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7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Patrick Buckley
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e603a6a7d1 |
fix(oidc): pin redirect URI via TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE env var (#74)
* fix(oidc): pin redirect URI via TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE env var OIDC redirect_uri was derived from the request Host header, which is unreliable behind reverse proxies. Add TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE (env var / config.toml) to pin the externally-reachable origin. Extract _build_oidc_redirect_uri() helper to deduplicate the authorize and callback handlers. Validate redirect_base at load time (must be scheme://host[:port], rejects paths/query strings/invalid schemes). * fix(oidc): reject redirect_base with missing hostname Addresses Copilot review: values like `https://` or `https://:443` passed validation but would produce invalid redirect URIs. * fix(oidc): reject redirect_base with userinfo or invalid port Addresses Copilot round 2: urlparse silently accepts user:pass@host and non-numeric ports. Now explicitly rejects both. |
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Patrick Buckley
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20df7b3034 |
feat: OIDC SSO authentication with PKCE, auto-provisioning, and role … (#71)
* feat: OIDC SSO authentication with PKCE, auto-provisioning, and role mapping Add OpenID Connect as a fourth authentication method, enabling single sign-on via any OIDC provider (Okta, Azure AD, Google, Keycloak). Opt-in via env vars (TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER, CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET). Security: - Authorization Code Flow with PKCE (S256) - State/nonce parameters with database-backed pending store (multi-node safe) - JWKS signature validation with async fetch + key rotation retry - Algorithm allowlist from JWKS key (not token header) prevents confusion - Identity matching exclusively by (issuer, sub) — prevents account takeover - password_enabled=false enforced server-side, not just UI - Rate limiting on both authorize and callback endpoints - OIDC users get "!oidc" password sentinel (bcrypt rejects naturally) - ID token validated for iss, aud, exp, nonce Features: - Auto-provisioning with username deduplication on first login - Claim-based role mapping with IdP demotion propagation (revokes stale roles) - "Continue with [Provider]" SSO button on login page - OIDC-only mode hides password form - Setup wizard required before OIDC login (admin bootstrap) Storage: migration 018 (oidc_identities + oidc_pending_states tables), 8 new protocol methods on both SQLite and PostgreSQL backends. 66 new tests (2273 total). * fix: address PR #71 review feedback (18 items) Bugs fixed: - OIDC success redirect now fetches permissions via new /auth/whoami endpoint before completing login (fixes permission-gating in UI) - Remove double decodeURIComponent on oidc_error (URLSearchParams already decodes; extra call throws on stray %) - Authorize rate limiter returns redirect instead of JSON 429 (endpoint reached via browser navigation, not fetch) - Lazy JWKS fetch in callback when startup discovery failed (IdP recovery without restart) - Startup exception handlers now log with exc_info=True - PostgreSQL pop_oidc_pending_state uses DELETE...RETURNING for true atomicity (eliminates TOCTOU) Behavior: - New OIDC users without role mapping get builtin-viewer by default (assigned_by="oidc-default", not revoked by role sync) Documentation fixes: - Role mapping: sync semantics (add + revoke stale), not "additive only" - PASSWORD_ENABLED=false blocks ALL password logins including admin - Algorithm: asymmetric allowlist, not per-key derivation - PlantUML diagram updated for role revocation API spec fixes: - Removed error_codes=[302] from callback (302 is success redirect) - Added /auth/whoami to both server + console specs - Regenerated TypeScript SDK OpenAPI snapshots (23 + 51 paths) * fix: address PR #71 round 2 review feedback (10 items) Rate limiting: - Authorize endpoint now calls record() after check() so the rate limiter actually counts attempts (was a no-op before) OIDC resilience: - Split startup try/except: discovery failure disables OIDC, JWKS prefetch failure leaves OIDC enabled for lazy retry on first login - JWKS unavailable message changed to "temporarily unavailable" (was misleadingly "not configured") - create_oidc_pending_state raises on collision instead of OR IGNORE (prevents silent insert drop on state collision) - SQLite pop_oidc_pending_state uses BEGIN IMMEDIATE for write lock (eliminates TOCTOU race) Frontend: - OIDC error display deferred 300ms so showLogin()'s async status fetch doesn't clear it via _switchMode → _clearError API spec: - OIDC authorize/callback endpoints now declare response_code=302 - Added AuthWhoamiResponse Pydantic model for /auth/whoami - Regenerated TypeScript SDK OpenAPI snapshots Documentation: - Diagram: JWKS "cached at startup, refreshed on-demand" (was "hourly") - Added TODO(tech-debt) comments on Host header redirect_uri sites |
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Patrick Buckley
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7492816ab2 |
feat: governance — RBAC, tool policies, prompt templates, usage track… (#39)
* feat: governance — RBAC, tool policies, prompt templates, usage tracking, audit logging Add comprehensive governance layer for the admin console: - RBAC with 15 granular permissions, 3 builtin roles (admin, operator, viewer), custom role CRUD, user-role assignment with privilege escalation prevention - Tool policies with glob pattern matching, priority-ordered evaluation (allow/deny/ask), enforced before auto-approve in WebUI.approve_tools() - Prompt templates with variable substitution, categories, default flag - Usage tracking: per-LLM-request token/tool metrics, aggregated queries (group by day/model/user), automatic 90-day pruning via scheduler - Audit logging: append-only event trail for all admin mutations, filterable/paginated queries, automatic 365-day pruning, X-Forwarded-For aware IP extraction - require_permission() enforced on all 35+ admin endpoints (users, tokens, channels, schedules, watches, roles, orgs, policies, templates, usage, audit) - Field allowlists on storage update methods prevent mass-assignment bugs - Self-deletion guard on admin_delete_user, delete_user cascades user_roles - _row_to_dict helper eliminates ~400 lines of fragile positional row mapping - _audit_context helper deduplicates 18 instances of audit boilerplate - Migration 008: 7 new tables, 3 builtin roles, org_id on users - Console admin panel: 5 new tabs (Roles, Policies, Templates, Usage, Audit) with permission-gated visibility, 7 modal dialogs, full keyboard accessibility - Python + TypeScript SDK methods for all governance endpoints - 120+ new tests (1554 total) * fix: address PR #39 review feedback - Rebuild serialized items after policy evaluation so denied/allowed verdicts are reflected in tool_info/approve_request SSE payloads - Make `since` query param optional in usage OpenAPI spec (handler already defaults to last 7 days) - Add response_model=StatusResponse to DELETE role/policy/template and POST/DELETE role assignment endpoints in OpenAPI spec - Add missing org_id/created/updated fields to UserRoleInfo schema - Add missing created field to AuditEventInfo schema - Show "no permissions" empty state instead of loading inaccessible tab when all admin tabs are permission-gated - Fix "13 permissions" → "15 permissions" in architecture.md and security.md - Fix import sorting in test_audit.py and test_tool_policy.py * fix: address PR #39 round 2 review feedback - Clear stale permissions from sessionStorage on config-token login (auth.js _storePermissions) - Only trust X-Forwarded-For when behind a proxy that sets X-Forwarded-Proto (conditional on is_secure_request trust model) - Thread user_id from auth into WebUI.on_status for usage events - Add created field to TS AuditEventInfo type - Return typed Pydantic models from all SDK governance methods instead of dict[str, Any] — both async and sync clients - Validate group_by param against allowed enum in admin_usage handler - Add deterministic secondary sort (event_id DESC) to list_audit_events in both SQLite and PostgreSQL backends |
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Patrick Buckley
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fb190f8977 |
Normalize session_id into ws_id as sole persistent identity (#29)
* Normalize session_id into ws_id as sole persistent identity Eliminate the separate session_id concept. The workstream ID (ws_id) is now the single identity used for both real-time routing and conversation persistence, removing a layer of indirection that was 1:1 in practice and buggy on resume (stale pointers, orphaned rows). Schema changes (migration 006): - Drop sessions table; add alias/title columns to workstreams - Rename conversations.session_id → ws_id - Rename session_config table → workstream_config (ws_id column) - Data migration remaps existing conversations to ws_id Storage/API renames: - register_session → register_workstream (already existed, merged) - save_message/load_messages now keyed by ws_id - resolve_session → resolve_workstream - ChatSession.session_id property → ws_id - ChatSession.resume_session() → resume() - resume_session field → resume_ws - SessionResumedEvent → WorkstreamResumedEvent - /api/sessions → /api/workstreams/saved - /sessions slash command → /workstreams - --session-retention-days → --retention-days Channel eviction recovery simplified: reuses old ws_id directly instead of get_session_id_by_ws() reverse lookup. * Fix Copilot review feedback: stale session wording in docs, regenerate OpenAPI spec - docs/channels.md: "resumes the session" → "resumes the workstream", "Session resumed:" → "Resumed:", "old session was pruned" → "old workstream was pruned" - docs/api-reference.md: "Each session object" → "Each saved workstream object", field descriptions updated, removed stale node_id field - sdk/typescript/openapi-server.json: fully regenerated from Python models — removes all stale session_id properties from WorkstreamInfo, DashboardWorkstream, CreateWorkstreamResponse schemas |
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Patrick Buckley
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e7fe8fca9d |
Add channel notification tool with security hardening (#27)
* Add channel notification tool with security hardening Implements the `notify` tool allowing the LLM to send notifications to Discord channels/users via the channel gateway. Includes fixes for 11 review findings: JWT auth on the gateway endpoint, first-healthy gateway delivery with retry+backoff, rate limiting only on success, SSRF URL scheme validation, Discord mention sanitization, SQLite ON CONFLICT upsert preserving created timestamps, advertise URL resolution for 0.0.0.0 bind, randomized service IDs, generic error messages to prevent internal state leakage, and partial direct-target validation. Service registry with heartbeat-based health filtering (migration 005). Channel gateway registers on startup, heartbeats every 30s, deregisters on shutdown. 70 new tests covering tool prepare/execute, HTTP endpoint auth (static + JWT), storage CRUD, and retry behavior. * Add notify documentation, diagrams, and review fixes Documentation: - New sequence diagram 17-notify-flow.puml showing end-to-end delivery - Updated 16-channel-architecture.puml with services table, notify HTTP path, and Notification Flow note - channels.md: Notifications section (targeting, delivery flow, service registry, security) and new config table entries - tools.md: notify tool reference, updated counts/tables (14→15 tools) - security.md: channel gateway row in service-to-service auth table - architecture.md: notification subsystem paragraph Review fixes (copilot): - _http.py: fail closed when auth unconfigured (401 instead of pass- through), strip whitespace on message/title, generic error messages for user-not-found vs no-linked-channels - session.py: parse gateway response JSON and require at least one result with status=="sent" before counting as success - _postgresql.py: use index_elements instead of constraint for upsert |
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Patrick Buckley
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77c0a7736b |
Bump version to 0.4.0 and update security docs
- Version bump in __init__.py, pyproject.toml, api-reference.md - security.md: document JWT aud/iss claims, login rate limiting, secure cookie defaults (24h, Secure flag), CORS restriction, service JWT auto-rotation, secret strength validation, and proxy auth forwarding via service tokens (not user JWT forwarding) |
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Patrick Buckley
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047680d669 |
Add user identity, JWT auth, and admin console UI (#23)
* Add user identity, JWT auth, and admin console UI (#23) JWT-based authentication with three token types: config-file (hmac, backward-compat), API tokens (ts_ prefix, SHA-256 hashed), and JWTs (HS256, 24h expiry). Username:password login via bcrypt. Hierarchical scopes: read < write < approve. New tables: users (username, password_hash), api_tokens (token_hash, scopes, expires), channel_users (future channel integrations). user_id column added to sessions and workstreams for attribution. Console owns admin CRUD (6 endpoints under /api/admin/). Server validates JWTs locally with shared signing secret. Public /api/auth/setup endpoint for first-time admin creation (atomic, only works with zero users). turnstone-admin CLI for user/token management. Admin console UI: Users and Tokens tabs with full CRUD modals, scope badges, token show-once with clipboard copy, keyboard accessibility (focus traps, Escape, arrow key tabs, ARIA roles). Login UI redesigned: username:password primary, token toggle for legacy, setup wizard auto-detected via /api/auth/status. Python + TypeScript SDKs updated with login(username, password), authStatus(), setup(). New docs/security.md + diagram 15-auth-architecture.puml. All existing docs updated. OpenAPI specs include all new endpoints. 64 new tests (1023 total). Dependencies: PyJWT, bcrypt. * Fix auth bugs, XSS vector, and doc inaccuracies from PR #23 review Address Copilot review feedback: escape double quotes in escapeHtml() to prevent XSS in HTML attributes, add JWT validation fallback so config tokens containing dots still work, add user_id to AuthLoginResponse schema, return created field from admin_create_user, and correct five documentation files to match actual API behavior. |