* feat(secrets): agent-requested credentials the model never sees
The new main-session secrets tool lets the agent request a credential by
name: the human enters the value in a masked question card (Control UI,
/ask/<id> deep link, iOS/macOS/Android), and the gateway diverts the
answer straight into the shared secret store at question.resolve. The
record, broadcast, waitAnswer, tool result, transcript, and model context
only ever carry a synthetic stored marker.
- protocol: additive secretStore binding, secretStoreExisting replacement
metadata, and resolve-time secretStoreAllowedHosts (since 2026.8)
- gateway: store-bound question validation, admin-gated minting (blocks
questions-scope self-answer escalation past secrets.store.set), shared
redaction-first store write service reused by secrets.store.set
- tool: secrets request/list/delete; write-only by design, delete carries
verified agent runtime identity; channel delivery is link-only so chat
text is never captured as a secret
- Control UI: masked composer card with requester identity, store banner,
editable allowed hosts, replacement warning, retry-on-validation-error,
a standalone /ask/<id> page, and a named startup-JS baseline bump
- mobile: SecureField / password transformation for isSecret questions,
no answer echo in terminal summaries; new native string registered in
the locale-refresh inventory (generated artifacts stay workflow-owned)
- regression: claimed harness secret input stays out of session transcripts
Live-proven on an isolated dev gateway: real model turn, masked entry via
Playwright, value present only in secret_store_entries, absent from every
transcript, log, and the DOM.
* chore(protocol): regenerate protocol models and tool display
* fix(cli): read image string options through a typed helper
PR #129463 added four commander option narrowings in image.ts without
SAFETY coverage, leaving the assertion-safety ratchet red (21 > 17) for
every branch on current main. Replace the casts with a typeof-checked
read so the assertions are removed rather than annotated; each value is
still validated by its normalizer. SAFETY comments cannot work in this
file: the ratchet's raw scanner never rescans template tokens, so
comments after the first substitution template are unreadable to it.
* chore(protocol): refresh Swift models against current main
* chore(i18n): re-baseline the native inventory on current main
* docs(secrets): state the default-on tool policy and how to disable it
* fix(secrets): tell the model what the store actually does
The shipped tool description named the three actions and nothing else,
and no parameter carried a description. The model could not tell that
request blocks a human, that reason is shown to that human, what secret
and env select, or - the silent-failure case - that a secret stored with
no allowedHosts can never be substituted, so a successful request could
produce a permanently unusable credential. Move the description to the
presets module beside ask_user and document every parameter.
* refactor(agents): share one blocking-question lifecycle between tools
ask_user and secrets each carried their own registration, wait, and
cancel logic, and they had diverged: ask_user recovers an answer that
lands between its wait timeout and the cancel, while secrets discarded
it and reported no_answer even though the Gateway had already stored the
credential. One shared canceller and answer reader fixes that race for
both, folds the two divergent gateway-call types into one, and drops two
type assertions in favour of the canonical record guard (ask_user's
assertion baseline shrinks 11 -> 8).
Net +49 production lines: the shared module costs more than the
duplication it removes, and buys the correctness fix plus a single owner
for question lifecycle.
* fix(ui): keep the allowed-hosts field readable as an input
Main's composer restructure moved the free-text input styling into the
option-row context, so the store-request hosts field - which sits outside
a row - lost its border and read as static text. It is the one field the
operator is meant to review and edit before releasing a credential, so
give it its own border and focus ring.
* fix(secrets): close two credential-boundary holes in agent requests
Requests are now protected-secret only. list renders env values, so an
agent could request kind=env, watch a human type it into a masked box
under a no-visibility promise, then read it straight back; the tool text
even claimed values are never returned. Environment values stay operator
-set in Settings or the CLI, where they are agent-readable by design.
Store-bound questions are also bound to the run that requested them. The
resolve path authorized only the answering client, so a terminated or
replaced agent run could still have a credential written on its behalf -
the recorded runId was provenance, not closure-bound authority. Minting
now requires a runId and resolution revalidates that exact live run
immediately before the store write, with no await in between, failing
closed as QUESTION_REQUESTER_INACTIVE.
Both reported by ClawSweeper as P1 credential-boundary findings.
* feat(secrets): add opt-in traffic allowlist to the secret egress proxy
Add secrets.egressProxy.allowedHosts: when present, the egress proxy
refuses non-sentinel requests and CONNECT tunnels to hosts outside the
effective allowed set (configured list, hosts bound to the run's
registered secrets, and bypassHosts) with a typed host-not-allowed
refusal naming the remediation. Empty array is lockdown; omitting the
key keeps the previous unrestricted behavior. Sentinel substitution,
per-secret destination binding, proxy auth, and bypass tunnels are
unchanged; the allowlist is defense in depth for cooperating traffic
since bypass-surviving sentinels remain the primary defense.
* fix(secrets): validate egress proxy allowlist hostnames at the config boundary
Extract the exact-host contract from the secret store into a canonical
normalizeExactAllowedHost helper and validate secrets.egressProxy
allowedHosts and bypassHosts entries through it. Schemes, ports,
wildcards, and malformed hostnames are now rejected when config is
accepted instead of throwing during egress-proxy startup, which the
runtime normalizer did for both keys before this change.
* fix(doctor): repair unusable secret egress proxy host entries
Tightening the egress-proxy host schema can invalidate an existing
config: a disabled proxy with a malformed bypassHosts entry loaded fine
before and now fails validation, which exits the Gateway with code 78.
Add the matching doctor --fix migration. Invalid entries never
functioned (the proxy's own hostname normalizer threw on them at
startup), so they are dropped rather than canonicalized; enabled and
valid entries are preserved untouched.
* fix(onboard): honor secret-input-mode ref for the generated gateway token
`openclaw onboard --secret-input-mode ref` was silently ignored for
`gateway.auth.token`: onboarding generated the token and wrote it into
`openclaw.json` as a plaintext string, so `openclaw doctor` warned about
`gateway.auth.token` on the install it had just created. The flag was
honored for provider credentials, so an operator who explicitly opted into
references still ended up with a plaintext secret and a remediation
(`openclaw secrets configure`) that cannot migrate a self-generated value,
because it validates a ref by resolving one that already exists.
Setup mints this token itself, so reference mode now provisions it:
- an ambient OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN keeps an `env` ref to that variable, so a
later rotation stays authoritative instead of being pinned by a stale copy
- anything else (freshly generated, or an existing plaintext token being
migrated) goes into the shared SQLite secret store as a write-only `secret`
entry, with config holding only `{source:"store",...}`
An existing store entry wins over a freshly generated one, so reruns never
rotate a token already paired with clients. The store write precedes the
config write: a ref persisted without its value would leave the gateway
unauthenticatable, while an orphaned entry is reused by the next run.
The interactive wizard had the same dead end and is fixed the same way.
Default (plaintext) onboarding is unchanged.
User impact: `--secret-input-mode ref` now keeps the gateway token out of
openclaw.json, and a fresh install no longer self-reports a plaintext-secret
warning.
* test(onboard): split gateway onboarding suite under the max-lines gate
The added gateway auth-token tests pushed
onboard-non-interactive.gateway.test.ts to 1014 lines, over the max-lines
limit (check-lint-core-3). Repo policy is to split, never suppress.
Extract the shared vi.mock/harness preamble into
onboard-non-interactive.gateway.test-mocks.ts, following the existing
agent-command.test-mocks.ts pattern, and move the four gateway auth-token
storage tests into their own suite. The reachability mock becomes a holder
object so both suites can swap it across the module boundary, and hoisted
mocks are re-exported in a separate export clause because Vitest rejects
exporting a vi.hoisted binding at its declaration.
Test set is unchanged: the it-declaration multiset matches the pre-split
file exactly, with no duplication across the two suites.
* test(onboard): give the shared gateway onboarding mocks unique export names
check-export-name-collisions flagged `runtime` and `readConfigFileSnapshotMock`
as colliding with program.test-mocks.ts and plugins-cli-test-helpers.ts once the
gateway onboarding preamble became a shared module. Rename the exports to
gatewayOnboardRuntime / gatewayOnboardConfigSnapshotMock per the repo's
unique-export-name rule; suites alias them locally so the assertions read the
same as before.
* test(tooling): route the new gateway auth-token suite from its test helper
test-projects asserts which suites a change to
onboard-non-interactive.test-helpers.ts should run. The new
onboard-non-interactive.gateway-auth-token.test.ts imports that helper, so it
belongs in the expected routing plan.
* feat(secrets): add authenticated egress substitution proxy
* feat(secrets): bind egress substitution to hosts
* ci(codeql): classify egress proxy bypass tunnel in network boundary query
* refactor(proxy-capture): use the canonical IP parser instead of node:net
* fix(secrets): compare proxy tokens with a process-keyed MAC
* test(secrets): cover code-mode nested exec store env; document harness boundary
* docs(secrets): warn that store env does not reach external agent harnesses
* fix(gateway): align configured local credentials
* test(gateway): align local credential coverage
* chore(gateway): leave release note to release process
* fix(secrets): use resolveStateDir for .env path to cover legacy .clawdbot dir
* fix(secrets): replace override-based legacy .env test with true automatic fallback, add apply-path coverage
* fix(config-cli): emit JSON error on config get --json for missing paths
When is used with a nonexistent
path, the command emits no JSON on stdout, only a text error on stderr.
This breaks automated consumers that expect machine-readable errors.
Fix: output JSON to stdout before exit(1) when
opts.json is set. This matches the existing JSON error output pattern
already used by runConfigValidate and handleConfigMutationError.
Also re-throw synthetic exit errors in the catch block so the
--json branch's writeRuntimeJson+exit is not caught and re-emitted
as a text error.
* fix(config-cli): use typed ExitError signal instead of __exit__ string sentinel
* fix(secrets): reuse resolved stateDir for .env path in audit
* fix(secrets): pass resolved stateDir into apply .env scrubbing, add root-switch regression
* test(config-cli): migrate remaining __exit__ sentinel to ExitError
* fix(secrets): cover config and state dotenv roots
* style(secrets): format dotenv path helper
* test(secrets): track temporary directories
* test(config): expect typed exit for missing patch files
---------
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <peter@steipete.me>
* feat(secrets): resolve SecretRef model credentials at egress via process-local sentinels
SecretRef-managed model-provider credentials now travel as opaque
oc-sent-v1 sentinels through auth storage, stream options, and SDK
config; the guarded model fetch injects real values into headers and
URLs immediately before the SSRF-guarded send and fails closed on
unknown sentinels. packages/ai adapters converge on the host guarded
fetch where the SDK supports custom fetch and unwrap at construction
where it does not. Resolved values (and their percent-encoded forms)
register for exact-value log redaction. Kill switch:
OPENCLAW_SECRET_SENTINELS=off. Also fixes a pre-existing unhandled
rejection race in capNonOkResponseBodyLazily (pipeThrough writer leak).
* test(plugin-sdk): update public surface budget
Peter Steinberger