_block=SimpleNamespace(**start)
)
)
if btype == "text" and d.get("text"):
events.append(
SimpleNamespace(
type="content_block_delta",
index=idx,
delta=SimpleNamespace(type="text_delta", text=d["text"]),
)
)
elif btype == "thinking":
if d.get("thinking"):
events.append(
SimpleNamespace(
type="content_block_delta",
index=idx,
delta=SimpleNamespace(type="thinking_delta", thinking=d["thinking"]),
)
)
if d.get("signature"):
events.append(
SimpleNamespace(
type="content_block_delta",
index=idx,
delta=SimpleNamespace(type="signature_delta", signature=d["signature"]),
)
)
elif btype == "tool_use":
events.append(
SimpleNamespace(
type="content_block_delta",
index=idx,
delta=SimpleNamespace(
type="input_json_delta",
partial_json=json.dumps(d.get("input", {})),
),
)
)
events.append(SimpleNamespace(type="content_block_stop", index=idx))
if stop_reason is not None or usage is not None:
events.append(
SimpleNamespace(
type="message_delta", usage=usage, delta=SimpleNamespace(stop_reason=stop_reason)
)
)
mgr = MagicMock()
mgr.__enter__ = MagicMock(return_value=events)
mgr.__exit__ = MagicMock(return_value=False)
return mgr
def as_stream(result: Any) -> list[StreamChunk]:
"""Adapt a ``CompletionResult``-shaped fake to a ``create_streaming``
return value (single terminal chunk).
The #831 transport collapse routes every single-shot lane through
``drain_stream(provider.create_streaming(...))``, so provider fakes
return chunk iterables now. Tests keep building result-shaped fakes
(``mock_completion_result`` or hand-rolled) and wrap them at
assignment: ``provider.create_streaming.return_value =
as_stream(result)``. A list re-iterates on every call, so one
``return_value`` serves repeated-call tests; convert AFTER mutating
the fake's fields — the chunk snapshots them.
Multi-chunk accumulation semantics are exercised by the dedicated
``drain_stream`` unit tests, not through this helper.
"""
deltas = [
ToolCallDelta(
index=i,
id=tc.get("id", ""),
name=tc.get("function", {}).get("name", ""),
arguments_delta=tc.get("function", {}).get("arguments", ""),
)
for i, tc in enumerate(result.tool_calls or [])
]
return [
StreamChunk(
content_delta=result.content or "",
reasoning_delta=getattr(result, "reasoning", "") or "",
tool_call_deltas=deltas,
usage=result.usage,
finish_reason=result.finish_reason or "stop",
provider_blocks=list(result.provider_blocks or []),
)
]
-604
View File
@@ -1,604 +0,0 @@
"""Browser-fidelity SSE recovery harness helpers.
The load-bearing assembly for ``tests/test_sse_recovery_e2e.py``: a
``BrowserlikeSSEClient`` that speaks the exact wire contract the real
``turnstone/shared_static/interactive.js`` pane speaks, and the
assertion helpers the scenarios share. The server boot machinery lives
in ``_sse_recovery_server.py``.
Why a raw-socket SSE reader (and not ``httpx.stream``): the slow-consumer
overflow scenario needs the consumer to STALL stop reading the socket
so the server's SSE generator blocks on ``await send`` and stops draining
the per-UI listener queue, which then poisons at its cap. A faithful
stall needs (a) precise control over when bytes are read and (b) a small
``SO_RCVBUF`` so the in-flight backlog before poison stays bounded to
~100 KB instead of the client kernel's multi-MB autotuned default (which
would need tens of thousands of events to overflow). A raw socket gives
both; httpx (used here only for the plain ``/history`` request/response)
gives neither. This is ALSO closer to the browser: EventSource has a
bounded receive buffer, not an unbounded one.
Client contract mirrored from interactive.js (line references are to
that file on the ``fix/sse-truncated-resync`` branch):
- ``_last_event_id`` advances ONLY from SSE ``id:`` fields, and only
ring-buffer events carry one synthetic replay frames (connected /
status / state_change / in_progress_snapshot / replay_truncated /
stream_overflow) do not, exactly like ``EventSource.lastEventId``
(interactive.js onmessage ~1378).
- reconnect presents ``connectCursor = _truncatedFromCursor ??
_lastEventId`` as ``?last_event_id=`` (manual path) or a
``Last-Event-ID`` header (native EventSource auto-reconnect path)
(interactive.js connectSSE ~1328).
- on a ``replay_truncated`` envelope the client records the
truncation-time cursor keep-oldest (``_truncatedFromCursor =
_lastEventId`` only when null) and runs ``_loadHistoryThenConnect``
(disconnect /history adopt cursor reconnect); a FAILED
/history leaves the record armed so the reconnect re-presents the
truncation-time cursor and re-draws the envelope (interactive.js
handleEvent replay_truncated ~2303, _loadHistoryThenConnect ~1604,
_refetchHistory seedCursor ~1706).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import json
import socket
import threading
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
import httpx
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable
# Small client receive buffer so a stalled consumer's in-flight backlog
# before the server-side poison stays bounded (~100 KB) instead of the
# multi-MB autotuned default. Paired with the server's small SO_SNDBUF
# (see _sse_recovery_server.build_recovery_server).
_CLIENT_RCVBUF = 2048
@dataclass
class SSEFrame:
"""One decoded SSE frame, tagged with the connection it arrived on.
``event_id`` is the ``id:`` field verbatim (a stringified integer,
or ``None`` for id-less synthetic frames the same string domain as
``EventSource.lastEventId``). ``etype`` is the ``type`` field of the
JSON ``data:`` payload (the application event type), distinct from
any SSE ``event:`` field, which the server never uses.
"""
conn_index: int
event_id: str | None
etype: str | None
payload: dict[str, Any] | None
raw: str
@property
def event_id_int(self) -> int | None:
if self.event_id is None:
return None
try:
return int(self.event_id)
except ValueError:
return None
class BrowserlikeSSEClient:
"""A single interactive pane's SSE + /history state machine.
Not thread-safe against concurrent public calls; drive it from one
test thread. Internally a per-connection reader thread decodes the
stream; ``stall()`` / ``resume()`` gate that thread's socket reads so
a test can build server-side backpressure without closing the
connection (the slow-consumer listener-queue-poison path).
"""
def __init__(self, base_url: str, ws_id: str, token: str) -> None:
parts = urlsplit(base_url)
self._host = parts.hostname or "127.0.0.1"
self._port = parts.port or 80
self._ws_id = ws_id
self._token = token
self._auth = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
self._http = httpx.Client(
base_url=f"http://{self._host}:{self._port}", timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0)
)
# EventSource-equivalent cursor state.
self._last_event_id: str | None = None
self._truncated_from_cursor: str | None = None
# Transcript. ``_all_frames`` is the cross-connection accumulation
# (what "the client eventually saw"); ``_conn_frames`` keeps each
# connection's slice for per-connection assertions (contiguity).
self._all_frames: list[SSEFrame] = []
self._conn_frames: list[list[SSEFrame]] = []
self._frames_lock = threading.Lock()
# Reader plumbing.
self._sock: socket.socket | None = None
self._reader: threading.Thread | None = None
self._stop = threading.Event()
self._read_gate = threading.Event()
self._read_gate.set() # reading permitted by default
self._status: int | None = None
self._headers_done = threading.Event()
# -- connection lifecycle ------------------------------------------------
def _events_path(self, cursor: str | None) -> str:
path = f"/v1/api/workstreams/{self._ws_id}/events"
if cursor is not None:
path += f"?last_event_id={cursor}"
return path
def connect(self, *, native: bool = False, rcvbuf: int | None = None) -> None:
"""Open the SSE stream, presenting the client's current cursor.
``native=True`` models the browser's EventSource auto-reconnect:
the cursor rides a ``Last-Event-ID`` HEADER and never appears in
the URL. ``native=False`` models the manual ``new EventSource(url
+ '?last_event_id=')`` path interactive.js uses when it must
override the live cursor (the ``connectCursor`` chokepoint).
``rcvbuf`` shrinks this connection's ``SO_RCVBUF`` — pass
``_CLIENT_RCVBUF`` on a connection the test will ``stall()`` so the
in-flight backlog before the server-side poison stays bounded.
Leave it ``None`` (OS default) on recovery reconnects so the ring
replay is not throttled to a crawl.
"""
if self._reader is not None:
raise RuntimeError("already connected; disconnect() first")
connect_cursor = (
self._truncated_from_cursor
if self._truncated_from_cursor is not None
else self._last_event_id
)
header_lines = [
f"Host: {self._host}:{self._port}",
f"Authorization: Bearer {self._token}",
"Accept: text/event-stream",
"Cache-Control: no-cache",
]
if native:
path = self._events_path(None)
if connect_cursor is not None:
header_lines.append(f"Last-Event-ID: {connect_cursor}")
else:
path = self._events_path(connect_cursor)
request = f"GET {path} HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "\r\n".join(header_lines) + "\r\n\r\n"
sock = socket.create_connection((self._host, self._port), timeout=10)
if rcvbuf is not None:
sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_RCVBUF, rcvbuf)
sock.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
sock.settimeout(None)
sock.sendall(request.encode())
self._sock = sock
self._stop.clear()
self._read_gate.set()
self._status = None
self._headers_done.clear()
conn_index = len(self._conn_frames)
frames: list[SSEFrame] = []
self._conn_frames.append(frames)
self._reader = threading.Thread(
target=self._read_loop,
args=(sock, conn_index, frames),
name=f"sse-reader-{self._ws_id[:6]}-{conn_index}",
daemon=True,
)
self._reader.start()
# Surface a non-200 handshake to the caller (409 half-built UI,
# 404 unknown ws, 401 auth) rather than silently reading nothing.
if not self._headers_done.wait(timeout=10):
self.disconnect()
raise AssertionError("events connect: no HTTP response headers")
if self._status != 200:
status = self._status
self.disconnect()
raise AssertionError(f"events connect returned HTTP {status}")
def disconnect(self) -> None:
"""Close the stream and join the reader (leak-guard clean)."""
self._stop.set()
self._read_gate.set() # release a stalled reader so it sees _stop
sock = self._sock
if sock is not None:
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
sock.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR) # interrupt a blocked recv
reader = self._reader
if reader is not None:
reader.join(timeout=15)
if reader.is_alive():
raise AssertionError("SSE reader thread failed to stop")
if sock is not None:
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
sock.close()
self._sock = None
self._reader = None
def close(self) -> None:
"""Full teardown: disconnect any live stream + close the HTTP client."""
if self._reader is not None:
self.disconnect()
self._http.close()
# -- the stall gate (backpressure driver) --------------------------------
def stall(self) -> None:
"""Stop reading the socket. The kernel + uvicorn send buffers fill,
blocking the server's SSE generator on its ``await send``, so it
stops draining the per-UI listener queue which poisons at its cap.
"""
self._read_gate.clear()
def resume(self) -> None:
"""Resume reading. A poisoned-and-closed stream delivers its
``stream_overflow`` farewell frame once the backlog drains."""
self._read_gate.set()
# -- reader --------------------------------------------------------------
def _read_loop(self, sock: socket.socket, conn_index: int, frames: list[SSEFrame]) -> None:
raw = b"" # undecoded bytes (headers, then chunked framing)
sse = b"" # decoded SSE byte stream
headers_parsed = False
chunked = False
while not self._stop.is_set():
# Backpressure gate: while stalled we do NOT read the socket, so
# its receive buffer fills and TCP flow control stalls the server.
if not self._read_gate.wait(timeout=0.1):
continue
if self._stop.is_set():
break
try:
chunk = sock.recv(65536)
except OSError:
break
if not chunk:
break # server closed
raw += chunk
if not headers_parsed:
if b"\r\n\r\n" not in raw:
continue
header_blob, raw = raw.split(b"\r\n\r\n", 1)
self._parse_headers(header_blob)
chunked = b"transfer-encoding: chunked" in header_blob.lower()
headers_parsed = True
self._headers_done.set()
if chunked:
decoded, raw = _dechunk(raw)
sse += decoded
else:
sse += raw
raw = b""
sse = sse.replace(b"\r\n", b"\n")
while b"\n\n" in sse:
block, sse = sse.split(b"\n\n", 1)
self._handle_block(block.decode("utf-8", "replace"), conn_index, frames)
def _parse_headers(self, header_blob: bytes) -> None:
first_line = header_blob.split(b"\r\n", 1)[0].decode("latin-1")
# "HTTP/1.1 200 OK"
parts = first_line.split(" ", 2)
if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[1].isdigit():
self._status = int(parts[1])
def _handle_block(self, block_text: str, conn_index: int, frames: list[SSEFrame]) -> None:
event_id: str | None = None
data_parts: list[str] = []
retry: str | None = None
for line in block_text.split("\n"):
if not line or line.startswith(":"):
continue # blank or comment (ping)
field_name, _, value = line.partition(":")
if value.startswith(" "):
value = value[1:] # SSE strips a single leading space
if field_name == "id":
event_id = value
elif field_name == "data":
data_parts.append(value)
elif field_name == "retry":
retry = value
# EventSource semantics: an event carrying an ``id:`` sets the
# last-event-id buffer; an event without one leaves it unchanged.
if event_id is not None:
self._last_event_id = event_id
if not data_parts:
if retry is not None:
self._record(SSEFrame(conn_index, None, "retry", None, block_text), frames)
return
data_str = "\n".join(data_parts)
payload: dict[str, Any] | None
try:
parsed = json.loads(data_str)
payload = parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else None
except ValueError:
payload = None
etype = payload.get("type") if payload is not None else None
frame = SSEFrame(conn_index, event_id, etype, payload, data_str)
self._record(frame, frames)
# Mirror the pane: the FIRST replay_truncated for an unrepaired gap
# records the truncation-time cursor (keep-oldest). Its consumer is
# the reconnect chokepoint (see ``connect``).
if etype == "replay_truncated" and self._truncated_from_cursor is None:
self._truncated_from_cursor = self._last_event_id
def _record(self, frame: SSEFrame, frames: list[SSEFrame]) -> None:
with self._frames_lock:
frames.append(frame)
self._all_frames.append(frame)
# -- /history + cursor flow ----------------------------------------------
def fetch_history(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""GET /history and return the parsed JSON ({ws_id, messages, cursor})."""
r = self._http.get(f"/v1/api/workstreams/{self._ws_id}/history", headers=self._auth)
r.raise_for_status()
result: dict[str, Any] = r.json()
return result
def seed_from_history(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The seedCursor step: fetch /history, adopt a non-null resume
cursor into ``_last_event_id``, and clear the truncation record on
a successful render (replayHistory clears ``_truncatedFromCursor``).
"""
data = self.fetch_history()
cursor = data.get("cursor")
if cursor is not None:
self._last_event_id = str(cursor)
self._truncated_from_cursor = None # successful full render repairs the gap
return data
def load_history_then_connect(
self, *, fail_history: bool = False, native: bool = False
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
"""Reproduce interactive.js ``_loadHistoryThenConnect``.
Disconnect first, drop the live cursor (``_last_event_id = None``)
but KEEP ``_truncated_from_cursor`` armed, then fetch /history and
reconnect. On success adopt the returned cursor and clear the
truncation record; on a FAILED /history (``fail_history`` the
harness IS the client here, so a client-side simulated failure is
faithful) leave the record armed so the reconnect re-presents the
truncation-time cursor and re-draws ``replay_truncated``.
Returns the /history JSON, or ``None`` when the fetch failed.
"""
if self._reader is not None:
self.disconnect()
self._last_event_id = None
data: dict[str, Any] | None
if fail_history:
data = None
else:
data = self.fetch_history()
cursor = data.get("cursor")
if cursor is not None:
self._last_event_id = str(cursor)
self._truncated_from_cursor = None
self.connect(native=native)
return data
# -- accessors + waits ---------------------------------------------------
@property
def last_event_id(self) -> str | None:
return self._last_event_id
@property
def truncated_from_cursor(self) -> str | None:
return self._truncated_from_cursor
def all_frames(self) -> list[SSEFrame]:
with self._frames_lock:
return list(self._all_frames)
def conn_frames(self, conn_index: int) -> list[SSEFrame]:
with self._frames_lock:
return list(self._conn_frames[conn_index])
def latest_conn_frames(self) -> list[SSEFrame]:
with self._frames_lock:
return list(self._conn_frames[-1]) if self._conn_frames else []
def num_connections(self) -> int:
with self._frames_lock:
return len(self._conn_frames)
def frames_of_type(self, etype: str) -> list[SSEFrame]:
return [f for f in self.all_frames() if f.etype == etype]
def has_type(self, etype: str) -> bool:
return any(f.etype == etype for f in self.all_frames())
def tool_output_by_call(self) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Concatenate every ``tool_output_chunk`` payload per call_id, in
arrival order the reconstructed live stream for each call."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for f in self.all_frames():
if f.etype == "tool_output_chunk" and f.payload is not None:
cid = str(f.payload.get("call_id", ""))
out[cid] = out.get(cid, "") + str(f.payload.get("chunk", ""))
return out
def tool_results_by_call(self) -> dict[str, str]:
"""The last ``tool_result`` output seen per call_id."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for f in self.all_frames():
if f.etype == "tool_result" and f.payload is not None:
out[str(f.payload.get("call_id", ""))] = str(f.payload.get("output", ""))
return out
def wait_for_type(self, etype: str, *, timeout: float = 45.0) -> SSEFrame:
"""Block until a frame of ``etype`` has arrived on ANY connection."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
for f in self.all_frames():
if f.etype == etype:
return f
time.sleep(0.05)
raise AssertionError(f"timed out waiting for a {etype!r} frame")
def wait_for(
self, predicate: Callable[[BrowserlikeSSEClient], bool], *, timeout: float = 45.0
) -> None:
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if predicate(self):
return
time.sleep(0.05)
raise AssertionError("timed out waiting for predicate")
def wait_for_call_result(self, call_id: str, *, timeout: float = 45.0) -> None:
self.wait_for(lambda c: call_id in c.tool_results_by_call(), timeout=timeout)
def _dechunk(buf: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
"""Incrementally decode HTTP/1.1 chunked transfer-encoding.
Consumes as many COMPLETE chunks from ``buf`` as possible and returns
``(decoded_bytes, remainder)`` where ``remainder`` is the trailing
partial chunk to carry into the next read. A zero-length chunk (stream
end) simply stops consumption; the reader's ``recv`` EOF handles close.
"""
decoded = b""
while True:
if b"\r\n" not in buf:
break # incomplete size line
size_line, rest = buf.split(b"\r\n", 1)
try:
n = int(size_line.strip() or b"z", 16)
except ValueError:
break # malformed / partial — wait for more bytes
if n == 0:
break # last chunk marker
if len(rest) < n + 2: # need n data bytes + trailing CRLF
break
decoded += rest[:n]
buf = rest[n + 2 :]
return decoded, buf
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Assertion helpers (shared by the scenarios).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def assert_contiguous_ids(frames: list[SSEFrame]) -> None:
"""Every id-bearing frame in a connection forms a gap-free, dup-free,
strictly increasing run.
Holds for a connection that took no ``_seq``-filtered fresh path a
fresh connect made before any event (snap_seq == 0) and every
``replay_ok`` reconnect (snap_seq == 0). The server stamps a fresh
monotonic id per enqueue with no in-ring coalescing, so a
non-filtered consumer sees consecutive ids.
"""
ids = [f.event_id_int for f in frames if f.event_id_int is not None]
assert ids, "connection carried no id-bearing frames"
assert len(set(ids)) == len(ids), f"duplicate SSE ids: {ids}"
assert ids == sorted(ids), f"SSE ids not monotonic: {ids}"
for prev, cur in zip(ids, ids[1:], strict=False):
assert cur == prev + 1, f"gap in SSE ids between {prev} and {cur}: {ids}"
def assert_ids_monotonic_no_dupes(frames: list[SSEFrame]) -> None:
"""Weaker invariant that holds on EVERY connection (including
``_seq``-filtered fresh/truncated paths, where gaps are legal): ids
are strictly increasing with no duplicates."""
ids = [f.event_id_int for f in frames if f.event_id_int is not None]
assert len(set(ids)) == len(ids), f"duplicate SSE ids: {ids}"
assert ids == sorted(ids), f"SSE ids not monotonic: {ids}"
def assert_chunk_result_ordering(frames: list[SSEFrame]) -> None:
"""Every ``tool_output_chunk`` for a call precedes that call's own
``tool_result`` on the wire (the load-bearing ordering the client
removes the streaming <pre> when it renders the result)."""
result_index: dict[str, int] = {}
for i, f in enumerate(frames):
if f.etype == "tool_result" and f.payload is not None:
result_index[str(f.payload.get("call_id", ""))] = i
for i, f in enumerate(frames):
if f.etype == "tool_output_chunk" and f.payload is not None:
cid = str(f.payload.get("call_id", ""))
assert cid in result_index, f"chunk for call {cid} has no tool_result"
assert i < result_index[cid], (
f"chunk for call {cid} arrived AFTER its tool_result "
f"(chunk idx {i} >= result idx {result_index[cid]})"
)
def assert_children_stamped(frames: list[SSEFrame], parent_call_id: str) -> None:
"""Every sub-agent child tool event carries ``parent_call_id`` (stamped
at the flush chokepoint). Sub-tool call_ids are minted
``{parent}::r{run}s{step}::{provider_id}`` the ``::`` segment is the
identifying mark and NONE may escape unstamped to the top level."""
unstamped: list[tuple[str | None, str, Any]] = []
stamped = 0
for f in frames:
if f.payload is None:
continue
items = f.payload.get("items")
entries = items if isinstance(items, list) else [f.payload]
for entry in entries:
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
continue
cid = str(entry.get("call_id", ""))
if "::" not in cid:
continue
if entry.get("parent_call_id") == parent_call_id:
stamped += 1
else:
unstamped.append((f.etype, cid, entry.get("parent_call_id")))
assert stamped > 0, f"no child events found for parent {parent_call_id}"
assert not unstamped, f"child events escaped unstamped (parent {parent_call_id}): {unstamped}"
def history_tool_outputs(history_json: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Extract {call_id: output} from a /history projection, however the
projection surfaces results (a folded ``output`` on a tool_call, or a
trailing ``role: tool`` row keyed by ``tool_call_id``)."""
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for msg in history_json.get("messages", []):
if not isinstance(msg, dict):
continue
if msg.get("role") == "tool":
cid = msg.get("tool_call_id") or msg.get("call_id")
if cid is not None:
out[str(cid)] = str(msg.get("content", ""))
for tc in msg.get("tool_calls") or ():
if not isinstance(tc, dict):
continue
cid = tc.get("id") or tc.get("call_id")
if cid is not None and tc.get("output") is not None:
out[str(cid)] = str(tc.get("output", ""))
return out
def assert_converged(client: BrowserlikeSSEClient, history_json: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""Turn-level equivalence: every tool result the client assembled live
is present, with the same output, in a fresh /history projection.
Compares by call_id so a reconnect that re-delivered a result can't
hide a divergence, and asserts the /history side isn't empty (a
silently-lost turn would leave the projection short)."""
live = client.tool_results_by_call()
hist = history_tool_outputs(history_json)
assert hist, "fresh /history projected no tool results — a turn was lost"
for call_id, output in live.items():
assert call_id in hist, f"call {call_id} seen live but absent from /history: {sorted(hist)}"
assert hist[call_id] == output, (
f"call {call_id} output diverged: live={output!r} history={hist[call_id]!r}"
)
-413
View File
@@ -1,413 +0,0 @@
"""Boot the REAL interactive Turnstone server for the SSE recovery e2e
harness: real ``SessionManager`` + real ``ChatSession`` engine driven
through a scripted chat-completions client at the SDK boundary, executing
REAL bash tools, exposed over a real uvicorn socket.
The recipe (verified end-to-end) has four load-bearing pieces:
1. **Provider injection seam.** ``create_app`` takes a PRE-BUILT
``SessionManager``, so the harness owns the ``session_factory``: it
passes ``client=fake_client`` and OMITS the registry, so
``ChatSession`` falls back to ``create_provider("openai-compatible")``
== ``OpenAIChatCompletionsProvider`` exactly what
``tests._session_helpers.scripted_chat_client`` targets. No production
monkeypatch of the engine.
2. **Auto-title suppression.** The first user message spawns a background
``_generate_title`` LLM call that would consume the first scripted
response (the tool call) and desync a positional script. Setting
``session._title_generated = True`` before the first send disables it.
3. **Completion barrier.** ``/send`` returns immediately after spawning
``ws.worker_thread``; joining that thread is the true "turn complete,
every SSE event enqueued" barrier (``stream_end`` is per-LLM-call, not
per-turn, so it is NOT a completion marker).
4. **Thread hygiene.** ``create_app``'s lifespan unconditionally starts
two daemon fan-out threads (``_global_fanout_thread`` blocking on
``global_queue.get()``, ``_aggregate_emitter_thread`` on a 10s loop)
with no shutdown sentinel they would trip conftest's leaked-thread
guard. They serve the cluster/global lane, which the per-ws ``/events``
path under test never touches, so the harness swaps them for no-ops
before boot (restored on ``stop``). The result is a fully clean
teardown no ``allow_thread_leak`` needed with the real per-ws SSE
engine fully intact.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
import json
import queue as _q
import socket
import threading
import time
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
import httpx
import uvicorn
import turnstone.server as tsrv
from tests._session_helpers import scripted_chat_client
from turnstone.core.adapters.interactive_adapter import InteractiveAdapter
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER, create_jwt
from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
from turnstone.core.session_manager import SessionManager
from turnstone.core.session_ui_base import SessionUIBase
from turnstone.core.storage import get_storage
from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamKind
from turnstone.prompts import ClientType
from turnstone.server import WebUI, create_app
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from turnstone.core.workstream import Workstream
_JWT_SECRET = "sse-recovery-e2e-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
# Small server send buffer so a stalled consumer's in-flight backlog before
# the listener-queue poison stays bounded (paired with the client's small
# SO_RCVBUF in _sse_recovery_helpers). Harmless for prompt readers.
_DEFAULT_SNDBUF = 8192
def _noop_thread(*_args: object, **_kwargs: object) -> None:
"""Stand-in for the cluster-lane daemon threads (see module docstring)."""
# The REAL daemon-thread factories, captured once at import so restore always
# targets them regardless of how many servers neuter/restore in a run (the
# restart scenarios build a second server before the run ends).
_REAL_FANOUT = tsrv._global_fanout_thread
_REAL_AGGREGATE = tsrv._aggregate_emitter_thread
def _fake_client(scripts: tuple[Any, ...]) -> Any:
"""An SDK-shaped fake whose ``chat.completions.create`` follows a
positional script (each a :func:`fake_chat_stream` kwargs dict)."""
create_fn = scripted_chat_client(*scripts)
client = SimpleNamespace(chat=SimpleNamespace(completions=SimpleNamespace(create=create_fn)))
client.calls = create_fn.calls
return client
class RecoveryServer:
"""A booted interactive node the recovery scenarios drive."""
def __init__(
self,
*,
sndbuf: int = _DEFAULT_SNDBUF,
listener_cap: int | None = None,
extra_routes: list[Any] | None = None,
port: int = 0,
) -> None:
self._global_queue: _q.Queue[dict[str, Any]] = _q.Queue(maxsize=100000)
self._global_listeners: list[_q.Queue[dict[str, Any]]] = []
self._global_listeners_lock = threading.Lock()
# Per-ws scripted client, resolved at factory-call time.
self._pending_client: Any = _fake_client((dict(content="ok", finish_reason="stop"),))
self._clients: dict[str, Any] = {}
WebUI._global_queue = self._global_queue
def session_factory(
ui: Any,
model_alias: str | None = None,
ws_id: str | None = None,
*,
skill: Any = None,
client_type: str = "",
kind: WorkstreamKind = WorkstreamKind.INTERACTIVE,
parent_ws_id: str | None = None,
project_id: str = "",
**_extra: Any,
) -> ChatSession:
client = self._pending_client
if ws_id is not None:
self._clients[ws_id] = client
return ChatSession(
client=client,
model="test-model",
ui=ui,
instructions=None,
temperature=None,
max_tokens=1024,
tool_timeout=30,
ws_id=ws_id,
user_id="recovery-user",
client_type=ClientType.WEB,
kind=kind,
# Don't truncate large tool outputs: the harness tests
# recovery, not the tool-result truncation budget, and a
# truncated /history would diverge from the full live event
# and defeat the convergence assertions.
tool_truncation=10_000_000,
)
self._adapter = InteractiveAdapter(
global_queue=self._global_queue,
ui_factory=lambda ws: WebUI(
ws_id=ws.id, user_id=ws.user_id, kind=ws.kind, parent_ws_id=ws.parent_ws_id
),
session_factory=session_factory,
)
self._manager = SessionManager(
self._adapter, storage=get_storage(), max_active=32, node_id="recovery-node"
)
self._adapter.attach(self._manager)
WebUI._workstream_mgr = self._manager
# Neuter the cluster-lane daemons for a clean teardown (see docstring).
tsrv._global_fanout_thread = _noop_thread
tsrv._aggregate_emitter_thread = _noop_thread
# Optional small listener-queue cap. The cap is a default arg on the
# registration methods with no config/env override, so lower it by
# patching their ``__defaults__`` (restored on stop). fix-3's
# de-amplification makes a real 500-cap overflow need a pathological
# storm; a small cap exercises the identical _ListenerOverflow ->
# stream_overflow -> reconnect-replay path within a bounded storm.
self._orig_defaults: list[tuple[Any, tuple[Any, ...] | None]] = []
if listener_cap is not None:
for meth in (
SessionUIBase._register_listener,
SessionUIBase.register_listener_with_in_progress_snapshot,
SessionUIBase.register_listener_with_replay,
):
self._orig_defaults.append((meth, meth.__defaults__))
meth.__defaults__ = (listener_cap,)
self._app = create_app(
workstreams=self._manager,
global_queue=self._global_queue,
global_listeners=self._global_listeners,
global_listeners_lock=self._global_listeners_lock,
skip_permissions=True,
jwt_secret=_JWT_SECRET,
node_id="recovery-node",
# /history + tenant checks read app.state.auth_storage.
auth_storage=get_storage(),
)
# Same-origin extras (Tier 2 serves its recovery page here so the real
# Pane's cookie auth + EventSource work without cross-origin plumbing).
if extra_routes:
self._app.router.routes.extend(extra_routes)
# Pre-bind a listening socket with a small SO_SNDBUF (accepted conns
# inherit it), then hand it to uvicorn.
self._sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
self._sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
self._sock.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_SNDBUF, sndbuf)
self._sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", port)) # port=0 -> ephemeral; fixed -> restart reuse
self._port = int(self._sock.getsockname()[1])
self._sock.listen(128)
self._server = uvicorn.Server(uvicorn.Config(self._app, log_level="warning", lifespan="on"))
self._thread = threading.Thread(
target=self._serve, name=f"uvicorn-recovery-{self._port}", daemon=True
)
self._thread.start()
if not _tcp_ready(self._port, 10.0):
self.stop()
raise AssertionError("recovery server did not accept TCP")
self._token = create_jwt(
user_id="recovery-user",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="recovery",
secret=_JWT_SECRET,
audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
)
self._http = httpx.Client(base_url=self.base_url, timeout=httpx.Timeout(30.0))
def _serve(self) -> None:
loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
try:
loop.run_until_complete(self._server.serve(sockets=[self._sock]))
finally:
pending = asyncio.all_tasks(loop)
for task in pending:
task.cancel()
if pending:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
loop.run_until_complete(asyncio.gather(*pending, return_exceptions=True))
loop.close()
# -- properties ----------------------------------------------------------
@property
def base_url(self) -> str:
return f"http://127.0.0.1:{self._port}"
@property
def token(self) -> str:
return self._token
@property
def manager(self) -> SessionManager:
return self._manager
# -- workstream lifecycle ------------------------------------------------
def create_workstream(self, *scripts: Any, name: str = "recovery-ws") -> str:
"""Create a ws whose scripted LLM follows ``scripts`` (positional
:func:`fake_chat_stream` kwargs). Auto-approves tools and suppresses
the auto-title call so the positional script stays in sync."""
self._pending_client = _fake_client(scripts)
ws = self._manager.create(user_id="recovery-user", name=name)
self._prime_ws(ws)
return ws.id
def open_workstream(self, ws_id: str, *scripts: Any) -> None:
"""Rehydrate a persisted ws on THIS node (the restart path). Fresh
UI empty ring + storage-seeded ``_event_id``."""
if scripts:
self._pending_client = _fake_client(scripts)
ws = self._manager.open(ws_id)
if ws is None:
raise AssertionError(f"open_workstream: ws {ws_id} not resurrectable")
self._prime_ws(ws)
def _prime_ws(self, ws: Workstream) -> None:
if isinstance(ws.ui, SessionUIBase):
ws.ui.auto_approve = True # blanket tool auto-approval
if ws.session is not None:
ws.session._title_generated = True # suppress the auto-title LLM call
def send(self, ws_id: str, message: str = "go") -> None:
"""POST /send — spawns the worker thread and returns immediately."""
r = self._http.post(
f"/v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/send",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {self._token}"},
json={"message": message},
)
r.raise_for_status()
def wait_turn(self, ws_id: str, *, timeout: float = 45.0) -> None:
"""Block until the turn's worker thread finishes (the true
turn-complete barrier) and the ws is idle."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
worker: threading.Thread | None = None
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
ws = self._manager.get(ws_id)
worker = ws.worker_thread if ws is not None else None
if worker is not None:
break
time.sleep(0.02)
if worker is not None:
worker.join(timeout=max(0.5, deadline - time.monotonic()))
if worker.is_alive():
raise AssertionError(f"turn worker for {ws_id} did not finish in {timeout}s")
def get_ws(self, ws_id: str) -> Workstream | None:
return self._manager.get(ws_id)
def ws_state(self, ws_id: str) -> str:
ws = self._manager.get(ws_id)
return ws.state.value if ws is not None else ""
def ring_span(self, ws_id: str) -> tuple[int | None, int]:
"""(earliest retained ring event_id or None, latest counter) — lets a
scenario wait for the ring to evict a specific cursor."""
ws = self._manager.get(ws_id)
ui = ws.ui if ws is not None else None
if not isinstance(ui, SessionUIBase):
return None, 0
buf = ui._event_buffer
earliest = buf[0][0] if buf else None
return earliest, ui._event_id
def listener_poisoned(self, ws_id: str) -> bool:
"""True once any live SSE listener on the ws has poisoned (overflow)."""
ws = self._manager.get(ws_id)
ui = ws.ui if ws is not None else None
if not isinstance(ui, SessionUIBase):
return False
return any(getattr(q, "poisoned", False) for q in list(ui._listeners))
def max_event_id(self, ws_id: str) -> int | None:
"""The storage high-water ``MAX(conversations.event_id)`` — what a
restarted node's fresh UI seeds ``_event_id`` from."""
result: int | None = get_storage().get_max_event_id(ws_id)
return result
def fetch_history(self, ws_id: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
r = self._http.get(
f"/v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/history",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {self._token}"},
)
r.raise_for_status()
result: dict[str, Any] = r.json()
return result
# -- teardown ------------------------------------------------------------
def stop(self) -> None:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
for ws in list(self._manager.list_all()):
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
self._manager.close(ws.id)
self._server.should_exit = True
self._thread.join(timeout=20)
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
self._http.close()
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
self._sock.close()
# Restore the cluster-lane daemon factories + any patched cap defaults.
tsrv._global_fanout_thread = _REAL_FANOUT
tsrv._aggregate_emitter_thread = _REAL_AGGREGATE
for meth, defaults in self._orig_defaults:
meth.__defaults__ = defaults
def _tcp_ready(port: int, timeout: float) -> bool:
end = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < end:
try:
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.3):
return True
except OSError:
time.sleep(0.05)
return False
def bash_toolcall_script(
call_id: str, command: str, *, finish_reason: str = "tool_calls"
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""A scripted assistant turn issuing ONE bash tool call."""
return dict(
tool_calls=[{"id": call_id, "name": "bash", "arguments": json.dumps({"command": command})}],
finish_reason=finish_reason,
)
def parallel_bash_script(commands: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""A scripted assistant turn issuing SEVERAL bash tool calls at once
(the parallel-pool storm), ``{call_id: command}``.
Each command is prefixed with a no-op ``: <call_id>;`` so the tool
ARGUMENTS are distinct per call while the OUTPUT is unchanged (``:``
ignores its args and prints nothing). Identical-argument parallel
calls otherwise trip the session's repeat-tool-call guard, which
appends a warning to the PERSISTED result only (not the live event)
an orthogonal divergence that would mask the recovery behavior the
convergence assertions test.
"""
return dict(
tool_calls=[
{
"id": cid,
"name": "bash",
"arguments": json.dumps({"command": f": {cid}; {cmd}"}),
}
for cid, cmd in commands.items()
],
finish_reason="tool_calls",
)
def final_text_script(content: str = "done") -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The scripted assistant turn that ends the agent loop (no tools)."""
return dict(content=content, finish_reason="stop")
-76
View File
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
"""Recording fake SDK client — captures the kwargs at each provider's seam.
Every provider's ``create_streaming`` assembles its kwargs and calls the
SDK *eagerly* before returning the stream iterator (Anthropic
``client.messages.stream``, OpenAI ``client.chat.completions.create``,
Responses ``client.responses.create/stream``), so driving a provider
against a :class:`RecordingClient` captures the full composed request
payload without a network round-trip.
Shared by the wire-payload golden harness (``test_wire_payload_golden``)
and the effort-ladder parity harness (``test_effort_ladder_wire_parity``)
so both assert against the same capture seam.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Iterator
class _EmptyStream:
"""Stand-in for an SDK stream / stream-manager: empty iterable AND no-op CM."""
def __iter__(self) -> Iterator[Any]:
return iter(())
def __enter__(self) -> _EmptyStream:
return self
def __exit__(self, *exc: object) -> None:
return None
class _Seam:
"""Records the kwargs of a single SDK call, returns an empty stream stub."""
def __init__(self, sink: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
self._sink = sink
def __call__(self, **kwargs: Any) -> _EmptyStream:
# Last write wins; only one seam is exercised per provider call.
self._sink["payload"] = kwargs
return _EmptyStream()
class _Completions:
def __init__(self, sink: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
self.create = _Seam(sink)
class _Chat:
def __init__(self, sink: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
self.completions = _Completions(sink)
class _Messages:
def __init__(self, sink: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
self.stream = _Seam(sink)
class _Responses:
def __init__(self, sink: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
self.create = _Seam(sink)
self.stream = _Seam(sink)
class RecordingClient:
"""Fake SDK client exposing every provider's call seam, recording kwargs."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.captured: dict[str, Any] = {}
self.messages = _Messages(self.captured)
self.chat = _Chat(self.captured)
self.responses = _Responses(self.captured)
+1 -198
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,6 @@ import asyncio
import contextlib
import logging
import os
import socket
import subprocess
import sys
import threading
import time
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
@@ -55,76 +52,8 @@ def serve_until_exit(server: Any) -> None:
loop.close()
class _PendingResolver:
"""Race-free drop-in for ``threading.Timer(delay, ui.resolve_approval)``.
``approve_tools`` runs ``_approval_event.clear()`` -> register
``_pending_approval`` -> ``_approval_event.wait(_APPROVAL_WAIT_TIMEOUT)``
(3600s). A *fixed-delay* timer can fire ``resolve_approval``
(``_approval_event.set()``) BEFORE that ``.clear()`` on a slow/loaded
runner, so the set is wiped by the clear and ``approve_tools`` blocks the
full hour -- surfacing as a CI hang. This instead waits until the approval
is actually registered (which happens *after* the clear), then resolves, so
the wakeup can never be lost. ``start()`` / ``cancel()`` mirror
``threading.Timer`` so it drops into existing scaffolding. ``cancel()``
signals the worker to stop and joins it, so a test that errors *before* the
approval registers can't leak the thread or resolve late into a finished
test. ``before`` runs just before resolving -- e.g. to snapshot
pending-state fields the test asserts on.
"""
def __init__(
self,
ui: Any,
*args: Any,
before: Callable[[], None] | None = None,
deadline: float = 10.0,
**kwargs: Any,
) -> None:
self._ui = ui
self._args = args
self._kwargs = kwargs
self._before = before
self._deadline = deadline
self._cancelled = threading.Event()
self._started = False
self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._run, name="resolve-when-pending", daemon=True)
def _run(self) -> None:
end = time.monotonic() + self._deadline
while time.monotonic() < end:
if self._cancelled.is_set():
return
# getattr (not a bare read) so a UI without _pending_approval can't
# crash the worker into a silent death that leaves approve_tools
# blocked for the full _APPROVAL_WAIT_TIMEOUT.
if getattr(self._ui, "_pending_approval", None) is not None:
if self._before is not None:
self._before()
self._ui.resolve_approval(*self._args, **self._kwargs)
return
time.sleep(0.001)
# Deadline without registration: approve_tools isn't parked on the
# approval event (returned early, or never reached it) -- don't resolve
# into an unknown state; let the test's own assertions speak.
def start(self) -> None:
self._started = True
self._thread.start()
def cancel(self) -> None:
self._cancelled.set()
if self._started:
self._thread.join(timeout=5)
def resolve_when_pending(ui: Any, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> _PendingResolver:
"""Build a race-free approval resolver (see :class:`_PendingResolver`)."""
return _PendingResolver(ui, *args, **kwargs)
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator
from collections.abc import Iterator
from turnstone.core.mcp_client import MCPClientManager, StaticServerState
from turnstone.core.mcp_crypto import MCPTokenCipher
@@ -219,98 +148,6 @@ def _seed_static_state(mgr: MCPClientManager, name: str, **overrides: Any) -> St
return state
def _run_on_loop(loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop, coro: Any, timeout: float = 10) -> Any:
"""Submit *coro* to *loop*, wait for the result.
The ONE copy shared by the MCP test files four hand-synced copies
had already drifted on the timeout (5s hardcoded vs a 10s default).
The timeout is an upper bound on waiting, not a behavior assertion,
so the most generous variant won the merge.
"""
fut = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(coro, loop)
return fut.result(timeout=timeout)
def _drain_background(mgr: MCPClientManager, loop: asyncio.AbstractEventLoop) -> None:
"""Deterministically await ``mgr``'s tracked background tasks.
Replaces fixed sleeps for synchronizing with scheduled dead-grant
drops / spawned refreshes: exact, and immune to slow-runner flake.
"""
async def _drain() -> None:
tasks = [t for t in list(mgr._background_tasks) if not t.done()]
if tasks:
await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
_run_on_loop(loop, _drain())
def _poll_until(predicate: Callable[[], bool], timeout: float, interval: float = 0.05) -> bool:
"""Poll *predicate* until true or *timeout* elapses — the ONE wait loop.
Shared by the live MCP smoke tests' condition helpers so the
deadline/poll pattern doesn't accrete per-file hand-synced copies.
"""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if predicate():
return True
time.sleep(interval)
return False
def _free_port() -> int:
"""Grab an ephemeral localhost port for a live-server subprocess.
Shared by the live MCP smoke tests (flaky-server, push-refresh) so
the socket-probe helpers stay in one place instead of drifting per
file.
"""
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s:
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
return int(s.getsockname()[1])
def _tcp_accepts(port: int) -> bool:
try:
with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=0.3):
return True
except OSError:
return False
def _wait_tcp_ready(port: int, timeout: float) -> bool:
"""Poll until something accepts TCP on 127.0.0.1:*port* (live tests)."""
return _poll_until(lambda: _tcp_accepts(port), timeout)
def _wait_session_live(mgr: MCPClientManager, name: str, timeout: float) -> bool:
"""Poll until static server *name* has a live session (live tests)."""
def _live() -> bool:
state = mgr._static_servers.get(name)
return state is not None and state.session is not None
return _poll_until(_live, timeout)
def _popen_mcp_server(script_path: Any, port: int) -> subprocess.Popen[bytes]:
"""Start a FastMCP live-server subprocess, streams to DEVNULL.
The shared spawn primitive for the live MCP smoke tests
(flaky-server flap loop, push-refresh) the readiness wait and the
skip-vs-raise-on-failure policy legitimately differ per test and
stay at the call sites. ``sys.executable`` runs the same interpreter,
so a server-side import gap surfaces as a failed TCP wait, not here.
"""
return subprocess.Popen(
[sys.executable, str(script_path), str(port)],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
def make_oidc_test_config(**overrides: Any) -> OIDCConfig:
"""Build a test ``OIDCConfig`` with sensible defaults.
@@ -430,40 +267,6 @@ def mock_openai_client():
return client
@pytest.fixture
def make_config_store():
"""Factory for a lightweight ConfigStore double.
``make_config_store(**overrides)`` returns an object whose ``.get(key)``
yields the override when present, else the registered SettingDef default
mirroring the real :meth:`ConfigStore.get` fail-open (a bool setting reads
as its ``False`` default on a miss, never ``None``). Shared by the
``server.require_project`` gate / advisory tests.
"""
_unset = object()
def _make(**overrides: Any) -> Any:
from turnstone.core.settings_registry import SETTINGS
class _ConfigStoreDouble:
def get(self, key: str, default: Any = _unset) -> Any:
# Mirror ConfigStore.get precedence exactly: cache (overrides)
# first, then a caller-supplied default, then the registry
# default, then None — so a reused caller passing an explicit
# default for an unset key gets the same value production would.
if key in overrides:
return overrides[key]
if default is not _unset:
return default
defn = SETTINGS.get(key)
return defn.default if defn else None
return _ConfigStoreDouble()
return _make
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _clear_policy_cache():
"""Drop the in-process tool-policy cache between tests.
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": "Weather in Paris and London?",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"id": "call_1",
"input": {
"city": "Paris"
},
"name": "get_weather",
"type": "tool_use"
},
{
"id": "call_2",
"input": {
"city": "London"
},
"name": "get_weather",
"type": "tool_use"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
},
{
"content": [
{
"content": "18C, clear.",
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
},
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_2",
"type": "tool_result"
},
{
"text": "Actually, never mind London.",
"type": "text"
}
],
"role": "user"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b",
"tools": [
{
"description": "Look up the weather for a city.",
"input_schema": {
"properties": {
"city": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"city"
],
"type": "object"
},
"name": "get_weather"
}
]
}
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": [
{
"text": "What's in this image?",
"type": "text"
},
{
"source": {
"data": "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mP8z8BQDwAEhQGAhKmMIQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
"media_type": "image/png",
"type": "base64"
},
"type": "image"
}
],
"role": "user"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b"
}
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": "Think about the weather.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"signature": "sig-abc",
"thinking": "The user wants weather.",
"type": "thinking"
},
{
"text": "Let me check.",
"type": "text"
},
{
"id": "call_1",
"input": {
"city": "Paris"
},
"name": "get_weather",
"type": "tool_use"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
},
{
"content": [
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
}
],
"role": "user"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b",
"tools": [
{
"description": "Look up the weather for a city.",
"input_schema": {
"properties": {
"city": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"city"
],
"type": "object"
},
"name": "get_weather"
}
]
}
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": "Think about the weather.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"signature": "sig-abc",
"thinking": "The user wants weather.",
"type": "thinking"
},
{
"text": "Let me check.",
"type": "text"
},
{
"id": "call_1",
"input": {
"city": "Paris"
},
"name": "get_weather",
"type": "tool_use"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
},
{
"content": [
{
"content": "18C, clear.",
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
}
],
"role": "user"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b",
"tools": [
{
"description": "Look up the weather for a city.",
"input_schema": {
"properties": {
"city": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"city"
],
"type": "object"
},
"name": "get_weather"
}
]
}
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": "Run the deploy.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"id": "call_1",
"input": {},
"name": "deploy",
"type": "tool_use"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
},
{
"content": [
{
"content": "deployed",
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
},
{
"text": "Great, what's next?",
"type": "text"
}
],
"role": "user"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b",
"system": "Output-guard: deploy output looked clean.",
"tools": [
{
"description": "Look up the weather for a city.",
"input_schema": {
"properties": {
"city": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"city"
],
"type": "object"
},
"name": "get_weather"
}
]
}
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": "Hi there.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"text": "Hello! How can I help?",
"type": "text"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
},
{
"content": "What's the weather in Paris?",
"role": "user"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b"
}
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": "Weather in Paris?",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"id": "call_1",
"input": {
"city": "Paris"
},
"name": "get_weather",
"type": "tool_use"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
},
{
"content": [
{
"content": "18C, clear.",
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
}
],
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"text": "It's 18C and clear in Paris.",
"type": "text"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b",
"tools": [
{
"description": "Look up the weather for a city.",
"input_schema": {
"properties": {
"city": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"city"
],
"type": "object"
},
"name": "get_weather"
}
]
}
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
{
"cache_control": {
"type": "ephemeral"
},
"extra_body": {
"chat_template_kwargs": {
"enable_thinking": true,
"reasoning_effort": "high"
}
},
"max_tokens": 4096,
"messages": [
{
"content": "Weather in Paris?",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": [
{
"id": "call_1",
"input": {
"city": "Paris"
},
"name": "get_weather",
"type": "tool_use"
}
],
"role": "assistant"
},
{
"content": [
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
}
],
"role": "user"
}
],
"model": "qwen3.6-27b",
"tools": [
{
"description": "Look up the weather for a city.",
"input_schema": {
"properties": {
"city": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"city"
],
"type": "object"
},
"name": "get_weather"
}
]
}
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
"type": "tool_result"
},
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_2",
"type": "tool_result"
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
{
"content": [
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"system": "Output-guard: deploy output looked clean.",
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
{
"content": [
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"temperature": 1.0,
"thinking": {
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
"type": "tool_result"
},
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_2",
"type": "tool_result"
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
{
"content": [
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
{
"content": [
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"is_error": true,
"tool_use_id": "call_1",
"type": "tool_result"
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
}
],
"model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"output_config": {
"effort": "medium"
},
"thinking": {
"display": "summarized",
"type": "adaptive"
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
"tool_call_id": "call_1"
},
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"role": "tool",
"tool_call_id": "call_2"
},
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
"stream_options": {
"include_usage": true
},
"temperature": 0.5,
"tools": [
{
"function": {
@@ -21,5 +21,6 @@
"stream": true,
"stream_options": {
"include_usage": true
}
},
"temperature": 0.5
}
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
]
},
{
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled. Outcome UNKNOWN — this call may have begun executing before the generation was stopped; do not assume it did not run, and reconcile before re-issuing it.",
"content": "Tool execution was cancelled.",
"role": "tool",
"tool_call_id": "call_1"
}
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
"stream_options": {
"include_usage": true
},
"temperature": 0.5,
"tools": [
{
"function": {
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
"stream_options": {
"include_usage": true
},
"temperature": 0.5,
"tools": [
{
"function": {
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
"stream_options": {
"include_usage": true
},
"temperature": 0.5,
"tools": [
{
"function": {

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More