fix(codex): prevent node process control from targeting gateway sessions (#126253)

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-08-19 01:31:52 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 30337c8962
commit fef5fc55f4
6 changed files with 103 additions and 87 deletions
+10 -9
View File
@@ -57,18 +57,19 @@ existing per-session OpenClaw process scope for background follow-up. Prefer
Codex native shell for ordinary local work.
With the default `tools.exec.host: "auto"` and no active OpenClaw sandbox,
Codex also receives `node_exec` and `node_process` tools for commands on paired
nodes. Native shell remains on the Codex app-server host and workspace
Codex also receives `node_exec` for commands on paired nodes. Native shell
remains on the Codex app-server host and workspace
(Gateway-local for the default stdio deployment); `node_exec` selects a node by
name or id and keeps OpenClaw's node approval policy in force. If a finite
runtime allowlist disables native Code Mode and leaves the turn without an
execution environment, OpenClaw keeps its policy-filtered `exec` and `process`
tools available instead for direct, unsandboxed execution.
name or id, keeps OpenClaw's node approval policy in force, and waits for the
remote command to finish. Remote-node background follow-up is not available. If
a finite runtime allowlist disables native Code Mode and leaves the turn without
an execution environment, OpenClaw keeps its policy-filtered `exec` and
`process` tools available instead for direct, unsandboxed execution.
When `tools.exec.host: "node"` or `/exec host=node` makes the node the session
default, OpenClaw hides the Codex-native shell and exposes `node_exec` and
`node_process` as the shell path. This keeps the configured execution host from
silently falling back to the app-server or Gateway machine.
default, OpenClaw hides the Codex-native shell and exposes `node_exec` as the
shell path. This keeps the configured execution host from silently falling
back to the app-server or Gateway machine.
`gateway_exec` is not exposed when an active OpenClaw sandbox, a node-default
execution policy, memory-flush restrictions, tool allow/deny policy, or