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https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw.git
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fix: large base64 attachments on /v1/responses crash the gateway with heap OOM (#126017)
* fix(media): stop canonicalizeBase64 allocating one cons-string node per char Per-character append built a rope of ~25 bytes per input character, all live until the final join — a 20 MB base64 attachment transiently needed ~700-900 MB of heap and OOM-crashed the gateway on POST /v1/responses. Validate in the same single pass but collect contiguous non-whitespace runs as slices; already-canonical input is returned unchanged with zero allocations. Measured: 15 MiB attachment 659 MB -> 0 MB transient heap, 4.3 s -> 0.2 s. * fix(media): bound canonicalizeBase64 cleanup memory by input length Review found the run-slicing cleanup unbounded for adversarial input: alternating data characters and whitespace retains one slice object per run (measured 421 MB of heap for an 8 MiB payload shredded to one run per character). Replace the run collection with a single output buffer materialized on the first whitespace and filled in the same validating pass: canonical input still returns unchanged with zero allocations, and any whitespace shape now costs at most one buffer bounded by the input length (measured 0 MB heap delta, 210 ms for the same shredded payload). Adds the many-short-runs regression test the review asked for, guarding both heapUsed and arrayBuffers. * refactor(media): condense canonicalizeBase64 invariant comment Review asked for the repository's 1-3-line invariant form: keep why the buffer is lazy and bounded, drop the implementation-history narration. * chore: retrigger CI (flaky gateway-server shard) * test(media): update base64 memory comment Punchcard-Session: frost-cedar-willow-ae --------- Co-authored-by: Vincent Koc <vincentkoc@ieee.org>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -13,6 +13,49 @@ describe("base64 helpers", () => {
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expect(canonicalizeBase64(encoded)).toBe(encoded);
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});
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it("canonicalizeBase64 handles attachment-sized payloads without heap blow-up", () => {
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// Regression guard: the previous per-character append built one cons-string
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// node per input character (~25 bytes each, all live at once), so this
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// 16 MiB payload (21.3 M base64 chars) transiently needed >500 MB of heap.
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// The threshold is deliberately generous; the bounded-buffer implementation
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// returns already-canonical input unchanged.
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const encoded = Buffer.alloc(16 * 1024 * 1024, 0xab).toString("base64");
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const before = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
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expect(canonicalizeBase64(encoded)).toBe(encoded);
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const delta = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed - before;
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expect(delta).toBeLessThan(100 * 1024 * 1024);
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});
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it("canonicalizeBase64 cleans whitespace inside large payloads", () => {
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const encoded = Buffer.alloc(1_000_000, 0xab).toString("base64");
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const wrapped = encoded.replace(/(.{76})/g, "$1\r\n");
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expect(canonicalizeBase64(wrapped)).toBe(encoded);
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});
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it("canonicalizeBase64 handles one whitespace per character without heap blow-up", () => {
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// Worst case for any run-collecting cleanup strategy: every data character
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// is its own whitespace-delimited run (2.7 M runs here). The whole cleanup
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// must stay bounded by the input length — one output buffer — not by the
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// number of runs.
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const encoded = Buffer.alloc(2 * 1024 * 1024, 0xab).toString("base64");
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const shredded = encoded.split("").join("\n");
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// heapUsed catches per-run JS objects (slices, rope nodes); arrayBuffers
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// catches Buffer-backed strategies — bound both.
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const usedBytes = () => {
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const usage = process.memoryUsage();
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return usage.heapUsed + usage.arrayBuffers;
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};
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const before = usedBytes();
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expect(canonicalizeBase64(shredded)).toBe(encoded);
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const delta = usedBytes() - before;
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expect(delta).toBeLessThan(64 * 1024 * 1024);
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});
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it.each([
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{
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name: "canonicalizeBase64 normalizes whitespace and keeps valid base64",
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@@ -39,6 +82,36 @@ describe("base64 helpers", () => {
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actual: canonicalizeBase64("ZE=="),
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expected: undefined,
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},
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{
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name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects nonzero pad bits on auto-padded input",
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actual: canonicalizeBase64("ZE"),
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expected: undefined,
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},
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{
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name: "canonicalizeBase64 trims leading and trailing whitespace",
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actual: canonicalizeBase64("\n\tSGVsbG8= "),
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expected: "SGVsbG8=",
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},
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{
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name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects data chars after padding",
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actual: canonicalizeBase64("QQ==QQ=="),
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expected: undefined,
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},
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{
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name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects more than two padding chars",
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actual: canonicalizeBase64("===="),
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expected: undefined,
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},
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{
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name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects a data: URL prefix",
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actual: canonicalizeBase64(""),
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expected: undefined,
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},
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{
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name: "canonicalizeBase64 rejects whitespace-only input",
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actual: canonicalizeBase64(" \r\n\t"),
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expected: undefined,
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},
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{
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name: "estimateBase64DecodedBytes handles whitespace",
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actual: estimateBase64DecodedBytes("SGV s bG8= \n"),
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@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ export function estimateBase64DecodedBytes(base64: string): number {
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return Math.max(0, estimated);
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}
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const CANONICALIZE_BASE64_CHUNK_SIZE = 8192;
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function isBase64DataChar(code: number): boolean {
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return (
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(code >= 0x41 && code <= 0x5a) ||
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@@ -67,25 +65,26 @@ function base64DataValue(code: number): number {
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* base64 only when the input has valid alphabet, padding, and length.
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*/
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export function canonicalizeBase64(base64: string): string | undefined {
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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let current = "";
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let cleanedLength = 0;
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// Single validating pass; the output buffer is allocated lazily on the first
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// whitespace and bounded by the input length, so canonical input returns
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// unchanged with zero allocations and no input shape multiplies intermediates.
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let out: Buffer | undefined;
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let outLen = 0;
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let padding = 0;
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let sawPadding = false;
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let lastDataCode = 0;
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const append = (char: string): void => {
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current += char;
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cleanedLength += 1;
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if (current.length >= CANONICALIZE_BASE64_CHUNK_SIZE) {
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chunks.push(current);
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current = "";
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}
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};
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for (let i = 0; i < base64.length; i += 1) {
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const code = base64.charCodeAt(i);
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if (code <= 0x20) {
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if (out === undefined) {
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// First whitespace: backfill the validated prefix [0, i).
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out = Buffer.allocUnsafe(base64.length - 1);
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for (let j = 0; j < i; j += 1) {
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out[j] = base64.charCodeAt(j);
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}
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outLen = i;
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}
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continue;
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}
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if (code === 0x3d) {
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@@ -94,32 +93,31 @@ export function canonicalizeBase64(base64: string): string | undefined {
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return undefined;
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}
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sawPadding = true;
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append("=");
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continue;
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}
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if (sawPadding || !isBase64DataChar(code)) {
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} else if (sawPadding || !isBase64DataChar(code)) {
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return undefined;
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} else {
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lastDataCode = code;
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}
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if (out !== undefined) {
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out[outLen] = code;
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outLen += 1;
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}
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lastDataCode = code;
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append(base64[i] ?? "");
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}
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const cleanedLength = out === undefined ? base64.length : outLen;
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if (cleanedLength === 0) {
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return undefined;
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}
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const remainder = cleanedLength % 4;
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if (remainder !== 0) {
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if (sawPadding || remainder === 1) {
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return undefined;
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}
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current += "=".repeat(4 - remainder);
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if (remainder !== 0 && (sawPadding || remainder === 1)) {
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return undefined;
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}
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const effectivePadding = remainder === 0 ? padding : 4 - remainder;
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const padBitMask = effectivePadding === 2 ? 0x0f : effectivePadding === 1 ? 0x03 : 0;
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if (padBitMask !== 0 && (base64DataValue(lastDataCode) & padBitMask) !== 0) {
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return undefined;
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}
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if (current) {
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chunks.push(current);
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}
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return chunks.join("");
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// Every kept character was validated against the base64 alphabet (ASCII),
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// so a latin1 decode reproduces them exactly.
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const cleaned = out === undefined ? base64 : out.subarray(0, outLen).toString("latin1");
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return remainder === 0 ? cleaned : cleaned + "=".repeat(4 - remainder);
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}
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