docs(security): describe warning policy decisions

This commit is contained in:
jesse-merhi
2026-08-11 02:53:19 +10:00
parent 6dcbe83bdd
commit c3bfde68d7
+1 -1
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@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ Plugins run in-process with the Gateway - treat them as trusted code.
- Installing/updating plugins runs executable code:
- The install path is the per-plugin directory under the active plugin install root.
- ClawHub packages and OpenClaw's bundled/official catalog are trusted sources. A new arbitrary npm, `npm-pack:`, git, local path/archive, or marketplace source warns before install; noninteractive installs require `--force` after you review and trust that source. `--force` confirms provenance and permits overwrite; it does not bypass `security.installPolicy` or remaining install safety checks. Updates reuse the already selected source.
- OpenClaw does not run built-in local dangerous-code blocking during install/update. Use `security.installPolicy` for operator-owned local allow/block decisions and `openclaw security audit --deep` for diagnostic scanning.
- OpenClaw does not run built-in local dangerous-code blocking during install/update. Use `security.installPolicy` for operator-owned local allow/warn/block decisions and `openclaw security audit --deep` for diagnostic scanning.
- npm and git plugin installs run package-manager dependency convergence only during the explicit install/update flow. Local paths and archives are treated as self-contained packages; OpenClaw copies/references them without running `npm install`.
- Prefer pinned exact versions (`@scope/pkg@1.2.3`) and inspect the unpacked code before enabling.
- `security.installPolicy` lets operators run a trusted local command to return `allow`, `warn`, or `block` for skill and plugin installs. It runs after source material is staged but before install continues and applies to ClawHub skills too.