* fix(memory-core): write MEMORY.md atomically during short-term promotion
applyShortTermPromotions rewrote MEMORY.md with a single non-atomic
fs.writeFile, which truncates the file before streaming the new content.
An OS write failure part way through (for example EFBIG on a size-limited
or full volume) left MEMORY.md truncated to the bytes written before the
failure, permanently dropping user long-term memory. The dreaming cron
path invokes this writer automatically, and the recall store is only
updated after the write, so the promotion stays eligible and the next
run reads the already-truncated file.
Route the write through replaceFileAtomic (temp file, fsync, atomic
rename), the same durable-write helper the sibling DREAMS.md writer in
this extension already uses. On failure the temp file is discarded and
the existing MEMORY.md is left untouched; on success the content and the
existing file mode are preserved.
* fix(memory-core): harden atomic promotion durability
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0317d7e628)
* fix(sessions): stop leaking file path as prompt content on read failure
When readFileSync fails for a valid file path, resolvePromptInput returns
the raw path string as prompt content instead of undefined. This injects
filesystem paths into the LLM context. The existing console.error warning
still fires; the caller already handles undefined returns correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: cover unreadable prompt paths
* test: use tracked resource loader temp dirs
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <peter@steipete.me>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit c924819292)
* fix(synology-chat): settle user_list overflow without hanging
Cap reads at 1 MiB with Buffer concat. On overflow, finish the promise
before destroy() — bare destroy often skips end/error and hung the test.
* fix(synology-chat): share bounded user-list reader
Co-authored-by: zw-xysk <zhao.wang1@xydigit.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 30c257f6b4)
* fix(moonshot): bound video description JSON response reads
The Moonshot video description endpoint used an unbounded await res.json()
to parse the media understanding response. Route through
readProviderJsonResponse (16 MiB cap) to match the bound already in
place for other media understanding providers (xai, openrouter).
AI-assisted.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* test(moonshot): add bounds and malformed-JSON coverage for video description
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 765d05c2e4)
Replace unbounded response.text() in readResponseBody and
response.json() in the device-code polling loop with
readResponseWithLimit (16 MiB cap).
(cherry picked from commit d5aca1d6d2)
Replace bare `await response.json()` in `installSignalCliFromRelease` with
`readProviderJsonResponse` (16 MiB cap, stream cancel on overflow). The
external GitHub Releases endpoint can include a large `body` changelog field;
the error path was already guarded but the success path was unbounded.
The existing inner catch continues to convert overflow errors into the
graceful `{ ok: false, error: "Failed to parse signal-cli release info." }` path.
Adds a regression test verifying the stream is cancelled before all chunks are
read on an oversized 20 MiB streaming response.
Co-authored-by: NIO <nocodet@mail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 51064bda4d)
Route OpenRouter video submit and poll success JSON through the shared bounded provider JSON reader, preserving malformed-response mapping and SSRF request policy coverage.
(cherry picked from commit 48f34b1d4d)
* fix(minimax): bound image/video success response reads
MiniMax image generation and video generation (task submit + status poll)
read their success responses through unbounded `await response.json()`, so
a misbehaving or hostile endpoint could stream an arbitrarily large body
into memory before parsing and exhaust the process. Read those success
bodies through the shared bounded reader (16 MiB cap, the same limit other
bundled providers and the sibling MiniMax web-search provider already use)
and cancel the stream on overflow. The error-body path is already bounded
via assertOkOrThrowHttpError; this closes the matching success-JSON gap.
MiniMax TTS is already bounded and is left unchanged.
AI-assisted.
* fix(minimax): bound video metadata response reads
* fix(minimax): leave image response sizing to image hardening
* fix(minimax): bound image/video success response reads
MiniMax image generation and video generation (task submit + status poll)
read their success responses through unbounded `await response.json()`, so
a misbehaving or hostile endpoint could stream an arbitrarily large body
into memory before parsing and exhaust the process. Read those success
bodies through the shared bounded reader (16 MiB cap, the same limit other
bundled providers and the sibling MiniMax web-search provider already use)
and cancel the stream on overflow. The error-body path is already bounded
via assertOkOrThrowHttpError; this closes the matching success-JSON gap.
MiniMax TTS is already bounded and is left unchanged.
AI-assisted.
* fix(minimax): bound video metadata response reads
(cherry picked from commit 25e184aeab)
* fix(mattermost): bound successful REST JSON/text response reads
The Mattermost REST client already bounds error bodies
(readResponseTextLimited) and streams guarded responses without buffering,
but the success path still called `await res.json()` / `await res.text()`,
reading the whole body into memory before parsing. A self-hosted or
compromised Mattermost server can return an arbitrarily large (or
never-terminating, content-length-less) JSON/text body and force the plugin
to buffer it unbounded.
Read successful JSON through the shared readProviderJsonResponse (16 MiB cap,
cancels the stream and throws a bounded error on overflow, same as the
provider HTTP path) and cap non-JSON success bodies with readResponseTextLimited.
uploadMattermostFile's file-info JSON is bounded the same way.
Symmetric follow-up to the #95103 / #95108 response-limit campaign.
AI-assisted.
* fix(mattermost): bound probe success JSON reads
* fix(mattermost): reject oversized success text bodies
(cherry picked from commit 9241b9701d)
* fix(github-copilot): bound model discovery and embeddings JSON response reads
The GitHub Copilot embeddings plugin already bounds its error response
bodies via readResponseTextLimited, but the success JSON reads for both
model discovery and the embeddings call used unbounded response.json().
Route both through readProviderJsonResponse (16 MiB cap).
Update isCopilotSetupError to recognise the new error label prefix so
auto-selection still falls through on malformed discovery responses.
Update tests to use proper Response objects and the new error messages.
AI-assisted.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(github-copilot): use memory embedding response cap
Signed-off-by: sallyom <somalley@redhat.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: sallyom <somalley@redhat.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: sallyom <somalley@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1aa7cafc35)
Route success JSON reads through readProviderJsonResponse (16 MiB cap) in
azure-speech, elevenlabs, microsoft, minimax/tts, xai/stt, and
openrouter/media-understanding to prevent OOM from oversized or hostile
endpoint responses. Mirrors the response-limit campaign already applied to
other provider paths.
AI-assisted.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 66e2fcc6f8)
The Copilot usage read in extensions/github-copilot/usage.ts parsed its
HTTP response with an unbounded await res.json(). A hostile or buggy
api.github.com proxy (the proxy endpoint is derived from a user-supplied
token) could stream an unbounded JSON body and drive the usage snapshot
into OOM.
Route the read through the shared readProviderJsonResponse (from
openclaw/plugin-sdk/provider-http), which enforces the 16 MiB byte cap,
cancels the stream on overflow, and wraps malformed JSON with the caller
label. Same no-helper-import-to-bounded-reader shape as the #96027 /
#96038 response-limit work.
Add a focused regression test: when the usage stream exceeds the JSON
byte cap, fetchCopilotUsage rejects with a bounded-overflow error and the
reader cancels the body mid-flight instead of buffering the full
advertised stream. Existing parse/HTTP-error cases keep passing.
(cherry picked from commit 646e54ae35)
The batch status read (fetchVoyageBatchStatus) parsed its response with an
unbounded await res.json(), and the batch error-file read (readVoyageBatchError)
buffered the whole body via await res.text(). On top of that, the non-OK
(4xx/5xx) diagnostic body was still read unbounded: assertVoyageResponseOk did
await res.text() before throwing, and the non-OK output-file branch in
runVoyageEmbeddingBatches did the same. Voyage base URLs are user-supplied and
reachable via SSRF, so a misbehaving or hostile endpoint could stream an
unbounded body into memory on any of these paths before parsing.
Route the status JSON through the shared readProviderJsonResponse, the error
file through readResponseWithLimit, and now the non-OK diagnostic body through
readResponseWithLimit as well, all under a single 16 MiB cap, cancelling the
stream on overflow before decode/parse. assertVoyageResponseOk preserves its
original "${context}: ${status} ${text}" diagnostic shape for under-cap bodies
and throws a bounded "(error body exceeds <N> bytes)" on overflow; the non-OK
output-file branch now reuses it instead of a duplicate unbounded read. The
existing error-file fail-soft handling (formatUnavailableBatchError) is
preserved, so a capped endpoint degrades gracefully. The submit path already
bounds its body via postJsonWithRetry/maxResponseBytes and is left untouched.
Symmetric counterpart to the #96027/#96038 response-limit campaign.
(cherry picked from commit d3620da3e0)