* fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard Auth is now mandatory for all deployments. Remove the TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED toggle and make JWT_SECRET and AUTH_TOKEN required in the wizard's system prompt. * fix: remove auth disable support from runtime and infra Remove AuthConfig.enabled field — auth is always on. Drop TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED env var, config toggle, and the check_request bypass. Update compose.yaml, Helm chart, Terraform, docs, and tests to match. * feat: deprecate config tokens, require JWT secret, prefer JWT auth Phase 1 of config-token removal: - load_jwt_secret() now exits with error if no secret is configured (was: silently auto-generated ephemeral secret) - _authenticate_token() logs deprecation warning on config token use - CLI /cluster commands use ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set - turnstone-admin tls-list uses ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set - Update bootstrap wizard, docker.md, security.md to mark TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN as deprecated and JWT_SECRET as required - Console test fixtures use auth token + headers (auth always enforced) * feat: add service scope for inter-service JWT auth Add "service" to VALID_SCOPES and SCOPE_HIERARCHY. Service tokens bypass require_permission() RBAC checks, replacing the old empty-user-id bypass that config tokens relied on. All ServiceTokenManager instances that need admin access now include "service" in their scopes (console proxy, channel gateway, CLI, admin CLI). Read-only services (collector, notification) unchanged. * feat: phase 2 config token deprecation - SDK doc examples now show API tokens (ts_) instead of config tokens - Remove _get_config_token() from admin CLI (dead code) - Block config token exchange in handle_auth_login — only password and API token login allowed - Update login tests to use password-based auth instead of config token exchange * feat: phase 3 — remove config tokens entirely Complete removal of config-file token authentication: - Delete AuthConfig.tokens, check(), _ROLE_TO_SCOPES, hmac dispatch branch, and config token loading from load_auth_config() - Remove auth_config parameter from _authenticate_token() and check_request() — callers updated throughout - Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from compose.yaml, Helm charts, Terraform, turnstone.example.toml - Remove --auth-token CLI flags from turnstone, turnstone-admin, and turnstone-console - Simplify console main() — always use ServiceTokenManager (no fallback to static tokens) - Delete config-token-specific tests, rewrite check_request and integration tests to use JWT auth with proper audience claims - Remove all config token references from docs (security.md, docker.md, sdk.md, console.md, architecture.md, bootstrap prompt) * fix: address code review findings - Fix 33 broken tests: add JWT auth to test_api_versioning, test_console_routing_proxy, test_tls_admin, test_tls_manager, test_server_live (jwt_secret + audience-scoped auth headers) - Add TestRequirePermissionServiceScope: 4 tests covering the service scope RBAC bypass path - Remove stale comments referencing config tokens in auth.py and console/server.py - Remove dead proxy_auth_token parameter from console create_app() and static token fallback in _proxy_auth_headers() - Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from env.py scrub list * fix: address Copilot review — JWT audience, compose require secret - CLI /cluster: add audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE to ServiceTokenManager (console validates audience, JWTs without it were rejected) - Admin CLI tls-list: same audience fix - compose.yaml: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET now uses :? to fail fast if unset - SDK console: fix default port from 8081 to 8090 * test: add auth enforcement tests for TLS admin endpoints 5 new tests: unauthenticated requests return 401 (list, renew, delete), read-only-scoped requests return 403 (renew, delete). Closes the TLS auth enforcement test gap noted in PROGRESS.md. * fix: address remaining Copilot review feedback - Fix token_source="config" → "test" in TLS test fixtures - Fix AuthResult.token_source docstring to include service origins - Require TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in cluster compose profile (:?) - Helm: add auth.jwtSecret + auth.existingSecret values, wire TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET into secret.yaml and both deployments - Terraform: replace auth_token with jwt_secret variable + secret, remove orphaned auth_token resources and IAM reference - Remove [[auth.tokens]] from security.md config example * fix: address full code review — 10 findings Critical: - Terraform: replace concat(common_env, auth_env) with common_env (auth_env local was removed but still referenced) - Channel gateway: remove hmac static token auth from _check_auth(), use JWT-only validation. Remove --auth-token CLI arg from channel - Rebalancer: add token_manager support so migration requests carry JWT auth (was sending unauthenticated POST to /internal/migrate) Major: - Guard _permissions_to_scopes() against "service" privilege escalation from DB role permissions - Remove dead AuthConfig class, load_auth_config(), and all auth_config parameters from create_app() signatures - Helm: inject JWT secret for both inline and existingSecret paths Minor: - Remove dead auth_token param from ClusterCollector - Remove empty TestLoadAuthConfig class - Short JWT secret now exits instead of warning - Compose: add generation command comment above JWT_SECRET - Clean stale config token references from 6 doc files - Clean stale AUTH_TOKEN reference from bootstrap wizard prompt * fix: remove remaining stale config token references from docs - channels.md: remove --auth-token from options table - oidc.md: remove "config-file tokens still work" claim - security.md: remove config token section, fix JWT secret docs (now required/exits, no ephemeral fallback), remove hmac from ASCII diagram, remove --auth-token reference
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TLS / mTLS
Turnstone supports end-to-end transport encryption with mutual TLS (mTLS) for inter-service communication, powered by lacme.
Quick Start (Docker Compose)
docker compose -f compose.yaml -f deploy/docker-compose.tls.yml up
This:
- Bootstraps an internal CA and issues certs for PostgreSQL
- Starts the console with TLS enabled (internal CA + ACME server)
- Server nodes auto-provision certs via the console's ACME endpoint
- All inter-service communication uses mTLS
Architecture
Console (CA + ACME Server)
+-- CertificateAuthority (owns root key, signs certs)
+-- ACMEResponder (mounted at /acme, RFC 8555)
+-- GET /acme/ca.pem (root cert for node bootstrapping)
|
| ACME protocol (auto-approve, no challenge validation)
+-----------+-----------+
| | |
Server(s) Channel GW
(auto-cert (mTLS
+ renewal) client)
Two cert paths on the console:
- Internal cert (mTLS): Always from the internal CA. Used for cluster service mesh communication.
- Frontend cert (HTTPS): From an external ACME CA (e.g. Let's Encrypt)
if
tls.acme_directoryis set, otherwise self-issued from the internal CA.
Configuration
Settings (ConfigStore / Admin Settings tab)
| Setting | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
tls.enabled |
false |
Master switch for internal mTLS |
tls.acme_directory |
"" |
External ACME CA URL for console frontend cert |
Bootstrap Config (config.toml)
These are needed before storage is available:
[database]
sslmode = "prefer" # disable, allow, prefer, require, verify-full
sslrootcert = "" # path to CA cert
sslcert = "" # path to client cert
sslkey = "" # path to client key
Hardcoded Defaults
| Parameter | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CA common name | "Turnstone CA" | |
| CA validity | 10 years | |
| Cert validity | 48 hours | Short-lived, auto-renewed |
| Renewal interval | 24 hours | Half of validity |
| ACME auto-approve | true | Internal network, no challenge validation |
CLI
Offline Bootstrap
Create a CA and infrastructure certs without a running console:
# Bootstrap CA + PostgreSQL certs
turnstone-admin tls-bootstrap --out /certs --issue postgres
# Output:
# /certs/ca.pem (CA root certificate)
# /certs/certs/postgres/ (PostgreSQL cert + key)
The output directory is chmod 0700 (contains the CA private key).
Online Cert Issuance
Request certs from a running console's ACME endpoint:
# Download CA root cert (TOFU — verify fingerprint)
turnstone-admin tls-ca-cert --out ca.pem --console-url http://console:8080
# Request a cert for a domain
turnstone-admin tls-issue worker-1.internal --out /certs --console-url http://console:8080
# List issued certs
turnstone-admin tls-list --console-url http://console:8080
Console URL Discovery
If --console-url is not provided, the CLI discovers it from the services
table in the shared database. The console registers itself on startup.
Admin UI
The TLS tab in the console admin panel (System group) shows:
- CA status (common name, certificate count)
- Certificate table (domain, SANs, issued, expires)
- Force-renew and delete actions per certificate
SDK
Python
from turnstone.sdk import TurnstoneServer
client = TurnstoneServer(
base_url="https://server:8080",
token="tok_xxx",
ca_cert="/path/to/ca.pem",
client_cert="/path/to/cert.pem",
client_key="/path/to/key.pem",
)
TypeScript
import { TurnstoneServer } from "@turnstone/sdk";
import { Agent } from "undici";
import * as fs from "fs";
const agent = new Agent({
connect: {
ca: fs.readFileSync("/path/to/ca.pem"),
cert: fs.readFileSync("/path/to/cert.pem"),
key: fs.readFileSync("/path/to/key.pem"),
},
});
const client = new TurnstoneServer({
baseUrl: "https://server:8080",
token: "tok_xxx",
// Node.js 18+ uses undici under the hood
fetch: (url, init) =>
fetch(url, { ...init, dispatcher: agent } as RequestInit),
});
How It Works
Node Bootstrap Flow
- Node starts, connects to shared database (plain connection)
- Discovers console URL from
servicestable - Fetches CA root cert from
http://console/acme/ca.pem(plain HTTP, TOFU) - Requests service cert via ACME protocol (plain HTTP, JWS-signed)
- Starts auto-renewal (24h interval, re-issues before expiry)
- All subsequent inter-service communication uses mTLS
Console Startup Flow
- Read
tls.enabledfrom ConfigStore - Initialize CA (load from DB or generate new root key)
- Mount ACME responder at
/acme(serves/ca.pemnatively) - Issue console certs (internal + optional frontend)
- Start CA-direct auto-renewal (no network, signs directly)
- Register console URL in services table with heartbeat
Troubleshooting
Cert expired / mTLS connection refused
Certs are valid for 48 hours. If auto-renewal stopped (e.g. console was down), restart the service to re-request a cert.
"No console service found"
The console registers itself in the services table on startup. If the console
hasn't started or the registration expired (1 hour TTL), nodes can't discover
it. Use --console-url explicitly.
Let's Encrypt for console frontend
Set tls.acme_directory to https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
in the admin Settings tab. The console will request a publicly trusted cert
for its HTTPS endpoint. Internal mTLS still uses the private CA.
Verifying the cert chain
openssl s_client -connect server:8080 -CAfile ca.pem