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10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Patrick Buckley 6f89d0cc13 chore: bump version to 0.9.10 2026-04-01 19:40:17 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 62d2a0fe6a fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard (#274)
* fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard

Auth is now mandatory for all deployments. Remove the
TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED toggle and make JWT_SECRET and AUTH_TOKEN
required in the wizard's system prompt.

* fix: remove auth disable support from runtime and infra

Remove AuthConfig.enabled field — auth is always on. Drop
TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED env var, config toggle, and the
check_request bypass. Update compose.yaml, Helm chart,
Terraform, docs, and tests to match.

* feat: deprecate config tokens, require JWT secret, prefer JWT auth

Phase 1 of config-token removal:

- load_jwt_secret() now exits with error if no secret is configured
  (was: silently auto-generated ephemeral secret)
- _authenticate_token() logs deprecation warning on config token use
- CLI /cluster commands use ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set
- turnstone-admin tls-list uses ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set
- Update bootstrap wizard, docker.md, security.md to mark
  TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN as deprecated and JWT_SECRET as required
- Console test fixtures use auth token + headers (auth always enforced)

* feat: add service scope for inter-service JWT auth

Add "service" to VALID_SCOPES and SCOPE_HIERARCHY. Service tokens
bypass require_permission() RBAC checks, replacing the old
empty-user-id bypass that config tokens relied on.

All ServiceTokenManager instances that need admin access now include
"service" in their scopes (console proxy, channel gateway, CLI,
admin CLI). Read-only services (collector, notification) unchanged.

* feat: phase 2 config token deprecation

- SDK doc examples now show API tokens (ts_) instead of config tokens
- Remove _get_config_token() from admin CLI (dead code)
- Block config token exchange in handle_auth_login — only password
  and API token login allowed
- Update login tests to use password-based auth instead of config
  token exchange

* feat: phase 3 — remove config tokens entirely

Complete removal of config-file token authentication:

- Delete AuthConfig.tokens, check(), _ROLE_TO_SCOPES, hmac dispatch
  branch, and config token loading from load_auth_config()
- Remove auth_config parameter from _authenticate_token() and
  check_request() — callers updated throughout
- Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from compose.yaml, Helm charts,
  Terraform, turnstone.example.toml
- Remove --auth-token CLI flags from turnstone, turnstone-admin,
  and turnstone-console
- Simplify console main() — always use ServiceTokenManager
  (no fallback to static tokens)
- Delete config-token-specific tests, rewrite check_request and
  integration tests to use JWT auth with proper audience claims
- Remove all config token references from docs (security.md,
  docker.md, sdk.md, console.md, architecture.md, bootstrap prompt)

* fix: address code review findings

- Fix 33 broken tests: add JWT auth to test_api_versioning,
  test_console_routing_proxy, test_tls_admin, test_tls_manager,
  test_server_live (jwt_secret + audience-scoped auth headers)
- Add TestRequirePermissionServiceScope: 4 tests covering the
  service scope RBAC bypass path
- Remove stale comments referencing config tokens in auth.py and
  console/server.py
- Remove dead proxy_auth_token parameter from console create_app()
  and static token fallback in _proxy_auth_headers()
- Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from env.py scrub list

* fix: address Copilot review — JWT audience, compose require secret

- CLI /cluster: add audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE to ServiceTokenManager
  (console validates audience, JWTs without it were rejected)
- Admin CLI tls-list: same audience fix
- compose.yaml: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET now uses :? to fail fast if unset
- SDK console: fix default port from 8081 to 8090

* test: add auth enforcement tests for TLS admin endpoints

5 new tests: unauthenticated requests return 401 (list, renew,
delete), read-only-scoped requests return 403 (renew, delete).
Closes the TLS auth enforcement test gap noted in PROGRESS.md.

* fix: address remaining Copilot review feedback

- Fix token_source="config" → "test" in TLS test fixtures
- Fix AuthResult.token_source docstring to include service origins
- Require TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in cluster compose profile (:?)
- Helm: add auth.jwtSecret + auth.existingSecret values, wire
  TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET into secret.yaml and both deployments
- Terraform: replace auth_token with jwt_secret variable + secret,
  remove orphaned auth_token resources and IAM reference
- Remove [[auth.tokens]] from security.md config example

* fix: address full code review — 10 findings

Critical:
- Terraform: replace concat(common_env, auth_env) with common_env
  (auth_env local was removed but still referenced)
- Channel gateway: remove hmac static token auth from _check_auth(),
  use JWT-only validation. Remove --auth-token CLI arg from channel
- Rebalancer: add token_manager support so migration requests carry
  JWT auth (was sending unauthenticated POST to /internal/migrate)

Major:
- Guard _permissions_to_scopes() against "service" privilege
  escalation from DB role permissions
- Remove dead AuthConfig class, load_auth_config(), and all
  auth_config parameters from create_app() signatures
- Helm: inject JWT secret for both inline and existingSecret paths

Minor:
- Remove dead auth_token param from ClusterCollector
- Remove empty TestLoadAuthConfig class
- Short JWT secret now exits instead of warning
- Compose: add generation command comment above JWT_SECRET
- Clean stale config token references from 6 doc files
- Clean stale AUTH_TOKEN reference from bootstrap wizard prompt

* fix: remove remaining stale config token references from docs

- channels.md: remove --auth-token from options table
- oidc.md: remove "config-file tokens still work" claim
- security.md: remove config token section, fix JWT secret docs
  (now required/exits, no ephemeral fallback), remove hmac from
  ASCII diagram, remove --auth-token reference
2026-04-01 19:38:24 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 5df37f83a7 fix: populate model in _last_usage so usage-by-model records correctly (#273)
* fix: populate model in _last_usage so usage-by-model records correctly

_last_usage was built purely from UsageInfo token counts, never
including a "model" key.  server.py's on_status() fell back to
model="" for every record_usage_event call, so GROUP BY model
collapsed all rows into a single empty-key bucket.

* fix: inject model at emission time, preserve dict[str, int] typing

Address Copilot review: keep _last_usage as dict[str, int] for type
safety, inject "model" from self.model when passing to on_status().
This also fixes stale model after /model switch since the value is
read fresh each time.
2026-04-01 13:21:48 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 651c4d98cd fix: MCP tools not surfacing after Sync to Nodes, update Anthropic to… (#272)
* fix: MCP tools not surfacing after Sync to Nodes, update Anthropic tool search

Three fixes:

1. session_factory closure captured mcp_client=None when no --mcp-config
   was passed at startup. internal_mcp_reload created a new MCPClientManager
   on app.state but the factory never saw it. New workstreams got 0 MCP tools.
   Fix: mutable _mcp_ref list shared between factory and reload handler.

2. Anthropic dropped the date suffix from tool_search_tool_bm25_20251119
   and now requires name == type. Updated constant and tool definition.

3. Add diagnostic logging around API errors (provider, model, base_url,
   message counts, full exception chain) and workstream resume (pre/post
   provider state, alias resolution warnings).

Also adds Node.js 24 LTS to Dockerfile via multi-stage copy for npx-based
MCP servers.

* fix: address Copilot review — set_storage on reload, sanitize log output

- Call mcp_mgr.set_storage(storage) when internal_mcp_reload creates a
  new MCPClientManager so prompt sync works for post-startup servers
- Strip query params from base_url before logging (may contain API keys
  in some vLLM deployments)
- Split API error logging: concise warning (type names only) + separate
  debug with exc_info=True for full traceback when needed

* chore: remove DDG MCP sidecar, web_search uses built-in ddgs client

The DuckDuckGo MCP server container is redundant — the built-in
DuckDuckGoClient (via ddgs package, included in all extras) auto-detects
when no Tavily key is configured. Removes the ddg-search service,
ddgCluster profile, and mcp-ddg.json config file.
2026-04-01 12:42:09 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e901e859c7 fix: materialize skill resources to disk for subprocess access (#271)
* fix: materialize skill resources to disk for subprocess access

Skill-bundled scripts stored in skill_resources were loaded into memory
but never written to disk, causing FileNotFoundError when the model
tried to execute them. Write resources to a per-workstream temp directory
on skill load, expose via SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR env var and PATH, clean up
on skill change or session close.

* fix: pre-flight validation warns when skill references missing resources

Scan rendered skill content for path references (scripts/foo.py, etc.)
and compare against bundled skill_resources. Warn via on_info if any
referenced paths are not bundled, so operators see the gap at skill
activation rather than at runtime FileNotFoundError.

* fix: address PR #271 review feedback

- Fix trailing colon in PATH when $PATH is empty (cwd-on-PATH risk)
- Move try/except inside per-resource loop so one bad write doesn't
  abort all resources
- Explicit encoding="utf-8" for deterministic writes across locales

* fix: address PR #271 review round 2

- Normalize available paths in _validate_skill_resources() to match
  referenced paths (both sides use os.path.normpath now)
- Fix flaky traversal test: assert inside base dir, not escaped path
2026-03-31 22:34:24 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 200dcfeac5 chore: trivy ignore CVE-2026-4046 (glibc iconv DoS, fix deferred) 2026-03-31 18:01:33 -07:00
Patrick Buckley 8c414feba2 chore: bump version to 0.9.9 2026-03-31 17:45:34 -07:00
Patrick Buckley d7cea053b6 fix: prevent cross-workstream SSE event contamination in WebUI (#270)
Multiple browser tabs open to the same server could see workstream
names, states, and content mixed up between workstreams when creating,
closing, and switching tabs rapidly.

Root causes and fixes:
- Global SSE ws_created events were never handled — other tabs never
  learned about new workstreams, causing blank names and stale tab bars
- SSE reconnection assigned all stale panes to the first workstream
  instead of deduplicating; now uses two-pass assignment with tracking
- switchTab left the old EventSource open while reassigning pane.wsId,
  creating a window for events to leak; now disconnects SSE first
- Per-workstream events carried no ws_id — server now stamps ws_id on
  all events via _enqueue (shallow copy); client handleEvent drops
  events with mismatched ws_id as defense-in-depth
- Plan dialog used pane.wsId at resolve time (could drift after tab
  switch); now captures ws_id when the dialog opens
- Global ws_closed could reassign panes before per-ws SSE finished
  draining; now disconnects per-ws SSE immediately on close
2026-03-31 17:43:25 -07:00
Patrick Buckley c45e98462b fix: prompt policy endpoints used non-existent admin.prompt_policies permission
The 5 prompt policy admin endpoints required "admin.prompt_policies"
but the builtin-admin role only grants "admin.policies". Changed to
match the existing permission used by tool policy endpoints.
2026-03-31 17:43:01 -07:00
Patrick Buckley e17cbe35a5 fix: harden Discord bot against gateway disconnects and SSE failures (#269)
* fix: harden Discord bot against gateway disconnects and SSE failures

- Isolate Discord API failures from SSE stream — _on_ws_event exceptions
  no longer kill the SSE connection and cause missed events
- Fix broken exponential backoff on 4xx/5xx (delay was reset on every
  attempt); skip aiter_sse() on error responses
- Add read timeout (90s) to SSE httpx client so half-open TCP
  connections are detected and recovered
- Re-resolve node URL on each SSE reconnect attempt
- Add on_resumed handler to recover SSE tasks that died during brief
  gateway disconnects (on_ready is not called on session resume)
- Sync slash commands only on first on_ready to avoid Discord rate limits

* fix: SSE backoff on 4xx/5xx and retrieve dead task exceptions

- Replace `continue` with raise+catch so 4xx/5xx errors hit the
  exponential backoff path instead of tight-looping
- Retrieve task exceptions in _purge_dead_sse_tasks to suppress
  "Task exception was never retrieved" warnings and log the cause
2026-03-31 17:28:59 -07:00
55 changed files with 1617 additions and 1016 deletions
+5
View File
@@ -17,3 +17,8 @@ CVE-2026-27135
# Affects libsystemd0, libudev1
# https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2026-29111
CVE-2026-29111
# glibc iconv() DoS — fix_deferred, no patched libc in Debian 13 yet
# Affects libc-bin, libc6
# https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2026-4046
CVE-2026-4046
+6
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y && apt-get install -y --no-install-reco
libpq5 git curl jq man-db manpages procps file \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Node.js LTS (for npx-based MCP servers like @modelcontextprotocol/server-github)
COPY --from=node:24-slim /usr/local/bin/node /usr/local/bin/node
COPY --from=node:24-slim /usr/local/lib/node_modules /usr/local/lib/node_modules
RUN ln -s ../lib/node_modules/npm/bin/npm-cli.js /usr/local/bin/npm \
&& ln -s ../lib/node_modules/npm/bin/npx-cli.js /usr/local/bin/npx
# Non-root user
RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash turnstone
+9 -54
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
# Single node: docker compose --profile production up
# Production (PG): DB_BACKEND=postgresql docker compose --profile production up
# 10-node cluster: docker compose --profile cluster up
# Cluster + DDG: docker compose --profile ddgCluster up
# =============================================================================
name: turnstone
@@ -28,7 +27,6 @@ services:
profiles:
- production
- cluster
- ddgCluster
command:
- postgres
- -c
@@ -82,15 +80,13 @@ services:
- "${SERVER_PORT:-8080}:8080"
volumes:
- turnstone-data:/data
- ./docker/mcp-ddg.json:/etc/turnstone/mcp-ddg.json:ro
environment:
- LLM_BASE_URL=${LLM_BASE_URL:-http://host.docker.internal:8000/v1}
- OPENAI_API_KEY=${OPENAI_API_KEY:-dummy}
- TAVILY_API_KEY=${TAVILY_API_KEY:-}
- SKIP_PERMISSIONS=${SKIP_PERMISSIONS:-}
- TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED=${TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED:-}
- TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN=${TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN:-}
- TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:-}
# Generate with: python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"
- TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:?Set TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in .env}
- MODEL=${MODEL:-}
- MCP_CONFIG=${MCP_CONFIG:-}
- TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND=${DB_BACKEND:-sqlite}
@@ -105,9 +101,6 @@ services:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
required: false
ddg-search:
condition: service_healthy
required: false
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "python", "/usr/local/bin/healthcheck.py", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/health"]
interval: 10s
@@ -130,9 +123,8 @@ services:
ports:
- "${CONSOLE_PORT:-8090}:8090"
environment:
- TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED=${TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED:-}
- TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN=${TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN:-}
- TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:-}
# Generate with: python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"
- TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:?Set TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in .env}
- TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND=${DB_BACKEND:-sqlite}
- TURNSTONE_DB_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-}
- TURNSTONE_CONSOLE_URL=http://console:8090
@@ -157,7 +149,6 @@ services:
profiles:
- production
- cluster
- ddgCluster
command:
- sh
- -c
@@ -168,8 +159,8 @@ services:
environment:
- TURNSTONE_DISCORD_TOKEN=${TURNSTONE_DISCORD_TOKEN:-}
- TURNSTONE_DISCORD_GUILD=${TURNSTONE_DISCORD_GUILD:-0}
- TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN=${TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN:-}
- TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:-}
# Generate with: python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"
- TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:?Set TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in .env}
- TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND=${DB_BACKEND:-postgresql}
- TURNSTONE_DB_URL=${DATABASE_URL:-postgresql://${POSTGRES_USER:-turnstone}:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-turnstone}@postgres:5432/turnstone}
- TURNSTONE_CHANNEL_ADVERTISE_URL=http://channel:8091
@@ -181,39 +172,6 @@ services:
required: false
restart: unless-stopped
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
# ddg-search — DuckDuckGo Search MCP server (HTTP transport)
# Provides web search + content fetch tools to turnstone via MCP.
# No API key required.
#
# Start with: MCP_CONFIG=/etc/turnstone/mcp-ddg.json \
# docker compose --profile ddgCluster up
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
ddg-search:
image: python:3.14-slim
profiles:
- ddgCluster
command:
- sh
- -c
- >-
pip install --no-cache-dir duckduckgo-mcp-server &&
python -c "from mcp.server.transport_security import TransportSecuritySettings; import duckduckgo_mcp_server.server as s; s.safe_search=s.SafeSearchMode.OFF; s.mcp.settings.host='0.0.0.0'; s.mcp.settings.port=3000; s.mcp.settings.transport_security=TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=False); s.mcp.run(transport='streamable-http')"
networks:
- turnstone-net
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "python -c \"import socket; s=socket.create_connection(('0.0.0.0',3000),2); s.close()\""]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 30s
deploy:
resources:
limits:
memory: 256M
cpus: '0.25'
restart: unless-stopped
# ===================================================================
# 10-node cluster (profile: cluster)
#
@@ -228,7 +186,7 @@ services:
server-1: &cluster-server
image: turnstone:local
build: { context: ., dockerfile: Dockerfile }
profiles: [cluster, ddgCluster]
profiles: [cluster]
command:
- sh
- -c
@@ -243,15 +201,13 @@ services:
$${MCP_CONFIG:+--mcp-config $$MCP_CONFIG}
volumes:
- turnstone-data:/data
- ./docker/mcp-ddg.json:/etc/turnstone/mcp-ddg.json:ro
environment: &cluster-server-env
LLM_BASE_URL: ${LLM_BASE_URL:-http://host.docker.internal:8000/v1}
OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-dummy}
TAVILY_API_KEY: ${TAVILY_API_KEY:-}
SKIP_PERMISSIONS: ${SKIP_PERMISSIONS:-}
TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED: ${TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED:-}
TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN:-}
TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET: ${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:-}
# Generate with: python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"
TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET: ${TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET:?Set TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in .env}
MODEL: ${MODEL:-}
MCP_CONFIG: ${MCP_CONFIG:-}
TURNSTONE_DB_BACKEND: ${DB_BACKEND:-postgresql}
@@ -262,7 +218,6 @@ services:
networks: [turnstone-net]
depends_on:
postgres: { condition: service_healthy }
ddg-search: { condition: service_healthy, required: false }
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "python", "/usr/local/bin/healthcheck.py", "http://127.0.0.1:8080/health"]
interval: 10s
@@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ spec:
- secretRef:
name: {{ include "turnstone.llm.secretName" . }}
optional: true
{{- if and .Values.auth.enabled .Values.auth.existingSecret }}
{{- if or .Values.auth.existingSecret .Values.auth.jwtSecret }}
env:
- name: TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN
- name: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ .Values.auth.existingSecret }}
key: TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN
name: {{ include "turnstone.auth.secretName" . }}
key: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET
{{- end }}
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
@@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ spec:
env:
- name: TURNSTONE_DB_URL
value: "postgresql+psycopg://$(TURNSTONE_DB_USER):$(POSTGRES_PASSWORD)@$(TURNSTONE_DB_HOST):$(TURNSTONE_DB_PORT)/$(TURNSTONE_DB_NAME)"
{{- if and .Values.auth.enabled .Values.auth.existingSecret }}
- name: TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN
{{- if or .Values.auth.existingSecret .Values.auth.jwtSecret }}
- name: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: {{ .Values.auth.existingSecret }}
key: TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN
name: {{ include "turnstone.auth.secretName" . }}
key: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET
{{- end }}
readinessProbe:
httpGet:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ data:
{{- else if and (not .Values.postgresql.enabled) .Values.database.external.password }}
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: {{ .Values.database.external.password | b64enc | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- if and .Values.auth.enabled .Values.auth.token (not .Values.auth.existingSecret) }}
TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN: {{ .Values.auth.token | b64enc | quote }}
{{- if and .Values.auth.jwtSecret (not .Values.auth.existingSecret) }}
TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET: {{ .Values.auth.jwtSecret | b64enc | quote }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
+2 -3
View File
@@ -59,10 +59,9 @@ llm:
apiKey: ""
existingSecret: ""
# -- Authentication
# -- Authentication (always enabled, JWT secret required)
auth:
enabled: false
token: ""
jwtSecret: ""
existingSecret: ""
# -- Ingress configuration
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "ecs_execution_secrets" {
[
aws_secretsmanager_secret.openai_api_key.arn,
aws_secretsmanager_secret.db_password.arn,
aws_secretsmanager_secret.jwt_secret.arn,
],
var.auth_token != "" ? [aws_secretsmanager_secret.auth_token[0].arn] : [],
)
},
]
+16 -20
View File
@@ -41,20 +41,26 @@ locals {
},
]
auth_env = var.auth_token != "" ? [
{ name = "TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED", value = "true" },
] : []
auth_secrets = var.auth_token != "" ? [
auth_secrets = [
{
name = "TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN"
valueFrom = aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.auth_token[0].arn
name = "TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET"
valueFrom = aws_secretsmanager_secret_version.jwt_secret.arn
},
] : []
]
}
# ---------- Secrets Manager ----------
resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "jwt_secret" {
name = "${var.name_prefix}-${var.environment}-jwt-secret"
tags = local.common_tags
}
resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "jwt_secret" {
secret_id = aws_secretsmanager_secret.jwt_secret.id
secret_string = var.jwt_secret
}
resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "openai_api_key" {
name = "${var.name_prefix}-${var.environment}-openai-api-key"
tags = local.common_tags
@@ -65,17 +71,7 @@ resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "openai_api_key" {
secret_string = var.openai_api_key
}
resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "auth_token" {
count = var.auth_token != "" ? 1 : 0
name = "${var.name_prefix}-${var.environment}-auth-token"
tags = local.common_tags
}
resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret_version" "auth_token" {
count = var.auth_token != "" ? 1 : 0
secret_id = aws_secretsmanager_secret.auth_token[0].id
secret_string = var.auth_token
}
resource "aws_secretsmanager_secret" "db_password" {
name = "${var.name_prefix}-${var.environment}-db-password"
@@ -140,7 +136,7 @@ resource "aws_ecs_task_definition" "server" {
{ containerPort = 8080, protocol = "tcp" },
]
environment = concat(local.common_env, local.auth_env)
environment = local.common_env
secrets = concat(local.common_secrets, local.auth_secrets)
logConfiguration = {
@@ -209,7 +205,7 @@ resource "aws_ecs_task_definition" "console" {
{ containerPort = 8090, protocol = "tcp" },
]
environment = concat(local.common_env, local.auth_env)
environment = local.common_env
secrets = concat(local.common_secrets, local.auth_secrets)
logConfiguration = {
@@ -90,11 +90,10 @@ variable "name_prefix" {
default = "turnstone"
}
variable "auth_token" {
description = "Optional authentication token for the Turnstone API. Empty string disables auth."
variable "jwt_secret" {
description = "JWT signing secret for Turnstone auth (required, min 32 characters)."
type = string
sensitive = true
default = ""
}
variable "certificate_arn" {
-7
View File
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
{
"mcpServers": {
"ddg": {
"url": "http://ddg-search:3000/mcp"
}
}
}
+3 -4
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ console.log(result.content);
## Authentication
When auth is enabled (`[auth].enabled = true` or `TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED=1`), all API endpoints except public paths require a valid token.
Auth is always enabled. All API endpoints except public paths require a valid token.
### Sending Credentials
@@ -65,15 +65,14 @@ Include a token in one of two ways:
- **Bearer header**: `Authorization: Bearer <token>`
- **Cookie**: `turnstone_auth=<token>` (set automatically by the login endpoint)
The server accepts three token types:
The server accepts two token types:
| Type | Format | Example |
|------|--------|---------|
| JWT | Base64 segments separated by dots | `eyJhbG...` |
| API token | `ts_` prefix + 64 hex chars | `ts_a1b2c3d4...` |
| Config token | Arbitrary string from `config.toml` | `my-secret-token` |
JWTs are the recommended credential for browser sessions. API tokens are suitable for programmatic access and CI/CD. Config tokens are a simple option for single-node deployments.
JWTs are the recommended credential for browser sessions. API tokens are suitable for programmatic access and CI/CD.
### `POST /v1/api/auth/login`
+4 -8
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@@ -1016,13 +1016,10 @@ limits using a token-bucket algorithm. Each IP gets a `TokenBucket` with
Turnstone supports three authentication mechanisms, unified behind an
`AuthResult` dataclass that carries `user_id`, `scopes`, and `token_source`:
1. **Config-file tokens**static secrets in `config.toml` `[[auth.tokens]]`
or the `TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN` env var. Validated in-memory via
`hmac.compare_digest`. Map to scopes through their role (`read` or `full`).
2. **API tokens** — database-backed, prefixed `ts_`, stored as SHA-256 hashes
1. **API tokens**database-backed, prefixed `ts_`, stored as SHA-256 hashes
in the `api_tokens` table. Can be exchanged for JWTs via
`POST /v1/api/auth/login`.
3. **JWTs** — short-lived HMAC-SHA256 session tokens (default 24h) issued after
2. **JWTs** — short-lived HMAC-SHA256 session tokens (default 24h) issued after
successful credential validation. Contain `sub` (user_id), `scopes`, and
`src` (origin) in claims.
@@ -1046,9 +1043,8 @@ Three hierarchical scopes control endpoint access:
2. **Token extraction**`Authorization: Bearer <token>` header first, then
`turnstone_auth` cookie as fallback.
3. **Token type detection** — dots in the token indicate JWT; `ts_` prefix
indicates API token; otherwise config-file token.
4. **Validation** — JWT signature check, API token hash lookup in storage, or
config-token hmac comparison.
indicates API token.
4. **Validation** — JWT signature check or API token hash lookup in storage.
5. **Scope check**`required_scope(method, path)` determines the minimum
scope; the request is rejected with 403 if the token lacks it.
6. **Context propagation** — on success, `ctx_user_id` is set so structured
+5 -6
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@@ -193,7 +193,6 @@ Plan review requests are displayed as a blue embed with:
| `--auto-approve` | — | `false` | Auto-approve ALL tool calls (skips approval buttons entirely) |
| `--http-host` | — | `127.0.0.1` | HTTP server bind address for notify endpoint |
| `--http-port` | `TURNSTONE_CHANNEL_PORT` | `8091` | HTTP server port |
| `--auth-token` | `TURNSTONE_CHANNEL_AUTH_TOKEN` | — | Static auth token for `/v1/api/notify` (alternative to JWT) |
| `--log-level` | `TURNSTONE_LOG_LEVEL` | `INFO` | Log level |
| `--log-format` | `TURNSTONE_LOG_FORMAT` | `auto` | Log format (`auto`/`json`/`text`) |
@@ -321,11 +320,11 @@ The `services` table schema:
### Security
- **Authentication** — the gateway's `POST /v1/api/notify` endpoint
requires authentication. Configure either `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET`
(the server mints JWTs with `aud: turnstone-channel` automatically)
or a static token via `--auth-token`. If neither is set, the
gateway fails closed and rejects all requests with 401. Server JWTs
(`aud: turnstone-server`) are rejected.
requires authentication. Configure `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` so the
server can mint JWTs with `aud: turnstone-channel` automatically.
If the secret is not set, the gateway fails closed and rejects all
requests with 401. Server JWTs (`aud: turnstone-server`) are
rejected.
- **Rate limit** — maximum 5 notifications per turn. The counter only
increments on successful delivery, so failures don't consume the
budget.
+1 -2
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@@ -628,7 +628,6 @@ CLI flags for `turnstone-console`:
|------|---------|-------------|
| `--host` | `0.0.0.0` | Bind host |
| `--port` | `8090` | HTTP port |
| `--auth-token` | `$TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN` | Bearer token for server node communication and proxy |
| `--log-level` | `INFO` | Log level |
Config file (`~/.config/turnstone/config.toml`):
@@ -649,7 +648,7 @@ url = "http://localhost:8090" # used by CLI /cluster commands
turnstone-server --port 8080
# Start cluster console (one instance)
turnstone-console --port 8090 --auth-token "$TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN"
turnstone-console --port 8090
```
Open `http://localhost:8090` for the cluster dashboard. Create workstreams via the "+ new" button. Click any workstream to open the proxied server UI — no direct access to server ports required.
+3 -3
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@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ All configuration is via environment variables in `.env` (copy from `.env.exampl
### Auth
Auth is always enabled. `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` is required.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED` | — | Set to `1` to require authentication |
| `TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN` | — | Config-file token for server/console (backward compat, works alongside JWT) |
| `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` | — | Secret key for signing JWTs (required when using user identity / JWT auth) |
| `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` | — | Secret key for signing JWTs (required) |
### Database
+5 -5
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ are set.
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME` | No | `SSO` | Display name for the login button (e.g. "Google", "Okta") |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` | No | — | ID token claim containing role/group values (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` | No | — | Mapping from claim values to Turnstone role IDs (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Set to `false` to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens and config-file tokens still work. |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Set to `false` to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens continue to work. |
| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | No | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Recommended when running behind a reverse proxy. When unset, derived from the request Host header. |
OIDC is enabled when all three required fields (issuer, client ID, client
@@ -246,10 +246,10 @@ password) before OIDC is enabled. The setup wizard always works
regardless of this setting because it is only available when zero users
exist in the database.
API token login (`POST /v1/api/auth/login` with a `ts_` token) and
config-file tokens (`Authorization: Bearer tok_xxx`) continue to work
regardless of this setting. OIDC-only mode affects password-based
authentication only.
API token login (`POST /v1/api/auth/login` with a `ts_` token)
continues to work regardless of this setting. JWTs and API tokens are
the supported authentication methods. OIDC-only mode affects
password-based authentication only.
---
+2 -2
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@@ -332,6 +332,6 @@ client.login(token="ts_abc123...")
- `client.logout()` clears the stored JWT from the client.
- If a request returns 401, the SDK raises `TurnstoneAPIError` — the caller is responsible for re-authenticating.
### Backward Compatibility
### Token Types
The config-file token (`TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN`) still works as a simple Bearer token for environments that do not use the user/JWT system. When the server receives a non-JWT Bearer token, it falls back to the legacy token check.
The SDK accepts any Bearer token — JWTs (from `ServiceTokenManager` or login) and API tokens (`ts_` prefix) are both supported. Use `token_factory` for auto-rotating JWTs or a static `token` for API tokens.
+11 -54
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@@ -8,23 +8,6 @@ credentials while individual server nodes validate JWTs locally.
## Token Types
### Config-file tokens
Static tokens defined in `config.toml` or the `TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN`
environment variable. Validated in-memory using `hmac.compare_digest`
(timing-safe). Each token maps to a role that determines its scopes.
```toml
[[auth.tokens]]
value = "tok_legacy"
role = "full" # full → {read, write, approve}
```
Role mappings: `"read"``{read}`, `"full"``{read, write, approve}`.
Config tokens are sent directly as `Authorization: Bearer tok_legacy`
on every request. No JWT exchange is needed.
### API tokens
Database-backed tokens prefixed with `ts_`. Created via the admin CLI
@@ -149,15 +132,6 @@ The API token is hashed, looked up in the database, and exchanged for a
JWT with the token's scopes. This is the recommended flow for SDKs and
automated clients that need cookie-based sessions.
### Config-file tokens (direct)
Config tokens are validated per-request via `hmac.compare_digest`. No
login exchange is needed — include the token as a `Bearer` header:
```
Authorization: Bearer tok_legacy
```
### First-time setup
When no users exist in the database:
@@ -276,7 +250,7 @@ Setting `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED=false` hides the password
form on the login page and blocks password-based login at the API
level. The setup wizard always works regardless of this setting — the
first admin user is created with a password before OIDC is relevant.
API tokens and config-file tokens are unaffected by this setting.
API tokens are unaffected by this setting.
#### Known limitations
@@ -297,8 +271,6 @@ and classifies the token:
1. **Contains `.`** → JWT → validate HS256 signature and expiry
2. **Starts with `ts_`** → API token → SHA-256 hash, database lookup
3. **Otherwise** → config-file token → `hmac.compare_digest` against
each configured token
If a session cookie is present and no `Authorization` header is sent,
the cookie value is treated as a JWT (step 1).
@@ -332,16 +304,10 @@ deployments.
| Signing secret | `[auth] jwt_secret` | `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` | Auto-generated ephemeral (warning logged) |
| Expiry | `[auth] jwt_expiry_hours` | — | 24 hours |
| Algorithm | — | — | HS256 (not configurable) |
| Minimum secret length | — | — | 32 characters (warning if shorter) |
| Minimum secret length | — | — | 32 characters (exits if shorter) |
All service nodes that need to validate JWTs must share the same signing
secret. If no secret is configured, an ephemeral key is generated at
startup and a warning is logged — JWTs will not survive restarts or work
across nodes.
The console **requires** `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` when no `--auth-token`
is provided. It exits with an error if the secret is missing, since
ephemeral secrets would silently break inter-service communication.
All services require `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` and exit at startup if it is
missing or shorter than 32 characters.
---
@@ -442,16 +408,15 @@ Console (cluster-wide) Server (per-node)
┌──────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐
│ User/Token CRUD (DB) │ │ JWT validation only │
│ Login: creds → JWT │ │ (shared signing key) │
│ Admin API endpoints │ │ Config tokens: hmac
│ Storage: users, │ │ No auth DB needed
│ Admin API endpoints │ │ No auth DB needed
│ Storage: users, │ │
│ api_tokens tables │ │ │
└──────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘
```
The console owns the credential database and handles all user/token
CRUD. Individual server nodes only need the JWT signing secret to
validate session tokens. Config-file tokens are validated locally
without any database.
validate session tokens.
### Proxy auth forwarding
@@ -478,8 +443,7 @@ distinguish proxied requests from direct logins in audit logs.
When no user context is available (auth disabled, or internal requests),
the proxy falls back to a `ServiceTokenManager` with service identity
`console-proxy` and full scopes. If `--auth-token` is provided, that
static token is used as a final fallback.
`console-proxy` and full scopes.
### Service-to-service authentication
@@ -518,22 +482,17 @@ channel gateway endpoint, and vice versa.
```toml
[auth]
enabled = true
jwt_secret = "your-secret-key-here"
jwt_expiry_hours = 24
[[auth.tokens]]
value = "tok_legacy"
role = "full"
```
### Environment variables
Auth is always enabled. `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` is required.
| Variable | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED=1` | Enable authentication |
| `TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN=tok_xxx` | Register a config-file token with `full` access |
| `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=xxx` | JWT signing secret (must match across nodes) |
| `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET=xxx` | JWT signing secret (required, must match across nodes) |
| `TURNSTONE_CORS_ORIGINS=` | CORS allowed origins (comma-separated; empty = same-origin only) |
---
@@ -571,8 +530,6 @@ and browsers enforce same-origin policy.
## Security Properties
- **Timing-safe comparison** for config-file tokens via
`hmac.compare_digest` — no timing side-channel.
- **Hash-based lookup** for API tokens — the database stores only
SHA-256 hashes, eliminating timing attacks on token comparison.
- **Local JWT validation** — no network call or database query needed
+1 -1
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@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ turnstone-admin tls-ca-cert --out ca.pem --console-url http://console:8080
turnstone-admin tls-issue worker-1.internal --out /certs --console-url http://console:8080
# List issued certs
turnstone-admin tls-list --console-url http://console:8080 --auth-token $TOKEN
turnstone-admin tls-list --console-url http://console:8080
```
### Console URL Discovery
+1 -1
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@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ current turn and letting it search for them on demand.
Tool search uses the best available mechanism for each provider:
1. **Anthropic (native)** -- Models that support it receive `defer_loading: true`
on deferred tool definitions plus the `tool_search_tool_bm25_20251119` server-side
on deferred tool definitions plus the `tool_search_tool_bm25` server-side
search tool. Anthropic's API handles search and expansion transparently.
2. **OpenAI GPT-5.4+ (native)** -- Models with hosted tool search receive
+1 -1
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
[project]
name = "turnstone"
version = "0.9.8"
version = "0.9.10"
description = "Multi-node AI orchestration platform with tool use, agent routing, and cluster simulation."
readme = "README.md"
license = "BUSL-1.1"
+1 -1
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
*
* const client = new TurnstoneServer({
* baseUrl: "http://localhost:8080",
* token: "tok_xxx",
* token: "ts_your_api_token",
* });
*
* const ws = await client.createWorkstream({ name: "demo" });
+37 -8
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@@ -6,6 +6,37 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
# Shared test auth — JWT-based
_TEST_JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
def _server_jwt() -> str:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER, create_jwt
return create_jwt(
user_id="test-versioning",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="test",
secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
)
def _console_jwt() -> str:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE, create_jwt
return create_jwt(
user_id="test-versioning",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="test",
secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE,
)
_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_server_jwt()}"}
_CONSOLE_AUTH_HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_console_jwt()}"}
class TestServerVersioning:
"""Test /v1/ routes and OpenAPI endpoints on the server."""
@@ -14,7 +45,6 @@ class TestServerVersioning:
def client(self):
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
from turnstone.server import create_app
mock_mgr = MagicMock()
@@ -26,19 +56,19 @@ class TestServerVersioning:
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
skip_permissions=False,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
yield client
client.close()
def test_v1_workstreams(self, client):
resp = client.get("/v1/api/workstreams")
resp = client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert "workstreams" in resp.json()
def test_unversioned_api_404(self, client):
resp = client.get("/api/workstreams")
resp = client.get("/api/workstreams", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 404
def test_openapi_json(self, client):
@@ -72,7 +102,6 @@ class TestConsoleVersioning:
from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
_load_static()
collector = MagicMock(spec=ClusterCollector)
@@ -84,18 +113,18 @@ class TestConsoleVersioning:
}
app = create_app(
collector=collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
yield client
client.close()
def test_v1_cluster_overview(self, client):
resp = client.get("/v1/api/cluster/overview")
resp = client.get("/v1/api/cluster/overview", headers=_CONSOLE_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_unversioned_api_404(self, client):
resp = client.get("/api/cluster/overview")
resp = client.get("/api/cluster/overview", headers=_CONSOLE_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 404
def test_openapi_json(self, client):
+263 -332
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@@ -9,12 +9,11 @@ import pytest
from turnstone.core.auth import (
WRITE_PATHS,
AuthConfig,
_extract_bearer,
_extract_cookie,
check_request,
create_jwt,
is_public_path,
load_auth_config,
make_clear_cookie,
make_set_cookie,
required_scope,
@@ -199,37 +198,6 @@ class TestRequiredScope:
assert required_scope("GET", "/api/_internal/mcp-reload") == "read"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TestAuthConfig
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestAuthConfig:
def test_check_valid_full_token(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"})
assert cfg.check("tok_full") == "full"
def test_check_valid_read_token(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"})
assert cfg.check("tok_read") == "read"
def test_check_invalid_token(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full"})
assert cfg.check("wrong") is None
def test_check_none_token(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full"})
assert cfg.check(None) is None
def test_check_empty_token(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full"})
assert cfg.check("") is None
def test_check_no_tokens(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={})
assert cfg.check("anything") is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TestExtractBearer
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -353,167 +321,157 @@ class TestMakeClearCookie:
class TestCheckRequest:
"""Tests for the main check_request() entry point."""
@pytest.fixture()
def disabled(self):
return AuthConfig(enabled=False)
_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
@pytest.fixture()
def enabled(self):
return AuthConfig(
enabled=True,
tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"},
)
def read_jwt(self):
return f"Bearer {create_jwt('u1', frozenset({'read'}), 'test', self._SECRET)}"
def test_disabled_allows_all(self, disabled):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(disabled, "POST", "/api/send", None)
@pytest.fixture()
def full_jwt(self):
return f"Bearer {create_jwt('u1', frozenset({'read', 'write', 'approve'}), 'test', self._SECRET)}"
def test_public_path_no_token_ok(self):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request("GET", "/health", None)
assert allowed is True
assert status == 200
def test_disabled_allows_no_header(self, disabled):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(disabled, "GET", "/api/workstreams", None)
def test_public_root_no_token_ok(self):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request("GET", "/", None)
assert allowed is True
def test_public_path_no_token_ok(self, enabled):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(enabled, "GET", "/health", None)
assert allowed is True
assert status == 200
def test_public_root_no_token_ok(self, enabled):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(enabled, "GET", "/", None)
def test_public_static_no_token_ok(self):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request("GET", "/static/style.css", None)
assert allowed is True
def test_public_static_no_token_ok(self, enabled):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(enabled, "GET", "/static/style.css", None)
assert allowed is True
def test_api_no_token_401(self, enabled):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(enabled, "GET", "/api/workstreams", None)
def test_api_no_token_401(self):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request("GET", "/api/workstreams", None)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 401
assert "Unauthorized" in msg
def test_api_invalid_token_401(self, enabled):
def test_api_invalid_token_401(self):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "GET", "/api/workstreams", "Bearer wrong_token"
"GET", "/api/workstreams", "Bearer wrong_token"
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 401
def test_api_read_token_ok(self, enabled):
def test_api_read_token_ok(self, read_jwt):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "GET", "/api/workstreams", "Bearer tok_read"
"GET", "/api/workstreams", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is True
assert status == 200
def test_api_full_token_ok(self, enabled):
def test_api_full_token_ok(self, full_jwt):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "GET", "/api/workstreams", "Bearer tok_full"
"GET", "/api/workstreams", full_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is True
def test_write_read_token_403(self, enabled):
def test_write_read_token_403(self, read_jwt):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/api/send", "Bearer tok_read"
"POST", "/api/send", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
assert "Forbidden" in msg
def test_write_full_token_ok(self, enabled):
def test_write_full_token_ok(self, full_jwt):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/api/send", "Bearer tok_full"
"POST", "/api/send", full_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is True
assert status == 200
def test_approve_read_token_403(self, enabled):
def test_approve_read_token_403(self, read_jwt):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/api/approve", "Bearer tok_read"
"POST", "/api/approve", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_proxy_write_read_token_403(self, enabled):
def test_proxy_write_read_token_403(self, read_jwt):
"""Read tokens cannot escalate to write ops via proxy routes."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/node/node-a/api/send", "Bearer tok_read"
"POST", "/node/node-a/api/send", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_proxy_write_trailing_slash_read_token_403(self, enabled):
def test_proxy_write_trailing_slash_read_token_403(self, read_jwt):
"""Trailing slash must not bypass write-role check on proxy routes."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/node/node-a/api/send/", "Bearer tok_read"
"POST", "/node/node-a/api/send/", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_direct_write_trailing_slash_read_token_403(self, enabled):
def test_direct_write_trailing_slash_read_token_403(self, read_jwt):
"""Trailing slash must not bypass write-role check on direct routes."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/api/send/", "Bearer tok_read"
"POST", "/api/send/", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_proxy_write_full_token_ok(self, enabled):
def test_proxy_write_full_token_ok(self, full_jwt):
"""Full tokens pass through proxy write routes."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/node/node-a/api/send", "Bearer tok_full"
"POST", "/node/node-a/api/send", full_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is True
def test_proxy_v1_write_read_token_403(self, enabled):
def test_proxy_v1_write_read_token_403(self, read_jwt):
"""Read tokens cannot escalate to write ops via v1 proxy routes."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/node/node-a/v1/api/send", "Bearer tok_read"
"POST", "/node/node-a/v1/api/send", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_proxy_v1_write_full_token_ok(self, enabled):
def test_proxy_v1_write_full_token_ok(self, full_jwt):
"""Full tokens pass through v1 proxy write routes."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/node/node-a/v1/api/send", "Bearer tok_full"
"POST", "/node/node-a/v1/api/send", full_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is True
def test_proxy_v1_cluster_ws_new_read_403(self, enabled):
def test_proxy_v1_cluster_ws_new_read_403(self, read_jwt):
"""Read tokens cannot create workstreams via v1 proxy."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled,
"POST",
"/node/node-a/v1/api/cluster/workstreams/new",
"Bearer tok_read",
read_jwt,
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_proxy_read_endpoint_read_token_ok(self, enabled):
def test_proxy_read_endpoint_read_token_ok(self, read_jwt):
"""Read tokens can access proxy read endpoints."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "GET", "/node/node-a/api/workstreams", "Bearer tok_read"
"GET", "/node/node-a/api/workstreams", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is True
def test_console_create_ws_read_token_403(self, enabled):
def test_console_create_ws_read_token_403(self, read_jwt):
"""Read tokens cannot create workstreams."""
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/api/cluster/workstreams/new", "Bearer tok_read"
"POST", "/api/cluster/workstreams/new", read_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_approve_full_token_ok(self, enabled):
def test_approve_full_token_ok(self, full_jwt):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(
enabled, "POST", "/api/approve", "Bearer tok_full"
"POST", "/api/approve", full_jwt, jwt_secret=self._SECRET
)
assert allowed is True
def test_no_auth_header_string(self, enabled):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request(enabled, "GET", "/api/dashboard", "")
def test_no_auth_header_string(self):
allowed, status, msg, _result = check_request("GET", "/api/dashboard", "")
assert allowed is False
assert status == 401
@@ -526,70 +484,71 @@ class TestCheckRequest:
class TestCheckRequestWithCookie:
"""Tests for cookie-based auth fallback in check_request."""
@pytest.fixture()
def enabled(self):
return AuthConfig(
enabled=True,
tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"},
)
_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
def test_cookie_fallback_when_no_bearer(self, enabled):
@pytest.fixture()
def read_jwt(self):
return create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "test", self._SECRET)
@pytest.fixture()
def full_jwt(self):
return create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}), "test", self._SECRET)
def test_cookie_fallback_when_no_bearer(self, read_jwt):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"GET",
"/api/workstreams",
None,
cookie_header="turnstone_auth=tok_read",
cookie_header=f"turnstone_auth={read_jwt}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed is True
assert status == 200
def test_bearer_takes_precedence_over_cookie(self, enabled):
# Bearer is full, cookie is read — Bearer should win
def test_bearer_takes_precedence_over_cookie(self, read_jwt, full_jwt):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"POST",
"/api/send",
"Bearer tok_full",
cookie_header="turnstone_auth=tok_read",
f"Bearer {full_jwt}",
cookie_header=f"turnstone_auth={read_jwt}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed is True
def test_invalid_cookie_401(self, enabled):
def test_invalid_cookie_401(self):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"GET",
"/api/workstreams",
None,
cookie_header="turnstone_auth=wrong_token",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 401
def test_cookie_read_on_write_403(self, enabled):
def test_cookie_read_on_write_403(self, read_jwt):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"POST",
"/api/send",
None,
cookie_header="turnstone_auth=tok_read",
cookie_header=f"turnstone_auth={read_jwt}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed is False
assert status == 403
def test_cookie_full_on_write_ok(self, enabled):
def test_cookie_full_on_write_ok(self, full_jwt):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"POST",
"/api/send",
None,
cookie_header="turnstone_auth=tok_full",
cookie_header=f"turnstone_auth={full_jwt}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed is True
def test_no_cookie_no_bearer_401(self, enabled):
def test_no_cookie_no_bearer_401(self):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"GET",
"/api/workstreams",
None,
@@ -598,18 +557,16 @@ class TestCheckRequestWithCookie:
assert allowed is False
assert status == 401
def test_login_path_public(self, enabled):
def test_login_path_public(self):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"POST",
"/api/auth/login",
None,
)
assert allowed is True
def test_logout_path_public(self, enabled):
def test_logout_path_public(self):
allowed, status, _, _r = check_request(
enabled,
"POST",
"/api/auth/logout",
None,
@@ -617,139 +574,6 @@ class TestCheckRequestWithCookie:
assert allowed is True
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TestLoadAuthConfig
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLoadAuthConfig:
"""Tests for load_auth_config with mocked config + env vars."""
def test_default_enabled(self):
with patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={}):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.enabled is True
assert cfg.tokens == {}
def test_explicit_disable(self):
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={"enabled": False}),
patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.enabled is False
def test_env_disable(self):
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={}),
patch.dict(os.environ, {"TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED": "0"}, clear=True),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.enabled is False
def test_config_file_tokens(self):
mock_cfg = {
"enabled": True,
"tokens": [
{"value": "tok_a", "role": "full"},
{"value": "tok_b", "role": "read"},
],
}
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value=mock_cfg),
patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.enabled is True
assert cfg.tokens == {"tok_a": "full", "tok_b": "read"}
def test_env_var_enabled(self):
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={}),
patch.dict(os.environ, {"TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED": "1"}, clear=False),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.enabled is True
def test_env_var_token(self):
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={}),
patch.dict(os.environ, {"TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN": "tok_env"}, clear=False),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert "tok_env" in cfg.tokens
assert cfg.tokens["tok_env"] == "full"
def test_config_plus_env_merge(self):
mock_cfg = {
"enabled": True,
"tokens": [{"value": "tok_cfg", "role": "read"}],
}
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value=mock_cfg),
patch.dict(os.environ, {"TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN": "tok_env"}, clear=False),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.tokens["tok_cfg"] == "read"
assert cfg.tokens["tok_env"] == "full"
def test_invalid_role_skipped(self):
mock_cfg = {
"enabled": True,
"tokens": [
{"value": "tok_ok", "role": "full"},
{"value": "tok_bad", "role": "admin"},
],
}
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value=mock_cfg),
patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert "tok_ok" in cfg.tokens
assert "tok_bad" not in cfg.tokens
def test_empty_value_skipped(self):
mock_cfg = {
"enabled": True,
"tokens": [{"value": "", "role": "full"}],
}
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value=mock_cfg),
patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert len(cfg.tokens) == 0
def test_non_dict_token_entry_skipped(self):
mock_cfg = {
"enabled": True,
"tokens": ["not_a_dict", {"value": "tok_ok", "role": "full"}],
}
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value=mock_cfg),
patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.tokens == {"tok_ok": "full"}
def test_env_enabled_true(self):
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={}),
patch.dict(os.environ, {"TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED": "true"}, clear=False),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.enabled is True
def test_env_enabled_yes(self):
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={}),
patch.dict(os.environ, {"TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED": "yes"}, clear=False),
):
cfg = load_auth_config()
assert cfg.enabled is True
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Integration tests — actual HTTP server with auth enabled
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -785,16 +609,22 @@ class TestServerAuth:
mock_mgr.list_all.return_value = [mock_ws]
mock_mgr.max_workstreams = 10
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER
cls._jwt_secret = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
cls._read_hdr = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {create_jwt('u1', frozenset({'read'}), 'test', cls._jwt_secret, audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER)}"
}
cls._full_hdr = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {create_jwt('u1', frozenset({'read', 'write', 'approve'}), 'test', cls._jwt_secret, audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER)}"
}
app = srv_mod.create_app(
workstreams=mock_mgr,
global_queue=queue.Queue(),
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
skip_permissions=False,
auth_config=AuthConfig(
enabled=True,
tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"},
),
jwt_secret=cls._jwt_secret,
cors_origins=["*"],
)
cls.client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
@@ -809,7 +639,6 @@ class TestServerAuth:
def test_metrics_no_token_passes_auth(self):
resp = self.client.get("/metrics")
# Public path — should never be 401/403
assert resp.status_code not in (401, 403)
def test_root_no_token_200(self):
@@ -826,23 +655,17 @@ class TestServerAuth:
assert "Unauthorized" in resp.json().get("error", "")
def test_api_workstreams_read_token_200(self):
resp = self.client.get(
"/v1/api/workstreams",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok_read"},
)
resp = self.client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=self._read_hdr)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_api_workstreams_full_token_200(self):
resp = self.client.get(
"/v1/api/workstreams",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok_full"},
)
resp = self.client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=self._full_hdr)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_api_send_read_token_403(self):
resp = self.client.post(
"/v1/api/send",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok_read"},
headers=self._read_hdr,
json={"message": "hello", "ws_id": "x"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 403
@@ -851,10 +674,9 @@ class TestServerAuth:
def test_api_send_full_token_passes_auth(self):
resp = self.client.post(
"/v1/api/send",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok_full"},
headers=self._full_hdr,
json={"message": "hello", "ws_id": "nonexistent"},
)
# Should get 404 (unknown workstream), not 401/403
assert resp.status_code not in (401, 403)
def test_api_send_no_token_401(self):
@@ -921,12 +743,18 @@ class TestConsoleAuth:
"aggregate": {"total_tokens": 100},
}
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE
cls._jwt_secret = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
cls._read_hdr = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {create_jwt('u1', frozenset({'read'}), 'test', cls._jwt_secret, audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE)}"
}
cls._full_hdr = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {create_jwt('u1', frozenset({'read', 'write', 'approve'}), 'test', cls._jwt_secret, audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE)}"
}
app = create_app(
collector=mock_collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(
enabled=True,
tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"},
),
jwt_secret=cls._jwt_secret,
)
cls.test_client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
@@ -947,17 +775,11 @@ class TestConsoleAuth:
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_api_overview_read_token_200(self):
resp = self.test_client.get(
"/v1/api/cluster/overview",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok_read"},
)
resp = self.test_client.get("/v1/api/cluster/overview", headers=self._read_hdr)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_api_overview_full_token_200(self):
resp = self.test_client.get(
"/v1/api/cluster/overview",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok_full"},
)
resp = self.test_client.get("/v1/api/cluster/overview", headers=self._full_hdr)
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_invalid_token_401(self):
@@ -1003,16 +825,33 @@ class TestServerLogin:
mock_mgr.list_all.return_value = [mock_ws]
mock_mgr.max_workstreams = 10
# Mock storage with a test user for password login
from turnstone.core.auth import hash_password
mock_storage = MagicMock()
mock_storage.get_user_by_username.side_effect = lambda u: (
{
"user_id": "uid_test",
"username": "testuser",
"password_hash": hash_password("testpass"),
"display_name": "Test",
}
if u == "testuser"
else None
)
mock_storage.list_user_roles.return_value = [
{"role_id": "builtin-admin", "scopes": "read,write,approve"}
]
cls._jwt_secret = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
app = srv_mod.create_app(
workstreams=mock_mgr,
global_queue=queue.Queue(),
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
skip_permissions=False,
auth_config=AuthConfig(
enabled=True,
tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"},
),
jwt_secret=cls._jwt_secret,
auth_storage=mock_storage,
)
cls.test_client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
@@ -1020,36 +859,36 @@ class TestServerLogin:
def teardown_class(cls):
cls.test_client.close()
def test_login_valid_token_sets_cookie(self):
def test_login_config_token_rejected(self):
"""Config token exchange is no longer allowed."""
resp = self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"token": "tok_full"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
assert data["role"] == "full"
cookie = resp.headers.get("set-cookie", "")
assert "turnstone_auth=tok_full" in cookie
assert "HttpOnly" in cookie
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_login_invalid_token_401(self):
def test_login_invalid_credentials_401(self):
resp = self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"token": "wrong"},
json={"username": "testuser", "password": "wrong"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_login_no_auth_required(self):
# /v1/api/auth/login is public — shouldn't require auth itself
def test_login_password_ok(self):
resp = self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"token": "tok_read"},
json={"username": "testuser", "password": "testpass"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
assert "jwt" in data
def test_cookie_auth_on_api(self):
# Login to get cookie (TestClient tracks cookies automatically)
login_resp = self.test_client.post("/v1/api/auth/login", json={"token": "tok_read"})
login_resp = self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"username": "testuser", "password": "testpass"},
)
assert login_resp.status_code == 200
# Use cookie to access API — TestClient forwards cookies
@@ -1057,7 +896,10 @@ class TestServerLogin:
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_logout_clears_cookie(self):
self.test_client.post("/v1/api/auth/login", json={"token": "tok_read"})
self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"username": "testuser", "password": "testpass"},
)
# Logout
logout_resp = self.test_client.post("/v1/api/auth/logout")
@@ -1081,6 +923,7 @@ class TestConsoleLogin:
from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import hash_password
_load_static()
@@ -1092,12 +935,26 @@ class TestConsoleLogin:
"aggregate": {"total_tokens": 100},
}
mock_storage = MagicMock()
mock_storage.get_user_by_username.side_effect = lambda u: (
{
"user_id": "uid_test",
"username": "testuser",
"password_hash": hash_password("testpass"),
"display_name": "Test",
}
if u == "testuser"
else None
)
mock_storage.list_user_roles.return_value = [
{"role_id": "builtin-admin", "scopes": "read,write,approve"}
]
cls._jwt_secret = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
app = create_app(
collector=mock_collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(
enabled=True,
tokens={"tok_full": "full", "tok_read": "read"},
),
jwt_secret=cls._jwt_secret,
auth_storage=mock_storage,
)
cls.test_client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
@@ -1105,28 +962,34 @@ class TestConsoleLogin:
def teardown_class(cls):
cls.test_client.close()
def test_login_valid_token(self):
def test_login_config_token_rejected(self):
resp = self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"token": "tok_read"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_login_password_ok(self):
resp = self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"username": "testuser", "password": "testpass"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert "turnstone_auth" in resp.headers.get("set-cookie", "")
def test_login_invalid_token(self):
resp = self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"token": "wrong"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_cookie_auth_on_api(self):
self.test_client.post("/v1/api/auth/login", json={"token": "tok_read"})
self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"username": "testuser", "password": "testpass"},
)
resp = self.test_client.get("/v1/api/cluster/overview")
assert resp.status_code == 200
def test_logout_then_api_fails(self):
self.test_client.post("/v1/api/auth/login", json={"token": "tok_read"})
self.test_client.post(
"/v1/api/auth/login",
json={"username": "testuser", "password": "testpass"},
)
self.test_client.post("/v1/api/auth/logout")
resp = self.test_client.get("/v1/api/cluster/overview")
assert resp.status_code == 401
@@ -1385,25 +1248,29 @@ class TestIsSecureRequest:
class TestSecretStrength:
def test_short_secret_warns(self, caplog):
import logging
def test_short_secret_exits(self):
import turnstone.core.auth as auth_mod
from turnstone.core.auth import _MIN_SECRET_LENGTH
old = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", "")
os.environ["TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET"] = "short"
try:
with pytest.raises(SystemExit):
auth_mod.load_jwt_secret()
finally:
if old:
os.environ["TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET"] = old
else:
os.environ.pop("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", None)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="turnstone.core.auth"):
import turnstone.core.auth as auth_mod
def test_missing_secret_exits(self):
import turnstone.core.auth as auth_mod
old = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", "")
os.environ["TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET"] = "short"
try:
secret = auth_mod.load_jwt_secret()
assert secret == "short"
assert any(str(_MIN_SECRET_LENGTH) in r.message for r in caplog.records)
finally:
if old:
os.environ["TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET"] = old
else:
os.environ.pop("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", None)
with (
patch("turnstone.core.config.load_config", return_value={}),
patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True),
pytest.raises(SystemExit),
):
auth_mod.load_jwt_secret()
class TestCorsConfigurable:
@@ -1424,7 +1291,6 @@ class TestCorsConfigurable:
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
skip_permissions=False,
auth_config=AuthConfig(enabled=False),
)
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.get("/health", headers={"Origin": "http://evil.com"})
@@ -1446,7 +1312,6 @@ class TestCorsConfigurable:
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
skip_permissions=False,
auth_config=AuthConfig(enabled=False),
cors_origins=["http://example.com"],
)
client = TestClient(app)
@@ -1502,3 +1367,69 @@ class TestOIDCPublicPaths:
def test_oidc_callback_is_public(self):
assert is_public_path("/api/auth/oidc/callback") is True
assert is_public_path("/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback") is True
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# TestRequirePermissionServiceScope — service scope bypasses permission checks
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestRequirePermissionServiceScope:
"""Verify require_permission() behaviour with the service scope."""
def _make_request(self, auth_result):
"""Build a mock Starlette request with the given AuthResult on state."""
request = MagicMock()
request.state.auth_result = auth_result
return request
def test_service_scope_bypasses_permission(self):
"""Service-scoped tokens bypass all permission checks (returns None)."""
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult, require_permission
auth = AuthResult(
user_id="svc-agent",
scopes=frozenset({"service"}),
token_source="jwt",
)
request = self._make_request(auth)
result = require_permission(request, "admin.users")
assert result is None # bypass — no 403
def test_without_service_scope_and_without_permission_returns_403(self):
"""Non-service tokens without the required permission get 403."""
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult, require_permission
auth = AuthResult(
user_id="regular-user",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write"}),
token_source="jwt",
)
request = self._make_request(auth)
result = require_permission(request, "admin.users")
assert result is not None
assert result.status_code == 403
def test_without_service_scope_with_permission_returns_none(self):
"""Non-service tokens with the required permission pass."""
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult, require_permission
auth = AuthResult(
user_id="admin-user",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}),
token_source="jwt",
permissions=frozenset({"admin.users"}),
)
request = self._make_request(auth)
result = require_permission(request, "admin.users")
assert result is None # granted — no 403
def test_no_auth_result_returns_401(self):
"""Missing auth_result on request state returns 401."""
from turnstone.core.auth import require_permission
request = MagicMock()
del request.state.auth_result # ensure attribute is absent
result = require_permission(request, "admin.users")
assert result is not None
assert result.status_code == 401
+37 -57
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import time
import pytest
from turnstone.core.auth import (
AuthConfig,
AuthResult,
_authenticate_token,
check_request,
@@ -203,24 +202,10 @@ class TestRequiredScope:
class TestAuthenticateToken:
def test_config_token_read(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_read": "read"})
result = _authenticate_token("tok_read", cfg)
assert result is not None
assert result.scopes == frozenset({"read"})
assert result.token_source == "config"
def test_config_token_full(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full"})
result = _authenticate_token("tok_full", cfg)
assert result is not None
assert result.scopes == frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"})
def test_jwt_token(self):
secret = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
jwt_tok = create_jwt("user1", frozenset({"read", "write"}), "db", secret)
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
result = _authenticate_token(jwt_tok, cfg, jwt_secret=secret)
result = _authenticate_token(jwt_tok, jwt_secret=secret)
assert result is not None
assert result.user_id == "user1"
assert result.token_source == "db"
@@ -243,8 +228,7 @@ class TestAuthenticateToken:
}
return None
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
result = _authenticate_token(raw, cfg, storage=MockStorage())
result = _authenticate_token(raw, storage=MockStorage())
assert result is not None
assert result.user_id == "user1"
assert result.has_scope("write")
@@ -266,13 +250,11 @@ class TestAuthenticateToken:
"expires": "2020-01-02T00:00:00",
}
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
result = _authenticate_token(raw, cfg, storage=MockStorage())
result = _authenticate_token(raw, storage=MockStorage())
assert result is None
def test_unknown_token(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok": "full"})
result = _authenticate_token("unknown", cfg)
result = _authenticate_token("unknown")
assert result is None
@@ -282,76 +264,74 @@ class TestAuthenticateToken:
class TestCheckRequestScopes:
def test_config_read_on_write_403(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_read": "read"})
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(cfg, "POST", "/api/send", "Bearer tok_read")
_SECRET = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
def test_jwt_read_on_write_403(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/send",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403
assert "write" in msg
def test_config_read_on_approve_403(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_read": "read"})
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(cfg, "POST", "/api/approve", "Bearer tok_read")
def test_jwt_read_on_approve_403(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/approve",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403
assert "approve" in msg
def test_config_full_on_approve_ok(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full"})
allowed, status, msg, result = check_request(cfg, "POST", "/api/approve", "Bearer tok_full")
def test_jwt_full_on_approve_ok(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, result = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/approve",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed
assert result is not None
assert result.has_scope("approve")
def test_jwt_with_scopes(self):
secret = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read", "write"}), "db", secret)
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read", "write"}), "db", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, result = check_request(
cfg,
"POST",
"/api/send",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=secret,
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed
assert result is not None
assert result.user_id == "u1"
def test_jwt_insufficient_scope(self):
secret = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "db", secret)
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True)
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "db", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
cfg,
"POST",
"/api/send",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=secret,
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403
def test_admin_path_requires_approve(self):
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_read": "read"})
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
cfg,
"GET",
"/v1/api/admin/users",
"Bearer tok_read",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403
def test_backward_compat_role_full(self):
"""Config tokens with role='full' get all scopes."""
cfg = AuthConfig(enabled=True, tokens={"tok_full": "full"})
allowed, _, _, result = check_request(
cfg,
"GET",
"/v1/api/admin/users",
"Bearer tok_full",
)
assert allowed
assert result is not None
assert result.has_scope("approve")
+34 -23
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,24 @@ import pytest
from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector, NodeSnapshot
# Shared test auth — JWT-based
_TEST_JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
def _test_jwt() -> str:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE, create_jwt
return create_jwt(
user_id="test-console",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="test",
secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE,
)
_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_test_jwt()}"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Mock storage for collector tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -711,13 +729,11 @@ class TestConsoleHTTPEndpoints:
_load_static()
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
app = create_app(
collector=mock_collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False, headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
yield client
client.close()
@@ -953,12 +969,11 @@ class TestConsoleWorkstreamCreation:
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
_load_static()
app = create_app(
collector=mock_collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
# Set up a mock proxy_client (lifespan doesn't run in TestClient)
@@ -974,7 +989,7 @@ class TestConsoleWorkstreamCreation:
mock_proxy.post = mock_post
app.state.proxy_client = mock_proxy
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False, headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
yield client, mock_post
client.close()
@@ -1151,14 +1166,13 @@ class TestConsoleProxy:
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
_load_static()
app = create_app(
collector=mock_collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False, headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
yield client
client.close()
@@ -1322,14 +1336,13 @@ class TestConsoleVersionEndpoints:
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
_load_static()
app = create_app(
collector=mock_collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False, headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
yield client
client.close()
@@ -1364,7 +1377,6 @@ class TestSharedStatic:
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
_load_static()
collector = MagicMock(spec=ClusterCollector)
@@ -1376,9 +1388,9 @@ class TestSharedStatic:
}
app = create_app(
collector=collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False, headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
yield client
client.close()
@@ -1481,7 +1493,6 @@ class TestProxySharedStatic:
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
_load_static()
collector = MagicMock(spec=ClusterCollector)
@@ -1494,9 +1505,9 @@ class TestProxySharedStatic:
collector.get_node_detail.return_value = None
app = create_app(
collector=collector,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False, headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
resp = client.get("/node/unknown/shared/base.css")
assert resp.status_code == 404
client.close()
@@ -1815,14 +1826,14 @@ class TestProxyAuthHeaders:
# Should use ServiceTokenManager, not mint a user JWT
assert headers["Authorization"] == f"Bearer {mgr.token}"
def test_fallback_static_token(self):
"""No auth_result, no ServiceTokenManager → uses static proxy_auth_token."""
def test_no_mgr_no_user_returns_empty(self):
"""No auth_result, no ServiceTokenManager → empty headers."""
from turnstone.console.server import _proxy_auth_headers
req = self._make_request(proxy_auth_token="static-tok-123")
req = self._make_request()
headers = _proxy_auth_headers(req)
assert headers == {"Authorization": "Bearer static-tok-123"}
assert headers == {}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+40 -7
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,24 @@ from turnstone.console.collector import ClusterCollector
from turnstone.console.router import ConsoleRouter, NodeRef
from turnstone.core.hash_ring import NoAvailableNodeError
# Shared test auth — JWT-based
_TEST_JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
def _test_jwt() -> str:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE, create_jwt
return create_jwt(
user_id="test-routing",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="test",
secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE,
)
_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS: dict[str, str] = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_test_jwt()}"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -42,12 +60,11 @@ def _make_app(
router: Any = None,
) -> Any:
from turnstone.console.server import _load_static, create_app
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
_load_static()
return create_app(
collector=collector or _make_mock_collector(),
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
router=router,
)
@@ -100,6 +117,7 @@ class TestRouteCreate:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"name": "test-ws"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
@@ -109,6 +127,7 @@ class TestRouteCreate:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"name": "test-ws"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
@@ -126,6 +145,7 @@ class TestRouteCreate:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"resume_ws": "old_ws_id"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
@@ -150,6 +170,7 @@ class TestRouteCreate:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"target_node": "node-c"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
@@ -203,6 +224,7 @@ class TestRouteCreate503Retry:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"name": "test-ws"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
@@ -233,6 +255,7 @@ class TestRouteProxy:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/send",
json={"ws_id": "abc123", "message": "hello"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
# Verify upstream URL was /v1/api/send (not /v1/api/route/send)
@@ -245,6 +268,7 @@ class TestRouteProxy:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/approve",
json={"ws_id": "abc123", "approved": True},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
@@ -252,6 +276,7 @@ class TestRouteProxy:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/cancel",
json={"ws_id": "abc123"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
@@ -259,6 +284,7 @@ class TestRouteProxy:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/command",
json={"ws_id": "abc123", "command": "status"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
@@ -266,6 +292,7 @@ class TestRouteProxy:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/close",
json={"ws_id": "abc123"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
@@ -288,14 +315,14 @@ class TestRouteLookup:
client.close()
def test_route_lookup(self, client):
resp = client.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc123")
resp = client.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc123", headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 200
data = resp.json()
assert data["node_url"] == "http://a:8080"
assert data["node_id"] == "node-a"
def test_route_lookup_missing_ws_id(self, client):
resp = client.get("/v1/api/route")
resp = client.get("/v1/api/route", headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 400
assert "ws_id" in resp.json()["error"]
@@ -329,6 +356,7 @@ class TestRouteNotReady:
resp = client_no_router.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"name": "test"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 503
@@ -336,6 +364,7 @@ class TestRouteNotReady:
resp = client_empty_cache.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"name": "test"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 503
@@ -343,22 +372,24 @@ class TestRouteNotReady:
resp = client_no_router.post(
"/v1/api/route/send",
json={"ws_id": "abc", "message": "hello"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 503
def test_route_lookup_no_router_503(self, client_no_router):
resp = client_no_router.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc")
resp = client_no_router.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc", headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 503
def test_route_proxy_empty_cache_503(self, client_empty_cache):
resp = client_empty_cache.post(
"/v1/api/route/send",
json={"ws_id": "abc", "message": "hello"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 503
def test_route_lookup_empty_cache_503(self, client_empty_cache):
resp = client_empty_cache.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc")
resp = client_empty_cache.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc", headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 503
@@ -384,6 +415,7 @@ class TestRouteNoNode:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/workstreams/new",
json={"name": "test"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 503
assert "No available node" in resp.json()["error"]
@@ -392,9 +424,10 @@ class TestRouteNoNode:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/route/send",
json={"ws_id": "abc", "message": "hello"},
headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS,
)
assert resp.status_code == 503
def test_route_lookup_no_node_503(self, client):
resp = client.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc")
resp = client.get("/v1/api/route?ws_id=abc", headers=_TEST_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 503
+38 -48
View File
@@ -8,8 +8,26 @@ import pytest
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
from turnstone.channels._http import create_channel_app
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CHANNEL, create_jwt
from turnstone.core.storage._sqlite import SQLiteBackend
_JWT_SECRET = "a" * 32
def _make_jwt() -> str:
"""Create a valid JWT for channel auth."""
return create_jwt(
user_id="system",
scopes=frozenset({"write"}),
source="service",
secret=_JWT_SECRET,
audience=JWT_AUD_CHANNEL,
)
def _auth_headers() -> dict[str, str]:
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_make_jwt()}"}
@pytest.fixture
def storage(tmp_path):
@@ -33,22 +51,22 @@ def no_auth_client(storage, mock_adapter):
@pytest.fixture
def client(storage, mock_adapter):
"""Default client with static auth token configured."""
app = create_channel_app({"discord": mock_adapter}, storage, auth_token="test-secret-token")
"""Default client with JWT auth configured."""
app = create_channel_app({"discord": mock_adapter}, storage, jwt_secret=_JWT_SECRET)
return TestClient(app)
@pytest.fixture
def authed_client(storage, mock_adapter):
"""Alias same as client, for auth-specific test clarity."""
app = create_channel_app({"discord": mock_adapter}, storage, auth_token="test-secret-token")
"""Alias -- same as client, for auth-specific test clarity."""
app = create_channel_app({"discord": mock_adapter}, storage, jwt_secret=_JWT_SECRET)
return TestClient(app)
@pytest.fixture
def jwt_client(storage, mock_adapter):
"""Client with JWT auth configured."""
app = create_channel_app({"discord": mock_adapter}, storage, jwt_secret="a" * 32)
app = create_channel_app({"discord": mock_adapter}, storage, jwt_secret=_JWT_SECRET)
return TestClient(app)
@@ -58,9 +76,6 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert resp.json()["status"] == "ok"
def _headers(self) -> dict[str, str]:
return {"Authorization": "Bearer test-secret-token"}
def test_direct_discord_target(self, client, mock_adapter):
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/notify",
@@ -68,7 +83,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"channel_type": "discord", "channel_id": "123456"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
results = resp.json()["results"]
@@ -85,7 +100,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"message": "Hello!",
"title": "Alert",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
mock_adapter.send.assert_called_once_with("123456", "**Alert**\nHello!")
@@ -101,7 +116,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"username": "testuser"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
results = resp.json()["results"]
@@ -116,7 +131,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"username": "nobody"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 404
error = resp.json()["error"]
@@ -132,10 +147,10 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"username": "testuser"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer test-secret-token"},
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 404
# Generic message must not differentiate "not found" vs "no channels"
# Generic message -- must not differentiate "not found" vs "no channels"
error = resp.json()["error"]
assert "testuser" not in error
assert "not found or has no linked channels" in error
@@ -144,7 +159,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/notify",
json={"target": {"username": "x"}},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 400
@@ -152,7 +167,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
resp = client.post(
"/v1/api/notify",
json={"message": "Hello!"},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 400
@@ -163,7 +178,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"invalid": "field"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 400
@@ -175,7 +190,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"channel_type": "email", "channel_id": "test@example.com"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
results = resp.json()["results"]
@@ -189,7 +204,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"channel_type": "discord", "channel_id": "123456"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
results = resp.json()["results"]
@@ -201,7 +216,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
content=b"not json",
headers={
"content-type": "application/json",
"Authorization": "Bearer test-secret-token",
"Authorization": f"Bearer {_make_jwt()}",
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 400
@@ -214,7 +229,7 @@ class TestNotifyEndpoint:
"target": {"channel_type": "discord", "channel_id": "123"},
"message": " ",
},
headers=self._headers(),
headers=_auth_headers(),
)
assert resp.status_code == 400
@@ -256,30 +271,9 @@ class TestNotifyAuth:
)
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_accept_valid_static_token(self, authed_client, mock_adapter):
"""Requests with correct static token are accepted."""
resp = authed_client.post(
"/v1/api/notify",
json={
"target": {"channel_type": "discord", "channel_id": "123"},
"message": "Hello!",
},
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer test-secret-token"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
assert resp.json()["results"][0]["status"] == "sent"
def test_accept_valid_jwt(self, jwt_client, mock_adapter):
"""Requests with a valid JWT for the channel audience are accepted."""
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CHANNEL, create_jwt
token = create_jwt(
user_id="system",
scopes=frozenset({"write"}),
source="service",
secret="a" * 32,
audience=JWT_AUD_CHANNEL,
)
token = _make_jwt()
resp = jwt_client.post(
"/v1/api/notify",
json={
@@ -292,13 +286,11 @@ class TestNotifyAuth:
def test_reject_jwt_wrong_audience(self, jwt_client):
"""JWTs with wrong audience are rejected."""
from turnstone.core.auth import create_jwt
token = create_jwt(
user_id="system",
scopes=frozenset({"write"}),
source="service",
secret="a" * 32,
secret=_JWT_SECRET,
audience="turnstone-server", # wrong audience
)
resp = jwt_client.post(
@@ -313,8 +305,6 @@ class TestNotifyAuth:
def test_reject_jwt_wrong_secret(self, jwt_client):
"""JWTs signed with wrong secret are rejected."""
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CHANNEL, create_jwt
token = create_jwt(
user_id="system",
scopes=frozenset({"write"}),
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2303,8 +2303,8 @@ class TestAnthropicToolSearch:
# MCP tool should be deferred
assert result[1]["defer_loading"] is True
# Search tool should be appended
assert result[-1]["type"] == "tool_search_tool_bm25_20251119"
assert result[-1]["name"] == "tool_search"
assert result[-1]["type"] == "tool_search_tool_bm25"
assert result[-1]["name"] == "tool_search_tool_bm25"
def test_inject_tool_search_no_op_without_deferred(self, provider):
caps = provider.get_capabilities("claude-opus-4-6-20260101")
+30 -11
View File
@@ -580,6 +580,24 @@ class TestSessionConfig:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_TEST_JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-minimum-32-chars!"
def _server_jwt() -> str:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER, create_jwt
return create_jwt(
user_id="test-server-live",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="test",
secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
)
_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_server_jwt()}"}
class TestServerHealthMetrics:
"""Verify /health and /metrics endpoints using a Starlette TestClient.
@@ -596,7 +614,6 @@ class TestServerHealthMetrics:
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
import turnstone.server as srv_mod
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
from turnstone.core.metrics import MetricsCollector
from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamState
@@ -631,7 +648,7 @@ class TestServerHealthMetrics:
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
skip_permissions=False,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
)
cls.client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
@@ -727,8 +744,8 @@ class TestServerHealthMetrics:
assert 'le="+Inf"' in body
def test_unknown_endpoint_returns_404(self):
status, _, _ = self._get("/does-not-exist")
assert status == 404
resp = self.client.get("/does-not-exist", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS)
assert resp.status_code == 404
def test_health_contains_backend_field(self):
_, _, body = self._get("/health")
@@ -772,7 +789,6 @@ class TestServerRateLimiting:
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
import turnstone.server as srv_mod
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthConfig
from turnstone.core.metrics import MetricsCollector
from turnstone.core.ratelimit import RateLimiter
from turnstone.core.workstream import WorkstreamState
@@ -808,7 +824,7 @@ class TestServerRateLimiting:
global_listeners=[],
global_listeners_lock=threading.Lock(),
skip_permissions=False,
auth_config=AuthConfig(),
jwt_secret=_TEST_JWT_SECRET,
rate_limiter=RateLimiter(enabled=True, rate=2.0, burst=3),
)
cls.client = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
@@ -830,16 +846,19 @@ class TestServerRateLimiting:
"""After exhausting burst on a non-exempt endpoint, get 429."""
# Exhaust burst on a non-exempt endpoint
for _ in range(5):
self._get("/v1/api/workstreams")
self.client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS)
# At least one should be 429
statuses = [self._get("/v1/api/workstreams").status_code for _ in range(3)]
statuses = [
self.client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS).status_code
for _ in range(3)
]
assert 429 in statuses
def test_429_includes_retry_after(self):
"""429 response includes Retry-After header."""
# Burn through burst
for _ in range(10):
resp = self._get("/v1/api/workstreams")
resp = self.client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS)
if resp.status_code == 429:
assert "retry-after" in resp.headers
data = resp.json()
@@ -851,7 +870,7 @@ class TestServerRateLimiting:
"""Health endpoint is always accessible regardless of rate limit."""
# Burn through bucket on non-exempt path
for _ in range(10):
self._get("/v1/api/workstreams")
self.client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS)
# Health should still work
resp = self._get("/health")
assert resp.status_code == 200
@@ -859,6 +878,6 @@ class TestServerRateLimiting:
def test_metrics_exempt_from_ratelimit(self):
"""Metrics endpoint is always accessible regardless of rate limit."""
for _ in range(10):
self._get("/v1/api/workstreams")
self.client.get("/v1/api/workstreams", headers=_SERVER_AUTH_HEADERS)
resp = self._get("/metrics")
assert resp.status_code == 200
@@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
"""Tests for skill resource materialization to disk.
Verifies that skill-bundled resources (scripts, references, assets) stored
in the ``skill_resources`` table are written to a temp directory when a
skill is loaded, exposed via ``SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR`` env var and ``PATH``,
and cleaned up on skill change or session close.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import stat
from typing import Any
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
from turnstone.core.session import ChatSession
from turnstone.core.storage._registry import get_storage
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Helpers (mirrors test_skills.py)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class NullUI:
"""UI adapter that discards all output."""
def on_thinking_start(self):
pass
def on_thinking_stop(self):
pass
def on_reasoning_token(self, text):
pass
def on_content_token(self, text):
pass
def on_stream_end(self):
pass
def approve_tools(self, items):
return True, None
def on_tool_result(self, call_id, name, output, **kwargs):
pass
def on_tool_output_chunk(self, call_id, chunk):
pass
def on_status(self, usage, context_window, effort):
pass
def on_plan_review(self, content):
return ""
def on_info(self, message):
pass
def on_error(self, message):
pass
def on_state_change(self, state):
pass
def on_rename(self, name):
pass
def on_output_warning(self, call_id, assessment):
pass
def _make_session(**kwargs: Any) -> ChatSession:
defaults: dict[str, Any] = dict(
client=MagicMock(),
model="test-model",
ui=NullUI(),
instructions=None,
temperature=0.5,
max_tokens=4096,
tool_timeout=30,
)
defaults.update(kwargs)
return ChatSession(**defaults)
def _create_skill(db: Any, skill_id: str, name: str, content: str, **kw: Any) -> None:
db.create_prompt_template(
template_id=skill_id,
name=name,
category=kw.get("category", "general"),
content=content,
variables=kw.get("variables", "[]"),
is_default=kw.get("is_default", False),
org_id="",
created_by="test",
origin="manual",
mcp_server="",
readonly=False,
description="",
tags="[]",
source_url="",
version="1.0.0",
author="",
activation=kw.get("activation", "named"),
token_estimate=0,
model="",
auto_approve=False,
temperature=None,
reasoning_effort="",
max_tokens=None,
token_budget=0,
agent_max_turns=None,
notify_on_complete="{}",
enabled=True,
allowed_tools="[]",
priority=0,
)
def _sys_content(session: ChatSession) -> str:
msgs = [m for m in session.system_messages if m["role"] == "system"]
assert msgs
return msgs[0]["content"]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestMaterializeResources:
def test_materialize_creates_files(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "test-skill", "Use the scripts.")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/helper.py", "print('hello')")
db.create_skill_resource("r2", "s1", "references/api.md", "# API")
session = _make_session(skill="test-skill")
assert session._skill_resources_dir is not None
base = session._skill_resources_dir
assert os.path.isdir(base)
helper = os.path.join(base, "scripts", "helper.py")
assert os.path.isfile(helper)
with open(helper) as f:
assert f.read() == "print('hello')"
api_md = os.path.join(base, "references", "api.md")
assert os.path.isfile(api_md)
with open(api_md) as f:
assert f.read() == "# API"
session.close()
def test_scripts_executable(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "exec-skill", "Run scripts/run.sh")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/run.sh", "#!/bin/bash\necho hi")
session = _make_session(skill="exec-skill")
base = session._skill_resources_dir
run_sh = os.path.join(base, "scripts", "run.sh")
mode = os.stat(run_sh).st_mode
assert mode & stat.S_IXUSR # owner execute
session.close()
def test_non_scripts_not_executable(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "ref-skill", "Read references/guide.md")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "references/guide.md", "# Guide")
session = _make_session(skill="ref-skill")
base = session._skill_resources_dir
guide = os.path.join(base, "references", "guide.md")
mode = os.stat(guide).st_mode
assert not (mode & stat.S_IXUSR) # not executable
session.close()
def test_cleanup_on_close(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "cleanup-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/a.py", "code")
session = _make_session(skill="cleanup-skill")
base = session._skill_resources_dir
assert os.path.isdir(base)
session.close()
assert not os.path.exists(base)
assert session._skill_resources_dir is None
def test_cleanup_on_skill_switch(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "skill-a", "Skill A")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/a.py", "code_a")
_create_skill(db, "s2", "skill-b", "Skill B")
db.create_skill_resource("r2", "s2", "scripts/b.py", "code_b")
session = _make_session(skill="skill-a")
dir_a = session._skill_resources_dir
assert os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dir_a, "scripts", "a.py"))
session.set_skill("skill-b")
dir_b = session._skill_resources_dir
assert dir_b != dir_a
assert not os.path.exists(dir_a)
assert os.path.isfile(os.path.join(dir_b, "scripts", "b.py"))
session.close()
def test_cleanup_on_skill_clear(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "clear-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/x.py", "code")
session = _make_session(skill="clear-skill")
base = session._skill_resources_dir
assert os.path.isdir(base)
session.set_skill(None)
assert not os.path.exists(base)
assert session._skill_resources_dir is None
session.close()
def test_empty_resources_no_dir(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "no-res-skill", "content")
# No resources added
session = _make_session(skill="no-res-skill")
assert session._skill_resources_dir is None
session.close()
def test_no_skill_no_dir(self, tmp_db):
session = _make_session()
assert session._skill_resources_dir is None
session.close()
def test_path_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "traversal-skill", "content")
# Inject a malicious path directly into storage
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "../etc/passwd", "bad content")
db.create_skill_resource("r2", "s1", "scripts/good.py", "good content")
session = _make_session(skill="traversal-skill")
base = session._skill_resources_dir
# The traversal path must not be written inside the resources dir
assert not os.path.exists(os.path.join(base, "etc"))
# The good resource should still be materialized
assert os.path.isfile(os.path.join(base, "scripts", "good.py"))
session.close()
class TestSkillResourceEnv:
def test_env_with_resources(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "env-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/tool.py", "code")
session = _make_session(skill="env-skill")
env = session._skill_resource_env()
assert env["SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR"] == session._skill_resources_dir
assert "PATH" in env
scripts_dir = os.path.join(session._skill_resources_dir, "scripts")
assert env["PATH"].startswith(scripts_dir + ":")
session.close()
def test_env_without_scripts_dir(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "no-scripts-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "references/doc.md", "# Doc")
session = _make_session(skill="no-scripts-skill")
env = session._skill_resource_env()
assert "SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR" in env
# No scripts/ subdir so PATH should not be overridden
assert "PATH" not in env
session.close()
def test_env_empty_when_no_resources(self, tmp_db):
session = _make_session()
assert session._skill_resource_env() == {}
session.close()
class TestSystemMessageHint:
def test_hint_present_when_resources_exist(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "hint-skill", "Use the bundled scripts.")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/run.py", "code")
session = _make_session(skill="hint-skill")
content = _sys_content(session)
assert "$SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR" in content
assert "scripts/ are on PATH" in content
session.close()
def test_no_hint_when_no_resources(self, tmp_db):
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "plain-skill", "No resources here.")
session = _make_session(skill="plain-skill")
content = _sys_content(session)
assert "SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR" not in content
session.close()
class TestMaterializeEdgeCases:
def test_all_resources_rejected_no_dir(self, tmp_db):
"""When every resource fails path validation, no temp dir is left."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "all-bad", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "../escape", "bad")
db.create_skill_resource("r2", "s1", "/absolute", "bad")
session = _make_session(skill="all-bad")
assert session._skill_resources_dir is None
session.close()
def test_dot_path_rejected(self, tmp_db):
"""A bare '.' path is rejected rather than crashing."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "dot-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", ".", "bad")
db.create_skill_resource("r2", "s1", "scripts/ok.py", "good")
session = _make_session(skill="dot-skill")
base = session._skill_resources_dir
assert os.path.isfile(os.path.join(base, "scripts", "ok.py"))
session.close()
def test_empty_path_rejected(self, tmp_db):
"""An empty string path is rejected."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "empty-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "", "bad")
db.create_skill_resource("r2", "s1", "scripts/ok.py", "good")
session = _make_session(skill="empty-skill")
assert session._skill_resources_dir is not None
session.close()
def test_nested_traversal_rejected(self, tmp_db):
"""Traversal hidden inside a valid prefix is still caught."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "nested-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/../../../etc/passwd", "bad")
db.create_skill_resource("r2", "s1", "scripts/ok.py", "good")
session = _make_session(skill="nested-skill")
base = session._skill_resources_dir
assert not os.path.exists(os.path.join(base, "etc"))
assert os.path.isfile(os.path.join(base, "scripts", "ok.py"))
session.close()
def test_double_close_idempotent(self, tmp_db):
"""Calling close() twice does not raise."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "double-skill", "content")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/x.py", "code")
session = _make_session(skill="double-skill")
session.close()
session.close() # must not raise
class TestPreflightValidation:
def test_missing_resource_warns(self, tmp_db):
"""Skill content references a script not in resources."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "warn-skill", "Run scripts/missing.py to start.")
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui, skill="warn-skill")
ui.on_info.assert_called_once()
msg = ui.on_info.call_args[0][0]
assert "scripts/missing.py" in msg
assert "warn-skill" in msg
session.close()
def test_all_resources_present_no_warn(self, tmp_db):
"""No warning when all referenced paths are bundled."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "ok-skill", "Run scripts/helper.py for help.")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "scripts/helper.py", "print('hi')")
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui, skill="ok-skill")
ui.on_info.assert_not_called()
session.close()
def test_no_references_no_warn(self, tmp_db):
"""Skill content with no resource paths triggers no validation warning."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "plain-skill", "Just a plain skill with no paths.")
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui, skill="plain-skill")
ui.on_info.assert_not_called()
session.close()
def test_multiple_missing_warns_once(self, tmp_db):
"""Multiple missing resources produce a single warning listing all."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(
db,
"s1",
"multi-skill",
"Use scripts/a.py and scripts/b.sh to process references/guide.md",
)
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui, skill="multi-skill")
ui.on_info.assert_called_once()
msg = ui.on_info.call_args[0][0]
assert "3 resource(s)" in msg
assert "scripts/a.py" in msg
assert "scripts/b.sh" in msg
assert "references/guide.md" in msg
session.close()
def test_validation_skipped_no_skill(self, tmp_db):
"""No crash or warning when no skill is active."""
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui)
ui.on_info.assert_not_called()
session.close()
def test_json_extension_not_truncated(self, tmp_db):
"""assets/config.json should match as .json, not .js."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(db, "s1", "json-skill", "Load assets/config.json for settings.")
db.create_skill_resource("r1", "s1", "assets/config.json", "{}")
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui, skill="json-skill")
ui.on_info.assert_not_called()
session.close()
def test_compound_prefix_not_matched(self, tmp_db):
"""'myscripts/tool.py' should not match as 'scripts/tool.py'."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(
db,
"s1",
"compound-skill",
"The myscripts/tool.py file is unrelated.",
)
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui, skill="compound-skill")
ui.on_info.assert_not_called()
session.close()
def test_extension_suffix_not_matched(self, tmp_db):
"""'scripts/tool.python' should not match as 'scripts/tool.py'."""
db = get_storage()
_create_skill(
db,
"s1",
"suffix-skill",
"Run scripts/tool.python to start.",
)
ui = NullUI()
ui.on_info = MagicMock()
session = _make_session(ui=ui, skill="suffix-skill")
ui.on_info.assert_not_called()
session.close()
+109 -2
View File
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ def _make_app(tls_manager):
async def _grant_access(request, call_next): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
user_id="",
scopes=frozenset({"approve"}),
token_source="config",
scopes=frozenset({"approve", "service"}),
token_source="test",
)
return await call_next(request)
@@ -124,6 +124,113 @@ def test_delete_cert_not_found(tls_manager):
assert resp.status_code == 404
# ── Auth enforcement ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _make_app_no_auth(tls_manager):
"""Create app without auth middleware — simulates unauthenticated requests."""
from starlette.applications import Starlette
from starlette.routing import Route
from turnstone.console.server import (
tls_ca_cert,
tls_ca_status,
tls_delete_cert,
tls_list_certs,
tls_renew_cert,
)
app = Starlette(
routes=[
Route("/ca", tls_ca_status),
Route("/ca.pem", tls_ca_cert),
Route("/certs", tls_list_certs),
Route("/certs/{domain}/renew", tls_renew_cert, methods=["POST"]),
Route("/certs/{domain}", tls_delete_cert, methods=["DELETE"]),
],
)
app.state.tls_manager = tls_manager
return app
def _make_app_read_only(tls_manager):
"""Create app with read-only auth — should be rejected by admin endpoints."""
from starlette.applications import Starlette
from starlette.middleware import Middleware
from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from starlette.routing import Route
from turnstone.console.server import (
tls_ca_cert,
tls_ca_status,
tls_delete_cert,
tls_list_certs,
tls_renew_cert,
)
from turnstone.core.auth import AuthResult
async def _grant_read(request, call_next): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
user_id="viewer",
scopes=frozenset({"read"}),
token_source="jwt",
)
return await call_next(request)
app = Starlette(
routes=[
Route("/ca", tls_ca_status),
Route("/ca.pem", tls_ca_cert),
Route("/certs", tls_list_certs),
Route("/certs/{domain}/renew", tls_renew_cert, methods=["POST"]),
Route("/certs/{domain}", tls_delete_cert, methods=["DELETE"]),
],
middleware=[Middleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware, dispatch=_grant_read)],
)
app.state.tls_manager = tls_manager
return app
def test_unauthenticated_list_certs_401(tls_manager):
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
client = TestClient(_make_app_no_auth(tls_manager))
resp = client.get("/certs")
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_unauthenticated_renew_401(tls_manager):
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
client = TestClient(_make_app_no_auth(tls_manager))
resp = client.post("/certs/test.internal/renew")
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_unauthenticated_delete_401(tls_manager):
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
client = TestClient(_make_app_no_auth(tls_manager))
resp = client.delete("/certs/test.internal")
assert resp.status_code == 401
def test_read_only_renew_403(tls_manager):
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
client = TestClient(_make_app_read_only(tls_manager))
resp = client.post("/certs/test.internal/renew")
assert resp.status_code == 403
def test_read_only_delete_403(tls_manager):
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
client = TestClient(_make_app_read_only(tls_manager))
resp = client.delete("/certs/test.internal")
assert resp.status_code == 403
# ── CLI bootstrap ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+2 -2
View File
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ async def test_tls_ca_cert_endpoint(tls_manager):
async def _grant_access(request, call_next): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
user_id="", scopes=frozenset({"approve"}), token_source="config"
user_id="", scopes=frozenset({"approve", "service"}), token_source="test"
)
return await call_next(request)
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ async def test_tls_endpoints_disabled():
async def _grant_access(request, call_next): # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
request.state.auth_result = AuthResult(
user_id="", scopes=frozenset({"approve"}), token_source="config"
user_id="", scopes=frozenset({"approve", "service"}), token_source="test"
)
return await call_next(request)
+19 -10
View File
@@ -730,13 +730,23 @@ class TestWebUIFanOut:
ui._enqueue({"type": "content", "text": "hello"}) # should not raise
def test_enqueue_single_listener(self):
"""Single listener receives the event."""
"""Single listener receives the event with ws_id stamped."""
from turnstone.server import WebUI
ui = WebUI(ws_id="test")
q = ui._register_listener()
ui._enqueue({"type": "content", "text": "hello"})
assert q.get_nowait() == {"type": "content", "text": "hello"}
assert q.get_nowait() == {"type": "content", "text": "hello", "ws_id": "test"}
def test_enqueue_does_not_mutate_input(self):
"""_enqueue must not mutate the caller's dict."""
from turnstone.server import WebUI
ui = WebUI(ws_id="test")
ui._register_listener()
original = {"type": "content", "text": "hello"}
ui._enqueue(original)
assert "ws_id" not in original
def test_enqueue_multiple_listeners(self):
"""All registered listeners receive an identical copy."""
@@ -747,12 +757,12 @@ class TestWebUIFanOut:
q2 = ui._register_listener()
q3 = ui._register_listener()
event = {"type": "content", "text": "world"}
ui._enqueue(event)
ui._enqueue({"type": "content", "text": "world"})
assert q1.get_nowait() == event
assert q2.get_nowait() == event
assert q3.get_nowait() == event
expected = {"type": "content", "text": "world", "ws_id": "test"}
assert q1.get_nowait() == expected
assert q2.get_nowait() == expected
assert q3.get_nowait() == expected
def test_unregister_stops_delivery(self):
"""After unregister, the queue receives no further events."""
@@ -784,11 +794,10 @@ class TestWebUIFanOut:
assert fast.qsize() == 0
# Enqueue via fan-out — slow drops (full), fast receives
event = {"type": "content", "text": "overflow"}
ui._enqueue(event)
ui._enqueue({"type": "content", "text": "overflow"})
assert slow.qsize() == 500 # still full, overflow dropped
assert fast.qsize() == 1
assert fast.get_nowait() == event
assert fast.get_nowait() == {"type": "content", "text": "overflow", "ws_id": "test"}
def test_unregister_idempotent(self):
"""Double unregister does not raise."""
+1 -3
View File
@@ -56,11 +56,9 @@
# --- Auth (node, console) ---
[auth]
# enabled = true # env: TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED
# Auth is always enabled. JWT secret is required.
# jwt_secret = "" # HS256 signing secret (min 32 bytes recommended)
# env: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET
# token = "" # Static config token for full access
# env: TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN
# --- Logging (turnstone, node, console) ---
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
"""turnstone - Multi-node AI orchestration platform with tool use, agent routing, and cluster simulation."""
__version__ = "0.9.8"
__version__ = "0.9.10"
+13 -18
View File
@@ -265,9 +265,19 @@ def _cmd_tls_list(args: argparse.Namespace) -> None:
url = f"{console_url}/v1/api/admin/tls/certs"
headers = {}
token = getattr(args, "auth_token", "") or _get_config_token()
if token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}"
# Prefer JWT via ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is available
jwt_secret = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", "").strip()
if jwt_secret:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE, ServiceTokenManager
mgr = ServiceTokenManager(
user_id="admin-cli",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="cli",
secret=jwt_secret,
audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE,
)
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {mgr.token}"
resp = httpx.get(url, headers=headers)
resp.raise_for_status()
data = resp.json()
@@ -283,20 +293,6 @@ def _cmd_tls_list(args: argparse.Namespace) -> None:
print(f"{c['domain']:<30s} {c['issued_at']:<22s} {c['expires_at']:<22s}")
def _get_config_token() -> str:
"""Try to load auth token from config.toml or environment."""
token = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN", "")
if token:
return token
try:
from turnstone.core.config import load_config
cfg = load_config("auth")
return str(cfg.get("token", ""))
except Exception:
return ""
def _discover_console_url() -> str:
"""Discover console URL from the services table."""
from turnstone.core.storage import get_storage
@@ -381,7 +377,6 @@ def main() -> None:
p_tlslist = sub.add_parser("tls-list", help="List issued certificates")
p_tlslist.add_argument("--console-url", default="", help="Console URL")
p_tlslist.add_argument("--auth-token", default="", help="Auth token for admin API")
args = parser.parse_args()
if not args.command:
+6 -6
View File
@@ -82,10 +82,9 @@ For commercial providers (OpenAI, Anthropic-via-proxy), use the real key.
- `POSTGRES_USER` PostgreSQL username (default: turnstone)
- `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` PostgreSQL password (required for production/cluster)
### Authentication
- `TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED` Enable auth (`true`/empty)
- `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` JWT signing secret (required if auth enabled)
- `TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN` Static bearer token for inter-service auth
### Authentication (always enabled)
- `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` JWT signing secret (required). All services must share the same secret. \
Generate with: `python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"`
### OIDC SSO (optional)
- `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER` OIDC issuer URL (e.g., https://accounts.google.com). Setting this + CLIENT_ID + CLIENT_SECRET enables SSO.
@@ -162,8 +161,9 @@ Walk the user through setting up their deployment step by step:
(may differ from this wizard's model). Ask for base URL, API key, model name.
4. **Database**: SQLite (dev/simple) vs PostgreSQL (production/cluster). \
PostgreSQL is required for cluster mode.
5. **Security**: Recommend enabling auth for any non-local deployment. \
Use `generate_secret` for JWT secret, auth token, and Postgres password. \
5. **Security**: Auth is always enabled and requires `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET`. \
Use `generate_secret` for JWT secret and Postgres password. \
Always set `TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET` in the .env. \
Ask for initial admin username and password. \
If the user's deployment will use an external identity provider (Okta, Azure AD, Google, etc.), \
offer to configure OIDC SSO. Ask for the issuer URL, client ID, and client secret. \
+3 -13
View File
@@ -37,10 +37,9 @@ async def _handle_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
def _check_auth(request: Request) -> JSONResponse | None:
"""Validate the request's Authorization header. Returns an error response or None."""
auth_token: str = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_token", "")
jwt_secret: str = getattr(request.app.state, "jwt_secret", "")
if not auth_token and not jwt_secret:
if not jwt_secret:
log.warning("notify.auth_not_configured")
return JSONResponse({"error": "authentication not configured"}, status_code=401)
@@ -50,15 +49,8 @@ def _check_auth(request: Request) -> JSONResponse | None:
token = header[7:]
# Static token check
if auth_token:
import hmac
if hmac.compare_digest(token, auth_token):
return None
# JWT check
if jwt_secret and "." in token:
# JWT validation
if "." in token:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CHANNEL, validate_jwt
result = validate_jwt(token, jwt_secret, audience=JWT_AUD_CHANNEL)
@@ -178,7 +170,6 @@ def create_channel_app(
adapters: dict[str, ChannelAdapter],
storage: StorageBackend,
*,
auth_token: str = "",
jwt_secret: str = "",
) -> Starlette:
"""Create the channel gateway HTTP application."""
@@ -195,7 +186,6 @@ def create_channel_app(
)
app.state.adapters = adapters
app.state.storage = storage
app.state.auth_token = auth_token
app.state.jwt_secret = jwt_secret
return app
+1 -12
View File
@@ -72,13 +72,6 @@ def main() -> None:
parser.add_argument("--ssl-keyfile", default=None, help="SSL private key file")
parser.add_argument("--ssl-ca-certs", default=None, help="SSL CA certs for client verification")
# -- Auth ----------------------------------------------------------------
parser.add_argument(
"--auth-token",
default=os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_CHANNEL_AUTH_TOKEN", ""),
help="Static auth token for /v1/api/notify (default: $TURNSTONE_CHANNEL_AUTH_TOKEN)",
)
# -- Workstream defaults -------------------------------------------------
parser.add_argument(
"--model",
@@ -121,7 +114,6 @@ def main() -> None:
)
# -- Auth config ---------------------------------------------------------
auth_token = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN", "") or args.auth_token
jwt_secret = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", "").strip()
# Prefer auto-rotating service JWTs when jwt_secret is available.
@@ -132,7 +124,7 @@ def main() -> None:
if jwt_secret:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE, JWT_AUD_SERVER, ServiceTokenManager
_scopes = frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"})
_scopes = frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"})
_console_mgr = ServiceTokenManager(
user_id="channel-gateway",
scopes=_scopes,
@@ -151,7 +143,6 @@ def main() -> None:
)
_console_token_factory = lambda: _console_mgr.token # noqa: E731
_server_token_factory = lambda: _server_mgr.token # noqa: E731
auth_token = "" # don't also pass static token
server_url: str = args.server_url
console_url: str = args.console_url
@@ -242,7 +233,6 @@ def main() -> None:
config,
server_url,
storage,
api_token=auth_token,
console_url=console_url,
console_token_factory=_console_token_factory,
server_token_factory=_server_token_factory,
@@ -253,7 +243,6 @@ def main() -> None:
channel_app = create_channel_app(
adapters, # type: ignore[arg-type]
storage,
auth_token=auth_token,
jwt_secret=jwt_secret,
)
+83 -17
View File
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ class TurnstoneBot:
server_token_factory=server_token_factory,
)
self._commands_synced: bool = False
self._subscribed_ws: set[str] = set()
self._sse_tasks: dict[str, asyncio.Task[None]] = {}
self._streaming: dict[str, StreamingMessage] = {}
@@ -204,12 +205,17 @@ class TurnstoneBot:
# response message can be re-tracked for multi-turn DM conversations.
self._notify_reply_channels: dict[str, tuple[discord.abc.Messageable, str]] = {}
# Shared HTTP client for SSE connections (long-lived, no timeout).
# Shared HTTP client for SSE connections.
# Read timeout detects half-open connections (server sends ping=5s
# keepalives, so 90s is very conservative).
# Token factory provides auto-rotating JWTs; static token is fallback.
headers: dict[str, str] = {}
if api_token and not server_token_factory:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {api_token}"
self._http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(headers=headers, timeout=None)
self._http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(
headers=headers,
timeout=httpx.Timeout(connect=10.0, read=90.0, write=10.0, pool=10.0),
)
intents = discord.Intents.default()
intents.message_content = True
@@ -230,6 +236,10 @@ class TurnstoneBot:
async def on_ready() -> None:
await self._on_ready()
@self._bot.event
async def on_resumed() -> None:
await self._on_resumed()
# -- lifecycle -----------------------------------------------------------
async def _setup_hook(self) -> None:
@@ -247,23 +257,57 @@ class TurnstoneBot:
log.info("discord.setup_hook_complete")
async def _on_ready(self) -> None:
"""Sync slash commands and recover existing routes."""
"""Sync slash commands (once) and recover existing routes."""
import discord
bot = self._bot
log.info("discord.ready", user=str(bot.user), guild_count=len(bot.guilds))
if self.config.guild_id:
guild = discord.Object(id=self.config.guild_id)
bot.tree.copy_global_to(guild=guild)
await bot.tree.sync(guild=guild)
log.info("discord.commands_synced", guild_id=self.config.guild_id)
else:
await bot.tree.sync()
log.info("discord.commands_synced_global")
if not self._commands_synced:
if self.config.guild_id:
guild = discord.Object(id=self.config.guild_id)
bot.tree.copy_global_to(guild=guild)
await bot.tree.sync(guild=guild)
log.info("discord.commands_synced", guild_id=self.config.guild_id)
else:
await bot.tree.sync()
log.info("discord.commands_synced_global")
self._commands_synced = True
self._purge_dead_sse_tasks("ready")
await self._recover_routes()
async def _on_resumed(self) -> None:
"""Recover dead SSE tasks after a gateway session resume.
Unlike ``on_ready``, ``on_resumed`` fires when discord.py resumes
an existing session after a brief disconnect ``on_ready`` is NOT
called in that case. Any SSE listener tasks that died during the
blip need to be cleaned up and re-subscribed.
"""
self._purge_dead_sse_tasks("resumed")
await self._recover_routes()
def _purge_dead_sse_tasks(self, trigger: str) -> None:
"""Remove completed/failed SSE tasks so they can be re-subscribed."""
dead = [ws_id for ws_id, task in self._sse_tasks.items() if task.done()]
for ws_id in dead:
task = self._sse_tasks.pop(ws_id)
self._subscribed_ws.discard(ws_id)
# Retrieve exception to suppress "Task exception was never
# retrieved" warnings and log the underlying failure.
if not task.cancelled():
exc = task.exception()
if exc is not None:
log.warning(
"discord.sse_task_failed",
trigger=trigger,
ws_id=ws_id,
error=str(exc),
)
if dead:
log.info("discord.purged_dead_tasks", trigger=trigger, count=len(dead), ws_ids=dead)
async def _recover_routes(self) -> None:
"""Re-subscribe to event channels for existing discord routes.
@@ -361,14 +405,15 @@ class TurnstoneBot:
"""
import httpx_sse
# When routing through the console, connect SSE directly to the
# assigned server node (node_url from the create response).
node_base = await self.router.get_node_url(ws_id)
url = f"{node_base}/v1/api/events"
delay = _SSE_RECONNECT_DELAY
url = "" # set before loop so exception handlers can reference it
while True:
try:
# Re-resolve node URL on each attempt so reconnects pick up
# changes after bot restarts or router cache expiry.
node_base = await self.router.get_node_url(ws_id)
url = f"{node_base}/v1/api/events"
# Refresh auth header per-connection (token may have rotated)
sse_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None
if self._token_factory is not None:
@@ -392,7 +437,13 @@ class TurnstoneBot:
ws_id=ws_id,
status=status,
)
# Fall through to backoff/retry for transient errors.
# Don't try to parse a non-SSE error body —
# fall through to backoff/retry below.
raise httpx.HTTPStatusError(
f"SSE upstream {status}",
request=event_source.response.request,
response=event_source.response,
)
delay = _SSE_RECONNECT_DELAY # reset on successful connect
async for sse in event_source.aiter_sse():
if sse.event == "message" or not sse.event:
@@ -406,12 +457,27 @@ class TurnstoneBot:
)
continue
event = ServerEvent.from_dict(data)
await self._on_ws_event(ws_id, thread, event)
try:
await self._on_ws_event(ws_id, thread, event)
except Exception:
# Discord API failures (rate limits, outages)
# must not kill the SSE connection.
log.warning(
"discord.event_dispatch_failed",
ws_id=ws_id,
exc_info=True,
)
except httpx.HTTPStatusError:
pass # already logged above; fall through to backoff
except httpx.RemoteProtocolError:
# Server closed connection (normal on stream_end or shutdown).
log.debug("discord.sse_remote_closed", ws_id=ws_id)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
return # unsubscribe or shutdown
except httpx.ReadTimeout:
# No data received within read timeout — likely a half-open
# connection. Reconnect to recover.
log.info("discord.sse_read_timeout", ws_id=ws_id)
except (httpx.ConnectError, httpx.ConnectTimeout) as exc:
log.warning(
"discord.sse_connect_failed",
+14 -9
View File
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ def _handle_ws_command(
# ─── Cluster commands ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _handle_cluster_command(cmd_line: str, console_url: str | None, auth_token: str = "") -> None:
def _handle_cluster_command(cmd_line: str, console_url: str | None) -> None:
"""Handle /cluster subcommands querying the turnstone-console API."""
import httpx
@@ -642,8 +642,18 @@ def _handle_cluster_command(cmd_line: str, console_url: str | None, auth_token:
return
headers: dict[str, str] = {}
if auth_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {auth_token}"
jwt_secret = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", "").strip()
if jwt_secret:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_CONSOLE, ServiceTokenManager
_cluster_token_mgr = ServiceTokenManager(
user_id="cli",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="cli",
secret=jwt_secret,
audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE,
)
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {_cluster_token_mgr.token}"
parts = cmd_line.strip().split()
sub = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else "status"
@@ -968,11 +978,6 @@ def main() -> None:
default=None,
help="Turnstone console URL for /cluster commands (e.g., http://localhost:8090)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--auth-token",
default=os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN", ""),
help="Bearer token for authenticating to turnstone services (default: $TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN)",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--mcp-config",
default=None,
@@ -1247,7 +1252,7 @@ def main() -> None:
continue
if user_input.startswith("/cluster"):
_handle_cluster_command(user_input, args.console_url, args.auth_token)
_handle_cluster_command(user_input, args.console_url)
continue
active = manager.get_active()
+1 -6
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ class ClusterCollector:
storage: StorageBackend,
discovery_interval: float = 60.0,
http_timeout: float = 30.0,
auth_token: str = "",
token_manager: ServiceTokenManager | None = None,
tls_verify: Any = True,
tls_cert: tuple[str, str] | None = None,
@@ -74,10 +73,6 @@ class ClusterCollector:
self._console_metrics = console_metrics
self._tls_verify = tls_verify
self._tls_cert = tls_cert
# Static auth header — only used when no token_manager is present.
self._static_auth: dict[str, str] | None = None
if auth_token and token_manager is None:
self._static_auth = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {auth_token}"}
self._lock = threading.Lock()
self._nodes: dict[str, NodeSnapshot] = {}
@@ -165,7 +160,7 @@ class ClusterCollector:
"""Build auth headers for the current SSE connection."""
if self._token_manager is not None:
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {self._token_manager.token}"}
return dict(self._static_auth) if self._static_auth else {}
return {}
# -- SSE manager ---------------------------------------------------------
+5 -1
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ class Rebalancer:
lock_ttl: int = 120,
eager_migrate: bool = False,
api_token: str = "",
token_manager: Any = None,
) -> None:
self._storage = storage
self._router = router
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ class Rebalancer:
self._lock_ttl = lock_ttl
self._eager_migrate = eager_migrate
self._api_token = api_token
self._token_manager = token_manager
self._stop_event = threading.Event()
self._trigger_event = threading.Event()
self._thread: threading.Thread | None = None
@@ -530,7 +532,9 @@ class Rebalancer:
return 0
headers: dict[str, str] = {}
if self._api_token:
if self._token_manager is not None:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {self._token_manager.token}"
elif self._api_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {self._api_token}"
migrated = 0
+31 -74
View File
@@ -162,19 +162,11 @@ def _proxy_auth_headers(request: Request) -> dict[str, str]:
)
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
# Fallback: service identity (no user context).
# When auth is disabled on the console, auth_result is None, so all proxied
# requests use the full-privilege service identity. This is safe only when
# the upstream server also has auth disabled.
# Fallback: service identity via ServiceTokenManager.
mgr = getattr(request.app.state, "proxy_token_mgr", None)
if mgr is not None:
return dict(mgr.bearer_header)
# Fall back to static proxy_auth_token (e.g. from --auth-token)
static_token = getattr(request.app.state, "proxy_auth_token", "")
if static_token:
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {static_token}"}
return {}
@@ -5580,7 +5572,7 @@ async def admin_list_prompt_policies(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
storage, err = require_storage_or_503(request)
if err:
return err
err = require_permission(request, "admin.prompt_policies")
err = require_permission(request, "admin.policies")
if err:
return err
@@ -5599,7 +5591,7 @@ async def admin_create_prompt_policy(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
storage, err = require_storage_or_503(request)
if err:
return err
err = require_permission(request, "admin.prompt_policies")
err = require_permission(request, "admin.policies")
if err:
return err
@@ -5656,7 +5648,7 @@ async def admin_get_prompt_policy(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
storage, err = require_storage_or_503(request)
if err:
return err
err = require_permission(request, "admin.prompt_policies")
err = require_permission(request, "admin.policies")
if err:
return err
@@ -5676,7 +5668,7 @@ async def admin_update_prompt_policy(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
storage, err = require_storage_or_503(request)
if err:
return err
err = require_permission(request, "admin.prompt_policies")
err = require_permission(request, "admin.policies")
if err:
return err
@@ -5729,7 +5721,7 @@ async def admin_delete_prompt_policy(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
storage, err = require_storage_or_503(request)
if err:
return err
err = require_permission(request, "admin.prompt_policies")
err = require_permission(request, "admin.policies")
if err:
return err
@@ -5924,10 +5916,8 @@ def _seed_config_from_env(config_store: Any, storage: Any) -> None:
def create_app(
*,
collector: ClusterCollector,
auth_config: Any,
jwt_secret: str = "",
auth_storage: Any = None,
proxy_auth_token: str = "",
proxy_token_mgr: Any = None,
cors_origins: list[str] | None = None,
tls_manager: Any = None,
@@ -6265,10 +6255,8 @@ def create_app(
lifespan=_lifespan,
)
app.state.collector = collector
app.state.auth_config = auth_config
app.state.jwt_secret = jwt_secret
app.state.auth_storage = auth_storage
app.state.proxy_auth_token = proxy_auth_token
app.state.proxy_token_mgr = proxy_token_mgr
app.state.console_url = console_url
app.state.tls_manager = tls_manager
@@ -6301,7 +6289,7 @@ def create_app(
scheduler = TaskScheduler(
collector=collector,
storage=auth_storage,
api_token=proxy_auth_token,
api_token="",
token_manager=proxy_token_mgr,
)
app.state.scheduler = scheduler
@@ -6351,12 +6339,6 @@ def main() -> None:
from turnstone.core.log import add_log_args
add_log_args(parser)
parser.add_argument(
"--auth-token",
default=os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN", ""),
help="Bearer token for polling turnstone-server nodes (default: $TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN)",
)
from turnstone.core.config import add_config_arg, apply_config
add_config_arg(parser)
@@ -6367,10 +6349,9 @@ def main() -> None:
configure_logging_from_args(args, "console")
from turnstone.core.auth import load_auth_config, load_jwt_secret
from turnstone.core.auth import load_jwt_secret
auth_config = load_auth_config()
jwt_secret = load_jwt_secret() if auth_config.enabled else ""
jwt_secret = load_jwt_secret()
# Initialize storage early — the collector needs it for service discovery.
auth_storage = None
@@ -6399,38 +6380,23 @@ def main() -> None:
)
raise SystemExit(1)
# If no explicit auth token is provided, use a ServiceTokenManager
# so collector JWTs auto-rotate. A shared JWT secret is required for
# multi-service deployments — ephemeral secrets differ per process.
collector_token = args.auth_token
collector_token_mgr = None
if not collector_token:
_jwt_secret = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", "")
if not _jwt_secret:
log.error(
"TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET is not set and no --auth-token provided. "
"The console cannot authenticate to server nodes. Set TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET "
"to a shared secret (at least 32 characters) or pass --auth-token."
)
raise SystemExit(1)
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER, ServiceTokenManager
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER, ServiceTokenManager
collector_token_mgr = ServiceTokenManager(
user_id="console-collector",
scopes=frozenset({"read"}),
source="console",
secret=_jwt_secret,
audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
expiry_hours=1,
)
log.info("console.collector_token_manager_created")
collector_token_mgr = ServiceTokenManager(
user_id="console-collector",
scopes=frozenset({"read"}),
source="console",
secret=jwt_secret,
audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
expiry_hours=1,
)
log.info("console.collector_token_manager_created")
router = ConsoleRouter(storage=auth_storage)
console_metrics = ConsoleMetrics()
collector = ClusterCollector(
storage=auth_storage,
auth_token=collector_token if collector_token_mgr is None else "",
token_manager=collector_token_mgr,
router=router,
console_metrics=console_metrics,
@@ -6439,22 +6405,15 @@ def main() -> None:
_load_static()
# If no explicit auth token is provided, use a ServiceTokenManager
# so proxy JWTs auto-rotate.
proxy_token = args.auth_token
proxy_token_mgr = None
if not proxy_token and jwt_secret:
from turnstone.core.auth import JWT_AUD_SERVER, ServiceTokenManager
proxy_token_mgr = ServiceTokenManager(
user_id="console-proxy",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}),
source="console",
secret=jwt_secret,
audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
expiry_hours=1,
)
log.info("console.proxy_token_manager_created")
proxy_token_mgr = ServiceTokenManager(
user_id="console-proxy",
scopes=frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
source="console",
secret=jwt_secret,
audience=JWT_AUD_SERVER,
expiry_hours=1,
)
log.info("console.proxy_token_manager_created")
from turnstone.core.web_helpers import parse_cors_origins
@@ -6541,7 +6500,8 @@ def main() -> None:
threshold=_rcs.get("rebalancer.threshold", 0.10),
vnodes_per_unit=_rcs.get("ring.vnodes_per_unit", 150),
eager_migrate=_rcs.get("rebalancer.eager_migrate", False),
api_token=proxy_token if proxy_token_mgr is None else "",
api_token="",
token_manager=proxy_token_mgr,
)
log.info("rebalancer.configured")
except Exception:
@@ -6549,10 +6509,8 @@ def main() -> None:
app = create_app(
collector=collector,
auth_config=auth_config,
jwt_secret=jwt_secret,
auth_storage=auth_storage,
proxy_auth_token=proxy_token if proxy_token_mgr is None else "",
proxy_token_mgr=proxy_token_mgr,
cors_origins=cors_origins,
tls_manager=tls_mgr,
@@ -6563,8 +6521,7 @@ def main() -> None:
)
log.info("Console starting on %s", console_url)
if auth_config.enabled:
log.info("Auth: enabled (%d config token(s))", len(auth_config.tokens))
log.info("Auth: enabled (JWT)")
print("Press Ctrl+C to stop.")
import uvicorn
+31 -130
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,12 @@
"""Bearer token authentication and authorization for turnstone HTTP servers.
Supports three token types:
Supports two token types:
1. **Config-file tokens** static tokens in ``config.toml`` or the
``TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN`` env var. Validated in-memory via
``hmac.compare_digest``. Map to scopes via their role.
2. **API tokens** database-backed, prefixed ``ts_``, stored as SHA-256
1. **API tokens** database-backed, prefixed ``ts_``, stored as SHA-256
hashes. Exchanged for JWTs via ``/api/auth/login``.
3. **JWTs** short-lived session tokens issued after API token validation.
Validated locally via shared HMAC-SHA256 secret. Contain user_id and
scopes in claims.
2. **JWTs** short-lived session tokens issued after login or by
:class:`ServiceTokenManager`. Validated locally via shared HMAC-SHA256
secret. Contain user_id and scopes in claims.
Public paths (``/``, ``/static/*``, ``/shared/*``, ``/health``, ``/metrics``,
``/openapi.json``, ``/docs``, ``/api/auth/login``, ``/api/auth/logout``) are
@@ -19,7 +16,6 @@ always accessible without authentication.
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import hmac
import json
import os
import re
@@ -28,7 +24,7 @@ import threading
import time
import urllib.parse
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -56,7 +52,7 @@ JWT_AUD_CONSOLE = "turnstone-console"
JWT_AUD_CHANNEL = "turnstone-channel"
_MIN_SECRET_LENGTH = 32 # 256 bits minimum for HMAC-SHA256
VALID_SCOPES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"})
VALID_SCOPES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"})
_USERNAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$")
USERNAME_MAX_LEN = 64
@@ -72,16 +68,12 @@ def is_valid_username(username: str) -> bool:
# Hierarchical: each scope implies all lower scopes.
# "service" is a superset that grants full access + bypasses RBAC permission checks.
SCOPE_HIERARCHY: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
"read": frozenset({"read"}),
"write": frozenset({"read", "write"}),
"approve": frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}),
}
# Map old role names to scope sets.
_ROLE_TO_SCOPES: dict[str, frozenset[str]] = {
"read": frozenset({"read"}),
"full": frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}),
"service": frozenset({"read", "write", "approve", "service"}),
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -106,7 +98,7 @@ def _permissions_to_scopes(permissions: set[str]) -> frozenset[str]:
scopes.add("read")
return frozenset(scopes)
for perm in permissions:
if perm in VALID_SCOPES:
if perm in VALID_SCOPES and perm != "service":
scopes.update(SCOPE_HIERARCHY.get(perm, {perm}))
# Any admin.* permission requires access to admin endpoints → approve scope
if any(p.startswith("admin.") for p in permissions):
@@ -120,15 +112,14 @@ def require_permission(request: Request, permission: str) -> JSONResponse | None
"""Return a 403 JSONResponse if the user lacks *permission*, else None.
Call from admin handlers after the middleware scope check passes.
Config-file tokens (no user_id) are treated as full-access.
Service tokens (scope ``service``) bypass permission checks.
"""
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
auth_result: AuthResult | None = getattr(getattr(request, "state", None), "auth_result", None)
if auth_result is None:
return JSONResponse({"error": "Unauthorized"}, status_code=401)
# Config-file tokens (no user_id) are treated as full-access
if not auth_result.user_id:
if auth_result.has_scope("service"):
return None
if auth_result.has_permission(permission):
return None
@@ -200,9 +191,9 @@ def _strip_version_prefix(path: str) -> str:
class AuthResult:
"""Result of successful authentication."""
user_id: str # empty string for config-file tokens
user_id: str
scopes: frozenset[str]
token_source: str # "config", "jwt", "database"
token_source: str # "jwt", "database", "password", or service origin (e.g. "console", "cli")
permissions: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
def has_scope(self, scope: str) -> bool:
@@ -214,28 +205,6 @@ class AuthResult:
return permission in self.permissions
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# AuthConfig (unchanged from before — static config-file tokens)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@dataclass
class AuthConfig:
"""Auth configuration loaded once at startup (not modified after creation)."""
enabled: bool = False
tokens: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict) # token_value → role
def check(self, token: str | None) -> str | None:
"""Return the role for a valid config token, or *None*."""
if not token:
return None
for known_token, role in self.tokens.items():
if hmac.compare_digest(token, known_token):
return role
return None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Token generation and hashing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -303,7 +272,11 @@ def parse_scopes(scopes_str: str) -> frozenset[str]:
def load_jwt_secret() -> str:
"""Load JWT signing secret from env or config, or auto-generate."""
"""Load JWT signing secret from env or config.
Raises :class:`SystemExit` if no secret is configured. A JWT secret
is required for auth, inter-service communication, and session tokens.
"""
secret = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET", "").strip()
if not secret:
from turnstone.core.config import load_config
@@ -312,18 +285,19 @@ def load_jwt_secret() -> str:
secret = str(auth_cfg.get("jwt_secret", "")).strip()
if not secret:
# Auto-generate an ephemeral secret
secret = secrets.token_hex(32)
log.warning(
"No JWT secret configured — using ephemeral secret (tokens will not survive restart)"
log.error(
"TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET is required but not set. "
'Generate one with: python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"'
)
return secret
raise SystemExit(1)
if len(secret) < _MIN_SECRET_LENGTH:
log.warning(
"JWT secret is shorter than %d characters — consider using a stronger secret",
log.error(
"JWT secret must be at least %d characters. "
'Generate one with: python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))"',
_MIN_SECRET_LENGTH,
)
raise SystemExit(1)
return secret
@@ -397,62 +371,6 @@ def validate_jwt(token: str, secret: str, audience: str = "") -> AuthResult | No
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Loading
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def load_auth_config() -> AuthConfig:
"""Build :class:`AuthConfig` from ``config.toml`` ``[auth]`` + env vars.
Auth is **enabled by default**. Set ``[auth] enabled = false`` or
``TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED=0`` to disable.
Config format::
[auth]
enabled = false # opt out
[[auth.tokens]]
value = "tok_abc123"
role = "full"
Environment variables:
- ``TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED=0`` disables auth
- ``TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED=1`` enables auth (default)
- ``TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN=<token>`` registers a single full-access token
"""
from turnstone.core.config import load_config
auth_cfg = load_config("auth")
enabled = bool(auth_cfg.get("enabled", True))
tokens: dict[str, str] = {}
# Tokens from config file (TOML array-of-tables)
for entry in auth_cfg.get("tokens", []):
value = entry.get("value", "") if isinstance(entry, dict) else ""
role = entry.get("role", "read") if isinstance(entry, dict) else ""
if value and role in ("read", "full"):
tokens[value] = role
# Environment variable overrides
env_enabled = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED", "").strip().lower()
if env_enabled in ("1", "true", "yes"):
enabled = True
elif env_enabled in ("0", "false", "no"):
enabled = False
env_token = os.environ.get("TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN", "").strip()
if env_token:
tokens[env_token] = "full"
if enabled and not tokens:
log.info("Auth enabled (no config tokens — use /api/auth/setup or turnstone-admin)")
return AuthConfig(enabled=enabled, tokens=tokens)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Path helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -529,7 +447,6 @@ def _extract_proxied_path(normalized: str) -> str | None:
def check_request(
auth_config: AuthConfig,
method: str,
path: str,
auth_header: str | None,
@@ -539,20 +456,16 @@ def check_request(
jwt_audience: str = "",
storage: Any = None,
) -> tuple[bool, int, str, AuthResult | None]:
"""Validate a request against the auth config.
"""Validate a request.
Checks ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` first, then falls back to the
``turnstone_auth`` cookie. Token types are auto-detected:
- Contains ``.`` JWT (validated with *jwt_secret*)
- Starts with ``ts_`` API token (looked up in *storage* by hash)
- Otherwise config-file token (hmac check)
Returns ``(allowed, status_code, message, auth_result)``.
"""
if not auth_config.enabled:
return True, 200, "", None
if is_public_path(path):
return True, 200, "", None
@@ -566,7 +479,7 @@ def check_request(
# Authenticate
result = _authenticate_token(
raw_token, auth_config, jwt_secret=jwt_secret, jwt_audience=jwt_audience, storage=storage
raw_token, jwt_secret=jwt_secret, jwt_audience=jwt_audience, storage=storage
)
if result is None:
return False, 401, "Unauthorized: missing or invalid token", None
@@ -581,7 +494,6 @@ def check_request(
def _authenticate_token(
token: str,
auth_config: AuthConfig,
*,
jwt_secret: str = "",
jwt_audience: str = "",
@@ -601,12 +513,6 @@ def _authenticate_token(
if token.startswith(TOKEN_PREFIX) and storage is not None:
return _authenticate_api_token(token, storage)
# 3. Config-file token (hmac comparison)
role = auth_config.check(token)
if role is not None:
scopes = _ROLE_TO_SCOPES.get(role, frozenset({"read"}))
return AuthResult(user_id="", scopes=scopes, token_source="config")
return None
@@ -852,7 +758,6 @@ class AuthMiddleware:
await self.app(scope, receive, send)
return
auth_config = request.app.state.auth_config
jwt_secret = getattr(request.app.state, "jwt_secret", "")
storage = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_storage", None)
method = request.method
@@ -860,7 +765,6 @@ class AuthMiddleware:
auth_header = request.headers.get("Authorization")
cookie_header = request.headers.get("Cookie")
allowed, status, msg, auth_result = check_request(
auth_config,
method,
path,
auth_header,
@@ -904,7 +808,6 @@ async def handle_auth_login(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:
except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return JSONResponse({"error": "Invalid JSON body"}, status_code=400)
auth_config = request.app.state.auth_config
jwt_secret = getattr(request.app.state, "jwt_secret", "")
storage = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_storage", None)
login_limiter: LoginRateLimiter | None = getattr(request.app.state, "login_limiter", None)
@@ -955,7 +858,6 @@ async def handle_auth_login(request: Request, audience: str) -> Response:
elif body.get("token"):
result = _authenticate_token(
body["token"],
auth_config,
jwt_secret=jwt_secret,
jwt_audience=audience,
storage=storage,
@@ -1011,7 +913,6 @@ async def handle_auth_status(request: Request) -> Response:
"""Shared ``GET /api/auth/status`` handler — login UI state detection."""
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
auth_config = request.app.state.auth_config
storage = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_storage", None)
has_users = False
@@ -1027,9 +928,9 @@ async def handle_auth_status(request: Request) -> Response:
oidc_enabled = bool(oidc_config and oidc_config.enabled)
resp: dict[str, Any] = {
"auth_enabled": auth_config.enabled,
"auth_enabled": True,
"has_users": has_users,
"setup_required": auth_config.enabled and not has_users,
"setup_required": not has_users,
}
if oidc_enabled and oidc_config is not None:
resp["oidc_enabled"] = True
-1
View File
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ _EXPLICIT_SCRUB: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
"TAVILY_API_KEY",
"TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET",
"TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN",
"TURNSTONE_DISCORD_TOKEN",
"TURNSTONE_GITHUB_TOKEN",
"TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET",
+2 -2
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ def _merge_consecutive(messages: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
_WEB_SEARCH_TOOL_TYPE = "web_search_20250305"
# Tool search: server-side BM25 tool discovery for deferred tools
_TOOL_SEARCH_TOOL_TYPE = "tool_search_tool_bm25_20251119"
_TOOL_SEARCH_TOOL_TYPE = "tool_search_tool_bm25"
# -- model capabilities -------------------------------------------------------
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ class AnthropicProvider:
result.append({**tool, "defer_loading": True})
else:
result.append(tool)
result.append({"type": _TOOL_SEARCH_TOOL_TYPE, "name": "tool_search"})
result.append({"type": _TOOL_SEARCH_TOOL_TYPE, "name": _TOOL_SEARCH_TOOL_TYPE})
return result
# -- shared param logic --------------------------------------------------
+154 -2
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import mimetypes
import os
import queue
import re
import shutil
import signal
import subprocess
import tempfile
@@ -161,6 +162,13 @@ _IMAGE_SIZE_CAP: int = 4 * 1024 * 1024
# Upper bound on total skill content injected into system messages
_MAX_SKILL_CONTENT: int = 32768
# Matches resource paths referenced in skill content (scripts/foo.py, etc.)
_RESOURCE_PATH_RE = re.compile(
r"(?<![/\w-])(?:scripts|references|assets)/[\w./-]+\."
r"(?:json|yaml|yml|toml|cfg|ini|py|sh|js|ts|md|txt)"
r"(?=[\s)\]}'\"`,;:\x60]|$)"
)
_TEMPLATE_VAR_RE = re.compile(r"\{\{(\w+)\}\}")
@@ -417,6 +425,7 @@ class ChatSession:
self._skill_name: str | None = skill
self._skill_content: str | None = None
self._skill_resources: dict[str, str] = {}
self._skill_resources_dir: str | None = None
self._load_skills()
self._init_system_messages()
self._save_config()
@@ -583,6 +592,8 @@ class ChatSession:
else:
self._skill_content = None
self._skill_resources = {}
self._materialize_skill_resources()
self._validate_skill_resources()
def set_skill(self, name: str | None) -> None:
"""Set or clear the active skill."""
@@ -613,6 +624,81 @@ class ChatSession:
log.warning("skill_resources.load_failed", skill_id=skill_id, exc_info=True)
return {}
def _cleanup_skill_resources(self) -> None:
"""Remove materialized skill resources from disk."""
d = self._skill_resources_dir
if d is not None:
shutil.rmtree(d, ignore_errors=True)
self._skill_resources_dir = None
def _materialize_skill_resources(self) -> None:
"""Write skill resources to a temp directory for subprocess access."""
self._cleanup_skill_resources()
if not self._skill_resources:
return
base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"skill-{self._ws_id[:8]}-")
written = 0
for rel_path, content in self._skill_resources.items():
normed = os.path.normpath(rel_path)
if not normed or normed == "." or normed.startswith(("..", "/")):
log.warning("skill_resources.bad_path", path=rel_path)
continue
if ".." in normed.split(os.sep):
log.warning("skill_resources.bad_path", path=rel_path)
continue
full = os.path.join(base, normed)
if not os.path.realpath(full).startswith(os.path.realpath(base)):
log.warning("skill_resources.path_escape", path=rel_path)
continue
try:
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(full), exist_ok=True)
with open(full, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(content)
if normed.startswith("scripts/"):
os.chmod(full, 0o755)
written += 1
except Exception:
log.warning("skill_resources.write_failed", path=rel_path, exc_info=True)
if written == 0:
shutil.rmtree(base, ignore_errors=True)
return
self._skill_resources_dir = base
log.info(
"skill_resources.materialized",
dir=base,
count=written,
)
def _skill_resource_env(self) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Return extra env vars for bash when skill resources are materialized."""
if not self._skill_resources_dir:
return {}
env: dict[str, str] = {"SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR": self._skill_resources_dir}
scripts_dir = os.path.join(self._skill_resources_dir, "scripts")
if os.path.isdir(scripts_dir):
current_path = os.environ.get("PATH")
if current_path:
env["PATH"] = scripts_dir + os.pathsep + current_path
else:
env["PATH"] = scripts_dir
return env
def _validate_skill_resources(self) -> None:
"""Warn if skill content references resource paths not in skill_resources."""
if not self._skill_content or not self._skill_name:
return
referenced = {os.path.normpath(p) for p in _RESOURCE_PATH_RE.findall(self._skill_content)}
if not referenced:
return
available = {os.path.normpath(p) for p in self._skill_resources}
missing = sorted(referenced - available)
if missing:
log.warning("skill_resources.missing", skill=self._skill_name, paths=missing)
self.ui.on_info(
f"Skill '{self._skill_name}' references {len(missing)} resource(s) "
f"not bundled: {', '.join(missing)}"
)
# -- MCP tool refresh ----------------------------------------------------
def _on_mcp_tools_changed(self) -> None:
@@ -747,6 +833,7 @@ class ChatSession:
self._mcp_prompt_cb = None
if self._watch_runner:
self._watch_runner.remove_dispatch_fn(self._ws_id)
self._cleanup_skill_resources()
def _handle_mcp_refresh(self, arg: str) -> None:
"""Handle ``/mcp refresh [server]``."""
@@ -893,6 +980,13 @@ class ChatSession:
self._msg_tokens = [
max(1, int(self._msg_char_count(m) / self._chars_per_token)) for m in self.messages
]
log.info(
"Resuming ws=%s: %d messages, provider=%s, model=%s",
ws_id,
len(messages),
type(self._provider).__name__,
self.model,
)
# Restore persisted config
config = load_workstream_config(ws_id)
if config:
@@ -910,11 +1004,24 @@ class ChatSession:
self.context_window = cfg.context_window
if not self._manual_tool_truncation:
self.tool_truncation = int(cfg.context_window * self._chars_per_token * 0.5)
log.info(
"Resume: resolved alias=%s → provider=%s, model=%s, ctx=%d",
saved_alias,
type(self._provider).__name__,
model_name,
cfg.context_window,
)
elif saved_model and saved_model != self.model:
# No alias or alias no longer in registry — at least set the model name
self.model = saved_model
self._model_alias = None
self._cached_capabilities = None
log.warning(
"Resume: alias %r not in registry, keeping default provider=%s for model=%s",
saved_alias,
type(self._provider).__name__,
saved_model,
)
if "temperature" in config:
self.temperature = float(config["temperature"])
if "reasoning_effort" in config:
@@ -1091,6 +1198,12 @@ class ChatSession:
"Resource content omitted (total exceeds 8KB). "
"Resource files are listed above by path and size."
)
if self._skill_resources_dir:
lines.append(
"\nResource files are materialized on disk. "
"Scripts in scripts/ are on PATH and can be run by name. "
"All files are under $SKILL_RESOURCES_DIR."
)
lines.append("</skill-resources>")
dev_parts.append("\n".join(lines))
# Skill catalog: disclose search-activated skills so the model
@@ -1275,6 +1388,21 @@ class ChatSession:
) -> Iterator[StreamChunk]:
"""Attempt a streaming API call with retries on transient errors."""
prov = provider or self._provider
raw_url = str(getattr(client, "base_url", getattr(client, "_base_url", "?")))
safe_url = raw_url.split("?")[0] # strip query params (may contain keys)
msg_count = len(msgs)
role_counts: dict[str, int] = {}
for m in msgs:
r = m.get("role", "?")
role_counts[r] = role_counts.get(r, 0) + 1
log.debug(
"API call: provider=%s model=%s base_url=%s msgs=%d roles=%s",
type(prov).__name__,
model,
safe_url,
msg_count,
role_counts,
)
last_err: Exception | None = None
for attempt in range(self._MAX_RETRIES + 1):
self._check_cancelled()
@@ -1294,6 +1422,29 @@ class ChatSession:
)
except Exception as e:
ename = type(e).__name__
cause_name = (
type(e.__cause__).__name__
if e.__cause__
else (type(e.__context__).__name__ if e.__context__ else "None")
)
log.warning(
"API error (attempt %d/%d): %s (cause=%s) "
"provider=%s model=%s base_url=%s msgs=%d",
attempt + 1,
self._MAX_RETRIES + 1,
ename,
cause_name,
type(prov).__name__,
model,
safe_url,
msg_count,
)
log.debug(
"API error details (attempt %d/%d)",
attempt + 1,
self._MAX_RETRIES + 1,
exc_info=True,
)
if ename not in prov.retryable_error_names or attempt == self._MAX_RETRIES:
raise
last_err = e
@@ -2184,7 +2335,8 @@ class ChatSession:
"""Emit status info via the UI."""
if not self._last_usage:
return
self.ui.on_status(self._last_usage, self.context_window, self.reasoning_effort)
usage: dict[str, Any] = {**self._last_usage, "model": self.model}
self.ui.on_status(usage, self.context_window, self.reasoning_effort)
# -- Conversation compaction ------------------------------------------------
@@ -4338,7 +4490,7 @@ class ChatSession:
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
text=True,
start_new_session=True,
env=scrubbed_env(),
env=scrubbed_env(extra=self._skill_resource_env()),
)
with self._procs_lock:
self._active_procs.add(proc)
+4 -4
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Usage::
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneConsole
with TurnstoneConsole("http://localhost:8081", token="tok_xxx") as client:
with TurnstoneConsole("http://localhost:8090", token="ts_your_api_token") as client:
overview = client.overview()
print(f"Nodes: {overview.nodes}, Workstreams: {overview.workstreams}")
"""
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ class AsyncTurnstoneConsole(_BaseClient):
def __init__(
self,
base_url: str = "http://localhost:8081",
base_url: str = "http://localhost:8090",
token: str = "",
timeout: float = 30.0,
httpx_client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None,
@@ -961,14 +961,14 @@ class TurnstoneConsole:
Usage::
with TurnstoneConsole("http://localhost:8081", token="tok_xxx") as client:
with TurnstoneConsole("http://localhost:8090", token="ts_your_api_token") as client:
overview = client.overview()
print(f"Nodes: {overview.nodes}")
"""
def __init__(
self,
base_url: str = "http://localhost:8081",
base_url: str = "http://localhost:8090",
token: str = "",
timeout: float = 30.0,
ca_cert: str | None = None,
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Usage::
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneServer
with TurnstoneServer("http://localhost:8080", token="tok_xxx") as client:
with TurnstoneServer("http://localhost:8080", token="ts_your_api_token") as client:
ws = client.create_workstream(name="Analysis")
result = client.send_and_wait("Hello", ws.ws_id)
print(result.content)
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ class TurnstoneServer:
Usage::
with TurnstoneServer("http://localhost:8080", token="tok_xxx") as client:
with TurnstoneServer("http://localhost:8080", token="ts_your_api_token") as client:
ws = client.create_workstream(name="Analysis")
result = client.send_and_wait("Hello", ws.ws_id)
print(result.content)
+23 -9
View File
@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ class WebUI:
self._ws_turn_content_size: int = 0
def _enqueue(self, data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
# Stamp ws_id on every per-workstream event so the client can
# validate it belongs to the pane's current workstream.
# Shallow copy to avoid mutating caller's dict (e.g. _pending_approval).
if "ws_id" not in data:
data = {**data, "ws_id": self.ws_id}
with self._listeners_lock:
snapshot = list(self._listeners)
for lq in snapshot:
@@ -2096,7 +2101,12 @@ def internal_mcp_reload(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
mcp_mgr = MCPClientManager({})
mcp_mgr.start()
mcp_mgr.set_storage(storage)
request.app.state.mcp_client = mcp_mgr
# Update shared ref so session_factory sees the new client
mcp_ref = getattr(request.app.state, "mcp_ref", None)
if mcp_ref is not None:
mcp_ref[0] = mcp_mgr
result = mcp_mgr.reconcile_sync(storage)
return JSONResponse({"status": "ok", **result})
@@ -2439,12 +2449,12 @@ def create_app(
global_listeners: list[queue.Queue[dict[str, Any]]],
global_listeners_lock: threading.Lock,
skip_permissions: bool,
auth_config: Any,
jwt_secret: str = "",
auth_storage: Any = None,
health_monitor: Any = None,
rate_limiter: Any = None,
mcp_client: Any = None,
mcp_ref: list[Any] | None = None,
registry: Any = None,
idle_timeout: int = 0,
node_id: str = "",
@@ -2519,12 +2529,12 @@ def create_app(
app.state.global_listeners = global_listeners
app.state.global_listeners_lock = global_listeners_lock
app.state.skip_permissions = skip_permissions
app.state.auth_config = auth_config
app.state.jwt_secret = jwt_secret
app.state.auth_storage = auth_storage
app.state.health_monitor = health_monitor
app.state.rate_limiter = rate_limiter
app.state.mcp_client = mcp_client
app.state.mcp_ref = mcp_ref
app.state.registry = registry
app.state.idle_timeout = idle_timeout
app.state.node_id = node_id
@@ -2751,6 +2761,9 @@ def main() -> None:
refresh_interval=config_store.get("mcp.refresh_interval"),
storage=_get_storage(),
)
# Mutable ref so session_factory always sees the latest MCP client,
# including ones created by internal_mcp_reload after startup.
_mcp_ref: list[Any] = [mcp_client]
# Backend health monitor with circuit breaker
from turnstone.core.healthcheck import BackendHealthMonitor
@@ -2861,6 +2874,9 @@ def main() -> None:
) -> ChatSession:
assert ui is not None
r_client, r_model, r_cfg = registry.resolve(model_alias)
# Read MCP client from shared ref — may have been replaced after startup
# by internal_mcp_reload (Sync to Nodes) when no --mcp-config was passed.
live_mcp_client = _mcp_ref[0]
uid = getattr(ui, "_user_id", "") or ""
# Resolve username from user_id for system message context
@@ -2895,7 +2911,7 @@ def main() -> None:
auto_compact_pct=config_store.get("session.auto_compact_pct"),
agent_max_turns=config_store.get("tools.agent_max_turns"),
tool_truncation=config_store.get("tools.truncation"),
mcp_client=mcp_client,
mcp_client=live_mcp_client,
registry=registry,
model_alias=model_alias or registry.default,
health_monitor=health_monitor,
@@ -2989,13 +3005,11 @@ def main() -> None:
_metrics.set_judge_enabled(judge_config.enabled if judge_config else False)
# Auth config
from turnstone.core.auth import load_auth_config, load_jwt_secret
from turnstone.core.auth import load_jwt_secret
from turnstone.core.storage import get_storage
auth_config = load_auth_config()
jwt_secret = load_jwt_secret() if auth_config.enabled else ""
if auth_config.enabled:
log.info("Auth: enabled (%d config token(s))", len(auth_config.tokens))
jwt_secret = load_jwt_secret()
log.info("Auth: enabled (JWT)")
# Build the ASGI app
from turnstone.core.web_helpers import parse_cors_origins
@@ -3020,12 +3034,12 @@ def main() -> None:
global_listeners=global_listeners,
global_listeners_lock=global_listeners_lock,
skip_permissions=_skip_perms,
auth_config=auth_config,
jwt_secret=jwt_secret,
auth_storage=get_storage(),
health_monitor=health_monitor,
rate_limiter=rate_limiter,
mcp_client=mcp_client,
mcp_ref=_mcp_ref,
registry=registry,
idle_timeout=config_store.get("server.workstream_idle_timeout"),
node_id=_node_id,
+62 -17
View File
@@ -310,29 +310,53 @@ Pane.prototype.connectSSE = function (wsId) {
workstreams[ws.id] = { name: ws.name, state: ws.state };
});
renderTabBar();
// Reconnect all disconnected panes, reassigning stale ws_ids
// Reconnect all disconnected panes, reassigning stale ws_ids.
// Two passes: (1) reassign stale panes, (2) reconnect all.
// Track assigned ws_ids to avoid multiple panes on the same ws.
var remaining = Object.keys(workstreams);
if (!remaining.length) {
showDashboard();
return;
}
var usedWsIds = {};
for (var pid in panes) {
var p = panes[pid];
if (p.wsId && !workstreams[p.wsId]) {
var ids = Object.keys(workstreams);
if (ids.length) {
p.wsId = ids[0];
p.messagesEl.innerHTML = "";
p.showEmptyState();
p.updateWsName();
} else {
showDashboard();
return;
if (panes[pid].wsId && workstreams[panes[pid].wsId])
usedWsIds[panes[pid].wsId] = true;
}
for (var pid2 in panes) {
var p2 = panes[pid2];
if (p2.wsId && !workstreams[p2.wsId]) {
var newWsId = null;
for (var ri = 0; ri < remaining.length; ri++) {
if (!usedWsIds[remaining[ri]]) {
newWsId = remaining[ri];
break;
}
}
if (newWsId) {
p2.disconnectSSE();
p2.wsId = newWsId;
usedWsIds[newWsId] = true;
while (p2.messagesEl.firstChild)
p2.messagesEl.removeChild(p2.messagesEl.firstChild);
p2.showEmptyState();
p2.updateWsName();
}
// else: more panes than workstreams — leave pane stale,
// connectSSE below will pick it up or it stays disconnected.
}
if (pid === focusedPaneId) currentWsId = p.wsId;
if (!p.evtSource) {
}
// Pass 2: reconnect all panes and sync focused pane
for (var pid3 in panes) {
var p3 = panes[pid3];
if (pid3 === focusedPaneId) currentWsId = p3.wsId;
if (!p3.evtSource && p3.wsId && workstreams[p3.wsId]) {
setTimeout(
(function (pp) {
return function () {
pp.connectSSE(pp.wsId);
};
})(p),
})(p3),
self.retryDelay,
);
}
@@ -357,6 +381,9 @@ Pane.prototype.connectSSE = function (wsId) {
};
Pane.prototype.handleEvent = function (evt) {
// Guard: drop events that belong to a different workstream.
// This prevents cross-contamination during tab switches and reconnects.
if (evt.ws_id && evt.ws_id !== this.wsId) return;
var self = this;
switch (evt.type) {
case "thinking_start":
@@ -2304,10 +2331,12 @@ function switchTab(wsId) {
}
}
pane.disconnectSSE();
pane.reset();
pane.wsId = wsId;
currentWsId = wsId;
pane.messagesEl.innerHTML = "";
while (pane.messagesEl.firstChild)
pane.messagesEl.removeChild(pane.messagesEl.firstChild);
pane.showEmptyState();
pane.updateWsName();
renderTabBar();
@@ -2957,8 +2986,18 @@ function connectGlobalSSE() {
for (var id in panes) {
if (panes[id].wsId === data.ws_id) panes[id].updateWsName();
}
} else if (data.type === "ws_created") {
workstreams[data.ws_id] = workstreams[data.ws_id] || {};
workstreams[data.ws_id].name = data.name || data.ws_id.slice(0, 6);
workstreams[data.ws_id].state = "idle";
renderTabBar();
} else if (data.type === "ws_closed") {
var wsId = data.ws_id;
// Disconnect per-ws SSE on affected panes immediately so stale
// events from the dying workstream don't leak into reassigned panes.
for (var cid in panes) {
if (panes[cid].wsId === wsId) panes[cid].disconnectSSE();
}
delete workstreams[wsId];
renderTabBar();
if (data.reason === "evicted") {
@@ -3137,10 +3176,13 @@ function makeCollapsible(el) {
var _planContent = "";
var _planPaneId = null;
var _planWsId = null;
function showPlanDialog(content) {
_planContent = content;
_planPaneId = focusedPaneId;
var paneNow = panes[_planPaneId];
_planWsId = paneNow ? paneNow.wsId : currentWsId;
document.getElementById("plan-content").textContent = content;
var feedbackEl = document.getElementById("plan-feedback");
feedbackEl.value = "";
@@ -3186,7 +3228,10 @@ function resolvePlan(defaultFeedback) {
}
// Critical: fire the API call first — this unblocks the server.
var wsId = pane ? pane.wsId : currentWsId;
// Use the ws_id captured when the dialog opened, not the current pane
// (user may have switched tabs while the dialog was open).
var wsId = _planWsId || (pane ? pane.wsId : currentWsId);
_planWsId = null;
authFetch("/v1/api/plan", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
Generated
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2485,7 +2485,7 @@ wheels = [
[[package]]
name = "turnstone"
version = "0.9.8"
version = "0.9.10"
source = { editable = "." }
dependencies = [
{ name = "alembic" },