diff --git a/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.e2e.test.ts b/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.e2e.test.ts
index 0074d2679035..9e11d5ca3393 100644
--- a/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.e2e.test.ts
+++ b/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.e2e.test.ts
@@ -824,6 +824,59 @@ describe("before_tool_call loop detection behavior", () => {
     });
   });
 
+  it("emits a security event for intentional hook vetoes", async () => {
+    hookRunner.hasHooks.mockImplementation((hookName: string) => hookName === "before_tool_call");
+    hookRunner.runBeforeToolCall.mockResolvedValue({
+      block: true,
+      blockReason: "blocked by policy",
+    });
+    const execute = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ content: [{ type: "text", text: "nope" }] });
+    const tool = wrapToolWithBeforeToolCallHook({ name: "read", execute } as any, {
+      agentId: "main",
+      sessionKey: "session-key",
+      loopDetection: { enabled: false },
+    });
+
+    await withDiagnosticEvents(async (emitted, flush) => {
+      await tool.execute("tool-call-blocked", { path: "/tmp/file" });
+      await flush();
+
+      const securityEvent = emitted.find(
+        (event): event is Extract<DiagnosticEventPayload, { type: "security.event" }> =>
+          event.type === "security.event",
+      );
+      expect(securityEvent).toMatchObject({
+        type: "security.event",
+        category: "tool",
+        action: "tool.execution.blocked",
+        outcome: "denied",
+        severity: "medium",
+        reason: "plugin-before-tool-call",
+        actor: { kind: "agent" },
+        target: {
+          kind: "tool",
+          name: "read",
+        },
+        policy: {
+          id: "plugin-before-tool-call",
+          decision: "deny",
+          reason: "plugin-before-tool-call",
+        },
+        control: {
+          id: "before-tool-call",
+          family: "approval",
+        },
+        attributes: {
+          params_kind: "object",
+          tool_source: "core",
+        },
+      });
+      expect(securityEvent?.eventId).toBeTypeOf("string");
+      expect(JSON.stringify(securityEvent)).not.toContain("/tmp/file");
+      expect(emitted.some((event) => event.type === "tool.execution.blocked")).toBe(true);
+    });
+  });
+
   it("does not let hostile thrown values break diagnostic error emission", async () => {
     const hostileError = new Proxy(
       {},
diff --git a/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.ts b/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.ts
index fac13aee4410..c7667f54cb0a 100644
--- a/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.ts
+++ b/src/agents/agent-tools.before-tool-call.ts
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import {
 import {
   emitTrustedDiagnosticEvent,
   emitTrustedDiagnosticEventWithPrivateData,
+  emitTrustedSecurityEvent,
   type DiagnosticEventPrivateData,
   type DiagnosticToolParamsSummary,
   type DiagnosticToolSource,
@@ -566,6 +567,45 @@ function emitSkillUsedDiagnostic(params: {
   });
 }
 
+function emitToolBlockedSecurityEvent(params: {
+  ctx?: HookContext;
+  deniedReason: string;
+  toolIdentity: ToolDiagnosticIdentity;
+  toolName: string;
+  trace?: DiagnosticTraceContext;
+  paramsSummary?: DiagnosticToolParamsSummary;
+}): void {
+  emitTrustedSecurityEvent({
+    category: "tool",
+    action: "tool.execution.blocked",
+    outcome: "denied",
+    severity: "medium",
+    reason: params.deniedReason,
+    ...(params.trace ? { trace: params.trace } : {}),
+    actor: {
+      kind: "agent",
+    },
+    target: {
+      kind: "tool",
+      name: params.toolName,
+      ...(params.toolIdentity.toolOwner ? { owner: params.toolIdentity.toolOwner } : {}),
+    },
+    policy: {
+      id: "plugin-before-tool-call",
+      decision: "deny",
+      reason: params.deniedReason,
+    },
+    control: {
+      id: "before-tool-call",
+      family: "approval",
+    },
+    attributes: {
+      tool_source: params.toolIdentity.toolSource,
+      ...(params.paramsSummary ? { params_kind: params.paramsSummary.kind } : {}),
+    },
+  });
+}
+
 function notifyPluginApprovalResolution(
   approval: PluginApprovalRequest,
   resolution: PluginApprovalResolution,
@@ -1353,6 +1393,14 @@ export function wrapToolWithBeforeToolCallHook(
             reason: outcome.reason,
             deniedReason: outcome.deniedReason ?? "plugin-before-tool-call",
           });
+          emitToolBlockedSecurityEvent({
+            ctx,
+            deniedReason: outcome.deniedReason ?? "plugin-before-tool-call",
+            toolIdentity: diagnosticIdentity,
+            toolName: normalizedToolName,
+            trace,
+            paramsSummary: eventBase.paramsSummary,
+          });
         }
         const blockedResult = buildBlockedToolResult({
           reason: outcome.reason,