Files
openclaw/src/plugin-sdk/security-runtime.ts
T
Jesse Merhi d7627d6f4c refactor(prompt): use plain inbound context labels and drop system-tag sanitizer (#112000)
* refactor(prompt): plain inbound context labels with a provenance marker

Replaces trust-worded inbound context labels ("(untrusted metadata)",
"(untrusted, for context)") with plain labels plus a fixed provenance
marker suffix appended to every OpenClaw-injected context header.

Detection keys on the marker, not label text, so strippers stay correct
across UI, TUI, replay, /trace segmentation, memory recall, and the Swift
chat preprocessor. Drops sanitizeInboundSystemTags in favor of the marker
boundary plus trusted system-prompt narration.

Renames the untrusted-named plugin SDK context identifiers to
channel-provenance names, keeping deprecated aliases registered for
removal after 2026-09-08.

Adds `openclaw doctor --fix` migrations that rewrite legacy inbound
labels in stored SQLite transcripts and purge legacy envelope-
contaminated LanceDB recall rows.

* fix(ci): resolve gate failures for plain inbound context labels

- doctor sqlite readers: open read-only connections via openNodeSqliteDatabase
  so the Kysely connection-boundary guardrail holds; unexport the now-internal
  transcript snapshot type (Knip unused-export gate).
- compat registry: split the record table into registry-records.ts and
  plugin-sdk-subpath-records.ts. The new compat record pushed registry.ts past
  the 700-line oxlint cap; suppressions are disallowed, so follow the existing
  sibling record-module pattern. Public exports and PluginCompatCode literals
  unchanged.
- acp-runtime test: assert current finalization behavior (newline normalization
  only). The bracket de-fang and System: rewrite it expected were removed with
  sanitizeInboundSystemTags; forged system lines are neutralized at the
  system-event queue, the single chokepoint feeding the System:-per-line render.
- regenerate docs_map and the plugin SDK API baseline manifest.

* fix(prompt): harden inbound context label migration and drop in-band sanitizer

Review follow-ups on the plain-label + provenance-marker change:

- Remove src/security/system-tags.ts. Rewriting inbound text to neutralize
  look-alike `System:`/`[System]` markers corrupted legitimate user text and is
  not a real injection boundary; role separation plus external-content wrapping
  is. Explicit product decision, recorded at the system-event queue.
- Narrow the LanceDB legacy-row purge so it cannot delete benign memories. It
  now requires a complete known legacy sentinel line, a legacy label followed by
  a fenced JSON body, or the complete legacy external-content header. The prior
  predicates matched ordinary prose such as `Notes (untrusted metadata):`, and
  deletion is irreversible.
- Make explicit-empty canonical ChannelStructuredContext win over the deprecated
  alias via a present/absent result instead of collapsing `[]` to undefined.
- Keep `\r?` in the active-memory doctor rule. It is the only rule spanning the
  header's line break, migrated assistant rows skip newline normalization, and
  without it the marked-header replace wins and the body strips to empty. Added
  a CRLF regression test.
- Fix stale comments that described removed behavior, and cover the Swift
  prose-block strip path.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WNzsPddQmxy9Y7jKD4wAxH
2026-07-27 11:27:53 +10:00

86 lines
2.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @deprecated Broad public SDK barrel. Prefer focused security/SSRF/secret
* subpaths and avoid adding new imports here.
*/
import { statRegularFileSync as inspectRegularFileSync } from "../infra/fs-safe.js";
/** Return whether a path resolves to a regular file, treating filesystem errors as missing. */
export function fileExists(filePath: string): boolean {
try {
return !inspectRegularFileSync(filePath).missing;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
export {
buildChannelMetadata,
buildUntrustedChannelMetadata,
} from "../security/channel-metadata.js";
export {
evaluateSupplementalContextVisibility,
filterSupplementalContextItems,
shouldIncludeSupplementalContext,
} from "../security/context-visibility.js";
export type { ContextVisibilityDecision } from "../security/context-visibility.js";
export {
expandAllowFromWithAccessGroups,
parseAccessGroupAllowFromEntry,
} from "./access-groups.js";
export { wrapExternalContent, wrapWebContent } from "../security/external-content.js";
export { compileSafeRegexDetailed } from "../security/safe-regex.js";
export type { SafeRegexRejectReason } from "../security/safe-regex.js";
export {
appendRegularFile,
FsSafeError,
openLocalFileSafely,
pathExists,
pathExistsSync,
readRegularFile,
resolveLocalPathFromRootsSync,
readRegularFileSync,
root,
statRegularFile,
statRegularFileSync,
writeExternalFileWithinRoot,
withTimeout,
} from "../infra/fs-safe.js";
export { extractErrorCode, formatErrorMessage } from "../infra/errors.js";
export { hasProxyEnvConfigured } from "../infra/net/proxy-env.js";
export { normalizeHostname } from "../infra/net/hostname.js";
export {
SsrFBlockedError,
isPrivateNetworkAllowedByPolicy,
matchesHostnameAllowlist,
resolvePinnedHostnameWithPolicy,
} from "../infra/net/ssrf.js";
export type { LookupFn, SsrFPolicy } from "../infra/net/ssrf.js";
export { isPathInside } from "../infra/path-guards.js";
export {
canonicalPathFromExistingAncestor,
findExistingAncestor,
resolveAbsolutePathForRead,
resolveAbsolutePathForWrite,
} from "../infra/fs-safe.js";
export { sanitizeUntrustedFileName } from "../infra/fs-safe-advanced.js";
export { privateFileStoreSync } from "../infra/private-file-store.js";
export { movePathWithCopyFallback, replaceFileAtomic } from "../infra/replace-file.js";
export { assertNoSymlinkParents, assertNoSymlinkParentsSync } from "../infra/fs-safe-advanced.js";
export { ensurePortAvailable } from "../infra/ports.js";
export {
resolveExistingPathsWithinRoot,
pathScope,
resolveStrictExistingPathsWithinRoot,
} from "../infra/root-paths.js";
export { resolvePreferredOpenClawTmpDir } from "../infra/tmp-openclaw-dir.js";
export { redactSensitiveText } from "../logging/redact.js";
export { safeEqualSecret } from "../security/secret-equal.js";
export { resolvePinnedMainDmOwnerFromAllowlist } from "../security/dm-policy-shared.js";