* fix(scripts): size the tsdown heap from the build's own cgroup budget The build heap probe only read the cgroup root (/sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max and the v1 equivalent). Those files exist only when the process runs in a namespaced container cgroup; under systemd the budget lives on the process's own slice, and the v2 root carries no limit at all. So every systemd-managed build found no limit, fell back to /proc/meminfo MemTotal, and took the full 12288 MB default heap regardless of its actual budget. Observed on a 15.4 GiB host: openclaw-main-update.service ran tsdown with NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size=12288 while its user@999.service slice was bounded at 5 GiB, reaching 3.2 GB RSS and 6.25 GB peak before the host began OOM-killing unrelated services. Resolve the limit from /proc/self/cgroup and walk that chain instead, reading memory.high alongside memory.max (memory.high throttles reclaim rather than failing allocation, so a heap above it stalls the build instead of OOM-ing), and take the tightest bound found. Root paths stay as the container fallback, and an explicitly injected path list still disables detection. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): resolve the build heap budget from the v1 memory controller too The slice walk only accepted the unified 0:: record, so a legacy or hybrid systemd host fell back to the root probe and kept taking host memory. One resolver now walks both hierarchies leaf-to-root, which makes the static root list its own depth-0 case and removes it. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): read cgroup controller mounts instead of assuming their paths v1 controllers can be co-mounted at the cgroup root, where memory.limit_in_bytes sits under the slice with no per-controller directory, so the hardcoded /sys/fs/cgroup/memory probe missed the budget and the build took the full 12288MB default. Mount points now come from mountinfo. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): translate cgroup records through the mount root mountinfo field 4 is the subtree a cgroupfs mount exposes. Under a container mount the /proc/self/cgroup record stays host-absolute, so walking it verbatim probed paths below the visible mount and the build fell back to host memory. Records now translate through the mount root before the walk. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): skip cgroup mounts that cannot represent this process Falling back to the mount root for a record outside the mount's subtree sized the build from an unrelated cgroup: an inherited namespace clamped the heap to the 2048MB floor from a foreign 1GiB limit. Non-representable mounts are now skipped, and the blind root probe only runs when no memory record exists. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): keep every cgroup mount view, not just the last one seen One hierarchy can be visible through several mounts and only some expose a subtree containing this process. Retaining only the last view dropped the budget whenever a non-representable bind view came later, sending the build back to host MemTotal. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): decode octal-escaped mountinfo paths before matching cgroups ClawSweeper P2 on7e64ad61f7: the cgroup resolver compared mountinfo's mount root and mount point verbatim. The kernel escapes space, tab, newline, and backslash in those two fields, so any cgroup mounted under such a path never matched, the bounded slice was missed, and heap sizing silently fell back to host memory. Decode both fields before matching. The decoder lives in scripts/lib beside the other shared script helpers rather than inline, so the scripts program has one copy rather than a new ad hoc one. Regression test fails pre-fix: a v2 mount at "/sys/fs/cgroup\040dir" with a 5 GiB memory.high yields --max-old-space-size=12288 (host fallback) before the fix and 4352 after. Follow-up, deliberately not bundled here: src/infra/sqlite-wal.ts, src/commands/doctor-state-integrity.ts, and src/plugins/bundled-source-overlays.ts each carry their own private copy of this same decoder. Consolidating all four into @openclaw/normalization-core is the right end state, but it touches a shared package plus three core modules and belongs in its own reviewable change. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): resolve cgroup-namespace-relative records to their mount ClawSweeper P1 ond6fe49dd3f: inside a cgroup namespace /proc/self/cgroup reports the namespace root ("0::/") while mountinfo field 4 stays the host subtree the cgroupfs was mounted from ("/docker/<id>"). relativeCgroupPath then found no prefix match and returned null; because a memory record had already been seen, the root probe was skipped and the build fell back to host MemTotal. A constrained container therefore missed its own budget entirely. That namespace root is exactly what the mount exposes at its mount point, so it resolves to "/" rather than failing closed. Regression test fails pre-fix: a "0::/" record against a /docker/2f1a9c mount root with a 5 GiB memory.max yields --max-old-space-size=12288 before the fix and 4352 after. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): reject inherited cgroup mount views instead of guessing ClawSweeper P1 onb4d200c5d2: the previous commit resolved a namespace-relative record against any mount root, including the inherited views cgroup_namespaces(7) documents, whose field-4 root reads "/..". Which cgroup such a view exposes is not derivable from mountinfo, so probing it can size the build from an unrelated cgroup's limit. Reject non-canonical mount roots outright. An undecidable view now falls back to host sizing, which is current main's behavior, rather than silently adopting the wrong budget. Regression test covers the "/.." inherited mount: it must yield host MemTotal sizing, not the 5 GiB limit sitting behind that mount. Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(scripts): fail closed on namespace-root records against non-root mounts ClawSweeper P1 on731d3bbc8e: a "0::/" record does not prove that a mount rooted at some other subtree exposes this process's cgroup. Resolving that pair could cap the build heap from an unrelated cgroup's limit. Return no mapping for it. An undecidable pair now falls back to host sizing, which is current main's behavior, so the failure mode is a missed optimisation rather than a wrong budget. The "/.." inherited-mount rejection stays; this covers the broader ambiguous mapping it did not. The namespace-relative test is repointed accordingly: an unrelated mounted subtree must yield host sizing, not that subtree's limit. Net production change: none (4 lines swapped). Co-authored-by: jesse-merhi <79823012+jesse-merhi@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(build): cap tsdown heap to the real budget and refuse hosts that cannot build The 2048MB floor was applied on top of a discovered cgroup limit, so a small container was handed a heap larger than it could honour. Measured in real cgroups, that does not OOM-kill, it thrashes: a 1500MiB container sat pinned at its ceiling for 10 minutes with oom_kill at 0, never finished the second of eleven invocations, and starved every other process on the host. Cap to the discovered budget, then refuse up front when that budget cannot hold the build. The threshold is the whole-build peak, not a single pass: a full eleven-invocation build peaks at 4730MiB, so a 5GiB slice completes while 4GiB and 2816MiB slices are both killed partway through the third invocation. The refusal runs before any output is cleaned, so a host that cannot rebuild does not also lose the build it has. * fix(build): harden tsdown heap admission * fix(build): guard the default tsdown plan * fix(build): preserve runtime-only Docker builds * fix(build): admit only declaration cache misses * fix(build): scope heap admission to real budgets * fix(build): guard direct unified declarations * fix(build): guard the canonical tsdown config * fix(build): satisfy cache planning lint * fix(gateway): release empty orphan leases * fix(build): cap cgroup budget by host memory * fix(build): serialize the canonical tsdown config * test(build): freeze host memory fixtures * fix(build): honor cgroup v1 soft limits * fix(build): respect cgroup v1 hierarchy mode * fix(build): admit unified runtime plans * fix(build): admit every unified runtime path * fix(build): collect repeated tsdown filters * fix(build): ignore cgroup v1 soft limits * fix(build): use explicit heap override as opt-in * refactor(build): simplify memory admission * fix(build): harden constrained build recovery * fix(ci): prebuild runtime before real CLI shards * fix(build): honor runtime-only runner environment * fix(ci): satisfy tooling shard lint
4.7 KiB
summary, doc-schema-version, read_when, title
| summary | doc-schema-version | read_when | title | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Run OpenClaw Gateway 24/7 on a Hetzner VPS with Docker | 1 |
|
Hetzner |
Run a persistent OpenClaw Gateway on a Debian or Ubuntu Hetzner VPS. This page covers Hetzner provisioning, host security, and access; the shared Docker VM runtime page owns container setup, persistence, custom binaries, verification, and updates.
Treat the VPS as stateful infrastructure. Keep personal browser, Apple, Google, and password-manager profiles off a company-shared runtime. If users do not share one trust boundary, split them across Gateways, hosts, or OS users. See Gateway security and VPS hosting.
What you need
- A Hetzner VPS with root access
- SSH access from your laptop
- A Hetzner Cloud Firewall or host firewall
- Model and optional channel credentials
- About 20 minutes
Provision and secure the VPS
In Hetzner Cloud, create a Debian or Ubuntu server with at least 6 GB RAM for a source image build. On a smaller server, use the official pre-built image described in [Docker VM runtime](/install/docker-vm-runtime). Add your SSH key during provisioning.Connect as root:
```bash
ssh root@<vps-ip>
```
Attach a Hetzner Cloud Firewall that allows TCP 22 from your administrative
network. Do not add a public inbound rule for TCP 18789; the tunnel below
reaches that port through SSH.
If you also use UFW on the host, allow SSH before enabling it:
```bash
apt-get update
apt-get install -y ufw
ufw allow OpenSSH
ufw enable
ufw status verbose
```
If you intentionally publish the Gateway through a reverse proxy or
tailnet, follow [Gateway security](/gateway/security) instead of opening the
container port directly to `0.0.0.0/0`.
```bash
apt-get update
apt-get install -y git curl ca-certificates
curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
docker --version
docker compose version
```
Configure the Docker runtime
On the VPS, follow Docker VM runtime from Before you begin through Verify and administer the Gateway. The maintained setup script uses these root-owned host paths by default:
export OPENCLAW_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.openclaw"
export OPENCLAW_WORKSPACE_DIR="$HOME/.openclaw/workspace"
export OPENCLAW_AUTH_PROFILE_SECRET_DIR="$HOME/.openclaw-auth-profile-secrets"
If a source build ends with Killed or exit code 137, resize the server before
retrying. See the shared guide for binary baking, the complete persistence map,
and the update command.
Access the Control UI
First confirm the VPS SSH daemon allows local port forwarding. In
/etc/ssh/sshd_config, use:
AllowTcpForwarding local
local permits ssh -L from your laptop while blocking remote forwards from
the server. After changing it, validate and restart SSH:
sshd -t
systemctl restart ssh
From your laptop, open the tunnel and leave it running:
ssh -N -L 18789:127.0.0.1:18789 root@<vps-ip>
Open http://127.0.0.1:18789/ and paste the Gateway token from the VPS .env.
To reprint the dashboard URL or approve a browser device, run on the VPS:
cd openclaw
docker compose run --rm openclaw-cli dashboard --no-open
docker compose run --rm openclaw-cli devices list
docker compose run --rm openclaw-cli devices approve <requestId>
If the tunnel fails with administratively prohibited, recheck
AllowTcpForwarding and the SSH service configuration. A cloud firewall only
needs to admit SSH; it does not need to admit port 18789.
Infrastructure as code
For teams that prefer Terraform, community-maintained projects provide remote state, cloud-init provisioning, deployment and backup scripts, firewall hardening, and SSH tunnel setup:
These repositories are community-maintained. Report issues and contribute in their respective repositories.