Hardened service + slice + node-identity drop-in template + a README for
running a turnstone-server outside Docker that joins the compose cluster —
the production-shaped counterpart to the one-liner in docs/docker.md. Secrets
stay in config.toml; per-host identity + cluster URLs go in the drop-in. The
README notes the cross-host mTLS caveat (turnstonelabs/lacme#22).
Drop the Tavily and DuckDuckGo (ddgs) web_search backends for a single
self-hosted SearxNG service bundled into the docker-compose stacks.
Core:
- New SearXNGClient + _format_searxng; rewrite resolve_web_search_client to
(backend, searxng_url, searxng_engines, ...). MCP backend + oauth_user guard
unchanged. _resolve_search_client follows storage -> toml -> env -> default
precedence (explicit "" disables, via ConfigStore.stored_keys()).
- Drop the Tavily-era topic=finance (no SearxNG category); topic is now
general/news.
Settings/config:
- Remove tools.tavily_api_key, get_tavily_key, $TAVILY_API_KEY, [api].tavily_key.
- Add tools.searxng_url (default http://searxng:8080) + tools.searxng_engines,
with get_searxng_url/get_searxng_engines.
Compose + bundled config:
- Internal-only searxng service (no published API port, :ro config, /healthz
healthcheck, persistent searxng-cache volume) in both stacks; bundle
turnstone/deploy/searxng/settings.yml (JSON output on, limiter off).
- Caddy serves the SearxNG web UI on :8444 (dev: localhost-only; prod: opt-in).
- bootstrap extractor + wheel packaging updated.
Deps: drop the ddg extra + ddgs mypy override (regenerates uv.lock, removing the
lxml/h2/brotli transitives).
Docs: tools/docker/architecture/openshell + diagrams + config example + CHANGELOG;
docs/docker.md carries the AGPL-3.0 §13 operator note.
BREAKING: tools.web_search_backend no longer accepts "tavily"/"ddg";
tools.tavily_api_key and the ddg extra are removed. Run the bundled SearxNG (ships
in the compose stacks) or set TURNSTONE_SEARXNG_URL to an external instance.
Closes#545
`docker compose up` from a clone builds one image and brings up the whole stack
— PostgreSQL, console, Caddy, channel, and 10 server nodes — sharing one
Postgres so the console discovers every node. The dashboard is reachable only
through Caddy (HTTP/2 avoids the browser's 6-connection cap on the dashboard's
SSE streams); the console's plain-HTTP port is no longer published. Postgres
binds 127.0.0.1 so a bare-metal turnstone-server can join the cluster — the
bare-metal overlay is folded in and removed. Insecure dev defaults keep it
zero-config; the bundled production stack mirrors the shape but pulls ghcr
images and requires real secrets.
Move the Caddyfile under turnstone/deploy so it ships in the wheel; update docs,
QUICKSTART, and .env.example to match.
Enabling mTLS broke the cluster in three layered ways:
- Service certs were keyed on socket.gethostname() (the container ID) and
never carried the advertised service name as a SAN, so every collector and
routing-proxy handshake failed the hostname check. build_cert_hostnames()
now puts the advertised host first: it becomes the cert's primary domain
(hence a SAN) and a stable store key that survives container recreation.
- lacme's RenewalManager renews everything in the store; with the store shared
cluster-wide, every node renewed every other node's (and every dead
container's) cert — an N×M renewal storm. _SingleDomainStore scopes each
node's sweep to its own cert, and the console adds a periodic GC for the
certs of long-departed nodes.
- uvicorn loads its cert once at boot and never reloads, so renewed certs
never reached the listener and the served cert expired mid-process.
swap_context_cert() hot-swaps renewed material into the live SSL context
(server listener and console client context) via load_cert_chain.
Observability and browser access:
- The collector logged connection/TLS failures at DEBUG, so a persistent
mTLS-verify failure was invisible. It now logs the first failure per node
(reachable->unreachable) at WARNING and stays at DEBUG on retries.
- The console serves plain HTTP (it is the ACME bootstrap endpoint) and no
longer rewrites its advertised URL to https://. Browser->console TLS is
terminated by a reverse proxy: the cluster profile gains a caddy service
(browser h2/HTTPS -> caddy -> console h1.1/HTTP) plus browser-TLS docs.
Tests: tests/test_tls_san_renewal.py, tests/test_collector_reachability.py.
The channel gateway registers with its Docker-internal hostname
(e.g. http://channel:8091) which is unreachable from a host-side
server. Publish port 8091 and set TURNSTONE_CHANNEL_ADVERTISE_URL
to localhost so the server can reach it for schedule notifications.
* fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard
Auth is now mandatory for all deployments. Remove the
TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED toggle and make JWT_SECRET and AUTH_TOKEN
required in the wizard's system prompt.
* fix: remove auth disable support from runtime and infra
Remove AuthConfig.enabled field — auth is always on. Drop
TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED env var, config toggle, and the
check_request bypass. Update compose.yaml, Helm chart,
Terraform, docs, and tests to match.
* feat: deprecate config tokens, require JWT secret, prefer JWT auth
Phase 1 of config-token removal:
- load_jwt_secret() now exits with error if no secret is configured
(was: silently auto-generated ephemeral secret)
- _authenticate_token() logs deprecation warning on config token use
- CLI /cluster commands use ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set
- turnstone-admin tls-list uses ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set
- Update bootstrap wizard, docker.md, security.md to mark
TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN as deprecated and JWT_SECRET as required
- Console test fixtures use auth token + headers (auth always enforced)
* feat: add service scope for inter-service JWT auth
Add "service" to VALID_SCOPES and SCOPE_HIERARCHY. Service tokens
bypass require_permission() RBAC checks, replacing the old
empty-user-id bypass that config tokens relied on.
All ServiceTokenManager instances that need admin access now include
"service" in their scopes (console proxy, channel gateway, CLI,
admin CLI). Read-only services (collector, notification) unchanged.
* feat: phase 2 config token deprecation
- SDK doc examples now show API tokens (ts_) instead of config tokens
- Remove _get_config_token() from admin CLI (dead code)
- Block config token exchange in handle_auth_login — only password
and API token login allowed
- Update login tests to use password-based auth instead of config
token exchange
* feat: phase 3 — remove config tokens entirely
Complete removal of config-file token authentication:
- Delete AuthConfig.tokens, check(), _ROLE_TO_SCOPES, hmac dispatch
branch, and config token loading from load_auth_config()
- Remove auth_config parameter from _authenticate_token() and
check_request() — callers updated throughout
- Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from compose.yaml, Helm charts,
Terraform, turnstone.example.toml
- Remove --auth-token CLI flags from turnstone, turnstone-admin,
and turnstone-console
- Simplify console main() — always use ServiceTokenManager
(no fallback to static tokens)
- Delete config-token-specific tests, rewrite check_request and
integration tests to use JWT auth with proper audience claims
- Remove all config token references from docs (security.md,
docker.md, sdk.md, console.md, architecture.md, bootstrap prompt)
* fix: address code review findings
- Fix 33 broken tests: add JWT auth to test_api_versioning,
test_console_routing_proxy, test_tls_admin, test_tls_manager,
test_server_live (jwt_secret + audience-scoped auth headers)
- Add TestRequirePermissionServiceScope: 4 tests covering the
service scope RBAC bypass path
- Remove stale comments referencing config tokens in auth.py and
console/server.py
- Remove dead proxy_auth_token parameter from console create_app()
and static token fallback in _proxy_auth_headers()
- Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from env.py scrub list
* fix: address Copilot review — JWT audience, compose require secret
- CLI /cluster: add audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE to ServiceTokenManager
(console validates audience, JWTs without it were rejected)
- Admin CLI tls-list: same audience fix
- compose.yaml: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET now uses :? to fail fast if unset
- SDK console: fix default port from 8081 to 8090
* test: add auth enforcement tests for TLS admin endpoints
5 new tests: unauthenticated requests return 401 (list, renew,
delete), read-only-scoped requests return 403 (renew, delete).
Closes the TLS auth enforcement test gap noted in PROGRESS.md.
* fix: address remaining Copilot review feedback
- Fix token_source="config" → "test" in TLS test fixtures
- Fix AuthResult.token_source docstring to include service origins
- Require TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in cluster compose profile (:?)
- Helm: add auth.jwtSecret + auth.existingSecret values, wire
TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET into secret.yaml and both deployments
- Terraform: replace auth_token with jwt_secret variable + secret,
remove orphaned auth_token resources and IAM reference
- Remove [[auth.tokens]] from security.md config example
* fix: address full code review — 10 findings
Critical:
- Terraform: replace concat(common_env, auth_env) with common_env
(auth_env local was removed but still referenced)
- Channel gateway: remove hmac static token auth from _check_auth(),
use JWT-only validation. Remove --auth-token CLI arg from channel
- Rebalancer: add token_manager support so migration requests carry
JWT auth (was sending unauthenticated POST to /internal/migrate)
Major:
- Guard _permissions_to_scopes() against "service" privilege
escalation from DB role permissions
- Remove dead AuthConfig class, load_auth_config(), and all
auth_config parameters from create_app() signatures
- Helm: inject JWT secret for both inline and existingSecret paths
Minor:
- Remove dead auth_token param from ClusterCollector
- Remove empty TestLoadAuthConfig class
- Short JWT secret now exits instead of warning
- Compose: add generation command comment above JWT_SECRET
- Clean stale config token references from 6 doc files
- Clean stale AUTH_TOKEN reference from bootstrap wizard prompt
* fix: remove remaining stale config token references from docs
- channels.md: remove --auth-token from options table
- oidc.md: remove "config-file tokens still work" claim
- security.md: remove config token section, fix JWT secret docs
(now required/exits, no ephemeral fallback), remove hmac from
ASCII diagram, remove --auth-token reference
* fix: TLS Docker end-to-end testing fixes
Fixes discovered during Docker Compose TLS integration testing:
- Dockerfile: use --extra all (prevents missing optional deps)
- lacme 1.0.3: fixes CACertificateIssued event logging crash
- chmod PermissionError: guard for Docker volume mounts
- socket import: moved to top of main() (was inside TLS conditional,
caused NameError in _default_node_id)
- redis.SSLConnection: ConnectionPool needs explicit connection_class,
not ssl=True (which only works on Redis() directly)
- Empty redis password: pass None instead of "" to avoid AUTH error
- TURNSTONE_CONSOLE_URL: env var for Docker service discovery
(0.0.0.0 bind address isn't reachable from other containers)
- HTTP01Handler: ACME client needs a challenge handler even when
server auto-approves
- Docker overlay: tls-init as root with chmod, Redis conditional
password, console Redis TLS flags, TURNSTONE_CONSOLE_URL
* feat: full mTLS end-to-end with lacme 1.0.4
Completes the mTLS chain across all services:
lacme 1.0.4:
- Dual EKU certs (serverAuth + clientAuth) — fixes mTLS rejection
- Configurable CA name (name="turnstone") — consistent store key
Bootstrap CA import:
- Console imports bootstrap CA from /certs volume on first boot
- Single trust root: bootstrap CA → console → all service certs
Bridge mTLS:
- TLSClient init when TURNSTONE_TLS_ENABLED set
- Auto-upgrades server URL from http:// to https://
- SSLContext passed to all 3 httpx clients via verify=
Console collector mTLS:
- upgrade_tls() method replaces httpx client with mTLS context
- Called in lifespan after cert issuance alongside proxy upgrade
- Fixes "Failed to poll node" when server serves HTTPS
Docker overlay:
- TURNSTONE_TLS_SANS on all services (Docker service names as SANs)
- TURNSTONE_TLS_ENABLED on bridge
- Channel service with Redis TLS flags
- TURNSTONE_CONSOLE_URL for service discovery
- Server healthcheck disabled (mTLS healthcheck deferred)
- Redis conditional password from env
Verified end-to-end: bootstrap → console CA → server HTTPS →
bridge mTLS → Redis TLS → channel Redis TLS → console collector
polls server over mTLS → workstream creation works through bridge
* fix: lint + copilot feedback on TLS Docker e2e
- SIM105: contextlib.suppress(PermissionError) for chmod
- F401: remove unused get_storage import in bridge
- Redis healthcheck: pass password when REDIS_PASSWORD is set
* fix: sort imports in admin.py and bridge.py
* fix: tls-init key permissions, healthcheck env, collector race
- tls-init: add set -e, chown to turnstone:turnstone with restrictive
perms (keys 0600, certs 0640, dirs 0750) instead of world-readable
- Redis healthcheck: use container runtime $$REDIS_PASSWORD instead of
Compose-time interpolation for consistency with --requirepass block
- collector upgrade_tls(): don't close old httpx client while concurrent
poll threads may still be using it — let GC handle cleanup
Patrick Buckley