turnstone/docs/governance.md

Governance

Turnstone governance provides role-based access control (RBAC), tool execution policies, prompt templates, usage tracking, and audit logging for the admin console.

Architecture

See diagram: 19-governance-architecture.puml.

RBAC (Roles & Permissions)

The permission model has two layers:

1. Scopes (legacy) — read, write, approve. Checked by AuthMiddleware on every request based on URL path classification.
2. Permissions (granular) — 15 permission strings checked per-endpoint by require_permission().

Built-in roles (seeded by migration 008):

Role	Permissions
admin	read, write, approve, admin.users, admin.roles, admin.orgs, admin.policies, admin.templates, admin.audit, admin.usage, admin.schedules, admin.watches, tools.approve, workstreams.create, workstreams.close
operator	read, write, workstreams.create, workstreams.close
viewer	read

Custom roles can be created with any subset of the 15 valid permissions.

Auth flow:

1. User logs in (password or API token) → _load_user_permissions() aggregates permissions from all assigned roles
2. _permissions_to_scopes() derives legacy scopes (any admin.* → approve)
3. JWT created with both scopes and permissions claims
4. Middleware checks scope → handler checks permission via require_permission()

Tool Policies

Admin-defined rules that control tool execution:

• Pattern matching: Glob syntax via fnmatch (e.g., bash*, file_write, *)
• Actions: allow (auto-approve), deny (block), ask (normal approval flow)
• Priority: Higher priority evaluated first, first match wins
• Enforcement: evaluate_tool_policies_batch() called in WebUI.approve_tools() before the auto_approve check
• MCP granular policies: MCP resources and prompts are evaluated using their approval_label for fine-grained control:
  • Resource reads: mcp_resource__{uri} (e.g., mcp_resource__file:///docs/* to allow, mcp_resource__* to deny all)
  • Prompt invocations: mcp__{server}__{prompt} (e.g., mcp__trusted__* to allow, mcp__* to require approval for all)
  • Built-in tools continue to use func_name for backward compatibility

Prompt Templates

Reusable system message templates with variable substitution:

• Variables: {{variable_name}} placeholders in content
• Categories: general, engineering, support, custom, mcp
• Default flag: is_default=true templates intended for new workstreams
• Storage: prompt_templates table with JSON variables array
• MCP sync: MCP server prompts are auto-synced into prompt_templates with origin="mcp", mcp_server set, and readonly=True. Manual templates take precedence on name collision. Admin UI shows origin badge and disables edit/delete for MCP-sourced templates. See docs/tools.md MCP Prompts section

Usage Tracking

Per-LLM-request token and tool call metrics:

• Recording: on_status() in WebUI records a usage_event after each LLM response with prompt/completion tokens, tool call count, model, ws_id
• Querying: GET /v1/api/admin/usage with group_by (day/hour/model/user) and time range filtering
• Pruning: prune_usage_events(retention_days=90) and prune_audit_events(retention_days=365) run automatically via the console scheduler's periodic cleanup cycle

Audit Logging

Append-only trail of admin actions:

• Recording: record_audit() helper called from all admin mutation handlers
• Events captured: user.create, user.delete, token.create, token.revoke, channel.link, channel.unlink, role.create, role.update, role.delete, role.assign, role.unassign, policy.create, policy.update, policy.delete, template.create, template.update, template.delete, org.update
• Querying: GET /v1/api/admin/audit with action/user/time filters + pagination

Database Schema

Migration 008 adds 7 tables:

Table	Purpose
orgs	Organizations (single default org for now)
roles	Named permission bundles (3 builtin + custom)
user_roles	User-to-role assignments (composite PK)
tool_policies	Per-tool approve/deny/ask rules
prompt_templates	Reusable system message templates
usage_events	Per-request token/tool metrics
audit_events	Admin action log

Also adds org_id column to users table.

API Endpoints

All under /v1/api/admin/ (requires approve scope + granular permission).

Group	Endpoints	Permission
Users / Tokens / Channels	9 (CRUD)	admin.users
Roles	7 (CRUD + assignment)	admin.roles / admin.users
Orgs	3 (list, get, update)	admin.orgs
Tool Policies	4 (CRUD)	admin.policies
Prompt Templates	4 (CRUD)	admin.templates
Schedules	6 (CRUD + runs)	admin.schedules
Watches	3 (list, create, cancel)	admin.watches
Usage	1 (aggregated query)	admin.usage
Audit	1 (paginated, filtered)	admin.audit

Full OpenAPI spec at /openapi.json and Swagger UI at /docs.

Admin Console UI

5 new tabs added to the admin panel (10 total):

• Roles — CRUD roles, permission checkbox grid, user role assignment modal
• Policies — CRUD tool policies with colored action badges (green/red/amber)
• Templates — CRUD prompt templates with wide modal, textarea editor
• Usage — Summary readouts + CSS bar chart, time range + group-by selectors
• Audit — Filterable log with relative timestamps, load-more pagination

Tabs are permission-gated: hidden if the user lacks the required permission.

SDK

Both Python and TypeScript console SDKs expose governance methods:

Python (TurnstoneConsole / AsyncTurnstoneConsole):

• list_roles(), create_role(), update_role(), delete_role()
• list_user_roles(), assign_role(), unassign_role()
• list_orgs(), get_org(), update_org()
• list_policies(), create_policy(), update_policy(), delete_policy()
• list_templates(), create_template(), update_template(), delete_template()
• get_usage(since, group_by=...), get_audit(action=..., limit=...)

TypeScript (TurnstoneConsole):

• Same methods with camelCase naming and typed interfaces

Security Considerations

• Privilege escalation prevented: admin_assign_role blocks self-assignment and requires caller to hold a superset of the target role's permissions
• Permission validation: Role create/update validates permissions against a 15-item allowlist (_VALID_PERMISSIONS)
• Self-deletion blocked: admin_delete_user rejects attempts to delete your own account (matching the self-assignment guard on role endpoints)
• Field allowlists: Storage update_* methods filter fields against allowlists (_ROLE_MUTABLE, _POLICY_MUTABLE, etc.) — handler bugs cannot overwrite role_id, builtin, created, or other protected columns
• Bootstrap safety: handle_auth_setup fails and rolls back if admin role assignment fails, preventing locked-out first user
• API token RBAC: _authenticate_api_token loads permissions from user's roles, ensuring API tokens are subject to RBAC enforcement
• Policy evaluation is fail-open: If storage is unavailable, tool policies degrade to the existing approval flow (not auto-approve)
• Audit IP resolution: _audit_context() prefers X-Forwarded-For for client IP when behind a reverse proxy, falling back to request.client.host