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16 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Patrick Buckley
|
7a06f5e8bc |
refactor(session): make ModelLane the provider boundary (#979) (#989)
* refactor(session): make ModelLane the provider boundary (#979) ## Summary This closes the model-lane ownership gap left by #832: `ChatSession` no longer stores raw provider/client handles. `ResolvedModelBinding` now carries the provider, client, model, capabilities, registry generation, and backend-auth configuration as one coherent snapshot. - Atomically rebind existing sessions after model-registry changes while pinning each in-flight send, fallback, judge, output guard, task agent, title, compaction, perception, and voice operation to its initiating principal and binding. - Fence UI publication, canonical trajectory folds, durable writes, streams, retries, child scopes, and judge work by generation. Stop can hand off to a successor without accepting late state; cancelled tools retain typed effect receipts, and concurrent approval batches resolve by exact cycle or call. - Make create, fork, open, close, and delete race-safe with hidden `creating` reservations, incarnation-aware state tails, and an ACL-rechecked transaction that clones checkpoint-bounded history, configuration, project/persona state, and attachment references. - Extend REST/OpenAPI and Python/TypeScript SDK contracts for create/fork inputs, routed-create metadata, live-workstream probes, targeted approvals, and structured cancellation results. - Update architecture, storage, authentication, judge, channel, console, API, and SDK documentation, including regenerated architecture diagrams and OpenAPI artifacts. ## Validation - SQLite suite: 11,188 passed, 9 skipped, 10 deselected - PostgreSQL suite: 11,195 passed, 2 skipped, 10 deselected - Live backend: 3 passed - SSE recovery: 6 passed; browser recovery harness passed all scenarios - Ruff: clean; 595 files correctly formatted - mypy: 243 source files clean - TypeScript: typecheck/build and 35 tests passed - OpenAPI artifacts fresh; all 14 changed diagrams reproduce byte-for-byte - `git diff --check` and Git LFS integrity clean Closes #979. * fix(deps): update nanoid for GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8 Refresh the transitive lock entry admitted by PostCSS so the TypeScript security gate no longer resolves the vulnerable custom-generator implementation. Validation: - npm ci - npm audit --audit-level=moderate: 0 vulnerabilities - TypeScript typecheck and build - TypeScript tests: 35 passed * fix(test): assert canonical model registry URLs Replace prefix checks with exact canonical base URL assertions so the tests do not model incomplete URL validation. Validation: tests/test_model_registry.py (185 passed); Ruff check/format; mypy. |
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Patrick Buckley
|
110d44b07e |
refactor(tools): remove man, math, and plan_agent built-in tools
`man` and `math` duplicated capabilities already reachable through `bash`; `plan_agent` is better expressed as a `task_agent` running a planning skill, and carried a large amount of special-case machinery (plan-review gate, refinement loop, per-kind model routing). Removing all three shrinks the tool surface and cuts per-call token cost. Also removed, as dead-once-the-tools-are-gone: - the `math` sandbox executor (`turnstone.core.sandbox`) and its `[sandbox]` extra; the eval analyst now runs bash-only - the read-only `AGENT_TOOLS` sub-agent tool set and the `agent` tool-metadata key (`task_agent`/`TASK_AGENT_TOOLS` retained) - the plan-review protocol end to end: the `on_plan_review` UI hook, `resolve_plan`, `POST /v1/api/plan` + `POST /v1/api/route/plan`, the `plan_review`/`plan_resolved` SSE events, and their Python SDK / TypeScript SDK / OpenAPI / frontend / Discord+Slack bindings - the `model.plan_alias` / `model.plan_effort` settings and the registry `plan_model` / `plan_effort` routing fields TOOLS 31->28, TASK_AGENT_TOOLS 13->11; COORDINATOR_TOOLS unchanged. BREAKING CHANGE: removes the `man`, `math`, `plan_agent` tools, the plan-review SSE/HTTP/SDK surface, and the plan_* model-routing settings from the experimental 1.6 line. |
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Patrick Buckley
|
d6e615d324 |
fix: apply /review feedback on legacy URL cleanup
Reviewer caught real misses on the consumer-swap claim:
- TypeScript SDK still defined and re-exported `CloseWorkstreamRequest`
(types.ts + index.ts) — drop both. Now matches the Python-side
removal.
- Four `tests/test_auth.py` cases (`test_write_full_token_ok`,
`test_approve_full_token_ok`, `test_bearer_takes_precedence_over_cookie`,
`test_cookie_full_on_write_ok`) were tautological after the legacy
URL removal: they posted to `/api/send` / `/api/approve` and asserted
`allowed is True`, but those paths now classify as `read` so a read
token would also pass — they no longer tested the write/approve
scope enforcement. Swap to path-keyed URLs to restore the original
intent.
- `is_public_path("/api/send")` test renamed + retargeted to a
path-keyed URL.
Doc-table drift the previous commit missed:
- `docs/security.md` path-to-scope mapping rewritten for the
path-keyed verb family (write set, DELETE-on-/send dequeue,
per-ws_id approve).
- `docs/architecture.md` scope-model row text swap from `/api/send`
/ `/api/approve` to the path-keyed equivalents.
- `docs/diagrams/01-system-context.puml` channel→server edge label
swap.
- `docs/diagrams/15-auth-architecture.puml` scope class swap.
Cosmetic comment-only stragglers:
- `tests/test_session_worker.py` module docstring URL update.
- `tests/test_ratelimit.py` ~11 `/api/send` fixture-key strings
retargeted to `/api/workstreams/abc/send` so the URL fixtures
reflect the post-1.5 surface (rate limiter is path-agnostic; the
swap is purely cosmetic).
4557 tests still passing under -m "not live"; ruff + mypy clean.
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Patrick Buckley
|
a917bf2690 |
docs: apply Copilot review feedback on PR #367
All eight suggestions verified against source before applying: - docs/settings.md — ConfigStore key names are `model.plan_alias` / `model.task_alias` (not `plan_model` / `task_model`); updated in both the overview list and the plan/task overrides table. - docs/security.md — `src` claim values now reflect what actually gets minted: `password`, `database` (from API-token exchange), `oidc`, plus service origins `console`, `cli`, `channel`. - docs/sdk.md — `upload_attachment(ws_id, filename, data, *, mime_type=...)` matches the real SDK signature; `bytes`-returning helper is `get_attachment_content` (not `download_attachment`); code example reordered so it doesn't collide on `filename=` kwarg. - docs/architecture.md — "prior `plan` tool call" → "prior `plan_agent` tool call" so wording stays consistent with the renamed tool. - docs/tools.md — `plan_agent` `primary_key` is `goal`, not `prompt`, in both the primary-key table and the summary table (matches the JSON schema in turnstone/tools/plan_agent.json). |
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Patrick Buckley
|
471d1a3311 |
docs: audit documentation for 1.4 / 1.5 state
Systematic pass over every doc under docs/, the root-level README /
QUICKSTART / CONTRIBUTING, and the PlantUML diagrams. Memory and docs
had drifted against the code since 1.2 — this catches them up to the
1.4.0 release and the 1.5.0a1 experimental line.
User-facing fixes
- README: fix broken docs/mcp.md link (→ mcp-registry.md); channel
gateway entry reflects shipped Discord + Slack adapters instead of
"Slack/Teams planned"; diagrams table mentions both.
- QUICKSTART: docs/*.md relative links were wrong from the repo root;
wizard version bumped from 0.5.4.
- CONTRIBUTING: add dev extra plus the ruff / mypy / pytest commands
we actually expect before push.
Reference docs
- architecture.md: 19 tool schemas (was 15), 18 admin tabs (was 14),
turnstone-bootstrap added to entry-points table, OpenAI provider
file split (chat/responses/common) documented, 38 SDK event
dataclasses (was 27 and referenced deleted mq/protocol.py), Slack
adapter + multi-adapter gateway, plan_agent/task_agent naming,
governance admin-panel rewrite.
- api-reference.md: full attachment endpoints (POST/GET/content/
DELETE on /v1/api/workstreams/{ws_id}/attachments) plus the
multipart mode on POST /v1/api/workstreams/new.
- channels.md: Slack Setup section (Socket Mode app creation, OAuth
scopes, tokens), Slack CLI/env reference in config table, combined-
adapter architecture diagram.
- console.md: 18-tab listing (was 13) with Channels/Models/Nodes/TLS
descriptions and ConfigStore live-edit note.
- docker.md: Slack env vars block; image entry-point list now
includes turnstone / turnstone-bootstrap.
- sdk.md: attachments methods on the server client, attachments
example (upload-then-send and at-creation), event count fixed.
- releasing.md: four-track table (stable/1.0, 1.3, 1.4 + main 1.5);
promotion workflow uses 1.5 / 1.6 numbering.
- settings.md: plan_model / task_model / plan_effort / task_effort
overrides section.
- governance.md: skill naming (/skill, `skill` field — not /template),
Prompts/Judge tabs called out.
- security.md: two-token-types wording; src claim values match the
AuthResult source strings actually emitted.
- mcp-registry.md: SDK package name is @turnstone/sdk.
- tools.md: plan / task renamed to plan_agent / task_agent in the
section headings and summary table; primary-key table matched.
- design/consistent-hash-ring.md: dead direct-http-transport.md
pointer redirected to architecture.md.
Diagrams
- 02-package-structure: drop phantom chat.py entry point, add admin
and bootstrap, add slack/bot.py, rename channels/gateway.py →
channels/cli.py.
- 16-channel-architecture: Slack is no longer "(future)", add a
SlackBot class and the slack-bolt Socket Mode edges; wire the new
bot into ChannelService. PNGs regenerated from both puml sources.
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Patrick Buckley
|
62d2a0fe6a |
fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard (#274)
* fix: remove non-auth support from bootstrap wizard Auth is now mandatory for all deployments. Remove the TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED toggle and make JWT_SECRET and AUTH_TOKEN required in the wizard's system prompt. * fix: remove auth disable support from runtime and infra Remove AuthConfig.enabled field — auth is always on. Drop TURNSTONE_AUTH_ENABLED env var, config toggle, and the check_request bypass. Update compose.yaml, Helm chart, Terraform, docs, and tests to match. * feat: deprecate config tokens, require JWT secret, prefer JWT auth Phase 1 of config-token removal: - load_jwt_secret() now exits with error if no secret is configured (was: silently auto-generated ephemeral secret) - _authenticate_token() logs deprecation warning on config token use - CLI /cluster commands use ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set - turnstone-admin tls-list uses ServiceTokenManager when JWT secret is set - Update bootstrap wizard, docker.md, security.md to mark TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN as deprecated and JWT_SECRET as required - Console test fixtures use auth token + headers (auth always enforced) * feat: add service scope for inter-service JWT auth Add "service" to VALID_SCOPES and SCOPE_HIERARCHY. Service tokens bypass require_permission() RBAC checks, replacing the old empty-user-id bypass that config tokens relied on. All ServiceTokenManager instances that need admin access now include "service" in their scopes (console proxy, channel gateway, CLI, admin CLI). Read-only services (collector, notification) unchanged. * feat: phase 2 config token deprecation - SDK doc examples now show API tokens (ts_) instead of config tokens - Remove _get_config_token() from admin CLI (dead code) - Block config token exchange in handle_auth_login — only password and API token login allowed - Update login tests to use password-based auth instead of config token exchange * feat: phase 3 — remove config tokens entirely Complete removal of config-file token authentication: - Delete AuthConfig.tokens, check(), _ROLE_TO_SCOPES, hmac dispatch branch, and config token loading from load_auth_config() - Remove auth_config parameter from _authenticate_token() and check_request() — callers updated throughout - Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from compose.yaml, Helm charts, Terraform, turnstone.example.toml - Remove --auth-token CLI flags from turnstone, turnstone-admin, and turnstone-console - Simplify console main() — always use ServiceTokenManager (no fallback to static tokens) - Delete config-token-specific tests, rewrite check_request and integration tests to use JWT auth with proper audience claims - Remove all config token references from docs (security.md, docker.md, sdk.md, console.md, architecture.md, bootstrap prompt) * fix: address code review findings - Fix 33 broken tests: add JWT auth to test_api_versioning, test_console_routing_proxy, test_tls_admin, test_tls_manager, test_server_live (jwt_secret + audience-scoped auth headers) - Add TestRequirePermissionServiceScope: 4 tests covering the service scope RBAC bypass path - Remove stale comments referencing config tokens in auth.py and console/server.py - Remove dead proxy_auth_token parameter from console create_app() and static token fallback in _proxy_auth_headers() - Remove TURNSTONE_AUTH_TOKEN from env.py scrub list * fix: address Copilot review — JWT audience, compose require secret - CLI /cluster: add audience=JWT_AUD_CONSOLE to ServiceTokenManager (console validates audience, JWTs without it were rejected) - Admin CLI tls-list: same audience fix - compose.yaml: TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET now uses :? to fail fast if unset - SDK console: fix default port from 8081 to 8090 * test: add auth enforcement tests for TLS admin endpoints 5 new tests: unauthenticated requests return 401 (list, renew, delete), read-only-scoped requests return 403 (renew, delete). Closes the TLS auth enforcement test gap noted in PROGRESS.md. * fix: address remaining Copilot review feedback - Fix token_source="config" → "test" in TLS test fixtures - Fix AuthResult.token_source docstring to include service origins - Require TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET in cluster compose profile (:?) - Helm: add auth.jwtSecret + auth.existingSecret values, wire TURNSTONE_JWT_SECRET into secret.yaml and both deployments - Terraform: replace auth_token with jwt_secret variable + secret, remove orphaned auth_token resources and IAM reference - Remove [[auth.tokens]] from security.md config example * fix: address full code review — 10 findings Critical: - Terraform: replace concat(common_env, auth_env) with common_env (auth_env local was removed but still referenced) - Channel gateway: remove hmac static token auth from _check_auth(), use JWT-only validation. Remove --auth-token CLI arg from channel - Rebalancer: add token_manager support so migration requests carry JWT auth (was sending unauthenticated POST to /internal/migrate) Major: - Guard _permissions_to_scopes() against "service" privilege escalation from DB role permissions - Remove dead AuthConfig class, load_auth_config(), and all auth_config parameters from create_app() signatures - Helm: inject JWT secret for both inline and existingSecret paths Minor: - Remove dead auth_token param from ClusterCollector - Remove empty TestLoadAuthConfig class - Short JWT secret now exits instead of warning - Compose: add generation command comment above JWT_SECRET - Clean stale config token references from 6 doc files - Clean stale AUTH_TOKEN reference from bootstrap wizard prompt * fix: remove remaining stale config token references from docs - channels.md: remove --auth-token from options table - oidc.md: remove "config-file tokens still work" claim - security.md: remove config token section, fix JWT secret docs (now required/exits, no ephemeral fallback), remove hmac from ASCII diagram, remove --auth-token reference |
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Patrick Buckley
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a7d9461735 |
refactor: channel router + scheduler use SDK clients
ChannelRouter: replace raw httpx with AsyncTurnstoneServer (single-node) and AsyncTurnstoneConsole route methods (multi-node). Remove _post() helper, _route_path(), and manual JSON construction. Scheduler: replace raw httpx.Client with TurnstoneServer (sync). Lazy per-node client cache with token rotation and stale client pruning. Clean remaining Redis/MQ references from tests, docs, and config: - test_tls_admin: redis.internal -> app.internal - test_config: [redis] test data -> [database] - docs/channels.md, console.md: rewrite for HTTP architecture - docs/api-reference.md, openshell.md: remove stale diagram/Redis refs - turnstone.example.toml: remove [redis] section - .pre-commit-config.yaml: remove types-redis dependency - QUICKSTART.md: remove bridge/Redis from deployment descriptions |
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Patrick Buckley
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803d8ee8f9 |
docs: document user_id propagation through MQ path
Update security.md with trusted service user_id forwarding. Update MQ protocol diagram to include user_id field on CreateWorkstreamMessage. Update console data flow diagram to show user_id in message and bridge forwarding. |
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Patrick Buckley
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037308f3b1 |
fix: propagate user identity through console proxy
Console proxy previously used a fixed service identity (console-proxy)
with full {read,write,approve} scopes for all proxied requests, losing
the real user's identity at the proxy boundary. Now mints per-request
short-lived JWTs carrying the authenticated user's actual user_id,
scopes, and permissions so upstream servers record correct audit
attribution and enforce scope narrowing as defense in depth.
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Patrick Buckley
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e603a6a7d1 |
fix(oidc): pin redirect URI via TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE env var (#74)
* fix(oidc): pin redirect URI via TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE env var OIDC redirect_uri was derived from the request Host header, which is unreliable behind reverse proxies. Add TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE (env var / config.toml) to pin the externally-reachable origin. Extract _build_oidc_redirect_uri() helper to deduplicate the authorize and callback handlers. Validate redirect_base at load time (must be scheme://host[:port], rejects paths/query strings/invalid schemes). * fix(oidc): reject redirect_base with missing hostname Addresses Copilot review: values like `https://` or `https://:443` passed validation but would produce invalid redirect URIs. * fix(oidc): reject redirect_base with userinfo or invalid port Addresses Copilot round 2: urlparse silently accepts user:pass@host and non-numeric ports. Now explicitly rejects both. |
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Patrick Buckley
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20df7b3034 |
feat: OIDC SSO authentication with PKCE, auto-provisioning, and role … (#71)
* feat: OIDC SSO authentication with PKCE, auto-provisioning, and role mapping Add OpenID Connect as a fourth authentication method, enabling single sign-on via any OIDC provider (Okta, Azure AD, Google, Keycloak). Opt-in via env vars (TURNSTONE_OIDC_ISSUER, CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SECRET). Security: - Authorization Code Flow with PKCE (S256) - State/nonce parameters with database-backed pending store (multi-node safe) - JWKS signature validation with async fetch + key rotation retry - Algorithm allowlist from JWKS key (not token header) prevents confusion - Identity matching exclusively by (issuer, sub) — prevents account takeover - password_enabled=false enforced server-side, not just UI - Rate limiting on both authorize and callback endpoints - OIDC users get "!oidc" password sentinel (bcrypt rejects naturally) - ID token validated for iss, aud, exp, nonce Features: - Auto-provisioning with username deduplication on first login - Claim-based role mapping with IdP demotion propagation (revokes stale roles) - "Continue with [Provider]" SSO button on login page - OIDC-only mode hides password form - Setup wizard required before OIDC login (admin bootstrap) Storage: migration 018 (oidc_identities + oidc_pending_states tables), 8 new protocol methods on both SQLite and PostgreSQL backends. 66 new tests (2273 total). * fix: address PR #71 review feedback (18 items) Bugs fixed: - OIDC success redirect now fetches permissions via new /auth/whoami endpoint before completing login (fixes permission-gating in UI) - Remove double decodeURIComponent on oidc_error (URLSearchParams already decodes; extra call throws on stray %) - Authorize rate limiter returns redirect instead of JSON 429 (endpoint reached via browser navigation, not fetch) - Lazy JWKS fetch in callback when startup discovery failed (IdP recovery without restart) - Startup exception handlers now log with exc_info=True - PostgreSQL pop_oidc_pending_state uses DELETE...RETURNING for true atomicity (eliminates TOCTOU) Behavior: - New OIDC users without role mapping get builtin-viewer by default (assigned_by="oidc-default", not revoked by role sync) Documentation fixes: - Role mapping: sync semantics (add + revoke stale), not "additive only" - PASSWORD_ENABLED=false blocks ALL password logins including admin - Algorithm: asymmetric allowlist, not per-key derivation - PlantUML diagram updated for role revocation API spec fixes: - Removed error_codes=[302] from callback (302 is success redirect) - Added /auth/whoami to both server + console specs - Regenerated TypeScript SDK OpenAPI snapshots (23 + 51 paths) * fix: address PR #71 round 2 review feedback (10 items) Rate limiting: - Authorize endpoint now calls record() after check() so the rate limiter actually counts attempts (was a no-op before) OIDC resilience: - Split startup try/except: discovery failure disables OIDC, JWKS prefetch failure leaves OIDC enabled for lazy retry on first login - JWKS unavailable message changed to "temporarily unavailable" (was misleadingly "not configured") - create_oidc_pending_state raises on collision instead of OR IGNORE (prevents silent insert drop on state collision) - SQLite pop_oidc_pending_state uses BEGIN IMMEDIATE for write lock (eliminates TOCTOU race) Frontend: - OIDC error display deferred 300ms so showLogin()'s async status fetch doesn't clear it via _switchMode → _clearError API spec: - OIDC authorize/callback endpoints now declare response_code=302 - Added AuthWhoamiResponse Pydantic model for /auth/whoami - Regenerated TypeScript SDK OpenAPI snapshots Documentation: - Diagram: JWKS "cached at startup, refreshed on-demand" (was "hourly") - Added TODO(tech-debt) comments on Host header redirect_uri sites |
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Patrick Buckley
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7492816ab2 |
feat: governance — RBAC, tool policies, prompt templates, usage track… (#39)
* feat: governance — RBAC, tool policies, prompt templates, usage tracking, audit logging Add comprehensive governance layer for the admin console: - RBAC with 15 granular permissions, 3 builtin roles (admin, operator, viewer), custom role CRUD, user-role assignment with privilege escalation prevention - Tool policies with glob pattern matching, priority-ordered evaluation (allow/deny/ask), enforced before auto-approve in WebUI.approve_tools() - Prompt templates with variable substitution, categories, default flag - Usage tracking: per-LLM-request token/tool metrics, aggregated queries (group by day/model/user), automatic 90-day pruning via scheduler - Audit logging: append-only event trail for all admin mutations, filterable/paginated queries, automatic 365-day pruning, X-Forwarded-For aware IP extraction - require_permission() enforced on all 35+ admin endpoints (users, tokens, channels, schedules, watches, roles, orgs, policies, templates, usage, audit) - Field allowlists on storage update methods prevent mass-assignment bugs - Self-deletion guard on admin_delete_user, delete_user cascades user_roles - _row_to_dict helper eliminates ~400 lines of fragile positional row mapping - _audit_context helper deduplicates 18 instances of audit boilerplate - Migration 008: 7 new tables, 3 builtin roles, org_id on users - Console admin panel: 5 new tabs (Roles, Policies, Templates, Usage, Audit) with permission-gated visibility, 7 modal dialogs, full keyboard accessibility - Python + TypeScript SDK methods for all governance endpoints - 120+ new tests (1554 total) * fix: address PR #39 review feedback - Rebuild serialized items after policy evaluation so denied/allowed verdicts are reflected in tool_info/approve_request SSE payloads - Make `since` query param optional in usage OpenAPI spec (handler already defaults to last 7 days) - Add response_model=StatusResponse to DELETE role/policy/template and POST/DELETE role assignment endpoints in OpenAPI spec - Add missing org_id/created/updated fields to UserRoleInfo schema - Add missing created field to AuditEventInfo schema - Show "no permissions" empty state instead of loading inaccessible tab when all admin tabs are permission-gated - Fix "13 permissions" → "15 permissions" in architecture.md and security.md - Fix import sorting in test_audit.py and test_tool_policy.py * fix: address PR #39 round 2 review feedback - Clear stale permissions from sessionStorage on config-token login (auth.js _storePermissions) - Only trust X-Forwarded-For when behind a proxy that sets X-Forwarded-Proto (conditional on is_secure_request trust model) - Thread user_id from auth into WebUI.on_status for usage events - Add created field to TS AuditEventInfo type - Return typed Pydantic models from all SDK governance methods instead of dict[str, Any] — both async and sync clients - Validate group_by param against allowed enum in admin_usage handler - Add deterministic secondary sort (event_id DESC) to list_audit_events in both SQLite and PostgreSQL backends |
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Patrick Buckley
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fb190f8977 |
Normalize session_id into ws_id as sole persistent identity (#29)
* Normalize session_id into ws_id as sole persistent identity Eliminate the separate session_id concept. The workstream ID (ws_id) is now the single identity used for both real-time routing and conversation persistence, removing a layer of indirection that was 1:1 in practice and buggy on resume (stale pointers, orphaned rows). Schema changes (migration 006): - Drop sessions table; add alias/title columns to workstreams - Rename conversations.session_id → ws_id - Rename session_config table → workstream_config (ws_id column) - Data migration remaps existing conversations to ws_id Storage/API renames: - register_session → register_workstream (already existed, merged) - save_message/load_messages now keyed by ws_id - resolve_session → resolve_workstream - ChatSession.session_id property → ws_id - ChatSession.resume_session() → resume() - resume_session field → resume_ws - SessionResumedEvent → WorkstreamResumedEvent - /api/sessions → /api/workstreams/saved - /sessions slash command → /workstreams - --session-retention-days → --retention-days Channel eviction recovery simplified: reuses old ws_id directly instead of get_session_id_by_ws() reverse lookup. * Fix Copilot review feedback: stale session wording in docs, regenerate OpenAPI spec - docs/channels.md: "resumes the session" → "resumes the workstream", "Session resumed:" → "Resumed:", "old session was pruned" → "old workstream was pruned" - docs/api-reference.md: "Each session object" → "Each saved workstream object", field descriptions updated, removed stale node_id field - sdk/typescript/openapi-server.json: fully regenerated from Python models — removes all stale session_id properties from WorkstreamInfo, DashboardWorkstream, CreateWorkstreamResponse schemas |
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Patrick Buckley
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e7fe8fca9d |
Add channel notification tool with security hardening (#27)
* Add channel notification tool with security hardening Implements the `notify` tool allowing the LLM to send notifications to Discord channels/users via the channel gateway. Includes fixes for 11 review findings: JWT auth on the gateway endpoint, first-healthy gateway delivery with retry+backoff, rate limiting only on success, SSRF URL scheme validation, Discord mention sanitization, SQLite ON CONFLICT upsert preserving created timestamps, advertise URL resolution for 0.0.0.0 bind, randomized service IDs, generic error messages to prevent internal state leakage, and partial direct-target validation. Service registry with heartbeat-based health filtering (migration 005). Channel gateway registers on startup, heartbeats every 30s, deregisters on shutdown. 70 new tests covering tool prepare/execute, HTTP endpoint auth (static + JWT), storage CRUD, and retry behavior. * Add notify documentation, diagrams, and review fixes Documentation: - New sequence diagram 17-notify-flow.puml showing end-to-end delivery - Updated 16-channel-architecture.puml with services table, notify HTTP path, and Notification Flow note - channels.md: Notifications section (targeting, delivery flow, service registry, security) and new config table entries - tools.md: notify tool reference, updated counts/tables (14→15 tools) - security.md: channel gateway row in service-to-service auth table - architecture.md: notification subsystem paragraph Review fixes (copilot): - _http.py: fail closed when auth unconfigured (401 instead of pass- through), strip whitespace on message/title, generic error messages for user-not-found vs no-linked-channels - session.py: parse gateway response JSON and require at least one result with status=="sent" before counting as success - _postgresql.py: use index_elements instead of constraint for upsert |
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Patrick Buckley
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77c0a7736b |
Bump version to 0.4.0 and update security docs
- Version bump in __init__.py, pyproject.toml, api-reference.md - security.md: document JWT aud/iss claims, login rate limiting, secure cookie defaults (24h, Secure flag), CORS restriction, service JWT auto-rotation, secret strength validation, and proxy auth forwarding via service tokens (not user JWT forwarding) |
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Patrick Buckley
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047680d669 |
Add user identity, JWT auth, and admin console UI (#23)
* Add user identity, JWT auth, and admin console UI (#23) JWT-based authentication with three token types: config-file (hmac, backward-compat), API tokens (ts_ prefix, SHA-256 hashed), and JWTs (HS256, 24h expiry). Username:password login via bcrypt. Hierarchical scopes: read < write < approve. New tables: users (username, password_hash), api_tokens (token_hash, scopes, expires), channel_users (future channel integrations). user_id column added to sessions and workstreams for attribution. Console owns admin CRUD (6 endpoints under /api/admin/). Server validates JWTs locally with shared signing secret. Public /api/auth/setup endpoint for first-time admin creation (atomic, only works with zero users). turnstone-admin CLI for user/token management. Admin console UI: Users and Tokens tabs with full CRUD modals, scope badges, token show-once with clipboard copy, keyboard accessibility (focus traps, Escape, arrow key tabs, ARIA roles). Login UI redesigned: username:password primary, token toggle for legacy, setup wizard auto-detected via /api/auth/status. Python + TypeScript SDKs updated with login(username, password), authStatus(), setup(). New docs/security.md + diagram 15-auth-architecture.puml. All existing docs updated. OpenAPI specs include all new endpoints. 64 new tests (1023 total). Dependencies: PyJWT, bcrypt. * Fix auth bugs, XSS vector, and doc inaccuracies from PR #23 review Address Copilot review feedback: escape double quotes in escapeHtml() to prevent XSS in HTML attributes, add JWT validation fallback so config tokens containing dots still work, add user_id to AuthLoginResponse schema, return created field from admin_create_user, and correct five documentation files to match actual API behavior. |