mirror of
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw.git
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82d1a03f25
* refactor(agents): require explicit roster defaults * feat(onboard): create named first roster agent * refactor(agents): remove runtime main fallbacks * style(agents): apply roster refactor formatting * refactor(agents): finish roster-only runtime sweep * fix(doctor): migrate legacy main session sqlite * fix(doctor): harden roster session migrations * fix(onboard): commit first agent atomically * fix(config): support empty-roster analysis * fix(agents): preserve legacy main state during creation * fix(setup): materialize baseline agent roster * fix(agents): harden legacy default transfer recovery * fix(agents): simplify roster-only legacy compatibility * fix(agents): preserve staged first-agent entries * fix(config): migrate persisted implicit-main rosters * fix(config): preserve staged empty rosters * fix(agents): finalize roster-only upgrade paths * fix(sessions): close legacy main migration outcomes * fix(config): migrate legacy roster markers at load * fix(sessions): preserve roster upgrade history * refactor(sessions): restore lean legacy main compatibility * fix(setup): prepare first-agent credentials before publish * fix(config): stabilize roster snapshot migration * refactor(sessions): shrink legacy main compatibility * fix(agents): restore roster compatibility fidelity * fix(sessions): preserve divergent legacy history * refactor(agents): narrow roster-only scope * fix(config): isolate roster migration * test(agents): align roster-only fixtures * fix(agents): keep main agent undeletable * fix(agents): harden roster migration invariants * fix(agents): close setup and audit scope gaps * fix(cron): scope session reaper throttles by agent * fix(agents): preserve scoped owner precedence * fix(config): preserve authored config ownership * fix(setup): keep default workspace and roster in sync * fix(setup): preserve default entry workspace on bare runs * fix(agents): adapt roster rebase to keyed entries * fix(agents): honor both roster representations * fix(agents): route roster reads through shared helpers * fix(config): preserve canonical roster writes * fix(cron): resolve dynamic default for session reaper * fix(agents): close dynamic default migration gaps * fix(agents): align scoped session ownership * fix(sessions): preserve legacy main directory casing * fix(agents): align cron and legacy auth ownership * fix(setup): provision the committed default workspace * fix(cron): align scoped ownership and reaping * fix(cron): treat blank agent ids as absent * fix(cron): retain configured session-store owners * fix(agents): repair roster-aware CI boundaries * fix(cron): preserve scoped ownership resolution * fix(agents): preserve rosterless maintenance paths * fix(agents): propagate roster ownership through runtime boundaries * fix(agents): preserve roster ownership across runtime paths * fix(agents): harden roster diagnostics and legacy routing * fix(agents): remove redundant diagnostic import * test(agents): type CLI policy fixture explicitly * fix(config): preserve canonical roster mutation identity * fix(doctor): read canonical agent rosters consistently * fix(config): resolve compound roster unsets safely * fix(config): finalize main-session reconciliation * fix(doctor): read canonical session state safely * fix(sessions): preserve current visibility alias * fix(config): track roster include provenance * test(config): type roster provenance cases * fix(config): refine roster include ownership * fix(agents): preserve staged roster invariants * test(config): align fixtures with explicit roster ownership * test(node-host): preserve optional plan typing * fix(config): preserve authored roster projections * test(config): keep raw roster fixtures explicit * test(config): normalize rosters at runtime fixtures * fix(config): protect authored roster ownership * fix(agents): require explicit session ownership * fix(agents): enforce scoped roster ownership * fix(sessions): merge fixed-store agent partitions * fix(agents): harden roster ownership boundaries * fix(config): reject ambiguous roster projections * fix(sessions): preserve persisted store ownership * fix(sessions): keep collision diagnostics additive * fix(security): scan malformed roster workspaces * test(config): align snapshot fixtures after rebase * test(agents): use explicit roster fixtures * fix(config): harden roster diagnostic boundaries * fix(sessions): isolate fixed-store agent databases * test(agents): type malformed default markers * refactor(sessions): extract store collision resolution * test(system-agent): split oversized setup coverage * style(system-agent): format split setup suite * fix(sessions): preserve promoted store ownership * fix(sessions): derive scoped owner before target * fix(sessions): preserve explicit sqlite ownership * fix(agents): restore roster compatibility across CI * fix(agents): enforce roster-owned runtime boundaries * fix(agents): satisfy default lookup lint * test(sessions): split known-owner coverage * fix(state): satisfy path identity lint * fix(agents): preserve malformed roster safety boundaries * fix(agents): restore roster compatibility at runtime boundaries * fix(config): satisfy roster boundary type checks * fix(agents): preserve roster ownership across runtime probes Setup inference probes now execute as the configured roster owner. Malformed agent-prefixed session rows are intentionally omitted by the fail-closed visibility contract rather than normalized by tests. * fix(agents): satisfy session list owner lint * fix(agents): preserve roster-owned runtime boundaries Restore shared logical rows for exact SQLite session locators while keeping their physical database owner separate. The ownership regression test now constructs an explicit sole-owner database directly instead of relying on first-touch capture, matching the intentional shared-store contract. * fix(sessions): preserve multiply owned exact stores * fix(sessions): restore runtime owner boundaries Keep incognito sentinels agent-owned, fold default-agent approvals into the global snapshot, and preserve the configless legacy-main CLI policy fallback. Also repair the existing CLI watchdog test lifecycle so the compact shard observes its timeout without an unawaited assertion or async timer stall; product behavior is unchanged by that test-only fix. * test(ci): align owner-scoped fixtures These assertions are unchanged. The fixtures now declare the intended non-default runner, expose the session-key constant imported by production status code, and select the main approvals bucket explicitly on Windows. * fix(agents): close final roster ownership gaps
451 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
451 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
/** Tests system.run allowlist planning, output truncation, and argv resolution. */
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import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { expectDefined } from "@openclaw/normalization-core";
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { resolveExecApprovalsFromFile, type ExecCommandSegment } from "../infra/exec-approvals.js";
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import { planShellAuthorization } from "../infra/exec-authorization-plan.js";
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import { buildAuthorizedShellCommandFromPlan } from "../infra/exec-authorization-render.js";
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import { resolveExecSafeBinRuntimePolicy } from "../infra/exec-safe-bin-runtime-policy.js";
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import {
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evaluateSystemRunAllowlist,
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resolveSystemRunExecArgv,
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} from "./invoke-system-run-allowlist.js";
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function resolveAllowlistApprovals() {
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return resolveExecApprovalsFromFile({
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file: {
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version: 1,
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defaults: {
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security: "allowlist",
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ask: "off",
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askFallback: "deny",
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},
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},
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});
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}
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function resolveWindowsShellExecArgv(segment: ExecCommandSegment) {
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return resolveSystemRunExecArgv({
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plannedAllowlistArgv: undefined,
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argv: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "safe --version"],
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security: "allowlist",
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approvals: resolveAllowlistApprovals(),
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safeBins: new Set(),
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safeBinProfiles: {},
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trustedSafeBinDirs: new Set(),
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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isWindows: true,
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policy: {
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approvedByAsk: false,
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analysisOk: true,
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allowlistSatisfied: true,
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},
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shellCommand: "safe --version",
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segments: [segment],
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segmentSatisfiedBy: ["allowlist"],
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authorizationPlan: undefined,
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cwd: "C:\\workspace",
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env: undefined,
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});
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}
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function runExecutable(params: {
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argv: string[];
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cwd: string;
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env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
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}): Promise<{ exitCode: number | null; stdout: string }> {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const child = spawn(
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expectDefined(params.argv[0], "params.argv[0] test invariant"),
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params.argv.slice(1),
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{
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cwd: params.cwd,
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env: params.env,
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stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
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windowsHide: true,
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},
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);
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const stdout: Buffer[] = [];
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child.stdout.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => stdout.push(chunk));
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child.once("error", reject);
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child.once("close", (exitCode) => {
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resolve({ exitCode, stdout: Buffer.concat(stdout).toString("utf8") });
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});
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});
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}
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describe("resolveSystemRunExecArgv", () => {
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it("pins Windows shell execution to the resolved allowlisted executable", async () => {
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const trustedExecutable = "C:\\trusted-bin\\safe.exe";
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const result = await resolveWindowsShellExecArgv({
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raw: "safe --version",
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argv: ["safe", "--version"],
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resolution: {
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execution: {
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rawExecutable: "safe",
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resolvedPath: trustedExecutable,
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executableName: "safe.exe",
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},
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policy: {
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rawExecutable: "safe",
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resolvedPath: trustedExecutable,
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executableName: "safe.exe",
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},
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},
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});
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expect(result).toEqual([trustedExecutable, "--version"]);
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});
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it("preserves unresolved Windows shell argv authorized by a bare wildcard", async () => {
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const result = await resolveWindowsShellExecArgv({
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raw: "safe --version",
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argv: ["safe", "--version"],
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resolution: null,
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});
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expect(result).toEqual(["safe", "--version"]);
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});
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it("fails closed for Windows opaque shell transports before inner argv rewrite", async () => {
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const trustedExecutable = "C:\\trusted-bin\\safe-tool.exe";
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const result = await resolveSystemRunExecArgv({
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plannedAllowlistArgv: undefined,
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argv: ["nu.exe", "--commands", "safe-tool arg"],
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security: "allowlist",
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approvals: resolveAllowlistApprovals(),
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safeBins: new Set(),
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safeBinProfiles: {},
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trustedSafeBinDirs: new Set(),
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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isWindows: true,
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policy: {
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approvedByAsk: false,
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analysisOk: true,
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allowlistSatisfied: true,
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},
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shellCommand: "safe-tool arg",
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segments: [
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{
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raw: "safe-tool arg",
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argv: ["safe-tool", "arg"],
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resolution: {
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execution: {
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rawExecutable: "safe-tool",
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resolvedPath: trustedExecutable,
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executableName: "safe-tool.exe",
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},
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policy: {
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rawExecutable: "safe-tool",
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resolvedPath: trustedExecutable,
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executableName: "safe-tool.exe",
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},
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},
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},
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],
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segmentSatisfiedBy: ["allowlist"],
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authorizationPlan: undefined,
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cwd: "C:\\workspace",
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env: undefined,
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});
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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});
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it("fails closed when the Windows shell execution plan is blocked", async () => {
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const result = await resolveWindowsShellExecArgv({
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raw: "safe --version",
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argv: ["safe", "--version"],
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resolution: {
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policyBlocked: true,
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execution: {
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rawExecutable: "safe",
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executableName: "safe",
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},
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policy: {
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rawExecutable: "safe",
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executableName: "safe",
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},
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},
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});
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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});
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it.runIf(process.platform === "win32")(
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"executes the allowlisted path instead of a workspace shadow executable",
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async () => {
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const fixtureRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-windows-shadow-"));
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const trustedBin = path.join(fixtureRoot, "trusted-bin");
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const workspace = path.join(fixtureRoot, "workspace");
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fs.mkdirSync(trustedBin);
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fs.mkdirSync(workspace);
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const trustedExecutable = path.join(trustedBin, "safe.exe");
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const shadowExecutable = path.join(workspace, "safe.exe");
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const systemRoot = process.env.SystemRoot ?? process.env.WINDIR ?? "C:\\Windows";
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fs.copyFileSync(path.join(systemRoot, "System32", "cmd.exe"), trustedExecutable);
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fs.copyFileSync(path.join(systemRoot, "System32", "where.exe"), shadowExecutable);
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const env = {
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...process.env,
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PATH: `${trustedBin}${path.delimiter}${process.env.PATH ?? ""}`,
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PATHEXT: process.env.PATHEXT ?? ".COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD",
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};
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const shellCommand = "safe /d /s /c echo TRUSTED_EXECUTABLE";
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const commandTail = ["/d", "/s", "/c", "echo", "TRUSTED_EXECUTABLE"];
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try {
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const bareResult = await runExecutable({
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argv: ["safe", ...commandTail],
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cwd: workspace,
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env,
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});
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expect(bareResult.exitCode).not.toBe(0);
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expect(bareResult.stdout).not.toContain("TRUSTED_EXECUTABLE");
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const approvals = resolveExecApprovalsFromFile({
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agentId: "main",
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file: {
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version: 1,
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defaults: { security: "allowlist", ask: "off", askFallback: "deny" },
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agents: { main: { allowlist: [{ pattern: trustedExecutable }] } },
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},
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});
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const analysis = await evaluateSystemRunAllowlist({
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shellCommand,
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argv: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", shellCommand],
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approvals,
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security: "allowlist",
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safeBins: new Set(),
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safeBinProfiles: {},
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trustedSafeBinDirs: new Set(),
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cwd: workspace,
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env,
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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});
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expect(analysis.analysisOk).toBe(true);
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expect(analysis.allowlistSatisfied).toBe(true);
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const execArgv = await resolveSystemRunExecArgv({
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plannedAllowlistArgv: undefined,
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argv: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", shellCommand],
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security: "allowlist",
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approvals,
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safeBins: new Set(),
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safeBinProfiles: {},
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trustedSafeBinDirs: new Set(),
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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isWindows: true,
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policy: {
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approvedByAsk: false,
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analysisOk: analysis.analysisOk,
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allowlistSatisfied: analysis.allowlistSatisfied,
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},
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shellCommand,
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segments: analysis.segments,
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segmentSatisfiedBy: analysis.segmentSatisfiedBy,
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authorizationPlan: analysis.authorizationPlan,
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cwd: workspace,
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env,
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});
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expect(execArgv?.[0]).toBe(fs.realpathSync(trustedExecutable));
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const fixedResult = await runExecutable({ argv: execArgv ?? [], cwd: workspace, env });
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expect(fixedResult.exitCode).toBe(0);
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expect(fixedResult.stdout).toContain("TRUSTED_EXECUTABLE");
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(fixtureRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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},
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);
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it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
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"fails closed when shell rewriting has no authorization plan",
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async () => {
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const env = { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" };
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const result = await resolveSystemRunExecArgv({
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plannedAllowlistArgv: undefined,
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argv: ["/bin/sh", "-lc", "head -c 16"],
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security: "allowlist",
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approvals: resolveAllowlistApprovals(),
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safeBins: new Set(),
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safeBinProfiles: {},
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trustedSafeBinDirs: new Set(),
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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isWindows: false,
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policy: {
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approvedByAsk: false,
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analysisOk: true,
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allowlistSatisfied: true,
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},
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shellCommand: "head -c 16",
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segments: [],
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segmentSatisfiedBy: ["safeBins"],
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authorizationPlan: undefined,
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cwd: undefined,
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env,
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});
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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},
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);
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it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
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"returns rebuilt shell argv when the authorization plan supports rewriting",
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async () => {
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const env = { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" };
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const authorizationPlan = await planShellAuthorization({
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command: "head -c 16",
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env,
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platform: process.platform,
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});
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expect(authorizationPlan.ok).toBe(true);
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if (!authorizationPlan.ok) {
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throw new Error(authorizationPlan.reason);
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}
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const safeBinPolicy = resolveExecSafeBinRuntimePolicy({
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global: { safeBins: ["head"] },
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});
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const segmentSatisfiedBy: ["safeBins"] = ["safeBins"];
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const expectedCommand = buildAuthorizedShellCommandFromPlan({
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plan: authorizationPlan,
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mode: "safeBins",
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segmentSatisfiedBy,
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});
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expect(expectedCommand.ok).toBe(true);
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if (!expectedCommand.ok) {
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throw new Error(expectedCommand.reason);
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}
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const result = await resolveSystemRunExecArgv({
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plannedAllowlistArgv: undefined,
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argv: ["/bin/sh", "-lc", "head -c 16"],
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security: "allowlist",
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approvals: resolveAllowlistApprovals(),
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safeBins: safeBinPolicy.safeBins,
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safeBinProfiles: safeBinPolicy.safeBinProfiles,
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trustedSafeBinDirs: safeBinPolicy.trustedSafeBinDirs,
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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isWindows: false,
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policy: {
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approvedByAsk: false,
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analysisOk: true,
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allowlistSatisfied: true,
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},
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shellCommand: "head -c 16",
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segments: authorizationPlan.groups.flatMap((group) =>
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group.candidates.map((candidate) => candidate.sourceSegment),
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),
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segmentSatisfiedBy,
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authorizationPlan,
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cwd: undefined,
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env,
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});
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expect(result).not.toBeNull();
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expect(result?.[0]).toBe("/bin/sh");
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expect(result?.[2]).toBe(expectedCommand.command);
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},
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);
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it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
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"fails closed instead of rewriting opaque shell transports",
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async () => {
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const env = { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" };
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const authorizationPlan = await planShellAuthorization({
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command: "head -c 16",
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env,
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platform: process.platform,
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});
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expect(authorizationPlan.ok).toBe(true);
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if (!authorizationPlan.ok) {
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throw new Error(authorizationPlan.reason);
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}
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const safeBinPolicy = resolveExecSafeBinRuntimePolicy({
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global: { safeBins: ["head"] },
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});
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const result = await resolveSystemRunExecArgv({
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plannedAllowlistArgv: undefined,
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argv: ["nu", "--commands", "head -c 16"],
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security: "allowlist",
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approvals: resolveAllowlistApprovals(),
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safeBins: safeBinPolicy.safeBins,
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safeBinProfiles: safeBinPolicy.safeBinProfiles,
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trustedSafeBinDirs: safeBinPolicy.trustedSafeBinDirs,
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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isWindows: false,
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policy: {
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approvedByAsk: false,
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analysisOk: true,
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allowlistSatisfied: true,
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},
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shellCommand: "head -c 16",
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segments: authorizationPlan.groups.flatMap((group) =>
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group.candidates.map((candidate) => candidate.sourceSegment),
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),
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segmentSatisfiedBy: ["safeBins"],
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authorizationPlan,
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cwd: undefined,
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env,
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});
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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},
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);
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it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")(
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"fails closed when opaque shell transports use inner allowlist authorization",
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async () => {
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const env = { PATH: "/usr/bin:/bin" };
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const authorizationPlan = await planShellAuthorization({
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command: "head -c 16",
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env,
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platform: process.platform,
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});
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expect(authorizationPlan.ok).toBe(true);
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if (!authorizationPlan.ok) {
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throw new Error(authorizationPlan.reason);
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}
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const result = await resolveSystemRunExecArgv({
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plannedAllowlistArgv: undefined,
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argv: ["nu", "--commands", "head -c 16"],
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security: "allowlist",
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approvals: resolveAllowlistApprovals(),
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safeBins: new Set(),
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safeBinProfiles: {},
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trustedSafeBinDirs: new Set(),
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skillBins: [],
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autoAllowSkills: false,
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isWindows: false,
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policy: {
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approvedByAsk: false,
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analysisOk: true,
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allowlistSatisfied: true,
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},
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shellCommand: "head -c 16",
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segments: authorizationPlan.groups.flatMap((group) =>
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group.candidates.map((candidate) => candidate.sourceSegment),
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),
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|
segmentSatisfiedBy: ["allowlist"],
|
|
authorizationPlan,
|
|
cwd: undefined,
|
|
env,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
expect(result).toBeNull();
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
});
|