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docs: repair spellcheck and anchor drift (#122960)
* docs: repair spellcheck and anchor drift * docs: satisfy markdown anchor lint
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@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ Why this shape is safer:
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- `allowedAgentIds` prevents this hook endpoint from selecting another agent. If the Gateway serves other hook workflows, include only their intended agent ids too.
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- `scope: "session"` gives each Gmail message its own sandbox; `workspaceAccess: "none"` keeps the host agent workspace out of that sandbox.
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- `allow: ["session_status"]` is an absolute per-agent clamp, so global `tools.alsoAllow` additions cannot leak into the reader. The minimal profile and explicit deny list make the intended boundary auditable.
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- `deliver: false` keeps completion inside the hook flow. To announce a summary externally after validating the reader, set `deliver: true` and add an explicit `channel` and `to`. Keep agent-to-agent handoff disabled unless you deliberately expose the exact coordination tool and pair it with a narrow [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#toolsagenttoagent) policy.
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- `deliver: false` keeps completion inside the hook flow. To announce a summary externally after validating the reader, set `deliver: true` and add an explicit `channel` and `to`. Keep agent-to-agent handoff disabled unless you deliberately expose the exact coordination tool and pair it with a narrow [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#tools-agenttoagent) policy.
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Tool policies can only become more restrictive as global, provider, agent, and sandbox rules are combined. The per-agent allowlist cannot restore `session_status` if an earlier policy removed it. Ensure inherited policies retain `session_status`; an empty effective tool set aborts before the model sees the email.
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@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ This writes `hooks.gmail` transport settings, enables the Gmail preset, preserve
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<Warning>
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The built-in Gmail preset's per-message session separates conversation context; it does not restrict the target agent's tools or workspace. Without a custom mapping that sets `agentId`, Gmail hooks run as the default agent.
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For untrusted inboxes, route the hook to a dedicated reader agent, give that agent read-only or no workspace access, and deny filesystem-write, shell, browser, and other unnecessary tools. If it needs to notify the main agent, expose only the required coordination tool and constrain its targets with `tools.agentToAgent`. See [Prompt injection](/gateway/security#prompt-injection), [Multi-agent sandbox and tools](/tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools), and [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#toolsagenttoagent).
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For untrusted inboxes, route the hook to a dedicated reader agent, give that agent read-only or no workspace access, and deny filesystem-write, shell, browser, and other unnecessary tools. If it needs to notify the main agent, expose only the required coordination tool and constrain its targets with `tools.agentToAgent`. See [Prompt injection](/gateway/security#prompt-injection), [Multi-agent sandbox and tools](/tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools), and [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#tools-agenttoagent).
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</Warning>
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### Verify the reader boundary
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@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ Related:
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- Configuration keys and defaults: [Gateway configuration](/gateway/config-agents#agentsdefaultssandbox)
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- Debugging why a tool is blocked: [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated)
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- Bind mounts details: [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing#custom-bind-mounts)
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- Bind mounts details: [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing#multiple-folders-for-one-agent)
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## Display labels
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@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ Key settings (see [/gateway/configuration](/gateway/configuration) for shared ch
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- `channels.msteams.streaming.chunkMode`: `length` (default) or `newline` to split on blank lines (paragraph boundaries) before length chunking.
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- `channels.msteams.mediaAllowHosts`: allowlist for inbound attachment hosts (defaults to Microsoft/Teams domains: Graph, SharePoint/OneDrive, Teams CDN, Bot Framework, Azure Media Services).
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- `channels.msteams.mediaAuthAllowHosts`: allowlist for attaching Authorization headers on media retries (defaults to Graph + Bot Framework hosts).
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- `channels.msteams.graphMediaFallback`: opt into Graph message lookups when channel/group HTML omits file markers (default `false`; see [Channel/group file recovery](#channelgroup-file-recovery-graphmediafallback)).
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- `channels.msteams.graphMediaFallback`: opt into Graph message lookups when channel/group HTML omits file markers (default `false`; see [Channel/group file recovery](/channels/msteams#channel%2Fgroup-file-recovery-graphmediafallback)).
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- `channels.msteams.mediaMaxMb`: per-channel media size limit override in MB. Falls back to `agents.defaults.mediaMaxMb` when unset.
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- `channels.msteams.requireMention`: require @mention in channels/groups (default `true`).
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- `channels.msteams.replyStyle`: `thread | top-level` (see [Reply style](#reply-style-threads-vs-posts)).
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@@ -211,13 +211,13 @@ group, then mention it or configure the group to run without a mention.
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entry overrides those defaults for one group. Group settings:
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| Field | Default | Description |
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| --------------------- | ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| --------------------- | ---------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| `requireMention` | `true` | Require an `@`-mention before the bot replies. |
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| `commandLevel` | `all` | Which built-in slash commands can run in the group (see below). |
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| `ignoreOtherMentions` | `false` | Drop messages that mention someone else but not the bot. |
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| `historyLimit` | `50` | Recent non-mention messages kept as context for the next mentioned turn. `0` disables history. |
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| `tools` | — | Allow/deny tools for the whole group. |
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| `toolsBySender` | — | Per-sender tool overrides; see [Groups](/channels/groups#groupchannel-tool-restrictions-optional). |
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| `toolsBySender` | — | Per-sender tool overrides; see [Groups](/channels/groups#group%2Fchannel-tool-restrictions-optional). |
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| `name` | openid prefix | Friendly label used in logs and group context. |
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| `prompt` | built-in default | Per-group behavior prompt appended to the agent context. |
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+1
-1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Options: `--force`, `--json`.
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Use routing bindings to pin inbound channel traffic to a specific agent.
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If you also want different visible skills per agent, configure `agents.defaults.skills` and `agents.entries.*.skills` in `openclaw.json`. See [Skills config](/tools/skills-config) and [Configuration reference](/gateway/config-agents#agentsdefaultsskills).
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If you also want different visible skills per agent, configure `agents.defaults.skills` and `agents.entries.*.skills` in `openclaw.json`. See [Skills config](/tools/skills-config) and [Configuration reference](/gateway/config-agents#agents-defaults-skills).
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List bindings:
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+1
-1
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ A join code and a paired device have separate lifecycles:
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- Burning or expiring a join code prevents another enrollment with that code.
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- It does not disconnect or remove a node that already redeemed it.
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- To revoke an enrolled machine, remove its paired device with
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[`openclaw devices remove <deviceId>`](/cli/devices#openclaw-devices-remove-deviceid).
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[`openclaw devices remove <deviceId>`](/cli/devices#openclaw-devices-remove-%3Cdeviceid%3E).
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## Troubleshooting
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@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ OpenClaw builds the candidate list from the currently requested `provider/model`
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- explicit aborts that are not timeout/failover-shaped
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- context overflow errors that should stay inside compaction/retry logic (for example `request_too_large`, `input token count exceeds the maximum number of input tokens`, `input exceeds the maximum number of tokens`, `input too long for the model`, or `ollama error: context length exceeded`)
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- a final unknown error when there are no candidates left
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- Claude Fable 5 safety refusals; direct API-key requests handle those at the provider level via Anthropic's server-side fallback to `claude-opus-4-8` instead (see [Anthropic](/providers/anthropic#safety-refusal-fallback-claude-fable-5))
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- Claude Fable 5 safety refusals; direct API-key requests handle those at the provider level via Anthropic's server-side fallback to `claude-opus-4-8` instead (see [Anthropic](/providers/anthropic#safety-refusal-fallback-claude-opus-5-and-fable-5))
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</Tab>
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</Tabs>
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@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ Claude CLI reuse (`claude -p`) is a sanctioned OpenClaw integration path. Anthro
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- `agents.defaults.models["openai/<model>"].params.transport` and `params.serviceTier` are authored embedded-provider request settings. They keep implicit runtime selection on OpenClaw; native Codex owns its app-server transport and service tier.
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- Valid model-scoped `params.fastMode` / `params.fast_mode` values and valid cutoff keys are portable typed agent-runtime controls. They do not count as authored provider request params and do not select a runtime. Pin `agentRuntime.id: "openclaw"` or `agentRuntime.id: "codex"` when a recipe depends on one runtime.
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- Hidden OpenClaw attribution headers (`originator`, `version`, `User-Agent`) are only attached on native Codex traffic to `chatgpt.com/backend-api`, not generic OpenAI-compatible proxies
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- The shared `/fast` toggle, configured defaults, and valid model-scoped Fast params resolve through one runtime-control policy. See [Thinking levels](/tools/thinking#fast-mode-fast) for precedence.
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- The shared `/fast` toggle, configured defaults, and valid model-scoped Fast params resolve through one runtime-control policy. See [Thinking levels](/tools/thinking#fast-mode-%2Ffast) for precedence.
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- OpenAI API Fast mode is premium-priced and model-specific. GPT-5.6 Sol currently costs 2× Standard token pricing, and long-context multipliers stack. ChatGPT/Codex-credit Fast mode is separate: GPT-5.6 and GPT-5.5 currently consume 2.5× Standard credits, while API-key Codex runs use API token pricing. See [Fast mode](https://openai.com/api-priority-processing/), [API pricing](https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/pricing), and [Codex speed](https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/agent-configuration/speed).
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- The native Codex catalog can expose exact `openai/gpt-5.6-sol`, `openai/gpt-5.6-terra`, and `openai/gpt-5.6-luna` refs according to account access. It does not apply the direct API's bare `gpt-5.6` alias client-side.
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- `openai/gpt-5.5` uses the Codex catalog native `contextWindow = 400000` and default runtime `contextTokens = 272000`; override the runtime cap with `models.providers.openai.models[].contextTokens`
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@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ enabling `streaming.progress.commentary` hands preambles to the interleaved
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commentary lane instead.
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On Discord, when a utility model resolves for the agent — an explicit
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[`utilityModel`](/gateway/config-agents#utilitymodel), or the primary
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[`utilityModel`](/gateway/config-agents#agents-defaults-model), or the primary
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provider's declared small-model default (OpenAI → `gpt-5.6-luna`,
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Anthropic → `claude-haiku-4-5`) — it supplies a short plain-language filler
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when the model emits no preamble or has been quiet for about 20 seconds
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@@ -1346,11 +1346,11 @@ candidate refs are replaced with neutral labels such as `candidate-01`; the
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report maps rankings back to real refs after parsing.
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Candidate runs default to `high` thinking, with `medium` for GPT-5.6 Luna and
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`xhigh` for older OpenAI eval refs that support it. Override a specific
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candidate inline with `--model provider/model,thinking=<level>`; inline
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options also support `fast`, `no-fast`, and `fast=<bool>`. `--thinking
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<level>` still sets a global fallback, and the older `--model-thinking
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<provider/model=level>` form is kept for compatibility. OpenAI candidate
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`xhigh` for older OpenAI eval refs that support it. Override a specific candidate
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inline with `--model provider/model,thinking=<level>`; inline options also support
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`fast`, `no-fast`, and `fast=<bool>`. `--thinking <level>` still sets a global
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fallback, and the older `--model-thinking <provider/model=level>` form is kept for
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compatibility. OpenAI candidate
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refs default to fast mode so priority processing is used where the provider
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supports it. Pass `--fast` only when you want to force fast mode on for
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every candidate model. Candidate and judge durations are recorded in the
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@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ date context. Falls back to the host timezone.
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- `model`: accepts either a string (`"provider/model"`) or an object (`{ primary, fallbacks }`).
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- String form sets only the primary model.
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- Object form sets primary plus ordered failover models.
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- `utilityModel`: optional `provider/model` ref or alias for short internal tasks. It currently powers generated Control UI session titles, Telegram DM topic titles, Discord auto-thread titles, and [progress-draft narration](/concepts/progress-drafts#narrated-status). When unset, OpenClaw derives the primary provider's declared small-model default when one exists (OpenAI → `gpt-5.6-luna`, Anthropic → `claude-haiku-4-5`); title tasks otherwise use the agent's primary model, and narration stays off. If a distinct utility model cannot prepare or complete a generated title, OpenClaw retries that title once with the primary model. For dashboard titles, automatic utility derivation and the regular fallback use the effective session provider and auth profile; an explicit utility model keeps its configured provider/auth. Set `utilityModel: ""` to skip the alternate utility route; dashboard title generation still proceeds directly to the regular session model. `agents.entries.*.utilityModel` overrides the default, and an operation-specific model override wins over both. Utility tasks make separate model calls and send task-specific content to the selected model provider. Dashboard title generation sends at most the first 1,000 characters of the first non-command message; narration sends the inbound request plus compact redacted tool summaries. Choose a provider that matches your cost and data-handling requirements.
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- `utilityModel`: optional `provider/model` ref or alias for short internal tasks. It currently powers generated Control UI session titles, Telegram DM topic titles, Discord auto-thread titles, and [progress-draft narration](/concepts/progress-drafts#status-headline). When unset, OpenClaw derives the primary provider's declared small-model default when one exists (OpenAI → `gpt-5.6-luna`, Anthropic → `claude-haiku-4-5`); title tasks otherwise use the agent's primary model, and narration stays off. If a distinct utility model cannot prepare or complete a generated title, OpenClaw retries that title once with the primary model. For dashboard titles, automatic utility derivation and the regular fallback use the effective session provider and auth profile; an explicit utility model keeps its configured provider/auth. Set `utilityModel: ""` to skip the alternate utility route; dashboard title generation still proceeds directly to the regular session model. `agents.entries.*.utilityModel` overrides the default, and an operation-specific model override wins over both. Utility tasks make separate model calls and send task-specific content to the selected model provider. Dashboard title generation sends at most the first 1,000 characters of the first non-command message; narration sends the inbound request plus compact redacted tool summaries. Choose a provider that matches your cost and data-handling requirements.
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- `imageModel`: accepts either a string (`"provider/model"`) or an object (`{ primary, fallbacks }`).
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- Used by the `image` tool path as its vision-model config when the active model cannot accept images. Native-vision models receive loaded image bytes directly instead.
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- Also used as fallback routing when the selected/default model cannot accept image input.
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@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ Validation and safety notes:
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- The built-in Gmail preset uses `sessionKey: "hook:gmail:{{messages[0].id}}"`.
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- This per-message key isolates conversation context, not tools or workspace access. Without a custom mapping that sets `agentId`, the preset uses the default agent.
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- For untrusted inboxes, route Gmail to a dedicated reader agent and restrict that agent with [per-agent sandbox and tool policy](/tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools). If the reader must notify the main agent, constrain the handoff with [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#toolsagenttoagent). See [Prompt injection](/gateway/security#prompt-injection) for the recommended threat model and model tier.
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- For untrusted inboxes, route Gmail to a dedicated reader agent and restrict that agent with [per-agent sandbox and tool policy](/tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools). If the reader must notify the main agent, constrain the handoff with [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#tools-agenttoagent). See [Prompt injection](/gateway/security#prompt-injection) for the recommended threat model and model tier.
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- The setup wizard configures Gmail transport but does not create the reader agent or required session-key policy. Apply the complete [restricted Gmail reader configuration](/automation/cron-jobs#configure-a-restricted-gmail-reader-recommended) before running setup for untrusted mail.
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- If you keep that per-message routing, set `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey: true` and constrain `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to match the Gmail namespace, for example `["hook:", "hook:gmail:"]`.
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- If you need `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey: false`, override the preset with a static `sessionKey` instead of the templated default.
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@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ What helps in practice:
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- Limit high-risk tools (`exec`, `browser`, `web_fetch`, `web_search`) to trusted agents or explicit allowlists.
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- If you allowlist interpreters (`python`, `node`, `ruby`, `perl`, `php`, `lua`, `osascript`), enable `tools.exec.strictInlineEval` so inline eval forms (`-c`, `-e`, and similar) still need explicit approval. In allowlist mode, any heredoc segment (`<<`) always requires reviewer or explicit approval, regardless of quoting - an allowlisted command cannot use a heredoc body to bypass allowlist review.
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- Reduce blast radius by using a read-only or tool-disabled **reader agent** to summarize untrusted content, then pass the summary to your main agent.
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- For Gmail hooks, the built-in per-message session isolates conversation context but does not remove the target agent's tool or workspace permissions. Route untrusted mail to a dedicated reader agent, apply [per-agent sandbox and tool restrictions](/tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools), and constrain any handoff to the main agent with [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#toolsagenttoagent). See [Gmail integration](/gateway/configuration-reference#gmail-integration).
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- For Gmail hooks, the built-in per-message session isolates conversation context but does not remove the target agent's tool or workspace permissions. Route untrusted mail to a dedicated reader agent, apply [per-agent sandbox and tool restrictions](/tools/multi-agent-sandbox-tools), and constrain any handoff to the main agent with [`tools.agentToAgent`](/gateway/config-tools#tools-agenttoagent). See [Gmail integration](/gateway/configuration-reference#gmail-integration).
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- Keep `web_search` / `web_fetch` / `browser` off for tool-enabled agents unless needed.
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- For OpenResponses URL inputs (`input_file` / `input_image`), set a tight `gateway.http.endpoints.responses.files.urlAllowlist` / `images.urlAllowlist` and keep `maxUrlParts` low (empty allowlists count as unset). Use `files.allowUrl: false` / `images.allowUrl: false` to disable URL fetching entirely.
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- Keep secrets out of prompts; pass them via env/config on the gateway host instead.
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@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ The Control UI needs a secure context (HTTPS or localhost) to generate device id
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## Deployment and host trust
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- Full-disk encryption on the gateway host; prefer a dedicated OS user account for the Gateway if the host is shared.
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- Published package dependency lock: source checkouts use `pnpm-lock.yaml`; the published `openclaw` npm package and OpenClaw-owned npm plugin packages include `npm-shrinkwrap.json` so installs use the reviewed transitive dependency graph from the release instead of resolving a fresh graph at install time. This is a supply-chain hardening and release reproducibility boundary, not a sandbox - see [npm shrinkwrap](/gateway/security/shrinkwrap).
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- Published package dependency lock: source checkouts use `pnpm-lock.yaml`; the published `openclaw` npm package and OpenClaw-owned npm plugin packages include `npm-shrinkwrap.json` so installs use the reviewed transitive dependency graph from the release instead of resolving a fresh graph at install time. This is a supply-chain hardening and release reproducibility boundary, not a sandbox - see [npm shrinkwrap](/gateway/security/dependency-locking).
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- Secure file operations: OpenClaw uses `@openclaw/fs-safe` for root-bounded file access, atomic writes, archive extraction, temp workspaces, and secret-file helpers. Optional native acceleration defaults **off**; set `OPENCLAW_FS_SAFE_NATIVE_MODE=auto` to use an installed platform binding or `require` to fail closed when native support is unavailable. Details: [Secure file operations](/gateway/security/secure-file-operations).
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- Shared Slack workspace risk: if everyone in Slack can message the bot, the core risk is delegated tool authority - any allowed sender can induce tool calls (`exec`, browser, network/file tools) within the agent's policy, prompt/content injection from one sender can affect shared state/devices/outputs, and if the shared agent has sensitive credentials/files, any allowed sender can potentially drive exfiltration via tool usage. Use separate agents/gateways with minimal tools for team workflows; keep personal-data agents private.
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- Company-shared agent (acceptable pattern): fine when everyone using the agent is in the same trust boundary (for example one company team) and the agent is strictly business-scoped. Run it on a dedicated machine/VM/container, use a dedicated OS user + dedicated browser/profile/accounts, and do not sign that runtime into personal Apple/Google accounts or personal password-manager/browser profiles. Mixing personal and company identities on the same runtime collapses the separation and increases personal-data exposure risk.
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@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Tailscale Serve gives your Gateway one HTTPS URL without exposing the Gateway po
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The result is `https://<host>.<tailnet>.ts.net`, reachable from permitted devices on your tailnet and not from the public internet. The matching WebSocket URL is `wss://<host>.<tailnet>.ts.net`.
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If you need a public URL, use [Tailscale Funnel](/gateway/tailscale#public-internet-funnel-shared-password) instead. Funnel is public, and OpenClaw requires password auth for it.
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If you need a public URL, use [Tailscale Funnel](/gateway/tailscale#public-internet-funnel-%2B-shared-password) instead. Funnel is public, and OpenClaw requires password auth for it.
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## Before you begin
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+1
-1
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ First-run Q&A - install, onboard, auth routes, subscriptions, initial failures -
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OpenClaw validates bind sources against both the normalized path and the canonical path resolved through the deepest existing ancestor, so symlink-parent escapes fail closed even when the final path segment does not exist yet.
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See [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing#custom-bind-mounts) and [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated#bind-mounts-security-quick-check).
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See [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing#multiple-folders-for-one-agent) and [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated#bind-mounts-security-quick-check).
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</Accordion>
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@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ gh workflow run package-acceptance.yml --ref main \
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homeserver. Source-checkout only - packaged installs do not ship
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`qa-lab`.
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- Full CLI, profile/scenario catalog, env vars, and artifact layout:
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[Matrix smoke lanes](/concepts/qa-e2e-automation#matrix-smoke-lanes).
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[Matrix smoke lanes](/concepts/qa-e2e-automation#matrix-live-lane).
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- `pnpm openclaw qa telegram`
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- Runs the Telegram live QA lane against a real private group using the
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driver and SUT bot tokens from env.
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@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ table through the Mantis GitHub App when `pr_number` is set.
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Live transport lanes share one standard contract so new transports do not
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drift; the per-lane coverage matrix lives in
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[QA overview - Live transport coverage](/concepts/qa-e2e-automation#live-transport-coverage).
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[QA overview - Live transport coverage](/concepts/qa-e2e-automation#buzz%2C-discord%2C-slack%2C-telegram%2C-and-whatsapp-qa-reference).
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`qa-channel` is the broad synthetic suite and is not part of that matrix.
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### Shared Telegram credentials via Convex (v1)
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@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ openclaw plugins inspect <plugin-id> --runtime --json
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openclaw plugins enable <plugin-id>
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```
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|
||||
Reference: [Operator install policy](/tools/skills-config#operator-install-policy-securityinstallpolicy)
|
||||
Reference: [Operator install policy](/tools/skills-config#operator-install-policy-security-installpolicy)
|
||||
|
||||
## Plugin present but blocked by suspicious ownership
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ Optional variables accepted by `scripts/docker/setup.sh` (and, for the gateway c
|
||||
| `OPENCLAW_SANDBOX` | Opt in to sandbox bootstrap (`1`, `true`, `yes`, `on`) |
|
||||
| `OPENCLAW_SKIP_ONBOARDING` | Skip the interactive onboarding step (`1`, `true`, `yes`, `on`) |
|
||||
| `OPENCLAW_DOCKER_SOCKET` | Override the Docker socket path |
|
||||
| `OPENCLAW_DISABLE_BONJOUR` | Force Bonjour/mDNS advertising on (`0`) or off (`1`); see [Bonjour / mDNS](#bonjour--mdns) |
|
||||
| `OPENCLAW_DISABLE_BONJOUR` | Force Bonjour/mDNS advertising on (`0`) or off (`1`); see [Bonjour / mDNS](/install/docker#bonjour-%2F-mdns) |
|
||||
| `OPENCLAW_DISABLE_BUNDLED_SOURCE_OVERLAYS` | Disable bundled plugin source bind-mount overlays |
|
||||
| `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` | Shared OTLP/HTTP collector endpoint for OpenTelemetry export |
|
||||
| `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*_ENDPOINT` | Signal-specific OTLP endpoints for traces, metrics, or logs |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Logging:
|
||||
- If the host loops with repeated `EADDRINUSE` or fast restarts, check for
|
||||
duplicate `ai.openclaw.gateway` / `ai.openclaw.node` LaunchAgents and the
|
||||
launchd-marker workaround in
|
||||
[Gateway troubleshooting](/gateway/troubleshooting#macos-launchd-supervisor-loop-with-duplicate-gatewaynode-launchagents).
|
||||
[Gateway troubleshooting](/gateway/troubleshooting#macos-launchd-supervisor-loop-with-duplicate-gateway%2Fnode-launchagents).
|
||||
|
||||
## Version compatibility
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ tools when available, and the specific message for the failing setup step.
|
||||
This Codex-owned Computer Use path runs on macOS, where the MCP server may need
|
||||
local OS permissions before it can inspect or control apps. (For cross-platform
|
||||
desktop control on Windows and Linux node hosts, see the
|
||||
[cua-computer fulfiller](/nodes/computer-use#windows-and-linux-experimental-via-cua-driver).)
|
||||
[cua-computer fulfiller](/nodes/computer-use#windows-and-linux-experimental%2C-via-cua-driver-sdk).)
|
||||
If OpenClaw says Computer Use is installed but the MCP server is unavailable,
|
||||
verify the Codex-side Computer Use setup first:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ agent loop: native tool execution, native compaction (`infiniteSessions`), and
|
||||
CLI-managed thread state under `copilotHome`. OpenClaw still owns chat
|
||||
channels, session files, model selection, dynamic tools (bridged), approvals,
|
||||
media delivery, the visible transcript mirror, `/btw` side questions (see
|
||||
[Side questions (`/btw`)](#side-questions-btw)), and `openclaw doctor`.
|
||||
[Side questions (`/btw`)](/plugins/copilot#side-questions-%2Fbtw)), and `openclaw doctor`.
|
||||
|
||||
For the broader model/provider/runtime split, start with
|
||||
[Agent runtimes](/concepts/agent-runtimes).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ before the next major release:
|
||||
- **Plaintext channel envelopes** in `inbound_claim` and `message_received`
|
||||
handlers. Read `BodyForAgent` and the structured user-context blocks
|
||||
instead of parsing flat envelope text. See
|
||||
[Plaintext channel envelopes → BodyForAgent](/plugins/sdk-migration#active-deprecations).
|
||||
[Plaintext channel envelopes → BodyForAgent](/plugins/sdk-migration#removal-timeline).
|
||||
- **`subagent_spawning`** remains for compatibility with older plugins, but
|
||||
new plugins should not return thread routing from it. Core prepares
|
||||
`thread: true` subagent bindings through channel session-binding adapters
|
||||
@@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ before the next major release:
|
||||
For the full list - memory capability registration, provider thinking
|
||||
profile, external auth providers, provider discovery types, task runtime
|
||||
accessors, and the `command-auth` → `command-status` rename - see
|
||||
[Plugin SDK migration → Active deprecations](/plugins/sdk-migration#active-deprecations).
|
||||
[Plugin SDK migration → Active deprecations](/plugins/sdk-migration#removal-timeline).
|
||||
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -192,16 +192,16 @@ local server returns context-length errors.
|
||||
## Recall and capture limits
|
||||
|
||||
| Setting | Default | Range | Applies to |
|
||||
| ----------------- | ------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| ----------------- | ------- | --------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `recallMaxChars` | `1000` | 100-10000 | Text sent to the embedding API for recall. |
|
||||
| `captureMaxChars` | `500` | 100-10000 | Message length eligible for auto-capture. |
|
||||
| `customTriggers` | `[]` | 0-50 items, each <=100 chars | Literal phrases that make auto-capture consider a message. |
|
||||
| `customTriggers` | `[]` | 0-50 items, each ≤100 chars | Literal phrases that make auto-capture consider a message. |
|
||||
|
||||
`recallMaxChars` bounds the `before_prompt_build` auto-recall query, the
|
||||
`memory_recall` tool, the `memory_forget` query path, and `openclaw ltm
|
||||
search`. Auto-recall embeds the latest user message from the turn and falls
|
||||
back to the full prompt only when no user message is present, keeping channel
|
||||
metadata and large prompt blocks out of the embedding request.
|
||||
`memory_recall` tool, the `memory_forget` query path, and `openclaw ltm search`.
|
||||
Auto-recall embeds the latest user message from the turn and falls back to the
|
||||
full prompt only when no user message is present, keeping channel metadata and
|
||||
large prompt blocks out of the embedding request.
|
||||
|
||||
`captureMaxChars` gates whether a user message from the turn's `agent_end`
|
||||
event is short enough to be considered for auto-capture; it does not affect
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ export default definePluginEntry({
|
||||
`resolveCreateSession({ agentId })` must return a config-derived model/runtime
|
||||
target before OpenClaw advertises creation or calls `startTerminalSession`.
|
||||
Use
|
||||
[`api.runtime.agent.resolveSessionCatalogCreateTarget(...)`](/plugins/sdk-runtime#apiruntimeagent)
|
||||
[`api.runtime.agent.resolveSessionCatalogCreateTarget(...)`](/plugins/sdk-runtime#api-runtime-agent)
|
||||
to apply the host's runtime and model-allowlist policy instead of duplicating
|
||||
it.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ not declared Codex-compatible.
|
||||
global default, per-model `params.fastMode`, then off. `/fast default`
|
||||
clears only the session layer. `/status` reports the resolved OpenClaw
|
||||
policy and runtime, not the upstream service tier actually honored or
|
||||
returned. See [Thinking levels](/tools/thinking#fast-mode-fast) and
|
||||
returned. See [Thinking levels](/tools/thinking#fast-mode-%2Ffast) and
|
||||
[Codex harness](/plugins/codex-harness#shared-fast-mode-and-codex-fast-mode).
|
||||
</Note>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ when you intentionally want both representations.
|
||||
</Note>
|
||||
|
||||
Ordinary model-invoked session transcript search obeys
|
||||
[`tools.sessions.visibility`](/gateway/config-tools#toolssessions). The default
|
||||
[`tools.sessions.visibility`](/gateway/config-tools#tools-sessions). The default
|
||||
`tree` visibility exposes the current session, sessions it spawned, and
|
||||
same-agent group sessions watched through ambient group awareness. Other
|
||||
unrelated sessions require `agent` visibility (or `all` only when cross-agent
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ OpenClaw supports "silent" turns for background tasks where the user should not
|
||||
|
||||
Before auto-compaction happens, OpenClaw can run a silent agentic turn that writes durable state to disk (for example `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md` in the agent workspace) so compaction cannot erase critical context. It monitors session context usage, and once it crosses a soft threshold below the compaction threshold, it sends a silent "write memory now" directive using the exact silent token `NO_REPLY` / `no_reply` so the user sees nothing.
|
||||
|
||||
Config (`agents.defaults.compaction.memoryFlush`), full reference at [/gateway/config-agents](/gateway/config-agents#agentsdefaultscompaction):
|
||||
Config (`agents.defaults.compaction.memoryFlush`), full reference at [/gateway/config-agents](/gateway/config-agents#agents-defaults-compaction):
|
||||
|
||||
| Key | Default | Notes |
|
||||
| --------------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ Across [Telegram](/channels/telegram), [WhatsApp](/channels/whatsapp), [Matrix](
|
||||
|
||||
[Model selection](/providers/models) and setup recover more clearly when catalogs, credentials, streams, timeouts, compaction, or fallbacks go wrong. Affected [OpenAI](/providers/openai), [OpenRouter](/providers/openrouter), and [OpenCode Go](/providers/opencode-go) configurations now report or recover from failures more consistently instead of leaving users with a stale choice or a stalled request.
|
||||
|
||||
Follow-up fixes for [fast mode](/tools/thinking#fast-mode-fast) improve its behavior in affected provider and fallback paths; automatic fast mode itself is not new in this release.
|
||||
Follow-up fixes for [fast mode](/tools/thinking#fast-mode-%2Ffast) improve its behavior in affected provider and fallback paths; automatic fast mode itself is not new in this release.
|
||||
|
||||
<Accordion title="Sources and contributors">
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ Design principles (decided, do not relitigate casually):
|
||||
- **The hatch is a ceremony**: same thread, avatar swap, the agent names itself
|
||||
and picks its own face. The custodian teaches the hierarchy once: "ask me
|
||||
about the system, or just ask your agent — it relays."
|
||||
- **Trust is tiered by source**: official catalog entries may be pre-selected;
|
||||
third-party ClawHub skills are never pre-selected regardless of model
|
||||
- **Trust is tiered by source**: official catalog entries may be preselected;
|
||||
third-party ClawHub skills are never preselected regardless of model
|
||||
ranking, and their labels say they install the publisher's code.
|
||||
- **Configured installs are sacred**: re-running onboarding is a verification
|
||||
pass. It never re-applies setup and never restarts the Gateway service.
|
||||
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Remote-gateway onboarding keeps its legacy conversational handoff
|
||||
explicit cap is passed).
|
||||
- **Supply-chain guard**: ClawHub listing text is publisher-controlled and
|
||||
reaches the matcher prompt, so a listing can promote itself to
|
||||
"recommended". Only official catalog entries may be pre-selected; ClawHub
|
||||
"recommended". Only official catalog entries may be preselected; ClawHub
|
||||
skills always require an explicit tick and are labeled "third-party ClawHub
|
||||
skill; installs its publisher's code".
|
||||
- Node command `device.apps` (TS node-host, Android envelope parity), sharing
|
||||
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ restart` from the real environment and verify the plist. Product follow-up:
|
||||
- Magical scan with kill switch, not consent-first (phase 1; persistent output
|
||||
discloses model and ClawHub use before scanning, and the results note repeats it).
|
||||
- Full vertical including the node `device.apps` command (phase 1).
|
||||
- Third-party ClawHub skills are never pre-selected and are labeled as
|
||||
- Third-party ClawHub skills are never preselected and are labeled as
|
||||
installing the publisher's code; official entries may be pre-checked
|
||||
(phase 1, shipped security posture).
|
||||
- Two access cards, not three; consent front-loaded into the choice (phase 2).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Exec approvals are enforced locally on the execution host:
|
||||
| `openclaw exec-policy set` / `preset` | Synchronize the local requested policy with the local host approvals document in one step. |
|
||||
|
||||
<Note>
|
||||
Per-session `/exec` overrides are not included. Run `/exec` in the relevant session to inspect its current defaults. See [session overrides](/tools/exec#session-overrides-exec).
|
||||
Per-session `/exec` overrides are not included. Run `/exec` in the relevant session to inspect its current defaults. See [session overrides](/tools/exec#session-overrides-%2Fexec).
|
||||
</Note>
|
||||
|
||||
Full CLI reference (flags, JSON output, allowlist add/remove): [Approvals CLI](/cli/approvals).
|
||||
@@ -305,18 +305,15 @@ openclaw exec-policy preset yolo
|
||||
Updates both local `tools.exec.host/security/ask` and the local approvals
|
||||
file defaults (including `askFallback: "full"`). It is intentionally
|
||||
local-only. To change gateway-host or node-host approvals remotely, use
|
||||
`openclaw approvals set --gateway` or `openclaw approvals set --node
|
||||
<id|name|ip>`.
|
||||
`openclaw approvals set --gateway` or
|
||||
`openclaw approvals set --node <id|name|ip>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Other built-in presets: `cautious` (`host=gateway`, `security=allowlist`,
|
||||
`ask=on-miss`, `askFallback=deny`) and `deny-all` (`host=gateway`,
|
||||
`security=deny`, `ask=off`, `askFallback=deny`). Apply the same way:
|
||||
`openclaw exec-policy preset cautious`.
|
||||
|
||||
To set individual fields instead of a full preset, use
|
||||
`openclaw exec-policy set --host <auto|sandbox|gateway|node> --security
|
||||
<deny|allowlist|full> --ask <off|on-miss|always> --ask-fallback
|
||||
<deny|allowlist|full>` with any subset of those flags.
|
||||
To set individual fields instead of a full preset, use `openclaw exec-policy set --host <auto|sandbox|gateway|node> --security <deny|allowlist|full> --ask <off|on-miss|always> --ask-fallback <deny|allowlist|full>` with any subset of those flags.
|
||||
|
||||
### Node host
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ spend and lockups while preserving normal tool access.
|
||||
<Card title="Sub-agents" href="/tools/subagents" icon="users">
|
||||
Spawning isolated agents to bound runaway behavior.
|
||||
</Card>
|
||||
<Card title="Configuration reference" href="/gateway/config-tools#toolsloopdetection" icon="gear">
|
||||
<Card title="Configuration reference" href="/gateway/config-tools#tools-loopdetection" icon="gear">
|
||||
Full `tools.loopDetection` schema and merging semantics.
|
||||
</Card>
|
||||
</CardGroup>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ deprecated `--dangerously-force-unsafe-install` flag is accepted for
|
||||
compatibility but is a no-op: it does not bypass install policy or
|
||||
`before_install` hook blocks.
|
||||
|
||||
See [Skills config](/tools/skills-config#operator-install-policy-securityinstallpolicy)
|
||||
See [Skills config](/tools/skills-config#operator-install-policy-security-installpolicy)
|
||||
for the shared `security.installPolicy` exec schema used by both skills and
|
||||
plugins.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ panels.
|
||||
## Related
|
||||
|
||||
- [Control UI](/web/control-ui)
|
||||
- [Gateway protocol](/gateway/protocol#method-families)
|
||||
- [Gateway protocol](/gateway/protocol#rpc-method-families)
|
||||
- [Browser tool](/tools/browser)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ wit
|
||||
allowIn
|
||||
planText
|
||||
nwe
|
||||
smoe
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -608,6 +608,16 @@ export function prepareAnchorAuditDocsDir(sourceDir = DOCS_DIR) {
|
||||
fs.rmSync(path.join(tempDir, entry.name), { recursive: true, force: true });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (const filePath of walk(tempDir).filter((entry) => /\.mdx?$/iu.test(entry))) {
|
||||
const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8");
|
||||
const normalized = raw.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/gu, (comment) =>
|
||||
comment.replace(/[^\r\n]/gu, ""),
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (normalized !== raw) {
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, normalized, "utf8");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const docsJsonPath = path.join(tempDir, "docs.json");
|
||||
const docsConfig = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(docsJsonPath, "utf8"));
|
||||
const sanitized = sanitizeDocsConfigForEnglishOnly(docsConfig);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -254,13 +254,31 @@ describe("docs-link-audit", () => {
|
||||
)}\n`,
|
||||
"utf8",
|
||||
);
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(docsRoot, "help", "testing.md"), "# testing\n", "utf8");
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(docsRoot, "help", "testing.md"),
|
||||
[
|
||||
"# testing",
|
||||
"<!-- BEGIN GENERATED: example -->",
|
||||
"visible <!-- a multiline",
|
||||
"comment --> text",
|
||||
"<!-- END GENERATED: example -->",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
].join("\n"),
|
||||
"utf8",
|
||||
);
|
||||
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(docsRoot, "zh-CN", "help", "testing.md"), "# 测试\n", "utf8");
|
||||
|
||||
const anchorDocsDir = prepareAnchorAuditDocsDir(docsRoot);
|
||||
try {
|
||||
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(anchorDocsDir, "help", "testing.md"))).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(anchorDocsDir, "zh-CN"))).toBe(false);
|
||||
const preparedMarkdown = fs.readFileSync(
|
||||
path.join(anchorDocsDir, "help", "testing.md"),
|
||||
"utf8",
|
||||
);
|
||||
expect(preparedMarkdown).not.toContain("<!--");
|
||||
expect(preparedMarkdown).not.toContain("BEGIN GENERATED");
|
||||
expect(preparedMarkdown.split("\n")).toHaveLength(6);
|
||||
|
||||
const sanitizedDocsJson = JSON.parse(
|
||||
fs.readFileSync(path.join(anchorDocsDir, "docs.json"), "utf8"),
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user