mirror of
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw.git
synced 2026-08-26 04:15:48 -06:00
Peter Steinberger
0a86702241
* feat(github): add device authorization lifecycle * fix(github): harden device authorization lifecycle * fix(github): refresh native tool display snapshot * fix(github): refresh config and UI baselines * refactor(github): break OAuth identity import cycle * test: make gateway retry deadline assertion scheduler-safe
916 lines
51 KiB
Markdown
916 lines
51 KiB
Markdown
---
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summary: "Tools config (policy, experimental toggles, provider-backed tools) and custom provider/base-URL setup"
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read_when:
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- Configuring `tools.*` policy, allowlists, or experimental features
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- Registering custom providers or overriding base URLs
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- Setting up OpenAI-compatible self-hosted endpoints
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title: "Configuration — tools and custom providers"
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sidebarTitle: "Tools and custom providers"
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---
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`tools.*` config keys and custom provider / base-URL setup. For agents, channels, and other top-level config keys, see [Configuration reference](/gateway/configuration-reference).
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## Tools
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### Tool profiles
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`tools.profile` sets a base allowlist before `tools.allow`/`tools.deny`:
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<Note>
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Local onboarding defaults new local configs to `tools.profile: "coding"` when unset (existing explicit profiles are preserved).
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</Note>
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| Profile | Includes |
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| ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `minimal` | `session_status` only |
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| `coding` | `group:fs`, `group:runtime`, `group:web`, `group:sessions`, `group:memory`, `cron`, `get_goal`, `create_goal`, `update_goal`, `progress_card`, `ask_user`, `skill_workshop`, `image`, `image_generate`, `music_generate`, `video_generate` |
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| `messaging` | `group:messaging`, `sessions`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_search`, `conversations_list`, `conversations_send`, `conversations_turn`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `sessions_yield`, `subagents`, `session_status`, `ask_user` |
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| `full` | No restriction (same as unset) |
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`coding` and `messaging` also implicitly allow `bundle-mcp` (configured MCP servers).
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### Tool groups
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| Group | Tools |
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| ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `group:runtime` | `exec`, `process`, `code_execution` (`bash` is accepted as an alias for `exec`) |
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| `group:fs` | `read`, `write`, `edit`, `apply_patch` |
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| `group:sessions` | `sessions`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_search`, `conversations_list`, `conversations_send`, `conversations_turn`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `sessions_yield`, `subagents`, `session_status`, `suggest_task`, `dismiss_task` |
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| `group:memory` | `memory_search`, `memory_get` |
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| `group:web` | `web_search`, `x_search`, `web_fetch` |
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| `group:ui` | `browser`, `screen`, `dashboard`, `terminal`, `portal`, `canvas`, `show_widget` |
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| `group:automation` | `heartbeat_respond`, `cron`, `gateway` |
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| `group:messaging` | `message` |
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| `group:nodes` | `nodes`, `computer` |
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| `group:agents` | `agents_list`, `get_goal`, `create_goal`, `update_goal`, `progress_card`, `ask_user`, `skill_workshop` |
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| `group:media` | `image`, `image_generate`, `music_generate`, `video_generate`, `tts` |
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| `group:openclaw` | All built-in tools above except `read`/`write`/`edit`/`apply_patch`/`exec`/`process`/`canvas` (excludes plugin tools) |
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| `group:plugins` | Tools owned by loaded plugins, including configured MCP servers exposed through `bundle-mcp` |
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`suggest_task` lets a coding agent propose confirmed follow-up work without starting it. The suggestion's project directory must be a git checkout; invalid suggestions, including a non-git directory or blank prompt, are rejected when the tool records them. The Control UI shows the title and summary as an actionable chip; a Gateway-backed TUI shows an equivalent interactive prompt. Accepting a suggestion can start it in a fresh managed worktree (the default), start it locally in a new session in the suggested checkout, send it to a cloud worker profile when one is configured, or deliver it into the source session. OpenClaw sends the full prompt to the selected destination while the current turn continues. `dismiss_task` withdraws a still-pending suggestion by the ephemeral `task_id` returned from `suggest_task`.
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The tools are offered only when the initiating operator surface can receive and action Gateway task-suggestion events. Channel sessions and local/embedded TUI sessions do not receive them; channel transports need a portable typed task action before they can safely expose this flow. Suggestions are process-local and disappear when the Gateway restarts. Both tools remain in the `coding` profile and `group:sessions`, so normal `tools.allow` and `tools.deny` policy configures them automatically when the surface supports them.
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### MCP and plugin tools inside sandbox tool policy
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Configured MCP servers are exposed as plugin-owned tools under the `bundle-mcp` plugin id. Normal tool profiles can allow them, but `tools.sandbox.tools` is an additional gate for sandboxed sessions. If sandbox mode is `"all"` or `"non-main"`, include one of these entries in the sandbox tool allowlist when MCP/plugin tools should be visible:
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- `bundle-mcp` for OpenClaw-managed MCP servers from `mcp.servers`
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- the plugin id for a specific native plugin
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- `group:plugins` for all loaded plugin-owned tools
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- exact MCP server tool names or server globs such as `outlook__send_mail` or `outlook__*` when you only want one server
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Server globs use the provider-safe MCP server prefix, not necessarily the raw `mcp.servers` key. Non-`[A-Za-z0-9_-]` characters become `-`, names that do not start with a letter get an `mcp-` prefix, and long or duplicate prefixes may be truncated or suffixed; for example, `mcp.servers["Outlook Graph"]` uses a glob like `outlook-graph__*`.
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```json5
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{
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agents: { defaults: { sandbox: { mode: "all" } } },
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mcp: {
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servers: {
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outlook: { command: "node", args: ["./outlook-mcp.js"] },
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},
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},
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tools: {
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sandbox: {
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tools: {
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alsoAllow: ["web_search", "web_fetch", "memory_search", "memory_get", "bundle-mcp"],
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},
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},
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},
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}
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```
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Without that sandbox-layer entry, the MCP server can still load successfully while its tools are filtered before the provider request. Use `openclaw doctor` to catch this shape for OpenClaw-managed servers in `mcp.servers`. MCP servers loaded from bundled plugin manifests or Claude `.mcp.json` use the same sandbox gate, but this diagnostic does not enumerate those sources yet; use the same allowlist entries if their tools disappear in sandboxed turns.
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### `tools.codeMode`
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`tools.codeMode` gates the generic OpenClaw code-mode surface. When engaged
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for a run with tools, normal OpenClaw tools move behind the in-sandbox `tools.*`
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catalog bridge, and MCP tools are available through the generated `MCP`
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namespace. The model normally sees `exec` and `wait`; tools such as `computer`
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whose structured results cannot cross the JSON-only bridge stay direct.
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`enabled` defaults to `"auto"`, which engages code mode only for models whose
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catalog entry flags `compat.codeMode: "preferred"`. See
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[Code Mode - automatic per-model activation](/tools/code-mode#automatic-per-model-activation).
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To opt out for every run:
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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codeMode: {
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enabled: false,
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},
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},
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}
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```
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The shorthand is also accepted:
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```json5
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{
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tools: { codeMode: false },
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}
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```
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`enabled: true` forces code mode on for every tool-capable run, regardless of
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model.
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MCP declarations are exposed through the read-only virtual API file surface in
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code mode. Guest code can call `API.list("mcp")` and
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`API.read("mcp/<server>.d.ts")` to inspect TypeScript-style signatures before
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calling `MCP.<server>.<tool>()`. See [Code Mode](/tools/code-mode) for the
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runtime contract, limits, and debugging steps.
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### `tools.allow` / `tools.deny`
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Global tool allow/deny policy (deny wins). Case-insensitive, supports `*` wildcards. Applied even when Docker sandbox is off.
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```json5
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{
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tools: { deny: ["browser", "canvas"] },
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}
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```
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`write` and `apply_patch` are separate tool ids. `allow: ["write"]` also enables `apply_patch` for compatible models, but `deny: ["write"]` does not deny `apply_patch`. To block all file mutation, deny `group:fs` or list each mutating tool explicitly:
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```json5
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{
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tools: { deny: ["write", "edit", "apply_patch"] },
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}
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```
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<Note>
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`allow` and `alsoAllow` cannot both be set in the same scope (`tools`, `tools.byProvider.<id>`, `agents.entries.*.tools`) — config validation rejects it. Merge `alsoAllow` entries into `allow`, or drop `allow` and use `profile` + `alsoAllow` instead.
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</Note>
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The image inspection tool is `view_image`. If an older config still names
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`image` in an allow, `alsoAllow`, or deny list, run `openclaw doctor --fix` to
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rewrite supported global, per-agent, provider, sandbox, sender, channel, and
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Gateway policy surfaces. Doctor preserves patterns such as `image*` that may
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still match other tools and adds `view_image` when the pattern no longer covers
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inspection. Patterns that already cover both names, such as `*` or `*image*`,
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remain unchanged.
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### `tools.byProvider`
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Further restrict tools for specific providers or models. Order: base profile → provider profile → allow/deny.
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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profile: "coding",
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byProvider: {
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anthropic: { profile: "minimal" },
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"openai/gpt-5.4": { allow: ["group:fs", "sessions_list"] },
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},
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},
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}
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```
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### `tools.toolsBySender`
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Restricts tools for the current turn's originating requester. This is defense-in-depth on top of channel access control; sender values must come from the channel adapter, not message text. It does not authenticate other content in the model prompt; see [Requester-scoped controls and prompt context](/gateway/security#requester-scoped-controls-and-prompt-context).
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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toolsBySender: {
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"channel:discord:1234567890123": { alsoAllow: ["group:fs"] },
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"id:guest-user-id": { deny: ["group:runtime", "group:fs"] },
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"*": { deny: ["exec", "process", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"] },
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},
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},
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}
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```
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Keys use explicit prefixes: `channel:<channelId>:<senderId>`, `id:<senderId>`, `e164:<phone>`, `username:<handle>`, `name:<displayName>`, or `"*"`. Channel ids are canonical OpenClaw ids; aliases such as `teams` normalize to `msteams`. Legacy unprefixed keys are accepted as `id:` only. Matching order is channel+id, id, e164, username, name, then wildcard.
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Per-agent `agents.entries.*.tools.toolsBySender` overrides the global sender match when it matches, even with an empty `{}` policy.
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### `tools.elevated`
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Controls elevated exec access outside the sandbox:
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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elevated: {
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enabled: true,
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allowFrom: {
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whatsapp: ["+15555550123"],
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discord: ["1234567890123", "987654321098765432"],
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},
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},
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},
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}
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```
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- Per-agent override (`agents.entries.*.tools.elevated`) can only further restrict.
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- `/elevated on|off|ask|full` stores state per session; inline directives apply to single message.
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- Elevated `exec` bypasses sandboxing and uses the configured escape path (`gateway` by default, or `node` when the exec target is `node`).
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### `tools.github`
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GitHub CLI identity is native by default. When `tools.github` is omitted, local agent tools, the Codex harness, and Agent Settings follow normal `gh` resolution: `GH_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` from the Gateway process takes precedence, followed by the runtime user's `gh` keyring/config. The Git author comes from the selected agent's workspace.
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Use **Agents → Tools → GitHub Identity → Connect GitHub** for the recommended setup. OpenClaw displays a one-time user code and a fixed link to `https://github.com/login/device`; you open GitHub explicitly and approve `repo`, `workflow`, `read:org`, and `gist`. The latter two are part of GitHub CLI's minimum classic-token contract. The Gateway owns the device code, token exchange, account verification, private managed `gh` profile, and rotating refresh token. None of those credentials enter browser responses, config, logs, command arguments, transcripts, or model environments.
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OAuth access tokens expire after about eight hours. The Gateway refreshes them before expiry, verifies the durable GitHub account ID, and atomically replaces the credential inside the same private profile so already-running local tools continue using that identity. An expired or rejected refresh token is shown as **Reconnect required**. Refresh never blocks Gateway startup.
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**Use a PAT instead** preserves the fine-grained personal access token setup as an explicit fallback. The browser places the pasted token in the secret store as a one-use handoff. The Gateway hard-deletes that handoff before passing its value to `gh auth login` on stdin. Both setup paths verify `/user`, publish an account-owned managed profile, default Git authorship to the account's canonical GitHub noreply identity, and store only secret-free config:
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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github: {
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profileId: "ghp_0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
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kind: "oauth",
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gitAuthor: { name: "Automation User", email: "automation@example.com" },
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},
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},
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agents: {
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entries: {
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reviewer: {
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tools: {
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github: {
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profileId: "ghp_fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210",
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gitAuthor: { name: "Review Agent" },
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},
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},
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},
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},
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},
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}
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```
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Omitting `agents.entries.<id>.tools.github` inherits the system identity. An agent object is a complete managed override. Settings shows the effective identity and the selected configuration scope separately, so editing **System** never masquerades as an agent override. If a configured managed profile is missing or unusable, GitHub status reports `configured_unavailable`; it never falls back to the native profile.
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Managed identity applies to the `gh` CLI/API account and optional Git author/committer metadata in local OpenClaw exec and the local Codex harness. OpenClaw supplies a private `GH_CONFIG_DIR`, clears ambient `GH_TOKEN` and `GITHUB_TOKEN` precedence, and applies configured author fields through process-local environment and Git config overlays. It does not install a credential helper, rewrite SSH remotes, add HTTP authorization headers, or otherwise override an existing repository's Git network credentials. OAuth refresh keeps the same profile path and atomically replaces only its credential after verifying the durable account ID, so admitted local processes see the refreshed token on their next `gh` command. Choosing a different identity or inheritance target creates or selects another profile for new runs; existing processes keep their prior selected profile until they close. Retired profile files are cleaned on the next Gateway restart, so changing this setting is not immediate credential revocation.
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Managed profiles provide execution and coordination identity; they are not an OS-user security sandbox. A process with unrestricted host execution under the same OS account can access account-owned files, including managed `gh` profiles. Use an OpenClaw sandbox, a dedicated host, or a dedicated OS user when adversarial isolation is required.
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The profile is not forwarded to node hosts, OpenClaw sandboxes, remote-exec placements, or cloud workers; those environments remain credential-free. The `github_publish` tool instead records a bounded publication request. For cloud and remote-exec turns, the Gateway waits until the exact workspace result is reconciled and accepted, then commits remaining changes as the verified effective GitHub user, pushes the authoritative session branch through a one-shot HTTPS credential helper, and creates or reuses a draft pull request. The tool and worker payload contain no repository authority or credential.
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Local session-owned worktrees can use the same **Publish PR** action in the Control UI. The Gateway derives the managed worktree, repository, branch, base, and head from current session ownership. It never accepts those authority facts from the browser or model. Publication retries use a durable request ID, an exact commit marker, remote branch observation, and pull-request lookup by head branch so a Gateway restart or lost response does not create duplicate commits, pushes, or pull requests.
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Verification proves which account answered the GitHub API request. Status reports the credential kind, access expiry, refresh availability, OAuth scopes, and Git author while distinguishing missing credentials, unverified transport failures, and GitHub rate limiting without returning `gh` diagnostics. Repository-specific grants remain unknown until an exact repository operation succeeds; `/user` does not prove write access.
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Removing an agent override or choosing native credentials deletes the associated local refresh record after the config change. Already-running local processes may retain the old profile and its current access token until they exit, restart, or the token expires, while new runs use the updated identity immediately. This local change does not revoke the authorization at GitHub; revoke it separately from the OAuth application's GitHub settings when required.
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Control UI repository previews and project discovery use the separate optional `gateway.controlUi.github.token` service credential. They never consume an agent tool identity. When this SecretRef is explicit, OpenClaw excludes its exact environment or store name from agent execution. A custom name does not clear unrelated `GH_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` values used by native identity; a ref named `GH_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN` excludes that exact variable.
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### `tools.exec`
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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exec: {
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backgroundMs: 10000,
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timeoutSeconds: 1800,
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cleanupMs: 1800000,
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approvalRunningNoticeMs: 10000,
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notifyOnExit: true,
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notifyOnExitEmptySuccess: false,
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commandHighlighting: false,
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applyPatch: {
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enabled: true,
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allowModels: ["gpt-5.6-sol"],
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},
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},
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},
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}
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```
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Values shown are defaults except `applyPatch.allowModels` (empty/unset by default, meaning any compatible model may use `apply_patch`). `approvalRunningNoticeMs` emits a running notice when approval-backed exec runs long; `0` disables it.
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### `tools.loopDetection`
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Tool-loop safety checks are **disabled by default**. Set `enabled: true` to activate detection. Settings can be defined globally in `tools.loopDetection` and overridden per-agent at `agents.entries.*.tools.loopDetection`.
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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loopDetection: {
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enabled: true,
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},
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},
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}
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```
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### `tools.web`
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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web: {
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search: {
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enabled: true,
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apiKey: "brave_api_key", // or BRAVE_API_KEY env (Brave provider)
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maxResults: 5,
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timeoutSeconds: 30,
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cacheTtlMinutes: 15,
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},
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fetch: {
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enabled: true,
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provider: "firecrawl", // optional; omit for auto-detect
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maxChars: 20000,
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maxCharsCap: 20000,
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maxResponseBytes: 750000,
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timeoutSeconds: 30,
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cacheTtlMinutes: 15,
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maxRedirects: 3,
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readability: true,
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userAgent: "custom-ua",
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},
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},
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},
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}
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```
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Values shown are defaults except `provider` and `userAgent`. `maxResponseBytes` clamps to 32000–10000000; `maxChars` clamps to `maxCharsCap` (raise `maxCharsCap` to allow larger responses).
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### `tools.media`
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Configures inbound media understanding (image/audio/video):
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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media: {
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concurrency: 2,
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models: [
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{ provider: "openai", model: "gpt-4o-mini-transcribe", capabilities: ["audio"] },
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{
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type: "cli",
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command: "whisper",
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args: ["--model", "base", "{{AttachmentPath}}"],
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capabilities: ["audio"],
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},
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{ provider: "ollama", model: "gemma4:26b", capabilities: ["image"] },
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{ provider: "google", model: "gemini-3-flash-preview", capabilities: ["video"] },
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],
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audio: { enabled: true, preferredModel: "openai/gpt-4o-mini-transcribe" },
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image: { enabled: true, preferredModel: "ollama/gemma4:26b" },
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video: { enabled: true },
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},
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},
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}
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```
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`tools.media.models` is the only configured model list. Every entry declares the capabilities it handles. The optional `preferredModel` selector accepts `provider/model`, a model id, `provider:<id>` for provider-default entries, or `cli:command`; matching entries move to the front of that capability's fallback order. Per-capability prompts, limits, request settings, scope, attachment policy, and audio transcript echo remain defaults for configured and auto-detected models; a model entry can override model-specific fields.
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<AccordionGroup>
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<Accordion title="Media model entry fields">
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**Provider entry** (`type: "provider"` or omitted):
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||
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- `provider`: API provider id (`openai`, `anthropic`, `google`/`gemini`, `groq`, etc.)
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- `model`: model id override
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- `profile` / `preferredProfile`: `auth-profiles.json` profile selection
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**CLI entry** (`type: "cli"`):
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- `command`: executable to run
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- `args`: templated args (supports `{{AttachmentPath}}`, `{{AttachmentUrl}}`, `{{AttachmentContentType}}`, `{{AttachmentDir}}`, `{{AttachmentIndex}}`, `{{Prompt}}`, `{{MaxChars}}`, etc.; `openclaw doctor --fix` migrates deprecated `{input}` placeholders to `{{AttachmentPath}}`). The older `{{MediaPath}}`, `{{MediaUrl}}`, `{{MediaType}}`, and `{{MediaDir}}` aliases remain available during their compatibility window but are deprecated.
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**Common fields:**
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||
|
||
- `capabilities`: list containing one or more of `image`, `audio`, and `video`.
|
||
- `prompt`, `maxChars`, `maxBytes`, `timeoutSeconds`, `language`: per-entry overrides.
|
||
- Matching image model `timeoutSeconds` entries also apply when the agent calls the explicit `view_image` tool. For image understanding, this timeout applies to the request itself and is not reduced by earlier preparation work.
|
||
- Failures fall back to the next entry.
|
||
|
||
Provider auth follows standard order: `auth-profiles.json` → env vars → `models.providers.*.apiKey`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
</AccordionGroup>
|
||
|
||
### `tools.agentToAgent`
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
tools: {
|
||
agentToAgent: {
|
||
enabled: false,
|
||
allow: ["home", "work"],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
### `tools.sessions`
|
||
|
||
Controls which sessions can be targeted by the session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`).
|
||
|
||
Default: `tree` (current session + sessions spawned by it, such as subagents;
|
||
the main session can reach every session of the same agent).
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
tools: {
|
||
sessions: {
|
||
// "self" | "tree" | "agent" | "all"
|
||
visibility: "tree",
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
<AccordionGroup>
|
||
<Accordion title="Visibility scopes">
|
||
- `self`: only the current session key.
|
||
- `tree`: current session + sessions spawned by the current session (subagents). When the caller is the canonical main session, it includes every same-agent session for list, history, search, send, and status.
|
||
- `agent`: any session belonging to the current agent id (can include other users if you run per-sender sessions under the same agent id).
|
||
- `all`: any session. Cross-agent targeting still requires `tools.agentToAgent`.
|
||
- `self` remains strict for main. Incognito denial remains absolute, and cross-agent access still requires `all` plus `tools.agentToAgent` policy.
|
||
- Sandbox clamp: when the current session is sandboxed and `agents.defaults.sandbox.sessionToolsVisibility="spawned"` (the default), access stays limited to spawned sessions even if the caller is main or `tools.sessions.visibility="all"`.
|
||
- When not `all`, `sessions_list` includes a compact `visibility` field
|
||
describing the effective mode and a warning that some sessions may be
|
||
omitted outside the current scope.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
</AccordionGroup>
|
||
|
||
Ambient group watches still queue activity notices and tell the main session
|
||
where something happened. They do not grant access: main's same-agent access is
|
||
built into `tree`. In a multi-user setup, `session.dmScope: "main"` shares that
|
||
main session across users; use a per-peer DM scope for isolation, or set
|
||
`tools.sessions.visibility: "self"` for strict current-session access.
|
||
|
||
### `tools.sessions_spawn`
|
||
|
||
Controls inline attachment support for `sessions_spawn`.
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
tools: {
|
||
sessions_spawn: {
|
||
attachments: {
|
||
enabled: false, // opt-in: set true to allow inline file attachments
|
||
maxTotalBytes: 5242880, // 5 MB total across all files
|
||
maxFiles: 50,
|
||
maxFileBytes: 1048576, // 1 MB per file
|
||
retainOnSessionKeep: false, // keep attachments when cleanup="keep"
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
<AccordionGroup>
|
||
<Accordion title="Attachment notes">
|
||
- Attachments require `enabled: true`.
|
||
- Subagent attachments are materialized into the child workspace at `.openclaw/attachments/<uuid>/` with a `.manifest.json`.
|
||
- ACP attachments are image-only and forwarded inline to the ACP runtime after the same file count, per-file byte, and total byte limits pass.
|
||
- Attachment content is automatically redacted from transcript persistence.
|
||
- Base64 inputs are validated with strict alphabet/padding checks and a pre-decode size guard.
|
||
- Subagent attachment file permissions are `0700` for directories and `0600` for files.
|
||
- Subagent cleanup follows the `cleanup` policy: `delete` always removes attachments; `keep` retains them only when `retainOnSessionKeep: true`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
</AccordionGroup>
|
||
|
||
<a id="toolsupdateplan"></a>
|
||
|
||
### `tools.updatePlan`
|
||
|
||
Kill switch for `progress_card`, the durable plan and status note used for non-trivial multi-step work tracking.
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
tools: {
|
||
updatePlan: false, // hide progress_card from every run
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- Default: `true` for every provider and model. Set `false` to keep the tool off; there is no model-specific auto-enable rule.
|
||
- The tool description tells the model to keep the plan current, use at most one `in_progress` step, and add Markdown only when it contributes information beyond the steps.
|
||
- Use `progress_card` in new `tools.allow` and `tools.deny` policies. Existing policies that name `update_plan` map to `progress_card`, so shipped allowlists and denylists keep their meaning.
|
||
|
||
Older configs used `tools.experimental.planTool`. Run `openclaw doctor --fix` to move the value to `tools.updatePlan`.
|
||
|
||
### `agents.defaults.subagents`
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
subagents: {
|
||
allowAgents: ["research"],
|
||
model: "minimax/MiniMax-M2.7",
|
||
maxConcurrent: 8,
|
||
runTimeoutSeconds: 900,
|
||
announceTimeoutMs: 120000,
|
||
archiveAfterMinutes: 60,
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
- `model`: default model for spawned sub-agents. If omitted, sub-agents inherit the caller's model.
|
||
- `allowAgents`: default allowlist of configured target agent ids for `sessions_spawn` when the requester agent does not set its own `subagents.allowAgents` (`["*"]` = any configured target; default: same agent only). Stale entries whose agent config was deleted are rejected by `sessions_spawn` and omitted from `agents_list`; run `openclaw doctor --fix` to clean them up.
|
||
- `maxConcurrent`: max concurrent sub-agent runs. Default: `8`.
|
||
- `runTimeoutSeconds`: timeout (seconds) for `sessions_spawn` when the caller does not pass its own override. Default: `0` (no timeout); the `900` shown above is a common opt-in value, not the built-in default.
|
||
- `announceTimeoutMs`: per-call timeout (milliseconds) for gateway `agent` announce delivery attempts. Default: `120000`. Transient retries can make the total announce wait longer than one configured timeout.
|
||
- `archiveAfterMinutes`: minutes after a sub-agent session completes before it is auto-archived. Default: `60`; `0` disables auto-archive.
|
||
- Per-subagent tool policy: `tools.subagents.tools.allow` / `tools.subagents.tools.deny`.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Custom providers and base URLs
|
||
|
||
Provider plugins publish their own model catalog rows. Add custom providers via `models.providers` in config or `~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/agent/models.json`.
|
||
|
||
Configuring a custom/local provider `baseUrl` is also the narrow network trust decision for model HTTP requests: OpenClaw allows that exact `scheme://host:port` origin through the guarded fetch path, without adding a separate config option or trusting other private origins.
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
models: {
|
||
mode: "merge", // merge (default) | replace
|
||
providers: {
|
||
"custom-proxy": {
|
||
baseUrl: "http://localhost:4000/v1",
|
||
apiKey: "LITELLM_KEY",
|
||
api: "openai-completions", // openai-completions | openai-responses | anthropic-messages | google-generative-ai | etc.
|
||
models: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: "llama-3.1-8b",
|
||
name: "Llama 3.1 8B",
|
||
reasoning: false,
|
||
input: ["text"],
|
||
cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 },
|
||
contextWindow: 128000,
|
||
contextTokens: 96000,
|
||
maxTokens: 32000,
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
<AccordionGroup>
|
||
<Accordion title="Auth and merge precedence">
|
||
- Use `authHeader: true` + `headers` for custom auth needs.
|
||
- Override agent config root with `OPENCLAW_AGENT_DIR`.
|
||
- Merge precedence for matching provider IDs:
|
||
- Non-empty agent `models.json` `baseUrl` values win.
|
||
- Non-empty agent `apiKey` values win only when that provider is not SecretRef-managed in current config/auth-profile context.
|
||
- SecretRef-managed provider `apiKey` values are refreshed from source markers (`ENV_VAR_NAME` for env refs, `secretref-managed` for file/exec/store refs) instead of persisting resolved secrets.
|
||
- SecretRef-managed provider header values are refreshed from source markers (`secretref-env:ENV_VAR_NAME` for env refs, `secretref-managed` for file/exec/store refs).
|
||
- Empty or missing agent `apiKey`/`baseUrl` fall back to `models.providers` in config.
|
||
- Matching model `contextWindow`/`maxTokens`: the explicit config value wins when present and valid (a positive finite number); otherwise the implicit/generated catalog value is used.
|
||
- Matching model `contextTokens` follows the same explicit-wins-else-implicit rule; use it to limit effective context without changing native model metadata.
|
||
- Provider-plugin catalogs are stored as generated plugin-owned catalog shards under the agent's plugin state.
|
||
- Use `models.mode: "replace"` when you want config to fully rewrite `models.json` and skip merging in plugin-owned catalog shards.
|
||
- Marker persistence is source-authoritative: markers are written from the active source config snapshot (pre-resolution), not from resolved runtime secret values.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
</AccordionGroup>
|
||
|
||
### Provider field details
|
||
|
||
<AccordionGroup>
|
||
<Accordion title="Top-level catalog">
|
||
- `models.mode`: provider catalog behavior (`merge` or `replace`).
|
||
- `models.providers`: custom provider map keyed by provider id.
|
||
- Safe edits: use `openclaw config set models.providers.<id> '<json>' --strict-json --merge` or `openclaw config set models.providers.<id>.models '<json-array>' --strict-json --merge` for additive updates. `config set` refuses destructive replacements unless you pass `--replace`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Provider connection and auth">
|
||
- `models.providers.*.api`: request adapter (`openai-completions`, `openai-responses`, `openai-chatgpt-responses`, `anthropic-messages`, `google-generative-ai`, `google-vertex`, `github-copilot`, `bedrock-converse-stream`, `ollama`, `azure-openai-responses`). For self-hosted `/v1/chat/completions` backends such as MLX, vLLM, SGLang, and most OpenAI-compatible local servers, use `openai-completions`. A custom provider with `baseUrl` but no `api` defaults to `openai-completions`; set `openai-responses` only when the backend supports `/v1/responses`.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.apiKey`: provider credential (prefer SecretRef/env substitution).
|
||
- `models.providers.*.auth`: auth strategy (`api-key`, `token`, `oauth`, `aws-sdk`).
|
||
- `models.providers.*.maxTokens`: default output-token cap for models under this provider when the model entry does not set `maxTokens`.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.timeoutSeconds`: optional per-provider model HTTP request timeout in seconds, including connect, headers, body, and total request abort handling.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.injectNumCtxForOpenAICompat`: for Ollama + `openai-completions`, inject `options.num_ctx` into requests (default: `true`).
|
||
- `models.providers.*.authHeader`: force credential transport in the `Authorization` header when required.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.baseUrl`: upstream API base URL.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.headers`: extra static headers for proxy/tenant routing.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Request transport overrides">
|
||
`models.providers.*.request`: transport overrides for model-provider HTTP requests.
|
||
|
||
- `request.headers`: extra headers (merged with provider defaults). Values accept SecretRef.
|
||
- `request.auth`: auth strategy override. Modes: `"provider-default"` (use provider's built-in auth), `"authorization-bearer"` (with `token`), `"header"` (with `headerName`, `value`, optional `prefix`).
|
||
- `request.proxy`: HTTP proxy override. Modes: `"env-proxy"` (use `HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY` env vars), `"explicit-proxy"` (with `url`). Both modes accept an optional `tls` sub-object.
|
||
- `request.tls`: TLS override for direct connections. Fields: `ca`, `cert`, `key`, `passphrase` (all accept SecretRef), `serverName`, `insecureSkipVerify`.
|
||
- `request.allowPrivateNetwork`: when `true`, allow model-provider HTTP requests to private, CGNAT, or similar ranges through the provider HTTP fetch guard. Custom/local provider base URLs already trust the exact configured origin, except metadata, link-local, and local-use NAT64 (`64:ff9b:1::/48`) origins, which remain blocked without explicit opt-in. Set this to `false` to opt out of exact-origin trust. WebSocket uses the same `request` for headers/TLS but not that fetch SSRF gate. Default `false`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Model catalog entries">
|
||
- `models.providers.*.models`: explicit provider model catalog entries.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.models.*.input`: model input modalities. Use `["text"]` for text-only models and `["text", "image"]` for native image/vision models. Image attachments are only injected into agent turns when the selected model is marked image-capable.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.models.*.contextWindow`: native context-window metadata for that model.
|
||
- `models.providers.*.models.*.contextTokens`: optional active-input cap for that model; use it when you want an effective budget distinct from the model's native `contextWindow`; `openclaw models list` shows both when they differ.
|
||
|
||
#### Custom provider capability declarations
|
||
|
||
Provider catalogs own `compat` for bundled and catalog-known model routes. Do not copy those flags into config: OpenClaw uses the catalog row when the configured `api` and `baseUrl` still identify that route. `openclaw doctor --fix` removes matching legacy overrides and reports divergent values for review.
|
||
|
||
A `compat` block remains supported for a genuinely custom provider, custom model, or catalog model routed to a different endpoint. Set only capabilities verified against that endpoint:
|
||
|
||
| Custom-route key | Runtime contract |
|
||
| --- | --- |
|
||
| `supportsStore` | Accepts the OpenAI `store` request field. |
|
||
| `supportsPromptCacheKey` | Accepts OpenAI prompt-cache/session-affinity keys. |
|
||
| `supportsDeveloperRole` | Accepts `developer` messages instead of requiring `system`. |
|
||
| `supportsReasoningEffort` | Accepts a reasoning-effort control. |
|
||
| `supportsTemperature` | Accepts `temperature` for this model and adapter. |
|
||
| `supportsUsageInStreaming` | Emits usage metadata in streaming responses. |
|
||
| `supportsTools` | Supports structured tool/function calling. Set `false` to disable tools. |
|
||
| `supportsStrictMode` | Accepts strict tool schemas. |
|
||
| `requiresStringContent` | Requires plain-string Chat Completions message content. |
|
||
| `strictMessageKeys` | Requires outgoing messages to contain only accepted keys. |
|
||
| `visibleReasoningDetailTypes` | Names reasoning detail block types safe to show in transcripts. |
|
||
| `supportedReasoningEfforts` | Lists the endpoint's accepted reasoning labels. |
|
||
| `reasoningEffortMap` | Maps OpenClaw thinking labels to endpoint-specific labels. |
|
||
| `maxTokensField` | Selects `max_tokens` or `max_completion_tokens`. |
|
||
| `thinkingFormat` | Selects the endpoint's reasoning payload dialect. |
|
||
| `requiresToolResultName` | Requires a tool name on tool-result messages. |
|
||
| `requiresAssistantAfterToolResult` | Requires an assistant message after tool results. |
|
||
| `requiresThinkingAsText` | Replays reasoning as text rather than structured content. |
|
||
| `requiresReasoningContentOnAssistantMessages` | Preserves DeepSeek-style `reasoning_content` during replay. |
|
||
| `toolSchemaProfile` | Selects a tool-schema normalization profile. Custom model entries recognize `llamacpp` and `gemini`. The `llamacpp` profile removes `pattern` and `maxLength` values at or above 2000; built-in `llama-cpp`, `ollama`, and `lmstudio` providers apply the same cleaner automatically. Custom provider IDs pointed at llama-server must select it explicitly. See the llama.cpp example below. |
|
||
| `unsupportedToolSchemaKeywords` | Removes named JSON Schema keywords rejected by the endpoint before tool schemas are sent. Use this for endpoint-specific gaps beyond a profile's targeted transformations. |
|
||
| `toolCallArgumentsEncoding` | Selects the endpoint's tool-call argument encoding. |
|
||
| `requiresOpenAiAnthropicToolPayload` | Converts OpenAI-shaped tool calls to Anthropic-family payloads. |
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Amazon Bedrock discovery">
|
||
- `plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery`: Bedrock auto-discovery settings root.
|
||
- `plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.enabled`: turn implicit discovery on/off.
|
||
- `plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.region`: AWS region for discovery.
|
||
- `plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.providerFilter`: optional provider-id filter for targeted discovery.
|
||
- `plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.refreshInterval`: polling interval for discovery refresh.
|
||
- `plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.defaultContextWindow`: fallback context window for discovered models.
|
||
- `plugins.entries.amazon-bedrock.config.discovery.defaultMaxTokens`: fallback max output tokens for discovered models.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
</AccordionGroup>
|
||
|
||
Interactive custom-provider onboarding infers image input for known vision-model-id patterns, including GPT-4o/GPT-4.1/GPT-5+, the `o1`/`o3`/`o4` reasoning families, Claude, Gemini, any `-vl`-suffixed id (Qwen-VL and similar), and named families such as LLaVA, Pixtral, InternVL, Mllama, MiniCPM-V, and GLM-4V; it skips the extra question for known text-only families (Llama, DeepSeek, Mistral/Mixtral, Kimi/Moonshot, Codestral, Devstral, Phi, QwQ, CodeLlama, and bare Qwen ids without a vl/vision suffix). Unknown model IDs still prompt for image support. Non-interactive onboarding uses the same inference; pass `--custom-image-input` to force image-capable metadata or `--custom-text-input` to force text-only metadata.
|
||
|
||
### Provider examples
|
||
|
||
<AccordionGroup>
|
||
<Accordion title="Cerebras (GLM 4.7 / GPT OSS)">
|
||
The official external `cerebras` provider plugin can configure this via `openclaw onboard --auth-choice cerebras-api-key`. Use explicit provider config only when overriding defaults.
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
env: { vars: { CEREBRAS_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: {
|
||
primary: "cerebras/zai-glm-4.7",
|
||
fallbacks: ["cerebras/gpt-oss-120b"],
|
||
},
|
||
models: {
|
||
"cerebras/zai-glm-4.7": { alias: "GLM 4.7 (Cerebras)" },
|
||
"cerebras/gpt-oss-120b": { alias: "GPT OSS 120B (Cerebras)" },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
models: {
|
||
mode: "merge",
|
||
providers: {
|
||
cerebras: {
|
||
baseUrl: "https://api.cerebras.ai/v1",
|
||
apiKey: "${CEREBRAS_API_KEY}",
|
||
api: "openai-completions",
|
||
models: [
|
||
{ id: "zai-glm-4.7", name: "GLM 4.7 (Cerebras)" },
|
||
{ id: "gpt-oss-120b", name: "GPT OSS 120B (Cerebras)" },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Use `cerebras/zai-glm-4.7` for Cerebras; `zai/glm-4.7` for Z.AI direct.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Kimi Coding">
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
env: { vars: { KIMI_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: { primary: "kimi/kimi-for-coding" },
|
||
models: { "kimi/kimi-for-coding": { alias: "Kimi Code" } },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Anthropic-compatible, built-in provider. Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice kimi-code-api-key`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Local models (llama.cpp / llama-server)">
|
||
The canonical `llama-cpp` provider applies the llama.cpp schema cleaner in managed and existing-server modes. If you instead point a **custom provider ID** at a remote `llama-server` (or another OpenAI-compatible llama.cpp endpoint), set `compat.toolSchemaProfile: "llamacpp"` on each model whose chat template compiles tool arguments into GBNF. The profile removes `pattern` and `maxLength` values at or above 2000, covering the `cron` tool's `trigger.script` limit of 65536. It is a targeted mitigation, not complete compatibility for every JSON Schema constraint or `minLength`.
|
||
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: { primary: "my-llamacpp/qwen35" },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
models: {
|
||
mode: "merge",
|
||
providers: {
|
||
"my-llamacpp": {
|
||
baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1",
|
||
apiKey: "llamacpp-no-key",
|
||
api: "openai-completions",
|
||
models: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: "qwen35",
|
||
name: "Qwen3.5 (llama-server)",
|
||
contextWindow: 8192,
|
||
maxTokens: 2048,
|
||
compat: {
|
||
supportsTools: true,
|
||
toolSchemaProfile: "llamacpp",
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
On older builds without `toolSchemaProfile`, the broader fallback is `compat.unsupportedToolSchemaKeywords: ["pattern", "patternProperties", "format", "propertyNames", "uniqueItems", "contains", "minContains", "maxContains", "minLength", "maxLength"]`. Unlike the profile, this removes every listed keyword unconditionally.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Local models (LM Studio)">
|
||
See [Local Models](/gateway/local-models). TL;DR: run a large local model via LM Studio Responses API on serious hardware; keep hosted models merged for fallback.
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="MiniMax M3 (direct)">
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: { primary: "minimax/MiniMax-M3" },
|
||
models: {
|
||
"minimax/MiniMax-M3": { alias: "Minimax" },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
models: {
|
||
mode: "merge",
|
||
providers: {
|
||
minimax: {
|
||
baseUrl: "https://api.minimax.io/anthropic",
|
||
apiKey: "${MINIMAX_API_KEY}",
|
||
api: "anthropic-messages",
|
||
models: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: "MiniMax-M3",
|
||
name: "MiniMax M3",
|
||
reasoning: true,
|
||
input: ["text", "image"],
|
||
cost: { input: 0.6, output: 2.4, cacheRead: 0.12, cacheWrite: 0 },
|
||
contextWindow: 1000000,
|
||
maxTokens: 131072,
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Set `MINIMAX_API_KEY`. Shortcuts: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice minimax-global-api` or `openclaw onboard --auth-choice minimax-cn-api`. The model catalog defaults to M3 and also includes the M2.7 variants. On the Anthropic-compatible streaming path, OpenClaw disables MiniMax M2.x thinking by default unless you explicitly set `thinking` yourself; MiniMax-M3 (and M3.x) stays on the provider's omitted/adaptive thinking path by default. `/fast on` or `params.fastMode: true` rewrites `MiniMax-M2.7` to `MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Moonshot AI (Kimi)">
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
env: { vars: { MOONSHOT_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: { primary: "moonshot/kimi-k2.6" },
|
||
models: { "moonshot/kimi-k2.6": { alias: "Kimi K2.6" } },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
models: {
|
||
mode: "merge",
|
||
providers: {
|
||
moonshot: {
|
||
baseUrl: "https://api.moonshot.ai/v1",
|
||
apiKey: "${MOONSHOT_API_KEY}",
|
||
api: "openai-completions",
|
||
models: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: "kimi-k2.6",
|
||
name: "Kimi K2.6",
|
||
reasoning: false,
|
||
input: ["text", "image"],
|
||
cost: { input: 0.95, output: 4, cacheRead: 0.16, cacheWrite: 0 },
|
||
contextWindow: 262144,
|
||
maxTokens: 262144,
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
For the China endpoint: `baseUrl: "https://api.moonshot.cn/v1"` or `openclaw onboard --auth-choice moonshot-api-key-cn`.
|
||
|
||
Native Moonshot endpoints advertise streaming usage compatibility on the shared `openai-completions` transport, and OpenClaw keys that off endpoint capabilities rather than the built-in provider id alone.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="OpenCode">
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: { primary: "opencode/claude-opus-4-6" },
|
||
models: { "opencode/claude-opus-4-6": { alias: "Opus" } },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Set `OPENCODE_API_KEY` (or `OPENCODE_ZEN_API_KEY`). Use `opencode/...` refs for the Zen catalog or `opencode-go/...` refs for the Go catalog. Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice opencode-zen` or `openclaw onboard --auth-choice opencode-go`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Synthetic (Anthropic-compatible)">
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
env: { vars: { SYNTHETIC_API_KEY: "sk-..." } },
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: { primary: "synthetic/hf:MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3" },
|
||
models: { "synthetic/hf:MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3": { alias: "MiniMax M3" } },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
models: {
|
||
mode: "merge",
|
||
providers: {
|
||
synthetic: {
|
||
baseUrl: "https://api.synthetic.new/anthropic",
|
||
apiKey: "${SYNTHETIC_API_KEY}",
|
||
api: "anthropic-messages",
|
||
models: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: "hf:MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3",
|
||
name: "MiniMax M3",
|
||
reasoning: true,
|
||
input: ["text", "image"],
|
||
cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 },
|
||
contextWindow: 262144,
|
||
maxTokens: 65536,
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Base URL should omit `/v1` (Anthropic client appends it). Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice synthetic-api-key`.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
<Accordion title="Z.AI (GLM-4.7)">
|
||
```json5
|
||
{
|
||
agents: {
|
||
defaults: {
|
||
model: { primary: "zai/glm-4.7" },
|
||
models: { "zai/glm-4.7": {} },
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Set `ZAI_API_KEY`. Model refs use the canonical `zai/*` provider ID. Shortcut: `openclaw onboard --auth-choice zai-api-key`.
|
||
|
||
- General endpoint: `https://api.z.ai/api/paas/v4`
|
||
- Coding endpoint: `https://api.z.ai/api/coding/paas/v4`
|
||
- The default `zai-api-key` auth choice probes your key and auto-detects which endpoint it belongs to (falling back to a prompt, defaulting to Global, if detection is inconclusive). Dedicated CN and Coding-Plan auth choices are also available for explicit selection.
|
||
- For the general endpoint, define a custom provider with the base URL override.
|
||
|
||
</Accordion>
|
||
</AccordionGroup>
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Related
|
||
|
||
- [Configuration — agents](/gateway/config-agents)
|
||
- [Configuration — channels](/gateway/config-channels)
|
||
- [Configuration reference](/gateway/configuration-reference) — other top-level keys
|
||
- [Tools and plugins](/tools)
|