Files
turnstone/tests/test_auth_identity.py
T
Patrick Buckley 62d2a0fe6a fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard (#274)
* fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard

Auth is now mandatory for all deployments. Remove the
TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED toggle and make JWT_SECRET and AUTH_TOKEN
required in the wizard's system prompt.

* fix: remove auth disable support from runtime and infra

Remove AuthConfig.enabled field — auth is always on. Drop
TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED env var, config toggle, and the
check_request bypass. Update compose.yaml, Helm chart,
Terraform, docs, and tests to match.

* feat: deprecate config tokens, require JWT secret, prefer JWT auth

Phase 1 of config-token removal:

- load_jwt_secret() now exits with error if no secret is configured
  (was: silently auto-generated ephemeral secret)
- _authenticate_token() logs deprecation warning on config token use
- CLI /cluster commands use ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set
- turnstone-admin tls-list uses ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set
- Update bootstrap wizard, docker.md, security.md to mark
  TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN as deprecated and JWT_SECRET as required
- Console test fixtures use auth token + headers (auth always enforced)

* feat: add service scope for inter-service JWT auth

Add "service" to VALID_SCOPES and SCOPE_HIERARCHY. Service tokens
bypass require_permission() RBAC checks, replacing the old
empty-user-id bypass that config tokens relied on.

All ServiceTokenManager instances that need admin access now include
"service" in their scopes (console proxy, channel gateway, CLI,
admin CLI). Read-only services (collector, notification) unchanged.

* feat: phase 2 config token deprecation

- SDK doc examples now show API tokens (ts_) instead of config tokens
- Remove _get_config_token() from admin CLI (dead code)
- Block config token exchange in handle_auth_login — only password
  and API token login allowed
- Update login tests to use password-based auth instead of config
  token exchange

* feat: phase 3 — remove config tokens entirely

Complete removal of config-file token authentication:

- Delete AuthConfig.tokens, check(), _ROLE_TO_SCOPES, hmac dispatch
  branch, and config token loading from load_auth_config()
- Remove auth_config parameter from _authenticate_token() and
  check_request() — callers updated throughout
- Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from compose.yaml, Helm charts,
  Terraform, turnstone.example.toml
- Remove --auth-token CLI flags from turnstone, turnstone-admin,
  and turnstone-console
- Simplify console main() — always use ServiceTokenManager
  (no fallback to static tokens)
- Delete config-token-specific tests, rewrite check_request and
  integration tests to use JWT auth with proper audience claims
- Remove all config token references from docs (security.md,
  docker.md, sdk.md, console.md, architecture.md, bootstrap prompt)

* fix: address code review findings

- Fix 33 broken tests: add JWT auth to test_api_versioning,
  test_console_routing_proxy, test_tls_admin, test_tls_manager,
  test_server_live (jwt_secret + audience-scoped auth headers)
- Add TestRequirePermissionServiceScope: 4 tests covering the
  service scope RBAC bypass path
- Remove stale comments referencing config tokens in auth.py and
  console/server.py
- Remove dead proxy_auth_token parameter from console create_app()
  and static token fallback in _proxy_auth_headers()
- Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from env.py scrub list

* fix: address Copilot review — JWT audience, compose require secret

- CLI /cluster: add audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE to ServiceTokenManager
  (console validates audience, JWTs without it were rejected)
- Admin CLI tls-list: same audience fix
- compose.yaml: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET now uses :? to fail fast if unset
- SDK console: fix default port from 8081 to 8090

* test: add auth enforcement tests for TLS admin endpoints

5 new tests: unauthenticated requests return 401 (list, renew,
delete), read-only-scoped requests return 403 (renew, delete).
Closes the TLS auth enforcement test gap noted in PROGRESS.md.

* fix: address remaining Copilot review feedback

- Fix token_source="config" → "test" in TLS test fixtures
- Fix AuthResult.token_source docstring to include service origins
- Require TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in cluster compose profile (:?)
- Helm: add auth.jwtSecret + auth.existingSecret values, wire
  TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET into secret.yaml and both deployments
- Terraform: replace auth_token with jwt_secret variable + secret,
  remove orphaned auth_token resources and IAM reference
- Remove [[auth.tokens]] from security.md config example

* fix: address full code review — 10 findings

Critical:
- Terraform: replace concat(common_env, auth_env) with common_env
  (auth_env local was removed but still referenced)
- Channel gateway: remove hmac static token auth from _check_auth(),
  use JWT-only validation. Remove --auth-token CLI arg from channel
- Rebalancer: add token_manager support so migration requests carry
  JWT auth (was sending unauthenticated POST to /internal/migrate)

Major:
- Guard _permissions_to_scopes() against "service" privilege
  escalation from DB role permissions
- Remove dead AuthConfig class, load_auth_config(), and all
  auth_config parameters from create_app() signatures
- Helm: inject JWT secret for both inline and existingSecret paths

Minor:
- Remove dead auth_token param from ClusterCollector
- Remove empty TestLoadAuthConfig class
- Short JWT secret now exits instead of warning
- Compose: add generation command comment above JWT_SECRET
- Clean stale config token references from 6 doc files
- Clean stale AUTH_TOKEN reference from bootstrap wizard prompt

* fix: remove remaining stale config token references from docs

- channels.md: remove --auth-token from options table
- oidc.md: remove "config-file tokens still work" claim
- security.md: remove config token section, fix JWT secret docs
  (now required/exits, no ephemeral fallback), remove hmac from
  ASCII diagram, remove --auth-token reference
2026-04-01 19:38:24 -07:00

338 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""Tests for user identity, API tokens, JWT, and scoped auth."""
from __future__ import annotations
import time
import pytest
from turnstone.core.auth import (
AuthResult,
_authenticate_token,
check_request,
create_jwt,
generate_token,
hash_password,
hash_token,
parse_scopes,
required_scope,
token_prefix,
validate_jwt,
verify_password,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# AuthResult
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestAuthResult:
def test_frozen(self):
r = AuthResult(user_id="u1", scopes=frozenset({"read"}), token_source="config")
with pytest.raises(AttributeError):
r.user_id = "u2" # type: ignore[misc]
def test_has_scope(self):
r = AuthResult(user_id="", scopes=frozenset({"read", "write"}), token_source="config")
assert r.has_scope("read")
assert r.has_scope("write")
assert not r.has_scope("approve")
def test_empty_scopes(self):
r = AuthResult(user_id="", scopes=frozenset(), token_source="config")
assert not r.has_scope("read")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Token generation and hashing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestTokenHelpers:
def test_generate_token_format(self):
tok = generate_token()
assert tok.startswith("ts_")
assert len(tok) == 3 + 64 # ts_ + 64 hex chars
def test_generate_token_unique(self):
tokens = {generate_token() for _ in range(10)}
assert len(tokens) == 10
def test_hash_token_deterministic(self):
assert hash_token("ts_abc") == hash_token("ts_abc")
def test_hash_token_hex(self):
h = hash_token("test")
assert len(h) == 64 # SHA-256 hex
int(h, 16) # valid hex
def test_token_prefix(self):
assert token_prefix("ts_abcdefgh1234") == "ts_abcde"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Password hashing (bcrypt)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestPasswordHashing:
def test_hash_and_verify(self):
pw = "hunter2"
hashed = hash_password(pw)
assert verify_password(pw, hashed)
def test_wrong_password(self):
hashed = hash_password("correct")
assert not verify_password("wrong", hashed)
def test_hash_is_different_each_time(self):
h1 = hash_password("same")
h2 = hash_password("same")
assert h1 != h2 # different salts
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Scope parsing
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestParseScopes:
def test_single_scope(self):
assert parse_scopes("read") == frozenset({"read"})
def test_hierarchy_write(self):
assert parse_scopes("write") == frozenset({"read", "write"})
def test_hierarchy_approve(self):
assert parse_scopes("approve") == frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"})
def test_comma_separated(self):
assert parse_scopes("read,write") == frozenset({"read", "write"})
def test_redundant_scopes(self):
# approve already includes read,write
assert parse_scopes("read,approve") == frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"})
def test_empty_string(self):
assert parse_scopes("") == frozenset()
def test_invalid_scope_filtered(self):
assert parse_scopes("bogus") == frozenset()
def test_mixed_valid_invalid(self):
assert parse_scopes("read,bogus,approve") == frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"})
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# JWT create / validate
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestJWT:
SECRET = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
def test_round_trip(self):
scopes = frozenset({"read", "write"})
token = create_jwt("user123", scopes, "database", self.SECRET, expiry_hours=1)
result = validate_jwt(token, self.SECRET)
assert result is not None
assert result.user_id == "user123"
assert result.scopes == frozenset({"read", "write"})
def test_expired_token(self):
import jwt
payload = {
"sub": "user1",
"scopes": "read",
"src": "database",
"iat": int(time.time()) - 7200,
"exp": int(time.time()) - 3600,
}
token = jwt.encode(payload, self.SECRET, algorithm="HS256")
assert validate_jwt(token, self.SECRET) is None
def test_invalid_signature(self):
token = create_jwt("user1", frozenset({"read"}), "db", self.SECRET)
assert validate_jwt(token, "wrong-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b") is None
def test_malformed_token(self):
assert validate_jwt("not.a.jwt", self.SECRET) is None
def test_contains_dots(self):
"""JWTs contain dots, used for detection."""
token = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "db", self.SECRET)
assert "." in token
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# required_scope
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestRequiredScope:
def test_get_read(self):
assert required_scope("GET", "/api/workstreams") == "read"
def test_post_write(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/api/send") == "write"
def test_post_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/api/approve") == "approve"
def test_admin_prefix(self):
assert required_scope("GET", "/api/admin/users") == "approve"
assert required_scope("POST", "/api/admin/users") == "approve"
assert required_scope("DELETE", "/api/admin/users/abc") == "approve"
def test_versioned_path(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/send") == "write"
assert required_scope("POST", "/v1/api/approve") == "approve"
def test_proxy_write(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/send") == "write"
def test_proxy_approve(self):
assert required_scope("POST", "/node/n1/api/approve") == "approve"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _authenticate_token
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestAuthenticateToken:
def test_jwt_token(self):
secret = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
jwt_tok = create_jwt("user1", frozenset({"read", "write"}), "db", secret)
result = _authenticate_token(jwt_tok, jwt_secret=secret)
assert result is not None
assert result.user_id == "user1"
assert result.token_source == "db"
def test_api_token_with_storage(self):
"""API tokens are looked up by hash in storage."""
raw = generate_token()
class MockStorage:
def get_api_token_by_hash(self, token_hash):
expected = hash_token(raw)
if token_hash == expected:
return {
"token_id": "tid",
"token_prefix": "ts_abcde",
"user_id": "user1",
"name": "test",
"scopes": "read,write",
"created": "2026-01-01T00:00:00",
}
return None
result = _authenticate_token(raw, storage=MockStorage())
assert result is not None
assert result.user_id == "user1"
assert result.has_scope("write")
assert result.token_source == "database"
def test_api_token_expired(self):
"""Expired API tokens are rejected."""
raw = generate_token()
class MockStorage:
def get_api_token_by_hash(self, token_hash):
return {
"token_id": "tid",
"token_prefix": "ts_abcde",
"user_id": "user1",
"name": "test",
"scopes": "read",
"created": "2020-01-01T00:00:00",
"expires": "2020-01-02T00:00:00",
}
result = _authenticate_token(raw, storage=MockStorage())
assert result is None
def test_unknown_token(self):
result = _authenticate_token("unknown")
assert result is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# check_request with scopes
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestCheckRequestScopes:
_SECRET = "test-secret-key-for-jwt-min-32b!"
def test_jwt_read_on_write_403(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/send",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403
assert "write" in msg
def test_jwt_read_on_approve_403(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/approve",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403
assert "approve" in msg
def test_jwt_full_on_approve_ok(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read", "write", "approve"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, result = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/approve",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed
assert result is not None
assert result.has_scope("approve")
def test_jwt_with_scopes(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read", "write"}), "db", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, result = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/send",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert allowed
assert result is not None
assert result.user_id == "u1"
def test_jwt_insufficient_scope(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "db", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
"POST",
"/api/send",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403
def test_admin_path_requires_approve(self):
jwt_tok = create_jwt("u1", frozenset({"read"}), "test", self._SECRET)
allowed, status, msg, _ = check_request(
"GET",
"/v1/api/admin/users",
f"Bearer {jwt_tok}",
jwt_secret=self._SECRET,
)
assert not allowed
assert status == 403