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Patrick Buckley
bfde387206
turnstone's primary audience self-hosts it beside other lab services —
a web_fetch or open_preview aimed at Grafana, Home Assistant, or a dev
node on the local network is the operator using their own network, not
an attack. The hard SSRF refusal made those targets unreachable.
New runtime setting tools.allow_private_network (settings registry,
default off, rendered in console Settings → Tools; hot — read per tool
call, no restart). When enabled, a call NAMING a private address
becomes approvable: the approval prompt tags it "(private network)" so
the operator approves it as what it is, and the human gate stays.
The redirect side-door stays closed either way: a PUBLIC target that
302s into private address space is refused regardless of the opt-in —
that address never appeared on the approval card, so it is never
fetched. Only a chain whose approved origin was itself private skips
hop screening (its redirects are the operator's own network).
Refusals now teach the knob (mirrors the oidc opt-in hint): the error
names tools.allow_private_network and where to enable it. Surfaces
without a ConfigStore (bare CLI, eval) stay strict — there is no admin
surface to have opted in on.
(cherry picked from commit 09abc9d199)