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fix(oidc): require TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE; drop Host-header fallback (sec-2)
_build_oidc_redirect_uri previously fell back to the request Host
header when redirect_base was unset. With a permissive reverse proxy
or direct backend access, a spoofed Host minted an authorize URL
pointing to attacker-controlled host — combined with a permissive
IdP redirect_uri allowlist this enables auth-code interception.
There is no production scenario where a Host-derived redirect_uri is
correct, so this fails closed:
- initialize_oidc_state checks redirect_base after discovery succeeds
and disables OIDC (with an explicit error log naming the env var)
if it's empty. Runs before fetch_jwks so a misconfigured deploy
doesn't make a wasted JWKS call.
- _build_oidc_redirect_uri simplifies to f"{redirect_base}/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback".
request parameter dropped; both call sites (handle_oidc_authorize,
handle_oidc_callback) updated.
- docs/oidc.md promotes TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE from "Recommended"
to "Required" with the security rationale.
This commit is contained in:
+14
-9
@@ -39,18 +39,18 @@ are set.
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| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_CLAIM` | No | — | ID token claim containing role/group values (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
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| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_ROLE_MAP` | No | — | Mapping from claim values to Turnstone role IDs (see [Role Mapping](#role-mapping)) |
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| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_PASSWORD_ENABLED` | No | `true` | Set to `false` to hide the password form and block all username/password logins (including admin). API tokens continue to work. |
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| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | No | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Recommended when running behind a reverse proxy. When unset, derived from the request Host header. |
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| `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` | Yes | — | Externally-reachable origin for the OIDC redirect URI (e.g. `https://app.example.com`). Without this, OIDC will refuse to start. The previous Host-header fallback was unsafe under permissive reverse proxies. |
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OIDC is enabled when all three required fields (issuer, client ID, client
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secret) are non-empty. If any is missing, OIDC is silently disabled and
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the login screen shows only the password form.
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All four required fields — issuer, client ID, client secret, and
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`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` — must be set. If any are missing OIDC
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is disabled at startup (an error is logged when only `redirect_base`
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is missing) and the login screen shows only the password form.
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### Reverse Proxy / Load Balancer
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### Redirect base (required)
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When Turnstone runs behind a reverse proxy, the internal `Host` header may
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not match the externally-reachable URL. Set `TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE`
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to the public origin so the redirect URI sent to the identity provider is
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correct:
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`TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE` pins the redirect URI sent to the identity
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provider to a known externally-visible origin. Set it to the public origin
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of your Turnstone deployment:
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```bash
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TURNSTONE_OIDC_REDIRECT_BASE=https://app.example.com
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@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ The resulting callback URL will be
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`https://app.example.com/v1/api/auth/oidc/callback` — register this as the
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authorized redirect URI in your identity provider.
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OIDC will refuse to start when this variable is unset. There is no
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Host-header fallback: a permissive reverse proxy or direct backend access
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would otherwise let an attacker spoof `Host` and steer the IdP redirect
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to a callback origin they control.
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### config.toml alternative
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```toml
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