Files
openclaw/docs/plugins/sdk-channel-ingress.md
Josh Avant 97a53a9b35 feat: audit admitted channel participant identity (#122863)
* feat: audit admitted channel participant identity

* fix: preserve Telegram identity through thread recovery

* fix: signal held gateway process groups

* fix: keep audit evidence passive in collect routing

* fix: validate copied channel participant evidence

* fix: bind channel participant evidence to host ingress

* fix: honor Telegram proof credential roles

* fix: restart held Telegram proof through gateway

* fix: repair channel identity CI regressions

* test(matrix): bind thread routing owner

* fix: preserve direct DM SDK compatibility

* fix: bind channel provenance at host runtime

* test(feishu): provide channel context builder

* fix: defer record-bound channel runtime resolution

* fix: keep channel admission evidence core-private

* fix(audit): bind channel admission to plugin lifecycle

* fix(audit): bind ingress provenance to final context

* refactor(audit): split admission scope keys

* test(queue): cover combined metadata carriers

* refactor(audit): keep lifecycle helpers private

* fix(queue): preserve combined turn authority

* test(channels): provide ingress context builders

* test(channels): align integrated CI fixtures

* test(clickclack): resolve model-loop ingress

* docs: preserve channel participant evidence invariant
2026-08-14 08:57:01 -05:00

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8.2 KiB
Markdown

---
summary: "Experimental channel ingress API for inbound message authorization"
read_when:
- Building or migrating a messaging channel plugin
- Changing DM or group allowlists, route gates, command auth, event auth, or mention activation
- Reviewing channel ingress redaction or SDK compatibility boundaries
title: "Channel ingress API"
sidebarTitle: "Channel Ingress"
---
Channel ingress is the experimental access-control boundary for inbound
channel events. Plugins own platform facts and side effects; core owns
generic policy: DM/group allowlists, pairing-store DM entries, route gates,
command gates, event auth, mention activation, redacted diagnostics, and
admission.
Use `openclaw/plugin-sdk/channel-ingress-runtime` for receive paths.
## Runtime resolver
```ts
import {
defineStableChannelIngressIdentity,
resolveChannelMessageIngress,
} from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/channel-ingress-runtime";
const identity = defineStableChannelIngressIdentity({
key: "platform-user-id",
normalize: normalizePlatformUserId,
sensitivity: "pii",
});
const result = await resolveChannelMessageIngress({
channelId: "my-channel",
accountId,
identity,
subject: { stableId: platformUserId },
conversation: { kind: isGroup ? "group" : "direct", id: conversationId },
contextBinding: {
agentId: agentRoute.agentId,
sessionKey: agentRoute.sessionKey,
messageId,
inboundEventKind: "user_request",
},
event: { kind: "message", authMode: "inbound", mayPair: !isGroup },
policy: {
dmPolicy: config.dmPolicy,
groupPolicy: config.groupPolicy,
groupAllowFromFallbackToAllowFrom: true,
},
allowFrom: config.allowFrom,
groupAllowFrom: config.groupAllowFrom,
accessGroups: cfg.accessGroups,
route,
readStoreAllowFrom,
command: hasControlCommand ? { allowTextCommands: true, hasControlCommand } : undefined,
});
const ctx = runtime.channel.inbound.buildContext({
// Pass the exact host result; do not rebuild participant evidence from
// SenderId, From, session keys, routes, rooms, or message metadata.
channelIngress: result,
// ...normalized channel facts
});
```
Do not precompute effective allowlists, command owners, or command groups.
The resolver derives them from raw allowlists, store callbacks, route
descriptors, access groups, policy, and conversation kind.
For a result that will enter a host context, resolve after the channel's route
owner has selected the final agent and session. `contextBinding` freezes those
facts with the stable transport message id (when present) and final inbound
event kind. Decision-only checks may omit it, but such a result is not valid
execution provenance and must not be passed as `channelIngress`. When a channel
batches several admitted messages, pass their exact results in source order;
the finalized context message id identifies the last source result.
## Result
Bundled plugins should consume modern projections directly:
| Field | Meaning |
| ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `ingress` | ordered gate decision and admission |
| `senderAccess` | sender/conversation authorization only |
| `routeAccess` | route and route-sender projection |
| `commandAccess` | command authorization; `requested: false` when no command gate ran |
| `activationAccess` | mention/activation result |
Event authorization stays available on the ordered `ingress.graph` and the
decisive `ingress.reasonCode`; no separate event projection is emitted.
Deprecated third-party SDK helpers may rebuild older shapes internally. New
bundled receive paths should not translate modern results back into local
DTOs.
When execution-identity audit collection is enabled, a trusted active native
plugin is the authoritative in-process producer of its remote participant
fact. The host-injected registered runtime binds the resolver result to the
exact plugin record and registry lifecycle epoch, then validates its complete
available conversation, route, agent, session, message, event, and participant scope during a
one-shot context handoff. The public standalone builder remains
non-authoritative and cannot mint participant evidence.
Queue collection retains attribution only when every contribution has valid
evidence for the same participant; mixed, missing, stale, or unminted evidence
is `unknown`. The carrier is opaque, bounded, one-shot, and diagnostic only.
Plugins cannot mint participant evidence from caller-chosen sender, account,
room, route, session, message, or transport fields. The SDK intentionally
exposes no record, epoch, owner capability, participant-evidence constructor,
or evidence copier. A structurally similar result, stale record, reused result,
or scope-changed context does not gain host authority.
`boundary-verified` means core verified that the participant fact crossed this
trusted active registered native-plugin boundary with the exact record, epoch,
scope, and one-shot handoff. It does not mean core independently queried the
remote service; only the channel plugin can observe that transport fact.
The audit states are distinct:
- **supported**: the authoritative ingress resolver ran. Its exact result can
yield a present invoker and enforced or attribution-only coverage.
- **unknown**: a supported handoff was missing, stale, fake, reused, mixed, or
otherwise failed host validation. Unknown never means allowed.
- **unsupported**: a named path has no Phase 0 authoritative integration and
explicitly passes `channelIngress: "unsupported"`. Unsupported never means
allowed and is not a shortcut for incomplete wiring.
## Access groups
`accessGroup:<name>` entries stay redacted. Core resolves static
`message.senders` groups itself and calls `resolveAccessGroupMembership` only
for dynamic groups that require a platform lookup. Missing, unsupported, and
failed groups fail closed.
## Event modes
| `authMode` | Meaning |
| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
| `inbound` | normal inbound sender gates |
| `command` | command gates for callbacks or scoped buttons |
| `origin-subject` | actor must match the original message subject |
| `route-only` | route gates only for route-scoped trusted events |
| `none` | plugin-owned internal events bypass shared auth |
Use `mayPair: false` for reactions, buttons, callbacks, and native commands.
## Routes and activation
Use route descriptors for room, topic, guild, thread, or nested route policy:
```ts
route: {
id: "room",
allowed: roomAllowed,
enabled: roomEnabled,
senderPolicy: "replace",
senderAllowFrom: roomAllowFrom,
blockReason: "room_sender_not_allowlisted",
}
```
Use `channelIngressRoutes(...)` when a plugin has several optional route
descriptors; it filters disabled branches while keeping route facts generic
and ordered by each descriptor's `precedence`.
Mention gating is an activation gate. A mention miss returns
`admission: "skip"` so the turn kernel does not process an observe-only turn.
Most channels should leave activation after sender and command gates. Public
chat surfaces that must quiet non-mentioned traffic before sender allowlist
noise can opt into `activation.order: "before-sender"` when text-command
bypass is disabled. Channels with implicit activation, such as replies in bot
threads, resolve `channels.defaults.implicitMentions` plus channel and account
overrides with `resolveChannelImplicitMentions(...)`, then pass the result as
`activation.implicitMentions`. The projected
`activationAccess.shouldBypassMention` reports when command or implicit
activation bypassed an explicit mention.
## Redaction
Raw sender values and raw allowlist entries are resolver input only. They
must not appear in resolved state, decisions, diagnostics, snapshots, or
compatibility facts. Use opaque subject ids, entry ids, route ids, and
diagnostic ids.
## Verification
```bash
pnpm test src/channels/message-access/message-access.test.ts src/plugin-sdk/channel-ingress-runtime.test.ts
pnpm plugin-sdk:api:diff --base "$(git merge-base origin/main HEAD)" --head HEAD
```