get_chat_by_id sent admins down a branch that returned the chat only when
ENABLE_ADMIN_CHAT_ACCESS was on, or the chat was internal, and never fell
through to the access-grant and shared-folder checks. With the setting off,
an admin was therefore denied a chat that had been deliberately shared with
them, either directly or through a shared folder, while any non-admin holding
the same grant could open it. The admin role removed access the user had been
given rather than only closing the admin-only path.
Try the admin path first, then let everyone fall through to the grant and
folder checks. ENABLE_ADMIN_CHAT_ACCESS=false still closes the admin-only
route to other users' chats, and internal chats stay reachable.
* fix: let only the attendee set their own calendar RSVP status
set_attendees took each attendee's status from the caller-supplied value, so an
event organiser could set another user's RSVP (for example to 'accepted') on
create or update. RSVP is meant to be self-service: the /events/{id}/rsvp
endpoint already scopes status changes to the calling user.
Derive attendee status server-side instead of from the request. An existing
attendee keeps the status they set via RSVP and a newly added attendee starts
'pending'; any caller-supplied status is ignored. Event edits no longer reset
attendees' existing responses.
Co-authored-by: legobattman <302282032+legobattman@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: hide declined calendar invites from the attendee view
`get_events_by_range` surfaced every event where the user is an attendee regardless of their RSVP status, so declining an invite left it in the calendar with no way to remove it. Exclude `declined` attendee rows from the attendee branch, so a decline now removes the event from the user's own view while pending, accepted and tentative invitations still surface.
Co-Authored-By: legobattman <302282032+legobattman@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: legobattman <302282032+legobattman@users.noreply.github.com>
The Function and Tool database columns declare user_id as a nullable
String column, but their Pydantic read-models required a non-null
string. A record with user_id NULL therefore raised a
pydantic ValidationError inside get_functions()/get_tools(), which run
during install_tool_and_function_dependencies() at app startup —
crashing the whole application and blocking all chat completions.
Make user_id Optional in the read/response models so such records
validate gracefully (user is already rendered as None downstream when
the id has no matching user) instead of taking down startup.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y4RRUNq7ZUFkRWbWPkDw3m
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
On narrow viewports the admin Models list rows previously collapsed into
unusable vertical stacks; the Models page redesign on dev has since
absorbed the truncation fixes this branch carried (min-w-0 chain, real
truncate on the name, shrink-0 action group, inline access label).
The one remaining gap: the per-row edit pencil duplicates the row tap
(both open the model editor) while costing scarce horizontal space on
mobile. Hide it below the sm breakpoint; it remains on sm+ screens.
AccessGrantsPermissions only declared allow_users, so allow_groups was
missing from the model backing the default user permissions endpoints.
Pydantic ignores undeclared fields, so POST /users/default/permissions
dropped allow_groups before model_dump(), it never reached the persisted
user.permissions config, and fill_missing_permissions restored it to the
default on the next read. Turning "Allow Sharing With Groups" off in
Admin Settings silently reverted to on, while the same toggle worked when
set per group, since group permissions are stored as a plain dict.
GET /users/default/permissions and /users/default/permissions/defaults
dropped it from their responses for the same reason.
Declare allow_groups on the model so it round-trips, matching the
access_grants block in DEFAULT_USER_PERMISSIONS. It defaults to True, so
existing payloads that omit it are unaffected.
This PR fixes two small errors in the German translation file:
- "kaann" -> "kann"
- "AAlle" -> "Alle"
No functional changes, only UI strings.
Co-authored-by: Tim Baek <tim@openwebui.com>
The channel message update and delete handlers enforced authorship only on group and dm channels. On standard channels the else branch accepted any caller holding write access on the channel, so a member who could post could also edit or delete messages authored by other members. Because the update form binds content, data and meta, and the model layer never touches message.user_id, an edited message kept the original author's attribution, so another member's message could be rewritten under their name.
Write access on a channel is the capability to post, not a moderation capability, and the frontend gates the edit and delete controls on authorship (message.user_id === user.id, or admin) for every channel type. The group and dm branch already encodes this with an explicit authorship check. Apply the same rule to the standard branch: the caller must hold write access on the channel and be the message author, unless they are an admin. Pinning is unchanged, since it is exposed to every member by design.
Since v0.10.0 chat messages are virtualized with content-visibility: auto to skip rendering of off-screen messages. Safari's implementation of content-visibility has known paint bugs (WebKit bugs 277573, 281570 and 283846) that can leave the contents of a message unpainted even when it is on screen. On iOS this makes assistant responses render as empty, both in Safari and as a PWA, while the same chats render fine in Chromium and Firefox. This matches the regression window reported in #26712, which appeared when upgrading from 0.9.6 to 0.10.2.
Detect Safari (including all iOS browsers, which use WebKit) with the same user agent check already used in MessageInput and ShareChatModal, and skip the virtualization class there. Safari falls back to rendering all messages like before v0.10.0, while other engines keep the optimization. Verified with a spoofed Safari user agent that messages render without the virtualization class and with content-visibility resolving to visible, while Chromium keeps content-visibility: auto.
Fixes#26712
The sandboxed Pyodide host (used when ENABLE_PYODIDE_FILE_PERSISTENCE is
disabled, the default) embeds its script in a String.raw template. The
matplotlib show() override was written with '\\t' escapes as if in a normal
string context, but String.raw preserves them verbatim, so the iframe's
script parser turns them into literal backslash-t characters in the
generated Python source. Pyodide then fails to compile any code that
triggers the matplotlib patch with "SyntaxError: unexpected character
after line continuation character", which is why matplotlib only worked
with the file persistence worker path enabled.
Use single '\t' escapes instead: String.raw keeps them as-is in the
script text and the sandbox's JS parser produces real tab indentation,
matching the working implementation in pyodide.worker.ts.
Fixes#26660
Assistant responses are now stored as structured output items on message.output, with message.content left empty. The action payload built in chatActionHandler still sent message.content only, so action functions received assistant messages with an empty content property. Derive the content from the structured output via getOutputText, falling back to message.content, matching how the rest of Chat.svelte resolves assistant text.
Fixes#26672
_ssrf_safe_new_conn unpacks each entry of self.socket_options straight into socket.setsockopt(), which accepts exactly 3 positional arguments. urllib3-future, a drop-in fork that shadows the urllib3 package whenever it is installed (for example as a dependency of niquests pulled in through a tool or function's requirements), declares its default socket options with a per-protocol 4th element: [(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1, "tcp")]. Its own _set_socket_options() strips that element before calling setsockopt(), but our override does not, so with urllib3-future present every synchronous web fetch (fetch_url, web search loading) fails on connect with "TypeError: setsockopt() takes exactly 3 arguments (4 given)" and returns empty content.
Mirror urllib3-future's handling in the override: for 4-element options whose last element is a protocol string, apply "tcp" options truncated to the first 3 elements and skip "udp" options (all sockets created here are SOCK_STREAM). Plain 3-element options, and any other shapes stock urllib3 would accept, are passed through unchanged, so behavior with stock urllib3 (which only ever uses 3-element tuples) is identical.
Verified locally: with urllib3-future installed the loader previously raised the TypeError on every URL and now fetches successfully; with stock urllib3 2.3.0 and 2.7.0 fetches behave the same before and after.
Note: #26015 reported this same crash but attributed it to stock urllib3 2.x, which only uses 3-element tuples; the 4-element form comes from urllib3-future shadowing urllib3.
Fixes#26791
is_regex_pattern only recognized the BRE-escaped form \| and not a bare |,
so a pattern like "Jornak|Silverlake|Orissa" was treated as one literal
string (including the pipe characters) and silently returned no matches.
This contradicted the tool docstring, which explicitly advertises
"error|warn" as an auto-detected regex example, and misled models into
concluding the searched terms were absent from the file.
Checking for a bare | also covers the escaped form, since \| contains |,
and normalize_regex already converts escaped pipes before compilation.
Literal patterns without regex metacharacters are unaffected.
Fixes#26781
SafeWebBaseLoader._unpack_fetch_results assigned the resolved parser to the parser parameter itself, so the None check only ran for the first URL. In a mixed batch every later document was parsed with whatever the first URL happened to select: an .xml feed first meant all following HTML pages went through the xml parser (broken text extraction), and an HTML page first meant .xml URLs were parsed as HTML. Web search regularly fetches mixed batches, so this silently degraded extraction quality depending on result order.
The parser is now resolved per URL; an explicitly passed parser still applies to the whole batch as before. Verified with mixed xml/html batches in both orders and with an explicit parser override.
When WEBSOCKET_MANAGER=redis, app.state.MODELS and the socket session/
usage pools are Redis-backed dicts, so every membership test and
getitem is a network round trip:
- generate_chat_completion checked `model_id not in models` (HEXISTS)
and then read `models[model_id]` (HGET) on every chat completion.
A single .get() now serves both, with the same not-found error.
- The direct-connection branch spread the pool with `{**MODELS, ...}`,
which iterates keys() then fetches each value — HKEYS plus one HGET
per model. dict(MODELS.items()) issues a single HGETALL instead.
- get_user_ids_from_room called SESSION_POOL.get(sid) twice per
session (once to filter, once for the value); the usage handler
checked membership then fetched the same key. Both now do one
lookup.
In non-Redis mode these are plain dicts and behavior is identical.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MHg5zs1VBjvRWQ54qHpfYD
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The streaming handler's content accumulator is a closure cell (declared nonlocal in stream_body_handler), and CPython's in-place string append optimization only applies to plain local variables (STORE_FAST), never to cell variables (STORE_DEREF). The content += value form introduced in #27231 therefore still allocates and copies the full accumulated string on every delta, exactly like the f-string it replaced; whether that copy is cheap or expensive is up to the allocator, and measurements swing accordingly (6 to 83 ms of pure copying for a 400 KB response on Python 3.12, against 0.3 ms for this patch).
Accumulate the deltas in a list instead and join once at the single read site (publish_chat_finished_event at stream end). List append is amortized O(1) with no dependence on reference counts, bytecode specialization or allocator behaviour, so accumulation is O(n) by construction. The non-str fallback keeps the previous f-string coercion semantics.
Verified end to end against a mock SSE upstream: a streamed chat with a think-tag block plus 40 content deltas produces output items, message text, reasoning text and usage identical to current dev, with no errors in the server log.
CompressMiddleware was registered before AuditLoggingMiddleware. Starlette prepends on add_middleware, so the audit layer ended up outside compression and, at the REQUEST_RESPONSE level, recorded the zstd/brotli/gzip bytes of every response, decoded with errors='replace'. Any client that sent Accept-Encoding (i.e. every browser) therefore produced audit entries whose response_object was unreadable mojibake.
Registering the audit middleware before the compression middleware places it inside compression, so it observes the response body exactly as the route produced it while the client still receives the compressed stream.
Verified with a stacked ASGI harness: in the old order the captured body is not parseable; in the new order the captured body round-trips as the original JSON and the client response stays compressed.
The header value was truncated with int(), so every request faster than one second reported X-Process-Time: 0 and the header carried no information for exactly the requests it is meant to describe. Emit fractional seconds with microsecond precision instead, matching the pre-ASGI-refactor behavior where the raw float was sent.
With audit logging enabled, every audited request authenticated twice. The route dependency resolved the user once, and then _log_audit_entry called get_current_user again in the request's finally block: a second JWT decode, two more Redis revocation lookups, a second user row fetch with pydantic validation and, crucially, a second fire-and-forget last-active write transaction per request.
get_current_user now stashes the resolved user on the scope-backed request state (the same mechanism the auth middleware already uses for request.state.token), and the audit middleware reuses it, falling back to the old resolution only when no user was stashed (e.g. routes without an auth dependency). While in the file, the audit path patterns are compiled once in the constructor instead of per request, and the always-log endpoint set is a class attribute instead of a per-call literal; both are fixed for the process lifetime.
Benchmark:
| metric | before | after |
| --- | --- | --- |
| audit auth resolution, CPU floor (JWT decode + user validate only) | 16.7 us | 0.24 us |
| extra work per audited request | 2 Redis GETs + 1 user SELECT + 1 last-active write | none |
The before column understates the saving: it excludes the Redis and DB round trips listed in the second row, which dominate in real deployments.
Functionally verified with a stacked ASGI harness: when the route resolves a user the audit entry carries that user and the auth pipeline is not invoked again; without a stashed user the fallback path still resolves and logs correctly; the skip matrix (exclusions, whitelist mode, always-log auth endpoints, unauthenticated and non-audited methods) is unchanged.
Timothy Jaeryang Baek