The SSRF guard on OIDC endpoint URLs hard-refused any hostname resolving to a non-public address, which made it impossible to use a self-hosted IdP (Keycloak, Authentik, Dex) on an internal network — even though the login-flow issuer is operator-configured, i.e. trusted input. Add [oidc] allow_private_network in config.toml (or TURNSTONE_OIDC_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK), default off. When set, the issuer and its discovered endpoints may resolve to private-range, unique-local, CGNAT, and loopback addresses. Link-local, multicast, unspecified, and reserved ranges stay refused regardless — cloud metadata services live on link-local and no legitimate IdP does. The HTTPS requirement and same-origin endpoint checks are unchanged. The private-address refusal now raises OAuthSSRFPrivateAddressError, and the OIDC wrapper appends the remediation hint to the error message so the failure is self-service. mcp_oauth call sites — where endpoint URLs come from untrusted remote-server metadata — do not get the knob and keep the strict public-address rule.
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OpenID Connect (OIDC) Single Sign-On
Turnstone supports OpenID Connect for federated authentication, allowing users to log in with their existing corporate identity provider instead of managing a separate password. OIDC is opt-in: when configured, the login screen shows a "Continue with SSO" button alongside the existing username/password form. When not configured, the login experience is unchanged.
Any OIDC-compliant provider works: Google, Okta, Azure AD, Keycloak,
Auth0, OneLogin, and others that publish a
.well-known/openid-configuration discovery document.
Prerequisites
- A registered confidential OIDC client at your identity provider
- The client's redirect URI must include:
https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback - A local admin user must exist in Turnstone (complete the initial setup wizard before enabling OIDC)
Configuration
OIDC is configured via environment variables (preferred) or the [oidc]
section of config.toml. Environment variables take precedence when both
are set.
| Variable | Required | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER |
Yes | — | Issuer URL (e.g. https://accounts.google.com). Must serve /.well-known/openid-configuration. |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID |
Yes | — | OAuth 2.0 client ID from your provider |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET |
Yes | — | OAuth 2.0 client secret (confidential client) |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_SCOPES |
No | openid email profile |
Space-separated OAuth scopes to request |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME |
No | SSO |
Display name for the login button (e.g. "Google", "Okta") |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM |
No | — | ID token claim containing role/group values (see Role Mapping) |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP |
No | — | Mapping from claim values to Turnstone role IDs (see Role Mapping) |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED |
No | true |
Set to false to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens continue to work. |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE |
Yes | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. https://app.example.com). Without this, OIDC will refuse to start. The previous Host-header fallback was unsafe under permissive reverse proxies. |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS |
No | — | Comma-separated list of additional hostnames whose endpoints the IdP discovery document is allowed to reference. See Cross-host endpoints. |
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK |
No | false |
Allow the issuer (and its discovered endpoints) to resolve to private/internal addresses — needed for a self-hosted IdP on an internal network. See Self-hosted and internal IdPs. |
All four required fields — issuer, client ID, client secret, and
TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE — must be set. If any are missing OIDC
is disabled at startup (an error is logged when only redirect_base
is missing) and the login screen shows only the password form.
Redirect base (required)
TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE pins the redirect URI sent to the identity
provider to a known externally-visible origin. Set it to the public origin
of your Turnstone deployment:
TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE=https://app.example.com
The resulting callback URL will be
https://app.example.com/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback — register this as the
authorized redirect URI in your identity provider.
OIDC will refuse to start when this variable is unset. There is no
Host-header fallback: a permissive reverse proxy or direct backend access
would otherwise let an attacker spoof Host and steer the IdP redirect
to a callback origin they control.
Cross-host endpoints
By default, every endpoint in the IdP discovery document
(token_endpoint, jwks_uri, userinfo_endpoint) must share the
issuer's (scheme, host, port). This prevents a hostile or compromised
IdP from redirecting the token-exchange POST (which carries
client_secret) to an arbitrary host, and prevents JWKS fetches from
being aimed at internal services.
A few public IdPs legitimately split endpoints across hostnames. Google is the canonical example:
| Field | Hostname |
|---|---|
| issuer | accounts.google.com |
| token_endpoint | oauth2.googleapis.com |
| jwks_uri | www.googleapis.com |
| userinfo_endpoint | openidconnect.googleapis.com |
Google's set is built in — operators using https://accounts.google.com
need no extra configuration.
For other IdPs whose discovery document references a non-issuer host, extend the allow-list explicitly:
TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS=token.example.com,keys.example.com
The same scheme / no-userinfo / SSRF rules apply to allow-listed hosts — this knob only relaxes the same-origin check, not the security gates. Each entry is a hostname (no scheme, no path).
Self-hosted and internal IdPs
By default Turnstone refuses an issuer whose hostname resolves to a private or internal address:
OIDCError: endpoint URL resolves to non-public address (10.0.0.5): https://auth.example.site
This is SSRF hardening, not a licensing or product restriction: the OIDC
flow makes server-side HTTP requests (discovery, JWKS, token exchange),
and refusing non-public destinations keeps a mistyped or maliciously
steered issuer from aiming those fetches at internal services. For a
self-hosted IdP (Keycloak, Authentik, Dex, …) on a private network,
opt in explicitly in config.toml:
[oidc]
allow_private_network = true
or via TURNSTONE_OIDC_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK=true (the env var wins
when both are set).
The opt-in admits private-range (RFC 1918), unique-local, CGNAT (100.64/10 — tailnets), and loopback addresses. Link-local, multicast, and reserved ranges stay refused even with the opt-in — cloud metadata services (169.254.169.254) live there, and no legitimate IdP does. The HTTPS requirement and the same-origin endpoint checks are unaffected.
This knob only affects the login-flow IdP configured here. OAuth endpoints advertised by remote MCP servers are untrusted input and are always held to the strict public-address rule.
config.toml alternative
[oidc]
issuer = "https://accounts.google.com"
client_id = "your-client-id"
client_secret = "your-client-secret"
scopes = "openid email profile"
provider_name = "Google"
role_claim = "groups"
password_enabled = true
redirect_base = "https://app.example.com"
# Self-hosted IdP on an internal network (see "Self-hosted and internal IdPs")
allow_private_network = false
[oidc.role_map]
admin = "builtin-admin"
engineering = "builtin-operator"
Provider-Specific Setup
- Go to Google Cloud Console > APIs & Services > Credentials
- Click Create Credentials > OAuth 2.0 Client ID
- Application type: Web application
- Add authorized redirect URI:
https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback - Copy the Client ID and Client secret
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://accounts.google.com
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=123456789.apps.googleusercontent.com
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=GOCSPX-...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME=Google
Okta
- In the Okta Admin Console, go to Applications > Create App Integration
- Sign-in method: OIDC - OpenID Connect
- Application type: Web Application
- Add sign-in redirect URI:
https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback - Note the Issuer (your Okta domain, e.g.
https://dev-123456.okta.com)
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://dev-123456.okta.com
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=0oaXXXXXXXXXXXXX
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME=Okta
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=groups
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,everyone:builtin-operator"
Azure AD (Entra ID)
- In the Azure Portal, go to App registrations > New registration
- Redirect URI: Web >
https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback - Under Certificates & secrets, create a new Client secret and copy the value immediately
- The issuer URL is
https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant-id}/v2.0
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://login.microsoftonline.com/YOUR_TENANT_ID/v2.0
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME="Azure AD"
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=roles
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="Admin:builtin-admin,User:builtin-operator"
Keycloak
- In the Keycloak Admin Console, select your Realm
- Go to Clients > Create client
- Client type: OpenID Connect
- Set Client authentication to On (confidential)
- Add valid redirect URI:
https://your-turnstone-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback - The issuer URL is
https://keycloak.example.com/realms/your-realm
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER=https://keycloak.example.com/realms/your-realm
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=turnstone
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=...
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME=Keycloak
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=realm_access.roles
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,operator:builtin-operator"
Role Mapping
OIDC role mapping assigns Turnstone roles to users based on claims in the
ID token. This is optional — without it, OIDC users are provisioned with
the builtin-viewer role (read-only access) by default.
Configuration
Set TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM to the name of the claim in the ID token
that contains the user's group or role memberships. Then set
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP to map claim values to Turnstone role IDs.
The role map is a comma-separated list of claim_value:turnstone_role
pairs:
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM=groups
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP="admin:builtin-admin,engineering:builtin-operator,viewer:builtin-viewer"
Behavior
- Synced on every login: roles are added when new claim values appear,
and OIDC-assigned roles are revoked when the corresponding claim value
is no longer present. Roles assigned manually (or by other sources) are
never touched — only roles with
assigned_by="oidc"are subject to revocation. - List or string: the claim value can be a JSON array
(
["admin", "engineering"]) or a single string ("admin"). Both are handled correctly. - Unknown values: claim values not present in the role map are silently ignored.
- Missing roles: if the role map references a Turnstone role ID that does not exist in the database, the assignment is skipped (no error).
- Evaluated on every login: roles are checked and applied each time the user authenticates via OIDC, so new group memberships are picked up on the next login.
assigned_by markers
Role assignments record an assigned_by value that controls how the
sync logic treats them. OIDC-driven flows use two distinct markers:
oidc— set by claim-driven role mapping; revoked automatically on the next login when the corresponding claim value is no longer present.oidc-default— applied to brand-new OIDC users who have no claim-mapped roles, as a safety net so they still getbuiltin-vieweraccess on first login. Survives subsequent logins regardless of claim contents and is never revoked byapply_role_mapping.
Built-in Roles
| Role ID | Permissions |
|---|---|
builtin-admin |
All permissions |
builtin-operator |
read, write, workstreams.create, workstreams.close |
builtin-viewer |
read |
User Provisioning
When a user logs in via OIDC for the first time, Turnstone automatically creates a local user account:
- The OIDC identity (
issuer+subclaim) is stored in theoidc_identitiestable and linked to the new user - The username is derived from the
preferred_usernameclaim, falling back to the email local part, with deduplication if needed - The display name comes from the
nameclaim, falling back topreferred_usernameor email - The user's password hash is set to a sentinel value (
!oidc) — OIDC users cannot log in with a password
On subsequent logins, the existing user is matched by (issuer, sub) and
the last_login timestamp is updated. Role mapping is re-evaluated on
every login.
OIDC-Only Mode
To enforce OIDC for all logins and hide the password form, set:
TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED=false
In this mode the login screen shows only the "Continue with SSO" button. The password form, token toggle, and sign-in button are all hidden. All username/password logins are blocked at the API level, including admin accounts.
The first admin account must be created via the setup wizard (with a password) before OIDC is enabled. The setup wizard always works regardless of this setting because it is only available when zero users exist in the database.
API token login (POST /v1/api/auth/login with a ts_ token)
continues to work regardless of this setting. JWTs and API tokens are
the supported authentication methods. OIDC-only mode affects
password-based authentication only.
Login Flow
Both the server and console support OIDC login. The flow is identical:
- The browser fetches
GET /v1/api/auth/statusat page load - If the response includes
oidc_enabled: true, the login screen shows a "Continue with {provider_name}" button - Clicking the button navigates to
GET /v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize - Turnstone generates a state token, nonce, and PKCE verifier, stores them in the database, and redirects the browser to the identity provider's authorization endpoint
- The user authenticates at the identity provider
- The IdP redirects back to
GET /v1/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=... - Turnstone validates the state, exchanges the authorization code for tokens using the PKCE verifier, validates the ID token against the provider's JWKS public keys, provisions or matches the user, and issues a Turnstone JWT
- The browser is redirected to
/?oidc_success=1with the JWT set in anHttpOnlysession cookie - The browser JavaScript detects the
oidc_successquery parameter, strips it from the URL, hides the login overlay, and callsonLoginSuccess()to initialize the application
API Endpoints
| Method | Path | Auth | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /v1/api/auth/oidc/authorize |
Public | Redirects to identity provider |
| GET | /v1/api/auth/oidc/callback |
Public | Handles IdP callback, issues JWT |
Both endpoints are public (no authentication required) because they are part of the login flow itself.
Auth status response
When OIDC is enabled, GET /v1/api/auth/status includes additional
fields:
{
"auth_enabled": true,
"has_users": true,
"setup_required": false,
"oidc_enabled": true,
"oidc_provider_name": "Google",
"password_enabled": true
}
Database Schema
Migration 018 creates two tables:
CREATE TABLE oidc_identities (
issuer TEXT NOT NULL,
subject TEXT NOT NULL,
user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
email TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
created TEXT NOT NULL,
last_login TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (issuer, subject)
);
CREATE INDEX idx_oidc_identities_user_id ON oidc_identities(user_id);
CREATE TABLE oidc_pending_states (
state TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
nonce TEXT NOT NULL,
code_verifier TEXT NOT NULL,
audience TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL
);
The oidc_identities table links an OIDC subject (identified by
issuer + subject) to a Turnstone user_id. A single user can have
multiple OIDC identities (e.g. from different providers).
The oidc_pending_states table stores authorization flow state for
callback validation. Entries are automatically cleaned up after 5 minutes.
Security Notes
- Authorization Code Flow with PKCE: the recommended OAuth 2.0 flow for web applications. PKCE prevents authorization code interception attacks even without a client secret (though the client secret is still used for additional security).
- ID token validation: all tokens are validated using the provider's JWKS public keys (RS256 or ES256). The signature, issuer, audience, and expiry are all checked.
- State parameter: a cryptographically random state token prevents CSRF attacks on the callback endpoint. The state is stored server-side and verified on callback.
- Nonce: a random nonce is included in the authorization request and verified in the ID token to prevent replay attacks.
- Client secret: never leaves the server — it is only used in the server-to-IdP token exchange, not exposed to the browser.
- OIDC users cannot use password login: the sentinel password hash
(
!oidc) ensuresverify_password()always rejects password attempts for OIDC-provisioned users. - Rate limiting: the callback endpoint shares the login rate limiter (5 attempts per 5-minute window per IP).
- State TTL: pending authorization states expire after 5 minutes. Expired states are lazily cleaned up on each callback.
- Setup guard: OIDC login requires at least one local admin user to exist. This ensures the initial admin account is always created via the setup wizard with a password, not hijacked by an external identity.
Troubleshooting
"OIDC not configured"
All four required environment variables must be set:
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER, TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
TURNSTONE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, and TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE.
Check that none are empty or whitespace-only.
"OIDC enabled but TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE is unset"
This error is logged when the three credential variables are set but
TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE is missing. OIDC is disabled at startup
to prevent Host-header-derived redirect URI spoofing. Set the variable
to your service's externally-visible origin (e.g.
https://app.example.com) and restart the server. See
Redirect base for the rationale.
Discovery silently disables OIDC with "host does not match issuer"
The IdP discovery document points token_endpoint, jwks_uri, or
userinfo_endpoint at a hostname that doesn't share the issuer's
origin. If the IdP is legitimate, add the additional hostname(s) to
TURNSTONE_OIDC_TRUSTED_ENDPOINT_HOSTS. Google is allow-listed
automatically; see Cross-host endpoints.
"Login session expired"
The authorization flow must complete within 5 minutes. If the user takes too long at the identity provider, the pending state expires. Try again.
"Initial setup required"
OIDC login is blocked until at least one local admin user exists. Complete the setup wizard first (navigate to the Turnstone URL and follow the prompts to create an admin user with a password).
Discovery fails at startup
Check that the issuer URL is reachable from the Turnstone server and
serves a valid /.well-known/openid-configuration document. The server
logs the discovery attempt at startup:
OIDC discovery failed for https://your-issuer.example.com: ...
OIDC is automatically disabled when discovery fails. Restart the server after fixing the connectivity issue.
Redirect URI mismatch
The redirect URI configured at the identity provider must exactly match
https://your-host/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback. Common issues:
- Scheme mismatch: the redirect uses
https://— make sure TLS is configured or a reverse proxy sets theX-Forwarded-Protoheader - Port mismatch: if running on a non-standard port, include it in the redirect URI
- Path mismatch: the path must include the
/v1API version prefix
User not assigned expected roles
Check that:
TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIMmatches the exact claim name in the ID token (case-sensitive)TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAPmaps the correct claim values to valid Turnstone role IDs- The roles referenced in the map exist in the database (check the admin panel > Roles tab)
- The identity provider is configured to include the claim in the ID token (some providers require explicit scope or claim configuration)