fix: large base64 attachments on /v1/responses crash the gateway with heap OOM (#126017)

* fix(media): stop canonicalizeBase64 allocating one cons-string node per char

Per-character append built a rope of ~25 bytes per input character, all
live until the final join — a 20 MB base64 attachment transiently needed
~700-900 MB of heap and OOM-crashed the gateway on POST /v1/responses.
Validate in the same single pass but collect contiguous non-whitespace
runs as slices; already-canonical input is returned unchanged with zero
allocations. Measured: 15 MiB attachment 659 MB -> 0 MB transient heap,
4.3 s -> 0.2 s.

* fix(media): bound canonicalizeBase64 cleanup memory by input length

Review found the run-slicing cleanup unbounded for adversarial input:
alternating data characters and whitespace retains one slice object per
run (measured 421 MB of heap for an 8 MiB payload shredded to one run
per character). Replace the run collection with a single output buffer
materialized on the first whitespace and filled in the same validating
pass: canonical input still returns unchanged with zero allocations, and
any whitespace shape now costs at most one buffer bounded by the input
length (measured 0 MB heap delta, 210 ms for the same shredded payload).
Adds the many-short-runs regression test the review asked for, guarding
both heapUsed and arrayBuffers.

* refactor(media): condense canonicalizeBase64 invariant comment

Review asked for the repository's 1-3-line invariant form: keep why the
buffer is lazy and bounded, drop the implementation-history narration.

* chore: retrigger CI (flaky gateway-server shard)

* test(media): update base64 memory comment

Punchcard-Session: frost-cedar-willow-ae

---------

Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
This commit is contained in:
alexeysophia
2026-08-19 20:11:37 +03:00
committed by GitHub
parent c5b7739ed5
commit 80dcef5044
2 changed files with 100 additions and 29 deletions
+73
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,49 @@ describe("base64 helpers", () => {
expect(canonicalizeBase64(encoded)).toBe(encoded);
});
it("canonicalizeBase64 handles attachment-sized payloads without heap blow-up", () => {
// Regression guard: the previous per-character append built one cons-string
// node per input character (~25 bytes each, all live at once), so this
// 16 MiB payload (21.3 M base64 chars) transiently needed >500 MB of heap.
// The threshold is deliberately generous; the bounded-buffer implementation
// returns already-canonical input unchanged.
const encoded = Buffer.alloc(16 * 1024 * 1024, 0xab).toString("base64");
const before = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
expect(canonicalizeBase64(encoded)).toBe(encoded);
const delta = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed - before;
expect(delta).toBeLessThan(100 * 1024 * 1024);
});
it("canonicalizeBase64 cleans whitespace inside large payloads", () => {
const encoded = Buffer.alloc(1_000_000, 0xab).toString("base64");
const wrapped = encoded.replace(/(.{76})/g, "$1\r\n");
expect(canonicalizeBase64(wrapped)).toBe(encoded);
});
it("canonicalizeBase64 handles one whitespace per character without heap blow-up", () => {
// Worst case for any run-collecting cleanup strategy: every data character
// is its own whitespace-delimited run (2.7 M runs here). The whole cleanup
// must stay bounded by the input length — one output buffer — not by the
// number of runs.
const encoded = Buffer.alloc(2 * 1024 * 1024, 0xab).toString("base64");
const shredded = encoded.split("").join("\n");
// heapUsed catches per-run JS objects (slices, rope nodes); arrayBuffers
// catches Buffer-backed strategies — bound both.
const usedBytes = () => {
const usage = process.memoryUsage();
return usage.heapUsed + usage.arrayBuffers;
};
const before = usedBytes();
expect(canonicalizeBase64(shredded)).toBe(encoded);
const delta = usedBytes() - before;
expect(delta).toBeLessThan(64 * 1024 * 1024);
});
it.each([
{
name: "canonicalizeBase64 normalizes whitespace and keeps valid base64",
@@ -39,6 +82,36 @@ describe("base64 helpers", () => {
actual: canonicalizeBase64("ZE=="),
expected: undefined,
},
{
name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects nonzero pad bits on auto-padded input",
actual: canonicalizeBase64("ZE"),
expected: undefined,
},
{
name: "canonicalizeBase64 trims leading and trailing whitespace",
actual: canonicalizeBase64("\n\tSGVsbG8= "),
expected: "SGVsbG8=",
},
{
name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects data chars after padding",
actual: canonicalizeBase64("QQ==QQ=="),
expected: undefined,
},
{
name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects more than two padding chars",
actual: canonicalizeBase64("===="),
expected: undefined,
},
{
name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects a data: URL prefix",
actual: canonicalizeBase64(""),
expected: undefined,
},
{
name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects whitespace-only input",
actual: canonicalizeBase64(" \r\n\t"),
expected: undefined,
},
{
name: "estimateBase64DecodedBytes handles whitespace",
actual: estimateBase64DecodedBytes("SGV s bG8= \n"),
+27 -29
View File
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ export function estimateBase64DecodedBytes(base64: string): number {
return Math.max(0, estimated);
}
const CANONICALIZE_BASE64_CHUNK_SIZE = 8192;
function isBase64DataChar(code: number): boolean {
return (
(code >= 0x41 && code <= 0x5a) ||
@@ -67,25 +65,26 @@ function base64DataValue(code: number): number {
* base64 only when the input has valid alphabet, padding, and length.
*/
export function canonicalizeBase64(base64: string): string | undefined {
const chunks: string[] = [];
let current = "";
let cleanedLength = 0;
// Single validating pass; the output buffer is allocated lazily on the first
// whitespace and bounded by the input length, so canonical input returns
// unchanged with zero allocations and no input shape multiplies intermediates.
let out: Buffer | undefined;
let outLen = 0;
let padding = 0;
let sawPadding = false;
let lastDataCode = 0;
const append = (char: string): void => {
current += char;
cleanedLength += 1;
if (current.length >= CANONICALIZE_BASE64_CHUNK_SIZE) {
chunks.push(current);
current = "";
}
};
for (let i = 0; i < base64.length; i += 1) {
const code = base64.charCodeAt(i);
if (code <= 0x20) {
if (out === undefined) {
// First whitespace: backfill the validated prefix [0, i).
out = Buffer.allocUnsafe(base64.length - 1);
for (let j = 0; j < i; j += 1) {
out[j] = base64.charCodeAt(j);
}
outLen = i;
}
continue;
}
if (code === 0x3d) {
@@ -94,32 +93,31 @@ export function canonicalizeBase64(base64: string): string | undefined {
return undefined;
}
sawPadding = true;
append("=");
continue;
}
if (sawPadding || !isBase64DataChar(code)) {
} else if (sawPadding || !isBase64DataChar(code)) {
return undefined;
} else {
lastDataCode = code;
}
if (out !== undefined) {
out[outLen] = code;
outLen += 1;
}
lastDataCode = code;
append(base64[i] ?? "");
}
const cleanedLength = out === undefined ? base64.length : outLen;
if (cleanedLength === 0) {
return undefined;
}
const remainder = cleanedLength % 4;
if (remainder !== 0) {
if (sawPadding || remainder === 1) {
return undefined;
}
current += "=".repeat(4 - remainder);
if (remainder !== 0 && (sawPadding || remainder === 1)) {
return undefined;
}
const effectivePadding = remainder === 0 ? padding : 4 - remainder;
const padBitMask = effectivePadding === 2 ? 0x0f : effectivePadding === 1 ? 0x03 : 0;
if (padBitMask !== 0 && (base64DataValue(lastDataCode) & padBitMask) !== 0) {
return undefined;
}
if (current) {
chunks.push(current);
}
return chunks.join("");
// Every kept character was validated against the base64 alphabet (ASCII),
// so a latin1 decode reproduces them exactly.
const cleaned = out === undefined ? base64 : out.subarray(0, outLen).toString("latin1");
return remainder === 0 ? cleaned : cleaned + "=".repeat(4 - remainder);
}