--- summary: "macOS IPC architecture for OpenClaw app, gateway node transport, and PeekabooBridge" read_when: - Editing IPC contracts or menu bar app IPC title: "macOS IPC" --- # OpenClaw macOS IPC architecture A local Unix socket connects the node host service to the macOS app for exec approvals and `system.run`. An `openclaw-mac` debug CLI (`apps/macos/Sources/OpenClawMacCLI`) exists for discovery/connect checks; agent actions still flow through the Gateway WebSocket and `node.invoke`. The node-backed `computer.act` path runs embedded Peekaboo automation in-process; standalone Peekaboo clients use PeekabooBridge. ## Goals - Single GUI app instance that owns all TCC-facing work (notifications, screen recording, mic, speech, AppleScript). - A small surface for automation: Gateway + node commands, in-process `computer.act`, plus PeekabooBridge for standalone UI automation clients. - Predictable permissions: always the same signed bundle ID, launched by launchd, so TCC grants stick. ## How it works ### Gateway + node transport - The app runs the Gateway (local mode) and connects to it as a node. - Agent actions are performed via `node.invoke` (e.g. `system.run`, `system.notify`, `canvas.present`). - Node commands include `canvas.present`, `canvas.hide`, `canvas.navigate`, `camera.list`, `camera.snap`, `camera.clip`, `camera.ptz.status`, `camera.ptz.control`, `screen.snapshot`, `screen.record`, `computer.act`, `system.run`, and `system.notify`. - The node reports a `permissions` map so agents can see whether screen, camera, microphone, speech, automation, or accessibility access is available. ### Node service + app IPC - A headless node host service connects to the Gateway WebSocket. - `system.run` requests are forwarded to the macOS app over a local Unix socket (`ExecApprovalsSocket.swift`). - The app performs the exec in UI context, prompts if needed, and returns output. - The socket owns the request lifetime. Node cancellation or a socket deadline closes the response reader, cancelling the native prompt or command and its process group. Stopping the app's exec server also cancels and drains active requests before releasing its socket lease. - Clients still half-close their **write** side after sending one JSONL request. That normal request EOF does not cancel execution; the response reader remains open until the result arrives. Diagram (SCI): ```text Agent -> Gateway -> Node Service (WS) | IPC (UDS + token + HMAC + TTL) v Mac App (UI + TCC + system.run) ``` ### PeekabooBridge (UI automation) - The built-in agent `computer` tool does **not** use this socket. A paired macOS node fulfills `computer.act` in the app process with embedded Peekaboo services. - UI automation uses a separate UNIX socket (`~/Library/Application Support/OpenClaw/`) and the PeekabooBridge JSON protocol. - Host preference order (client-side): Peekaboo.app -> Claude.app -> OpenClaw.app -> local execution. - Security: bridge hosts require the exact signed Peekaboo client bundle identifier and Peekaboo's canonical current/legacy release signer set; a DEBUG-only same-UID escape hatch is guarded by `PEEKABOO_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_SOCKET_CLIENTS=1` (Peekaboo convention). - See: [PeekabooBridge usage](/platforms/mac/peekaboo) for details. ## Operational flows - Restart/rebuild: `scripts/restart-mac.sh` kills existing instances, rebuilds via Swift, repackages, and relaunches. It auto-detects an available signing identity and falls back to `--no-sign` if none is found; pass `--sign` to require signing (fails if no key is available) or `--no-sign` to force the unsigned path. An explicit `SIGN_IDENTITY` is preserved through packaging; otherwise `scripts/codesign-mac-app.sh` auto-detects the certificate. - Single instance: the app checks `NSWorkspace.runningApplications` for a duplicate bundle ID and exits if more than one instance is found (`isDuplicateInstance()` in `MenuBar.swift`). ## Hardening notes - Prefer requiring a TeamID match for all privileged surfaces. - PeekabooBridge: `PEEKABOO_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_SOCKET_CLIENTS=1` (DEBUG-only) may allow same-UID callers for local development. - All communication remains local-only; no network sockets are exposed. - TCC prompts originate only from the GUI app bundle; keep the signed bundle ID stable across rebuilds. - Exec approvals socket hardening: file mode `0600`, shared token stored in the `exec_approvals_config` row of `state/openclaw.sqlite`, peer-UID check (`getpeereid`), HMAC-SHA256 challenge/response, and a short TTL on requests. ## Related - [macOS app](/platforms/macos) - [macOS IPC flow (Exec approvals)](/tools/exec-approvals-advanced#macos-ipc-flow)